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On August 28 2023 07:14 Yurie wrote:Show nested quote +On August 27 2023 22:56 Excludos wrote:On August 27 2023 22:52 Magic Powers wrote:On August 27 2023 22:39 Excludos wrote:On August 27 2023 20:24 Magic Powers wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On August 27 2023 17:33 Ardias wrote:Show nested quote +On August 26 2023 19:53 Magic Powers wrote:People need to read this. Personally, I suspect that the consistent framing of the war as a stalemate is top-down orchestrated information warfare by anti-Ukrainian agents. Sowing seeds of doubt. The goal is very obviously to undermine support for Ukraine in the short and long run. The claims have nothing to do with the reality on the ground. The reality is that Ukrainian forces are currently pummeling the Russian defenses. While the process is slow, Russian command is 100% freaking out about the prospect of a Southern breakthrough. It's practically a repeat of the Kherson offensive, which for many months didn't seem to be moving at all, then began rolling, and then suddenly the Russian defenses collapsed. The Kharkiv offensive was similar in that Ukrainian forces chipped away at the defenses for months before Russian troops had to suddenly withdraw and surrender the entire oblast. Ukraine is still absolutely on pace for another collapse of the Russian defenses. We've been seeing many indicators of a potential breakthrough, possibly even before the end of 2023. That isn't to say this war is going smoothly in Ukraine's favor. But anyone comparing this to a stalemate has absolutely no idea how war actually works in real life. First of all, there was no chipping at Kharkov defences, that part of the front was quiet for months, hence Russian command moved combat forces to other areas, leaving thin green line of LDPR reservists there, and neglected the information about gathering Ukrainian forces there, which later led to collapse of the front. In Kherson the main issue forcing a retreat was logistics hanging on two bridges being more and more damaged each day and potential destruction of the dam, which would cut off all Russian forces on the bridgehead. Neither of these conditions apply to current situation. Also some people who study how the war works in real life for a living tend to disagree with you: https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/russian-fortifications-present-an-old-problem-for-ukraine/ Ukraine definitely, without even the slightest of doubts, chipped away at the Russian defenses in and around Kharkiv before the Kharkiv offensive. The same is true for Kherson. While the following images from 2022 are not accurate (because back then the inaccuracies were far more numerous), we can still see some general trends. The first image shows the territorial changes between April 6 (after Russia withdrew from the North) and May 15. While there were many contested areas, it's very clear that Ukraine was seeing much success in and around the Kharkiv region. Meanwhile Russia focused its efforts on the region near Sievierodonetsk. ![[image loading]](https://abload.de/img/1-april6bismai152022-r2i16.png) The second image shows May 15 until Sept 16 (until about one week before the grand Kharkiv offensive). During those four months Ukraine was carving out more space in the Kharkiv region. Russian command had failed to respect the threat of a collapse of the Kharkiv oblast, presumably because it looked like Russia was contesting the region from its own borders in the North. Those smaller advances later proved to be unsubstantial. Ukraine was making a lot of progress from various directions, most notably reclaiming most of the recently lost territory South of Izium and also pushing further to the East of Kharkiv city. A lot of reports were coming out about Ukraine's progress in the Izium region. With hindsight we know that the whole oblast - and not just Izium - was in the process of being encircled while Russia was distracted near Sievierodonetsk. When you look at both maps, it's fairly clear that Ukraine focused most of its offensive efforts on three regions: Kharkiv, Kherson and later also Zaporizhzhia. These fronts were not "quiet" in any capacity. Russia simply did not react appropriately to the various threats. Ukraine was very busy in all three regions. Russian command should've respected this fact, but they did not. Additionally, the fact that the Dnipro made the region in the North of Kherson too dangerous to hold on to - perhaps because here Russia, and not only Ukraine, had claimed some territory in the previous months - was also underestimated by Russian command. Perhaps they were thinking too much in purely territorial changes and not enough strategically. ![[image loading]](https://abload.de/img/2-mai15bissept162022-kpiij.png) These maps are super interesting. Where do you find them? From the Youtube channel balkan mapper. They've been reporting daily on the territorial changes (and other information) since the first day of the invasion. https://www.youtube.com/c/balkanmaping/videosEvery few months I take screenshots and upload edited versions so people can see the changes. Ah, ok. Damn. Was hoping for a dynamic map I could open intermittently and check myself Kind of this: https://liveuamap.com/ (there is time in top right on PC)
Thank you for this one! This is a really helpful tool to keep oneself updated that isn't just one-sided reporting
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On August 28 2023 23:58 Excludos wrote:Show nested quote +On August 28 2023 07:14 Yurie wrote:On August 27 2023 22:56 Excludos wrote:On August 27 2023 22:52 Magic Powers wrote:On August 27 2023 22:39 Excludos wrote:On August 27 2023 20:24 Magic Powers wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On August 27 2023 17:33 Ardias wrote:Show nested quote +On August 26 2023 19:53 Magic Powers wrote:People need to read this. Personally, I suspect that the consistent framing of the war as a stalemate is top-down orchestrated information warfare by anti-Ukrainian agents. Sowing seeds of doubt. The goal is very obviously to undermine support for Ukraine in the short and long run. The claims have nothing to do with the reality on the ground. The reality is that Ukrainian forces are currently pummeling the Russian defenses. While the process is slow, Russian command is 100% freaking out about the prospect of a Southern breakthrough. It's practically a repeat of the Kherson offensive, which for many months didn't seem to be moving at all, then began rolling, and then suddenly the Russian defenses collapsed. The Kharkiv offensive was similar in that Ukrainian forces chipped away at the defenses for months before Russian troops had to suddenly withdraw and surrender the entire oblast. Ukraine is still absolutely on pace for another collapse of the Russian defenses. We've been seeing many indicators of a potential breakthrough, possibly even before the end of 2023. That isn't to say this war is going smoothly in Ukraine's favor. But anyone comparing this to a stalemate has absolutely no idea how war actually works in real life. First of all, there was no chipping at Kharkov defences, that part of the front was quiet for months, hence Russian command moved combat forces to other areas, leaving thin green line of LDPR reservists there, and neglected the information about gathering Ukrainian forces there, which later led to collapse of the front. In Kherson the main issue forcing a retreat was logistics hanging on two bridges being more and more damaged each day and potential destruction of the dam, which would cut off all Russian forces on the bridgehead. Neither of these conditions apply to current situation. Also some people who study how the war works in real life for a living tend to disagree with you: https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/russian-fortifications-present-an-old-problem-for-ukraine/ Ukraine definitely, without even the slightest of doubts, chipped away at the Russian defenses in and around Kharkiv before the Kharkiv offensive. The same is true for Kherson. While the following images from 2022 are not accurate (because back then the inaccuracies were far more numerous), we can still see some general trends. The first image shows the territorial changes between April 6 (after Russia withdrew from the North) and May 15. While there were many contested areas, it's very clear that Ukraine was seeing much success in and around the Kharkiv region. Meanwhile Russia focused its efforts on the region near Sievierodonetsk. The second image shows May 15 until Sept 16 (until about one week before the grand Kharkiv offensive). During those four months Ukraine was carving out more space in the Kharkiv region. Russian command had failed to respect the threat of a collapse of the Kharkiv oblast, presumably because it looked like Russia was contesting the region from its own borders in the North. Those smaller advances later proved to be unsubstantial. Ukraine was making a lot of progress from various directions, most notably reclaiming most of the recently lost territory South of Izium and also pushing further to the East of Kharkiv city. A lot of reports were coming out about Ukraine's progress in the Izium region. With hindsight we know that the whole oblast - and not just Izium - was in the process of being encircled while Russia was distracted near Sievierodonetsk. When you look at both maps, it's fairly clear that Ukraine focused most of its offensive efforts on three regions: Kharkiv, Kherson and later also Zaporizhzhia. These fronts were not "quiet" in any capacity. Russia simply did not react appropriately to the various threats. Ukraine was very busy in all three regions. Russian command should've respected this fact, but they did not. Additionally, the fact that the Dnipro made the region in the North of Kherson too dangerous to hold on to - perhaps because here Russia, and not only Ukraine, had claimed some territory in the previous months - was also underestimated by Russian command. Perhaps they were thinking too much in purely territorial changes and not enough strategically. These maps are super interesting. Where do you find them? From the Youtube channel balkan mapper. They've been reporting daily on the territorial changes (and other information) since the first day of the invasion. https://www.youtube.com/c/balkanmaping/videosEvery few months I take screenshots and upload edited versions so people can see the changes. Ah, ok. Damn. Was hoping for a dynamic map I could open intermittently and check myself Kind of this: https://liveuamap.com/ (there is time in top right on PC) Thank you for this one! This is a really helpful tool to keep oneself updated that isn't just one-sided reporting
Bit of both. Ukraine is running strict information blackout, and have been for a while. However a lot of videos still surface from the Ukrainian side as well, likely extremely tightly vetted and controlled. This is how we know Ukraine has taken certain towns or done certain actions right after Russia has gone public and denied it. As important as OPSEC is, it's equally important for Ukraine to show the world that stuff is happening
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On August 28 2023 23:37 KwarK wrote:
Yeah, they’re probably giving up their fortifications, letting Ukraine’s artillery get into range of strategic vulnerabilities, and rushing reinforcements to the line precisely because of how well it’s going for them.
It's quite interesting actually, as we are talking about 3 lines of defense, but like you say, if the first line falls, there will not be logistical support for the other 2 lines, and technically, taking 500m can make the critical difference in that direction.
And I kind of agree that we can consider it a fact that Russia losses are vastly superior to Ukrainian ones, we don't need to bring sources anymore at this point.
Russia does not have enough missile to continue to strike critical civile infrastructure. Russia does not have enough shells for its artillery to continue like they did before.
Russia is broke and can only afford to try and defend what they have captured. Hoping now that defending will be cheaper than attacking.
Kharkiv push back in the days clearly was cheaper than normal offense and done with light material...
Either the Russian defense collapse or the Russian regime collapses.
Though I've never seen so much foreign "love" for Putin as when Wagner started to march toward Moscow. No one in western wants chaos and shit for Russia.
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On August 28 2023 23:55 JimmiC wrote:
Isn't a lot of the information that is bad for Russia in the south currently coming from Russian bloggers while the Ukrainians have been pretty quiet about it?
I read both sides, pro-Russian sources have rarely been this optimistic about how everything is going, even the doomers. We've already talked about the fake 'Russian bloggers' here, nobody takes that seriously. Most of the hopium and copium about Rabotne comes from pro-Ukraine sources citing their own bot Russian sources. Today is only the 5th day in a row 'Rabotne has fallen'
On August 28 2023 23:37 KwarK wrote:
Yeah, they’re probably giving up their fortifications, letting Ukraine’s artillery get into range of strategic vulnerabilities, and rushing reinforcements to the line precisely because of how well it’s going for them.
The Russians are really on the ropes here, its over, better flood every piece of equipment and valuable artillery into that pocket under 24/7 drone and artillery coverage so they can be 1km closer to the 'strategic vulnerabilities'. They should totally do that 100% Russia is done for. Its over, those are the last troops Russia has. No way the line will be at the same place in a week. No way.
On August 28 2023 23:58 Excludos wrote:Show nested quote +On August 28 2023 07:14 Yurie wrote:On August 27 2023 22:56 Excludos wrote:On August 27 2023 22:52 Magic Powers wrote:On August 27 2023 22:39 Excludos wrote:On August 27 2023 20:24 Magic Powers wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On August 27 2023 17:33 Ardias wrote:Show nested quote +On August 26 2023 19:53 Magic Powers wrote:People need to read this. Personally, I suspect that the consistent framing of the war as a stalemate is top-down orchestrated information warfare by anti-Ukrainian agents. Sowing seeds of doubt. The goal is very obviously to undermine support for Ukraine in the short and long run. The claims have nothing to do with the reality on the ground. The reality is that Ukrainian forces are currently pummeling the Russian defenses. While the process is slow, Russian command is 100% freaking out about the prospect of a Southern breakthrough. It's practically a repeat of the Kherson offensive, which for many months didn't seem to be moving at all, then began rolling, and then suddenly the Russian defenses collapsed. The Kharkiv offensive was similar in that Ukrainian forces chipped away at the defenses for months before Russian troops had to suddenly withdraw and surrender the entire oblast. Ukraine is still absolutely on pace for another collapse of the Russian defenses. We've been seeing many indicators of a potential breakthrough, possibly even before the end of 2023. That isn't to say this war is going smoothly in Ukraine's favor. But anyone comparing this to a stalemate has absolutely no idea how war actually works in real life. First of all, there was no chipping at Kharkov defences, that part of the front was quiet for months, hence Russian command moved combat forces to other areas, leaving thin green line of LDPR reservists there, and neglected the information about gathering Ukrainian forces there, which later led to collapse of the front. In Kherson the main issue forcing a retreat was logistics hanging on two bridges being more and more damaged each day and potential destruction of the dam, which would cut off all Russian forces on the bridgehead. Neither of these conditions apply to current situation. Also some people who study how the war works in real life for a living tend to disagree with you: https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/russian-fortifications-present-an-old-problem-for-ukraine/ Ukraine definitely, without even the slightest of doubts, chipped away at the Russian defenses in and around Kharkiv before the Kharkiv offensive. The same is true for Kherson. While the following images from 2022 are not accurate (because back then the inaccuracies were far more numerous), we can still see some general trends. The first image shows the territorial changes between April 6 (after Russia withdrew from the North) and May 15. While there were many contested areas, it's very clear that Ukraine was seeing much success in and around the Kharkiv region. Meanwhile Russia focused its efforts on the region near Sievierodonetsk. The second image shows May 15 until Sept 16 (until about one week before the grand Kharkiv offensive). During those four months Ukraine was carving out more space in the Kharkiv region. Russian command had failed to respect the threat of a collapse of the Kharkiv oblast, presumably because it looked like Russia was contesting the region from its own borders in the North. Those smaller advances later proved to be unsubstantial. Ukraine was making a lot of progress from various directions, most notably reclaiming most of the recently lost territory South of Izium and also pushing further to the East of Kharkiv city. A lot of reports were coming out about Ukraine's progress in the Izium region. With hindsight we know that the whole oblast - and not just Izium - was in the process of being encircled while Russia was distracted near Sievierodonetsk. When you look at both maps, it's fairly clear that Ukraine focused most of its offensive efforts on three regions: Kharkiv, Kherson and later also Zaporizhzhia. These fronts were not "quiet" in any capacity. Russia simply did not react appropriately to the various threats. Ukraine was very busy in all three regions. Russian command should've respected this fact, but they did not. Additionally, the fact that the Dnipro made the region in the North of Kherson too dangerous to hold on to - perhaps because here Russia, and not only Ukraine, had claimed some territory in the previous months - was also underestimated by Russian command. Perhaps they were thinking too much in purely territorial changes and not enough strategically. These maps are super interesting. Where do you find them? From the Youtube channel balkan mapper. They've been reporting daily on the territorial changes (and other information) since the first day of the invasion. https://www.youtube.com/c/balkanmaping/videosEvery few months I take screenshots and upload edited versions so people can see the changes. Ah, ok. Damn. Was hoping for a dynamic map I could open intermittently and check myself Kind of this: https://liveuamap.com/ (there is time in top right on PC) Thank you for this one! This is a really helpful tool to keep oneself updated that isn't just one-sided reporting
Liveupmap is one of the most pro-UKR / pro-Maidan sources/maps out there.
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On August 29 2023 00:33 zeo wrote:Show nested quote +On August 28 2023 23:55 JimmiC wrote:
Isn't a lot of the information that is bad for Russia in the south currently coming from Russian bloggers while the Ukrainians have been pretty quiet about it? I read both sides, pro-Russian sources have rarely been this optimistic about how everything is going, even the doomers. We've already talked about the fake 'Russian bloggers' here, nobody takes that seriously. Most of the hopium and copium about Rabotne comes from pro-Ukraine sources citing their own bot Russian sources. Today is only the 5th day in a row 'Rabotne has fallen' Show nested quote +On August 28 2023 23:37 KwarK wrote:
Yeah, they’re probably giving up their fortifications, letting Ukraine’s artillery get into range of strategic vulnerabilities, and rushing reinforcements to the line precisely because of how well it’s going for them. The Russians are really on the ropes here, its over, better flood every piece of equipment and valuable artillery into that pocket under 24/7 drone and artillery coverage so they can be 1km closer to the 'strategic vulnerabilities'. They should totally do that 100% Russia is done for. Its over, those are the last troops Russia has. No way the line will be at the same place in a week. No way. Show nested quote +On August 28 2023 23:58 Excludos wrote:On August 28 2023 07:14 Yurie wrote:On August 27 2023 22:56 Excludos wrote:On August 27 2023 22:52 Magic Powers wrote:On August 27 2023 22:39 Excludos wrote:On August 27 2023 20:24 Magic Powers wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On August 27 2023 17:33 Ardias wrote:Show nested quote +On August 26 2023 19:53 Magic Powers wrote:People need to read this. Personally, I suspect that the consistent framing of the war as a stalemate is top-down orchestrated information warfare by anti-Ukrainian agents. Sowing seeds of doubt. The goal is very obviously to undermine support for Ukraine in the short and long run. The claims have nothing to do with the reality on the ground. The reality is that Ukrainian forces are currently pummeling the Russian defenses. While the process is slow, Russian command is 100% freaking out about the prospect of a Southern breakthrough. It's practically a repeat of the Kherson offensive, which for many months didn't seem to be moving at all, then began rolling, and then suddenly the Russian defenses collapsed. The Kharkiv offensive was similar in that Ukrainian forces chipped away at the defenses for months before Russian troops had to suddenly withdraw and surrender the entire oblast. Ukraine is still absolutely on pace for another collapse of the Russian defenses. We've been seeing many indicators of a potential breakthrough, possibly even before the end of 2023. That isn't to say this war is going smoothly in Ukraine's favor. But anyone comparing this to a stalemate has absolutely no idea how war actually works in real life. First of all, there was no chipping at Kharkov defences, that part of the front was quiet for months, hence Russian command moved combat forces to other areas, leaving thin green line of LDPR reservists there, and neglected the information about gathering Ukrainian forces there, which later led to collapse of the front. In Kherson the main issue forcing a retreat was logistics hanging on two bridges being more and more damaged each day and potential destruction of the dam, which would cut off all Russian forces on the bridgehead. Neither of these conditions apply to current situation. Also some people who study how the war works in real life for a living tend to disagree with you: https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/russian-fortifications-present-an-old-problem-for-ukraine/ Ukraine definitely, without even the slightest of doubts, chipped away at the Russian defenses in and around Kharkiv before the Kharkiv offensive. The same is true for Kherson. While the following images from 2022 are not accurate (because back then the inaccuracies were far more numerous), we can still see some general trends. The first image shows the territorial changes between April 6 (after Russia withdrew from the North) and May 15. While there were many contested areas, it's very clear that Ukraine was seeing much success in and around the Kharkiv region. Meanwhile Russia focused its efforts on the region near Sievierodonetsk. The second image shows May 15 until Sept 16 (until about one week before the grand Kharkiv offensive). During those four months Ukraine was carving out more space in the Kharkiv region. Russian command had failed to respect the threat of a collapse of the Kharkiv oblast, presumably because it looked like Russia was contesting the region from its own borders in the North. Those smaller advances later proved to be unsubstantial. Ukraine was making a lot of progress from various directions, most notably reclaiming most of the recently lost territory South of Izium and also pushing further to the East of Kharkiv city. A lot of reports were coming out about Ukraine's progress in the Izium region. With hindsight we know that the whole oblast - and not just Izium - was in the process of being encircled while Russia was distracted near Sievierodonetsk. When you look at both maps, it's fairly clear that Ukraine focused most of its offensive efforts on three regions: Kharkiv, Kherson and later also Zaporizhzhia. These fronts were not "quiet" in any capacity. Russia simply did not react appropriately to the various threats. Ukraine was very busy in all three regions. Russian command should've respected this fact, but they did not. Additionally, the fact that the Dnipro made the region in the North of Kherson too dangerous to hold on to - perhaps because here Russia, and not only Ukraine, had claimed some territory in the previous months - was also underestimated by Russian command. Perhaps they were thinking too much in purely territorial changes and not enough strategically. These maps are super interesting. Where do you find them? From the Youtube channel balkan mapper. They've been reporting daily on the territorial changes (and other information) since the first day of the invasion. https://www.youtube.com/c/balkanmaping/videosEvery few months I take screenshots and upload edited versions so people can see the changes. Ah, ok. Damn. Was hoping for a dynamic map I could open intermittently and check myself Kind of this: https://liveuamap.com/ (there is time in top right on PC) Thank you for this one! This is a really helpful tool to keep oneself updated that isn't just one-sided reporting Liveuamap is one of the most pro-UKR / pro-Maidan sources/maps out there.
I do not believe a second you read both side.
And the claim that pro-russian side has rarely been this optimistic about how everything is going is really weird even from you, most of the hopium and copium from you has it's source from Kremlin troll farms.
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On August 29 2023 00:33 zeo wrote:
Liveupmap is one of the most pro-UKR / pro-Maidan sources/maps out there.
Of course it is. Anything that doesn't mesh with your narrative is pro-UKR after all. All those red dots that shows Russian shelling is just made up by brainwashed pro Ukrainians for...reasons
When reality turns "pro-UKR", it might be time to reevaluate your own worldview here buddy
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United States41989 Posts
On August 29 2023 00:33 zeo wrote:Show nested quote +On August 28 2023 23:37 KwarK wrote:
Yeah, they’re probably giving up their fortifications, letting Ukraine’s artillery get into range of strategic vulnerabilities, and rushing reinforcements to the line precisely because of how well it’s going for them. The Russians are really on the ropes here, its over, better flood every piece of equipment and valuable artillery into that pocket under 24/7 drone and artillery coverage so they can be 1km closer to the 'strategic vulnerabilities'. They should totally do that 100% Russia is done for. Its over, those are the last troops Russia has. No way the line will be at the same place in a week. No way.
This is a pretty weak attempt to move the goalposts so that you can claim you’re right if Ukraine haven’t broken through in one week. Again, comes down to “they’re not winning fast enough”.
Last week you were insisting they were making zero progress against Robotyne just days before the Russians broke and fled.
On August 19 2023 16:19 zeo wrote:
If you think saying Rabotyne is still there after more than two months of offensives
Now they’ve fled you’ve changed to insisting that while the old line did in fact move, the new line won’t move. Until of course it does. And then you’ll be insisting that the new new line won’t move. And if it does move, well, it didn’t move fast enough.
It’s like you don’t know that we can see your previous posts and that we remember what you said. You flip between “they’re not making progress” and “that progress doesn’t count” shamelessly.
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Left: Kharkiv oblast one week before a major offensive.
Right: Zaporizhzhia oblast a few days ago.
![[image loading]](https://bilderhochladen.at/uploads/d00c9794defin.png)
Doesn't seem to look so great for the Russian forces.
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On August 29 2023 00:54 KwarK wrote:Show nested quote +On August 29 2023 00:33 zeo wrote:On August 28 2023 23:37 KwarK wrote:
Yeah, they’re probably giving up their fortifications, letting Ukraine’s artillery get into range of strategic vulnerabilities, and rushing reinforcements to the line precisely because of how well it’s going for them. The Russians are really on the ropes here, its over, better flood every piece of equipment and valuable artillery into that pocket under 24/7 drone and artillery coverage so they can be 1km closer to the 'strategic vulnerabilities'. They should totally do that 100% Russia is done for. Its over, those are the last troops Russia has. No way the line will be at the same place in a week. No way. This is a pretty weak attempt to move the goalposts so that you can claim you’re right if Ukraine haven’t broken through in one week. Again, comes down to “they’re not winning fast enough”. Last week you were insisting they were making zero progress against Robotyne just days before the Russians broke and fled. Show nested quote +On August 19 2023 16:19 zeo wrote:
If you think saying Rabotyne is still there after more than two months of offensives Now they’ve fled you’ve changed to insisting that while the old line did in fact move, the new line won’t move. Until of course it does. And then you’ll be insisting that the new new line won’t move. And if it does move, well, it didn’t move fast enough. It’s like you don’t know that we can see your previous posts and that we remember what you said. You flip between “they’re not making progress” and “that progress doesn’t count” shamelessly.
I'm pretty sure that once the war reaches its inevitable conclusion, zeo will claim that the whole point of Putin's adventure was to pull out from Ukraine. ;-)
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On August 29 2023 00:37 JimmiC wrote:Show nested quote +On August 29 2023 00:33 zeo wrote:On August 28 2023 23:55 JimmiC wrote:
Isn't a lot of the information that is bad for Russia in the south currently coming from Russian bloggers while the Ukrainians have been pretty quiet about it? I read both sides, pro-Russian sources have rarely been this optimistic about how everything is going, even the doomers. We've already talked about the fake 'Russian bloggers' here, nobody takes that seriously. Most of the hopium and copium about Rabotne comes from pro-Ukraine sources citing their own bot Russian sources. Today is only the 5th day in a row 'Rabotne has fallen' On August 28 2023 23:37 KwarK wrote:
Yeah, they’re probably giving up their fortifications, letting Ukraine’s artillery get into range of strategic vulnerabilities, and rushing reinforcements to the line precisely because of how well it’s going for them. The Russians are really on the ropes here, its over, better flood every piece of equipment and valuable artillery into that pocket under 24/7 drone and artillery coverage so they can be 1km closer to the 'strategic vulnerabilities'. They should totally do that 100% Russia is done for. Its over, those are the last troops Russia has. No way the line will be at the same place in a week. No way. On August 28 2023 23:58 Excludos wrote:On August 28 2023 07:14 Yurie wrote:On August 27 2023 22:56 Excludos wrote:On August 27 2023 22:52 Magic Powers wrote:On August 27 2023 22:39 Excludos wrote:On August 27 2023 20:24 Magic Powers wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On August 27 2023 17:33 Ardias wrote:Show nested quote +On August 26 2023 19:53 Magic Powers wrote:People need to read this. Personally, I suspect that the consistent framing of the war as a stalemate is top-down orchestrated information warfare by anti-Ukrainian agents. Sowing seeds of doubt. The goal is very obviously to undermine support for Ukraine in the short and long run. The claims have nothing to do with the reality on the ground. The reality is that Ukrainian forces are currently pummeling the Russian defenses. While the process is slow, Russian command is 100% freaking out about the prospect of a Southern breakthrough. It's practically a repeat of the Kherson offensive, which for many months didn't seem to be moving at all, then began rolling, and then suddenly the Russian defenses collapsed. The Kharkiv offensive was similar in that Ukrainian forces chipped away at the defenses for months before Russian troops had to suddenly withdraw and surrender the entire oblast. Ukraine is still absolutely on pace for another collapse of the Russian defenses. We've been seeing many indicators of a potential breakthrough, possibly even before the end of 2023. That isn't to say this war is going smoothly in Ukraine's favor. But anyone comparing this to a stalemate has absolutely no idea how war actually works in real life. First of all, there was no chipping at Kharkov defences, that part of the front was quiet for months, hence Russian command moved combat forces to other areas, leaving thin green line of LDPR reservists there, and neglected the information about gathering Ukrainian forces there, which later led to collapse of the front. In Kherson the main issue forcing a retreat was logistics hanging on two bridges being more and more damaged each day and potential destruction of the dam, which would cut off all Russian forces on the bridgehead. Neither of these conditions apply to current situation. Also some people who study how the war works in real life for a living tend to disagree with you: https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/russian-fortifications-present-an-old-problem-for-ukraine/ Ukraine definitely, without even the slightest of doubts, chipped away at the Russian defenses in and around Kharkiv before the Kharkiv offensive. The same is true for Kherson. While the following images from 2022 are not accurate (because back then the inaccuracies were far more numerous), we can still see some general trends. The first image shows the territorial changes between April 6 (after Russia withdrew from the North) and May 15. While there were many contested areas, it's very clear that Ukraine was seeing much success in and around the Kharkiv region. Meanwhile Russia focused its efforts on the region near Sievierodonetsk. The second image shows May 15 until Sept 16 (until about one week before the grand Kharkiv offensive). During those four months Ukraine was carving out more space in the Kharkiv region. Russian command had failed to respect the threat of a collapse of the Kharkiv oblast, presumably because it looked like Russia was contesting the region from its own borders in the North. Those smaller advances later proved to be unsubstantial. Ukraine was making a lot of progress from various directions, most notably reclaiming most of the recently lost territory South of Izium and also pushing further to the East of Kharkiv city. A lot of reports were coming out about Ukraine's progress in the Izium region. With hindsight we know that the whole oblast - and not just Izium - was in the process of being encircled while Russia was distracted near Sievierodonetsk. When you look at both maps, it's fairly clear that Ukraine focused most of its offensive efforts on three regions: Kharkiv, Kherson and later also Zaporizhzhia. These fronts were not "quiet" in any capacity. Russia simply did not react appropriately to the various threats. Ukraine was very busy in all three regions. Russian command should've respected this fact, but they did not. Additionally, the fact that the Dnipro made the region in the North of Kherson too dangerous to hold on to - perhaps because here Russia, and not only Ukraine, had claimed some territory in the previous months - was also underestimated by Russian command. Perhaps they were thinking too much in purely territorial changes and not enough strategically. These maps are super interesting. Where do you find them? From the Youtube channel balkan mapper. They've been reporting daily on the territorial changes (and other information) since the first day of the invasion. https://www.youtube.com/c/balkanmaping/videosEvery few months I take screenshots and upload edited versions so people can see the changes. Ah, ok. Damn. Was hoping for a dynamic map I could open intermittently and check myself Kind of this: https://liveuamap.com/ (there is time in top right on PC) Thank you for this one! This is a really helpful tool to keep oneself updated that isn't just one-sided reporting Liveuamap is one of the most pro-UKR / pro-Maidan sources/maps out there. Post your balanced sources than. It appears you only talk about everything else is bad. Give the us the good accurate stuff you get. And what's your opinion on Robotnye? Is it still under Russian control? Are they setting up a pincer? Give us your wisdom.
For maps? I like this one Ukraine Control Map they are pro-Kiev but they seem to put a lot of emphasis on troop deployment of both sides. Usually its either one side or the other. EDIT: also they put effort into using geolocation sources
On August 29 2023 00:54 KwarK wrote:Show nested quote +On August 29 2023 00:33 zeo wrote:On August 28 2023 23:37 KwarK wrote:
Yeah, they’re probably giving up their fortifications, letting Ukraine’s artillery get into range of strategic vulnerabilities, and rushing reinforcements to the line precisely because of how well it’s going for them. The Russians are really on the ropes here, its over, better flood every piece of equipment and valuable artillery into that pocket under 24/7 drone and artillery coverage so they can be 1km closer to the 'strategic vulnerabilities'. They should totally do that 100% Russia is done for. Its over, those are the last troops Russia has. No way the line will be at the same place in a week. No way. This is a pretty weak attempt to move the goalposts so that you can claim you’re right if Ukraine haven’t broken through in one week. Again, comes down to “they’re not winning fast enough”. Last week you were insisting they were making zero progress against Robotyne just days before the Russians broke and fled. Show nested quote +On August 19 2023 16:19 zeo wrote:
If you think saying Rabotyne is still there after more than two months of offensives Now they’ve fled you’ve changed to insisting that while the old line did in fact move, the new line won’t move. Until of course it does. And then you’ll be insisting that the new new line won’t move. And if it does move, well, it didn’t move fast enough. It’s like you don’t know that we can see your previous posts and that we remember what you said. You flip between “they’re not making progress” and “that progress doesn’t count” shamelessly.
'Broke and fled from Robotnye'. They are still there in the village, the south is no mans land. It is basically zero progress compared to the massive casualties and lost armor / firepower. Taking small territory with repeated human wave attacks is not a viable strategic option. Eventually you run out of humans to wave. I'm just here waiting for the inevitable cope and spin about why the all conquering offensive is still stalled where it is today in a months time.
Most realists thought that Ukraine would make some gains, but everyone really expected a lot more than this. Three months into this offensive and this is all Kiev has managed, this was supposed to be a first day or first couple of hours objective at the very least it needed to fall in the first week to be considered not good, but not bad either. Instead, it took over three months for that to happen (and its still not over). The losses taken just to get through the screening zone and get to the real lines of defense are what were planned for the entire operation to the Azov Sea.
The western armor is wasted, manpower decimated. Other areas where they were conducting offensives petered out because they syphoned forces off to send to this front. Bahmut is basically 100% safe now after how many months of frontal assaults by UKR units. The Robotne salient now is surrounded by Russian forces on three sides and losing steam fast like the 'breakthroughs' at Uroziane, Pyatihatky ect.
There are very few metrics left that can be used to not describe this offensive as anything other than a failure. Its not a disaster yet, but its well on its way to becoming one if they keep this up.
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So it appears the multiple Russian jets destroyed by Ukraine were reportedly done by cardboard drones. From Australia.
Ukrainian forces reportedly used SYPAQ Corvo Precision Payload Delivery System, or PPDS, drones as loitering munitions to carry out an attack on an undisclosed Russian airfield.
The SYPAQ PPDS drone boasts an operational range of up to 120 kilometers (74 miles), 3 kilograms of payload, and a cruise speed of 60 kilometers per hour (37 miles per hour).
But what makes the PPDS stand out is that it is primarily made from a material similar to cardboard. It is a low-cost, expendable platform that can be transported as a small package and assembled rapidly with minimal tools. Its composition also makes it harder to detect by radar systems.
In May 2023, the Melbourne-based company reported having delivered the system to Ukraine.
“It is an honor to be supporting the Ukrainian Armed Forces,” SYPAQ CEO Amanda Holt said at the time. “PPDS is an Australian capability that will help the Ukrainian people defend their country.”
AeroTime has sent a request for comment to SYPAQ.
The first use of the PPDS by the Ukrainian military was reported on August 27, 2023, by the Fighterbomber Telegram channel, which is run by a person associated with the Russian Air Force.
“Tonight, [Ukrainians] used them in a swarm, mixing drones with warheads with empty drones,” the post read. “I don’t know exactly what engines were on the drones, but if they were electric-powered, then they were not launched from Ukraine.”
Though the exact location of the strikes was not shared, both Ukraine and Russia reported a drone attack on Kursk Vostochny Airfield the same day.
An insider from the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) told Kyiv Post that a significant quantity of drones was deployed, resulting in the claimed destruction of four Su-30 aircraft and one MiG-29. Additionally, two missile launchers belonging to a Pantsir air defense system, as well as the radars of an S-300 air defense system, were reportedly damaged.
The Russian news agency TASS reported that “aircraft-type UAVs” were intercepted by Russian air defense systems over Kursk, with one drone causing damage to an apartment building.
Kursk Airfield is located 97 kilometers (60 miles) away from the Ukrainian border.
Source
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Cardboard drones 🤣 weak and strong!
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It is fascinating how simply making the flying object as small as possible creates a checkmate situation against anti-air capabilities. It looks like a combination of "make them smaller" and "use a bunch of them" is a huge weakness of Russian air defense.
Has western air defense had the same weakness? I imagine this is something all major systems have a hard time with, since it would not be a design consideration previously.
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On August 29 2023 07:05 Mohdoo wrote:
It is fascinating how simply making the flying object as small as possible creates a checkmate situation against anti-air capabilities. It looks like a combination of "make them smaller" and "use a bunch of them" is a huge weakness of Russian air defense.
Has western air defense had the same weakness? I imagine this is something all major systems have a hard time with, since it would not be a design consideration previously. Who knows what the US was or was not ready for.
But in my completely uninformed opinion I imagine there might be a tiny bit of panic as they look at the success of large numbers of cheap tiny drones and wonder what the hell they are going to do if they were on the receiving end.
When we thought of drones changing the future of warfare the idea was big reaper drones with missiles flying around up high. Not a dozen small cardboard boxes.
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On August 29 2023 07:12 Gorsameth wrote:Show nested quote +On August 29 2023 07:05 Mohdoo wrote:
It is fascinating how simply making the flying object as small as possible creates a checkmate situation against anti-air capabilities. It looks like a combination of "make them smaller" and "use a bunch of them" is a huge weakness of Russian air defense.
Has western air defense had the same weakness? I imagine this is something all major systems have a hard time with, since it would not be a design consideration previously. Who knows what the US was or was not ready for. But in my completely uninformed opinion I imagine there might be a tiny bit of panic as they look at the success of large numbers of cheap tiny drones and wonder what the hell they are going to do if they were on the receiving end. When we thought of drones changing the future of warfare the idea was big reaper drones with missiles flying around up high. Not a dozen small cardboard boxes.
I suppose I more so mean "Is Ukraine also showing weakness against a dozen cardboard drones?"
I imagine Russia has the same capability, right?
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On August 29 2023 07:05 Mohdoo wrote:
It is fascinating how simply making the flying object as small as possible creates a checkmate situation against anti-air capabilities. It looks like a combination of "make them smaller" and "use a bunch of them" is a huge weakness of Russian air defense.
Has western air defense had the same weakness? I imagine this is something all major systems have a hard time with, since it would not be a design consideration previously.
100%. With the exception of some anti drone jamming devices, no one has really been developing anti drone measures. Especially ones that are cheaper than your average DJI drone with a bomb strapped to it in cost, which is the other part of the equations. It's all well and good to use expensive missiles to shoot down drones, but not when those drones are 1/100 the price of that missile. Drone technology has simple out-developed its counter part in terms of availability and production capability, which historically has mostly been fixated on countering fast and big helicopters and jets.
And this much is true for the entire world. While I'm sure jamming technology is going to catch up in price, availability and effectiveness eventually, no one has it figured out quite yet.
Russia should have the same capability as their sanctions aren't affecting their ability to trade with China, but for whatever reason they have decided not to go down this route. Drones are used, as confirmed by a multitude of videos; every battle small or large have Ukranian and Russian drones watching over it. But seemingly Russia only uses them for recon/observation, not for attacking, like Ukraine is.
On a digression, I can confirm that every military in the world is extremely busy right now noting down everything that is happening in this war, especially drone usage. No one really expected them to be this much of a dominating force as they are. I don't think I'm exposing any kind of secret by saying that militaries everywhere are absolutely scrambling to integrate them into their own forces. I myself have been bringing my private drone to some of our military exercises simply to get people used to having one around, and get into the mindset of having to both needing to counter and rely upon it (Only issue is that DJI drones are GPS locked out of military areas, so I sometimes get egg on my face when trying to show off my cool civilian drone that then just refuses to take off. But my superiors are still lukewarm to the idea of purchasing Black Hornets for us, so that's all I got for now)
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United States41989 Posts
On August 29 2023 07:05 Mohdoo wrote:
It is fascinating how simply making the flying object as small as possible creates a checkmate situation against anti-air capabilities. It looks like a combination of "make them smaller" and "use a bunch of them" is a huge weakness of Russian air defense.
Has western air defense had the same weakness? I imagine this is something all major systems have a hard time with, since it would not be a design consideration previously.
It does. It’s a basic premise of warfare that favours offence over static defence. The defender must have enough in all places at all times to defeat a concentrated effort. The attacker can pick their spot and time. It’s one of the reasons the drone attacks no longer target Kyiv. Ukraine has sufficient defence in Kyiv to defeat a concentrated attack but by concentrating defence there they must leave gaps elsewhere. And even if they have a limited amount of universal coverage that still doesn’t help against an attacker who overwhelms it in one location. Excess capacity where the enemy doesn’t attack is no help, just wasted effort.
In most contexts the counter is knowing where they’ll attack ahead of time and having a highly mobile group of reserves behind a tripwire front line. The front pulls them in in a delaying action while the reserves redeploy.
In mass drone wars there’s not really a good counter yet. Drones are cheap, mass producible, highly mobile, and capable of inflicting damage exponentially greater than their cost. If the US were interested in doing so it could build them by the thousand and there would be no way of defeating such a raid.
This quote from Ender’s Shadow seems relevant.
“Fortification engineering from the time of Louis the Fourteenth?” Bean nodded. He thought back to Vauban and how his strategies had adapted to fit Louis’s ever-more-straitened finances… He started to talk about this, but Dimak cut him off.
“Come on, Bean. Why are you studying a subject that has nothing to do with war in space?”…
“Well of course fortifications are impossible in space,” said Bean. “In the traditional sense, that is. But there are things you can do. Like his mini-fortresses, where you leave a sallying force outside the main fortification. You can station squads of ships to intercept raiders. And there are barriers you can put up. Mines. Fields of flotsam to cause collisions with fast-moving ships, holing them. That sort of thing.” Dimak nodded, but said nothing. Bean was beginning to warm to the discussion.
“The real problem is that unlike Vauban, we have only one strong point worth defending — Earth. And the enemy is not limited to a primary direction of approach. He could come from anywhere. From anywhere all at once. So we run into the classic problem of defense, cubed. The farther out you deploy your defenses, the more of them you have to have, and if your resources are limited, you soon have more fortifications than you can man. What good are bases on moons Jupiter or Saturn or Neptune, when the enemy doesn’t even have to come in on the plane of the ecliptic? He can bypass all our fortifications. The way Nimitz and MacArthur used two- dimensional island-hopping against the defense in depth of the Japanese in World War II. Only our enemy can work in three dimensions. Therefore we cannot possibly maintain defense in depth. Our only defense is early detection and a single massed force… [E]ven that was a recipe for disaster, because the enemy is free to divide his forces. So even if we intercept and defeat ninety-nine of a hundred attacking squadrons, he only has to get one squadron through to cause terrible devastation on Earth. We saw how much territory a single ship could scour when they first showed up and started burning over China. Get ten ships to Earth for a single day — and if they spread us out enough, they’d have a lot more than a day! — and they could wipe out most of our main population centers. All our eggs are in that one basket.”
“And all this you got from Vauban,” said Dimak.
Finally. That was apparently enough to satisfy him. “From thinking about Vauban, and how much harder our defensive problem is.”
“So,” said Dimak, “what’s your solution?”
…”I don’t think there is a solution,” said Bean, buying time again. But then, having said it, he began to believe it. “There’s no point in trying to defend Earth at all. In fact, unless they have some defensive device we don’t know about, like some way of putting an invisible shield around a planet or something, the enemy is just as vulnerable. So the only strategy that makes any sense at all is an all-out attack. To send our fleet against *their* home world and destroy it.”
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EPT
