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Finland916 Posts
On August 26 2023 09:17 Nezgar wrote: Unfortunately that thing is paywalled, so I cannot say what evidence they present this time.
Oh yeah, here's an English language version that shouldn't be paywalled. Excerpts:
DER SPIEGEL The operation was aimed at "inflicting lasting damage to the functionality of the state and its facilities. In this sense, this is an attack on the internal security of the state." That's the legal language used by the examining magistrates at the German Federal Court of Justice in the investigation into unknown perpetrators that has been underway since then.
Unknown because – even though countless criminal investigators, intelligence agents and prosecutors from a dozen countries have been searching for those behind the act – it has not yet been determined who did it. Or why. The findings of the investigation thus far, much of them coming from German officials, are strictly confidential. Nothing is to reach the public. On orders from the Chancellery.
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Officially, politicians and the Office of the Federal Prosecutor are still holding back with any conclusions. Currently, it is not possible to say "this was state-controlled by Ukraine," Federal Prosecutor Otte says. "As far as that is concerned, the investigation is ongoing, much of it still undercover."
Behind the scenes, though, you get clearer statements. Investigators from the BKA, the Federal Police and the Office of the Federal Prosecutor have few remaining doubts that a Ukrainian commando was responsible for blowing up the pipelines. A striking number of clues point to Ukraine, they say. They start with Valeri K., IP addresses of mails and phone calls, location data and numerous other, even clearer clues that have been kept secret so far. One top official says that far more is known than has been stated publicly. According to DER SPIEGEL's sources, investigators are certain that the saboteurs were in Ukraine before and after the attack. Indeed, the overall picture formed by the puzzles pieces of technical information has grown quite clear.
And the possible motives also seem clear to international security circles: The aim, they says, was to deprive Moscow of an important source of revenue for financing the war against Ukraine. And at the same time to deprive Putin once and for all of his most important instrument of blackmail against the German government.
But crucial questions remain unanswered. From how high up was the attack ordered and who knew about it? Was it an intelligence operation that the political leadership in Kyiv learned about only later? Or was it the product of a commando unit acting on its own? Or was it a military operation in which the Ukrainian General Staff was involved? Intelligence experts and security policy experts, however, consider it unlikely that Ukrainian President Zelenskyy was in on it: In cases of sabotage, the political leadership is often deliberately kept in the dark so that they can plausibly deny any knowledge later on. In early June, when the first indications of Kyiv's possible involvement came to light, Zelenskyy strongly denied it. "I am president and I give orders accordingly," he said. "Nothing of the sort has been done by Ukraine. I would never act in such a manner."
In any case, it is difficult terrain for the BKA, not only politically, but also in practical terms. The German criminal investigators cannot conduct investigations in Ukraine, and it isn't expected that Kyiv will provide much support. The German authorities have also shied away from submitting a request to Ukraine for legal assistance because doing so would require that they reveal what they know. That could provide Ukraine the opportunity to cover up any traces that may exist and to protect the people responsible. Asked whether there will be arrest warrants one day, an official familiar with the events replies: "We need a lot of patience." ... The situation changed in March, when the New York Times, Germany's Die Zeit and Berlin-based public broadcaster RBB first reported on the evidence pointing to Ukraine. A little bit later, the Süddeutsche Zeitung newspaper also published its own investigative report. Soon after, Jens Plötner, an adviser to the chancellor, openly addressed the articles in a phone call with Andriy Yermak, one of President Vlodymyr Zelenskyy's closest confidants. The answer was clear: Yermak apparently assured the Germans that the Ukrainian government had not been involved in the plot and that no one from the security apparatus knew who was behind it.
Few in Berlin want to think right now about what action should be taken if the involvement of Ukrainian state agencies is proven. On the one hand, Germany couldn't simply brush off such a serious crime. But suspending support for Ukraine in its war against Russia also wouldn't be an option. "Everyone is shying away from the question of consequences," says one member of parliament with a party that is a member of the German government coalition. ... But the perception among investigators is that the will to solve the case is not particularly pronounced in the capital. Politically, it is easier to live with what happened if it remains unclear who is behind the attacks. The process is not being hindered, but neither is there much support from the overarching government ministries. Meanwhile, it is clear to career-oriented ministry officials that there is no glory to be had with this case. If only because the culprits will likely never have to answer for their actions in Germany. Even if they could be identified, it's very unlikely they would be extradited.
So Berlin is looking away, and that is definitely being registered in agencies where staff is constantly in short supply and procedures have to be prioritized. All of which leads to the investigation falling down the priority list.
And here's an article by ZDF in German, who's been working together with Spiegel on it. It's not nearly as exhaustive as the Spiegel one.
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On August 26 2023 17:45 RvB wrote:Show nested quote +On August 26 2023 17:25 zatic wrote:On June 07 2023 16:47 zatic wrote:On June 07 2023 06:32 maybenexttime wrote: I still doubt Ukraine did it. They'd have to be really fucking stupid to potentially jeopardise their support from the West for practically no gain. I mean by now there should be little doubt it was Ukraine in one way or another. What is extra spicy: A so far unnamed European intel agency learned about the plans in June 2022. They notified the CIA and BND (German intel). CIA did not trust the source. BND did, enough to inform members of parliament about them. The agencies then learned that the plans had been cancelled. The bombing in September does not match the plans BND and CIA had from June. Obviously the target was the same, but doesn't match the planning from June in terms of scale and I suppose other factors. So there is still some ambiguity who exactly conducted the specific operation in September (Ukraine special ops, private actors operated by Ukraine intel, etc), but all leads point to Ukraine. It was Ukraine, i that's been clear to everyone who wants to know for months. It's just that it's not in the interest of any of Ukraine's allies to really dig into this case too deeply. As to that particular source, the Spiegel investigative team is still highly regarded. It was the Dutch MIVD that informed the CIA and BND. The bombing matched the scenario in June and after the bombing the MIVD received additional information about the bombing from a source in Ukraine. So it looks likely it was Ukraine but they're not sure yet and still investigating. Source is in Dutch so sorry for that: https://nos.nl/artikel/2478770-vs-waarschuwde-oekraine-nord-stream-niet-te-saboteren-na-alarm-van-mivd
This article is from June though. And I have to place a large question mark by the conclusions. I'll happily believe Ukraine had a plan to blow up Nordstream. It makes sense they'd have that and it makes sense they'd want to execute before the gas was cut off anyway. But they got warned not to do it, and held back. 3 months later, it happened anyway. If I were Russia, and knew Ukraine had this plan AND the west knew about this plan, then I'd absolutely use exactly that plan to blow up Nordstream. And by September the Russians had far more to gain from blowing it up than the Ukrainians did. Especially with minimal damage to Nordstream 2.
So I think we need more than "Ukraine had a plan to do it in June, we warned them not to do it and it happened 3 months later, therefore it's Ukraine".
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"But the perception among investigators is that the will to solve the case is not particularly pronounced in the capital. Politically, it is easier to live with what happened if it remains unclear who is behind the attacks. The process is not being hindered, but neither is there much support from the overarching government ministries. Meanwhile, it is clear to career-oriented ministry officials that there is no glory to be had with this case. If only because the culprits will likely never have to answer for their actions in Germany. Even if they could be identified, it's very unlikely they would be extradited."
This part in particular is complete bullshit. Ukraine wants to be part of NATO and the EU. They will not be able to get into either NATO or the EU if they refuse to cooperate on this.
Whoever wrote this article is being deliberately inflammatory.
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Finally they are going to explain how a country with no naval projection of their own coast covertly executed an advanced underwater sabotage mission in another part of Europe.
Oh, just joking absolutely no information about the main thing people are sceptical about. 7 people rented a boat and this guy was in Ukraine before and after doesn't cut it.
The pipeline was blown between 42 and 78 m in multiple places. This places it firmly in deep dive territory. This means you need well trained operatives, a lot of time on site and/or highly specialised equipment or access to remotely operated vehicles. Of course in addition to whatever explosives you choose to use. They have to acquire this fairly specific equipment and a suitable vessel, presumably in the EU which you are not citizens in, without a paper trail. They have to do the operation without raising suspicion at moderate depths (and if I remember correctly visibility is notoriously poor in the baltic sea?).
If the puzzle of technical information has grown quite clear I for one would like to see a decent technical explanation of how they actually pulled it off and at least some proof to back it up.
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On August 26 2023 19:09 CuddlyCuteKitten wrote:Show nested quote +On August 26 2023 17:48 hexhaven wrote:On August 26 2023 09:17 Nezgar wrote: Unfortunately that thing is paywalled, so I cannot say what evidence they present this time. Oh yeah, here's an English language version that shouldn't be paywalled. Excerpts: DER SPIEGEL Indeed, the overall picture formed by the puzzles pieces of technical information has grown quite clear.
And here's an article by ZDF in German, who's been working together with Spiegel on it. It's not nearly as exhaustive as the Spiegel one. Finally they are going to explain how a country with no naval projection of their own coast covertly executed an advanced underwater sabotage mission in another part of Europe. Oh, just joking absolutely no information about the main thing people are sceptical about. 7 people rented a boat and this guy was in Ukraine before and after doesn't cut it. The pipeline was blown between 42 and 78 m in multiple places. This places it firmly in deep dive territory. This means you need well trained operatives, a lot of time on site and/or highly specialised equipment or access to remotely operated vehicles. Of course in addition to whatever explosives you choose to use. They have to acquire this fairly specific equipment and a suitable vessel, presumably in the EU which you are not citizens in, without a paper trail. They have to do the operation without raising suspicion at moderate depths (and if I remember correctly visibility is notoriously poor in the baltic sea?). If the puzzle of technical information has grown quite clear I for one would like to see a decent technical explanation of how they actually pulled it off and at least some proof to back it up. In addition, they did something requiring that level or expertise and yet botched the job by only mildly damaging NS2.
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On August 26 2023 18:19 Acrofales wrote:Show nested quote +On August 26 2023 17:45 RvB wrote:On August 26 2023 17:25 zatic wrote:On June 07 2023 16:47 zatic wrote:On June 07 2023 06:32 maybenexttime wrote: I still doubt Ukraine did it. They'd have to be really fucking stupid to potentially jeopardise their support from the West for practically no gain. I mean by now there should be little doubt it was Ukraine in one way or another. What is extra spicy: A so far unnamed European intel agency learned about the plans in June 2022. They notified the CIA and BND (German intel). CIA did not trust the source. BND did, enough to inform members of parliament about them. The agencies then learned that the plans had been cancelled. The bombing in September does not match the plans BND and CIA had from June. Obviously the target was the same, but doesn't match the planning from June in terms of scale and I suppose other factors. So there is still some ambiguity who exactly conducted the specific operation in September (Ukraine special ops, private actors operated by Ukraine intel, etc), but all leads point to Ukraine. It was Ukraine, i that's been clear to everyone who wants to know for months. It's just that it's not in the interest of any of Ukraine's allies to really dig into this case too deeply. As to that particular source, the Spiegel investigative team is still highly regarded. It was the Dutch MIVD that informed the CIA and BND. The bombing matched the scenario in June and after the bombing the MIVD received additional information about the bombing from a source in Ukraine. So it looks likely it was Ukraine but they're not sure yet and still investigating. Source is in Dutch so sorry for that: https://nos.nl/artikel/2478770-vs-waarschuwde-oekraine-nord-stream-niet-te-saboteren-na-alarm-van-mivd This article is from June though. And I have to place a large question mark by the conclusions. I'll happily believe Ukraine had a plan to blow up Nordstream. It makes sense they'd have that and it makes sense they'd want to execute before the gas was cut off anyway. But they got warned not to do it, and held back. 3 months later, it happened anyway. If I were Russia, and knew Ukraine had this plan AND the west knew about this plan, then I'd absolutely use exactly that plan to blow up Nordstream. And by September the Russians had far more to gain from blowing it up than the Ukrainians did. Especially with minimal damage to Nordstream 2. So I think we need more than "Ukraine had a plan to do it in June, we warned them not to do it and it happened 3 months later, therefore it's Ukraine". From the article it's not clear if the CIA informed Ukraine before or after they knew. But yeah if Dutch intelligence knew of the plans it's also possible that Russia knew of the plans. I assume it's one of the scenarios they're investigating.
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People need to read this.
Personally, I suspect that the consistent framing of the war as a stalemate is top-down orchestrated information warfare by anti-Ukrainian agents. Sowing seeds of doubt. The goal is very obviously to undermine support for Ukraine in the short and long run.
The claims have nothing to do with the reality on the ground.
The reality is that Ukrainian forces are currently pummeling the Russian defenses. While the process is slow, Russian command is 100% freaking out about the prospect of a Southern breakthrough. It's practically a repeat of the Kherson offensive, which for many months didn't seem to be moving at all, then began rolling, and then suddenly the Russian defenses collapsed. The Kharkiv offensive was similar in that Ukrainian forces chipped away at the defenses for months before Russian troops had to suddenly withdraw and surrender the entire oblast.
Ukraine is still absolutely on pace for another collapse of the Russian defenses. We've been seeing many indicators of a potential breakthrough, possibly even before the end of 2023.
That isn't to say this war is going smoothly in Ukraine's favor. But anyone comparing this to a stalemate has absolutely no idea how war actually works in real life.
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Guess we'll see what happens, if anything, in the next few weeks.
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It's possible they've already breached some key defensive lines on the southern front
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Rumors are that NATO insisted on resumption of breakthrough attempts around Robotyne. Which is a little strange since it's not very likely that Ukraine can reach Melitopol by now. This would come at the cost of Ukrainian effort around Bakhmut.
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On August 27 2023 17:27 pmp10 wrote:Rumors are that NATO insisted on resumption of breakthrough attempts around Robotyne. Which is a little strange since it's not very likely that Ukraine can reach Melitopol by now. This would come at the cost of Ukrainian effort around Bakhmut. Your going to have to do a whole lot better then "rumor". Because that just makes it 99% certain to be Russian propaganda.
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Russian Federation605 Posts
On August 26 2023 19:53 Magic Powers wrote:People need to read this. Personally, I suspect that the consistent framing of the war as a stalemate is top-down orchestrated information warfare by anti-Ukrainian agents. Sowing seeds of doubt. The goal is very obviously to undermine support for Ukraine in the short and long run. The claims have nothing to do with the reality on the ground. The reality is that Ukrainian forces are currently pummeling the Russian defenses. While the process is slow, Russian command is 100% freaking out about the prospect of a Southern breakthrough. It's practically a repeat of the Kherson offensive, which for many months didn't seem to be moving at all, then began rolling, and then suddenly the Russian defenses collapsed. The Kharkiv offensive was similar in that Ukrainian forces chipped away at the defenses for months before Russian troops had to suddenly withdraw and surrender the entire oblast. Ukraine is still absolutely on pace for another collapse of the Russian defenses. We've been seeing many indicators of a potential breakthrough, possibly even before the end of 2023. That isn't to say this war is going smoothly in Ukraine's favor. But anyone comparing this to a stalemate has absolutely no idea how war actually works in real life. First of all, there was no chipping at Kharkov area defences, that part of the front was quiet for months, hence Russian command moved combat forces to other areas, leaving thin green line of LDPR reservists there, and neglected the information about gathering Ukrainian forces there, which later led to collapse of the front. In Kherson the main issue forcing a retreat was logistics hanging on two bridges being more and more damaged each day and potential destruction of the dam, which would cut off all Russian forces on the bridgehead. Neither of these conditions apply to current situation. Also some people who study how the war works in real life for a living tend to disagree with you: https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/russian-fortifications-present-an-old-problem-for-ukraine/
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On August 27 2023 17:32 Gorsameth wrote:Show nested quote +On August 27 2023 17:27 pmp10 wrote:Rumors are that NATO insisted on resumption of breakthrough attempts around Robotyne. Which is a little strange since it's not very likely that Ukraine can reach Melitopol by now. This would come at the cost of Ukrainian effort around Bakhmut. Your going to have to do a whole lot better then "rumor". Because that just makes it 99% certain to be Russian propaganda. Will The Guardian suffice?
British sources are reluctant to say much about the outcome of the meeting at the border. But the indications from the west is that the strategy has changed as a result of the discussions. “I think you can see they are focusing on the Zaporizhzhia front,” said one insider, amid reports of fresh Ukrainian attacks aimed at the city of Tokmak, an initial step towards reaching the Sea of Azov, thereby cutting the land bridge to Crimea. It's still a rumor since I can't be sure if Ukraine is actually doing it. That part was only stated by some (Ukraine-friendly) military analysts on twitter.
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On August 27 2023 17:52 pmp10 wrote:Show nested quote +On August 27 2023 17:32 Gorsameth wrote:On August 27 2023 17:27 pmp10 wrote:Rumors are that NATO insisted on resumption of breakthrough attempts around Robotyne. Which is a little strange since it's not very likely that Ukraine can reach Melitopol by now. This would come at the cost of Ukrainian effort around Bakhmut. Your going to have to do a whole lot better then "rumor". Because that just makes it 99% certain to be Russian propaganda. Will The Guardian suffice?Show nested quote +British sources are reluctant to say much about the outcome of the meeting at the border. But the indications from the west is that the strategy has changed as a result of the discussions. “I think you can see they are focusing on the Zaporizhzhia front,” said one insider, amid reports of fresh Ukrainian attacks aimed at the city of Tokmak, an initial step towards reaching the Sea of Azov, thereby cutting the land bridge to Crimea. It's still a rumor since I can't be sure if Ukraine is actually doing it. That part was only stated by some (Ukraine-friendly) military analysts on twitter. You realise there is a gulf big enough to reach the sun between "tactics changed after high level strategic meetings" and "the West is forcing Ukraine to throw themselves at Robotyne" right?
No one doubts the former, your the one bringing up the latter based on 'rumours'.
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On August 27 2023 17:58 Gorsameth wrote:Show nested quote +On August 27 2023 17:52 pmp10 wrote:On August 27 2023 17:32 Gorsameth wrote:On August 27 2023 17:27 pmp10 wrote:Rumors are that NATO insisted on resumption of breakthrough attempts around Robotyne. Which is a little strange since it's not very likely that Ukraine can reach Melitopol by now. This would come at the cost of Ukrainian effort around Bakhmut. Your going to have to do a whole lot better then "rumor". Because that just makes it 99% certain to be Russian propaganda. Will The Guardian suffice?British sources are reluctant to say much about the outcome of the meeting at the border. But the indications from the west is that the strategy has changed as a result of the discussions. “I think you can see they are focusing on the Zaporizhzhia front,” said one insider, amid reports of fresh Ukrainian attacks aimed at the city of Tokmak, an initial step towards reaching the Sea of Azov, thereby cutting the land bridge to Crimea. It's still a rumor since I can't be sure if Ukraine is actually doing it. That part was only stated by some (Ukraine-friendly) military analysts on twitter. You realise there is a gulf big enough to reach the sun between "tactics changed after high level strategic meetings" and "the West is forcing Ukraine to throw themselves at Robotyne" right? No one doubts the former, your the one bringing up the latter based on 'rumours'. No, I'm bringing up the latter based on longer string of criticism from the west urging breakthroughs and talking up NATO doctrine. That this is exactly the change of tactics the western commanders have in mind is pretty self-evident. Now if it is actually happening we can't be certain for a couple weeks, but then I didn't see a ban on evidence based speculation.
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On August 27 2023 17:33 Ardias wrote:Show nested quote +On August 26 2023 19:53 Magic Powers wrote:People need to read this. Personally, I suspect that the consistent framing of the war as a stalemate is top-down orchestrated information warfare by anti-Ukrainian agents. Sowing seeds of doubt. The goal is very obviously to undermine support for Ukraine in the short and long run. The claims have nothing to do with the reality on the ground. The reality is that Ukrainian forces are currently pummeling the Russian defenses. While the process is slow, Russian command is 100% freaking out about the prospect of a Southern breakthrough. It's practically a repeat of the Kherson offensive, which for many months didn't seem to be moving at all, then began rolling, and then suddenly the Russian defenses collapsed. The Kharkiv offensive was similar in that Ukrainian forces chipped away at the defenses for months before Russian troops had to suddenly withdraw and surrender the entire oblast. Ukraine is still absolutely on pace for another collapse of the Russian defenses. We've been seeing many indicators of a potential breakthrough, possibly even before the end of 2023. That isn't to say this war is going smoothly in Ukraine's favor. But anyone comparing this to a stalemate has absolutely no idea how war actually works in real life. First of all, there was no chipping at Kharkov defences, that part of the front was quiet for months, hence Russian command moved combat forces to other areas, leaving thin green line of LDPR reservists there, and neglected the information about gathering Ukrainian forces there, which later led to collapse of the front. In Kherson the main issue forcing a retreat was logistics hanging on two bridges being more and more damaged each day and potential destruction of the dam, which would cut off all Russian forces on the bridgehead. Neither of these conditions apply to current situation. Also some people who study how the war works in real life for a living tend to disagree with you: https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/russian-fortifications-present-an-old-problem-for-ukraine/
Ukraine definitely, without even the slightest of doubts, chipped away at the Russian defenses in and around Kharkiv before the Kharkiv offensive. The same is true for Kherson.
While the following images from 2022 are not accurate (because back then the inaccuracies were far more numerous), we can still see some general trends.
The first image shows the territorial changes between April 6 (after Russia withdrew from the North) and May 15. While there were many contested areas, it's very clear that Ukraine was seeing much success in and around the Kharkiv region. Meanwhile Russia focused its efforts on the region near Sievierodonetsk.
![[image loading]](https://abload.de/img/1-april6bismai152022-r2i16.png)
The second image shows May 15 until Sept 16 (until about one week before the grand Kharkiv offensive). During those four months Ukraine was carving out more space in the Kharkiv region. Russian command had failed to respect the threat of a collapse of the Kharkiv oblast, presumably because it looked like Russia was contesting the region from its own borders in the North. Those smaller advances later proved to be unsubstantial. Ukraine was making a lot of progress from various directions, most notably reclaiming most of the recently lost territory South of Izium and also pushing further to the East of Kharkiv city. A lot of reports were coming out about Ukraine's progress in the Izium region. With hindsight we know that the whole oblast - and not just Izium - was in the process of being encircled while Russia was distracted near Sievierodonetsk.
When you look at both maps, it's fairly clear that Ukraine focused most of its offensive efforts on three regions: Kharkiv, Kherson and later also Zaporizhzhia. These fronts were not "quiet" in any capacity. Russia simply did not react appropriately to the various threats. Ukraine was very busy in all three regions. Russian command should've respected this fact, but they did not.
Additionally, the fact that the Dnipro made the region in the North of Kherson too dangerous to hold on to - perhaps because here Russia, and not only Ukraine, had claimed some territory in the previous months - was also underestimated by Russian command. Perhaps they were thinking too much in purely territorial changes and not enough strategically.
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On August 27 2023 20:24 Magic Powers wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On August 27 2023 17:33 Ardias wrote:Show nested quote +On August 26 2023 19:53 Magic Powers wrote:People need to read this. Personally, I suspect that the consistent framing of the war as a stalemate is top-down orchestrated information warfare by anti-Ukrainian agents. Sowing seeds of doubt. The goal is very obviously to undermine support for Ukraine in the short and long run. The claims have nothing to do with the reality on the ground. The reality is that Ukrainian forces are currently pummeling the Russian defenses. While the process is slow, Russian command is 100% freaking out about the prospect of a Southern breakthrough. It's practically a repeat of the Kherson offensive, which for many months didn't seem to be moving at all, then began rolling, and then suddenly the Russian defenses collapsed. The Kharkiv offensive was similar in that Ukrainian forces chipped away at the defenses for months before Russian troops had to suddenly withdraw and surrender the entire oblast. Ukraine is still absolutely on pace for another collapse of the Russian defenses. We've been seeing many indicators of a potential breakthrough, possibly even before the end of 2023. That isn't to say this war is going smoothly in Ukraine's favor. But anyone comparing this to a stalemate has absolutely no idea how war actually works in real life. First of all, there was no chipping at Kharkov defences, that part of the front was quiet for months, hence Russian command moved combat forces to other areas, leaving thin green line of LDPR reservists there, and neglected the information about gathering Ukrainian forces there, which later led to collapse of the front. In Kherson the main issue forcing a retreat was logistics hanging on two bridges being more and more damaged each day and potential destruction of the dam, which would cut off all Russian forces on the bridgehead. Neither of these conditions apply to current situation. Also some people who study how the war works in real life for a living tend to disagree with you: https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/russian-fortifications-present-an-old-problem-for-ukraine/ Ukraine definitely, without even the slightest of doubts, chipped away at the Russian defenses in and around Kharkiv before the Kharkiv offensive. The same is true for Kherson. While the following images from 2022 are not accurate (because back then the inaccuracies were far more numerous), we can still see some general trends. The first image shows the territorial changes between April 6 (after Russia withdrew from the North) and May 15. While there were many contested areas, it's very clear that Ukraine was seeing much success in and around the Kharkiv region. Meanwhile Russia focused its efforts on the region near Sievierodonetsk. ![[image loading]](https://abload.de/img/1-april6bismai152022-r2i16.png) The second image shows May 15 until Sept 16 (until about one week before the grand Kharkiv offensive). During those four months Ukraine was carving out more space in the Kharkiv region. Russian command had failed to respect the threat of a collapse of the Kharkiv oblast, presumably because it looked like Russia was contesting the region from its own borders in the North. Those smaller advances later proved to be unsubstantial. Ukraine was making a lot of progress from various directions, most notably reclaiming most of the recently lost territory South of Izium and also pushing further to the East of Kharkiv city. A lot of reports were coming out about Ukraine's progress in the Izium region. With hindsight we know that the whole oblast - and not just Izium - was in the process of being encircled while Russia was distracted near Sievierodonetsk. When you look at both maps, it's fairly clear that Ukraine focused most of its offensive efforts on three regions: Kharkiv, Kherson and later also Zaporizhzhia. These fronts were not "quiet" in any capacity. Russia simply did not react appropriately to the various threats. Ukraine was very busy in all three regions. Russian command should've respected this fact, but they did not. Additionally, the fact that the Dnipro made the region in the North of Kherson too dangerous to hold on to - perhaps because here Russia, and not only Ukraine, had claimed some territory in the previous months - was also underestimated by Russian command. Perhaps they were thinking too much in purely territorial changes and not enough strategically. ![[image loading]](https://abload.de/img/2-mai15bissept162022-kpiij.png)
These maps are super interesting. Where do you find them?
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On August 27 2023 22:39 Excludos wrote:Show nested quote +On August 27 2023 20:24 Magic Powers wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On August 27 2023 17:33 Ardias wrote:Show nested quote +On August 26 2023 19:53 Magic Powers wrote:People need to read this. Personally, I suspect that the consistent framing of the war as a stalemate is top-down orchestrated information warfare by anti-Ukrainian agents. Sowing seeds of doubt. The goal is very obviously to undermine support for Ukraine in the short and long run. The claims have nothing to do with the reality on the ground. The reality is that Ukrainian forces are currently pummeling the Russian defenses. While the process is slow, Russian command is 100% freaking out about the prospect of a Southern breakthrough. It's practically a repeat of the Kherson offensive, which for many months didn't seem to be moving at all, then began rolling, and then suddenly the Russian defenses collapsed. The Kharkiv offensive was similar in that Ukrainian forces chipped away at the defenses for months before Russian troops had to suddenly withdraw and surrender the entire oblast. Ukraine is still absolutely on pace for another collapse of the Russian defenses. We've been seeing many indicators of a potential breakthrough, possibly even before the end of 2023. That isn't to say this war is going smoothly in Ukraine's favor. But anyone comparing this to a stalemate has absolutely no idea how war actually works in real life. First of all, there was no chipping at Kharkov defences, that part of the front was quiet for months, hence Russian command moved combat forces to other areas, leaving thin green line of LDPR reservists there, and neglected the information about gathering Ukrainian forces there, which later led to collapse of the front. In Kherson the main issue forcing a retreat was logistics hanging on two bridges being more and more damaged each day and potential destruction of the dam, which would cut off all Russian forces on the bridgehead. Neither of these conditions apply to current situation. Also some people who study how the war works in real life for a living tend to disagree with you: https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/russian-fortifications-present-an-old-problem-for-ukraine/ Ukraine definitely, without even the slightest of doubts, chipped away at the Russian defenses in and around Kharkiv before the Kharkiv offensive. The same is true for Kherson. While the following images from 2022 are not accurate (because back then the inaccuracies were far more numerous), we can still see some general trends. The first image shows the territorial changes between April 6 (after Russia withdrew from the North) and May 15. While there were many contested areas, it's very clear that Ukraine was seeing much success in and around the Kharkiv region. Meanwhile Russia focused its efforts on the region near Sievierodonetsk. ![[image loading]](https://abload.de/img/1-april6bismai152022-r2i16.png) The second image shows May 15 until Sept 16 (until about one week before the grand Kharkiv offensive). During those four months Ukraine was carving out more space in the Kharkiv region. Russian command had failed to respect the threat of a collapse of the Kharkiv oblast, presumably because it looked like Russia was contesting the region from its own borders in the North. Those smaller advances later proved to be unsubstantial. Ukraine was making a lot of progress from various directions, most notably reclaiming most of the recently lost territory South of Izium and also pushing further to the East of Kharkiv city. A lot of reports were coming out about Ukraine's progress in the Izium region. With hindsight we know that the whole oblast - and not just Izium - was in the process of being encircled while Russia was distracted near Sievierodonetsk. When you look at both maps, it's fairly clear that Ukraine focused most of its offensive efforts on three regions: Kharkiv, Kherson and later also Zaporizhzhia. These fronts were not "quiet" in any capacity. Russia simply did not react appropriately to the various threats. Ukraine was very busy in all three regions. Russian command should've respected this fact, but they did not. Additionally, the fact that the Dnipro made the region in the North of Kherson too dangerous to hold on to - perhaps because here Russia, and not only Ukraine, had claimed some territory in the previous months - was also underestimated by Russian command. Perhaps they were thinking too much in purely territorial changes and not enough strategically. ![[image loading]](https://abload.de/img/2-mai15bissept162022-kpiij.png) These maps are super interesting. Where do you find them?
From the Youtube channel balkan mapper. They've been reporting daily on the territorial changes (and other information) since the first day of the invasion.
https://www.youtube.com/c/balkanmaping/videos
Every few months I take screenshots and upload edited versions (like the above) so people can see the changes.
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