On July 08 2013 02:21 Reason wrote: Very well my good man, I shall do so.
Free will The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion.
The key here is that free will means at one's own discretion. You do what you want, because you want to do it. Your choices are your own.
The reason you want to do things is entirely dependent upon what your brain tells you that you want. If you alter the brain, so desire is also altered. Yes, our decision making process is more than tied to the physiology of the brain, it's absolutely governed by it.
Free will doesn't mean anything apart from free will. On moral responsibility, what you're saying there is "people that murder are simply acting on their natural impulses and so therefore should not be punished".
We exercise free will the same way we always have, just because we are subject to the laws of the universe doesn't change anything.
In most discussions of free will, it's hard to get everyone agreeing on an exact definition. What you're saying is one (compatibilist) definition, but not all philosophers agree with the idea that free will is compatible with determinism. They'd argue that determinism violates the first part of your definition ("the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate"), and that basically in order to truly have "the ability to act at one's own discretion," the functioning of one's mind cannot come down to the laws of physics. There must be an additional component where you choose A or B, and that regardless of the physical state of your mind right before the decision, you must actually be able to choose A (and all the neurological consequences that implies) or choose B (and all the different neurological consequences that implies). Determinism, some argue, makes it so that only one of A or B is a choice you are physically capable of making.
You still choose A because you "want to" in the sense that your internal narrative and your preference function says that that is what you want, which fits the compatibilist definition of free will. But it doesn't really fit the libertarian definition.
Agreed, so until we discover the nature of the universe whether or not we have free will can not be ascertained and therefore all following discussions on the matter are simply philosophical speculation which I do not care to indulge in for the most part.
Okay, I think I understand what you've tried to do there quoting me that piece but since I don't share your views on this matter that which those words make incredibly obvious to you still eludes me. I could begin to construct a response to your point but I'd prefer you did more than allude to before I do so.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
On evidence, I'm talking about something more than hearsay. No, hearsay is not acceptable evidence as far as I'm concerned and I make no apologies for it.
We rely on hearsay for most of what we know. Fundamentally, there are three paths to justification: authority, experience, and reason. We rely on authority, or "hearsay" to establish every truth which we have not come to independently, and in the field of education, that is pretty much everything we know to be true.
Authority and Hearsay are pretty friggin' different. I wouldn't characterize them as the same at all.
Either way, the whole point of science is to reduce the problem of Argument by Authority. This is why you have to make sure your tests are Repeatable, so that anyone with the proper tools can do them. The whole point of Empiricism and science is that we don't have to rely on just "hearsay" or "personal experience." We can collectively do multiple separate fields of research and have them all culminate in scientific theories and bodies of research.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
Logical argumentation is a product of consciousness; everything which appears explicitly in the mind. That which is unconscious are the unstated, and unseen assumptions behind them. i.e. Why would you ask "What is this non-material universe you speak of?" rather than "What is this material universe you speak of?" Consciousness is deceptive all the time.
When you think your wife is cheating on you because she stays out late, whereas she was merely visiting her ailing mother is a deception of thought. The fact that we intuitively know the mind as the sovereign and uncaused thing, whereas according to physicalism it is apparently the effect of synaptic reflexes is another example of self-deception.
Physicalist theories of the mind necessarily begin with the assumption that the mind is unreliable.
But we already know the mind is unreliable. I don't even understand this argument. I don't have to even bring up halluncinations and things like that. People think things that are not true all the time. We've thought false things since the beginning of time. You would have to think that thinking something makes it more likely to be true, which is absurd to the point of making me cross-eyed.
But really, "unreliable" is not the correct word. Logic is not how the brain functions. The brain is much more Bayesian than that, and relies almost entirely on previous information. The brain also is evolutionarily adapted for social behavior, rather than logic, which is why humans are prone to things like the conjunction fallacy, which mistakes plausibility for probability.
On July 08 2013 01:54 Signet wrote: I wouldn't call that an "illusion" though. Something more along the lines of an interpretation. What's in the mind is a map, what's actually out there is the territory.
Ah, but once you move from "illusion" to "interpretation," you are a heretic to the doctrine of physicalism, because you are no longer willing to acknowledge that reality has a single, unitary and logically-reducible language.
What? No you aren't. I have no idea what you're talking about. Saying that there is an objective reality does not mean that there aren't different perspectives on the same thing. Hell, how would I explain different camera angles???? You're being silly.
And also, physicalism really has very little to do with language.
That link on Bayesian thinking is pretty light on sources, not that I necessarily disagree with it.
I'm always skeptical of people bringing up Bayesian probability online since it seems to correspond alarmingly with subscribing to other views promulgated by LessWrong. My own paranoia, I guess, but I've encountered a lot of people who seem to uphold Bayesian probability as the answer to everything, so I guess it's healthy to be suspicious .
Okay, I think I understand what you've tried to do there quoting me that piece but since I don't share your views on this matter that which those words make incredibly obvious to you still eludes me. I could begin to construct a response to your point but I'd prefer you did more than allude to before I do so.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
On evidence, I'm talking about something more than hearsay. No, hearsay is not acceptable evidence as far as I'm concerned and I make no apologies for it.
We rely on hearsay for most of what we know. Fundamentally, there are three paths to justification: authority, experience, and reason. We rely on authority, or "hearsay" to establish every truth which we have not come to independently, and in the field of education, that is pretty much everything we know to be true.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
Logical argumentation is a product of consciousness; everything which appears explicitly in the mind. That which is unconscious are the unstated, and unseen assumptions behind them. i.e. Why would you ask "What is this non-material universe you speak of?" rather than "What is this material universe you speak of?" Consciousness is deceptive all the time.
When you think your wife is cheating on you because she stays out late, whereas she was merely visiting her ailing mother is a deception of thought. The fact that we intuitively know the mind as the sovereign and uncaused thing, whereas according to physicalism it is apparently the effect of synaptic reflexes is another example of self-deception.
Physicalist theories of the mind necessarily begin with the assumption that the mind is unreliable.
Are you a solipsist? I'm sure you understand why people are hesitant to accept a position that's unfalsifiable by definition.
"Consciousness exists because i am conscious" is just as unfalsifiable. Unfortunately certain organic thinking machines find it compellingly intuitive.
What about "one strong piece of evidence for my consciousness existing is other people observing and accurately characterizing decisions I make stemming from something that inductively must be nothing other than my own consciousness"
I can make decisions and spit out ideas and respond to stimuli, and all of this activity implicates there being a consciousness stemming from my brain
On July 08 2013 02:21 Reason wrote: Very well my good man, I shall do so.
Free will The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion.
The key here is that free will means at one's own discretion. You do what you want, because you want to do it. Your choices are your own.
The reason you want to do things is entirely dependent upon what your brain tells you that you want. If you alter the brain, so desire is also altered. Yes, our decision making process is more than tied to the physiology of the brain, it's absolutely governed by it.
Free will doesn't mean anything apart from free will. On moral responsibility, what you're saying there is "people that murder are simply acting on their natural impulses and so therefore should not be punished".
We exercise free will the same way we always have, just because we are subject to the laws of the universe doesn't change anything.
In most discussions of free will, it's hard to get everyone agreeing on an exact definition. What you're saying is one (compatibilist) definition, but not all philosophers agree with the idea that free will is compatible with determinism. They'd argue that determinism violates the first part of your definition ("the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate"), and that basically in order to truly have "the ability to act at one's own discretion," the functioning of one's mind cannot come down to the laws of physics. There must be an additional component where you choose A or B, and that regardless of the physical state of your mind right before the decision, you must actually be able to choose A (and all the neurological consequences that implies) or choose B (and all the different neurological consequences that implies). Determinism, some argue, makes it so that only one of A or B is a choice you are physically capable of making.
You still choose A because you "want to" in the sense that your internal narrative and your preference function says that that is what you want, which fits the compatibilist definition of free will. But it doesn't really fit the libertarian definition.
The compatibilist response to this is that you don't gain anything extra from using the libertarian definition. Moral responsibility, freedom, etc. etc. are all perfectly preserved under the compatibilist definition. You get everything you could possibly desire from the compatibilist perspective, and libertarian definition is not useful.
Okay, I think I understand what you've tried to do there quoting me that piece but since I don't share your views on this matter that which those words make incredibly obvious to you still eludes me. I could begin to construct a response to your point but I'd prefer you did more than allude to before I do so.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
On evidence, I'm talking about something more than hearsay. No, hearsay is not acceptable evidence as far as I'm concerned and I make no apologies for it.
We rely on hearsay for most of what we know. Fundamentally, there are three paths to justification: authority, experience, and reason. We rely on authority, or "hearsay" to establish every truth which we have not come to independently, and in the field of education, that is pretty much everything we know to be true.
Authority and Hearsay are pretty friggin' different. I wouldn't characterize them as the same at all.
Either way, the whole point of science is to reduce the problem of Argument by Authority. This is why you have to make sure your tests are Repeatable, so that anyone with the proper tools can do them. The whole point of Empiricism and science is that we don't have to rely on just "hearsay" or "personal experience." We can collectively do multiple separate fields of research and have them all culminate in scientific theories and bodies of research.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
Logical argumentation is a product of consciousness; everything which appears explicitly in the mind. That which is unconscious are the unstated, and unseen assumptions behind them. i.e. Why would you ask "What is this non-material universe you speak of?" rather than "What is this material universe you speak of?" Consciousness is deceptive all the time.
When you think your wife is cheating on you because she stays out late, whereas she was merely visiting her ailing mother is a deception of thought. The fact that we intuitively know the mind as the sovereign and uncaused thing, whereas according to physicalism it is apparently the effect of synaptic reflexes is another example of self-deception.
Physicalist theories of the mind necessarily begin with the assumption that the mind is unreliable.
But we already know the mind is unreliable. I don't even understand this argument. I don't have to even bring up halluncinations and things like that. People think things that are not true all the time. We've thought false things since the beginning of time. You would have to think that thinking something makes it more likely to be true, which is absurd to the point of making me cross-eyed.
But really, "unreliable" is not the correct word. Logic is not how the brain functions. The brain is much more Bayesian than that, and relies almost entirely on previous information. The brain also is evolutionarily adapted for social behavior, rather than logic, which is why humans are prone to things like the conjunction fallacy, which mistakes plausibility for probability.
On July 08 2013 02:17 MoltkeWarding wrote:
On July 08 2013 01:54 Signet wrote: I wouldn't call that an "illusion" though. Something more along the lines of an interpretation. What's in the mind is a map, what's actually out there is the territory.
Ah, but once you move from "illusion" to "interpretation," you are a heretic to the doctrine of physicalism, because you are no longer willing to acknowledge that reality has a single, unitary and logically-reducible language.
What? No you aren't. I have no idea what you're talking about. Saying that there is an objective reality does not mean that there aren't different perspectives on the same thing. Hell, how would I explain different camera angles???? You're being silly.
And also, physicalism really has very little to do with language.
That link on Bayesian thinking is pretty light on sources, not that I necessarily disagree with it.
I'm always skeptical of people bringing up Bayesian probability online since it seems to correspond alarmingly with subscribing to other views promulgated by LessWrong. My own paranoia, I guess, but I've encountered a lot of people who seem to uphold Bayesian probability as the answer to everything, so I guess it's healthy to be suspicious .
Well I'm pretty much one of those people, so I guess your suspicion is warranted.
Bayesian Probability is powerful because it generalizes empiricism. Empiricism is just a special case of Bayesian Probability. And it's also pretty powerful because it's keeps being correct over and over and over again. And with the new computing power of computers, it's can actually be used for stuff.
But really, "unreliable" is not the correct word. Logic is not how the brain functions. The brain is much more Bayesian than that, and relies almost entirely on previous information. The brain also is evolutionarily adapted for social behavior, rather than logic, which is why humans are prone to things like the conjunction fallacy, which mistakes plausibility for probability.
While I mostly agree with what you're saying, I just wanted to point out that the initial experiments done on the conjunction fallacy are rather dubious because of the way the questions were posed/worded.
The question about the Soviet Union, for example, may imply that the U.S. breaking relations with the Soviet Union over an invasion is different from the U.S. breaking relations for no reason.
The debiased experiment tends to frame the question more clearly and far fewer people fail that one.
On July 08 2013 02:29 lebowskiguy wrote:
On July 08 2013 02:14 wherebugsgo wrote:
On July 08 2013 02:11 lebowskiguy wrote:
On July 08 2013 02:04 Reason wrote:
On July 08 2013 02:00 lebowskiguy wrote: to all those who support the existence of free will: How do you explain the fact that people with brain damage or people who develop tumors in the area of the brain change their decision process drastically? Many of them develop new violent or psychopathic urges and a different completely character overall. Doesn't this mean that our decision making process is tied to the physiology of our brain?
To those who might suggest that this doesn't count because these brains are altered or impaired: doesn't this mean that for free will to have a meaning or for moral responsibility to meaningfully come into play we should all have the same type of brain with no alterations? (this is of course never the case as there are not even 2 people with the same brain)
How do we exercise free will if our decision making process is irrefutably tied to the physiology of our brain and therefore the laws of the universe? (these questions are probably relevant only for the people who have a naturalistic view of the world)
The answer is very simple and has no doubt already been given in this thread.
Everything you've said has absolutely nothing to do with the concept of free will.
unless you have your own definition of free will ( do share) everything I have said is relevant to the concept of free will. Try to honor your name and reason with me.
He's right though, your conclusion doesn't logically follow from anything you've said so far, and what you've said is not really relevant to free will at all.
I assume free will has to do with decision making or else what is it good for? Free will is (google): the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion. Everything I have said in that post is 100% relevant. The alterations of your brain change your decision making process, they prove that your decision making process follows material laws; these laws are either probabilistic or deterministic or a combination of both. Now it is you that has to find room for your "free will" concept, because I sure can't
No, it isn't. A change in the physiology of your brain is not due to a constraint of necessity or fate. You still act at your own discretion, unless you are suggesting that no one has free will to begin with.
of course I am suggesting that there is no free will to begin with. The fact that you used your phrasing in what appears as a dismissive manner did probably reveals that you are somewhat ignorant of a heated philosophical debate that has lasted centuries. Also idk what you are saying with the constraint of necessity or fate line. Are we to be held morally responsible for our personality changing brain tumors too?
That's mostly because I am not concerned with discussing philosophy, because there is no actual basis or evidence for either side-if your claim is that free will doesn't exist, and my claim is that it does, then...well, there's nothing more to argue until we know more about how the fundamentals of the universe work. I'm a physicist and computer scientist-I'd rather deal with things I can actually substantiate.
The "constraint of necessity or fate" is in the definition of free will, at least the one I'm using. Generally people are held responsible for their actions, yes, regardless of whether or not they are impaired due to a disability or otherwise. The punishment or consequence generally varies depending on the severity of the action and the severity of the injury/disability-this is, of course, in the realms of law and medicine. Some consequences for the mentally impaired involve therapy or assignment to a treatment center-different, obviously, than prison, but society still imposes consequences upon them if their actions are immoral.
Think about what you are suggesting for a minute. If you say we have no free will, and those who are impaired should not be held morally responsible for their actions, then people can do anything they want, and if they can show they were impaired when the action happened, they're not responsible! If I drink until I black out and then go murder someone, are you saying that I should not be held responsible because I don't have free will, and the alcohol impaired my decision-making process? (or rather, I didn't have a decision-making process to begin with, so I guess it didn't even matter that I was drunk!)
What if I drink so much that I get permanent brain damage and become a raging, pyschopathic serial killer? Should I be held responsible for someone's death by my hands in that case?
Your argument really doesn't make much sense at all.
Okay, I think I understand what you've tried to do there quoting me that piece but since I don't share your views on this matter that which those words make incredibly obvious to you still eludes me. I could begin to construct a response to your point but I'd prefer you did more than allude to before I do so.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
On evidence, I'm talking about something more than hearsay. No, hearsay is not acceptable evidence as far as I'm concerned and I make no apologies for it.
We rely on hearsay for most of what we know. Fundamentally, there are three paths to justification: authority, experience, and reason. We rely on authority, or "hearsay" to establish every truth which we have not come to independently, and in the field of education, that is pretty much everything we know to be true.
Authority and Hearsay are pretty friggin' different. I wouldn't characterize them as the same at all.
Either way, the whole point of science is to reduce the problem of Argument by Authority. This is why you have to make sure your tests are Repeatable, so that anyone with the proper tools can do them. The whole point of Empiricism and science is that we don't have to rely on just "hearsay" or "personal experience." We can collectively do multiple separate fields of research and have them all culminate in scientific theories and bodies of research.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
Logical argumentation is a product of consciousness; everything which appears explicitly in the mind. That which is unconscious are the unstated, and unseen assumptions behind them. i.e. Why would you ask "What is this non-material universe you speak of?" rather than "What is this material universe you speak of?" Consciousness is deceptive all the time.
When you think your wife is cheating on you because she stays out late, whereas she was merely visiting her ailing mother is a deception of thought. The fact that we intuitively know the mind as the sovereign and uncaused thing, whereas according to physicalism it is apparently the effect of synaptic reflexes is another example of self-deception.
Physicalist theories of the mind necessarily begin with the assumption that the mind is unreliable.
But we already know the mind is unreliable. I don't even understand this argument. I don't have to even bring up halluncinations and things like that. People think things that are not true all the time. We've thought false things since the beginning of time. You would have to think that thinking something makes it more likely to be true, which is absurd to the point of making me cross-eyed.
But really, "unreliable" is not the correct word. Logic is not how the brain functions. The brain is much more Bayesian than that, and relies almost entirely on previous information. The brain also is evolutionarily adapted for social behavior, rather than logic, which is why humans are prone to things like the conjunction fallacy, which mistakes plausibility for probability.
On July 08 2013 02:17 MoltkeWarding wrote:
On July 08 2013 01:54 Signet wrote: I wouldn't call that an "illusion" though. Something more along the lines of an interpretation. What's in the mind is a map, what's actually out there is the territory.
Ah, but once you move from "illusion" to "interpretation," you are a heretic to the doctrine of physicalism, because you are no longer willing to acknowledge that reality has a single, unitary and logically-reducible language.
What? No you aren't. I have no idea what you're talking about. Saying that there is an objective reality does not mean that there aren't different perspectives on the same thing. Hell, how would I explain different camera angles???? You're being silly.
And also, physicalism really has very little to do with language.
That link on Bayesian thinking is pretty light on sources, not that I necessarily disagree with it.
I'm always skeptical of people bringing up Bayesian probability online since it seems to correspond alarmingly with subscribing to other views promulgated by LessWrong. My own paranoia, I guess, but I've encountered a lot of people who seem to uphold Bayesian probability as the answer to everything, so I guess it's healthy to be suspicious .
Well I'm pretty much one of those people, so I guess your suspicion is warranted.
Bayesian Probability is powerful because it generalizes empiricism. Empiricism is just a special case of Bayesian Probability. And it's also pretty powerful because it's keeps being correct over and over and over again. And with the new computing power of computers, it's can actually be used for stuff.
I see. Well, I guess we'll agree to disagree . I like Bayesian probability, but I really, really hate Eliezer Yudkowsky so my enthusiasm for its applications has been stymied somewhat ^^.
Okay, I think I understand what you've tried to do there quoting me that piece but since I don't share your views on this matter that which those words make incredibly obvious to you still eludes me. I could begin to construct a response to your point but I'd prefer you did more than allude to before I do so.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
On evidence, I'm talking about something more than hearsay. No, hearsay is not acceptable evidence as far as I'm concerned and I make no apologies for it.
We rely on hearsay for most of what we know. Fundamentally, there are three paths to justification: authority, experience, and reason. We rely on authority, or "hearsay" to establish every truth which we have not come to independently, and in the field of education, that is pretty much everything we know to be true.
Authority and Hearsay are pretty friggin' different. I wouldn't characterize them as the same at all.
Either way, the whole point of science is to reduce the problem of Argument by Authority. This is why you have to make sure your tests are Repeatable, so that anyone with the proper tools can do them. The whole point of Empiricism and science is that we don't have to rely on just "hearsay" or "personal experience." We can collectively do multiple separate fields of research and have them all culminate in scientific theories and bodies of research.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
Logical argumentation is a product of consciousness; everything which appears explicitly in the mind. That which is unconscious are the unstated, and unseen assumptions behind them. i.e. Why would you ask "What is this non-material universe you speak of?" rather than "What is this material universe you speak of?" Consciousness is deceptive all the time.
When you think your wife is cheating on you because she stays out late, whereas she was merely visiting her ailing mother is a deception of thought. The fact that we intuitively know the mind as the sovereign and uncaused thing, whereas according to physicalism it is apparently the effect of synaptic reflexes is another example of self-deception.
Physicalist theories of the mind necessarily begin with the assumption that the mind is unreliable.
But we already know the mind is unreliable. I don't even understand this argument. I don't have to even bring up halluncinations and things like that. People think things that are not true all the time. We've thought false things since the beginning of time. You would have to think that thinking something makes it more likely to be true, which is absurd to the point of making me cross-eyed.
But really, "unreliable" is not the correct word. Logic is not how the brain functions. The brain is much more Bayesian than that, and relies almost entirely on previous information. The brain also is evolutionarily adapted for social behavior, rather than logic, which is why humans are prone to things like the conjunction fallacy, which mistakes plausibility for probability.
On July 08 2013 02:17 MoltkeWarding wrote:
On July 08 2013 01:54 Signet wrote: I wouldn't call that an "illusion" though. Something more along the lines of an interpretation. What's in the mind is a map, what's actually out there is the territory.
Ah, but once you move from "illusion" to "interpretation," you are a heretic to the doctrine of physicalism, because you are no longer willing to acknowledge that reality has a single, unitary and logically-reducible language.
What? No you aren't. I have no idea what you're talking about. Saying that there is an objective reality does not mean that there aren't different perspectives on the same thing. Hell, how would I explain different camera angles???? You're being silly.
And also, physicalism really has very little to do with language.
That link on Bayesian thinking is pretty light on sources, not that I necessarily disagree with it.
I'm always skeptical of people bringing up Bayesian probability online since it seems to correspond alarmingly with subscribing to other views promulgated by LessWrong. My own paranoia, I guess, but I've encountered a lot of people who seem to uphold Bayesian probability as the answer to everything, so I guess it's healthy to be suspicious .
Well I'm pretty much one of those people, so I guess your suspicion is warranted.
Bayesian Probability is powerful because it generalizes empiricism. Empiricism is just a special case of Bayesian Probability. And it's also pretty powerful because it's keeps being correct over and over and over again. And with the new computing power of computers, it's can actually be used for stuff.
I see. Well, I guess we'll agree to disagree . I like Bayesian probability, but I really, really hate Eliezer Yudkowsky so my enthusiasm for its applications has been stymied somewhat ^^.
Eh, he has his ups and downs. My feeling toward Eliezer is rather ambivalent, though I do think LessWrong is a fantastic resource.
Most of what I've learned about Bayesian Probability is not from Eliezer, but from this book, which talks about the crazy history of Bayes' Theorem.
On July 08 2013 02:21 Reason wrote: Very well my good man, I shall do so.
Free will The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion.
The key here is that free will means at one's own discretion. You do what you want, because you want to do it. Your choices are your own.
The reason you want to do things is entirely dependent upon what your brain tells you that you want. If you alter the brain, so desire is also altered. Yes, our decision making process is more than tied to the physiology of the brain, it's absolutely governed by it.
Free will doesn't mean anything apart from free will. On moral responsibility, what you're saying there is "people that murder are simply acting on their natural impulses and so therefore should not be punished".
We exercise free will the same way we always have, just because we are subject to the laws of the universe doesn't change anything.
In most discussions of free will, it's hard to get everyone agreeing on an exact definition. What you're saying is one (compatibilist) definition, but not all philosophers agree with the idea that free will is compatible with determinism. They'd argue that determinism violates the first part of your definition ("the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate"), and that basically in order to truly have "the ability to act at one's own discretion," the functioning of one's mind cannot come down to the laws of physics. There must be an additional component where you choose A or B, and that regardless of the physical state of your mind right before the decision, you must actually be able to choose A (and all the neurological consequences that implies) or choose B (and all the different neurological consequences that implies). Determinism, some argue, makes it so that only one of A or B is a choice you are physically capable of making.
You still choose A because you "want to" in the sense that your internal narrative and your preference function says that that is what you want, which fits the compatibilist definition of free will. But it doesn't really fit the libertarian definition.
your post is insightful. I guess my main objection with the combatibilist definition is: what we like (Schopenhauer's "will") and the entire mechanism of decision making we use are neither controllable nor metaphysical (so that they would defy the rules of physics). There simply is no room to claim responsibility... I read this article: http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/bering-in-mind/2010/04/06/scientists-say-free-will-probably-doesnt-exist-but-urge-dont-stop-believing/ that puts forth the proposition that "simple" people are not ready for a world without free will. I am not really convinced of this.
On July 08 2013 02:51 DoubleReed wrote: The compatibilist response to this is that you don't gain anything extra from using the libertarian definition. Moral responsibility, freedom, etc. etc. are all perfectly preserved under the compatibilist definition. You get everything you could possibly desire from the compatibilist perspective, and libertarian definition is not useful.
Well if libertarian free will existed, then the universe would have to be non-deterministic at a level high enough to allow your brain to make choices at least somewhat independently of the physical state of the universe.
But yes, if libertarian free will doesn't exist, then you don't lose those concepts under the compatibilist definition, which would be sufficient to explain the feeling of free will that we have in a deterministic universe.
Okay, I think I understand what you've tried to do there quoting me that piece but since I don't share your views on this matter that which those words make incredibly obvious to you still eludes me. I could begin to construct a response to your point but I'd prefer you did more than allude to before I do so.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
On evidence, I'm talking about something more than hearsay. No, hearsay is not acceptable evidence as far as I'm concerned and I make no apologies for it.
We rely on hearsay for most of what we know. Fundamentally, there are three paths to justification: authority, experience, and reason. We rely on authority, or "hearsay" to establish every truth which we have not come to independently, and in the field of education, that is pretty much everything we know to be true.
Authority and Hearsay are pretty friggin' different. I wouldn't characterize them as the same at all.
Either way, the whole point of science is to reduce the problem of Argument by Authority. This is why you have to make sure your tests are Repeatable, so that anyone with the proper tools can do them. The whole point of Empiricism and science is that we don't have to rely on just "hearsay" or "personal experience." We can collectively do multiple separate fields of research and have them all culminate in scientific theories and bodies of research.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
Logical argumentation is a product of consciousness; everything which appears explicitly in the mind. That which is unconscious are the unstated, and unseen assumptions behind them. i.e. Why would you ask "What is this non-material universe you speak of?" rather than "What is this material universe you speak of?" Consciousness is deceptive all the time.
When you think your wife is cheating on you because she stays out late, whereas she was merely visiting her ailing mother is a deception of thought. The fact that we intuitively know the mind as the sovereign and uncaused thing, whereas according to physicalism it is apparently the effect of synaptic reflexes is another example of self-deception.
Physicalist theories of the mind necessarily begin with the assumption that the mind is unreliable.
But we already know the mind is unreliable. I don't even understand this argument. I don't have to even bring up halluncinations and things like that. People think things that are not true all the time. We've thought false things since the beginning of time. You would have to think that thinking something makes it more likely to be true, which is absurd to the point of making me cross-eyed.
But really, "unreliable" is not the correct word. Logic is not how the brain functions. The brain is much more Bayesian than that, and relies almost entirely on previous information. The brain also is evolutionarily adapted for social behavior, rather than logic, which is why humans are prone to things like the conjunction fallacy, which mistakes plausibility for probability.
On July 08 2013 02:17 MoltkeWarding wrote:
On July 08 2013 01:54 Signet wrote: I wouldn't call that an "illusion" though. Something more along the lines of an interpretation. What's in the mind is a map, what's actually out there is the territory.
Ah, but once you move from "illusion" to "interpretation," you are a heretic to the doctrine of physicalism, because you are no longer willing to acknowledge that reality has a single, unitary and logically-reducible language.
What? No you aren't. I have no idea what you're talking about. Saying that there is an objective reality does not mean that there aren't different perspectives on the same thing. Hell, how would I explain different camera angles???? You're being silly.
And also, physicalism really has very little to do with language.
That link on Bayesian thinking is pretty light on sources, not that I necessarily disagree with it.
I'm always skeptical of people bringing up Bayesian probability online since it seems to correspond alarmingly with subscribing to other views promulgated by LessWrong. My own paranoia, I guess, but I've encountered a lot of people who seem to uphold Bayesian probability as the answer to everything, so I guess it's healthy to be suspicious .
Well I'm pretty much one of those people, so I guess your suspicion is warranted.
Bayesian Probability is powerful because it generalizes empiricism. Empiricism is just a special case of Bayesian Probability. And it's also pretty powerful because it's keeps being correct over and over and over again. And with the new computing power of computers, it's can actually be used for stuff.
I see. Well, I guess we'll agree to disagree . I like Bayesian probability, but I really, really hate Eliezer Yudkowsky so my enthusiasm for its applications has been stymied somewhat ^^.
fwiw Nate Silver is also a Bayesian. Not sure if that would make you more or less enthusiastic towards its applications :p
On July 08 2013 02:21 Reason wrote: Very well my good man, I shall do so.
Free will The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion.
The key here is that free will means at one's own discretion. You do what you want, because you want to do it. Your choices are your own.
The reason you want to do things is entirely dependent upon what your brain tells you that you want. If you alter the brain, so desire is also altered. Yes, our decision making process is more than tied to the physiology of the brain, it's absolutely governed by it.
Free will doesn't mean anything apart from free will. On moral responsibility, what you're saying there is "people that murder are simply acting on their natural impulses and so therefore should not be punished".
We exercise free will the same way we always have, just because we are subject to the laws of the universe doesn't change anything.
In most discussions of free will, it's hard to get everyone agreeing on an exact definition. What you're saying is one (compatibilist) definition, but not all philosophers agree with the idea that free will is compatible with determinism. They'd argue that determinism violates the first part of your definition ("the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate"), and that basically in order to truly have "the ability to act at one's own discretion," the functioning of one's mind cannot come down to the laws of physics. There must be an additional component where you choose A or B, and that regardless of the physical state of your mind right before the decision, you must actually be able to choose A (and all the neurological consequences that implies) or choose B (and all the different neurological consequences that implies). Determinism, some argue, makes it so that only one of A or B is a choice you are physically capable of making.
You still choose A because you "want to" in the sense that your internal narrative and your preference function says that that is what you want, which fits the compatibilist definition of free will. But it doesn't really fit the libertarian definition.
your post is insightful. I guess my main objection with the combatibilist definition is: what we like (Schopenhauer's "will") and the entire mechanism of decision making we use are neither controllable nor metaphysical (so that they would defy the rules of physics). There simply is no room to claim responsibility... I read this article: http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/bering-in-mind/2010/04/06/scientists-say-free-will-probably-doesnt-exist-but-urge-dont-stop-believing/ that puts forth the proposition that "simple" people are not ready for a world without free will. I am not really convinced of this.
I always find these sorts of exhortations to be a little befuddling. If free will doesn't exist then urging people to do anything is pointless; they either will or they won't by determined necessity. Similarly, I'm always confused when people like Sam Harris say that free will doesn't exist (not even in the compatibilist sense) and then go on to write pages and pages about why we should do choice X over choice Y. If free will doesn't exist, then choice X or Y don't even exist because they're not choices.
But really, "unreliable" is not the correct word. Logic is not how the brain functions. The brain is much more Bayesian than that, and relies almost entirely on previous information. The brain also is evolutionarily adapted for social behavior, rather than logic, which is why humans are prone to things like the conjunction fallacy, which mistakes plausibility for probability.
While I mostly agree with what you're saying, I just wanted to point out that the initial experiments done on the conjunction fallacy are rather dubious because of the way the questions were posed/worded.
The question about the Soviet Union, for example, may imply that the U.S. breaking relations with the Soviet Union over an invasion is different from the U.S. breaking relations for no reason.
The debiased experiment tends to frame the question more clearly and far fewer people fail that one.
On July 08 2013 02:29 lebowskiguy wrote:
On July 08 2013 02:14 wherebugsgo wrote:
On July 08 2013 02:11 lebowskiguy wrote:
On July 08 2013 02:04 Reason wrote:
On July 08 2013 02:00 lebowskiguy wrote: to all those who support the existence of free will: How do you explain the fact that people with brain damage or people who develop tumors in the area of the brain change their decision process drastically? Many of them develop new violent or psychopathic urges and a different completely character overall. Doesn't this mean that our decision making process is tied to the physiology of our brain?
To those who might suggest that this doesn't count because these brains are altered or impaired: doesn't this mean that for free will to have a meaning or for moral responsibility to meaningfully come into play we should all have the same type of brain with no alterations? (this is of course never the case as there are not even 2 people with the same brain)
How do we exercise free will if our decision making process is irrefutably tied to the physiology of our brain and therefore the laws of the universe? (these questions are probably relevant only for the people who have a naturalistic view of the world)
The answer is very simple and has no doubt already been given in this thread.
Everything you've said has absolutely nothing to do with the concept of free will.
unless you have your own definition of free will ( do share) everything I have said is relevant to the concept of free will. Try to honor your name and reason with me.
He's right though, your conclusion doesn't logically follow from anything you've said so far, and what you've said is not really relevant to free will at all.
I assume free will has to do with decision making or else what is it good for? Free will is (google): the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion. Everything I have said in that post is 100% relevant. The alterations of your brain change your decision making process, they prove that your decision making process follows material laws; these laws are either probabilistic or deterministic or a combination of both. Now it is you that has to find room for your "free will" concept, because I sure can't
No, it isn't. A change in the physiology of your brain is not due to a constraint of necessity or fate. You still act at your own discretion, unless you are suggesting that no one has free will to begin with.
of course I am suggesting that there is no free will to begin with. The fact that you used your phrasing in what appears as a dismissive manner did probably reveals that you are somewhat ignorant of a heated philosophical debate that has lasted centuries. Also idk what you are saying with the constraint of necessity or fate line. Are we to be held morally responsible for our personality changing brain tumors too?
That's mostly because I am not concerned with discussing philosophy, because there is no actual basis or evidence for either side-if your claim is that free will doesn't exist, and my claim is that it does, then...well, there's nothing more to argue until we know more about how the fundamentals of the universe work. I'm a physicist and computer scientist-I'd rather deal with things I can actually substantiate.
The "constraint of necessity or fate" is in the definition of free will, at least the one I'm using. Generally people are held responsible for their actions, yes, regardless of whether or not they are impaired due to a disability or otherwise. The punishment or consequence generally varies depending on the severity of the action and the severity of the injury/disability-this is, of course, in the realms of law and medicine. Some consequences for the mentally impaired involve therapy or assignment to a treatment center-different, obviously, than prison, but society still imposes consequences upon them if their actions are immoral.
Think about what you are suggesting for a minute. If you say we have no free will, and those who are impaired should not be held morally responsible for their actions, then people can do anything they want, and if they can show they were impaired when the action happened, they're not responsible! If I drink until I black out and then go murder someone, are you saying that I should not be held responsible because I don't have free will, and the alcohol impaired my decision-making process? (or rather, I didn't have a decision-making process to begin with, so I guess it didn't even matter that I was drunk!)
What if I drink so much that I get permanent brain damage and become a raging, pyschopathic serial killer? Should I be held responsible for someone's death by my hands in that case?
Your argument really doesn't make much sense at all.
what if I told you that the reasons people started putting other people in jail (or cutting their hands off etc) were pragmatic and not moralistic? The fear of being caught does prevent people from deciding to do whatever they want, it is meant to be one of the variables that affect the decision of the potential law breaker.
On July 08 2013 02:21 Reason wrote: Very well my good man, I shall do so.
Free will The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion.
The key here is that free will means at one's own discretion. You do what you want, because you want to do it. Your choices are your own.
The reason you want to do things is entirely dependent upon what your brain tells you that you want. If you alter the brain, so desire is also altered. Yes, our decision making process is more than tied to the physiology of the brain, it's absolutely governed by it.
Free will doesn't mean anything apart from free will. On moral responsibility, what you're saying there is "people that murder are simply acting on their natural impulses and so therefore should not be punished".
We exercise free will the same way we always have, just because we are subject to the laws of the universe doesn't change anything.
In most discussions of free will, it's hard to get everyone agreeing on an exact definition. What you're saying is one (compatibilist) definition, but not all philosophers agree with the idea that free will is compatible with determinism. They'd argue that determinism violates the first part of your definition ("the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate"), and that basically in order to truly have "the ability to act at one's own discretion," the functioning of one's mind cannot come down to the laws of physics. There must be an additional component where you choose A or B, and that regardless of the physical state of your mind right before the decision, you must actually be able to choose A (and all the neurological consequences that implies) or choose B (and all the different neurological consequences that implies). Determinism, some argue, makes it so that only one of A or B is a choice you are physically capable of making.
You still choose A because you "want to" in the sense that your internal narrative and your preference function says that that is what you want, which fits the compatibilist definition of free will. But it doesn't really fit the libertarian definition.
your post is insightful. I guess my main objection with the combatibilist definition is: what we like (Schopenhauer's "will") and the entire mechanism of decision making we use are neither controllable nor metaphysical (so that they would defy the rules of physics). There simply is no room to claim responsibility... I read this article: http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/bering-in-mind/2010/04/06/scientists-say-free-will-probably-doesnt-exist-but-urge-dont-stop-believing/ that puts forth the proposition that "simple" people are not ready for a world without free will. I am not really convinced of this.
I always find these sorts of exhortations to be a little befuddling. If free will doesn't exist then urging people to do anything is pointless; they either will or they won't by determined necessity. Similarly, I'm always confused when people like Sam Harris say that free will doesn't exist (not even in the compatibilist sense) and then go on to write pages and pages about why we should do choice X over choice Y. If free will doesn't exist, then choice X or Y don't even exist because they're not choices.
Well it's not as if they could choose to stop urging people / writing pages / etc
But seriously, if free will doesn't exist in whatever philosophical sense, that doesn't cause the thing that makes you feel as though you have free will to stop existing. And whatever that thing is, it drives human decision-making. People would go on acting as they always have. Reality stays the same, it is our understanding of reality that changes.
Okay, I think I understand what you've tried to do there quoting me that piece but since I don't share your views on this matter that which those words make incredibly obvious to you still eludes me. I could begin to construct a response to your point but I'd prefer you did more than allude to before I do so.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
On evidence, I'm talking about something more than hearsay. No, hearsay is not acceptable evidence as far as I'm concerned and I make no apologies for it.
We rely on hearsay for most of what we know. Fundamentally, there are three paths to justification: authority, experience, and reason. We rely on authority, or "hearsay" to establish every truth which we have not come to independently, and in the field of education, that is pretty much everything we know to be true.
Authority and Hearsay are pretty friggin' different. I wouldn't characterize them as the same at all.
Either way, the whole point of science is to reduce the problem of Argument by Authority. This is why you have to make sure your tests are Repeatable, so that anyone with the proper tools can do them. The whole point of Empiricism and science is that we don't have to rely on just "hearsay" or "personal experience." We can collectively do multiple separate fields of research and have them all culminate in scientific theories and bodies of research.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
Logical argumentation is a product of consciousness; everything which appears explicitly in the mind. That which is unconscious are the unstated, and unseen assumptions behind them. i.e. Why would you ask "What is this non-material universe you speak of?" rather than "What is this material universe you speak of?" Consciousness is deceptive all the time.
When you think your wife is cheating on you because she stays out late, whereas she was merely visiting her ailing mother is a deception of thought. The fact that we intuitively know the mind as the sovereign and uncaused thing, whereas according to physicalism it is apparently the effect of synaptic reflexes is another example of self-deception.
Physicalist theories of the mind necessarily begin with the assumption that the mind is unreliable.
But we already know the mind is unreliable. I don't even understand this argument. I don't have to even bring up halluncinations and things like that. People think things that are not true all the time. We've thought false things since the beginning of time. You would have to think that thinking something makes it more likely to be true, which is absurd to the point of making me cross-eyed.
But really, "unreliable" is not the correct word. Logic is not how the brain functions. The brain is much more Bayesian than that, and relies almost entirely on previous information. The brain also is evolutionarily adapted for social behavior, rather than logic, which is why humans are prone to things like the conjunction fallacy, which mistakes plausibility for probability.
On July 08 2013 02:17 MoltkeWarding wrote:
On July 08 2013 01:54 Signet wrote: I wouldn't call that an "illusion" though. Something more along the lines of an interpretation. What's in the mind is a map, what's actually out there is the territory.
Ah, but once you move from "illusion" to "interpretation," you are a heretic to the doctrine of physicalism, because you are no longer willing to acknowledge that reality has a single, unitary and logically-reducible language.
What? No you aren't. I have no idea what you're talking about. Saying that there is an objective reality does not mean that there aren't different perspectives on the same thing. Hell, how would I explain different camera angles???? You're being silly.
And also, physicalism really has very little to do with language.
That link on Bayesian thinking is pretty light on sources, not that I necessarily disagree with it.
I'm always skeptical of people bringing up Bayesian probability online since it seems to correspond alarmingly with subscribing to other views promulgated by LessWrong. My own paranoia, I guess, but I've encountered a lot of people who seem to uphold Bayesian probability as the answer to everything, so I guess it's healthy to be suspicious .
Well I'm pretty much one of those people, so I guess your suspicion is warranted.
Bayesian Probability is powerful because it generalizes empiricism. Empiricism is just a special case of Bayesian Probability. And it's also pretty powerful because it's keeps being correct over and over and over again. And with the new computing power of computers, it's can actually be used for stuff.
I see. Well, I guess we'll agree to disagree . I like Bayesian probability, but I really, really hate Eliezer Yudkowsky so my enthusiasm for its applications has been stymied somewhat ^^.
fwiw Nate Silver is also a Bayesian. Not sure if that would make you more or less enthusiastic towards its applications :p
I'm wary in general of modes of reasoning that purport to solve every problem. Bayesian reasoning in a certain sense is obvious useful and applicable to a lot of things, is still the subject of debate with respect to interpretation (subjectivists vs objectivists + how to derive priors etc. etc.) and so I dislike when people write blog posts and make some grand sweeping generalization about how Bayesian reasoning is literally a panacea for all reason because it misleads people into thinking that simply looking at the probability formula will give an easy solution to a given problem (despite the fact that a shitload of really bad applications of the formula have been made e.g. Drake equation etc).
Yudkowsky, for instance, thinks that Bayesian probability contradicts the scientific method and therefore the latter should be rejected (roughly). Not my cup of tea.
On July 08 2013 02:21 Reason wrote: Very well my good man, I shall do so.
Free will The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion.
The key here is that free will means at one's own discretion. You do what you want, because you want to do it. Your choices are your own.
The reason you want to do things is entirely dependent upon what your brain tells you that you want. If you alter the brain, so desire is also altered. Yes, our decision making process is more than tied to the physiology of the brain, it's absolutely governed by it.
Free will doesn't mean anything apart from free will. On moral responsibility, what you're saying there is "people that murder are simply acting on their natural impulses and so therefore should not be punished".
We exercise free will the same way we always have, just because we are subject to the laws of the universe doesn't change anything.
In most discussions of free will, it's hard to get everyone agreeing on an exact definition. What you're saying is one (compatibilist) definition, but not all philosophers agree with the idea that free will is compatible with determinism. They'd argue that determinism violates the first part of your definition ("the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate"), and that basically in order to truly have "the ability to act at one's own discretion," the functioning of one's mind cannot come down to the laws of physics. There must be an additional component where you choose A or B, and that regardless of the physical state of your mind right before the decision, you must actually be able to choose A (and all the neurological consequences that implies) or choose B (and all the different neurological consequences that implies). Determinism, some argue, makes it so that only one of A or B is a choice you are physically capable of making.
You still choose A because you "want to" in the sense that your internal narrative and your preference function says that that is what you want, which fits the compatibilist definition of free will. But it doesn't really fit the libertarian definition.
your post is insightful. I guess my main objection with the combatibilist definition is: what we like (Schopenhauer's "will") and the entire mechanism of decision making we use are neither controllable nor metaphysical (so that they would defy the rules of physics). There simply is no room to claim responsibility... I read this article: http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/bering-in-mind/2010/04/06/scientists-say-free-will-probably-doesnt-exist-but-urge-dont-stop-believing/ that puts forth the proposition that "simple" people are not ready for a world without free will. I am not really convinced of this.
I always find these sorts of exhortations to be a little befuddling. If free will doesn't exist then urging people to do anything is pointless; they either will or they won't by determined necessity. Similarly, I'm always confused when people like Sam Harris say that free will doesn't exist (not even in the compatibilist sense) and then go on to write pages and pages about why we should do choice X over choice Y. If free will doesn't exist, then choice X or Y don't even exist because they're not choices.
He writes/says the things that he does, maybe I'll read them and it will affect my thought process or not; I don't really see the problem relevant video
sums up everything I want to argue with compatibilists in this thread perfectly
But really, "unreliable" is not the correct word. Logic is not how the brain functions. The brain is much more Bayesian than that, and relies almost entirely on previous information. The brain also is evolutionarily adapted for social behavior, rather than logic, which is why humans are prone to things like the conjunction fallacy, which mistakes plausibility for probability.
While I mostly agree with what you're saying, I just wanted to point out that the initial experiments done on the conjunction fallacy are rather dubious because of the way the questions were posed/worded.
The question about the Soviet Union, for example, may imply that the U.S. breaking relations with the Soviet Union over an invasion is different from the U.S. breaking relations for no reason.
The debiased experiment tends to frame the question more clearly and far fewer people fail that one.
On July 08 2013 02:29 lebowskiguy wrote:
On July 08 2013 02:14 wherebugsgo wrote:
On July 08 2013 02:11 lebowskiguy wrote:
On July 08 2013 02:04 Reason wrote:
On July 08 2013 02:00 lebowskiguy wrote: to all those who support the existence of free will: How do you explain the fact that people with brain damage or people who develop tumors in the area of the brain change their decision process drastically? Many of them develop new violent or psychopathic urges and a different completely character overall. Doesn't this mean that our decision making process is tied to the physiology of our brain?
To those who might suggest that this doesn't count because these brains are altered or impaired: doesn't this mean that for free will to have a meaning or for moral responsibility to meaningfully come into play we should all have the same type of brain with no alterations? (this is of course never the case as there are not even 2 people with the same brain)
How do we exercise free will if our decision making process is irrefutably tied to the physiology of our brain and therefore the laws of the universe? (these questions are probably relevant only for the people who have a naturalistic view of the world)
The answer is very simple and has no doubt already been given in this thread.
Everything you've said has absolutely nothing to do with the concept of free will.
unless you have your own definition of free will ( do share) everything I have said is relevant to the concept of free will. Try to honor your name and reason with me.
He's right though, your conclusion doesn't logically follow from anything you've said so far, and what you've said is not really relevant to free will at all.
I assume free will has to do with decision making or else what is it good for? Free will is (google): the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion. Everything I have said in that post is 100% relevant. The alterations of your brain change your decision making process, they prove that your decision making process follows material laws; these laws are either probabilistic or deterministic or a combination of both. Now it is you that has to find room for your "free will" concept, because I sure can't
No, it isn't. A change in the physiology of your brain is not due to a constraint of necessity or fate. You still act at your own discretion, unless you are suggesting that no one has free will to begin with.
of course I am suggesting that there is no free will to begin with. The fact that you used your phrasing in what appears as a dismissive manner did probably reveals that you are somewhat ignorant of a heated philosophical debate that has lasted centuries. Also idk what you are saying with the constraint of necessity or fate line. Are we to be held morally responsible for our personality changing brain tumors too?
That's mostly because I am not concerned with discussing philosophy, because there is no actual basis or evidence for either side-if your claim is that free will doesn't exist, and my claim is that it does, then...well, there's nothing more to argue until we know more about how the fundamentals of the universe work. I'm a physicist and computer scientist-I'd rather deal with things I can actually substantiate.
The "constraint of necessity or fate" is in the definition of free will, at least the one I'm using. Generally people are held responsible for their actions, yes, regardless of whether or not they are impaired due to a disability or otherwise. The punishment or consequence generally varies depending on the severity of the action and the severity of the injury/disability-this is, of course, in the realms of law and medicine. Some consequences for the mentally impaired involve therapy or assignment to a treatment center-different, obviously, than prison, but society still imposes consequences upon them if their actions are immoral.
Think about what you are suggesting for a minute. If you say we have no free will, and those who are impaired should not be held morally responsible for their actions, then people can do anything they want, and if they can show they were impaired when the action happened, they're not responsible! If I drink until I black out and then go murder someone, are you saying that I should not be held responsible because I don't have free will, and the alcohol impaired my decision-making process? (or rather, I didn't have a decision-making process to begin with, so I guess it didn't even matter that I was drunk!)
What if I drink so much that I get permanent brain damage and become a raging, pyschopathic serial killer? Should I be held responsible for someone's death by my hands in that case?
Your argument really doesn't make much sense at all.
what if I told you that the reasons people started putting other people in jail (or cutting their hands off etc) were pragmatic and not moralistic? The fear of being caught does prevent people from deciding to do whatever they want, it is meant to be one of the variables that affect the decision of the potential law breaker.
What does this have to do with free will? You just completely dodged my question.
Are you or are you not suggesting that someone who commits murder while impaired by alcohol is morally responsible for his or her actions?
Authority and Hearsay are pretty friggin' different. I wouldn't characterize them as the same at all.
Either way, the whole point of science is to reduce the problem of Argument by Authority. This is why you have to make sure your tests are Repeatable, so that anyone with the proper tools can do them. The whole point of Empiricism and science is that we don't have to rely on just "hearsay" or "personal experience." We can collectively do multiple separate fields of research and have them all culminate in scientific theories and bodies of research.
The kind of scientific culture dominant today is not really empirical, but neo-Platonic, it subordinates observations to idealised structures and models. A cardinally empirical science would produce a composition of reality closer to Impressionism than Realism. It would not require "scientific theories." Poetic forms of thought are closer to pure empiricism than the symbolisation of reality via mathematical models. Direct empiricism reduces argument by authority, but what are you arguing for is not for more empiricism, but indirect empiricism, that is, accepting the conclusions of other empiricists, which again, is reliance on authority. Therefore I yet await to see the essential difference between your belief in anything, and my belief in fairies.
I am also astonished by your assertion that we can reduce argument by authority by appealing to experimental repetition. I look forward to watching you prove by such a means what you saw at noon yesterday.
But we already know the mind is unreliable. I don't even understand this argument. People think things that are not true all the time. We've thought false things since the beginning of time. You would have to think that thinking something makes it more likely to be true, which is absurd to the point of making me cross-eyed.
Exactly. You've graduated to premise B. Now all you have to do to approach the logical (or, rather, counter-logical conclusion issued therefrom.)
What? No you aren't. I have no idea what you're talking about. Saying that there is an objective reality does not mean that there aren't different perspectives on the same thing. Hell, how would I explain different camera angles???? You're being silly.
"Illusion" and "interpretation" imply different sorts of relationships between mental images and their external correlates. The one implies a subordinate relationship, the other implies either a superordinate or a co-ordinate relationship. For physicalism to be both true and meaningful, the subordinate relationship must be established.
You still haven't explained what you meant by the poem...
The poem is a typical specimen of the English Romantic movement, in which the rustic and untutored (unsoiled by the artificialities of urbane civilisation) are held to come closest to an intense experience of reality. Open curiosity is the mental state most conductive to flexible and direct experiences of novel phenomena, and children possess a natural mental superiority to adults, due to their very credulity. In a state of infancy, children even in modern civilisation have not yet learned to achieve what Jung called the "withdrawal" of projections, the loss by modern civilisation of the ancient ability to displace the psychic contents of a person's mind into the external world. In a child's mind, incorporeal objects are given the attributes of the human psyche, and there occurs an idealisation of the external universe. The modern tendency to withdraw into an extroverted orientation means that as we grow up, a counter-projection occurs, whereby the properties of the external world are imposed upon the mind. The consequence is the denial by modern men of magic, fairies and spirits. However, if Jung's Weltanschauung is to be believed, we have not lost the magic, we have merely changed their names. This entire thread is dotted by fairies and gods and spirits, seen, yet unrecognised.
On July 08 2013 02:21 Reason wrote: Very well my good man, I shall do so.
Free will The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion.
The key here is that free will means at one's own discretion. You do what you want, because you want to do it. Your choices are your own.
The reason you want to do things is entirely dependent upon what your brain tells you that you want. If you alter the brain, so desire is also altered. Yes, our decision making process is more than tied to the physiology of the brain, it's absolutely governed by it.
Free will doesn't mean anything apart from free will. On moral responsibility, what you're saying there is "people that murder are simply acting on their natural impulses and so therefore should not be punished".
We exercise free will the same way we always have, just because we are subject to the laws of the universe doesn't change anything.
In most discussions of free will, it's hard to get everyone agreeing on an exact definition. What you're saying is one (compatibilist) definition, but not all philosophers agree with the idea that free will is compatible with determinism. They'd argue that determinism violates the first part of your definition ("the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate"), and that basically in order to truly have "the ability to act at one's own discretion," the functioning of one's mind cannot come down to the laws of physics. There must be an additional component where you choose A or B, and that regardless of the physical state of your mind right before the decision, you must actually be able to choose A (and all the neurological consequences that implies) or choose B (and all the different neurological consequences that implies). Determinism, some argue, makes it so that only one of A or B is a choice you are physically capable of making.
You still choose A because you "want to" in the sense that your internal narrative and your preference function says that that is what you want, which fits the compatibilist definition of free will. But it doesn't really fit the libertarian definition.
your post is insightful. I guess my main objection with the combatibilist definition is: what we like (Schopenhauer's "will") and the entire mechanism of decision making we use are neither controllable nor metaphysical (so that they would defy the rules of physics). There simply is no room to claim responsibility... I read this article: http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/bering-in-mind/2010/04/06/scientists-say-free-will-probably-doesnt-exist-but-urge-dont-stop-believing/ that puts forth the proposition that "simple" people are not ready for a world without free will. I am not really convinced of this.
I always find these sorts of exhortations to be a little befuddling. If free will doesn't exist then urging people to do anything is pointless; they either will or they won't by determined necessity. Similarly, I'm always confused when people like Sam Harris say that free will doesn't exist (not even in the compatibilist sense) and then go on to write pages and pages about why we should do choice X over choice Y. If free will doesn't exist, then choice X or Y don't even exist because they're not choices.
They aren't choices, really. If someone reads Sam Harris' pages and pages and is influenced to change their mind from X to Y, is that really their choice? The set of circumstances which would cause a person to read the pages and pages are mostly out of their control in the first place. Then, after reading, what causes the person to accept his proposition or not? It entirely depends on whether his reasons are compatible with your previous experience, logical framework, intuition, etc, all of which are ultimately out of your control as well. I fail to see where there is any room for a choice here.
On July 08 2013 02:21 Reason wrote: Very well my good man, I shall do so.
Free will The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion.
The key here is that free will means at one's own discretion. You do what you want, because you want to do it. Your choices are your own.
The reason you want to do things is entirely dependent upon what your brain tells you that you want. If you alter the brain, so desire is also altered. Yes, our decision making process is more than tied to the physiology of the brain, it's absolutely governed by it.
Free will doesn't mean anything apart from free will. On moral responsibility, what you're saying there is "people that murder are simply acting on their natural impulses and so therefore should not be punished".
We exercise free will the same way we always have, just because we are subject to the laws of the universe doesn't change anything.
In most discussions of free will, it's hard to get everyone agreeing on an exact definition. What you're saying is one (compatibilist) definition, but not all philosophers agree with the idea that free will is compatible with determinism. They'd argue that determinism violates the first part of your definition ("the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate"), and that basically in order to truly have "the ability to act at one's own discretion," the functioning of one's mind cannot come down to the laws of physics. There must be an additional component where you choose A or B, and that regardless of the physical state of your mind right before the decision, you must actually be able to choose A (and all the neurological consequences that implies) or choose B (and all the different neurological consequences that implies). Determinism, some argue, makes it so that only one of A or B is a choice you are physically capable of making.
You still choose A because you "want to" in the sense that your internal narrative and your preference function says that that is what you want, which fits the compatibilist definition of free will. But it doesn't really fit the libertarian definition.
your post is insightful. I guess my main objection with the combatibilist definition is: what we like (Schopenhauer's "will") and the entire mechanism of decision making we use are neither controllable nor metaphysical (so that they would defy the rules of physics). There simply is no room to claim responsibility... I read this article: http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/bering-in-mind/2010/04/06/scientists-say-free-will-probably-doesnt-exist-but-urge-dont-stop-believing/ that puts forth the proposition that "simple" people are not ready for a world without free will. I am not really convinced of this.
I always find these sorts of exhortations to be a little befuddling. If free will doesn't exist then urging people to do anything is pointless; they either will or they won't by determined necessity. Similarly, I'm always confused when people like Sam Harris say that free will doesn't exist (not even in the compatibilist sense) and then go on to write pages and pages about why we should do choice X over choice Y. If free will doesn't exist, then choice X or Y don't even exist because they're not choices.
He writes/says the things that he does, maybe I'll read them and it will affect my thought process or not; I don't really see the problem relevant video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TXWDkwSyjpU sums up everything I want to argue with compatibilists in this thread perfectly
The problem is that he wrote a book called The Moral Landscape which makes absolutely no sense if free will doesn't exist because making moral choices requires the ability to actually make choices to start with.
EPT
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