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The important thing is that you feel superior to both of those types of people with your imaginary categorization.
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Cayman Islands24199 Posts
On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote: irrespective of any progress there this does not - and could never - further our understanding about the non-functional aspects of consciousness, the "like-ness" of a conscious experience aka the qualia.
The claim goes that it were metaphysically or at least logically possible that we would be some form of intelligent automaton (or p-zombie) that would show exactly the same functional behavior, we could think and deliberate, but it would not be anything "like" being us (we would have no quale when feeling pain, but nonetheless show the very same external reaction).
my arguments a while back directly addressed why this 'what it is like' question does not pose a problem in the way nagel etc think it does, and as for the conceivability of a bunch of matter having consciousness, feelings and so forth, it is useful to consider the problem put to a 'consciousness' backwards, making it prove it is indeed something wthin the world. in this investigation we'll see how there are two distinct ways in which people locate themselves in the world.
one of which is through external description of the body, and the brain etc etc. biology and natural understanding of the brain and so on is operative on this branch.
in the famous experiment in which a patient's corpus collosum was severed, the two halves of the brain nevertheless imagine themselves as the sole "I". there are also body replacement thought experiments that, despite a body's entire physical matter replaced by 'foreign' matter, intuition still suggest that the person continues (more in way of identity but also works here, since that consciousness will claim that it is still the same consciousness, despite its body replacement. this suggests that consciousness is but an indexical)
this second way of self locating, understanding etc, is that "I feel i am here", the cartesian cogito, what it is like to be a philosophical zombie bat etc etc. this intuition is strongest in the way of the feeling, but there's also a hidden assumption built in, and that is in how it locates this feeling in the world. i.e. how "i feel my consciousness" translates into "consciousness in the world." this jump is the fatal blindspot for systems that yield to the "internalist" intuition.
for it is merely a built in assumption, built in by evolution and the fact that the evolved organism's brain is always on its body so it can put the idea of "i'm in the world" directly into any sensory coordination system, or whatever function that consciousness ultimately serves. much in the way when you install turning lights on a car, you probably want the lights to signal relative, rather than absolute direction. that the lights are on the car are assumed in the design.
so this second way of locating oneself in the world is ultimately responsible for suggesting that consciousness is something in the world, that there exists a placement problem to find it a proper place. this is but a confusion due to not sufficiently understanding the limitations of a useful idea, asking questions ill framed by its bounds. it's a problem that is in need of dissolution ala wittgenstein.
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On August 31 2013 19:54 xM(Z wrote:just wanted to point out that one can see/discern the internal/innate logic/narrative of people talking here  . people arguing for physicalism work/function better in confined spaces(they need finite quantities to work with) while ones advocating for mystery/unknown work better in open spaces (they need infinities). that being said, this whole discussion looks like someone is trying to win, to show that his innate logic is better, by means using various concepts, self-validating concepts. that's fine, the evolution needs both sides to exist for it to happen.
We had like a five page discussion on how infinity works. Are you really trying to get us to go back to that?
I mean I love talking about countability and the difference between the extended real number infinity and the cardinality.
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the process may be physical, ie, chemical and electric, but the product is not, or at least not entirely. As my philo teacher says, the whole is more than the sum of its parts.
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On September 01 2013 00:04 DoubleReed wrote:Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 19:54 xM(Z wrote:just wanted to point out that one can see/discern the internal/innate logic/narrative of people talking here . people arguing for physicalism work/function better in confined spaces(they need finite quantities to work with) while ones advocating for mystery/unknown work better in open spaces (they need infinities). that being said, this whole discussion looks like someone is trying to win, to show that his innate logic is better, by means using various concepts, self-validating concepts. that's fine, the evolution needs both sides to exist for it to happen. We had like a five page discussion on how infinity works. Are you really trying to get us to go back to that? I mean I love talking about countability and the difference between the extended real number infinity and the cardinality.
I thought it was fun too! Sadly, half the time was spent quibbling about words  . Possibly the most frustrating thing about talking about mathematics in an informal setting is that words mean really precise things in mathematics that they don't necessarily mean in common speech.
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On August 31 2013 22:22 oneofthem wrote:Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote: irrespective of any progress there this does not - and could never - further our understanding about the non-functional aspects of consciousness, the "like-ness" of a conscious experience aka the qualia.
The claim goes that it were metaphysically or at least logically possible that we would be some form of intelligent automaton (or p-zombie) that would show exactly the same functional behavior, we could think and deliberate, but it would not be anything "like" being us (we would have no quale when feeling pain, but nonetheless show the very same external reaction).
my arguments a while back directly addressed why this 'what it is like' question does not pose a problem in the way nagel etc think it does, and as for the conceivability of a bunch of matter having consciousness, feelings and so forth, it is useful to consider the problem put to a 'consciousness' backwards, making it prove it is indeed something wthin the world. in this investigation we'll see how there are two distinct ways in which people locate themselves in the world. one of which is through external description of the body, and the brain etc etc. biology and natural understanding of the brain and so on is operative on this branch. in the famous experiment in which a patient's corpus collosum was severed, the two halves of the brain nevertheless imagine themselves as the sole "I". there are also body replacement thought experiments that, despite a body's entire physical matter replaced by 'foreign' matter, intuition still suggest that the person continues (more in way of identity but also works here, since that consciousness will claim that it is still the same consciousness, despite its body replacement. this suggests that consciousness is but an indexical) this second way of self locating, understanding etc, is that "I feel i am here", the cartesian cogito, what it is like to be a philosophical zombie bat etc etc. this intuition is strongest in the way of the feeling, but there's also a hidden assumption built in, and that is in how it locates this feeling in the world. i.e. how "i feel my consciousness" translates into "consciousness in the world." this jump is the fatal blindspot for systems that yield to the "internalist" intuition. for it is merely a built in assumption, built in by evolution and the fact that the evolved organism's brain is always on its body so it can put the idea of "i'm in the world" directly into any sensory coordination system, or whatever function that consciousness ultimately serves. much in the way when you install turning lights on a car, you probably want the lights to signal relative, rather than absolute direction. that the lights are on the car are assumed in the design. so this second way of locating oneself in the world is ultimately responsible for suggesting that consciousness is something in the world, that there exists a placement problem to find it a proper place. this is but a confusion due to not sufficiently understanding the limitations of a useful idea, asking questions ill framed by its bounds. it's a problem that is in need of dissolution ala wittgenstein.
Sorry, I must have missed these posts, but will certainly read up on them. Can I take it from your description here that you are an eliminitavist about the "non-functional part" of consciousness?
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On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
In my view the main problem that plagues discussions about the "hard problem" of consciousness is that it is so difficult for all participants to "shelter" it from any discussion about functionality. This goes to a point that I am not even sure whether Sam and farvacola are actually defending the "original" hard problem as championed by Chalmers or some variant of hybrid.
In the original problem it was argued that: yes, progress on a functional understanding of consciousness has been made, i.e. we have learned a good deal about how the brain is structured and how signals are processed, but irrespective of any progress there this does not - and could never - further our understanding about the non-functional aspects of consciousness, the "like-ness" of a conscious experience aka the qualia.
But it does further it, precisely because the "likeness" of a conscious experience depends entirely upon the physical elements in and outside of the body. This, however, does not mean that it will lead us to be able to subjectively experience the world from other points of view than our own (at least exactly like other "points of experience" than our own, I don't mean only certain aspects of it, such as seeings like dogs see etc.) Well, actually, one could hypothetically imagine a time when technology would allow us to completely transform our physical selves into, for example, chimpanzees, then turning ourselves back human - this would have led "us" (it depends also on how you define "your self") to experience the world from a chimpanzees' point of view, but would not leave us with a memory of it (unless we manage to create technology that somehow allows us to do so, possibly by modifying our own brains).
Regardless, all of this doesn't bring anything new to the table. Understanding how the universe works and experimenting our presence in the universe are two different things. We know about the speed of light in space, yet we cannot experience going ourselves as fast as light in space (I don't mean through wormholes, obviously :p). We know what our sun is made of, and why it "burns" like it does, yet we can't experience being in the center of the sun - or being the sun itself. So what? This is true of absolutely every bit of knowledge - understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something, although one can help with the other. Why does it suddenly pose such a problem when it comes to the brain? And again, who knows, maybe future technology will allow us to experience other "subjectivities".
On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
The claim goes that it were metaphysically or at least logically possible that we would be some form of intelligent automaton (or p-zombie) that would show exactly the same functional behavior, we could think and deliberate, but it would not be anything "like" being us (we would have no quale when feeling pain, but nonetheless show the very same external reaction).
The philosophical zombie argument is so flawed with regards to its attempt at "disproving" physicalism that I'm genuinely surprised some people are still using it to do just that. If we imagine a "zombie" that is physically identical to us in every way, then that zombie will be as conscious as we are, precisely because it is being physically as we are which gives us consciousness.
On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
It is in this latter non-functional sense of consciousness that pointing to emergent phenomena seems somewhat like question begging since we do not seem to have any other example in the natural world of such subjective status. And it is in this way - or so the claim goes - that consciousness really is special or mysterious or fundamentally different from mere signal processing or computing.
There are other examples of subjective status (as in, self-awareness) among animals, to various degrees. This pretty much points again to brain development & composition being the relevant variable with regards to the existence (and the "level") of consciousness.
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+ Show Spoiler +On September 01 2013 03:57 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
In my view the main problem that plagues discussions about the "hard problem" of consciousness is that it is so difficult for all participants to "shelter" it from any discussion about functionality. This goes to a point that I am not even sure whether Sam and farvacola are actually defending the "original" hard problem as championed by Chalmers or some variant of hybrid.
In the original problem it was argued that: yes, progress on a functional understanding of consciousness has been made, i.e. we have learned a good deal about how the brain is structured and how signals are processed, but irrespective of any progress there this does not - and could never - further our understanding about the non-functional aspects of consciousness, the "like-ness" of a conscious experience aka the qualia. But it does further it, precisely because the "likeness" of a conscious experience depends entirely upon the physical elements in and outside of the body. This, however, does not mean that it will lead us to be able to subjectively experience the world from other points of view than our own (at least exactly like other "points of experience" than our own, I don't mean only certain aspects of it, such as seeings like dogs see etc.) Well, actually, one could hypothetically imagine a time when technology would allow us to completely transform our physical selves into, for example, chimpanzees, then turning ourselves back human - this would have led "us" (it depends also on how you define "your self") to experience the world from a chimpanzees' point of view, but would not leave us with a memory of it (unless we manage to create technology that somehow allows us to do so, possibly by modifying our own brains). Regardless, all of this doesn't bring anything new to the table. Understanding how the universe works and experimenting our presence in the universe are two different things. We know about the speed of light in space, yet we cannot experience going ourselves as fast as light in space (I don't mean through wormholes, obviously :p). We know what our sun is made of, and why it "burns" like it does, yet we can't experience being in the center of the sun - or being the sun itself. So what? This is true of absolutely every bit of knowledge - understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something, although one can help with the other. Why does it suddenly pose such a problem when it comes to the brain? And again, who knows, maybe future technology will allow us to experience other "subjectivities". Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
The claim goes that it were metaphysically or at least logically possible that we would be some form of intelligent automaton (or p-zombie) that would show exactly the same functional behavior, we could think and deliberate, but it would not be anything "like" being us (we would have no quale when feeling pain, but nonetheless show the very same external reaction). The philosophical zombie argument is so flawed with regards to its attempt at "disproving" physicalism that I'm genuinely surprised some people are still using it to do just that. If we imagine a "zombie" that is physically identical to us in every way, then that zombie will be as conscious as we are, precisely because it is being physically as we are which gives us consciousness. Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
It is in this latter non-functional sense of consciousness that pointing to emergent phenomena seems somewhat like question begging since we do not seem to have any other example in the natural world of such subjective status. And it is in this way - or so the claim goes - that consciousness really is special or mysterious or fundamentally different from mere signal processing or computing. There are other examples of subjective status (as in, self-awareness) among animals, to various degrees. This pretty much points again to brain development & composition being the relevant variable with regards to the existence (and the "level") of consciousness.
Please let's take some time to look at what you replied. Maybe we'll find out why you don't seem to connect to farv and sam. For instance you say:
"But it does further it, precisely because the "likeness" of a conscious experience depends entirely upon the physical elements in and outside of the body."
In my book you would need to qualify this statement with "... if physicalism is true." But then this is exactly what is under contention. How on earth do you think this could sway anybody who is not already dedicated to your position? To them it must seem like question begging. Heck, I would describe myself as a physicalist and to me it sure looks like question begging. The 'like-ness' (quale) of an experience is not a physical state, even though it might have a neurophysiological correlate. While it might be clear how the neurophysiological correlate is influenced by the "physical elements in and outside of the body", it is not at all obvious how the neurophysiological correlate gives rise to the sensation of "like-ness" in the first place. This is Chalmers' hard problem and you have not addressed it as far as I can see.
You further argue that we cannot experience "traveling at the speed of light" or "being in the center of the sun", but why is that? Because of physical limitations or because it simply "is not like anything to experience traveling at the speed of light or being in the center of the sun"? What if our physical makeup or our laws of physics were different? Would your answer change?
You then say:
"This is true of absolutely every bit of knowledge - understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something."
Yes, but even if this is so, the question remains why this should be case? Why do we have the strong intuition that irrespective of how many explanations from limitless perspectives we hear, they do not and cannot tell us fully how it is to experience a phenomenon? This is directly relevant to discussing brains because the very existence of (something like) a brain seems to bring the hard problem into existence.
Imagine you meet an alien from another dimension where gravity does not exist. I have a strong intuition that I could explain to her how gravity works nonetheless. However, if she were to tell me that, to her, experiencing something never really felt like anything in particular, I would be at a loss on how to explain to her how the effects gravity has on my body "feel like" to me. This part of subjective experience seems ineffable and fundamental. Do you share this intuition? Why is that so? Can you see now why others wrote that you are only rephrasing the 'hard problem' not trying to answer it?
Your argument against p-zombies needs some more clarification. Do you merely hold that p-zombies are physically impossible? Chalmers would agree with you but claim that merely conceivability is required. Do you think p-zombies are inconceivable? Well, others think they can conceive of them. What mistake are they making? Is there a way to point it out to them without assuming that physicalism is true from the get-go?
Finally, when you talk about self-awareness it mixes again the functional aspects of consciousness with he supposed non-functional aspects. Being self-aware, as in being able to recognize oneself and realize facts about ones position in the world with respect to others, has clear consequences in the world. The claim is that you could have all that functional awareness without feeling that "it is like something" to be you.
The bottom line is that I share your general view on the world, but others do not. In order to communicate effectively to them you need to understand where their positions differ and address 'that'. It is certainly much easier to just sit around and ask a bunch of questions, like I just did, than to spell out ones world view conclusively, so please take my post as a simple hint on where I think that your prior conversations went wrong. I do not expect at all that you reply to all or any of the questions asked in the post, but if you would like to clarify some parts or tell me where I misinterpreted you, I would sure be interested.
Cheers!
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On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On September 01 2013 03:57 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
In my view the main problem that plagues discussions about the "hard problem" of consciousness is that it is so difficult for all participants to "shelter" it from any discussion about functionality. This goes to a point that I am not even sure whether Sam and farvacola are actually defending the "original" hard problem as championed by Chalmers or some variant of hybrid.
In the original problem it was argued that: yes, progress on a functional understanding of consciousness has been made, i.e. we have learned a good deal about how the brain is structured and how signals are processed, but irrespective of any progress there this does not - and could never - further our understanding about the non-functional aspects of consciousness, the "like-ness" of a conscious experience aka the qualia. But it does further it, precisely because the "likeness" of a conscious experience depends entirely upon the physical elements in and outside of the body. This, however, does not mean that it will lead us to be able to subjectively experience the world from other points of view than our own (at least exactly like other "points of experience" than our own, I don't mean only certain aspects of it, such as seeings like dogs see etc.) Well, actually, one could hypothetically imagine a time when technology would allow us to completely transform our physical selves into, for example, chimpanzees, then turning ourselves back human - this would have led "us" (it depends also on how you define "your self") to experience the world from a chimpanzees' point of view, but would not leave us with a memory of it (unless we manage to create technology that somehow allows us to do so, possibly by modifying our own brains). Regardless, all of this doesn't bring anything new to the table. Understanding how the universe works and experimenting our presence in the universe are two different things. We know about the speed of light in space, yet we cannot experience going ourselves as fast as light in space (I don't mean through wormholes, obviously :p). We know what our sun is made of, and why it "burns" like it does, yet we can't experience being in the center of the sun - or being the sun itself. So what? This is true of absolutely every bit of knowledge - understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something, although one can help with the other. Why does it suddenly pose such a problem when it comes to the brain? And again, who knows, maybe future technology will allow us to experience other "subjectivities". Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
The claim goes that it were metaphysically or at least logically possible that we would be some form of intelligent automaton (or p-zombie) that would show exactly the same functional behavior, we could think and deliberate, but it would not be anything "like" being us (we would have no quale when feeling pain, but nonetheless show the very same external reaction). The philosophical zombie argument is so flawed with regards to its attempt at "disproving" physicalism that I'm genuinely surprised some people are still using it to do just that. If we imagine a "zombie" that is physically identical to us in every way, then that zombie will be as conscious as we are, precisely because it is being physically as we are which gives us consciousness. Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
It is in this latter non-functional sense of consciousness that pointing to emergent phenomena seems somewhat like question begging since we do not seem to have any other example in the natural world of such subjective status. And it is in this way - or so the claim goes - that consciousness really is special or mysterious or fundamentally different from mere signal processing or computing. There are other examples of subjective status (as in, self-awareness) among animals, to various degrees. This pretty much points again to brain development & composition being the relevant variable with regards to the existence (and the "level") of consciousness. Please let's take some time to look at what you replied. Maybe we'll find out why you don't seem to connect to farv and sam. For instance you say: "But it does further it, precisely because the "likeness" of a conscious experience depends entirely upon the physical elements in and outside of the body." In my book you would need to qualify this statement with "... if physicalism is true." But then this is exactly what is under contention. How on earth do you think this could sway anybody who is not already dedicated to your position? To them it must seem like question begging.
The argument that was being made here was that physicalism couldn't be reconciled with phenomenological experiences. Obviously, if someone holds the position that physicalism is not true, you're right that this person will (or is likely to) simply dismiss as not true my statement that knowledge about the physical structures and processes in the brain can further our understanding of consciousness. It is however different to assert that even though consciousness is physical, as is everything else, we cannot reach further understanding of consciousness through scientific inquiry on the physical.
On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Heck, I would describe myself as a physicalist and to me it sure looks like question begging. The 'like-ness' (quale) of an experience is not a physical state, even though it might have a neurophysiological correlate. While it might be clear how the neurophysiological correlate is influenced by the "physical elements in and outside of the body", it is not at all obvious how the neurophysiological correlate gives rise to the sensation of "like-ness" in the first place. This is Chalmers' hard problem and you have not addressed it as far as I can see.
This, Chalmer's hard problem, is an illusion - as in, it only exists if you have an a-priori belief about consciousness being detached from the physical structures and processes (or if you don't have that belief but simply don't understand what it means to link the two).
Knowing how the said physical structures and processes give rise to the sensation of "like-ness" is purely a matter of having enough knowledge about the said physical structures and processes. Us not having yet a complete answer to this (or even if we could never have the answer) doesn't change that.
Note again that I am not here talking about experiencing "like-ness", but understanding how "like-ness" works. The distinction is essential.
On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
You further argue that we cannot experience "traveling at the speed of light" or "being in the center of the sun", but why is that? Because of physical limitations or because it simply "is not like anything to experience traveling at the speed of light or being in the center of the sun"? What if our physical makeup or our laws of physics were different? Would your answer change?
Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends on our physical composition. Photons do not have a physical composition that would lead them to "feel" anything, if we go by the common understanding of "to feel". My example of being at the center of the sun wasn't the best since you could argue that we could find a way to go there even if it is to die instantly, but the sun itself is another example of an object that doesn't "feel" because it's physical composition does not allow it to feel anything. If you or others have a different definition of what it means to "feel", then by all means, present it to us and we'll discuss it. For example, if you define "to feel" as "to exist", then yes, everything that exists also feels, by definition. That's not how the word is understood, however.
On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
You then say:
"This is true of absolutely every bit of knowledge - understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something."
Yes, but even if this is so, the question remains why this should be case? Why do we have the strong intuition that irrespective of how many explanations from limitless perspectives we hear, they do not and cannot tell us fully how it is to experience a phenomenon?
This is the case because to feel something is to have our internal composition be a certain way, transmitting to itself information about how it is (including in relation to its environment) and, as the common understanding of the word goes, being conscious of all or part of the information that has been transmitted and interpreted. As long as persons A & B don't have the exact same information transmitted to themselves about how they are and aren't conscious in the same way about exactly all or part of that information, then they will not "feel" the same.
The answer to "why is it so" that understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something is therefore that our physical composition has access to and transmits to itself consciously information about the two in two different ways.
On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
This is directly relevant to discussing brains because the very existence of (something like) a brain seems to bring the hard problem into existence.
Like I said, it only brings the hard problem into existence if you have an a-priori belief (even if you're not aware of it) of a consciousness existing detached from the physical processes and structures.
On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Imagine you meet an alien from another dimension where gravity does not exist. I have a strong intuition that I could explain to her how gravity works nonetheless. However, if she were to tell me that, to her, experiencing something never really felt like anything in particular, I would be at a loss on how to explain to her how the effects gravity has on my body "feel like" to me. This part of subjective experience seems ineffable and fundamental. Do you share this intuition? Why is that so? Can you see now why others wrote that you are only rephrasing the 'hard problem' not trying to answer it?
No need to go this far - we can take the example of the "color red". You would be at a loss to explain to someone who has never experienced seeing the color red what exactly it feels like to see the color red, even if that someone had studied the electromagnetic spectrum. Why is this a problem? I completely covered and answered it when I explained the difference between knowing the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively.
On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Your argument against p-zombies needs some more clarification. Do you merely hold that p-zombies are physically impossible? Chalmers would agree with you but claim that merely conceivability is required. Do you think p-zombies are inconceivable? Well, others think they can conceive of them. What mistake are they making? Is there a way to point it out to them without assuming that physicalism is true from the get-go?
Like I said, the problem of the philosophical zombie is not the act of conceiving a philosophical zombie itself, it is the assertion that the philosophical zombie argument logically disproves physicalism.
Let's look at why this assertion is false by looking the logical reasoning behind it (taken from wikipedia):
1. According to physicalism, all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical.
2. Thus, if physicalism is true, a logically possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular, conscious experience must exist in such a possible world.
3. In fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this (so Chalmers argues) it follows that such a world is logically possible.
4. Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows from 2. and 3. by modus tollens.)
1. is true.
2. is true, but after "must contain everything that exists in our actual world" one could add "and must work exactly like our actual world".
3. is false. Why? Because the moment you conceive a world physically indistinguishable from our world, it must work exactly like our world according to physicalism. So if you decree that there is no consciousness in that conceived world, you are either breaking the premise that it is physically indistinguishable from our world or adding something that would make the two physically indistinguishable worlds work differently, thus breaking the physicalist premise.
4. is therefore not a conclusion that disproves physicalism in any way, since the premises have been broken mid-way.
On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Finally, when you talk about self-awareness it mixes again the functional aspects of consciousness with he supposed non-functional aspects. Being self-aware, as in being able to recognize oneself and realize facts about ones position in the world with respect to others, has clear consequences in the world. The claim is that you could have all that functional awareness without feeling that "it is like something" to be you.
That claim is based on nothing, except faith/belief (in addition to "feeling like" being poorly defined).
On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
The bottom line is that I share your general view on the world, but others do not. In order to communicate effectively to them you need to understand where their positions differ and address 'that'.
I already pointed out where the positions differed: it is on the conception, or understanding, of the link between the physical components and consciousness. The problem is that some people do not recognize the implications of holding the position that consciousness only comes from the specific workings of the physical. So some of them will acknowledge that it does, then make assertions that they do not realize contradict that position.
Cheers ,-)
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+ Show Spoiler +On September 03 2013 03:07 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On September 01 2013 03:57 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
In my view the main problem that plagues discussions about the "hard problem" of consciousness is that it is so difficult for all participants to "shelter" it from any discussion about functionality. This goes to a point that I am not even sure whether Sam and farvacola are actually defending the "original" hard problem as championed by Chalmers or some variant of hybrid.
In the original problem it was argued that: yes, progress on a functional understanding of consciousness has been made, i.e. we have learned a good deal about how the brain is structured and how signals are processed, but irrespective of any progress there this does not - and could never - further our understanding about the non-functional aspects of consciousness, the "like-ness" of a conscious experience aka the qualia. But it does further it, precisely because the "likeness" of a conscious experience depends entirely upon the physical elements in and outside of the body. This, however, does not mean that it will lead us to be able to subjectively experience the world from other points of view than our own (at least exactly like other "points of experience" than our own, I don't mean only certain aspects of it, such as seeings like dogs see etc.) Well, actually, one could hypothetically imagine a time when technology would allow us to completely transform our physical selves into, for example, chimpanzees, then turning ourselves back human - this would have led "us" (it depends also on how you define "your self") to experience the world from a chimpanzees' point of view, but would not leave us with a memory of it (unless we manage to create technology that somehow allows us to do so, possibly by modifying our own brains). Regardless, all of this doesn't bring anything new to the table. Understanding how the universe works and experimenting our presence in the universe are two different things. We know about the speed of light in space, yet we cannot experience going ourselves as fast as light in space (I don't mean through wormholes, obviously :p). We know what our sun is made of, and why it "burns" like it does, yet we can't experience being in the center of the sun - or being the sun itself. So what? This is true of absolutely every bit of knowledge - understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something, although one can help with the other. Why does it suddenly pose such a problem when it comes to the brain? And again, who knows, maybe future technology will allow us to experience other "subjectivities". Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
The claim goes that it were metaphysically or at least logically possible that we would be some form of intelligent automaton (or p-zombie) that would show exactly the same functional behavior, we could think and deliberate, but it would not be anything "like" being us (we would have no quale when feeling pain, but nonetheless show the very same external reaction). The philosophical zombie argument is so flawed with regards to its attempt at "disproving" physicalism that I'm genuinely surprised some people are still using it to do just that. If we imagine a "zombie" that is physically identical to us in every way, then that zombie will be as conscious as we are, precisely because it is being physically as we are which gives us consciousness. Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
It is in this latter non-functional sense of consciousness that pointing to emergent phenomena seems somewhat like question begging since we do not seem to have any other example in the natural world of such subjective status. And it is in this way - or so the claim goes - that consciousness really is special or mysterious or fundamentally different from mere signal processing or computing. There are other examples of subjective status (as in, self-awareness) among animals, to various degrees. This pretty much points again to brain development & composition being the relevant variable with regards to the existence (and the "level") of consciousness. Please let's take some time to look at what you replied. Maybe we'll find out why you don't seem to connect to farv and sam. For instance you say: "But it does further it, precisely because the "likeness" of a conscious experience depends entirely upon the physical elements in and outside of the body." In my book you would need to qualify this statement with "... if physicalism is true." But then this is exactly what is under contention. How on earth do you think this could sway anybody who is not already dedicated to your position? To them it must seem like question begging. The argument that was being made here was that physicalism couldn't be reconciled with phenomenological experiences. Obviously, if someone holds the position that physicalism is not true, you're right that this person will (or is likely to) simply dismiss as not true my statement that knowledge about the physical structures and processes in the brain can further our understanding of consciousness. It is however different to assert that even though consciousness is physical, as is everything else, we cannot reach further understanding of consciousness through scientific inquiry on the physical. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Heck, I would describe myself as a physicalist and to me it sure looks like question begging. The 'like-ness' (quale) of an experience is not a physical state, even though it might have a neurophysiological correlate. While it might be clear how the neurophysiological correlate is influenced by the "physical elements in and outside of the body", it is not at all obvious how the neurophysiological correlate gives rise to the sensation of "like-ness" in the first place. This is Chalmers' hard problem and you have not addressed it as far as I can see. This, Chalmer's hard problem, is an illusion - as in, it only exists if you have an a-priori belief about consciousness being detached from the physical structures and processes (or if you don't have that belief but simply don't understand what it means to link the two). Knowing how the said physical structures and processes give rise to the sensation of "like-ness" is purely a matter of having enough knowledge about the said physical structures and processes. Us not having yet a complete answer to this (or even if we could never have the answer) doesn't change that. Note again that I am not here talking about experiencing "like-ness", but understanding how "like-ness" works. The distinction is essential. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
You further argue that we cannot experience "traveling at the speed of light" or "being in the center of the sun", but why is that? Because of physical limitations or because it simply "is not like anything to experience traveling at the speed of light or being in the center of the sun"? What if our physical makeup or our laws of physics were different? Would your answer change? Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends on our physical composition. Photons do not have a physical composition that would lead them to "feel" anything, if we go by the common understanding of "to feel". My example of being at the center of the sun wasn't the best since you could argue that we could find a way to go there even if it is to die instantly, but the sun itself is another example of an object that doesn't "feel" because it's physical composition does not allow it to feel anything. If you or others have a different definition of what it means to "feel", then by all means, present it to us and we'll discuss it. For example, if you define "to feel" as "to exist", then yes, everything that exists also feels, by definition. That's not how the word is understood, however. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
You then say:
"This is true of absolutely every bit of knowledge - understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something."
Yes, but even if this is so, the question remains why this should be case? Why do we have the strong intuition that irrespective of how many explanations from limitless perspectives we hear, they do not and cannot tell us fully how it is to experience a phenomenon? This is the case because to feel something is to have our internal composition be a certain way, transmitting to itself information about how it is (including in relation to its environment) and, as the common understanding of the word goes, being conscious of all or part of the information that has been transmitted and interpreted. As long as persons A & B don't have the exact same information transmitted to themselves about how they are and aren't conscious in the same way about exactly all or part of that information, then they will not "feel" the same. The answer to "why is it so" that understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something is therefore that our physical composition has access to and transmits to itself consciously information about the two in two different ways. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
This is directly relevant to discussing brains because the very existence of (something like) a brain seems to bring the hard problem into existence. Like I said, it only brings the hard problem into existence if you have an a-priori belief (even if you're not aware of it) of a consciousness existing detached from the physical processes and structures. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Imagine you meet an alien from another dimension where gravity does not exist. I have a strong intuition that I could explain to her how gravity works nonetheless. However, if she were to tell me that, to her, experiencing something never really felt like anything in particular, I would be at a loss on how to explain to her how the effects gravity has on my body "feel like" to me. This part of subjective experience seems ineffable and fundamental. Do you share this intuition? Why is that so? Can you see now why others wrote that you are only rephrasing the 'hard problem' not trying to answer it? No need to go this far - we can take the example of the "color red". You would be at a loss to explain to someone who has never experienced seeing the color red what exactly it feels like to see the color red, even if that someone had studied the electromagnetic spectrum. Why is this a problem? I completely covered and answered it when I explained the difference between knowing the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Your argument against p-zombies needs some more clarification. Do you merely hold that p-zombies are physically impossible? Chalmers would agree with you but claim that merely conceivability is required. Do you think p-zombies are inconceivable? Well, others think they can conceive of them. What mistake are they making? Is there a way to point it out to them without assuming that physicalism is true from the get-go? Like I said, the problem of the philosophical zombie is not the act of conceiving a philosophical zombie itself, it is the assertion that the philosophical zombie argument logically disproves physicalism. Let's look at why this assertion is false by looking the logical reasoning behind it (taken from wikipedia): Show nested quote +1. According to physicalism, all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical.
2. Thus, if physicalism is true, a logically possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular, conscious experience must exist in such a possible world.
3. In fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this (so Chalmers argues) it follows that such a world is logically possible.
4. Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows from 2. and 3. by modus tollens.) 1. is true. 2. is true, but after "must contain everything that exists in our actual world" one could add "and must work exactly like our actual world". 3. is false. Why? Because the moment you conceive a world physically indistinguishable from our world, it must work exactly like our world according to physicalism. So if you decree that there is no consciousness in that conceived world, you are either breaking the premise that it is physically indistinguishable from our world or adding something that would make the two physically indistinguishable worlds work differently, thus breaking the physicalist premise. 4. is therefore not a conclusion that disproves physicalism in any way, since the premises have been broken mid-way. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Finally, when you talk about self-awareness it mixes again the functional aspects of consciousness with he supposed non-functional aspects. Being self-aware, as in being able to recognize oneself and realize facts about ones position in the world with respect to others, has clear consequences in the world. The claim is that you could have all that functional awareness without feeling that "it is like something" to be you. That claim is based on nothing, except faith/belief (in addition to "feeling like" being poorly defined). Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
The bottom line is that I share your general view on the world, but others do not. In order to communicate effectively to them you need to understand where their positions differ and address 'that'. I already pointed out where the positions differed: it is on the conception, or understanding, of the link between the physical components and consciousness. The problem is that some people do not recognize the implications of holding the position that consciousness only comes from the specific workings of the physical. So some of them will acknowledge that it does, then make assertions that they do not realize contradict that position. Cheers ,-)
I appreciate your response, even though it feels somewhat funny to 'defend' the non-physicalist position to me. But for the sake of removing bad arguments from the discussion and clearing up the actual points of contention here it goes anyway:
Throughout your whole post you simply refer to 'consciousness' without giving he slightest indication that you understood that the hard problem only relates to phenomenal experience, not functional nor behavioral types of awareness, so in the following I will simply assume that you equate 'consciousness' with 'experiencing qualia'/'having phenomenological experiences'. Please note, if you have a broader definition of consciousness at play here, then you are consistently missing the point anyway.
You write:
"The argument that was being made here was that physicalism couldn't be reconciled with phenomenological experiences."
This is simply not true. You answered to the part of my post where I was explaining the hard problem of consciousness. It doesn't follow at all from the hard problem that qualia are irreconcilable with physicalism (there are other arguments for that) only that this is a problem that physicalists will have to deal with. You need to be way more precise in your responses otherwise you start out by missing the point - which is a bad way to start.
Then you say:
"This, Chalmer's hard problem, is an illusion - as in, it only exists if you have an a-priori belief about consciousness being detached from the physical structures and processes (or if you don't have that belief but simply don't understand what it means to link the two)."
You only got it right in the brackets. The claim is not at all that qualia are completely detached from the physical structures, but on the contrary that they are somehow linked - but on a physicalist view it is hard to account for how this could be the case, unless consciousness were a fundamental physical property (which only few physicalists -the crazy ones- believe). Qualia seem further not logically necessary for any causal/functional/behavioral theory , so why is it that in this world experiences are (always?) accompanied by qualia?
Your following paragraph...:
"Knowing how the said physical structures and processes give rise to the sensation of "like-ness" is purely a matter of having enough knowledge about the said physical structures and processes. Us not having yet a complete answer to this (or even if we could never have the answer) doesn't change that."
... is simply wishful thinking to rescue your position. Surely, you should be willing to admit that if we could never have an answer to the question of how qualia are generated, then Chalmers' 'hard problem' really should be considered 'hard'. Now where is the illusion in that, eh?
You go on with:
"Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends on our physical composition."
"Like I said"? Is this a subtle form of backpedaling or why is "entirely" prominently missing in your restatement? Because no property dualist would object to what you wrote there as long as you don't claim to know that there are absolutely no non-physical factors at play (like bridge laws) - and how on earth would you know something like that?
The following paragraph seems wholly confused since nobody ever claimed that objects like 'suns' or 'rocks' have phenomenological experiences. Do you think that this was entailed by the argument?
Anyway, you try to get to the core of phenomenological experience by saying:
"As long as persons A & B don't have the exact same information transmitted to themselves about how they are and aren't conscious in the same way about exactly all or part of that information, then they will not "feel" the same."
Apart from the utter mystery of how you would ever go about demonstrating such a bold claim, it remains the fact that I seem to have rather robust phenomenological experiences even though the "transmitted information" is not "exactly" the same. Are you talking only about the internal stance here and not about external stimuli? And how would you control for exactly the same 'information' and 'feeling'? I mean, you surely don't suggest that the 'redness' of red is identical to the electric impulses or chemical transmitters in my synapses, do you?
You then go on to make a surprising (to me at least) admission:
"No need to go this far - we can take the example of the "color red". You would be at a loss to explain to someone who has never experienced seeing the color red what exactly it feels like to see the color red, even if that someone had studied the electromagnetic spectrum. Why is this a problem? I completely covered and answered it when I explained the difference between knowing the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively."
You are sliding on thin ice here as you seem to be dangerously close to conceding the whole argument to the non-physicalist, only to then wave the conclusion away with a sleight of hand. Do you think I can 'know' how it is to see the color red once I've experienced it but not before? If so, you seem to agree that second order phenomenological knowledge/belief requires a completely different process to be obtained than any other piece of knowledge/belief. It would hence be a bit disingenuous to ask: "Why is consciousness special?". This at the very least opens the door to the non-physicalist to propose that as knowledge of qualia cannot be obtained by 'standard epistemological methods' explanations of qualia are prime candidates for requiring "non-standard non-physicalist tools" to be successful.
The worst part comes when you aim to dismantle Chalmers' argument via Wikipedia. Let's take a look:
"3. is false if "logically possible" still means "logically possible world working according to physicalism". Why? Because the moment you conceive a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness, you are no longer conceiving that world according to physicalism."
This almost leaves me speechless, since it is a logic101 fail. Why on earth should 'logically possible' entail 'logically possible according to physicalism' as long as it is not established that physicalism holds in the first place!? The argument presented here tries to establish a reductio against physicalism, so you cannot insert your conclusion into a premise as long as you haven't established its validity. This is textbook question begging! How can you not see that? I guess given that you assume that the Zombie argument is riddled with problems it's quite a feat to pick out the one thing that is genuinely unproblematic here but whatever ... 
Finally you state that the claim that there exist purely phenomenal experiences ('feeling like-ness') that are unnecessary for function or behavior is...
"... based on nothing, except faith/belief (in addition to "feeling like" being poorly defined)."
This strikes me as clearly untrue. The robots we develop are already able to show a remarkable variety of functional and behavioral traits, without having phenomenological experiences at all (or do you think they have them?). Given this evidence I don't find it prima facie absurd that a very advanced robot could show a functional variety in the ballpark of higher animals or even humans without the phenomenological 'baggage'. Furthermore we have examples of humans who lose a class of phenomenological experiences while at least maintaining some functional/behavioral awareness (e.g., blindsight). And notice that I am even providing you with some (albeit limited) examples from this world, whereas Chalmers argument works if you grant that phenomenal experience can be stripped from the functional in some logically possible world. Where is the obvious contradiction here?
In my opinion you are really overselling the case for physicalism, maybe because you have never really engaged with the case of the opposition (outside of Wikipedia), but dismissed their arguments out of hand. I would recommend Chalmers' book "The conscious mind" to you. Even though I certainly disagree with a lot of Chalmers' conclusions, he is a smart guy and knows what he is talking about. Plus it's all in all a fun read.
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@miramax
Do you think it's possible to create a robot that possesses "phenomenological experiences" provided complete understanding of the brain?
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@miramax Physicalism is default assumption, because of lack of any evidence of anything not falling under it and there not existing anything that obviously requires us even entertaining a notion of something else. If you assume scientific method and principle of parsimony as basis for your epistemology physicalism is default position that is currently not threatened by anything. Especially when you add all the actual evidence for it. If you do not assume those, discussion needs to be done on that topic as discussing physicalism while differing on more basic level is useless.
Also the whole discussion of qualia seems like a lot of word games without any actual meaning behind it. It seems to be abusing a language and its unfortunate property that even meaningless sentences can be uttered and our brain is incapable of easily recognizing their meaninglessness. Large areas of philosophy are based on this unfortunate , but probably unavoidable, property of natural languages.
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On September 04 2013 00:32 FallDownMarigold wrote:
@miramax
Do you think it's possible to create a robot that possesses "phenomenological experiences" provided complete understanding of the brain?
I am agnostic on that issue because of two reasons.
1) I am not convinced that eliminitavism about phenomenological consciousness is absurd. That is, I am somehwat open to the idea that humans (and other animals) are p-zombies in a relevant sense. So if that were the case, a complete understanding of our brain would not necessarily get us closer to realizing a robot who has - unlike us - 'true' phenomenological experiences.
2) Even provided that eliminitivism about consciousness is false and physicalism is true, then I am not convinced that consciousness is sufficiently substrate independent in order to allow for phenomenological robots , instead of some variant of artificial animal. (Unless you'd classify animals as 'wet' robots, in which case we can already 'create' them even without understanding the brain.)
However, I also have no reason to believe that such a robot is physically or logically impossible.
Notwithstanding I am much more sceptical with regard to 'mind uploading'/ 'singularity' type of technologies. What do you think?
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First would you mind using actual quote tags? It makes replying to you easier, since it gives the context of what's being discussed and allows for not having to go back to the previous post each time.
On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On September 03 2013 03:07 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On September 01 2013 03:57 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
In my view the main problem that plagues discussions about the "hard problem" of consciousness is that it is so difficult for all participants to "shelter" it from any discussion about functionality. This goes to a point that I am not even sure whether Sam and farvacola are actually defending the "original" hard problem as championed by Chalmers or some variant of hybrid.
In the original problem it was argued that: yes, progress on a functional understanding of consciousness has been made, i.e. we have learned a good deal about how the brain is structured and how signals are processed, but irrespective of any progress there this does not - and could never - further our understanding about the non-functional aspects of consciousness, the "like-ness" of a conscious experience aka the qualia. But it does further it, precisely because the "likeness" of a conscious experience depends entirely upon the physical elements in and outside of the body. This, however, does not mean that it will lead us to be able to subjectively experience the world from other points of view than our own (at least exactly like other "points of experience" than our own, I don't mean only certain aspects of it, such as seeings like dogs see etc.) Well, actually, one could hypothetically imagine a time when technology would allow us to completely transform our physical selves into, for example, chimpanzees, then turning ourselves back human - this would have led "us" (it depends also on how you define "your self") to experience the world from a chimpanzees' point of view, but would not leave us with a memory of it (unless we manage to create technology that somehow allows us to do so, possibly by modifying our own brains). Regardless, all of this doesn't bring anything new to the table. Understanding how the universe works and experimenting our presence in the universe are two different things. We know about the speed of light in space, yet we cannot experience going ourselves as fast as light in space (I don't mean through wormholes, obviously :p). We know what our sun is made of, and why it "burns" like it does, yet we can't experience being in the center of the sun - or being the sun itself. So what? This is true of absolutely every bit of knowledge - understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something, although one can help with the other. Why does it suddenly pose such a problem when it comes to the brain? And again, who knows, maybe future technology will allow us to experience other "subjectivities". Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
The claim goes that it were metaphysically or at least logically possible that we would be some form of intelligent automaton (or p-zombie) that would show exactly the same functional behavior, we could think and deliberate, but it would not be anything "like" being us (we would have no quale when feeling pain, but nonetheless show the very same external reaction). The philosophical zombie argument is so flawed with regards to its attempt at "disproving" physicalism that I'm genuinely surprised some people are still using it to do just that. If we imagine a "zombie" that is physically identical to us in every way, then that zombie will be as conscious as we are, precisely because it is being physically as we are which gives us consciousness. Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
It is in this latter non-functional sense of consciousness that pointing to emergent phenomena seems somewhat like question begging since we do not seem to have any other example in the natural world of such subjective status. And it is in this way - or so the claim goes - that consciousness really is special or mysterious or fundamentally different from mere signal processing or computing. There are other examples of subjective status (as in, self-awareness) among animals, to various degrees. This pretty much points again to brain development & composition being the relevant variable with regards to the existence (and the "level") of consciousness. Please let's take some time to look at what you replied. Maybe we'll find out why you don't seem to connect to farv and sam. For instance you say: "But it does further it, precisely because the "likeness" of a conscious experience depends entirely upon the physical elements in and outside of the body." In my book you would need to qualify this statement with "... if physicalism is true." But then this is exactly what is under contention. How on earth do you think this could sway anybody who is not already dedicated to your position? To them it must seem like question begging. The argument that was being made here was that physicalism couldn't be reconciled with phenomenological experiences. Obviously, if someone holds the position that physicalism is not true, you're right that this person will (or is likely to) simply dismiss as not true my statement that knowledge about the physical structures and processes in the brain can further our understanding of consciousness. It is however different to assert that even though consciousness is physical, as is everything else, we cannot reach further understanding of consciousness through scientific inquiry on the physical. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Heck, I would describe myself as a physicalist and to me it sure looks like question begging. The 'like-ness' (quale) of an experience is not a physical state, even though it might have a neurophysiological correlate. While it might be clear how the neurophysiological correlate is influenced by the "physical elements in and outside of the body", it is not at all obvious how the neurophysiological correlate gives rise to the sensation of "like-ness" in the first place. This is Chalmers' hard problem and you have not addressed it as far as I can see. This, Chalmer's hard problem, is an illusion - as in, it only exists if you have an a-priori belief about consciousness being detached from the physical structures and processes (or if you don't have that belief but simply don't understand what it means to link the two). Knowing how the said physical structures and processes give rise to the sensation of "like-ness" is purely a matter of having enough knowledge about the said physical structures and processes. Us not having yet a complete answer to this (or even if we could never have the answer) doesn't change that. Note again that I am not here talking about experiencing "like-ness", but understanding how "like-ness" works. The distinction is essential. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
You further argue that we cannot experience "traveling at the speed of light" or "being in the center of the sun", but why is that? Because of physical limitations or because it simply "is not like anything to experience traveling at the speed of light or being in the center of the sun"? What if our physical makeup or our laws of physics were different? Would your answer change? Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends on our physical composition. Photons do not have a physical composition that would lead them to "feel" anything, if we go by the common understanding of "to feel". My example of being at the center of the sun wasn't the best since you could argue that we could find a way to go there even if it is to die instantly, but the sun itself is another example of an object that doesn't "feel" because it's physical composition does not allow it to feel anything. If you or others have a different definition of what it means to "feel", then by all means, present it to us and we'll discuss it. For example, if you define "to feel" as "to exist", then yes, everything that exists also feels, by definition. That's not how the word is understood, however. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
You then say:
"This is true of absolutely every bit of knowledge - understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something."
Yes, but even if this is so, the question remains why this should be case? Why do we have the strong intuition that irrespective of how many explanations from limitless perspectives we hear, they do not and cannot tell us fully how it is to experience a phenomenon? This is the case because to feel something is to have our internal composition be a certain way, transmitting to itself information about how it is (including in relation to its environment) and, as the common understanding of the word goes, being conscious of all or part of the information that has been transmitted and interpreted. As long as persons A & B don't have the exact same information transmitted to themselves about how they are and aren't conscious in the same way about exactly all or part of that information, then they will not "feel" the same. The answer to "why is it so" that understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something is therefore that our physical composition has access to and transmits to itself consciously information about the two in two different ways. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
This is directly relevant to discussing brains because the very existence of (something like) a brain seems to bring the hard problem into existence. Like I said, it only brings the hard problem into existence if you have an a-priori belief (even if you're not aware of it) of a consciousness existing detached from the physical processes and structures. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Imagine you meet an alien from another dimension where gravity does not exist. I have a strong intuition that I could explain to her how gravity works nonetheless. However, if she were to tell me that, to her, experiencing something never really felt like anything in particular, I would be at a loss on how to explain to her how the effects gravity has on my body "feel like" to me. This part of subjective experience seems ineffable and fundamental. Do you share this intuition? Why is that so? Can you see now why others wrote that you are only rephrasing the 'hard problem' not trying to answer it? No need to go this far - we can take the example of the "color red". You would be at a loss to explain to someone who has never experienced seeing the color red what exactly it feels like to see the color red, even if that someone had studied the electromagnetic spectrum. Why is this a problem? I completely covered and answered it when I explained the difference between knowing the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Your argument against p-zombies needs some more clarification. Do you merely hold that p-zombies are physically impossible? Chalmers would agree with you but claim that merely conceivability is required. Do you think p-zombies are inconceivable? Well, others think they can conceive of them. What mistake are they making? Is there a way to point it out to them without assuming that physicalism is true from the get-go? Like I said, the problem of the philosophical zombie is not the act of conceiving a philosophical zombie itself, it is the assertion that the philosophical zombie argument logically disproves physicalism. Let's look at why this assertion is false by looking the logical reasoning behind it (taken from wikipedia): Show nested quote +1. According to physicalism, all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical.
2. Thus, if physicalism is true, a logically possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular, conscious experience must exist in such a possible world.
3. In fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this (so Chalmers argues) it follows that such a world is logically possible.
4. Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows from 2. and 3. by modus tollens.) 1. is true. 2. is true, but after "must contain everything that exists in our actual world" one could add "and must work exactly like our actual world". 3. is false. Why? Because the moment you conceive a world physically indistinguishable from our world, it must work exactly like our world according to physicalism. So if you decree that there is no consciousness in that conceived world, you are either breaking the premise that it is physically indistinguishable from our world or adding something that would make the two physically indistinguishable worlds work differently, thus breaking the physicalist premise. 4. is therefore not a conclusion that disproves physicalism in any way, since the premises have been broken mid-way. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Finally, when you talk about self-awareness it mixes again the functional aspects of consciousness with he supposed non-functional aspects. Being self-aware, as in being able to recognize oneself and realize facts about ones position in the world with respect to others, has clear consequences in the world. The claim is that you could have all that functional awareness without feeling that "it is like something" to be you. That claim is based on nothing, except faith/belief (in addition to "feeling like" being poorly defined). Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
The bottom line is that I share your general view on the world, but others do not. In order to communicate effectively to them you need to understand where their positions differ and address 'that'. I already pointed out where the positions differed: it is on the conception, or understanding, of the link between the physical components and consciousness. The problem is that some people do not recognize the implications of holding the position that consciousness only comes from the specific workings of the physical. So some of them will acknowledge that it does, then make assertions that they do not realize contradict that position. Cheers ,-) I appreciate your response, even though it feels somewhat funny to 'defend' the non-physicalist position to me. But for the sake of removing bad arguments from the discussion and clearing up the actual points of contention here it goes anyway: Throughout your whole post you simply refer to 'consciousness' without giving he slightest indication that you understood that the hard problem only relates to phenomenal experience, not functional nor behavioral types of awareness, so in the following I will simply assume that you equate 'consciousness' with 'experiencing qualia'/'having phenomenological experiences'. Please note, if you have a broader definition of consciousness at play here, then you are consistently missing the point anyway.
Throughout my whole post I reply to the arguments being made. Chalmers' separation of phenomenal experience from the "rest" of consciousness participates in the illusion that I mentioned with regards to his formulation of the hard problem. So, thanks, but no, I'm not "missing the point". See below.
On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
You write:
"The argument that was being made here was that physicalism couldn't be reconciled with phenomenological experiences."
This is simply not true.
No, this is true - "here" refers to the discussion that was going on in this thread. Since you wrote the sentence "How on earth do you think this could sway anybody who is not already dedicated to your position? To them it must seem like question begging.", and we were in the context of a discussion where someone was not being swayed and argued that our replies were question begging, I was pointing out that the argument being made in this thread went beyond simply having two different views about the world and questioned whether the opposing view was internally consistent.
On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
How on earth do you think this could sway anybody who is not already dedicated to your position? To them it must seem like question begging.
You answered to the part of my post where I was explaining the hard problem of consciousness. It doesn't follow at all from the hard problem that qualia are irreconcilable with physicalism (there are other arguments for that) only that this is a problem that physicalists will have to deal with. You need to be way more precise in your responses otherwise you start out by missing the point - which is a bad way to start.
I was very precise, and you apparently missed the context of this exchange.
On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Then you say:
"This, Chalmer's hard problem, is an illusion - as in, it only exists if you have an a-priori belief about consciousness being detached from the physical structures and processes (or if you don't have that belief but simply don't understand what it means to link the two)."
You only got it right in the brackets. The claim is not at all that qualia are completely detached from the physical structures, but on the contrary that they are somehow linked - but on a physicalist view it is hard to account for how this could be the case, unless consciousness were a fundamental physical property (which only few physicalists -the crazy ones- believe). Qualia seem further not logically necessary for any causal/functional/behavioral theory , so why is it that in this world experiences are (always?) accompanied by qualia?
No, I got it right in the entire sentence. I never said that the claim was that qualia were "completely detached from the physical structures". I said that thinking that there is a hard problem presupposes either that, even unconsciously/without fully acknowledging it, one does believe (as a kind of "gut feeling", perhaps) that qualia and the physical structures and processes are still somehow detached, or that one believes that they are not detached but doesn't understand what it means to link the two physically. You mention that "on a physicalist view it is hard to account for how this could be the case". Why? Why even say that qualia "seem further not logically necessary for any causal/functional/behavioral theory"? That's a claim which comes out of thin air. What tells you that our brain, and our entire body, would operate the same without qualia? Physicalism precisely holds that our body works the way it works because of how it is physically, period - this includes qualia. If you're going to make the claim that qualia have "no function", then the burden of proof is on you. That's why I mentioned at the start that the separation Chalmers makes between qualia and the "rest" of consciousness participates in his illusion of a hard problem - there is nothing that suggests qualia is any different from the rest of consciousness in its playing a role in the functional workings of our body, except that it's perhaps counter-intuitive, which is not an excuse for having no basis to substantiate a claim that it doesn't play a functional role.
On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Your following paragraph...:
"Knowing how the said physical structures and processes give rise to the sensation of "like-ness" is purely a matter of having enough knowledge about the said physical structures and processes. Us not having yet a complete answer to this (or even if we could never have the answer) doesn't change that."
... is simply wishful thinking to rescue your position. Surely, you should be willing to admit that if we could never have an answer to the question of how qualia are generated, then Chalmers' 'hard problem' really should be considered 'hard'. Now where is the illusion in that, eh?
How is that wishful thinking in any way, shape or form? There are plenty of things that we will not have a complete answer for in our lifetimes, or perhaps ever, but that doesn't mean at all that they pose a problem to, or contradict, physicalism. And I never even said that we would never have an answer to how qualia exist, I said "even if we couldn't".
On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
You go on with:
"Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends on our physical composition."
"Like I said"? Is this a subtle form of backpedaling or why is "entirely" prominently missing in your restatement? Because no property dualist would object to what you wrote there as long as you don't claim to know that there are absolutely no non-physical factors at play (like bridge laws) - and how on earth would you know something like that?
Yes, "like I said". I didn't think "entirely" was necessary in the context of what I've been arguing quite clearly. Let me rephrase for your convenience: "Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends entirely, fully, totally, wholly, completely, exclusively, solely, 100% on our physical composition."
I would know something like that because that is the default position - there has yet to be discovered anything in the universe that has been shown to depend on something else than the physical for its explanation. Of course, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, so yes, I am perfectly fine with agreeing that there is no evidence that there isn't something supernatural at play in our brains and that it's therefore possible that there is, just like it's possible that the spaghetti monster is out there, or that there are alien monkeys playing a monkey-version of Guitar Hero inside the sun. If you're going to make the claim that there is something non-physical going on, however, the burden of proof lies on you.
On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
The following paragraph seems wholly confused since nobody ever claimed that objects like 'suns' or 'rocks' have phenomenological experiences. Do you think that this was entailed by the argument?
You probably missed the part of the thread where sam!zdat asked me if and what it felt like something to be matter.
On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Anyway, you try to get to the core of phenomenological experience by saying:
"As long as persons A & B don't have the exact same information transmitted to themselves about how they are and aren't conscious in the same way about exactly all or part of that information, then they will not "feel" the same."
Apart from the utter mystery of how you would ever go about demonstrating such a bold claim, it remains the fact that I seem to have rather robust phenomenological experiences even though the "transmitted information" is not "exactly" the same.
What does having "robust phenomenological experiences" have to do with the fact that those experiences will not be the same as another person's, which is the entire point of what I was saying?
On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Are you talking only about the internal stance here and not about external stimuli?
I specifically mentioned information covering both internal and external factors participating in the phenomenological experience.
On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
And how would you control for exactly the same 'information' and 'feeling'? I mean, you surely don't suggest that the 'redness' of red is identical to the electric impulses or chemical transmitters in my synapses, do you?
Why would I need to "control" anything? I am explaining to you why the two experiences are different, and it is because of the physical differences between the two.
On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
You then go on to make a surprising (to me at least) admission:
"No need to go this far - we can take the example of the "color red". You would be at a loss to explain to someone who has never experienced seeing the color red what exactly it feels like to see the color red, even if that someone had studied the electromagnetic spectrum. Why is this a problem? I completely covered and answered it when I explained the difference between knowing the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively."
You are sliding on thin ice here as you seem to be dangerously close to conceding the whole argument to the non-physicalist, only to then wave the conclusion away with a sleight of hand. Do you think I can 'know' how it is to see the color red once I've experienced it but not before? If so, you seem to agree that second order phenomenological knowledge/belief requires a completely different process to be obtained than any other piece of knowledge/belief. It would hence be a bit disingenuous to ask: "Why is consciousness special?". This at the very least opens the door to the non-physicalist to propose that as knowledge of qualia cannot be obtained by 'standard epistemological methods' explanations of qualia are prime candidates for requiring "non-standard non-physicalist tools" to be successful.
I'm not too sure how you managed to do it, but you somehow completely missed my point about the difference between knowledge about the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively.
No, I do not come even remotely close to "conceding the whole argument to the non-physicalist". Why? Because, again, physicalism doesn't make the claim that knowledge about the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively are the same things. This, however, doesn't mean that one requires physical processes and the other doesn't - both consist in information physically reaching the physical components of ourselves that allow us to process the said information. This is virtually true of everything - no single physical "road" to information reaching our brain will be the same in terms of both the processes and the information at play.
What do you define as "knowledge of qualia"? If it's knowledge about how qualia arise and are to be experienced, then this only depends upon learning the physical structures and processes at play. If it's "knowledge" in the sense of us experimenting a qualia (for example the color "red"), then our own physical structures and processes must be put into use in the way that learning about them in the first case would have showed us they have to be.
So, again, let's be clear: if the question is "how do qualia arise/come into existence?", the answer lies purely with the physical workings of the brain.
If I was able to see the physical explanation of the color red being experimented by someone, and wanted to feel it myself, then it would mean I would have to receive a physical information and have my physical structures & processes work a certain way (the way described earlier).
By the way, one of the problems seems to be that you are mistaking physicalism for an epistemological position. It isn't - it's an ontological position.
On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:The worst part comes when you aim to dismantle Chalmers' argument via Wikipedia. Let's take a look: "3. is false if "logically possible" still means "logically possible world working according to physicalism". Why? Because the moment you conceive a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness, you are no longer conceiving that world according to physicalism." This almost leaves me speechless, since it is a logic101 fail. Why on earth should 'logically possible' entail 'logically possible according to physicalism' as long as it is not established that physicalism holds in the first place!? The argument presented here tries to establish a reductio against physicalism, so you cannot insert your conclusion into a premise as long as you haven't established its validity. This is textbook question begging! How can you not see that? I guess given that you assume that the Zombie argument is riddled with problems it's quite a feat to pick out the one thing that is genuinely unproblematic here but whatever ...
First, I'd like to point out I edited my post to make it easier to understand quite a while before you replied, so I guess if you didn't see the edit it must have taken you some time to write your reply (or you didn't refresh the page that you had loaded a while ago).
Second, you obviously did not get what I meant by "according to physicalism", so I'll explain again why one of the premises is broken. If you take the time to read Chalmers' argument again, you will see that one of the premises is that the world created is a world "in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world". If all of the physical facts are the same, it necessarily means that the world works the same way physically, because this is included in the "physical facts".
So, when we move to the third proposition, namely "in fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness", we can quite easily see that is false. Why? Because the moment you conceive a world physically indistinguishable from our world, it must work exactly like our world, unless "the physical facts" that were referred to earlier are no longer the same. So if you decree that there is no consciousness in that conceived world, you are breaking the premise that the physical facts of that world are the same. That is what I was referring to - one of the premises held was that the physical facts would be the same in the world, and it is broken mid-reasoning.
On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Finally you state that the claim that there exist purely phenomenal experiences ('feeling like-ness') that are unnecessary for function or behavior is...
"... based on nothing, except faith/belief (in addition to "feeling like" being poorly defined)."
This strikes me as clearly untrue.
That's too bad, because it is true.
On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
The robots we develop are already able to show a remarkable variety of functional and behavioral traits, without having phenomenological experiences at all (or do you think they have them?).
The robots we develop do not display the same functional/behavioral traits as we do. They are not constituted as we are. And you still have not supported the claim that phenomenological experimenting is non-functional.
On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Given this evidence I don't find it prima facie absurd that a very advanced robot could show a functional variety in the ballpark of higher animals or even humans without the phenomenological 'baggage'.
I frankly do not care that you don't "don't find it absurd" - you're missing the point and I never said physicalism was intuitive. The point is that qualia, and consciousness more broadly, are there, and are there as they are, purely because of the physical workings of our bodies. As long as robots do not have physical structures and processes that precisely mimic what we have, they will of course not have similar consciousness and experiment qualia as we do.
On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Furthermore we have examples of humans who lose a class of phenomenological experiences while at least maintaining some functional/behavioral awareness (e.g., blindsight). And notice that I am even providing you with some (albeit limited) examples from this world
What is the relevance of what you just said? The awareness you are referring to is still entirely explained by the physical workings of the body. Those physical structures/processes which have been affected and have led to the loss of a class of phenomenological experiences have not impaired the physical structures/processes which lead to the aforementioned awareness.
On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
whereas Chalmers argument works if you grant that phenomenal experience can be stripped from the functional in some logically possible world. Where is the obvious contradiction here?
See above for Chalmers' argument.
On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
In my opinion you are really overselling the case for physicalism, maybe because you have never really engaged with the case of the opposition (outside of Wikipedia), but dismissed their arguments out of hand.
I'm not, I have, and I didn't.
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Thanks for your posts, Miramax; I very much appreciate your approach.
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On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:
First would you mind using actual quote tags? It makes replying to you easier, since it gives the context of what's being discussed and allows for not having to go back to the previous post each time.
I'll try, but will make no promises
On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On September 03 2013 03:07 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On September 01 2013 03:57 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
In my view the main problem that plagues discussions about the "hard problem" of consciousness is that it is so difficult for all participants to "shelter" it from any discussion about functionality. This goes to a point that I am not even sure whether Sam and farvacola are actually defending the "original" hard problem as championed by Chalmers or some variant of hybrid.
In the original problem it was argued that: yes, progress on a functional understanding of consciousness has been made, i.e. we have learned a good deal about how the brain is structured and how signals are processed, but irrespective of any progress there this does not - and could never - further our understanding about the non-functional aspects of consciousness, the "like-ness" of a conscious experience aka the qualia. But it does further it, precisely because the "likeness" of a conscious experience depends entirely upon the physical elements in and outside of the body. This, however, does not mean that it will lead us to be able to subjectively experience the world from other points of view than our own (at least exactly like other "points of experience" than our own, I don't mean only certain aspects of it, such as seeings like dogs see etc.) Well, actually, one could hypothetically imagine a time when technology would allow us to completely transform our physical selves into, for example, chimpanzees, then turning ourselves back human - this would have led "us" (it depends also on how you define "your self") to experience the world from a chimpanzees' point of view, but would not leave us with a memory of it (unless we manage to create technology that somehow allows us to do so, possibly by modifying our own brains). Regardless, all of this doesn't bring anything new to the table. Understanding how the universe works and experimenting our presence in the universe are two different things. We know about the speed of light in space, yet we cannot experience going ourselves as fast as light in space (I don't mean through wormholes, obviously :p). We know what our sun is made of, and why it "burns" like it does, yet we can't experience being in the center of the sun - or being the sun itself. So what? This is true of absolutely every bit of knowledge - understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something, although one can help with the other. Why does it suddenly pose such a problem when it comes to the brain? And again, who knows, maybe future technology will allow us to experience other "subjectivities". Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
The claim goes that it were metaphysically or at least logically possible that we would be some form of intelligent automaton (or p-zombie) that would show exactly the same functional behavior, we could think and deliberate, but it would not be anything "like" being us (we would have no quale when feeling pain, but nonetheless show the very same external reaction). The philosophical zombie argument is so flawed with regards to its attempt at "disproving" physicalism that I'm genuinely surprised some people are still using it to do just that. If we imagine a "zombie" that is physically identical to us in every way, then that zombie will be as conscious as we are, precisely because it is being physically as we are which gives us consciousness. Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
It is in this latter non-functional sense of consciousness that pointing to emergent phenomena seems somewhat like question begging since we do not seem to have any other example in the natural world of such subjective status. And it is in this way - or so the claim goes - that consciousness really is special or mysterious or fundamentally different from mere signal processing or computing. There are other examples of subjective status (as in, self-awareness) among animals, to various degrees. This pretty much points again to brain development & composition being the relevant variable with regards to the existence (and the "level") of consciousness. Please let's take some time to look at what you replied. Maybe we'll find out why you don't seem to connect to farv and sam. For instance you say: "But it does further it, precisely because the "likeness" of a conscious experience depends entirely upon the physical elements in and outside of the body." In my book you would need to qualify this statement with "... if physicalism is true." But then this is exactly what is under contention. How on earth do you think this could sway anybody who is not already dedicated to your position? To them it must seem like question begging. The argument that was being made here was that physicalism couldn't be reconciled with phenomenological experiences. Obviously, if someone holds the position that physicalism is not true, you're right that this person will (or is likely to) simply dismiss as not true my statement that knowledge about the physical structures and processes in the brain can further our understanding of consciousness. It is however different to assert that even though consciousness is physical, as is everything else, we cannot reach further understanding of consciousness through scientific inquiry on the physical. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Heck, I would describe myself as a physicalist and to me it sure looks like question begging. The 'like-ness' (quale) of an experience is not a physical state, even though it might have a neurophysiological correlate. While it might be clear how the neurophysiological correlate is influenced by the "physical elements in and outside of the body", it is not at all obvious how the neurophysiological correlate gives rise to the sensation of "like-ness" in the first place. This is Chalmers' hard problem and you have not addressed it as far as I can see. This, Chalmer's hard problem, is an illusion - as in, it only exists if you have an a-priori belief about consciousness being detached from the physical structures and processes (or if you don't have that belief but simply don't understand what it means to link the two). Knowing how the said physical structures and processes give rise to the sensation of "like-ness" is purely a matter of having enough knowledge about the said physical structures and processes. Us not having yet a complete answer to this (or even if we could never have the answer) doesn't change that. Note again that I am not here talking about experiencing "like-ness", but understanding how "like-ness" works. The distinction is essential. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
You further argue that we cannot experience "traveling at the speed of light" or "being in the center of the sun", but why is that? Because of physical limitations or because it simply "is not like anything to experience traveling at the speed of light or being in the center of the sun"? What if our physical makeup or our laws of physics were different? Would your answer change? Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends on our physical composition. Photons do not have a physical composition that would lead them to "feel" anything, if we go by the common understanding of "to feel". My example of being at the center of the sun wasn't the best since you could argue that we could find a way to go there even if it is to die instantly, but the sun itself is another example of an object that doesn't "feel" because it's physical composition does not allow it to feel anything. If you or others have a different definition of what it means to "feel", then by all means, present it to us and we'll discuss it. For example, if you define "to feel" as "to exist", then yes, everything that exists also feels, by definition. That's not how the word is understood, however. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
You then say:
"This is true of absolutely every bit of knowledge - understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something."
Yes, but even if this is so, the question remains why this should be case? Why do we have the strong intuition that irrespective of how many explanations from limitless perspectives we hear, they do not and cannot tell us fully how it is to experience a phenomenon? This is the case because to feel something is to have our internal composition be a certain way, transmitting to itself information about how it is (including in relation to its environment) and, as the common understanding of the word goes, being conscious of all or part of the information that has been transmitted and interpreted. As long as persons A & B don't have the exact same information transmitted to themselves about how they are and aren't conscious in the same way about exactly all or part of that information, then they will not "feel" the same. The answer to "why is it so" that understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something is therefore that our physical composition has access to and transmits to itself consciously information about the two in two different ways. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
This is directly relevant to discussing brains because the very existence of (something like) a brain seems to bring the hard problem into existence. Like I said, it only brings the hard problem into existence if you have an a-priori belief (even if you're not aware of it) of a consciousness existing detached from the physical processes and structures. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Imagine you meet an alien from another dimension where gravity does not exist. I have a strong intuition that I could explain to her how gravity works nonetheless. However, if she were to tell me that, to her, experiencing something never really felt like anything in particular, I would be at a loss on how to explain to her how the effects gravity has on my body "feel like" to me. This part of subjective experience seems ineffable and fundamental. Do you share this intuition? Why is that so? Can you see now why others wrote that you are only rephrasing the 'hard problem' not trying to answer it? No need to go this far - we can take the example of the "color red". You would be at a loss to explain to someone who has never experienced seeing the color red what exactly it feels like to see the color red, even if that someone had studied the electromagnetic spectrum. Why is this a problem? I completely covered and answered it when I explained the difference between knowing the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Your argument against p-zombies needs some more clarification. Do you merely hold that p-zombies are physically impossible? Chalmers would agree with you but claim that merely conceivability is required. Do you think p-zombies are inconceivable? Well, others think they can conceive of them. What mistake are they making? Is there a way to point it out to them without assuming that physicalism is true from the get-go? Like I said, the problem of the philosophical zombie is not the act of conceiving a philosophical zombie itself, it is the assertion that the philosophical zombie argument logically disproves physicalism. Let's look at why this assertion is false by looking the logical reasoning behind it (taken from wikipedia): Show nested quote +1. According to physicalism, all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical.
2. Thus, if physicalism is true, a logically possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular, conscious experience must exist in such a possible world.
3. In fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this (so Chalmers argues) it follows that such a world is logically possible.
4. Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows from 2. and 3. by modus tollens.) 1. is true. 2. is true, but after "must contain everything that exists in our actual world" one could add "and must work exactly like our actual world". 3. is false. Why? Because the moment you conceive a world physically indistinguishable from our world, it must work exactly like our world according to physicalism. So if you decree that there is no consciousness in that conceived world, you are either breaking the premise that it is physically indistinguishable from our world or adding something that would make the two physically indistinguishable worlds work differently, thus breaking the physicalist premise. 4. is therefore not a conclusion that disproves physicalism in any way, since the premises have been broken mid-way. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Finally, when you talk about self-awareness it mixes again the functional aspects of consciousness with he supposed non-functional aspects. Being self-aware, as in being able to recognize oneself and realize facts about ones position in the world with respect to others, has clear consequences in the world. The claim is that you could have all that functional awareness without feeling that "it is like something" to be you. That claim is based on nothing, except faith/belief (in addition to "feeling like" being poorly defined). Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
The bottom line is that I share your general view on the world, but others do not. In order to communicate effectively to them you need to understand where their positions differ and address 'that'. I already pointed out where the positions differed: it is on the conception, or understanding, of the link between the physical components and consciousness. The problem is that some people do not recognize the implications of holding the position that consciousness only comes from the specific workings of the physical. So some of them will acknowledge that it does, then make assertions that they do not realize contradict that position. Cheers ,-) I appreciate your response, even though it feels somewhat funny to 'defend' the non-physicalist position to me. But for the sake of removing bad arguments from the discussion and clearing up the actual points of contention here it goes anyway: Throughout your whole post you simply refer to 'consciousness' without giving he slightest indication that you understood that the hard problem only relates to phenomenal experience, not functional nor behavioral types of awareness, so in the following I will simply assume that you equate 'consciousness' with 'experiencing qualia'/'having phenomenological experiences'. Please note, if you have a broader definition of consciousness at play here, then you are consistently missing the point anyway. Throughout my whole post I reply to the arguments being made. Chalmers' separation of phenomenal experience from the "rest" of consciousness participates in the illusion that I mentioned with regards to his formulation of the hard problem. So, thanks, but no, I'm not "missing the point". See below.
So, let's call that your argument (1) you claim phenomenal experience as defined does not exist, correct? Would you see yourself rather as a deflationist or strict eliminitivist on that matter? What is your prime argument for the claim that they can't be seperated?
On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
You write:
"The argument that was being made here was that physicalism couldn't be reconciled with phenomenological experiences."
This is simply not true. No, this is true - "here" refers to the discussion that was going on in this thread. Since you wrote the sentence "How on earth do you think this could sway anybody who is not already dedicated to your position? To them it must seem like question begging.", and we were in the context of a discussion where someone was not being swayed and argued that our replies were question begging, I was pointing out that the argument being made in this thread went beyond simply having two different views about the world and questioned whether the opposing view was internally consistent.
Silly me, and here I thought you were replying to me!? But we are on the same page now that the hard problem does not try or claim to rule out physicalism, right? So then we are making slow progress.
On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
How on earth do you think this could sway anybody who is not already dedicated to your position? To them it must seem like question begging.
You answered to the part of my post where I was explaining the hard problem of consciousness. It doesn't follow at all from the hard problem that qualia are irreconcilable with physicalism (there are other arguments for that) only that this is a problem that physicalists will have to deal with. You need to be way more precise in your responses otherwise you start out by missing the point - which is a bad way to start. I was very precise, and you apparently missed the context of this exchange.
Thanks for setting me straight. That'll teach me!
On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Then you say:
"This, Chalmer's hard problem, is an illusion - as in, it only exists if you have an a-priori belief about consciousness being detached from the physical structures and processes (or if you don't have that belief but simply don't understand what it means to link the two)."
You only got it right in the brackets. The claim is not at all that qualia are completely detached from the physical structures, but on the contrary that they are somehow linked - but on a physicalist view it is hard to account for how this could be the case, unless consciousness were a fundamental physical property (which only few physicalists -the crazy ones- believe). Qualia seem further not logically necessary for any causal/functional/behavioral theory , so why is it that in this world experiences are (always?) accompanied by qualia? No, I got it right in the entire sentence. I never said that the claim was that qualia were "completely detached from the physical structures". I said that thinking that there is a hard problem presupposes either that, even unconsciously/without fully acknowledging it, one does believe (as a kind of "gut feeling", perhaps) that qualia and the physical structures and processes are still somehow detached, or that one believes that they are not detached but doesn't understand what it means to link the two physically. You mention that "on a physicalist view it is hard to account for how this could be the case". Why? Why even say that qualia "seem further not logically necessary for any causal/functional/behavioral theory"? That's a claim which comes out of thin air. What tells you that our brain, and our entire body, would operate the same without qualia? Physicalism precisely holds that our body works the way it works because of how it is physically, period - this includes qualia. If you're going to make the claim that qualia have "no function", then the burden of proof is on you. That's why I mentioned at the start that the separation Chalmers makes between qualia and the "rest" of consciousness participates in his illusion of a hard problem - there is nothing that suggests qualia is any different from the rest of consciousness in its playing a role in the functional workings of our body, except that it's perhaps counter-intuitive, which is not an excuse for having no basis to substantiate a claim that it doesn't play a functional role.
Actually you still got it wrong. Thinking that there is a Chalmerian 'hard problem' requires that qualia are somehow attached to neurophysiological correlates. Now, you start to argue about qualia as if you think they do exist, which would somehwat contradict your argument (1). So I take it here that you mean that something like qualia exist, but they are always functional. Did I get it right? What is the function of experiencing the 'redness' of red instead of just visually registering red and reactig on it?
On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Your following paragraph...:
"Knowing how the said physical structures and processes give rise to the sensation of "like-ness" is purely a matter of having enough knowledge about the said physical structures and processes. Us not having yet a complete answer to this (or even if we could never have the answer) doesn't change that."
... is simply wishful thinking to rescue your position. Surely, you should be willing to admit that if we could never have an answer to the question of how qualia are generated, then Chalmers' 'hard problem' really should be considered 'hard'. Now where is the illusion in that, eh? How is that wishful thinking in any way, shape or form? There are plenty of things that we will not have a complete answer for in our lifetimes, or perhaps ever, but that doesn't mean at all that they pose a problem to, or contradict, physicalism. And I never even said that we would never have an answer to how qualia exist, I said "even if we couldn't".
Really, not at all? Not even a tiny little bit? Not the slightest problem? Note again that you falsely equated the "mere existence of a hard problem" with a contradiction of physicalism here. And just when I thought we were making progress...
On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
You go on with:
"Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends on our physical composition."
"Like I said"? Is this a subtle form of backpedaling or why is "entirely" prominently missing in your restatement? Because no property dualist would object to what you wrote there as long as you don't claim to know that there are absolutely no non-physical factors at play (like bridge laws) - and how on earth would you know something like that? Yes, "like I said". I didn't think "entirely" was necessary in the context of what I've been arguing quite clearly. Let me rephrase for your convenience: "Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends entirely, fully, totally, wholly, completely, exclusively, solely, 100% on our physical composition." I would know something like that because that is the default position - there has yet to be discovered anything in the universe that has been shown to depend on something else than the physical for its explanation. Of course, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, so yes, I am perfectly fine with agreeing that there is no evidence that there isn't something supernatural at play in our brains and that it's therefore possible that there is, just like it's possible that the spaghetti monster is out there, or that there are alien monkeys playing a monkey-version of Guitar Hero inside the sun. If you're going to make the claim that there is something non-physical going on, however, the burden of proof lies on you.
So now you seem to change your line of argument. You now claim to know that physicalism is true because it is the default position. Hmmm ... I find this somewhat weird. Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that you simply assume physicalism is true here, because it has worked well in the past to explain other phenomena? Not that I think that there is anything wrong with this position, but shouldn't you inform your interlocutor before you make such sweeping "statements of fact"?
On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
The following paragraph seems wholly confused since nobody ever claimed that objects like 'suns' or 'rocks' have phenomenological experiences. Do you think that this was entailed by the argument? You probably missed the part of the thread where sam!zdat asked me if and what it felt like something to be matter.
And THAT made you think that sam!zdat believes all collections of matter feel something? Okay...
On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Anyway, you try to get to the core of phenomenological experience by saying:
"As long as persons A & B don't have the exact same information transmitted to themselves about how they are and aren't conscious in the same way about exactly all or part of that information, then they will not "feel" the same."
Apart from the utter mystery of how you would ever go about demonstrating such a bold claim, it remains the fact that I seem to have rather robust phenomenological experiences even though the "transmitted information" is not "exactly" the same. What does having "robust phenomenological experiences" have to do with the fact that those experiences will not be the same as another person's, which is the entire point of what I was saying?
Well, if I can have very similar phenomenal experiences on different information, why could somebody else not have the same phenomenal experience as I do? Isn't the majority of human interaction based on the presupposition that different human beings share similar qualia in similar situations?
On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Are you talking only about the internal stance here and not about external stimuli? I specifically mentioned information covering both internal and external factors participating in the phenomenological experience.
Alas, when I dream I can "experience redness" without seeing and to me it at least seems to be the same "redness" as in the presence of external stimuli.
On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
And how would you control for exactly the same 'information' and 'feeling'? I mean, you surely don't suggest that the 'redness' of red is identical to the electric impulses or chemical transmitters in my synapses, do you? Why would I need to "control" anything? I am explaining to you why the two experiences are different, and it is because of the physical differences between the two.
You made a very sweeping general statement (quite the habit), and if you would ever be interested in demonstrating the truth of your claim you would need to be sure that "the exact same information" and "the exact same feeling" could be controlled. Since you are more in the business of "claiming" then "demonstrating" I understand that this doesn't bother you.
On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
You then go on to make a surprising (to me at least) admission:
"No need to go this far - we can take the example of the "color red". You would be at a loss to explain to someone who has never experienced seeing the color red what exactly it feels like to see the color red, even if that someone had studied the electromagnetic spectrum. Why is this a problem? I completely covered and answered it when I explained the difference between knowing the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively."
You are sliding on thin ice here as you seem to be dangerously close to conceding the whole argument to the non-physicalist, only to then wave the conclusion away with a sleight of hand. Do you think I can 'know' how it is to see the color red once I've experienced it but not before? If so, you seem to agree that second order phenomenological knowledge/belief requires a completely different process to be obtained than any other piece of knowledge/belief. It would hence be a bit disingenuous to ask: "Why is consciousness special?". This at the very least opens the door to the non-physicalist to propose that as knowledge of qualia cannot be obtained by 'standard epistemological methods' explanations of qualia are prime candidates for requiring "non-standard non-physicalist tools" to be successful. I'm not too sure how you managed to do it, but you somehow completely missed my point about the difference between knowledge about the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively. No, I do not come even remotely close to "conceding the whole argument to the non-physicalist". Why? Because, again, physicalism doesn't make the claim that knowledge about the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively are the same things. This, however, doesn't mean that one requires physical processes and the other doesn't - both consist in information physically reaching the physical components of ourselves that allow us to process the said information. This is virtually true of everything - no single physical "road" to information reaching our brain will be the same in terms of both the processes and the information at play. What do you define as "knowledge of qualia"? If it's knowledge about how qualia arise and are experienced, then this only depends upon learning the physical structures and processes at play. If it's "knowledge" in the sense of us experimenting a qualia (for example the color "red"), then our own physical structures and processes must be put into use in the way that learning about them in the first case would have showed us they have to be. So, again, let's be clear: if the question is "how do qualia arise/come into existence?", the answer lies purely with the physical workings of the brain. If I was able to see the physical explanation of the color red being experimented by someone, and wanted to feel it myself, then it would mean I would have to receive a physical information and have my physical structures & processes work a certain way (the way described earlier). By the way, one of the problems seems to be that you are mistaking physicalism for an epistemological position. It isn't - it's an ontological position.
You don't seem to have read a lot of literature on the knowledge argument, otherwise you would understand why it is a big deal (and used to be a hotly debated topic) how knowledge about qualia is obtained. Physicalism can actually mean both: 'all knowledge is physical knowledge' and 'all things are physical'. Notice how you used the argument (2) of "physicalism as the default position" in order to argue for physicalism, which you can only defend on epistemic grounds (so far all our successful explanations make use of physical things). The knowledge argument - if successful - could undercut this. Bolding words is a useful skill toi have, anyways.
On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:The worst part comes when you aim to dismantle Chalmers' argument via Wikipedia. Let's take a look: "3. is false if "logically possible" still means "logically possible world working according to physicalism". Why? Because the moment you conceive a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness, you are no longer conceiving that world according to physicalism." This almost leaves me speechless, since it is a logic101 fail. Why on earth should 'logically possible' entail 'logically possible according to physicalism' as long as it is not established that physicalism holds in the first place!? The argument presented here tries to establish a reductio against physicalism, so you cannot insert your conclusion into a premise as long as you haven't established its validity. This is textbook question begging! How can you not see that? I guess given that you assume that the Zombie argument is riddled with problems it's quite a feat to pick out the one thing that is genuinely unproblematic here but whatever ... First, I'd like to point out I edited my post to make it easier to understand quite a while before you replied, so I guess if you didn't see the edit it must have taken you some time to write your reply (or you didn't refresh the page that you had loaded a while ago). Second, you obviously did not get what I meant by "according to physicalism", so I'll explain again why one of the premises is broken. If you take the time to read Chalmers' argument again, you will see that one of the premises is that the world created is a world "in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world". If all of the physical facts are the same, it necessarily means that the world works the same way physically, because this is included in the "physical facts". So, when we move to the third proposition, namely "in fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness", we can quite easily see that is false. Why? Because the moment you conceive a world physically indistinguishable from our world, it must work exactly like our world, unless "the physical facts" that were referred to earlier are no longer the same. So if you decree that there is no consciousness in that conceived world, you are breaking the premise that the physical facts of that world are the same. That is what I was referring to - one of the premises held was that the physical facts would be the same in the world, and it is broken mid-reasoning.
I have lot's of other stuff to do, so I sometimes have to write my replies offline in breaks. I apologize, but blame my busy schedule!
Your 'correction', however, does not help you to avoid the fallacy I pointed out. It is even still right there in your second attempt to clarify. You claim that "the moment we observe a world physically indistinguishable from our world, it must work exactly like our world, unless "the physical facts" that were referred to earlier are no longer the same". But this is only true if physicalism is true. You don't belive me? Okay: Suppose physicalism were false, would a [i]physically[/i} indistinguishable world still need to work exactly the same? If you still don't get why what you are doing is committing a logical fallacy and also don't believe me, then please ask an authority of your trust...or take some introductory class in logic.
On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Finally you state that the claim that there exist purely phenomenal experiences ('feeling like-ness') that are unnecessary for function or behavior is...
"... based on nothing, except faith/belief (in addition to "feeling like" being poorly defined)."
This strikes me as clearly untrue. That's too bad, because it is true.
What is asserted without argument can be dismissed without argument, I guess ...
On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
The robots we develop are already able to show a remarkable variety of functional and behavioral traits, without having phenomenological experiences at all (or do you think they have them?). The robots we develop do not display the same functional/behavioral traits as we do. They are not constituted as we are. And you still have not supported the claim that phenomenological experimenting is non-functional.
Well, it establishes that the execution of some functions do not require phenomenal experience. Don't you agree? It doesn't even count as any support for the claim? Why not?
As an aside, you sometimes write "experimenting". Is that a typo or do you mean something particular?
On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Given this evidence I don't find it prima facie absurd that a very advanced robot could show a functional variety in the ballpark of higher animals or even humans without the phenomenological 'baggage'. I frankly do not care that you don't "don't find it absurd" - you're missing the point and I never said physicalism was intuitive. The point is that qualia, and consciousness more broadly, are there, and are there as they are, purely because of the physical workings of our bodies. As long as robots do not have physical structures and processes that precisely mimic what we have, they will of course not have similar consciousness and experiment qualia as we do.
So, do you find the above mentioned notion absurd, because I care? Protip: If you don't, you might get into trouble ...
On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Furthermore we have examples of humans who lose a class of phenomenological experiences while at least maintaining some functional/behavioral awareness (e.g., blindsight). And notice that I am even providing you with some (albeit limited) examples from this world What is the relevance of what you just said? The awareness you are referring to is still entirely explained by the physical workings of the body. Those physical structures/processes which have been affected and have led to the loss of a class of phenomenological experiences have not impaired the physical structures/processes which lead to the aforementioned awareness.
It shows that some visual functions can be reliably executed without accompanying phenomenal experience. Do you still not see the relevance?
On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
whereas Chalmers argument works if you grant that phenomenal experience can be stripped from the functional in some logically possible world. Where is the obvious contradiction here? See above for Chalmers' argument.
See above indeed!
On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
In my opinion you are really overselling the case for physicalism, maybe because you have never really engaged with the case of the opposition (outside of Wikipedia), but dismissed their arguments out of hand. I'm not, I have, and I didn't.
Well, you have presented two arguments, as far as I can see.
1) You think that phenomenal experience is also functional, i.e. doesn't exist as defined, without giving any support other than - it just is the case since physicalism says so.
2) You claim physicalism is the default position, since it has worked in the past to explain a wide range of phenomena.
I see merit in both lines of argument, but so far you haven't substantiated (1) at all, whereas (2) would only allow you very modest inferences in light of the unique epistemic character of qualia, which you seem to acknowledge.
If you work on those two, I am sure however, that your future exchanges with non-physicalists will turn out to be much more fruitful! Thanks for the discussion!
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On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:
First would you mind using actual quote tags? It makes replying to you easier, since it gives the context of what's being discussed and allows for not having to go back to the previous post each time.
I'll try, but will make no promises
There, much better ,-)
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On September 03 2013 03:07 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On September 01 2013 03:57 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
In my view the main problem that plagues discussions about the "hard problem" of consciousness is that it is so difficult for all participants to "shelter" it from any discussion about functionality. This goes to a point that I am not even sure whether Sam and farvacola are actually defending the "original" hard problem as championed by Chalmers or some variant of hybrid.
In the original problem it was argued that: yes, progress on a functional understanding of consciousness has been made, i.e. we have learned a good deal about how the brain is structured and how signals are processed, but irrespective of any progress there this does not - and could never - further our understanding about the non-functional aspects of consciousness, the "like-ness" of a conscious experience aka the qualia. But it does further it, precisely because the "likeness" of a conscious experience depends entirely upon the physical elements in and outside of the body. This, however, does not mean that it will lead us to be able to subjectively experience the world from other points of view than our own (at least exactly like other "points of experience" than our own, I don't mean only certain aspects of it, such as seeings like dogs see etc.) Well, actually, one could hypothetically imagine a time when technology would allow us to completely transform our physical selves into, for example, chimpanzees, then turning ourselves back human - this would have led "us" (it depends also on how you define "your self") to experience the world from a chimpanzees' point of view, but would not leave us with a memory of it (unless we manage to create technology that somehow allows us to do so, possibly by modifying our own brains). Regardless, all of this doesn't bring anything new to the table. Understanding how the universe works and experimenting our presence in the universe are two different things. We know about the speed of light in space, yet we cannot experience going ourselves as fast as light in space (I don't mean through wormholes, obviously :p). We know what our sun is made of, and why it "burns" like it does, yet we can't experience being in the center of the sun - or being the sun itself. So what? This is true of absolutely every bit of knowledge - understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something, although one can help with the other. Why does it suddenly pose such a problem when it comes to the brain? And again, who knows, maybe future technology will allow us to experience other "subjectivities". Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
The claim goes that it were metaphysically or at least logically possible that we would be some form of intelligent automaton (or p-zombie) that would show exactly the same functional behavior, we could think and deliberate, but it would not be anything "like" being us (we would have no quale when feeling pain, but nonetheless show the very same external reaction). The philosophical zombie argument is so flawed with regards to its attempt at "disproving" physicalism that I'm genuinely surprised some people are still using it to do just that. If we imagine a "zombie" that is physically identical to us in every way, then that zombie will be as conscious as we are, precisely because it is being physically as we are which gives us consciousness. Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
It is in this latter non-functional sense of consciousness that pointing to emergent phenomena seems somewhat like question begging since we do not seem to have any other example in the natural world of such subjective status. And it is in this way - or so the claim goes - that consciousness really is special or mysterious or fundamentally different from mere signal processing or computing. There are other examples of subjective status (as in, self-awareness) among animals, to various degrees. This pretty much points again to brain development & composition being the relevant variable with regards to the existence (and the "level") of consciousness. Please let's take some time to look at what you replied. Maybe we'll find out why you don't seem to connect to farv and sam. For instance you say: "But it does further it, precisely because the "likeness" of a conscious experience depends entirely upon the physical elements in and outside of the body." In my book you would need to qualify this statement with "... if physicalism is true." But then this is exactly what is under contention. How on earth do you think this could sway anybody who is not already dedicated to your position? To them it must seem like question begging. The argument that was being made here was that physicalism couldn't be reconciled with phenomenological experiences. Obviously, if someone holds the position that physicalism is not true, you're right that this person will (or is likely to) simply dismiss as not true my statement that knowledge about the physical structures and processes in the brain can further our understanding of consciousness. It is however different to assert that even though consciousness is physical, as is everything else, we cannot reach further understanding of consciousness through scientific inquiry on the physical. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Heck, I would describe myself as a physicalist and to me it sure looks like question begging. The 'like-ness' (quale) of an experience is not a physical state, even though it might have a neurophysiological correlate. While it might be clear how the neurophysiological correlate is influenced by the "physical elements in and outside of the body", it is not at all obvious how the neurophysiological correlate gives rise to the sensation of "like-ness" in the first place. This is Chalmers' hard problem and you have not addressed it as far as I can see. This, Chalmer's hard problem, is an illusion - as in, it only exists if you have an a-priori belief about consciousness being detached from the physical structures and processes (or if you don't have that belief but simply don't understand what it means to link the two). Knowing how the said physical structures and processes give rise to the sensation of "like-ness" is purely a matter of having enough knowledge about the said physical structures and processes. Us not having yet a complete answer to this (or even if we could never have the answer) doesn't change that. Note again that I am not here talking about experiencing "like-ness", but understanding how "like-ness" works. The distinction is essential. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
You further argue that we cannot experience "traveling at the speed of light" or "being in the center of the sun", but why is that? Because of physical limitations or because it simply "is not like anything to experience traveling at the speed of light or being in the center of the sun"? What if our physical makeup or our laws of physics were different? Would your answer change? Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends on our physical composition. Photons do not have a physical composition that would lead them to "feel" anything, if we go by the common understanding of "to feel". My example of being at the center of the sun wasn't the best since you could argue that we could find a way to go there even if it is to die instantly, but the sun itself is another example of an object that doesn't "feel" because it's physical composition does not allow it to feel anything. If you or others have a different definition of what it means to "feel", then by all means, present it to us and we'll discuss it. For example, if you define "to feel" as "to exist", then yes, everything that exists also feels, by definition. That's not how the word is understood, however. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
You then say:
"This is true of absolutely every bit of knowledge - understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something."
Yes, but even if this is so, the question remains why this should be case? Why do we have the strong intuition that irrespective of how many explanations from limitless perspectives we hear, they do not and cannot tell us fully how it is to experience a phenomenon? This is the case because to feel something is to have our internal composition be a certain way, transmitting to itself information about how it is (including in relation to its environment) and, as the common understanding of the word goes, being conscious of all or part of the information that has been transmitted and interpreted. As long as persons A & B don't have the exact same information transmitted to themselves about how they are and aren't conscious in the same way about exactly all or part of that information, then they will not "feel" the same. The answer to "why is it so" that understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something is therefore that our physical composition has access to and transmits to itself consciously information about the two in two different ways. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
This is directly relevant to discussing brains because the very existence of (something like) a brain seems to bring the hard problem into existence. Like I said, it only brings the hard problem into existence if you have an a-priori belief (even if you're not aware of it) of a consciousness existing detached from the physical processes and structures. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Imagine you meet an alien from another dimension where gravity does not exist. I have a strong intuition that I could explain to her how gravity works nonetheless. However, if she were to tell me that, to her, experiencing something never really felt like anything in particular, I would be at a loss on how to explain to her how the effects gravity has on my body "feel like" to me. This part of subjective experience seems ineffable and fundamental. Do you share this intuition? Why is that so? Can you see now why others wrote that you are only rephrasing the 'hard problem' not trying to answer it? No need to go this far - we can take the example of the "color red". You would be at a loss to explain to someone who has never experienced seeing the color red what exactly it feels like to see the color red, even if that someone had studied the electromagnetic spectrum. Why is this a problem? I completely covered and answered it when I explained the difference between knowing the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Your argument against p-zombies needs some more clarification. Do you merely hold that p-zombies are physically impossible? Chalmers would agree with you but claim that merely conceivability is required. Do you think p-zombies are inconceivable? Well, others think they can conceive of them. What mistake are they making? Is there a way to point it out to them without assuming that physicalism is true from the get-go? Like I said, the problem of the philosophical zombie is not the act of conceiving a philosophical zombie itself, it is the assertion that the philosophical zombie argument logically disproves physicalism. Let's look at why this assertion is false by looking the logical reasoning behind it (taken from wikipedia): Show nested quote +1. According to physicalism, all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical.
2. Thus, if physicalism is true, a logically possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular, conscious experience must exist in such a possible world.
3. In fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this (so Chalmers argues) it follows that such a world is logically possible.
4. Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows from 2. and 3. by modus tollens.) 1. is true. 2. is true, but after "must contain everything that exists in our actual world" one could add "and must work exactly like our actual world". 3. is false. Why? Because the moment you conceive a world physically indistinguishable from our world, it must work exactly like our world according to physicalism. So if you decree that there is no consciousness in that conceived world, you are either breaking the premise that it is physically indistinguishable from our world or adding something that would make the two physically indistinguishable worlds work differently, thus breaking the physicalist premise. 4. is therefore not a conclusion that disproves physicalism in any way, since the premises have been broken mid-way. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Finally, when you talk about self-awareness it mixes again the functional aspects of consciousness with he supposed non-functional aspects. Being self-aware, as in being able to recognize oneself and realize facts about ones position in the world with respect to others, has clear consequences in the world. The claim is that you could have all that functional awareness without feeling that "it is like something" to be you. That claim is based on nothing, except faith/belief (in addition to "feeling like" being poorly defined). Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
The bottom line is that I share your general view on the world, but others do not. In order to communicate effectively to them you need to understand where their positions differ and address 'that'. I already pointed out where the positions differed: it is on the conception, or understanding, of the link between the physical components and consciousness. The problem is that some people do not recognize the implications of holding the position that consciousness only comes from the specific workings of the physical. So some of them will acknowledge that it does, then make assertions that they do not realize contradict that position. Cheers ,-) I appreciate your response, even though it feels somewhat funny to 'defend' the non-physicalist position to me. But for the sake of removing bad arguments from the discussion and clearing up the actual points of contention here it goes anyway: Throughout your whole post you simply refer to 'consciousness' without giving he slightest indication that you understood that the hard problem only relates to phenomenal experience, not functional nor behavioral types of awareness, so in the following I will simply assume that you equate 'consciousness' with 'experiencing qualia'/'having phenomenological experiences'. Please note, if you have a broader definition of consciousness at play here, then you are consistently missing the point anyway. Throughout my whole post I reply to the arguments being made. Chalmers' separation of phenomenal experience from the "rest" of consciousness participates in the illusion that I mentioned with regards to his formulation of the hard problem. So, thanks, but no, I'm not "missing the point". See below. So, let's call that your argument (1) you claim phenomenal experience as defined does not exist, correct?
Uh what? Where did I make that claim and where did you define "phenomenal experience"?
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
Would you see yourself rather as a deflationist or strict eliminitivist on that matter? What is your prime argument for the claim that they can't be seperated?
I did not say that they couldn't be separated - analytically, you can reflect on the two separately. I said that the way Chalmers is separating the two by taking for granted that phenomenal experience does not play a functional role participates in the illusion I mentioned with regards to his hard problem.
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
You write:
"The argument that was being made here was that physicalism couldn't be reconciled with phenomenological experiences."
This is simply not true. No, this is true - "here" refers to the discussion that was going on in this thread. Since you wrote the sentence "How on earth do you think this could sway anybody who is not already dedicated to your position? To them it must seem like question begging.", and we were in the context of a discussion where someone was not being swayed and argued that our replies were question begging, I was pointing out that the argument being made in this thread went beyond simply having two different views about the world and questioned whether the opposing view was internally consistent. Silly me, and here I thought you were replying to me!?
I was replying to you referring to other people.
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
But we are on the same page now that the hard problem does not try or claim to rule out physicalism, right? So then we are making slow progress.
The "hard problem" is about claiming that there is a "hard problem" in explaining why there is a subjective component to experience. The implication is that this subjective component cannot be explained through a physicalist world view. It is an illusion.
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
How on earth do you think this could sway anybody who is not already dedicated to your position? To them it must seem like question begging.
You answered to the part of my post where I was explaining the hard problem of consciousness. It doesn't follow at all from the hard problem that qualia are irreconcilable with physicalism (there are other arguments for that) only that this is a problem that physicalists will have to deal with. You need to be way more precise in your responses otherwise you start out by missing the point - which is a bad way to start. I was very precise, and you apparently missed the context of this exchange. Thanks for setting me straight. That'll teach me!
Always a pleasure!
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Then you say:
"This, Chalmer's hard problem, is an illusion - as in, it only exists if you have an a-priori belief about consciousness being detached from the physical structures and processes (or if you don't have that belief but simply don't understand what it means to link the two)."
You only got it right in the brackets. The claim is not at all that qualia are completely detached from the physical structures, but on the contrary that they are somehow linked - but on a physicalist view it is hard to account for how this could be the case, unless consciousness were a fundamental physical property (which only few physicalists -the crazy ones- believe). Qualia seem further not logically necessary for any causal/functional/behavioral theory , so why is it that in this world experiences are (always?) accompanied by qualia? No, I got it right in the entire sentence. I never said that the claim was that qualia were "completely detached from the physical structures". I said that thinking that there is a hard problem presupposes either that, even unconsciously/without fully acknowledging it, one does believe (as a kind of "gut feeling", perhaps) that qualia and the physical structures and processes are still somehow detached, or that one believes that they are not detached but doesn't understand what it means to link the two physically. You mention that "on a physicalist view it is hard to account for how this could be the case". Why? Why even say that qualia "seem further not logically necessary for any causal/functional/behavioral theory"? That's a claim which comes out of thin air. What tells you that our brain, and our entire body, would operate the same without qualia? Physicalism precisely holds that our body works the way it works because of how it is physically, period - this includes qualia. If you're going to make the claim that qualia have "no function", then the burden of proof lies with you. That's why I mentioned at the start that the separation Chalmers makes between qualia and the "rest" of consciousness participates in his illusion of a hard problem - there is nothing that suggests qualia is any different from the rest of consciousness in its playing a role in the functional workings of our body, except that it's perhaps counter-intuitive, which is not an excuse for having no basis to substantiate a claim that it doesn't play a functional role. Actually you still got it wrong. Thinking that there is a Chalmerian 'hard problem' requires that qualia are somehow attached to neurophysiological correlates.
No, you did. You can very well believe that there is a hard problem if you think that qualia are something that go beyond simple physical correlates.
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
Now, you start to argue about qualia as if you think they do exist, which would somehwat contradict your argument (1).
You made up argument (1) and attributed it to me. Qualia at the very least exist as the representations that we have of our experience. They may well be inherent to consciousness - I haven't made any claim in that regards.
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
So I take it here that you mean that something like qualia exist, but they are always functional. Did I get it right? What is the function of experiencing the 'redness' of red instead of just visually registering red and reactig on it?
No, you didn't get it right. You transformed me telling you that the claim that qualia have no functional utility has to be substantiated before it can be taken as true into me claiming that qualia have a functional role. I'm not making any claims here. I'm disputing that it can be taken for granted that qualia "play no functional role".
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Your following paragraph...:
"Knowing how the said physical structures and processes give rise to the sensation of "like-ness" is purely a matter of having enough knowledge about the said physical structures and processes. Us not having yet a complete answer to this (or even if we could never have the answer) doesn't change that."
... is simply wishful thinking to rescue your position. Surely, you should be willing to admit that if we could never have an answer to the question of how qualia are generated, then Chalmers' 'hard problem' really should be considered 'hard'. Now where is the illusion in that, eh? How is that wishful thinking in any way, shape or form? There are plenty of things that we will not have a complete answer for in our lifetimes, or perhaps ever, but that doesn't mean at all that they pose a problem to, or contradict, physicalism. And I never even said that we would never have an answer to how qualia exist, I said "even if we couldn't". Really, not at all? Not even a tiny little bit? Not the slightest problem?
Why would it be the case? If you have an argument to make, then make it.
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
Note again that you falsely equated the "mere existence of a hard problem" with a contradiction of physicalism here. And just when I thought we were making progress...
You really do need to learn to take things into context. Physicalism argues that everything is physical. The "hard problem" relies on the idea that experience does not play a physical function, and that the problem it poses goes beyond its physical workings. To quote Chalmers himself:
The emergence of experience goes beyond what can be derived from physical theory.
Purely physical explanation is well-suited to the explanation of physical structures, explaining macroscopic structures in terms of detailed microstructural constituents; and it provides a satisfying explanation of the performance of functions, accounting for these functions in terms of the physical mechanisms that perform them. This is because a physical account can entail the facts about structures and functions: once the internal details of the physical account are given, the structural and functional properties fall out as an automatic consequence. But the structure and dynamics of physical processes yield only more structure and dynamics, so structures and functions are all we can expect these processes to explain. The facts about experience cannot be an automatic consequence of any physical account, as it is conceptually coherent that any given process could exist without experience. Experience may arise from the physical, but it is not entailed by the physical.
Physicalism will reply to this that, contrary to what Chalmers is saying, "the emergence of experience does not go beyond what can be derived from physical theory".
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
You go on with:
"Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends on our physical composition."
"Like I said"? Is this a subtle form of backpedaling or why is "entirely" prominently missing in your restatement? Because no property dualist would object to what you wrote there as long as you don't claim to know that there are absolutely no non-physical factors at play (like bridge laws) - and how on earth would you know something like that? Yes, "like I said". I didn't think "entirely" was necessary in the context of what I've been arguing quite clearly. Let me rephrase for your convenience: "Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends entirely, fully, totally, wholly, completely, exclusively, solely, 100% on our physical composition." I would know something like that because that is the default position - there has yet to be discovered anything in the universe that has been shown to depend on something else than the physical for its explanation. Of course, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, so yes, I am perfectly fine with agreeing that there is no evidence that there isn't something supernatural at play in our brains and that it's therefore possible that there is, just like it's possible that the spaghetti monster is out there, or that there are alien monkeys playing a monkey-version of Guitar Hero inside the sun. If you're going to make the claim that there is something non-physical going on, however, the burden of proof lies with you. So now you seem to change your line of argument. You now claim to know that physicalism is true because it is the default position. Hmmm ... I find this somewhat weird. Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that you simply assume physicalism is true here, because it has worked well in the past to explain other phenomena? Not that I think that there is anything wrong with this position, but shouldn't you inform your interlocutor before you make such sweeping "statements of fact"?
I'm pretty sure the paragraph you just replied to already covered what you just asked - and I did not change my line of argument.
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
The following paragraph seems wholly confused since nobody ever claimed that objects like 'suns' or 'rocks' have phenomenological experiences. Do you think that this was entailed by the argument? You probably missed the part of the thread where sam!zdat asked me if and what it felt like something to be matter. And THAT made you think that sam!zdat believes all collections of matter feel something? Okay...
No, that made me reply to what sam!zdat was asking.
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Anyway, you try to get to the core of phenomenological experience by saying:
"As long as persons A & B don't have the exact same information transmitted to themselves about how they are and aren't conscious in the same way about exactly all or part of that information, then they will not "feel" the same."
Apart from the utter mystery of how you would ever go about demonstrating such a bold claim, it remains the fact that I seem to have rather robust phenomenological experiences even though the "transmitted information" is not "exactly" the same. What does having "robust phenomenological experiences" have to do with the fact that those experiences will not be the same as another person's, which is the entire point of what I was saying? Well, if I can have very similar phenomenal experiences on different information, why could somebody else not have the same phenomenal experience as I do? Isn't the majority of human interaction based on the presupposition that different human beings share similar qualia in similar situations?
Different human beings share similar physical structures which are fed similar information (such as various wavelengths of light). Thus we can share similar qualia in similar situations. This does not mean that the experiences will be the exact same, which is what I was explaining in my example.
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Are you talking only about the internal stance here and not about external stimuli? I specifically mentioned information covering both internal and external factors participating in the phenomenological experience. Alas, when I dream I can "experience redness" without seeing and to me it at least seems to be the same "redness" as in the presence of external stimuli.
So? How does this go against anything I said?
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
And how would you control for exactly the same 'information' and 'feeling'? I mean, you surely don't suggest that the 'redness' of red is identical to the electric impulses or chemical transmitters in my synapses, do you? Why would I need to "control" anything? I am explaining to you why the two experiences are different, and it is because of the physical differences between the two. You made a very sweeping general statement (quite the habit), and if you would ever be interested in demonstrating the truth of your claim you would need to be sure that "the exact same information" and "the exact same feeling" could be controlled. Since you are more in the business of "claiming" then "demonstrating" I understand that this doesn't bother you.
That is rich coming from the guy who claims it can be assumed that qualia serve no function.
I am explaining to you how physicalism answers the matter of qualia, and more generally the question of what it feels like to be oneself, in comparison to what it feels like to be someone else. Again, it's an ontological position - I never argued that you could make an experiment to make it possible for one individual to experience the subjectivity of someone else and compare it to his own.
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
You then go on to make a surprising (to me at least) admission:
"No need to go this far - we can take the example of the "color red". You would be at a loss to explain to someone who has never experienced seeing the color red what exactly it feels like to see the color red, even if that someone had studied the electromagnetic spectrum. Why is this a problem? I completely covered and answered it when I explained the difference between knowing the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively."
You are sliding on thin ice here as you seem to be dangerously close to conceding the whole argument to the non-physicalist, only to then wave the conclusion away with a sleight of hand. Do you think I can 'know' how it is to see the color red once I've experienced it but not before? If so, you seem to agree that second order phenomenological knowledge/belief requires a completely different process to be obtained than any other piece of knowledge/belief. It would hence be a bit disingenuous to ask: "Why is consciousness special?". This at the very least opens the door to the non-physicalist to propose that as knowledge of qualia cannot be obtained by 'standard epistemological methods' explanations of qualia are prime candidates for requiring "non-standard non-physicalist tools" to be successful. I'm not too sure how you managed to do it, but you somehow completely missed my point about the difference between knowledge about the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively. No, I do not come even remotely close to "conceding the whole argument to the non-physicalist". Why? Because, again, physicalism doesn't make the claim that knowledge about the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively are the same things. This, however, doesn't mean that one requires physical processes and the other doesn't - both consist in information physically reaching the physical components of ourselves that allow us to process the said information. This is virtually true of everything - no single physical "road" to information reaching our brain will be the same in terms of both the processes and the information at play. What do you define as "knowledge of qualia"? If it's knowledge about how qualia arise and are experienced, then this only depends upon learning the physical structures and processes at play. If it's "knowledge" in the sense of us experimenting a qualia (for example the color "red"), then our own physical structures and processes must be put into use in the way that learning about them in the first case would have showed us they have to be. So, again, let's be clear: if the question is "how do qualia arise/come into existence?", the answer lies purely with the physical workings of the brain. If I was able to see the physical explanation of the color red being experimented by someone, and wanted to feel it myself, then it would mean I would have to receive a physical information and have my physical structures & processes work a certain way (the way described earlier). By the way, one of the problems seems to be that you are mistaking physicalism for an epistemological position. It isn't - it's an ontological position. You don't seem to have read a lot of literature on the knowledge argument, otherwise you would understand why it is a big deal (and used to be a hotly debated topic) how knowledge about qualia is obtained. Physicalism can actually mean both: 'all knowledge is physical knowledge' and 'all things are physical'. Notice how you used the argument (2) of "physicalism as the default position" in order to argue for physicalism, which you can only defend on epistemic grounds (so far all our successful explanations make use of physical things). The knowledge argument - if successful - could undercut this. Bolding words is a useful skill toi have, anyways.
Apparently another useful skill to have is dodging questions. Again - what do you understand by "knowledge about qualia"? I answered both the aspect of knowledge of the workings and the aspect of experience as knowledge propositions - I await your reply to what I explained.
Defending physicalism through an argument pertaining to the state of our knowledge of the universe is not the same as presenting physicalism as an epistemological position, which I haven't done.
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:The worst part comes when you aim to dismantle Chalmers' argument via Wikipedia. Let's take a look: "3. is false if "logically possible" still means "logically possible world working according to physicalism". Why? Because the moment you conceive a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness, you are no longer conceiving that world according to physicalism." This almost leaves me speechless, since it is a logic101 fail. Why on earth should 'logically possible' entail 'logically possible according to physicalism' as long as it is not established that physicalism holds in the first place!? The argument presented here tries to establish a reductio against physicalism, so you cannot insert your conclusion into a premise as long as you haven't established its validity. This is textbook question begging! How can you not see that? I guess given that you assume that the Zombie argument is riddled with problems it's quite a feat to pick out the one thing that is genuinely unproblematic here but whatever ... First, I'd like to point out I edited my post to make it easier to understand quite a while before you replied, so I guess if you didn't see the edit it must have taken you some time to write your reply (or you didn't refresh the page that you had loaded a while ago). Second, you obviously did not get what I meant by "according to physicalism", so I'll explain again why one of the premises is broken. If you take the time to read Chalmers' argument again, you will see that one of the premises is that the world created is a world "in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world". If all of the physical facts are the same, it necessarily means that the world works the same way physically, because this is included in the "physical facts". So, when we move to the third proposition, namely "in fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness", we can quite easily see that is false. Why? Because the moment you conceive a world physically indistinguishable from our world, it must work exactly like our world, unless "the physical facts" that were referred to earlier are no longer the same. So if you decree that there is no consciousness in that conceived world, you are breaking the premise that the physical facts of that world are the same. That is what I was referring to - one of the premises held was that the physical facts would be the same in the world, and it is broken mid-reasoning. I have lot's of other stuff to do, so I sometimes have to write my replies offline in breaks. I apologize, but blame my busy schedule! Your 'correction', however, does not help you to avoid the fallacy I pointed out. It is even still right there in your second attempt to clarify. You claim that "the moment we observe a world physically indistinguishable from our world, it must work exactly like our world, unless "the physical facts" that were referred to earlier are no longer the same". But this is only true if physicalism is true. You don't belive me? Okay: Suppose physicalism were false, would a physically indistinguishable world still need to work exactly the same? If you still don't get why what you are doing is committing a logical fallacy and also don't believe me, then please ask an authority of your trust...or take some introductory class in logic.
I'm beginning to wonder if you've actually read the enunciation of the philosophical zombie argument I referred to, because your gripes are with the logical fallacy of the argument and not with my pointing it out.
The entire foundation of the argument is that Chalmers is imagining a world in which all of the physical facts are the same as in our world. This is not me inserting physicalism into Chalmers' conception, it is Chalmers declaring how the world he is imagining is. By "physical facts", he is including the physical workings, which are physical facts. He did not simply say "physical elements" because that's the entire point of his argument - he is trying to disprove physicalism. And adding later a proposition in which the physical workings stop being the same as in our world (there is no consciousness) necessarily means that the physical facts are no longer the same, and thus a different result (there being no consciousness) no longer disproves physicalism.
Here, I'll help you with your own example. Let's say that Chalmers was imagining a world in which the physical elements were the same as in ours, but with different workings (due to the existence of non-physical causes, thus contrary to physicalism). You could, in this world, have p-zombies. Would this disprove physicalism? No, because there were non-physical causes involved. So, if you go back to the original argument, as long as you have only physical workings involved, you cannot have a philosophical zombie. And the moment you add something which is non-physical, you are no longer disproving physicalism (I bolded it to help, since you seem to be receptive to bolding).
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Finally you state that the claim that there exist purely phenomenal experiences ('feeling like-ness') that are unnecessary for function or behavior is...
"... based on nothing, except faith/belief (in addition to "feeling like" being poorly defined)."
This strikes me as clearly untrue. That's too bad, because it is true. What is asserted without argument can be dismissed without argument, I guess ...
Indeed - you have yet to substantiate the claim that experiences have no functional basis
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
The robots we develop are already able to show a remarkable variety of functional and behavioral traits, without having phenomenological experiences at all (or do you think they have them?). The robots we develop do not display the same functional/behavioral traits as we do. They are not constituted as we are. And you still have not supported the claim that phenomenological experimenting is non-functional. Well, it establishes that the execution of some functions do not require phenomenal experience. Don't you agree? It doesn't even count as any support for the claim? Why not?
Indeed, the execution of some functions do not require phenomenal experience. Has this been ever contested? What is the relevance of this fact with regards to the claim you're making that phenomenal experience is not functional?
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
As an aside, you sometimes write "experimenting". Is that a typo or do you mean something particular?
Yeah, I meant "experiencing".
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Given this evidence I don't find it prima facie absurd that a very advanced robot could show a functional variety in the ballpark of higher animals or even humans without the phenomenological 'baggage'. I frankly do not care that you don't "don't find it absurd" - you're missing the point and I never said physicalism was intuitive. The point is that qualia, and consciousness more broadly, are there, and are there as they are, purely because of the physical workings of our bodies. As long as robots do not have physical structures and processes that precisely mimic what we have, they will of course not have similar consciousness and experiment qualia as we do. So, do you find the above mentioned notion absurd, because I care? Protip: If you don't, you might get into trouble ...
So far, I have yet to hear any substance behind your claim other than "I don't find it absurd" or "it seems likely". When you are ready to actually address what I said and substantiate your claim, feel free to let me know.
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Furthermore we have examples of humans who lose a class of phenomenological experiences while at least maintaining some functional/behavioral awareness (e.g., blindsight). And notice that I am even providing you with some (albeit limited) examples from this world What is the relevance of what you just said? The awareness you are referring to is still entirely explained by the physical workings of the body. Those physical structures/processes which have been affected and have led to the loss of a class of phenomenological experiences have not impaired the physical structures/processes which lead to the aforementioned awareness. It shows that some visual functions can be reliably executed without accompanying phenomenal experience. Do you still not see the relevance?
Actually, that's not what your example showed, because maintaining some form of residual awareness can still be experienced, albeit in a different way than the initial, full awareness - something that is entirely consistent with my position. Now, with regards to what you just said, namely that "visual functions can be reliably executed without accompanying phenomenal experience", it still does not support your claim in any way. Why would visual functions existing without phenomenal experience mean that phenomenal experience does not play a function? This is akin to me declaring that because my arms are working, I can assert that blood flowing to my stomach does not play a function.
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
whereas Chalmers argument works if you grant that phenomenal experience can be stripped from the functional in some logically possible world. Where is the obvious contradiction here? See above for Chalmers' argument. See above indeed!
Quite so.
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
In my opinion you are really overselling the case for physicalism, maybe because you have never really engaged with the case of the opposition (outside of Wikipedia), but dismissed their arguments out of hand. I'm not, I have, and I didn't. Well, you have presented two arguments, as far as I can see. 1) You think that phenomenal experience is also functional, i.e. doesn't exist as defined, without giving any support other than - it just is the case since physicalism says so.
I don't know if you're doing this on purpose, but if you are this is intellectual dishonesty at its best. I am not the one making the claim. Chalmers and you are claiming that phenomenal experience is not functional. The burden of proof lies with you.
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
2) You claim physicalism is the default position, since it has worked in the past to explain a wide range of phenomena.
I see merit in both lines of argument, but so far you haven't substantiated (1) at all, whereas (2) would only allow you very modest inferences in light of the unique epistemic character of qualia, which you seem to acknowledge.
For (1) refer to the above, and for (2), as I explained, both types of knowledge about qualia are entirely consistent with physicalism.
On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
If you work on those two, I am sure however, that your future exchanges with non-physicalists will turn out to be much more fruitful! Thanks for the discussion!
If you work on substantiating your claims, I'm sure your future exchanges with anyone will turn out to be much more fruitful ,-) Thanks to you too.
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On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:
First would you mind using actual quote tags? It makes replying to you easier, since it gives the context of what's being discussed and allows for not having to go back to the previous post each time.
I'll try, but will make no promises There, much better ,-) Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On September 03 2013 03:07 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On September 01 2013 03:57 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
In my view the main problem that plagues discussions about the "hard problem" of consciousness is that it is so difficult for all participants to "shelter" it from any discussion about functionality. This goes to a point that I am not even sure whether Sam and farvacola are actually defending the "original" hard problem as championed by Chalmers or some variant of hybrid.
In the original problem it was argued that: yes, progress on a functional understanding of consciousness has been made, i.e. we have learned a good deal about how the brain is structured and how signals are processed, but irrespective of any progress there this does not - and could never - further our understanding about the non-functional aspects of consciousness, the "like-ness" of a conscious experience aka the qualia. But it does further it, precisely because the "likeness" of a conscious experience depends entirely upon the physical elements in and outside of the body. This, however, does not mean that it will lead us to be able to subjectively experience the world from other points of view than our own (at least exactly like other "points of experience" than our own, I don't mean only certain aspects of it, such as seeings like dogs see etc.) Well, actually, one could hypothetically imagine a time when technology would allow us to completely transform our physical selves into, for example, chimpanzees, then turning ourselves back human - this would have led "us" (it depends also on how you define "your self") to experience the world from a chimpanzees' point of view, but would not leave us with a memory of it (unless we manage to create technology that somehow allows us to do so, possibly by modifying our own brains). Regardless, all of this doesn't bring anything new to the table. Understanding how the universe works and experimenting our presence in the universe are two different things. We know about the speed of light in space, yet we cannot experience going ourselves as fast as light in space (I don't mean through wormholes, obviously :p). We know what our sun is made of, and why it "burns" like it does, yet we can't experience being in the center of the sun - or being the sun itself. So what? This is true of absolutely every bit of knowledge - understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something, although one can help with the other. Why does it suddenly pose such a problem when it comes to the brain? And again, who knows, maybe future technology will allow us to experience other "subjectivities". Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
The claim goes that it were metaphysically or at least logically possible that we would be some form of intelligent automaton (or p-zombie) that would show exactly the same functional behavior, we could think and deliberate, but it would not be anything "like" being us (we would have no quale when feeling pain, but nonetheless show the very same external reaction). The philosophical zombie argument is so flawed with regards to its attempt at "disproving" physicalism that I'm genuinely surprised some people are still using it to do just that. If we imagine a "zombie" that is physically identical to us in every way, then that zombie will be as conscious as we are, precisely because it is being physically as we are which gives us consciousness. Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
It is in this latter non-functional sense of consciousness that pointing to emergent phenomena seems somewhat like question begging since we do not seem to have any other example in the natural world of such subjective status. And it is in this way - or so the claim goes - that consciousness really is special or mysterious or fundamentally different from mere signal processing or computing. There are other examples of subjective status (as in, self-awareness) among animals, to various degrees. This pretty much points again to brain development & composition being the relevant variable with regards to the existence (and the "level") of consciousness. Please let's take some time to look at what you replied. Maybe we'll find out why you don't seem to connect to farv and sam. For instance you say: "But it does further it, precisely because the "likeness" of a conscious experience depends entirely upon the physical elements in and outside of the body." In my book you would need to qualify this statement with "... if physicalism is true." But then this is exactly what is under contention. How on earth do you think this could sway anybody who is not already dedicated to your position? To them it must seem like question begging. The argument that was being made here was that physicalism couldn't be reconciled with phenomenological experiences. Obviously, if someone holds the position that physicalism is not true, you're right that this person will (or is likely to) simply dismiss as not true my statement that knowledge about the physical structures and processes in the brain can further our understanding of consciousness. It is however different to assert that even though consciousness is physical, as is everything else, we cannot reach further understanding of consciousness through scientific inquiry on the physical. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Heck, I would describe myself as a physicalist and to me it sure looks like question begging. The 'like-ness' (quale) of an experience is not a physical state, even though it might have a neurophysiological correlate. While it might be clear how the neurophysiological correlate is influenced by the "physical elements in and outside of the body", it is not at all obvious how the neurophysiological correlate gives rise to the sensation of "like-ness" in the first place. This is Chalmers' hard problem and you have not addressed it as far as I can see. This, Chalmer's hard problem, is an illusion - as in, it only exists if you have an a-priori belief about consciousness being detached from the physical structures and processes (or if you don't have that belief but simply don't understand what it means to link the two). Knowing how the said physical structures and processes give rise to the sensation of "like-ness" is purely a matter of having enough knowledge about the said physical structures and processes. Us not having yet a complete answer to this (or even if we could never have the answer) doesn't change that. Note again that I am not here talking about experiencing "like-ness", but understanding how "like-ness" works. The distinction is essential. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
You further argue that we cannot experience "traveling at the speed of light" or "being in the center of the sun", but why is that? Because of physical limitations or because it simply "is not like anything to experience traveling at the speed of light or being in the center of the sun"? What if our physical makeup or our laws of physics were different? Would your answer change? Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends on our physical composition. Photons do not have a physical composition that would lead them to "feel" anything, if we go by the common understanding of "to feel". My example of being at the center of the sun wasn't the best since you could argue that we could find a way to go there even if it is to die instantly, but the sun itself is another example of an object that doesn't "feel" because it's physical composition does not allow it to feel anything. If you or others have a different definition of what it means to "feel", then by all means, present it to us and we'll discuss it. For example, if you define "to feel" as "to exist", then yes, everything that exists also feels, by definition. That's not how the word is understood, however. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
You then say:
"This is true of absolutely every bit of knowledge - understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something."
Yes, but even if this is so, the question remains why this should be case? Why do we have the strong intuition that irrespective of how many explanations from limitless perspectives we hear, they do not and cannot tell us fully how it is to experience a phenomenon? This is the case because to feel something is to have our internal composition be a certain way, transmitting to itself information about how it is (including in relation to its environment) and, as the common understanding of the word goes, being conscious of all or part of the information that has been transmitted and interpreted. As long as persons A & B don't have the exact same information transmitted to themselves about how they are and aren't conscious in the same way about exactly all or part of that information, then they will not "feel" the same. The answer to "why is it so" that understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something is therefore that our physical composition has access to and transmits to itself consciously information about the two in two different ways. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
This is directly relevant to discussing brains because the very existence of (something like) a brain seems to bring the hard problem into existence. Like I said, it only brings the hard problem into existence if you have an a-priori belief (even if you're not aware of it) of a consciousness existing detached from the physical processes and structures. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Imagine you meet an alien from another dimension where gravity does not exist. I have a strong intuition that I could explain to her how gravity works nonetheless. However, if she were to tell me that, to her, experiencing something never really felt like anything in particular, I would be at a loss on how to explain to her how the effects gravity has on my body "feel like" to me. This part of subjective experience seems ineffable and fundamental. Do you share this intuition? Why is that so? Can you see now why others wrote that you are only rephrasing the 'hard problem' not trying to answer it? No need to go this far - we can take the example of the "color red". You would be at a loss to explain to someone who has never experienced seeing the color red what exactly it feels like to see the color red, even if that someone had studied the electromagnetic spectrum. Why is this a problem? I completely covered and answered it when I explained the difference between knowing the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Your argument against p-zombies needs some more clarification. Do you merely hold that p-zombies are physically impossible? Chalmers would agree with you but claim that merely conceivability is required. Do you think p-zombies are inconceivable? Well, others think they can conceive of them. What mistake are they making? Is there a way to point it out to them without assuming that physicalism is true from the get-go? Like I said, the problem of the philosophical zombie is not the act of conceiving a philosophical zombie itself, it is the assertion that the philosophical zombie argument logically disproves physicalism. Let's look at why this assertion is false by looking the logical reasoning behind it (taken from wikipedia): Show nested quote +1. According to physicalism, all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical.
2. Thus, if physicalism is true, a logically possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular, conscious experience must exist in such a possible world.
3. In fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this (so Chalmers argues) it follows that such a world is logically possible.
4. Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows from 2. and 3. by modus tollens.) 1. is true. 2. is true, but after "must contain everything that exists in our actual world" one could add "and must work exactly like our actual world". 3. is false. Why? Because the moment you conceive a world physically indistinguishable from our world, it must work exactly like our world according to physicalism. So if you decree that there is no consciousness in that conceived world, you are either breaking the premise that it is physically indistinguishable from our world or adding something that would make the two physically indistinguishable worlds work differently, thus breaking the physicalist premise. 4. is therefore not a conclusion that disproves physicalism in any way, since the premises have been broken mid-way. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Finally, when you talk about self-awareness it mixes again the functional aspects of consciousness with he supposed non-functional aspects. Being self-aware, as in being able to recognize oneself and realize facts about ones position in the world with respect to others, has clear consequences in the world. The claim is that you could have all that functional awareness without feeling that "it is like something" to be you. That claim is based on nothing, except faith/belief (in addition to "feeling like" being poorly defined). Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
The bottom line is that I share your general view on the world, but others do not. In order to communicate effectively to them you need to understand where their positions differ and address 'that'. I already pointed out where the positions differed: it is on the conception, or understanding, of the link between the physical components and consciousness. The problem is that some people do not recognize the implications of holding the position that consciousness only comes from the specific workings of the physical. So some of them will acknowledge that it does, then make assertions that they do not realize contradict that position. Cheers ,-) I appreciate your response, even though it feels somewhat funny to 'defend' the non-physicalist position to me. But for the sake of removing bad arguments from the discussion and clearing up the actual points of contention here it goes anyway: Throughout your whole post you simply refer to 'consciousness' without giving he slightest indication that you understood that the hard problem only relates to phenomenal experience, not functional nor behavioral types of awareness, so in the following I will simply assume that you equate 'consciousness' with 'experiencing qualia'/'having phenomenological experiences'. Please note, if you have a broader definition of consciousness at play here, then you are consistently missing the point anyway. Throughout my whole post I reply to the arguments being made. Chalmers' separation of phenomenal experience from the "rest" of consciousness participates in the illusion that I mentioned with regards to his formulation of the hard problem. So, thanks, but no, I'm not "missing the point". See below. So, let's call that your argument (1) you claim phenomenal experience as defined does not exist, correct? Uh what? Where did I make that claim and where did you define "phenomenal experience"?
Where did I define phenomenal experience?! Did you miss that part where I entered the thread starting out with stressing the importance of understanding that the non-physicalist only discusses the phenomenal part of conscience that's devoid of function? Seriously? No wonder we are not making progress... Better watch out next time! :p
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
Would you see yourself rather as a deflationist or strict eliminitivist on that matter? What is your prime argument for the claim that they can't be seperated? I did not say that they couldn't be separated - analytically, you can reflect on the two separately. I said that the way Chalmers is separating the two by taking for granted that phenomenal experience does not play a functional role participates in the illusion I mentioned with regards to his hard problem. Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
You write:
"The argument that was being made here was that physicalism couldn't be reconciled with phenomenological experiences."
This is simply not true. No, this is true - "here" refers to the discussion that was going on in this thread. Since you wrote the sentence "How on earth do you think this could sway anybody who is not already dedicated to your position? To them it must seem like question begging.", and we were in the context of a discussion where someone was not being swayed and argued that our replies were question begging, I was pointing out that the argument being made in this thread went beyond simply having two different views about the world and questioned whether the opposing view was internally consistent. Silly me, and here I thought you were replying to me!? I was replying to you referring to other people.
Maybe you can try a bit harder to reply to what I say, though! Deal?
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
But we are on the same page now that the hard problem does not try or claim to rule out physicalism, right? So then we are making slow progress. The "hard problem" is about claiming that there is a "hard problem" in explaining why there is a subjective component to experience. The implication is that this subjective component cannot be explained through a physicalist world view. It is an illusion.
Precision is your friend in debates! You can acknowledge that there is a hard problem without conceding physicalism. That was my whole point and I am optimistic that you got it now!
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
How on earth do you think this could sway anybody who is not already dedicated to your position? To them it must seem like question begging.
You answered to the part of my post where I was explaining the hard problem of consciousness. It doesn't follow at all from the hard problem that qualia are irreconcilable with physicalism (there are other arguments for that) only that this is a problem that physicalists will have to deal with. You need to be way more precise in your responses otherwise you start out by missing the point - which is a bad way to start. I was very precise, and you apparently missed the context of this exchange. Thanks for setting me straight. That'll teach me! Always a pleasure! Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Then you say:
"This, Chalmer's hard problem, is an illusion - as in, it only exists if you have an a-priori belief about consciousness being detached from the physical structures and processes (or if you don't have that belief but simply don't understand what it means to link the two)."
You only got it right in the brackets. The claim is not at all that qualia are completely detached from the physical structures, but on the contrary that they are somehow linked - but on a physicalist view it is hard to account for how this could be the case, unless consciousness were a fundamental physical property (which only few physicalists -the crazy ones- believe). Qualia seem further not logically necessary for any causal/functional/behavioral theory , so why is it that in this world experiences are (always?) accompanied by qualia? No, I got it right in the entire sentence. I never said that the claim was that qualia were "completely detached from the physical structures". I said that thinking that there is a hard problem presupposes either that, even unconsciously/without fully acknowledging it, one does believe (as a kind of "gut feeling", perhaps) that qualia and the physical structures and processes are still somehow detached, or that one believes that they are not detached but doesn't understand what it means to link the two physically. You mention that "on a physicalist view it is hard to account for how this could be the case". Why? Why even say that qualia "seem further not logically necessary for any causal/functional/behavioral theory"? That's a claim which comes out of thin air. What tells you that our brain, and our entire body, would operate the same without qualia? Physicalism precisely holds that our body works the way it works because of how it is physically, period - this includes qualia. If you're going to make the claim that qualia have "no function", then the burden of proof lies with you. That's why I mentioned at the start that the separation Chalmers makes between qualia and the "rest" of consciousness participates in his illusion of a hard problem - there is nothing that suggests qualia is any different from the rest of consciousness in its playing a role in the functional workings of our body, except that it's perhaps counter-intuitive, which is not an excuse for having no basis to substantiate a claim that it doesn't play a functional role. Actually you still got it wrong. Thinking that there is a Chalmerian 'hard problem' requires that qualia are somehow attached to neurophysiological correlates. No, you did. You can very well believe that there is a hard problem if you think that qualia are something that go beyond simple physical correlates.
Qualia are defined as 'going beyond' the physical correlates, since a third person can look at the physical correlates, but not at any induced quale. That you think you can confidently contribute to a debate without even knowing the basic definitions , should show you that we still have a long road to walk. Now please don't turn around yet again to claim that what you really meant was 'completely detached'.
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
Now, you start to argue about qualia as if you think they do exist, which would somehwat contradict your argument (1). You made up argument (1) and attributed it to me. Qualia at the very least exist as the representations that we have of our experience. They may well be inherent to consciousness - I haven't made any claim in that regards.
Qualia are representations, but they are special representations since they seem to be only accessible by the subject. It seemed to me that you were arguing repeatedly that they are not merely phenomenal but functional "just like the rest of consciousness" (which would mean they don't exist as defined by the non-physicalist). This is a valid point of attack which many physicalists have chosen. You now inform me that is not what you aimed to do, so I happily retract the statement.
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
So I take it here that you mean that something like qualia exist, but they are always functional. Did I get it right? What is the function of experiencing the 'redness' of red instead of just visually registering red and reactig on it? No, you didn't get it right. You transformed me telling you that the claim that qualia have no functional utility has to be substantiated before it can be taken as true into me claiming that qualia have a functional role. I'm not making any claims here. I'm disputing that it can be taken for granted that qualia "play no functional role".
That's a perfectly fine stance to take. But you can't seem to name a function nor do you see a logical contradiction here, correct? That leaves you with agnosticism with respect to the existence of qualia (as defined by the non-physicalist) which is unproblematic and shifts the burden of proof. Fine! But just another tip: if you don't want to make unsubstantiated claims about qualia don't say things such as: "Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends entirely, fully, totally, wholly, completely, exclusively, solely, 100% on our physical composition." Just say: "It could be the case that..."
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Your following paragraph...:
"Knowing how the said physical structures and processes give rise to the sensation of "like-ness" is purely a matter of having enough knowledge about the said physical structures and processes. Us not having yet a complete answer to this (or even if we could never have the answer) doesn't change that."
... is simply wishful thinking to rescue your position. Surely, you should be willing to admit that if we could never have an answer to the question of how qualia are generated, then Chalmers' 'hard problem' really should be considered 'hard'. Now where is the illusion in that, eh? How is that wishful thinking in any way, shape or form? There are plenty of things that we will not have a complete answer for in our lifetimes, or perhaps ever, but that doesn't mean at all that they pose a problem to, or contradict, physicalism. And I never even said that we would never have an answer to how qualia exist, I said "even if we couldn't". Really, not at all? Not even a tiny little bit? Not the slightest problem? Why would it be the case? If you have an argument to make, then make it.
So if Bob says: "Hear, hear people! My world view claims that gravity doesn't exist. It's too mysterious to be true!" And Alice objects: "Well, how do you explain that objects fall to he ground?". But Bob retorts confidently: "There will always be things that our worldview will not be able to explain! Why not just settle that this can't be explained?"
Then you don't see how this could be even slightly problematic for Bob? You need to have this argument spelled out for you? Unexplainable phenomena in the world are the prime candidates for forcing us to update our core beliefs. Sure the existence of an as of yet unexplained phenomenon doesn't mean that it will never be explained or that a central belief really is wrong. But to go on to say even if a phenomenon really is unexplainable, we are allowed to label it a 'hard problem', is ... errrr ... disingenuous.
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
Note again that you falsely equated the "mere existence of a hard problem" with a contradiction of physicalism here. And just when I thought we were making progress... You really do need to learn to take things into context. Physicalism argues that everything is physical. The "hard problem" relies on the idea that experience does not play a physical function, and that the problem it poses goes beyond its physical workings. To quote Chalmers himself: Show nested quote +The emergence of experience goes beyond what can be derived from physical theory.
Purely physical explanation is well-suited to the explanation of physical structures, explaining macroscopic structures in terms of detailed microstructural constituents; and it provides a satisfying explanation of the performance of functions, accounting for these functions in terms of the physical mechanisms that perform them. This is because a physical account can entail the facts about structures and functions: once the internal details of the physical account are given, the structural and functional properties fall out as an automatic consequence. But the structure and dynamics of physical processes yield only more structure and dynamics, so structures and functions are all we can expect these processes to explain. The facts about experience cannot be an automatic consequence of any physical account, as it is conceptually coherent that any given process could exist without experience. Experience may arise from the physical, but it is not entailed by the physical. Physicalism will reply to this that, contrary to what Chalmers is saying, "the emergence of experience does not go beyond what can be derived from physical theory".
And you really need to learn to read carefully. The coining of the hard problem is a challenge posed to the physicalist. Chalmers doesn't think this alone implies that the physicalist cannot solve the hard problem. He thinks that for other reasons some of which are stated in the text you masterfully quoted.
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
You go on with:
"Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends on our physical composition."
"Like I said"? Is this a subtle form of backpedaling or why is "entirely" prominently missing in your restatement? Because no property dualist would object to what you wrote there as long as you don't claim to know that there are absolutely no non-physical factors at play (like bridge laws) - and how on earth would you know something like that? Yes, "like I said". I didn't think "entirely" was necessary in the context of what I've been arguing quite clearly. Let me rephrase for your convenience: "Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends entirely, fully, totally, wholly, completely, exclusively, solely, 100% on our physical composition." I would know something like that because that is the default position - there has yet to be discovered anything in the universe that has been shown to depend on something else than the physical for its explanation. Of course, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, so yes, I am perfectly fine with agreeing that there is no evidence that there isn't something supernatural at play in our brains and that it's therefore possible that there is, just like it's possible that the spaghetti monster is out there, or that there are alien monkeys playing a monkey-version of Guitar Hero inside the sun. If you're going to make the claim that there is something non-physical going on, however, the burden of proof lies with you. So now you seem to change your line of argument. You now claim to know that physicalism is true because it is the default position. Hmmm ... I find this somewhat weird. Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that you simply assume physicalism is true here, because it has worked well in the past to explain other phenomena? Not that I think that there is anything wrong with this position, but shouldn't you inform your interlocutor before you make such sweeping "statements of fact"? I'm pretty sure the paragraph you just replied to already covered what you just asked - and I did not change my line of argument.
Well, this was the first time that I saw you refer to the "physicalism is the default position" defense. I understood now that in spite of your confident rhetoric ("fully, totally, 100%") that's all you got. So you are agnostic about physicalism and willing to accept it tentatively since it's explanations worked in the past and you are not convinced phenomenal consciousness poses insurmountable hurdles. This is a perfectly fine, albeit modest stance. You should have told sam and farv about it.
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
The following paragraph seems wholly confused since nobody ever claimed that objects like 'suns' or 'rocks' have phenomenological experiences. Do you think that this was entailed by the argument? You probably missed the part of the thread where sam!zdat asked me if and what it felt like something to be matter. And THAT made you think that sam!zdat believes all collections of matter feel something? Okay... No, that made me reply to what sam!zdat was asking.
... to me of all people... okay, I get it ...
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Anyway, you try to get to the core of phenomenological experience by saying:
"As long as persons A & B don't have the exact same information transmitted to themselves about how they are and aren't conscious in the same way about exactly all or part of that information, then they will not "feel" the same."
Apart from the utter mystery of how you would ever go about demonstrating such a bold claim, it remains the fact that I seem to have rather robust phenomenological experiences even though the "transmitted information" is not "exactly" the same. What does having "robust phenomenological experiences" have to do with the fact that those experiences will not be the same as another person's, which is the entire point of what I was saying? Well, if I can have very similar phenomenal experiences on different information, why could somebody else not have the same phenomenal experience as I do? Isn't the majority of human interaction based on the presupposition that different human beings share similar qualia in similar situations? Different human beings share similar physical structures which are fed similar information (such as various wavelengths of light). Thus we can share similar qualia in similar situations. This does not mean that the experiences will be the exact same, which is what I was explaining in my example.
You were not 'explaining', you were 'asserting'. Do you actually know the difference? Your assertion remains indemonstrable, though.
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Are you talking only about the internal stance here and not about external stimuli? I specifically mentioned information covering both internal and external factors participating in the phenomenological experience. Alas, when I dream I can "experience redness" without seeing and to me it at least seems to be the same "redness" as in the presence of external stimuli. So? How does this go against anything I said?
It could serve to show that I can have the exact same quale on different informational input (at least externally which you again explicitly included). But I guess you still don't want to revise your statement and will say: well, the same person can have the same quale on completely different external stimuli, but two different people could never have the same quale unless external and internal factors are exactly the same... why? because I say so...
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
And how would you control for exactly the same 'information' and 'feeling'? I mean, you surely don't suggest that the 'redness' of red is identical to the electric impulses or chemical transmitters in my synapses, do you? Why would I need to "control" anything? I am explaining to you why the two experiences are different, and it is because of the physical differences between the two. You made a very sweeping general statement (quite the habit), and if you would ever be interested in demonstrating the truth of your claim you would need to be sure that "the exact same information" and "the exact same feeling" could be controlled. Since you are more in the business of "claiming" then "demonstrating" I understand that this doesn't bother you. That is rich coming from the guy who claims it can be assumed that qualia serve no function. I am explaining to you how physicalism answers the matter of qualia, and more generally the question of what it feels like to be oneself, in comparison to what it feels like to be someone else. Again, it's an ontological position - I never argued that you could make an experiment to make it possible for one individual to experience the subjectivity of someone else and compare it to his own.
I am a physicalist, remember? I only relayed a claim non-physicalists often make - but am happy to tell you that I find it difficult to disprove, since I do not see any logical contradiction. I was hoping you could help me out here, but realize now that you got nothing but agnosticism. (why, oh why, didn't you say so, right away?)
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
You then go on to make a surprising (to me at least) admission:
"No need to go this far - we can take the example of the "color red". You would be at a loss to explain to someone who has never experienced seeing the color red what exactly it feels like to see the color red, even if that someone had studied the electromagnetic spectrum. Why is this a problem? I completely covered and answered it when I explained the difference between knowing the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively."
You are sliding on thin ice here as you seem to be dangerously close to conceding the whole argument to the non-physicalist, only to then wave the conclusion away with a sleight of hand. Do you think I can 'know' how it is to see the color red once I've experienced it but not before? If so, you seem to agree that second order phenomenological knowledge/belief requires a completely different process to be obtained than any other piece of knowledge/belief. It would hence be a bit disingenuous to ask: "Why is consciousness special?". This at the very least opens the door to the non-physicalist to propose that as knowledge of qualia cannot be obtained by 'standard epistemological methods' explanations of qualia are prime candidates for requiring "non-standard non-physicalist tools" to be successful. I'm not too sure how you managed to do it, but you somehow completely missed my point about the difference between knowledge about the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively. No, I do not come even remotely close to "conceding the whole argument to the non-physicalist". Why? Because, again, physicalism doesn't make the claim that knowledge about the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively are the same things. This, however, doesn't mean that one requires physical processes and the other doesn't - both consist in information physically reaching the physical components of ourselves that allow us to process the said information. This is virtually true of everything - no single physical "road" to information reaching our brain will be the same in terms of both the processes and the information at play. What do you define as "knowledge of qualia"? If it's knowledge about how qualia arise and are experienced, then this only depends upon learning the physical structures and processes at play. If it's "knowledge" in the sense of us experimenting a qualia (for example the color "red"), then our own physical structures and processes must be put into use in the way that learning about them in the first case would have showed us they have to be. So, again, let's be clear: if the question is "how do qualia arise/come into existence?", the answer lies purely with the physical workings of the brain. If I was able to see the physical explanation of the color red being experimented by someone, and wanted to feel it myself, then it would mean I would have to receive a physical information and have my physical structures & processes work a certain way (the way described earlier). By the way, one of the problems seems to be that you are mistaking physicalism for an epistemological position. It isn't - it's an ontological position. You don't seem to have read a lot of literature on the knowledge argument, otherwise you would understand why it is a big deal (and used to be a hotly debated topic) how knowledge about qualia is obtained. Physicalism can actually mean both: 'all knowledge is physical knowledge' and 'all things are physical'. Notice how you used the argument (2) of "physicalism as the default position" in order to argue for physicalism, which you can only defend on epistemic grounds (so far all our successful explanations make use of physical things). The knowledge argument - if successful - could undercut this. Bolding words is a useful skill toi have, anyways. Apparently another useful skill to have is dodging questions. Again - what do you understand by "knowledge about qualia"? I answered both the aspect of knowledge of the workings and the aspect of experience as knowledge propositions - I await your reply to what I explained. Defending physicalism through an argument pertaining to the state of our knowledge of the universe is not the same as presenting physicalism as an epistemological position, which I haven't done.
No, but now you have related the two positions and if the non-physicalist can bring you to admit that consciousness has a unique epistemic status - which you did - then he can undercut your reliance on the "it has worked well in the past" defense (yeah, but in the past you were dealing with different beasts).
Knowledge of qualia simply means to know what it is like to see 'the redness of red". You would know that if you had ever read any piece on the problem and I would not need to explain all that to you (feel free to thank me anyway ).
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:The worst part comes when you aim to dismantle Chalmers' argument via Wikipedia. Let's take a look: "3. is false if "logically possible" still means "logically possible world working according to physicalism". Why? Because the moment you conceive a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness, you are no longer conceiving that world according to physicalism." This almost leaves me speechless, since it is a logic101 fail. Why on earth should 'logically possible' entail 'logically possible according to physicalism' as long as it is not established that physicalism holds in the first place!? The argument presented here tries to establish a reductio against physicalism, so you cannot insert your conclusion into a premise as long as you haven't established its validity. This is textbook question begging! How can you not see that? I guess given that you assume that the Zombie argument is riddled with problems it's quite a feat to pick out the one thing that is genuinely unproblematic here but whatever ... First, I'd like to point out I edited my post to make it easier to understand quite a while before you replied, so I guess if you didn't see the edit it must have taken you some time to write your reply (or you didn't refresh the page that you had loaded a while ago). Second, you obviously did not get what I meant by "according to physicalism", so I'll explain again why one of the premises is broken. If you take the time to read Chalmers' argument again, you will see that one of the premises is that the world created is a world "in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world". If all of the physical facts are the same, it necessarily means that the world works the same way physically, because this is included in the "physical facts". So, when we move to the third proposition, namely "in fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness", we can quite easily see that is false. Why? Because the moment you conceive a world physically indistinguishable from our world, it must work exactly like our world, unless "the physical facts" that were referred to earlier are no longer the same. So if you decree that there is no consciousness in that conceived world, you are breaking the premise that the physical facts of that world are the same. That is what I was referring to - one of the premises held was that the physical facts would be the same in the world, and it is broken mid-reasoning. I have lot's of other stuff to do, so I sometimes have to write my replies offline in breaks. I apologize, but blame my busy schedule! Your 'correction', however, does not help you to avoid the fallacy I pointed out. It is even still right there in your second attempt to clarify. You claim that "the moment we observe a world physically indistinguishable from our world, it must work exactly like our world, unless "the physical facts" that were referred to earlier are no longer the same". But this is only true if physicalism is true. You don't belive me? Okay: Suppose physicalism were false, would a physically indistinguishable world still need to work exactly the same? If you still don't get why what you are doing is committing a logical fallacy and also don't believe me, then please ask an authority of your trust...or take some introductory class in logic. I'm beginning to wonder if you've actually read the enunciation of the philosophical zombie argument I referred to, because your gripes are with the logical fallacy of the argument and not with my pointing it out. The entire foundation of the argument is that Chalmers is imagining a world in which all of the physical facts are the same as in our world. This is not me inserting physicalism into Chalmers' conception, it is Chalmers declaring how the world he is imagining is. By "physical facts", he is including the physical workings, which are physical facts. He did not simply say "physical elements" because that's the entire point of his argument - he is trying to disprove physicalism. And adding later a proposition in which the physical workings stop being the same as in our world (there is no consciousness) necessarily means that the physical facts are no longer the same, and thus a different result (there being no consciousness) no longer disproves physicalism, and thus a different result (there being no consciousness) no longer disproves physicalism. Here, I'll help you with your own example. Let's say that Chalmers was imagining a world in which the physical elements were the same as in ours, but with different workings (due to the existence of non-physical causes, thus contrary to physicalism). You could, in this world, have p-zombies. Would this disprove physicalism? No, because there were non-physical causes involved. So, if you go back to the original argument, as long as you have only physical workings involved, you cannot have a philosophical zombie. And the moment you add something which is non-physical, you are no longer disproving physicalism (I bolded it to help, since you seem to be receptive to bolding).
This is turning out quite hilariously. Chalmers asks us to imagine a world where all the physical facts are the same all the while being silent about any non-physical fact.
Your claim that:
"And adding later a proposition in which the physical workings stop being the same as in our world (there is no consciousness) necessarily means that the physical facts are no longer the same... " is STILL begging the question, since it would only be the case iff phenomenal conscience were physical - which Chalmers is explicitly denying! You'd make a great example of repeating the same informal fallacy in different ways. Your reference to "physical workings" does not add anything of substance either since, according to Chalmers, phenomenal conscience is no "physical working".
The Zombie argument is designed to attack the logical necessity of physicalism. So the moment you grant that there are two possible worlds in which the physical facts are the same but in one world phenomenal consciousness exists and in the other one not irrespective of any non-physical facts - as you seem to do later on - you concede the argument to Chalmers -aka you're doing it wrong. There might still be some options to rescue physicalism but they are rather technical and some quite esoteric at that stage (i.e., eliminativism). You would know all this of course, if you had ever bothered to read any of the professional literature.
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Finally you state that the claim that there exist purely phenomenal experiences ('feeling like-ness') that are unnecessary for function or behavior is...
"... based on nothing, except faith/belief (in addition to "feeling like" being poorly defined)."
This strikes me as clearly untrue. That's too bad, because it is true. What is asserted without argument can be dismissed without argument, I guess ... Indeed - you have yet to substantiate the claim that experiences have no functional basis
But I have instead made small progress in showing that functions don't require phenomenal experiences, which is all I'd need to show for the statement being true. By the way, you never gave me credit for that, I wonder why that is...
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
The robots we develop are already able to show a remarkable variety of functional and behavioral traits, without having phenomenological experiences at all (or do you think they have them?). The robots we develop do not display the same functional/behavioral traits as we do. They are not constituted as we are. And you still have not supported the claim that phenomenological experimenting is non-functional. Well, it establishes that the execution of some functions do not require phenomenal experience. Don't you agree? It doesn't even count as any support for the claim? Why not? Indeed, the execution of some functions do not require phenomenal experience. Has this been ever contested? What is the relevance of this fact with regards to the claim you're making that phenomenal experience is not functional?
Precision is your friend... The non-physicalist claims that phenomenal experiences exist that are not necessary for executing functions and behavior. You called this a baseless assertion. Do you see now how modest the claim actually is? Do you want to reassess your evaluation?
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
As an aside, you sometimes write "experimenting". Is that a typo or do you mean something particular? Yeah, I meant "experiencing". Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Given this evidence I don't find it prima facie absurd that a very advanced robot could show a functional variety in the ballpark of higher animals or even humans without the phenomenological 'baggage'. I frankly do not care that you don't "don't find it absurd" - you're missing the point and I never said physicalism was intuitive. The point is that qualia, and consciousness more broadly, are there, and are there as they are, purely because of the physical workings of our bodies. As long as robots do not have physical structures and processes that precisely mimic what we have, they will of course not have similar consciousness and experiment qualia as we do. So, do you find the above mentioned notion absurd, because I care? Protip: If you don't, you might get into trouble ... So far, I have yet to hear any substance behind your claim other than "I don't find it absurd" or "it seems likely". When you are ready to actually address what I said and substantiate your claim, feel free to let me know.
So you just don't want to share your opinion here? Not that much interested in an exchange of ideas after all, eh?
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Furthermore we have examples of humans who lose a class of phenomenological experiences while at least maintaining some functional/behavioral awareness (e.g., blindsight). And notice that I am even providing you with some (albeit limited) examples from this world What is the relevance of what you just said? The awareness you are referring to is still entirely explained by the physical workings of the body. Those physical structures/processes which have been affected and have led to the loss of a class of phenomenological experiences have not impaired the physical structures/processes which lead to the aforementioned awareness. It shows that some visual functions can be reliably executed without accompanying phenomenal experience. Do you still not see the relevance? Actually, that's not what your example showed, because maintaining some form of residual awareness can still be experienced, albeit in a different way than the initial, full awareness - something that is entirely consistent with my position. Now, with regards to what you just said, namely that "visual functions can be reliably executed without accompanying phenomenal experience", it still does not support your claim in any way. Why would visual functions existing without phenomenal experience mean that phenomenal experience does not play a function? This is akin to me declaring that because my arms are working, I can assert that blood flowing to my stomach does not play a function.
Well, if you would agree that the phenomenal experiences that accompany vision, for instance, were not performing any function related to vision, then the non-physicalist might be entitled to shift the burden of proof, since she could reasonably claim that the execution of any other function remains dubious. Anybody can play the total sceptic and say: "Well, but there could always be a hidden function that just can't be understood..." To have warrant for her belief the non-physicalist is not obliged to completely refute physicalism, just to show it's 'implausibility' after all.
You might want to take a second look at blindsight by the way, since here the patients really have no quale (that they could report) when they 'see' things even though they retain some form of visual awareness.
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
whereas Chalmers argument works if you grant that phenomenal experience can be stripped from the functional in some logically possible world. Where is the obvious contradiction here? See above for Chalmers' argument. See above indeed! Quite so. Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
In my opinion you are really overselling the case for physicalism, maybe because you have never really engaged with the case of the opposition (outside of Wikipedia), but dismissed their arguments out of hand. I'm not, I have, and I didn't. Well, you have presented two arguments, as far as I can see. 1) You think that phenomenal experience is also functional, i.e. doesn't exist as defined, without giving any support other than - it just is the case since physicalism says so. I don't know if you're doing this on purpose, but if you are this is intellectual dishonesty at its best. I am not the one making the claim. Chalmers and you are claiming that phenomenal experience is not functional. The burden of proof lies with you.
I am a physicalist so I disagree with Chalmers, remember (really precision is your friend). I was dragged by you in this dialectical exercise, since your way of arguing for physicalism is - for the most part - a combination of overconfident rhetoric and question begging, which pains me. I now see that you are an agnostic about physicalism - which is fine - who just thinks it's a good idea not to separate 'statements of fact' from 'assumption' and 'assertion' from 'explanation' because ... ... well, frankly I don't know ... maybe, you think it weakens your position.
This makes talking to you quite tedious not only for non-physicalists, but also for physicalists like me.
I realize you might have the same or a similar impression about me, so I guess we might need to let any reader decide...
I am now off to a conference for the next week and still need to prepare my talk, so I am afraid I will not be able to answer for some time. We seem to be turning in circles by now anyway, so it might be a good time to say farewell anyway. Before I generously offer you the last word, let me tell you I enjoyed the exchange!
Cheers!
On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
2) You claim physicalism is the default position, since it has worked in the past to explain a wide range of phenomena.
I see merit in both lines of argument, but so far you haven't substantiated (1) at all, whereas (2) would only allow you very modest inferences in light of the unique epistemic character of qualia, which you seem to acknowledge. For (1) refer to the above, and for (2), as I explained, both types of knowledge about qualia are entirely consistent with physicalism. Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
If you work on those two, I am sure however, that your future exchanges with non-physicalists will turn out to be much more fruitful! Thanks for the discussion!
If you work on substantiating your claims, I'm sure your future exchanges with anyone will turn out to be much more fruitful ,-) Thanks to you too.
<sigh...>
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On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:
First would you mind using actual quote tags? It makes replying to you easier, since it gives the context of what's being discussed and allows for not having to go back to the previous post each time.
I'll try, but will make no promises There, much better ,-) On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On September 03 2013 03:07 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On September 01 2013 03:57 kwizach wrote:Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
In my view the main problem that plagues discussions about the "hard problem" of consciousness is that it is so difficult for all participants to "shelter" it from any discussion about functionality. This goes to a point that I am not even sure whether Sam and farvacola are actually defending the "original" hard problem as championed by Chalmers or some variant of hybrid.
In the original problem it was argued that: yes, progress on a functional understanding of consciousness has been made, i.e. we have learned a good deal about how the brain is structured and how signals are processed, but irrespective of any progress there this does not - and could never - further our understanding about the non-functional aspects of consciousness, the "like-ness" of a conscious experience aka the qualia. But it does further it, precisely because the "likeness" of a conscious experience depends entirely upon the physical elements in and outside of the body. This, however, does not mean that it will lead us to be able to subjectively experience the world from other points of view than our own (at least exactly like other "points of experience" than our own, I don't mean only certain aspects of it, such as seeings like dogs see etc.) Well, actually, one could hypothetically imagine a time when technology would allow us to completely transform our physical selves into, for example, chimpanzees, then turning ourselves back human - this would have led "us" (it depends also on how you define "your self") to experience the world from a chimpanzees' point of view, but would not leave us with a memory of it (unless we manage to create technology that somehow allows us to do so, possibly by modifying our own brains). Regardless, all of this doesn't bring anything new to the table. Understanding how the universe works and experimenting our presence in the universe are two different things. We know about the speed of light in space, yet we cannot experience going ourselves as fast as light in space (I don't mean through wormholes, obviously :p). We know what our sun is made of, and why it "burns" like it does, yet we can't experience being in the center of the sun - or being the sun itself. So what? This is true of absolutely every bit of knowledge - understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something, although one can help with the other. Why does it suddenly pose such a problem when it comes to the brain? And again, who knows, maybe future technology will allow us to experience other "subjectivities". Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
The claim goes that it were metaphysically or at least logically possible that we would be some form of intelligent automaton (or p-zombie) that would show exactly the same functional behavior, we could think and deliberate, but it would not be anything "like" being us (we would have no quale when feeling pain, but nonetheless show the very same external reaction). The philosophical zombie argument is so flawed with regards to its attempt at "disproving" physicalism that I'm genuinely surprised some people are still using it to do just that. If we imagine a "zombie" that is physically identical to us in every way, then that zombie will be as conscious as we are, precisely because it is being physically as we are which gives us consciousness. Show nested quote +On August 31 2013 15:14 MiraMax wrote:
It is in this latter non-functional sense of consciousness that pointing to emergent phenomena seems somewhat like question begging since we do not seem to have any other example in the natural world of such subjective status. And it is in this way - or so the claim goes - that consciousness really is special or mysterious or fundamentally different from mere signal processing or computing. There are other examples of subjective status (as in, self-awareness) among animals, to various degrees. This pretty much points again to brain development & composition being the relevant variable with regards to the existence (and the "level") of consciousness. Please let's take some time to look at what you replied. Maybe we'll find out why you don't seem to connect to farv and sam. For instance you say: "But it does further it, precisely because the "likeness" of a conscious experience depends entirely upon the physical elements in and outside of the body." In my book you would need to qualify this statement with "... if physicalism is true." But then this is exactly what is under contention. How on earth do you think this could sway anybody who is not already dedicated to your position? To them it must seem like question begging. The argument that was being made here was that physicalism couldn't be reconciled with phenomenological experiences. Obviously, if someone holds the position that physicalism is not true, you're right that this person will (or is likely to) simply dismiss as not true my statement that knowledge about the physical structures and processes in the brain can further our understanding of consciousness. It is however different to assert that even though consciousness is physical, as is everything else, we cannot reach further understanding of consciousness through scientific inquiry on the physical. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Heck, I would describe myself as a physicalist and to me it sure looks like question begging. The 'like-ness' (quale) of an experience is not a physical state, even though it might have a neurophysiological correlate. While it might be clear how the neurophysiological correlate is influenced by the "physical elements in and outside of the body", it is not at all obvious how the neurophysiological correlate gives rise to the sensation of "like-ness" in the first place. This is Chalmers' hard problem and you have not addressed it as far as I can see. This, Chalmer's hard problem, is an illusion - as in, it only exists if you have an a-priori belief about consciousness being detached from the physical structures and processes (or if you don't have that belief but simply don't understand what it means to link the two). Knowing how the said physical structures and processes give rise to the sensation of "like-ness" is purely a matter of having enough knowledge about the said physical structures and processes. Us not having yet a complete answer to this (or even if we could never have the answer) doesn't change that. Note again that I am not here talking about experiencing "like-ness", but understanding how "like-ness" works. The distinction is essential. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
You further argue that we cannot experience "traveling at the speed of light" or "being in the center of the sun", but why is that? Because of physical limitations or because it simply "is not like anything to experience traveling at the speed of light or being in the center of the sun"? What if our physical makeup or our laws of physics were different? Would your answer change? Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends on our physical composition. Photons do not have a physical composition that would lead them to "feel" anything, if we go by the common understanding of "to feel". My example of being at the center of the sun wasn't the best since you could argue that we could find a way to go there even if it is to die instantly, but the sun itself is another example of an object that doesn't "feel" because it's physical composition does not allow it to feel anything. If you or others have a different definition of what it means to "feel", then by all means, present it to us and we'll discuss it. For example, if you define "to feel" as "to exist", then yes, everything that exists also feels, by definition. That's not how the word is understood, however. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
You then say:
"This is true of absolutely every bit of knowledge - understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something."
Yes, but even if this is so, the question remains why this should be case? Why do we have the strong intuition that irrespective of how many explanations from limitless perspectives we hear, they do not and cannot tell us fully how it is to experience a phenomenon? This is the case because to feel something is to have our internal composition be a certain way, transmitting to itself information about how it is (including in relation to its environment) and, as the common understanding of the word goes, being conscious of all or part of the information that has been transmitted and interpreted. As long as persons A & B don't have the exact same information transmitted to themselves about how they are and aren't conscious in the same way about exactly all or part of that information, then they will not "feel" the same. The answer to "why is it so" that understanding how something works is not the same as subjectively experimenting something is therefore that our physical composition has access to and transmits to itself consciously information about the two in two different ways. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
This is directly relevant to discussing brains because the very existence of (something like) a brain seems to bring the hard problem into existence. Like I said, it only brings the hard problem into existence if you have an a-priori belief (even if you're not aware of it) of a consciousness existing detached from the physical processes and structures. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Imagine you meet an alien from another dimension where gravity does not exist. I have a strong intuition that I could explain to her how gravity works nonetheless. However, if she were to tell me that, to her, experiencing something never really felt like anything in particular, I would be at a loss on how to explain to her how the effects gravity has on my body "feel like" to me. This part of subjective experience seems ineffable and fundamental. Do you share this intuition? Why is that so? Can you see now why others wrote that you are only rephrasing the 'hard problem' not trying to answer it? No need to go this far - we can take the example of the "color red". You would be at a loss to explain to someone who has never experienced seeing the color red what exactly it feels like to see the color red, even if that someone had studied the electromagnetic spectrum. Why is this a problem? I completely covered and answered it when I explained the difference between knowing the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Your argument against p-zombies needs some more clarification. Do you merely hold that p-zombies are physically impossible? Chalmers would agree with you but claim that merely conceivability is required. Do you think p-zombies are inconceivable? Well, others think they can conceive of them. What mistake are they making? Is there a way to point it out to them without assuming that physicalism is true from the get-go? Like I said, the problem of the philosophical zombie is not the act of conceiving a philosophical zombie itself, it is the assertion that the philosophical zombie argument logically disproves physicalism. Let's look at why this assertion is false by looking the logical reasoning behind it (taken from wikipedia): Show nested quote +1. According to physicalism, all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical.
2. Thus, if physicalism is true, a logically possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular, conscious experience must exist in such a possible world.
3. In fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this (so Chalmers argues) it follows that such a world is logically possible.
4. Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows from 2. and 3. by modus tollens.) 1. is true. 2. is true, but after "must contain everything that exists in our actual world" one could add "and must work exactly like our actual world". 3. is false. Why? Because the moment you conceive a world physically indistinguishable from our world, it must work exactly like our world according to physicalism. So if you decree that there is no consciousness in that conceived world, you are either breaking the premise that it is physically indistinguishable from our world or adding something that would make the two physically indistinguishable worlds work differently, thus breaking the physicalist premise. 4. is therefore not a conclusion that disproves physicalism in any way, since the premises have been broken mid-way. Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
Finally, when you talk about self-awareness it mixes again the functional aspects of consciousness with he supposed non-functional aspects. Being self-aware, as in being able to recognize oneself and realize facts about ones position in the world with respect to others, has clear consequences in the world. The claim is that you could have all that functional awareness without feeling that "it is like something" to be you. That claim is based on nothing, except faith/belief (in addition to "feeling like" being poorly defined). Show nested quote +On September 02 2013 17:55 MiraMax wrote:
The bottom line is that I share your general view on the world, but others do not. In order to communicate effectively to them you need to understand where their positions differ and address 'that'. I already pointed out where the positions differed: it is on the conception, or understanding, of the link between the physical components and consciousness. The problem is that some people do not recognize the implications of holding the position that consciousness only comes from the specific workings of the physical. So some of them will acknowledge that it does, then make assertions that they do not realize contradict that position. Cheers ,-) I appreciate your response, even though it feels somewhat funny to 'defend' the non-physicalist position to me. But for the sake of removing bad arguments from the discussion and clearing up the actual points of contention here it goes anyway: Throughout your whole post you simply refer to 'consciousness' without giving he slightest indication that you understood that the hard problem only relates to phenomenal experience, not functional nor behavioral types of awareness, so in the following I will simply assume that you equate 'consciousness' with 'experiencing qualia'/'having phenomenological experiences'. Please note, if you have a broader definition of consciousness at play here, then you are consistently missing the point anyway. Throughout my whole post I reply to the arguments being made. Chalmers' separation of phenomenal experience from the "rest" of consciousness participates in the illusion that I mentioned with regards to his formulation of the hard problem. So, thanks, but no, I'm not "missing the point". See below. So, let's call that your argument (1) you claim phenomenal experience as defined does not exist, correct? Uh what? Where did I make that claim and where did you define "phenomenal experience"? Where did I define phenomenal experience?! Did you miss that part where I entered the thread starting out with stressing the importance of understanding that the non-physicalist only discusses the phenomenal part of conscience that's devoid of function? Seriously? No wonder we are not making progress... Better watch out next time! :p
So you recognize I did not make that claim - and saying that "phenomenal experience" is "the phenomenal part of conscience that's devoid of function" hardly qualifies as an actual definition considering you're taking for granted something that is part of your argument yet is not substantiated in any way, namely that "it" would be "devoid of function". So in the case that it is not devoid of function, you would no longer be referring to anything. That's why it's much better to refer to phenomenological experience and qualia by painting them as representations that we have without trying to add any claim about their lack of functionality.
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
Would you see yourself rather as a deflationist or strict eliminitivist on that matter? What is your prime argument for the claim that they can't be seperated? I did not say that they couldn't be separated - analytically, you can reflect on the two separately. I said that the way Chalmers is separating the two by taking for granted that phenomenal experience does not play a functional role participates in the illusion I mentioned with regards to his hard problem. On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
You write:
"The argument that was being made here was that physicalism couldn't be reconciled with phenomenological experiences."
This is simply not true. No, this is true - "here" refers to the discussion that was going on in this thread. Since you wrote the sentence "How on earth do you think this could sway anybody who is not already dedicated to your position? To them it must seem like question begging.", and we were in the context of a discussion where someone was not being swayed and argued that our replies were question begging, I was pointing out that the argument being made in this thread went beyond simply having two different views about the world and questioned whether the opposing view was internally consistent. Silly me, and here I thought you were replying to me!? I was replying to you referring to other people. Maybe you can try a bit harder to reply to what I say, though! Deal?
I did reply to what you said, considering you were referring to other people. Maybe you can try a bit harder to pay attention to what you're saying - deal?
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
But we are on the same page now that the hard problem does not try or claim to rule out physicalism, right? So then we are making slow progress. The "hard problem" is about claiming that there is a "hard problem" in explaining why there is a subjective component to experience. The implication is that this subjective component cannot be explained through a physicalist world view. It is an illusion. Precision is your friend in debates! You can acknowledge that there is a hard problem without conceding physicalism. That was my whole point and I am optimistic that you got it now!
Of course I can. And I can also look at the relation between the hard problem and claims about physicalism, including from Chalmers himself. One does not exclude the other. Like you said, precision is your friend!
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
How on earth do you think this could sway anybody who is not already dedicated to your position? To them it must seem like question begging.
You answered to the part of my post where I was explaining the hard problem of consciousness. It doesn't follow at all from the hard problem that qualia are irreconcilable with physicalism (there are other arguments for that) only that this is a problem that physicalists will have to deal with. You need to be way more precise in your responses otherwise you start out by missing the point - which is a bad way to start. I was very precise, and you apparently missed the context of this exchange. Thanks for setting me straight. That'll teach me! Always a pleasure! On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Then you say:
"This, Chalmer's hard problem, is an illusion - as in, it only exists if you have an a-priori belief about consciousness being detached from the physical structures and processes (or if you don't have that belief but simply don't understand what it means to link the two)."
You only got it right in the brackets. The claim is not at all that qualia are completely detached from the physical structures, but on the contrary that they are somehow linked - but on a physicalist view it is hard to account for how this could be the case, unless consciousness were a fundamental physical property (which only few physicalists -the crazy ones- believe). Qualia seem further not logically necessary for any causal/functional/behavioral theory , so why is it that in this world experiences are (always?) accompanied by qualia? No, I got it right in the entire sentence. I never said that the claim was that qualia were "completely detached from the physical structures". I said that thinking that there is a hard problem presupposes either that, even unconsciously/without fully acknowledging it, one does believe (as a kind of "gut feeling", perhaps) that qualia and the physical structures and processes are still somehow detached, or that one believes that they are not detached but doesn't understand what it means to link the two physically. You mention that "on a physicalist view it is hard to account for how this could be the case". Why? Why even say that qualia "seem further not logically necessary for any causal/functional/behavioral theory"? That's a claim which comes out of thin air. What tells you that our brain, and our entire body, would operate the same without qualia? Physicalism precisely holds that our body works the way it works because of how it is physically, period - this includes qualia. If you're going to make the claim that qualia have "no function", then the burden of proof lies with you. That's why I mentioned at the start that the separation Chalmers makes between qualia and the "rest" of consciousness participates in his illusion of a hard problem - there is nothing that suggests qualia is any different from the rest of consciousness in its playing a role in the functional workings of our body, except that it's perhaps counter-intuitive, which is not an excuse for having no basis to substantiate a claim that it doesn't play a functional role. Actually you still got it wrong. Thinking that there is a Chalmerian 'hard problem' requires that qualia are somehow attached to neurophysiological correlates. No, you did. You can very well believe that there is a hard problem if you think that qualia are something that go beyond simple physical correlates. Qualia are defined as 'going beyond' the physical correlates, since a third person can look at the physical correlates, but not at any induced quale. That you think you can confidently contribute to a debate without even knowing the basic definitions , should show you that we still have a long road to walk. Now please don't turn around yet again to claim that what you really meant was 'completely detached'.
You have a tendency to build an incorrect representation of my words and then gloat about what you identified as a fallacy in the construction you've just made yourself. The physical aspects I mentioned were clearly not referring to the physical properties of the "object" as opposed to our experience of the object. They were referring to the entire process. My point, since the beginning, is that some people can very well believe in the hard problem while being of the opinion that there is something "else", non physical, at play - thus "detaching" consciousness from being purely the result of physical processes without actually detaching it from its physical processes. I'm beginning to wonder if you're actually interested in addressing my arguments or simply in attempting to prove me wrong, considering the time you spent gloating about what you thought was a comprehension failure from my part (about 2/3rds of your reply) could have been spent thinking about what I had been saying from the start.
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
Now, you start to argue about qualia as if you think they do exist, which would somehwat contradict your argument (1). You made up argument (1) and attributed it to me. Qualia at the very least exist as the representations that we have of our experience. They may well be inherent to consciousness - I haven't made any claim in that regards. Qualia are representations, but they are special representations since they seem to be only accessible by the subject. It seemed to me that you were arguing repeatedly that they are not merely phenomenal but functional "just like the rest of consciousness" (which would mean they don't exist as defined by the non-physicalist). This is a valid point of attack which many physicalists have chosen. You now inform me that is not what you aimed to do, so I happily retract the statement.
I'm glad to see you recognize what I've been saying.
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
So I take it here that you mean that something like qualia exist, but they are always functional. Did I get it right? What is the function of experiencing the 'redness' of red instead of just visually registering red and reactig on it? No, you didn't get it right. You transformed me telling you that the claim that qualia have no functional utility has to be substantiated before it can be taken as true into me claiming that qualia have a functional role. I'm not making any claims here. I'm disputing that it can be taken for granted that qualia "play no functional role". That's a perfectly fine stance to take. But you can't seem to name a function nor do you see a logical contradiction here, correct? That leaves you with agnosticism with respect to the existence of qualia (as defined by the non-physicalist) which is unproblematic and shifts the burden of proof. Fine! But just another tip: if you don't want to make unsubstantiated claims about qualia don't say things such as: "Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends entirely, fully, totally, wholly, completely, exclusively, solely, 100% on our physical composition." Just say: "It could be the case that..."
Again, I already covered this in my paragraph about seeing physicalism as the default position yet agreeing that "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, so yes, I am perfectly fine with agreeing that there is no evidence that there isn't something supernatural at play in our brains and that it's therefore possible that there is, just like it's possible that the spaghetti monster is out there, or that there are alien monkeys playing a monkey-version of Guitar Hero inside the sun".
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Your following paragraph...:
"Knowing how the said physical structures and processes give rise to the sensation of "like-ness" is purely a matter of having enough knowledge about the said physical structures and processes. Us not having yet a complete answer to this (or even if we could never have the answer) doesn't change that."
... is simply wishful thinking to rescue your position. Surely, you should be willing to admit that if we could never have an answer to the question of how qualia are generated, then Chalmers' 'hard problem' really should be considered 'hard'. Now where is the illusion in that, eh? How is that wishful thinking in any way, shape or form? There are plenty of things that we will not have a complete answer for in our lifetimes, or perhaps ever, but that doesn't mean at all that they pose a problem to, or contradict, physicalism. And I never even said that we would never have an answer to how qualia exist, I said "even if we couldn't". Really, not at all? Not even a tiny little bit? Not the slightest problem? Why would it be the case? If you have an argument to make, then make it. So if Bob says: "Hear, hear people! My world view claims that gravity doesn't exist. It's too mysterious to be true!" And Alice objects: "Well, how do you explain that objects fall to he ground?". But Bob retorts confidently: "There will always be things that our worldview will not be able to explain! Why not just settle that this can't be explained?" Then you don't see how this could be even slightly problematic for Bob? You need to have this argument spelled out for you? Unexplainable phenomena in the world are the prime candidates for forcing us to update our core beliefs. Sure the existence of an as of yet unexplained phenomenon doesn't mean that it will never be explained or that a central belief really is wrong. But to go on to say even if a phenomenon really is unexplainable, we are allowed to label it a 'hard problem', is ... errrr ... disingenuous.
I think you meant to write "aren't allowed".
If you want to call everything we have yet to explain about the universe "hard problems", go right ahead, but then the term would be meaningless. There isn't anything special about phenomenological experience with regards to other problems we have yet to solve (for example: the rise of consciousness it its entirety), except perhaps if you take for granted the assumption that there is something non-functional about it (and even then, something non-functional may very well be explained fully by its components and their effects together). And again, nothing supports taking it for granted.
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
Note again that you falsely equated the "mere existence of a hard problem" with a contradiction of physicalism here. And just when I thought we were making progress... You really do need to learn to take things into context. Physicalism argues that everything is physical. The "hard problem" relies on the idea that experience does not play a physical function, and that the problem it poses goes beyond its physical workings. To quote Chalmers himself: The emergence of experience goes beyond what can be derived from physical theory.
Purely physical explanation is well-suited to the explanation of physical structures, explaining macroscopic structures in terms of detailed microstructural constituents; and it provides a satisfying explanation of the performance of functions, accounting for these functions in terms of the physical mechanisms that perform them. This is because a physical account can entail the facts about structures and functions: once the internal details of the physical account are given, the structural and functional properties fall out as an automatic consequence. But the structure and dynamics of physical processes yield only more structure and dynamics, so structures and functions are all we can expect these processes to explain. The facts about experience cannot be an automatic consequence of any physical account, as it is conceptually coherent that any given process could exist without experience. Experience may arise from the physical, but it is not entailed by the physical. Physicalism will reply to this that, contrary to what Chalmers is saying, "the emergence of experience does not go beyond what can be derived from physical theory". And you really need to learn to read carefully. The coining of the hard problem is a challenge posed to the physicalist. Chalmers doesn't think this alone implies that the physicalist cannot solve the hard problem. He thinks that for other reasons some of which are stated in the text you masterfully quoted.
You may want to go read the original article if you're incapable of understanding the context of his argument, but Chalmers is very clearly explaining here the reasoning behind him thinking that there is a hard problem. This is not him saying "There is a hard problem. Moving on, here are others thoughts I have". It's him detailing his reasoning behind the hard problem, and physicalism would take issue with some aspects of that reasoning. "Learn to read intelligently", I guess?
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
You go on with:
"Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends on our physical composition."
"Like I said"? Is this a subtle form of backpedaling or why is "entirely" prominently missing in your restatement? Because no property dualist would object to what you wrote there as long as you don't claim to know that there are absolutely no non-physical factors at play (like bridge laws) - and how on earth would you know something like that? Yes, "like I said". I didn't think "entirely" was necessary in the context of what I've been arguing quite clearly. Let me rephrase for your convenience: "Like I said, us experiencing our relation to our environment and ourselves depends entirely, fully, totally, wholly, completely, exclusively, solely, 100% on our physical composition." I would know something like that because that is the default position - there has yet to be discovered anything in the universe that has been shown to depend on something else than the physical for its explanation. Of course, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, so yes, I am perfectly fine with agreeing that there is no evidence that there isn't something supernatural at play in our brains and that it's therefore possible that there is, just like it's possible that the spaghetti monster is out there, or that there are alien monkeys playing a monkey-version of Guitar Hero inside the sun. If you're going to make the claim that there is something non-physical going on, however, the burden of proof lies with you. So now you seem to change your line of argument. You now claim to know that physicalism is true because it is the default position. Hmmm ... I find this somewhat weird. Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that you simply assume physicalism is true here, because it has worked well in the past to explain other phenomena? Not that I think that there is anything wrong with this position, but shouldn't you inform your interlocutor before you make such sweeping "statements of fact"? I'm pretty sure the paragraph you just replied to already covered what you just asked - and I did not change my line of argument. Well, this was the first time that I saw you refer to the "physicalism is the default position" defense. I understood now that in spite of your confident rhetoric ("fully, totally, 100%") that's all you got. So you are agnostic about physicalism and willing to accept it tentatively since it's explanations worked in the past and you are not convinced phenomenal consciousness poses insurmountable hurdles. This is a perfectly fine, albeit modest stance. You should have told sam and farv about it.
Please do not try to equate you feeling the need to justify your previous questions about my position with me not having been abundantly clear about my position in the first place. Your statement "that's all you got" is pretty funny too - what else is there to "have"? Like I said, it is possible that there are non-physical elements at play, just like it's possible the spaghetti monster exists. Given how unlikely it is, however, I can assert confidently that there is no involvement of non-physical elements. I'd like to point out that this attitude is perfectly consistent with how everyone, including you, lives his life. It is entirely possible that, at any point, with the next step we take our foot is going to land on a small invisible magic portal that will send us to another world populated only by giant spiders. But I'm pretty sure you're confident enough that this won't be the case to still walk normally without even thinking about it.
Also, I'd like to point out that sam!zdat explicitly said he accepted physicalism, and I'm pretty sure he understood my position just fine. By the way, this was another example of you mentioning the other posters in this thread, so I hope you won't get super-confused about me mentioning sam as well.
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
The following paragraph seems wholly confused since nobody ever claimed that objects like 'suns' or 'rocks' have phenomenological experiences. Do you think that this was entailed by the argument? You probably missed the part of the thread where sam!zdat asked me if and what it felt like something to be matter. And THAT made you think that sam!zdat believes all collections of matter feel something? Okay... No, that made me reply to what sam!zdat was asking. ... to me of all people... okay, I get it ...
Again, the very reason you replied was to address the reasons behind the "disconnect between Sam, Farv, DoubleReed and kvizach". I included in the general argument I was making in my reply to you examples that addressed sam!zdat's question as well, without detracting in any way from what I was saying to you. Exactly what is supposed to be the problem here?
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Anyway, you try to get to the core of phenomenological experience by saying:
"As long as persons A & B don't have the exact same information transmitted to themselves about how they are and aren't conscious in the same way about exactly all or part of that information, then they will not "feel" the same."
Apart from the utter mystery of how you would ever go about demonstrating such a bold claim, it remains the fact that I seem to have rather robust phenomenological experiences even though the "transmitted information" is not "exactly" the same. What does having "robust phenomenological experiences" have to do with the fact that those experiences will not be the same as another person's, which is the entire point of what I was saying? Well, if I can have very similar phenomenal experiences on different information, why could somebody else not have the same phenomenal experience as I do? Isn't the majority of human interaction based on the presupposition that different human beings share similar qualia in similar situations? Different human beings share similar physical structures which are fed similar information (such as various wavelengths of light). Thus we can share similar qualia in similar situations. This does not mean that the experiences will be the exact same, which is what I was explaining in my example. You were not 'explaining', you were 'asserting'. Do you actually know the difference? Your assertion remains indemonstrable, though.
I was explaining, since I was explaining how physicalism (and I) view the matter of "feeling like". Do you actually pay attention to what you're replying to, or are you only interested in scoring cheap rhetorical points (which you happen to be failing to do)?
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Are you talking only about the internal stance here and not about external stimuli? I specifically mentioned information covering both internal and external factors participating in the phenomenological experience. Alas, when I dream I can "experience redness" without seeing and to me it at least seems to be the same "redness" as in the presence of external stimuli. So? How does this go against anything I said? It could serve to show that I can have the exact same quale on different informational input (at least externally which you again explicitly included). But I guess you still don't want to revise your statement and will say: well, the same person can have the same quale on completely different external stimuli, but two different people could never have the same quale unless external and internal factors are exactly the same... why? because I say so...
You are claiming that they are "exactly the same quale". You would need to substantiate that claim - perhaps there is still a difference that you are forgetting/glossing over in your thought experiment. Beyond this, I explained thoroughly the reasoning behind the idea that you can hardly "feel like" someone else - the physical structures, processes and information that make one "feel like" something would have to be the exact same. Perhaps, as I said to you in my first reply, technology will one day allow us to experience other subjectivities.
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
And how would you control for exactly the same 'information' and 'feeling'? I mean, you surely don't suggest that the 'redness' of red is identical to the electric impulses or chemical transmitters in my synapses, do you? Why would I need to "control" anything? I am explaining to you why the two experiences are different, and it is because of the physical differences between the two. You made a very sweeping general statement (quite the habit), and if you would ever be interested in demonstrating the truth of your claim you would need to be sure that "the exact same information" and "the exact same feeling" could be controlled. Since you are more in the business of "claiming" then "demonstrating" I understand that this doesn't bother you. That is rich coming from the guy who claims it can be assumed that qualia serve no function. I am explaining to you how physicalism answers the matter of qualia, and more generally the question of what it feels like to be oneself, in comparison to what it feels like to be someone else. Again, it's an ontological position - I never argued that you could make an experiment to make it possible for one individual to experience the subjectivity of someone else and compare it to his own. I am a physicalist, remember? I only relayed a claim non-physicalists often make - but am happy to tell you that I find it difficult to disprove, since I do not see any logical contradiction. I was hoping you could help me out here, but realize now that you got nothing but agnosticism. (why, oh why, didn't you say so, right away?)
Again, there is no need to "disprove" a claim that isn't substantiated in any way. The burden of proof lies with the one making the claim. With regards to me having "nothing but", refer to what I said above. With regards to the contents of your parenthesis, I'll repeat my invitation to stop childishly trying to score rhetorical points - I've been clear from the start with regards to my position.
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
You then go on to make a surprising (to me at least) admission:
"No need to go this far - we can take the example of the "color red". You would be at a loss to explain to someone who has never experienced seeing the color red what exactly it feels like to see the color red, even if that someone had studied the electromagnetic spectrum. Why is this a problem? I completely covered and answered it when I explained the difference between knowing the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively."
You are sliding on thin ice here as you seem to be dangerously close to conceding the whole argument to the non-physicalist, only to then wave the conclusion away with a sleight of hand. Do you think I can 'know' how it is to see the color red once I've experienced it but not before? If so, you seem to agree that second order phenomenological knowledge/belief requires a completely different process to be obtained than any other piece of knowledge/belief. It would hence be a bit disingenuous to ask: "Why is consciousness special?". This at the very least opens the door to the non-physicalist to propose that as knowledge of qualia cannot be obtained by 'standard epistemological methods' explanations of qualia are prime candidates for requiring "non-standard non-physicalist tools" to be successful. I'm not too sure how you managed to do it, but you somehow completely missed my point about the difference between knowledge about the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively. No, I do not come even remotely close to "conceding the whole argument to the non-physicalist". Why? Because, again, physicalism doesn't make the claim that knowledge about the physical workings of something and experimenting something subjectively are the same things. This, however, doesn't mean that one requires physical processes and the other doesn't - both consist in information physically reaching the physical components of ourselves that allow us to process the said information. This is virtually true of everything - no single physical "road" to information reaching our brain will be the same in terms of both the processes and the information at play. What do you define as "knowledge of qualia"? If it's knowledge about how qualia arise and are experienced, then this only depends upon learning the physical structures and processes at play. If it's "knowledge" in the sense of us experimenting a qualia (for example the color "red"), then our own physical structures and processes must be put into use in the way that learning about them in the first case would have showed us they have to be. So, again, let's be clear: if the question is "how do qualia arise/come into existence?", the answer lies purely with the physical workings of the brain. If I was able to see the physical explanation of the color red being experimented by someone, and wanted to feel it myself, then it would mean I would have to receive a physical information and have my physical structures & processes work a certain way (the way described earlier). By the way, one of the problems seems to be that you are mistaking physicalism for an epistemological position. It isn't - it's an ontological position. You don't seem to have read a lot of literature on the knowledge argument, otherwise you would understand why it is a big deal (and used to be a hotly debated topic) how knowledge about qualia is obtained. Physicalism can actually mean both: 'all knowledge is physical knowledge' and 'all things are physical'. Notice how you used the argument (2) of "physicalism as the default position" in order to argue for physicalism, which you can only defend on epistemic grounds (so far all our successful explanations make use of physical things). The knowledge argument - if successful - could undercut this. Bolding words is a useful skill toi have, anyways. Apparently another useful skill to have is dodging questions. Again - what do you understand by "knowledge about qualia"? I answered both the aspect of knowledge of the workings and the aspect of experience as knowledge propositions - I await your reply to what I explained. Defending physicalism through an argument pertaining to the state of our knowledge of the universe is not the same as presenting physicalism as an epistemological position, which I haven't done. No, but now you have related the two positions and if the non-physicalist can bring you to admit that consciousness has a unique epistemic status - which you did - then he can undercut your reliance on the "it has worked well in the past" defense (yeah, but in the past you were dealing with different beasts).
Again, you are confusing two issues. I did not say that consciousness had a unique epistemic status. Nothing indicates that there is something about consciousness that would prevent us from understanding it differently than we understand any of the other physical elements of the universe we've explained.
What I said was that this "knowledge of consciousness" I just referred to was different from the experience of consciousness. This is valid for everything in existence. Knowledge of the physical consequences of a car falling on top of a human is not the same as experiencing having a car fall on oneself. Knowledge of the physical workings of nuclear fission is not the same as experiencing nuclear fission. They are two different types of information, and our brain processes them differently. This, however, is irrelevant to the fact that in both cases only the physical is at play.
Also, plenty of scientific experiments on subjective experience have been done, so your claim that "in the past you were dealing with different beasts" is completely false as well - we've been dealing with the very beast we're talking about through experiments on the physical, and they are perfectly consistent with the rest (physical elements explaining the changes in subjective experience).
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Knowledge of qualia simply means to know what it is like to see 'the redness of red". You would know that if you had ever read any piece on the problem and I would not need to explain all that to you (feel free to thank me anyway ).
Considering I'm the one who gave to you the much more simple example of the "redness of red" when you had gone the road of an "alien from another dimension where gravity does not exist", I think you should be the one doing the thanking.
Once again, if you had taken the time to pay attention to my question instead of trying to score points, you would have noticed that I had detailed two different types of knowledge - knowledge of the workings and experience as knowledge. I addressed both above and earlier, and was asking you which one you were referring to. "Knowledge of qualia" could be, and has been, used for both (separately and together).
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:The worst part comes when you aim to dismantle Chalmers' argument via Wikipedia. Let's take a look: "3. is false if "logically possible" still means "logically possible world working according to physicalism". Why? Because the moment you conceive a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness, you are no longer conceiving that world according to physicalism." This almost leaves me speechless, since it is a logic101 fail. Why on earth should 'logically possible' entail 'logically possible according to physicalism' as long as it is not established that physicalism holds in the first place!? The argument presented here tries to establish a reductio against physicalism, so you cannot insert your conclusion into a premise as long as you haven't established its validity. This is textbook question begging! How can you not see that? I guess given that you assume that the Zombie argument is riddled with problems it's quite a feat to pick out the one thing that is genuinely unproblematic here but whatever ... First, I'd like to point out I edited my post to make it easier to understand quite a while before you replied, so I guess if you didn't see the edit it must have taken you some time to write your reply (or you didn't refresh the page that you had loaded a while ago). Second, you obviously did not get what I meant by "according to physicalism", so I'll explain again why one of the premises is broken. If you take the time to read Chalmers' argument again, you will see that one of the premises is that the world created is a world "in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world". If all of the physical facts are the same, it necessarily means that the world works the same way physically, because this is included in the "physical facts". So, when we move to the third proposition, namely "in fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness", we can quite easily see that is false. Why? Because the moment you conceive a world physically indistinguishable from our world, it must work exactly like our world, unless "the physical facts" that were referred to earlier are no longer the same. So if you decree that there is no consciousness in that conceived world, you are breaking the premise that the physical facts of that world are the same. That is what I was referring to - one of the premises held was that the physical facts would be the same in the world, and it is broken mid-reasoning. I have lot's of other stuff to do, so I sometimes have to write my replies offline in breaks. I apologize, but blame my busy schedule! Your 'correction', however, does not help you to avoid the fallacy I pointed out. It is even still right there in your second attempt to clarify. You claim that "the moment we observe a world physically indistinguishable from our world, it must work exactly like our world, unless "the physical facts" that were referred to earlier are no longer the same". But this is only true if physicalism is true. You don't belive me? Okay: Suppose physicalism were false, would a physically indistinguishable world still need to work exactly the same? If you still don't get why what you are doing is committing a logical fallacy and also don't believe me, then please ask an authority of your trust...or take some introductory class in logic. I'm beginning to wonder if you've actually read the enunciation of the philosophical zombie argument I referred to, because your gripes are with the logical fallacy of the argument and not with my pointing it out. The entire foundation of the argument is that Chalmers is imagining a world in which all of the physical facts are the same as in our world. This is not me inserting physicalism into Chalmers' conception, it is Chalmers declaring how the world he is imagining is. By "physical facts", he is including the physical workings, which are physical facts. He did not simply say "physical elements" because that's the entire point of his argument - he is trying to disprove physicalism. And adding later a proposition in which the physical workings stop being the same as in our world (there is no consciousness) necessarily means that the physical facts are no longer the same, and thus a different result (there being no consciousness) no longer disproves physicalism, and thus a different result (there being no consciousness) no longer disproves physicalism. Here, I'll help you with your own example. Let's say that Chalmers was imagining a world in which the physical elements were the same as in ours, but with different workings (due to the existence of non-physical causes, thus contrary to physicalism). You could, in this world, have p-zombies. Would this disprove physicalism? No, because there were non-physical causes involved. So, if you go back to the original argument, as long as you have only physical workings involved, you cannot have a philosophical zombie. And the moment you add something which is non-physical, you are no longer disproving physicalism (I bolded it to help, since you seem to be receptive to bolding). This is turning out quite hilariously. Chalmers asks us to imagine a world where all the physical facts are the same all the while being silent about any non-physical fact. Your claim that: "And adding later a proposition in which the physical workings stop being the same as in our world (there is no consciousness) necessarily means that the physical facts are no longer the same... " is STILL begging the question, since it would only be the case iff phenomenal conscience were physical - which Chalmers is explicitly denying! You'd make a great example of repeating the same informal fallacy in different ways. Your reference to "physical workings" does not add anything of substance either since, according to Chalmers, phenomenal conscience is no "physical working". The Zombie argument is designed to attack the logical necessity of physicalism. So the moment you grant that there are two possible worlds in which the physical facts are the same but in one world phenomenal consciousness exists and in the other one not irrespective of any non-physical facts - as you seem to do later on - you concede the argument to Chalmers -aka you're doing it wrong. There might still be some options to rescue physicalism but they are rather technical and some quite esoteric at that stage (i.e., eliminativism). You would know all this of course, if you had ever bothered to read any of the professional literature.
Ok, I see what the problem is: you missed the point of the philosophical zombie argument. I could tell you to "bother to read any of the professional literature", or even the wikipedia entry on the topic given that you missed the basic point of the argument, but I'll explain it to you instead.
You mention the use of the philosophical zombie argument to dispute "the logical necessity of physicalism". The philosophical zombie argument is actually used to go beyond this in proving that physicalism itself is false. That is what the formulation I quoted intends to do, and this is what I've been addressing since my first post ("the philosophical zombie argument is so flawed with regards to its attempt at "disproving" physicalism"). If you read Chalmers' The conscious mind (1996), a book which I happen to have, you'll see he attempts to do exactly that in chapter 4 ("Naturalistic dualism", in the first section "An argument against materialism"): after having presented his idea of a phenomenal zombie in the previous chapter, he moves on to present the following argument:
(1) In our world, there are conscious experiences.
(2) There is a logically possible world physically identical to ours, in which the positive
facts about consciousness in our world do not hold.
(3) Therefore facts about consciousness are further facts about our world, over and above
the physical facts.
(4) Therefore materialism is false.
The formulation of the zombie argument I quoted earlier combines the two chapters, with its conclusion being, just like in this one, "physicalism [=materialism] is false". This is indeed how Chalmers sums up the argument on the next page: "If zombie worlds or inverted worlds are [logically] possible, the physical facts do not entail all the positive facts about our world, and materialism is false."
So, the point here is clearly not to say that physicalism "isn't logically necessary", but to actually argue that physicalism is false.
Now, let's go back to the condensed demonstration that I quoted earlier to reiterate my explanation of why it does not prove that physicalism is false:
1. According to physicalism, all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical.
2. Thus, if physicalism is true, a logically possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular, conscious experience must exist in such a possible world.
3. In fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this (so Chalmers argues) it follows that such a world is logically possible.
4. Therefore, physicalism is false.
For this demonstration to prove that "physicalism is false", it would have to keep intact until the end its premise that "all physical facts are the same" in the imagined world as in our world - "all physical facts" including both physical elements and the physical workings of the elements. The problem is that this premise is broken in the third proposition: for there to be no consciousness, the "physical facts" must no longer be the same, otherwise there would be consciousness! Since the original premise is broken, the conclusion is invalid.
Your objection to this is that Chalmers does not believe consciousness to be a "physical fact". Well, that's the entire point - if we start the demonstration by using Chalmers' definition of consciousness, the demonstration no longer disproves physicalism. I think you will agree to this, since you apparently missed the point that the demonstration was trying to disprove physicalism.
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Finally you state that the claim that there exist purely phenomenal experiences ('feeling like-ness') that are unnecessary for function or behavior is...
"... based on nothing, except faith/belief (in addition to "feeling like" being poorly defined)."
This strikes me as clearly untrue. That's too bad, because it is true. What is asserted without argument can be dismissed without argument, I guess ... Indeed - you have yet to substantiate the claim that experiences have no functional basis But I have instead made small progress in showing that functions don't require phenomenal experiences, which is all I'd need to show for the statement being true. By the way, you never gave me credit for that, I wonder why that is...
Showing that functions don't require phenomenal experiences is, again, irrelevant to the claim that phenomenal experience is non-functional. Why would I give you credit for stating that functions don't require phenomenal experiences, something that is as obvious as it gets? All you had to mention was the keyboard you're using to reply to me
.
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
The robots we develop are already able to show a remarkable variety of functional and behavioral traits, without having phenomenological experiences at all (or do you think they have them?). The robots we develop do not display the same functional/behavioral traits as we do. They are not constituted as we are. And you still have not supported the claim that phenomenological experimenting is non-functional. Well, it establishes that the execution of some functions do not require phenomenal experience. Don't you agree? It doesn't even count as any support for the claim? Why not? Indeed, the execution of some functions do not require phenomenal experience. Has this been ever contested? What is the relevance of this fact with regards to the claim you're making that phenomenal experience is not functional? Precision is your friend... The non-physicalist claims that phenomenal experiences exist that are not necessary for executing functions and behavior. You called this a baseless assertion. Do you see now how modest the claim actually is? Do you want to reassess your evaluation?
No, but you might want to reassess your formulation of the non-physicalist claim, since it is that phenomenological experience is non-functional. That is, indeed, a baseless assertion. Precision doesn't seem to be your friend.
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
As an aside, you sometimes write "experimenting". Is that a typo or do you mean something particular? Yeah, I meant "experiencing". On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Given this evidence I don't find it prima facie absurd that a very advanced robot could show a functional variety in the ballpark of higher animals or even humans without the phenomenological 'baggage'. I frankly do not care that you don't "don't find it absurd" - you're missing the point and I never said physicalism was intuitive. The point is that qualia, and consciousness more broadly, are there, and are there as they are, purely because of the physical workings of our bodies. As long as robots do not have physical structures and processes that precisely mimic what we have, they will of course not have similar consciousness and experiment qualia as we do. So, do you find the above mentioned notion absurd, because I care? Protip: If you don't, you might get into trouble ... So far, I have yet to hear any substance behind your claim other than "I don't find it absurd" or "it seems likely". When you are ready to actually address what I said and substantiate your claim, feel free to let me know. So you just don't want to share your opinion here? Not that much interested in an exchange of ideas after all, eh?
Is that your way of agreeing that there is no substance behind the claim that phenomenological experiences are non-functional? I'm pretty sure us discussing the matter constitutes an exchange of ideas.
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
Furthermore we have examples of humans who lose a class of phenomenological experiences while at least maintaining some functional/behavioral awareness (e.g., blindsight). And notice that I am even providing you with some (albeit limited) examples from this world What is the relevance of what you just said? The awareness you are referring to is still entirely explained by the physical workings of the body. Those physical structures/processes which have been affected and have led to the loss of a class of phenomenological experiences have not impaired the physical structures/processes which lead to the aforementioned awareness. It shows that some visual functions can be reliably executed without accompanying phenomenal experience. Do you still not see the relevance? Actually, that's not what your example showed, because maintaining some form of residual awareness can still be experienced, albeit in a different way than the initial, full awareness - something that is entirely consistent with my position. Now, with regards to what you just said, namely that "visual functions can be reliably executed without accompanying phenomenal experience", it still does not support your claim in any way. Why would visual functions existing without phenomenal experience mean that phenomenal experience does not play a function? This is akin to me declaring that because my arms are working, I can assert that blood flowing to my stomach does not play a function. Well, if you would agree that the phenomenal experiences that accompany vision, for instance, were not performing any function related to vision, then the non-physicalist might be entitled to shift the burden of proof, since she could reasonably claim that the execution of any other function remains dubious. Anybody can play the total sceptic and say: "Well, but there could always be a hidden function that just can't be understood..." To have warrant for her belief the non-physicalist is not obliged to completely refute physicalism, just to show it's 'implausibility' after all.
There isn't any indication that our phenomenological experience of vision does not perform any function with regards to how vision input is processed by our brain and put into relation with its content. If anyone is going to claim that it doesn't, the burden of proof lies with that person. That person finding it "counter-intuitive" or "dubious" that it would doesn't mean that she suddenly doesn't have to substantiate her claim anymore.
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:
You might want to take a second look at blindsight by the way, since here the patients really have no quale (that they could report) when they 'see' things even though they retain some form of visual awareness.
I was referring to that "visual awareness" as quale/phenomenological experience. Are you trying to argue that this form of visual awareness was not part of their phenomenological experience?
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
whereas Chalmers argument works if you grant that phenomenal experience can be stripped from the functional in some logically possible world. Where is the obvious contradiction here? See above for Chalmers' argument. See above indeed! Quite so. On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:On September 04 2013 01:26 kwizach wrote:On September 03 2013 22:49 MiraMax wrote:
In my opinion you are really overselling the case for physicalism, maybe because you have never really engaged with the case of the opposition (outside of Wikipedia), but dismissed their arguments out of hand. I'm not, I have, and I didn't. Well, you have presented two arguments, as far as I can see. 1) You think that phenomenal experience is also functional, i.e. doesn't exist as defined, without giving any support other than - it just is the case since physicalism says so. I don't know if you're doing this on purpose, but if you are this is intellectual dishonesty at its best. I am not the one making the claim. Chalmers and you are claiming that phenomenal experience is not functional. The burden of proof lies with you. I am a physicalist so I disagree with Chalmers, remember (really precision is your friend).
I am not concerned with who you are but with what I'm presented with. When you present me with a claim that is unsubstantiated, I will point out that this claim is unsubstantiated. What you did here, however, was transform me telling you that the claim that phenomenological experience is non-functional had not been substantiated into you saying that I had argued that phenomenological experience was necessarily functional. So either you missed what I said, or you deliberately changed it (and this would qualify as intellectual dishonesty).
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:
I was dragged by you in this dialectical exercise, since your way of arguing for physicalism is - for the most part - a combination of overconfident rhetoric and question begging, which pains me.
I'm absolutely fine with recognizing that I am confident in my position. The "question begging" component is, however, the product of your imagination (or of your comprehension failures, as in the case of the philosophical zombie argument, as shown above).
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:
I now see that you are an agnostic about physicalism - which is fine - who just thinks it's a good idea not to separate 'statements of fact' from 'assumption' and 'assertion' from 'explanation' because ... ... well, frankly I don't know ... maybe, you think it weakens your position.
See above. I've been very clearly presenting the views I was detailing as being physicalist views, and me adhering to them. In fact, I've been so clear about me adhering to physicalism that sam!zdat thought I was accusing him of not adhering to the same views.
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:
This makes talking to you quite tedious not only for non-physicalists, but also for physicalists like me.
No it doesn't. Also, if you want to mention making it tedious to talk to someone, I would like to point out that adopting a condescending tone in your response to someone else doesn't make for a pleasant read for the person you are addressing. The first person in this exchange to adopt such a tone was you in this post. I followed suit - getting talked to condescendingly has a tendency to irritate me, especially when the other person misses the mark on several of my points.
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:
I realize you might have the same or a similar impression about me, so I guess we might need to let any reader decide...
I am now off to a conference for the next week and still need to prepare my talk, so I am afraid I will not be able to answer for some time. We seem to be turning in circles by now anyway, so it might be a good time to say farewell anyway. Before I generously offer you the last word, let me tell you I enjoyed the exchange!
Enjoy your conference.
On September 04 2013 18:50 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On September 04 2013 05:58 kwizach wrote:On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
2) You claim physicalism is the default position, since it has worked in the past to explain a wide range of phenomena.
I see merit in both lines of argument, but so far you haven't substantiated (1) at all, whereas (2) would only allow you very modest inferences in light of the unique epistemic character of qualia, which you seem to acknowledge. For (1) refer to the above, and for (2), as I explained, both types of knowledge about qualia are entirely consistent with physicalism. On September 04 2013 03:33 MiraMax wrote:
If you work on those two, I am sure however, that your future exchanges with non-physicalists will turn out to be much more fruitful! Thanks for the discussion!
If you work on substantiating your claims, I'm sure your future exchanges with anyone will turn out to be much more fruitful ,-) Thanks to you too. <sigh...>
If by "sigh" you mean "it is true that until this last post I had not acknowledged that the claim I was presenting you with was unsubstantiated", then yes, "sigh" ,--)
Cheers.
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