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I was responding to this sentence,
On August 01 2014 23:34 2Pacalypse- wrote:
The good thing about science is that it doesn't care what you believe or what your biases are. This is one of the hallmarks of scientific method; it forces you to purge your beliefs and eliminate all biases.
This is a very general statement and I will provide the Galileo example in a sec, but science has often been used by dominant political powers to confirm societal and cultural biases rather than the other way around.
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On August 01 2014 23:55 Prog wrote:
My claim was not bold at all. It is a fact that there is currently no direct empirical evidence for things like string theory. I never claimed that there is no empirical data that is related to theories that are not directly empirically justified. (That is no different for some philosophical theories though.) Try to read carefully, please.
I was more focused on your use of word whatsoever, which I deem a bold claim, because it implies looking at the things in a vacuum, devoid of any context. Besides that, your previous post was pretty much obvious; "there are parts of science which are not directly tested". Well duh, any scientific hypothesis which has not been tested empirically yet could be called a part of science.
And just to be clear, in strict scientific sense, string theory is actually a hypothesis. It would be better for your argument if you used multiverse as an example, because there's less chance we will ever be able to prove that empirically directly as we are seemingly casually detached from it.
On August 01 2014 23:55 Prog wrote:
And it is very obvious that just relatedness to things that are directly empirically justified is not enough to show that sciences actually justify only empirically.
And that's why string theory (hypothesis) is not yet justified. Give me one example of a scientific theory (and I mean that in scientific sense) that is not empirically justified.
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So when Copernicus and later Galileo first argued for their theories, they were not only empirically unjustified but directly contradicted. This continued even with the invention of the telescope for there was no rational reason to believe it gave an accurate picture of the sky. It was only until Kepler developed his theory of optics that it could be used to argue, and justify very weakly Galileo's intuitions. Copernicus acted in large part on faith.
From Against Method:
"Consider the case of the Copernican hypothesis, whose invention, defence, and partial vindication runs counter to almost every methodological rule one might care to think of today. The auxiliary sciences here contained laws describing the properties and the influence of the terrestrial atmosphere (meteorology); optical laws dealing with the structure of the eye and of telescopes, and with the behaviour of light; and dynamical laws describing motion in moving systems. Most importantly, however, the auxiliary sciences contained a theory of cognition that postulated a certain simple relation between perceptions and physical objects. Not all auxiliary disciplines were available in explicit form. Many of them merged with the observation language, and led to the situation described at the beginning of the preceding paragraph.
Consideration of all these circumstances, of observation terms, sensory core, auxiliary sciences, background speculation, suggest that a theory may be inconsistent with the evidence, not because it is incorrect, but because the evidence is contaminated. The theory is threatened because the evidence either contains unanalysed sensations which only partly correspond to external processes, or because it is presented in terms of antiquated views, or because it is evaluated with the help of backward auxiliary subjects. The Copernican theory was in trouble for all these reasons.
It is this historico-physiological character of the evidence, the fact that it does not merely describe some objective state of affairs but also expresses subjective, mythical, and long-forgotten views concerning this state of affairs, that forces us to take a fresh look at methodology. It shows that it would be extremely imprudent to let the evidence judge our theories directly and without any further ado. A straightforward and unqualified judgement of theories by 'facts' is bound to eliminate ideas simply because they do not fit into the framework of some older cosmology . Taking experimental results and observations for granted and putting the burden of proof on the theory means taking the observational ideology for granted without having ever examined it. (Note that the experimental results are supposed to have been obtained with the greatest possible care. Hence 'taking observations,etc., for granted' means 'taking them for granted after the most careful examination of their reliability': for even the most careful examination of an observation statement does not interfere with the concepts in which it is expressed, or with the structure of the sensory image.)"
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Just look at my original post: I think that believing in the existence of the higgs-boson was well justified based on non-empirical reasons, prior to 2012.
To sum it up:
You said: You somehow think that science can't ask a single philosophical question, when I would argue it's just a way of pursuing knowledge, much like philosophy; it just goes about it by actually going outside and looking at the world.
and
By "looking", I didn't mean simply looking with your eyes. I meant empirically testing.
I claim that is wrong, by citing parts of physics that are (or were) justified prior to empirical testing. The reasons for, say, the higgs-boson prior 2012, were not found outside by looking at the world (in terms of empirically testing). The reasons to believe in the higgs-boson prior 2012 were for the most part explanatory advantages compared to rival theories. Of course the higgs-boson hypothesis was related to empirically tested theories, but it was crucially underdetermined. So non-empirical justification had to be the main reason to believe in it.
Now you may claim that this sort of justification is not what you accept as "real justification" and only what is empirically justified is a real scientific theory. But I think if I had asked a physicist in 2011 whether the explanatory story around the higgs-boson is a theory of physics, I bet s/he would have answered "yes, it is". And if I asked them whether we are justified in believing it, s/he would also have said "yes, we are".
[I removed a wrong part]
Edit: The usage of "theory" and "hypothesis" is, as far as my inquiry shows not even consistent in physics. In theoretical physics "theory" is often just a label for hypothesis with a sufficient mathematical framework and does not refer to confirmations (in whatever way).
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On August 01 2014 18:13 2Pacalypse- wrote:Show nested quote +On August 01 2014 14:58 bookwyrm wrote:
I think about the most complicated thing that can be considered "science" is biology. And some of biology is not a science, but a history, which carries an entire other set of problems. Behavioral psychology is barely science. Nothing past that is in any way "science." on my view.
At any rate: chemistry - definitely science. biology - still pretty much science, but some aspects which are tricky. psychology - kinda science, but mostly not at all. Study of any systems in which individual minds are components - definitely not science. Economics could, in some aspects, be studied in ways which would be scientific, but mostly is not by economists, and is in large part not-science inherently because actually about history and society, which are not-science. You seem to have a very narrow definition of science. I don't really want to be the one to argue semantics and definitions, but once again, I'll invoke Lawrence Krauss and his definition of science: "Rational thinking applied to empirical evidence that makes predictions."
Yes, I think that definition is much too broad and leads to confusion. It's close though, and it wouldn't apply to the things I'm talking about because "predictions" are not things you can make about, say, moral questions. You could make a scientific inquiry into the way that people behave in ethically difficult situations, you could not make a scientific inquiry into the correct way to behave in an ethically difficult situation. Do you see the difference?
Also, "rational thinking" is not a well-defined entity, it just means "the kind of thinking that I approve of because I am scientific and rational." It's circular, so it doesn't help you. I would be impressed if you could provide a non-circular definition of "rationality."
You somehow think that science can't ask a single philosophical question, when I would argue it's just a way of pursuing knowledge, much like philosophy; it just goes about it by actually going outside and looking at the world.
no, "science" can't. Can you give an example? I've argued about this with a lot of people, and nobody has ever been able to give an example. Design me a quick experiment that answers some sort of philosophical question. Please!
On August 01 2014 19:02 Sapphire.lux wrote:Show nested quote +On August 01 2014 18:13 2Pacalypse- wrote:On August 01 2014 14:58 bookwyrm wrote:
I think about the most complicated thing that can be considered "science" is biology. And some of biology is not a science, but a history, which carries an entire other set of problems. Behavioral psychology is barely science. Nothing past that is in any way "science." on my view.
At any rate: chemistry - definitely science. biology - still pretty much science, but some aspects which are tricky. psychology - kinda science, but mostly not at all. Study of any systems in which individual minds are components - definitely not science. Economics could, in some aspects, be studied in ways which would be scientific, but mostly is not by economists, and is in large part not-science inherently because actually about history and society, which are not-science. You seem to have a very narrow definition of science. I don't really want to be the one to argue semantics and definitions, but once again, I'll invoke Lawrence Krauss and his definition of science: "Rational thinking applied to empirical evidence that makes predictions." You somehow think that science can't ask a single philosophical question, when I would argue it's just a way of pursuing knowledge, much like philosophy; it just goes about it by actually going outside and looking at the world. This is the general impression i get from some of the apparently well read posters here. Like scientists are some robots that only look at numbers and graphs that can't form an independent thought about the significance of something or what it means in a greater context or what the implications are or etc... Some people clearly don't have the understanding of this, but others seem intelligent and well read so i wander if it's still just general misunderstanding of science or the blind desire to force the full time philosopher in to relevance in to different fields.
Scientists can do whatever they like, not everything a "scientist" does is therefore "science."
You guys might be interested to know I'm being kicked out of my PhD program for defending science too much. I'm quite heretically pro-science. The way to defend science is by having a rigorous understanding of what is and is not science. And if it's any consolation, they are much dumber and about as equally infuriating as you guys in their dogmatic attachment to fashionable anti-science bullshit. I understand them more because I talk to people like this on the internet who actually DO believe that Science is Truth, but they are just as bad.
Remember that deciding about the boundaries of science is not a scientific question. It's a question which scientists could ask, but when they ask it they are not doing science. There's no experiment you can do to see if an experiment is the right way to ask some question (see Godel).
Also, when it is obvious to all that the following proposition "there are some questions which science can answer to which philosophy is not suited" is true, why is there such resistance to the inverse? Why can't you bear the fact that science is not a universal panacea to the human condition? Don't raise it to the level of a religious truth which can know no outside. It's not "attacking science" to say that there are some things that science can't answer, and some questions which are not its appropriate domain. To deny that, on the contrary, is really a sort of hysterical religious dogma.
On August 01 2014 23:58 zulu_nation8 wrote:I was responding to this sentence, Show nested quote +On August 01 2014 23:34 2Pacalypse- wrote:
The good thing about science is that it doesn't care what you believe or what your biases are. This is one of the hallmarks of scientific method; it forces you to purge your beliefs and eliminate all biases.
Yes, that claim is quite absurd. I'm not sure Feyerebend is what you need though 
"science" certainly doesn't force you to "purge beliefs and eliminate all biases." That is a religious notion (I have finally achieved the "true knowledge.") Scientific culture creates a whole set of its own biases (which often impede the progress of science, for example the reductionist paradigm). Furthermore, for the daily practice of science it doesn't really matter WHAT you believe or what your biases are, the daily practice of science is mostly just mindless tedium. You can be a scientists and believe whatever sort of crazy stuff you want. True believing christians are scientists. There are lots of chinese science grad students who are fundamentalists christians. It doesn't matter to the activity of science, they can still measure stuff and perform experiments. 2pac, you have a very romantic and unrealistic view of what science is and what it does for the Scientific Subject.
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On August 02 2014 00:37 Prog wrote:
Just look at my original post: I think that believing in the existence of the higgs-boson was well justified based on non-empirical reasons, prior to 2012.
You can't say that it was well justified based on non-empirical reasons and then neglect *everything* that happened before and *everything* that justified it. For example, "belief" (which is an ugly word that should never be used in science, but I digress) that Higgs-Boson exists was justified based on the theory that every energy field has a particle associated with it (or something like that, my understanding of the details is pretty amateurish) and that by smacking protons at high enough energies creates a bunch of particles, one of which might be Higgs-Boson. So the hypothesized Higgs field, which was a beautiful and simple way to explain why things have mass, could be proven right (although nothing is proven right in science, rather more likely, but again I digress) if we detected a Higgs particle at high enough energies.
Anyways, no matter what I say here can't do the justice to the real story on how the Higgs-Boson was detected. I urge you to watch this video by Lawrence Krauss where he tells the greatest story ever told:
It's ridiculous to suggest that scientists "believed" in the Higgs-Boson without any context.
On August 02 2014 00:37 Prog wrote:To sum it up: You said: Show nested quote +You somehow think that science can't ask a single philosophical question, when I would argue it's just a way of pursuing knowledge, much like philosophy; it just goes about it by actually going outside and looking at the world. and Show nested quote +By "looking", I didn't mean simply looking with your eyes. I meant empirically testing. I claim that is wrong, by citing parts of physics that are (or were) justified prior to empirical testing. The reasons for, say, the higgs-boson prior 2012, were not found outside by looking at the world (in terms of empirically testing). The reasons to believe in the higgs-boson prior 2012 were for the most part explanatory advantages compared to rival theories. Of course the higgs-boson hypothesis was related to empirically tested theories, but it was crucially underdetermined. So non-empirical justification had to be the main reason to believe in it. Now you may claim that this sort of justification is not what you accept as "real justification" and only what is empirically justified is a real scientific theory. But I think if I had asked a physicist in 2011 whether the explanatory story around the higgs-boson is a theory of physics, I bet s/he would have answered "yes, it is". And if I asked them whether we are justified in believing it, s/he would also have said "yes, we are".
To add to what I've said above, even if I concede to you that "belief" in Higgs-Boson was based on non-empirical reasons (which is simply not true and insulting to all the work that led to the discovery of Higgs-Boson), the reality still wouldn't give a damn if we justified that belief or not. Now you should realize that the word "belief" shouldn't be used in science; because it's irrelevant what our beliefs are. Prior to Higgs-Boson discovery, it was very likely that it exists based on all the theories before it and that is all a good scientist should be able to tell you before we discovered it. And if it was proven to be false, it would be thrown out like yesterday's news paper.
On August 02 2014 00:37 Prog wrote:
PS: I always thought the difference of theory and hypothesis in physics were based on whether there is a mathematical framework that has not been falsified. I think there are (at least partially) mathematical frameworks for string theory, so I called it theory. If you can show me (with sources) why that is false, please do so. [I edited this last part sligthly]
There's no really a rigid definition of the word "theory" nor is it used consistently, because each field tends to treat it differently. However, the most useful way of thinking about scientific theory in its truest sense would be to use the word "fact" in ordinary language.
Here's a good discussion on string theory specifically: http://www.reddit.com/r/askscience/comments/10rir2/is_string_theory_an_actual_scientific_theory/
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On August 02 2014 01:47 2Pacalypse- wrote:
However, the most useful way of thinking about scientific theory in its truest sense would be to use the word "fact" in ordinary language.
No. Not because of the claim you are trying to make (to give "theory" a more solid epistemological force). But a "fact" is a much dumber thing than a theory. A "fact" is something like "the sun keeps rising." A "theory" has to explain why. If you reduce "theory" to "fact" you make "theory" a much less powerful entity, which is not what you are trying to do here.
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On August 02 2014 00:36 zulu_nation8 wrote:
So when Copernicus and later Galileo first argued for their theories, they were not only empirically unjustified but directly contradicted. This continued even with the invention of the telescope for there was no rational reason to believe it gave an accurate picture of the sky. It was only until Kepler developed his theory of optics that it could be used to argue, and justify very weakly Galileo's intuitions. Copernicus acted in large part on faith.
From Against Method:
"Consider the case of the Copernican hypothesis, whose invention, defence, and partial vindication runs counter to almost every methodological rule one might care to think of today. The auxiliary sciences here contained laws describing the properties and the influence of the terrestrial atmosphere (meteorology); optical laws dealing with the structure of the eye and of telescopes, and with the behaviour of light; and dynamical laws describing motion in moving systems. Most importantly, however, the auxiliary sciences contained a theory of cognition that postulated a certain simple relation between perceptions and physical objects. Not all auxiliary disciplines were available in explicit form. Many of them merged with the observation language, and led to the situation described at the beginning of the preceding paragraph.
Consideration of all these circumstances, of observation terms, sensory core, auxiliary sciences, background speculation, suggest that a theory may be inconsistent with the evidence, not because it is incorrect, but because the evidence is contaminated. The theory is threatened because the evidence either contains unanalysed sensations which only partly correspond to external processes, or because it is presented in terms of antiquated views, or because it is evaluated with the help of backward auxiliary subjects. The Copernican theory was in trouble for all these reasons.
It is this historico-physiological character of the evidence, the fact that it does not merely describe some objective state of affairs but also expresses subjective, mythical, and long-forgotten views concerning this state of affairs, that forces us to take a fresh look at methodology. It shows that it would be extremely imprudent to let the evidence judge our theories directly and without any further ado. A straightforward and unqualified judgement of theories by 'facts' is bound to eliminate ideas simply because they do not fit into the framework of some older cosmology . Taking experimental results and observations for granted and putting the burden of proof on the theory means taking the observational ideology for granted without having ever examined it. (Note that the experimental results are supposed to have been obtained with the greatest possible care. Hence 'taking observations,etc., for granted' means 'taking them for granted after the most careful examination of their reliability': for even the most careful examination of an observation statement does not interfere with the concepts in which it is expressed, or with the structure of the sensory image.)"
This sounds like a whole bunch of philosophy to me  (which I admit, I'm not that well versed in). If you could reiterate the main argument here in simpler terms by using an example from the last 100 year, that would be very helpful.
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On August 02 2014 01:51 2Pacalypse- wrote:Show nested quote +On August 02 2014 00:36 zulu_nation8 wrote:
So when Copernicus and later Galileo first argued for their theories, they were not only empirically unjustified but directly contradicted. This continued even with the invention of the telescope for there was no rational reason to believe it gave an accurate picture of the sky. It was only until Kepler developed his theory of optics that it could be used to argue, and justify very weakly Galileo's intuitions. Copernicus acted in large part on faith.
From Against Method:
"Consider the case of the Copernican hypothesis, whose invention, defence, and partial vindication runs counter to almost every methodological rule one might care to think of today. The auxiliary sciences here contained laws describing the properties and the influence of the terrestrial atmosphere (meteorology); optical laws dealing with the structure of the eye and of telescopes, and with the behaviour of light; and dynamical laws describing motion in moving systems. Most importantly, however, the auxiliary sciences contained a theory of cognition that postulated a certain simple relation between perceptions and physical objects. Not all auxiliary disciplines were available in explicit form. Many of them merged with the observation language, and led to the situation described at the beginning of the preceding paragraph.
Consideration of all these circumstances, of observation terms, sensory core, auxiliary sciences, background speculation, suggest that a theory may be inconsistent with the evidence, not because it is incorrect, but because the evidence is contaminated. The theory is threatened because the evidence either contains unanalysed sensations which only partly correspond to external processes, or because it is presented in terms of antiquated views, or because it is evaluated with the help of backward auxiliary subjects. The Copernican theory was in trouble for all these reasons.
It is this historico-physiological character of the evidence, the fact that it does not merely describe some objective state of affairs but also expresses subjective, mythical, and long-forgotten views concerning this state of affairs, that forces us to take a fresh look at methodology. It shows that it would be extremely imprudent to let the evidence judge our theories directly and without any further ado. A straightforward and unqualified judgement of theories by 'facts' is bound to eliminate ideas simply because they do not fit into the framework of some older cosmology . Taking experimental results and observations for granted and putting the burden of proof on the theory means taking the observational ideology for granted without having ever examined it. (Note that the experimental results are supposed to have been obtained with the greatest possible care. Hence 'taking observations,etc., for granted' means 'taking them for granted after the most careful examination of their reliability': for even the most careful examination of an observation statement does not interfere with the concepts in which it is expressed, or with the structure of the sensory image.)" This sounds like a whole bunch of philosophy to me (which I admit, I'm not that well versed in). If you could reiterate the main argument here in simpler terms by using an example from the last 100 year, that would be very helpful.
Oh come on, it's perfectly readable. Don't stick your fingers in your ears and go nanana. You might have to read it slower and think more about individual words than you're used to, but I promise you can understand what Feyerabend is saying, he's not that smart.
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On August 02 2014 01:50 bookwyrm wrote:Show nested quote +On August 02 2014 01:47 2Pacalypse- wrote:
However, the most useful way of thinking about scientific theory in its truest sense would be to use the word "fact" in ordinary language. No. Not because of the claim you are trying to make (to give "theory" a more solid epistemological force). But a "fact" is a much dumber thing than a theory. A "fact" is something like "the sun keeps rising." A "theory" has to explain why. If you reduce "theory" to "fact" you make "theory" a much less powerful entity, which is not what you are trying to do here.
I really don't want to enter a semantics and definition discussion here. I'm just saying when you try to explain what a "scientific theory" is to a common person, the best way is by equating it with a fact.
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On August 02 2014 01:51 bookwyrm wrote:Show nested quote +On August 02 2014 01:51 2Pacalypse- wrote:On August 02 2014 00:36 zulu_nation8 wrote:
So when Copernicus and later Galileo first argued for their theories, they were not only empirically unjustified but directly contradicted. This continued even with the invention of the telescope for there was no rational reason to believe it gave an accurate picture of the sky. It was only until Kepler developed his theory of optics that it could be used to argue, and justify very weakly Galileo's intuitions. Copernicus acted in large part on faith.
From Against Method:
"Consider the case of the Copernican hypothesis, whose invention, defence, and partial vindication runs counter to almost every methodological rule one might care to think of today. The auxiliary sciences here contained laws describing the properties and the influence of the terrestrial atmosphere (meteorology); optical laws dealing with the structure of the eye and of telescopes, and with the behaviour of light; and dynamical laws describing motion in moving systems. Most importantly, however, the auxiliary sciences contained a theory of cognition that postulated a certain simple relation between perceptions and physical objects. Not all auxiliary disciplines were available in explicit form. Many of them merged with the observation language, and led to the situation described at the beginning of the preceding paragraph.
Consideration of all these circumstances, of observation terms, sensory core, auxiliary sciences, background speculation, suggest that a theory may be inconsistent with the evidence, not because it is incorrect, but because the evidence is contaminated. The theory is threatened because the evidence either contains unanalysed sensations which only partly correspond to external processes, or because it is presented in terms of antiquated views, or because it is evaluated with the help of backward auxiliary subjects. The Copernican theory was in trouble for all these reasons.
It is this historico-physiological character of the evidence, the fact that it does not merely describe some objective state of affairs but also expresses subjective, mythical, and long-forgotten views concerning this state of affairs, that forces us to take a fresh look at methodology. It shows that it would be extremely imprudent to let the evidence judge our theories directly and without any further ado. A straightforward and unqualified judgement of theories by 'facts' is bound to eliminate ideas simply because they do not fit into the framework of some older cosmology . Taking experimental results and observations for granted and putting the burden of proof on the theory means taking the observational ideology for granted without having ever examined it. (Note that the experimental results are supposed to have been obtained with the greatest possible care. Hence 'taking observations,etc., for granted' means 'taking them for granted after the most careful examination of their reliability': for even the most careful examination of an observation statement does not interfere with the concepts in which it is expressed, or with the structure of the sensory image.)" This sounds like a whole bunch of philosophy to me (which I admit, I'm not that well versed in). If you could reiterate the main argument here in simpler terms by using an example from the last 100 year, that would be very helpful. Oh come on, it's perfectly readable. Don't stick your fingers in your ears and go nanana. You might have to read it slower and think more about individual words than you're used to, but I promise you can understand what Feyerabend is saying, he's not that smart.
Holy condescending batman.
Let's just say I have a 7 year old nephew here next to me who wants to know. Can you explain it to him?
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On August 01 2014 23:06 son1dow wrote:Show nested quote +On August 01 2014 21:57 MoonfireSpam wrote:I think this thread accurately sums up the pros and cons of philosophy  Builds good foundations for logical arguments / other stuff but is always on the edge of falling into self mastubatory word salad bullshit. A bunch of politicians are (and have been for ages) discussing whether Assisted dying (euthanasia i guess) should become a thing in the UK. I wonder how much philosophy would be involved or how you would go about arguing this beyond common sense. Majority of people arguing about masturbatory word salad bullshit had no idea what philosophy is, so I don't know how you came to that conclusion unless you just pandered to both sides somehow. There are philosophers as consultants on ethics boards and such, I remember one interview of a philosopher who is a consultant in philosophy bites. However, they are rather rare, politicians tend to prefer doing their thing only pandering to philosophical ideas that have permeated the socium already, that way they can do them in a shallow manner. Easier and more space for political maneuverings and pandering to lobbyists. PS. Nice post Prog, btw. Interesting stuff.
It's when people come up with stuff like, well most of IgnE's posts. It like hes writing words, but whatever meaning there is in there is obscured by extra words that add no meaning.
I mean my view on philosophy from this thread seems to be that it's a way of putting meaning to everything which is useful. From the point of view of research articles. It crosses over with maths (P values, sample sizes etc.), it crosses over with science (confounding factors, bias, controls etc.). Philosophy probably explains why those factors lead to (more) reliable results and that your observations are sound. Or that philosophy makes you question both your hypothesis and observations to give the best interpretion of stuff, and in doing so birthed everything in brackets.
Oh actually I think that was the point zulunation might have been trying to make.
Yeah I probably do pander to both sides. When I read this article I see philosophy, statistics and biology, and can be confident that when someone goes "is eating fruit and veg good?" I can say "yeah".
+ Show Spoiler +
I doing that I am changing a >95% chance of being correct to "fact" which is 100% to most lay people. And usually when asked about outcomes of patients or coming to diagnoses without proof (i.e. imaging, blood tests) I will always favor an analogy of probability rather than stating certainty.
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On August 02 2014 01:23 bookwyrm wrote:Show nested quote +On August 01 2014 18:13 2Pacalypse- wrote:
You somehow think that science can't ask a single philosophical question, when I would argue it's just a way of pursuing knowledge, much like philosophy; it just goes about it by actually going outside and looking at the world. no, "science" can't. Can you give an example? I've argued about this with a lot of people, and nobody has ever been able to give an example. Design me a quick experiment that answers some sort of philosophical question. Please!
I didn't say science can answer philosophical questions, just that it can ask them.
But then again, I'm pretty sure philosophy can't answer philosophical questions either
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Noone said that anyone believed in the higgs boson without context. What I argue for is that people believed it because of explanatory power, not because of it being empirically justified (because that was impossible for a very long time). But you seem not to understand this difference at all.The higgs boson fit well into the framework and could explain a bunch of stuff. Noone had empirical data that it existed. But still they had a good reason to believe that it exists.
And obviously you should use the term "belief" in science. Not using belief is hilarious. I don't know how it is in your native language, but in english "belief" is not something that is used in stark contrast to knowledge, neither is it solely used for unscientific stuff (religion, mysticism etc). Knowledge requires belief for 99% of english speaking people! Believing something just means regarding something as true!
Also:
...the reality still wouldn't give a damn if we justified that belief or not...
Last time I checked I was part of the reality. And I'd rather only believe in propositions I am justified believing in.
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On August 02 2014 02:00 2Pacalypse- wrote:Show nested quote +On August 02 2014 01:51 bookwyrm wrote:On August 02 2014 01:51 2Pacalypse- wrote:On August 02 2014 00:36 zulu_nation8 wrote:
So when Copernicus and later Galileo first argued for their theories, they were not only empirically unjustified but directly contradicted. This continued even with the invention of the telescope for there was no rational reason to believe it gave an accurate picture of the sky. It was only until Kepler developed his theory of optics that it could be used to argue, and justify very weakly Galileo's intuitions. Copernicus acted in large part on faith.
From Against Method:
"Consider the case of the Copernican hypothesis, whose invention, defence, and partial vindication runs counter to almost every methodological rule one might care to think of today. The auxiliary sciences here contained laws describing the properties and the influence of the terrestrial atmosphere (meteorology); optical laws dealing with the structure of the eye and of telescopes, and with the behaviour of light; and dynamical laws describing motion in moving systems. Most importantly, however, the auxiliary sciences contained a theory of cognition that postulated a certain simple relation between perceptions and physical objects. Not all auxiliary disciplines were available in explicit form. Many of them merged with the observation language, and led to the situation described at the beginning of the preceding paragraph.
Consideration of all these circumstances, of observation terms, sensory core, auxiliary sciences, background speculation, suggest that a theory may be inconsistent with the evidence, not because it is incorrect, but because the evidence is contaminated. The theory is threatened because the evidence either contains unanalysed sensations which only partly correspond to external processes, or because it is presented in terms of antiquated views, or because it is evaluated with the help of backward auxiliary subjects. The Copernican theory was in trouble for all these reasons.
It is this historico-physiological character of the evidence, the fact that it does not merely describe some objective state of affairs but also expresses subjective, mythical, and long-forgotten views concerning this state of affairs, that forces us to take a fresh look at methodology. It shows that it would be extremely imprudent to let the evidence judge our theories directly and without any further ado. A straightforward and unqualified judgement of theories by 'facts' is bound to eliminate ideas simply because they do not fit into the framework of some older cosmology . Taking experimental results and observations for granted and putting the burden of proof on the theory means taking the observational ideology for granted without having ever examined it. (Note that the experimental results are supposed to have been obtained with the greatest possible care. Hence 'taking observations,etc., for granted' means 'taking them for granted after the most careful examination of their reliability': for even the most careful examination of an observation statement does not interfere with the concepts in which it is expressed, or with the structure of the sensory image.)" This sounds like a whole bunch of philosophy to me (which I admit, I'm not that well versed in). If you could reiterate the main argument here in simpler terms by using an example from the last 100 year, that would be very helpful. Oh come on, it's perfectly readable. Don't stick your fingers in your ears and go nanana. You might have to read it slower and think more about individual words than you're used to, but I promise you can understand what Feyerabend is saying, he's not that smart. Holy condescending batman. Let's just say I have a 7 year old nephew here next to me who wants to know. Can you explain it to him?
No, he's not old enough. You, on the other hand, are.
On August 02 2014 01:57 2Pacalypse- wrote:Show nested quote +On August 02 2014 01:50 bookwyrm wrote:On August 02 2014 01:47 2Pacalypse- wrote:
However, the most useful way of thinking about scientific theory in its truest sense would be to use the word "fact" in ordinary language. No. Not because of the claim you are trying to make (to give "theory" a more solid epistemological force). But a "fact" is a much dumber thing than a theory. A "fact" is something like "the sun keeps rising." A "theory" has to explain why. If you reduce "theory" to "fact" you make "theory" a much less powerful entity, which is not what you are trying to do here. I really don't want to enter a semantics and definition discussion here. I'm just saying when you try to explain what a "scientific theory" is to a common person, the best way is by equating it with a fact.
And I'm explaining why that's a bad idea, but you don't want to talk about it, apparently. Don't accuse me of condescension and then go around about what is the "best way to explain to a 'common person.'" My point was that doing so vitiates your own position and makes it weaker. Don't listen to me if you don't care, I guess, I'm trying to help you here.
there's nothing more infuriating than a person who makes some claim and then responds to any possible criticism with "I don't want to argue semantics." What that sentence means is "I just wanna say whatever I want and have it be true without thinking about what I'm really saying or defending it against someone who disagrees." I don't understand why people who say the word "semantics" as a rebuttal even talk to other people in the first place. Do you not have a mirror?
On August 02 2014 02:06 2Pacalypse- wrote:Show nested quote +On August 02 2014 01:23 bookwyrm wrote:On August 01 2014 18:13 2Pacalypse- wrote:
You somehow think that science can't ask a single philosophical question, when I would argue it's just a way of pursuing knowledge, much like philosophy; it just goes about it by actually going outside and looking at the world. no, "science" can't. Can you give an example? I've argued about this with a lot of people, and nobody has ever been able to give an example. Design me a quick experiment that answers some sort of philosophical question. Please! I didn't say science can answer philosophical questions, just that it can ask them.
and I asked for an example, which you didn't give. I didn't expect you to, as nobody ever has, out of the dozens of people who have made this claim and whom I've asked for examples.
But then again, I'm pretty sure philosophy can't answer philosophical questions either
Figuring out what the questions are is enough task for a lifetime. Another philosophical question: what do you do when there are questions that you cannot answer, but must answer? This is one that I'm particularly interested in.
edit: At any rate, I wish I could put you and my professor in a room together and watch with a bag of popcorn. The only trouble is, the encounter would make you both feel like you were each right, when what you should both realize is that you are each horribly wrong and that I'm right... but alas...
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what counts as a philosophical question exactly? For example, "what is the nature of water?" used to be a purely philosophical question.
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On August 02 2014 01:50 bookwyrm wrote:Show nested quote +On August 02 2014 01:47 2Pacalypse- wrote:
However, the most useful way of thinking about scientific theory in its truest sense would be to use the word "fact" in ordinary language. No. Not because of the claim you are trying to make (to give "theory" a more solid epistemological force). But a "fact" is a much dumber thing than a theory. A "fact" is something like "the sun keeps rising." A "theory" has to explain why. If you reduce "theory" to "fact" you make "theory" a much less powerful entity, which is not what you are trying to do here.
Following your logic, there's nothing we can ever know. I guess it'd help you out a lot if you'd actually talk to someone with a better grasp of empirical procedures, rather than getting your knowledge from hilariously overcomplicated texts. What you do is hide behind words, twist definitions until they fit and throw them onto non-native English speakers, who're bound to "lose" in this fight. No point in argueing with you here.
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Another philosophical question: what do you do when there are questions that you cannot answer, but must answer? This is one that I'm particularly interested in.
Can't answer this in philosophy speak but in real life in the context of making a difficult diagnosis.
You observe as much as you can (X-rays, CT, blood tests - not always with high degrees of probability. Not always available)
You try and grasp context (patient history, previous admissions, risk factors - all very subjective stuff)
Use past experience (bias)
Use pre existing knowledge of others i.e. specialists, text books (also subject to bias)
Formulate answer based on above.
Screen answer to make sure it passes guidelines (gotta protect your own ass).
Give answer and treat based on most likely outcome. Wait with interest to see what happens and repeat from start if required.
I'd actually be interested in hearing a philosophy side to that methodology (or maybe there isn't one to be made - also fine).
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What about the passage I quoted is difficult? It's first saying sometimes when a new theory is proposed, there needs to be other, auxiliary sciences invented to support the main theory, the example of which I gave in the first sentence, that a theory of optics was needed to explain the images in the telescope, and thus support its legitimacy as a scientific instrument.
edit: specifically in why the images are blurry unless you adjust it. Galileo had little knowledge of optics when he decided to support Copernicus.
It then makes the point that observation can refute better and valid theories due to there not having been invented a theoretical language to describe observed evidence. For example the "natural" observation that a rock falls vertically from a high place to the ground directly contradicts the claim the Earth rotates, because if it does, the rock wouldn't fall vertically down but instead to a place opposite of the direction of Earth's rotation; unless the concept of relative motion is introduced to complement such a theory and explain the "natural" motion of the rock. Hence empirical evidence by itself can often wrongly establish or discredit theories, because the observation of evidence by itself assumes a language, a system of thinking that is implicit in the description of evidence.
This is the simplest example I can think of, and it comes straight from the book.
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On August 02 2014 02:33 MoonfireSpam wrote:Show nested quote +Another philosophical question: what do you do when there are questions that you cannot answer, but must answer? This is one that I'm particularly interested in. Can't answer this in philosophy speak but in real life in the context of making a difficult diagnosis. You observe as much as you can (X-rays, CT, blood tests - not always with high degrees of probability. Not always available) You try and grasp context (patient history, previous admissions, risk factors - all very subjective stuff) Use past experience (bias) Use pre existing knowledge of others i.e. specialists, text books (also subject to bias) Formulate answer based on above. Screen answer to make sure it passes guidelines (gotta protect your own ass). Give answer and treat based on most likely outcome. Wait with interest to see what happens and repeat from start if required. I'd actually be interested in hearing a philosophy side to that methodology (or maybe there isn't one to be made - also fine).
That is a form of inference to the best explanation. The current standard book on that methodology is from Peter Lipton "inference to the best explanation". It's more with a focus on sciences though.
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EPT![[image loading]](http://i.imgur.com/Y8I0qDs.jpg)
