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On July 07 2013 22:51 DertoQq wrote:Show nested quote +On July 07 2013 22:45 xM(Z wrote:On July 07 2013 22:38 DertoQq wrote:On July 07 2013 22:06 xM(Z wrote:On July 07 2013 21:36 DertoQq wrote:On July 07 2013 21:31 xM(Z wrote:On July 07 2013 20:50 gedatsu wrote:On July 07 2013 19:40 xM(Z wrote:On July 07 2013 19:28 Tobberoth wrote:On July 07 2013 19:22 xM(Z wrote:
[quote]
but then it's like having 2 different effects from the same cause.
for your statement to be true you'd need to have two causes one for each efect: determinism and free will. What same cause? The belief in free will and the belief in determinism come from tons of causes, most of them not shared. but all those tons of causes are determined. my question still stands. Your question has been answered. Maybe you didn't understand the answer, but it is not very complicated. I'll help you out further. Assume the universe is deterministic. If person A believes in determinism, it is because his brain is shaped in such a way that, together with the sum of all the external stimuli it has received, it has come to the conclusion that the universe is deterministic. He happens to be right. If person B does not believe in determinism, it is because his brain is not a complete copy of person A's brain, and because they have not had the exact same experiences in their lives. His opinion happens to be wrong. Different causes lead to different effects. that doesn't explain anything. you just bounce determinism off environment and call it explanation. why would the environment, the one giving you those different experiences, be outside (universal) determinism?. your explanation implies a brain influenced by outside non-determined forces is wrong?. at best for you, it's a mixup of concepts, semantics, but is no way near an explanation for me. when you start from the same premise (everything is determined) then, with the same everything is determined logic, come to two different but equally true conclusions (believe in free will exists, believe in determinism exists) something went terribly wrong. how can the phrase: "i was determined to believe in free will" be wrong? when it follows the deterministic logic. i didn't chose to believe in free will, the determinism made me do it. A kid can be pre-determined to believe that 3*3=6, the fact that he was pre-determined to believe that doesn't made him right. a kid can be pre-determined to believe that free will doesn't exist, the fact that he was pre-determined to believe that doesn't make him right. Being pre-determined to believe something doesn't mean anything. It doesn't make it right or it doesn't make it wrong. It doesn't mean anything. So why are you even talking about it ? you started it  . "It doesn't make it right or it doesn't make it wrong" is a fair assessment. but you'd get a problem if determinism and free will (definitions wise) would be opposite/incompatible. in that case there would be no more determinism. you said : "how can the phrase: "i was determined to believe in free will" be wrong? when it follows the deterministic logic. i didn't chose to believe in free will, the determinism made me do it. " Of course it can be wrong, if you believe in something that is wrong, it doesn't matter if you were pre-determined to believe it, you are still wrong. pre-determination doesn't impact the wrong/right in any way.
i meant wrong in the context: "i was determined to believe in free will" vs "i was determined to believe in determinism".
other then that, you are seeing it wrong - it's not whether or not i was predetermined to believe it, it's more along the lines - the believe was already in my brain before i was aware of it.
how can you accuse ME of being wrong if ME had nothing to do with the decision?.
best case scenario for you: when determinism made that decision for me, it was wrong (but if you say that, you'll be screwed)
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On July 07 2013 23:08 xM(Z wrote:Show nested quote +On July 07 2013 22:51 DertoQq wrote:On July 07 2013 22:45 xM(Z wrote:On July 07 2013 22:38 DertoQq wrote:On July 07 2013 22:06 xM(Z wrote:On July 07 2013 21:36 DertoQq wrote:On July 07 2013 21:31 xM(Z wrote:On July 07 2013 20:50 gedatsu wrote:On July 07 2013 19:40 xM(Z wrote:On July 07 2013 19:28 Tobberoth wrote:
[quote]
What same cause? The belief in free will and the belief in determinism come from tons of causes, most of them not shared. but all those tons of causes are determined. my question still stands. Your question has been answered. Maybe you didn't understand the answer, but it is not very complicated. I'll help you out further. Assume the universe is deterministic. If person A believes in determinism, it is because his brain is shaped in such a way that, together with the sum of all the external stimuli it has received, it has come to the conclusion that the universe is deterministic. He happens to be right. If person B does not believe in determinism, it is because his brain is not a complete copy of person A's brain, and because they have not had the exact same experiences in their lives. His opinion happens to be wrong. Different causes lead to different effects. that doesn't explain anything. you just bounce determinism off environment and call it explanation. why would the environment, the one giving you those different experiences, be outside (universal) determinism?. your explanation implies a brain influenced by outside non-determined forces is wrong?. at best for you, it's a mixup of concepts, semantics, but is no way near an explanation for me. when you start from the same premise (everything is determined) then, with the same everything is determined logic, come to two different but equally true conclusions (believe in free will exists, believe in determinism exists) something went terribly wrong. how can the phrase: "i was determined to believe in free will" be wrong? when it follows the deterministic logic. i didn't chose to believe in free will, the determinism made me do it. A kid can be pre-determined to believe that 3*3=6, the fact that he was pre-determined to believe that doesn't made him right. a kid can be pre-determined to believe that free will doesn't exist, the fact that he was pre-determined to believe that doesn't make him right. Being pre-determined to believe something doesn't mean anything. It doesn't make it right or it doesn't make it wrong. It doesn't mean anything. So why are you even talking about it ? you started it . "It doesn't make it right or it doesn't make it wrong" is a fair assessment. but you'd get a problem if determinism and free will (definitions wise) would be opposite/incompatible. in that case there would be no more determinism. you said : "how can the phrase: "i was determined to believe in free will" be wrong? when it follows the deterministic logic. i didn't chose to believe in free will, the determinism made me do it. " Of course it can be wrong, if you believe in something that is wrong, it doesn't matter if you were pre-determined to believe it, you are still wrong. pre-determination doesn't impact the wrong/right in any way. i meant wrong in the context: "i was determined to believe in free will" vs "i was determined to believe in determinism". other then that, you are seeing it wrong - it's not whether or not i was predetermined to believe it, it's more along the lines - the believe was already in my brain before i was aware of it. how can you accuse ME of being wrong if ME had nothing to do with the decision?. best case scenario for you: when determinism made that decision for me, it was wrong (but if you say that, you'll be screwed)
Please, you're just arguing over the definitions of words once again (right and wrong in this case). You're simply saying that in a deterministic world you can't be wrong (because you need free-will to be wrong according to you), so you can't be wrong in saying that free-will exist (because free-will doesn't exist). So free-will exist.
I sincerely hope you can see why this kind of argument doesn't make any sense.
At this point you're just arguing for the sake of it.
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On July 07 2013 22:43 Reason wrote:Show nested quote +On July 07 2013 22:38 MoltkeWarding wrote:On July 07 2013 20:10 Reason wrote:On July 07 2013 20:02 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 07:26 EatThePath wrote:On July 07 2013 04:23 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 03:15 EatThePath wrote:On July 06 2013 22:34 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 06 2013 17:55 DertoQq wrote:On July 06 2013 17:18 LuckyFool wrote:
[quote]
I see your point but I don't really like the weather analogy. We suck at predicting the weather before it happens, but it's nothing as complicated as the human brain. We can very easily go back and see what happened to cause a weather event to occur. We can't however go back and figure out what prompted a human decision in any way. (Purely from a physical/matter standpoint)
A seemingly random shift in the jet stream happens that a forecast didn't account for which changes the weather, we see this and say "well that's why it ended up sunny today!" If only understanding brain activity were as simple as shifts in a jet stream. The Weather / brain analogy is a good one. You're saying that it is not because one is more complicated than the other, how do you know that ? Complexity is something very tricky. Maybe we will be able to create perfect human AI and read mind with 100% accuracy before we can predict the weather. Complexity is not a good argument. We know how a game of starcraft work, but we will probably never (ok maybe someday, never is a long time) be able to predict the perfect way to play (like we can do with games like checkers or tic tac toe), the complexity is simply way too high. Does this mean we don't understand how the game is done ? Or that there is something mystical about starcraft ? We just know for a fact that we don't have the technology to do that. Also, don't underestimate what we know about the brain, unlike everything you might hear (scientists are modest people !), the field of neurology is extremely advanced. The problem of consciousness is not about complexity. You're completely missing the mark. There are many things about what we ordinarily call consciousness or consider part of it that aren't subject to controversy. Aspects of memory for example are likely explainable with physical language alone. The real problem is why im actually experiencing something when I think of a particularly good moment in my life. There is currently no one who can explain or even give something close to a coherent explanaition of how the qualitative aspects of consciousness (qualia) can exist in a purely physical world. In the end we either end up with a physical world we no longer can make sense of, or we pretend there's no ghost in the machine when there clearly is (eliminativists do this). The problem is there is a ghost, that we cannot doubt, but for all we know there really shouldn't be. David Chalmers on Consciousness The appeal to qualia is so misguided; I don't get why this is still a thing. Why can't there be unique states of a system based upon unique inputs? The universe will never be in the same state twice, nor will you or I, first of all because we're different and second for the same reason the universe won't. You make a philosophical hypothetical proposition that qualia could be identified because they could be in principle, and then go on to say that physicalism doesn't handle this. You're right! Why would an impossible hypothetical be manifest in reality? This is no kind of argument against physicalism. 1. How does that have any bearing on the issue at hand? 2. I dont have to make any hypothetical proposition regarding subjective experience, its quite evident to all of us I'd say. To quote Sam Harris, "it's the one thing that cannot be an illusion". There are various reasons for why non-physical explanations of consciousness fail to deliver, but physicalism is just slightly less nonsensical. To refer to qualia is to inject subjectivity into your ontology, and I don't see any grounds for doing this, but more importantly it's just a claim, not an argument. With regard to 2, I agree consciousness doesn't make obvious sense. It need not be intuitive, though? Subjectivity is the one thing any ontology of the world can't do without. To try and circumvent the one truly obvious thing to each and every self-conscious being is just bad science and bad metaphysics. It reminds me of how Moore responds to the skeptic: "This is a hand". Well here the skeptics position is being held by the eliminativist who claims that somehow the very thing that cant be an illusion actually is! I may be mistaken about the unicorn I saw in the forest, I may be mistaken about there being a forest, but its impossible for me to be mistaken about there being the experience of seeing a forest. Indeed few neuroscientists and philosophers of mind hold the elminativist position, among the few are the Churchlands and in some sense Dan Dennett (though it is somewhat unclear to me if he truly is a hardcore elminativist or more of a soft one, I lean towards the latter). More often we find reductionists, but I have yet to see an example of anyone actually making sense of the idea that actual taste of ice-cream, while not an illusion, is simply neurological activity. That is not to say that epiphenomenalists or property-dualists are in a better place, in my opinion its an even bigger mess in a lot of ways. But most seem to settle for what Nagel did. ps. Some types of epiphenomenalism may be in a similar spot as reductive physicalism with "only" one big issue. Jaegwon Kim holds the position that only intrinsic properties of qualia are epiphenomenal for example, and that qualia as relational properties are reducible. I don't think that position makes any sense whatsoever though. Can you explain why the notion that the taste of ice cream being simple neurological activity is something anyone needs to make sense of? Seems perfectly reasonable to me and I don't have a problem with this concept at all. I've watched a fair amount of stuff about conciousness and I have to say I'm not familiar with this whole "it's completely inexplicable" in a physical world.... can you explain/discuss this a bit more and maybe give some material on the subject for us lay people? Materialistic reductionism is neither impossible nor inconceivable, and its internal reasonability is not what is at question. What is impossible is an argument where such a system could be verified by the intelligence. Our awareness of the physical universe is basically deductive and inferential. Our awareness of the mind is that Ding an sich. It's akin to a person looking into a smoky mirror, and concluding that he has no eyes, because he sees none in the reflection. Okay, but I still don't see why this justifies believing in fairies.
Eh, your very phraseology is intentionally designed to produce a logical, self-evident answer, whereas taken in its literal meaning, such an answer does not issue from the premises at all. You are semantically equating "fairy" with "the non-existent," which already pre-supposes fairies are non-existent, and therefore belief in them to be non-justifiable.
Otherwise I do not see why the point is relevant to the question. After all, the non-materialist explanation of the mind satisfies the logical principle of non-contradiction, whereas the materialist explanation of the mind encounters problems.
The problem is you are frustrated by the abundance of external evidence about the material universe, whereas most of what we infer about the non-material universe is based on the introspective. Therefore the physicalist model is preferred by some people because it is more logically accessible explanation, although it is fundamentally less logical.
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On July 07 2013 22:40 Zahir wrote:Show nested quote +On July 07 2013 20:02 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 07:26 EatThePath wrote:On July 07 2013 04:23 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 03:15 EatThePath wrote:On July 06 2013 22:34 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 06 2013 17:55 DertoQq wrote:On July 06 2013 17:18 LuckyFool wrote:On July 06 2013 16:26 SnipedSoul wrote:On July 06 2013 07:56 LuckyFool wrote:
Human minds on the other hand aren't being built by humans. We try to mimic them, we create robots with human like minds, capable of reasoning "like" a human, but there's a complexity in the human mind that we haven't even come close to being able to understand, replicate or understand to date. Saying we can be certain it's all just chemical and electricity without fully understanding it, just seems incredibly ignorant to me. I can make the same argument about the weather. The weather is obscenely complex and cannot be predicted with any sort of accuracy outside of a window of a few days. Hell, we still can't tell with much certainty whether or not it will rain unless there's a ton of dark storm clouds coming. We know all the basic laws that govern the weather such as chemical composition of the local atmosphere, heat transfer, fluid mechanics, pressure changes, etc. The only thing we cannot figure out about the weather is how all these things interact because it's simply too complex for us to make a proper model. Is it ignorant to assume that the weather is nothing more than chemicals and thermal energy just because we don't have a complete understanding of it? I see your point but I don't really like the weather analogy. We suck at predicting the weather before it happens, but it's nothing as complicated as the human brain. We can very easily go back and see what happened to cause a weather event to occur. We can't however go back and figure out what prompted a human decision in any way. (Purely from a physical/matter standpoint) A seemingly random shift in the jet stream happens that a forecast didn't account for which changes the weather, we see this and say "well that's why it ended up sunny today!" If only understanding brain activity were as simple as shifts in a jet stream. The Weather / brain analogy is a good one. You're saying that it is not because one is more complicated than the other, how do you know that ? Complexity is something very tricky. Maybe we will be able to create perfect human AI and read mind with 100% accuracy before we can predict the weather. Complexity is not a good argument. We know how a game of starcraft work, but we will probably never (ok maybe someday, never is a long time) be able to predict the perfect way to play (like we can do with games like checkers or tic tac toe), the complexity is simply way too high. Does this mean we don't understand how the game is done ? Or that there is something mystical about starcraft ? We just know for a fact that we don't have the technology to do that. Also, don't underestimate what we know about the brain, unlike everything you might hear (scientists are modest people !), the field of neurology is extremely advanced. The problem of consciousness is not about complexity. You're completely missing the mark. There are many things about what we ordinarily call consciousness or consider part of it that aren't subject to controversy. Aspects of memory for example are likely explainable with physical language alone. The real problem is why im actually experiencing something when I think of a particularly good moment in my life. There is currently no one who can explain or even give something close to a coherent explanaition of how the qualitative aspects of consciousness (qualia) can exist in a purely physical world. In the end we either end up with a physical world we no longer can make sense of, or we pretend there's no ghost in the machine when there clearly is (eliminativists do this). The problem is there is a ghost, that we cannot doubt, but for all we know there really shouldn't be. David Chalmers on Consciousness The appeal to qualia is so misguided; I don't get why this is still a thing. Why can't there be unique states of a system based upon unique inputs? The universe will never be in the same state twice, nor will you or I, first of all because we're different and second for the same reason the universe won't. You make a philosophical hypothetical proposition that qualia could be identified because they could be in principle, and then go on to say that physicalism doesn't handle this. You're right! Why would an impossible hypothetical be manifest in reality? This is no kind of argument against physicalism. 1. How does that have any bearing on the issue at hand? 2. I dont have to make any hypothetical proposition regarding subjective experience, its quite evident to all of us I'd say. To quote Sam Harris, "it's the one thing that cannot be an illusion". There are various reasons for why non-physical explanations of consciousness fail to deliver, but physicalism is just slightly less nonsensical. To refer to qualia is to inject subjectivity into your ontology, and I don't see any grounds for doing this, but more importantly it's just a claim, not an argument. With regard to 2, I agree consciousness doesn't make obvious sense. It need not be intuitive, though? Subjectivity is the one thing any ontology of the world can't do without. To try and circumvent the one truly obvious thing to each and every self-conscious being is just bad science and bad metaphysics. It reminds me of how Moore responds to the skeptic: "This is a hand". Well here the skeptics position is being held by the eliminativist who claims that somehow the very thing that cant be an illusion actually is! I may be mistaken about the unicorn I saw in the forest, I may be mistaken about there being a forest, but its impossible for me to be mistaken about there being the experience of seeing a forest. Indeed few neuroscientists and philosophers of mind hold the elminativist position, among the few are the Churchlands and in some sense Dan Dennett (though it is somewhat unclear to me if he truly is a hardcore elminativist or more of a soft one, I lean towards the latter). More often we find reductionists, but I have yet to see an example of anyone actually making sense of the idea that the actual taste of ice-cream, while not an illusion in the eliminativist sense, is simply neurological activity. That is not to say that epiphenomenalists or property-dualists are in a better place, in my opinion its an even bigger mess in a lot of ways. ps. Some types of epiphenomenalism may be in a similar spot as reductive physicalism with "only" one big issue. Jaegwon Kim holds the position that only intrinsic properties of qualia are epiphenomenal for example, and that qualia as relational properties are reducible. I don't think that position makes any sense whatsoever though. It's not impossible for you to be mistaken about there being experiences, it's impossible for you to NOT be mistaken. Consider that a p zombie (brain without consciousness) would have no way of realizing it wasn't conscious. Assuming that our brains are somehow impervious to the same physical phenomenon that cause beliefs to arise within a theoretical metaphysically 'conscious' person, is to assume to existence of metaphysics from the start.
First of all, the possibility of zombies is a pretty hot potato. Not that many would agree that theyre even possible. Secondly, I have no idea what you're saying there. What is a "theoretical metaphysically 'conscious' person" exactly? Why would one assume that "our brains are impervious to the physical phenomenon that cause beliefs to arise", when that is clearly not the case as beliefs, excluding the phenomenal parts, are quite clearly caused by our brains.
At the end of the day, assuming zombies are possible, the zombie is still in the same boat as a computer. Or a rock. There is nothing mystical going on when a zombie is "mistaken", and indeed talking about being "mistaken" about having experiences is like talking about a computer being "mistaken". its nonsense. The zombie isn't phenomenally conscious in the first place and its beliefs are thus analogous to the "beliefs" of a computer. I on the other hand cannot be sure about others having experiences, but I cannot doubt my very own phenomenal experiences at this moment.
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On July 07 2013 23:33 MoltkeWarding wrote:Show nested quote +On July 07 2013 22:43 Reason wrote:On July 07 2013 22:38 MoltkeWarding wrote:On July 07 2013 20:10 Reason wrote:On July 07 2013 20:02 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 07:26 EatThePath wrote:On July 07 2013 04:23 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 03:15 EatThePath wrote:On July 06 2013 22:34 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 06 2013 17:55 DertoQq wrote:
[quote]
The Weather / brain analogy is a good one. You're saying that it is not because one is more complicated than the other, how do you know that ? Complexity is something very tricky. Maybe we will be able to create perfect human AI and read mind with 100% accuracy before we can predict the weather. Complexity is not a good argument.
We know how a game of starcraft work, but we will probably never (ok maybe someday, never is a long time) be able to predict the perfect way to play (like we can do with games like checkers or tic tac toe), the complexity is simply way too high. Does this mean we don't understand how the game is done ? Or that there is something mystical about starcraft ? We just know for a fact that we don't have the technology to do that.
Also, don't underestimate what we know about the brain, unlike everything you might hear (scientists are modest people !), the field of neurology is extremely advanced.
The problem of consciousness is not about complexity. You're completely missing the mark. There are many things about what we ordinarily call consciousness or consider part of it that aren't subject to controversy. Aspects of memory for example are likely explainable with physical language alone. The real problem is why im actually experiencing something when I think of a particularly good moment in my life. There is currently no one who can explain or even give something close to a coherent explanaition of how the qualitative aspects of consciousness (qualia) can exist in a purely physical world. In the end we either end up with a physical world we no longer can make sense of, or we pretend there's no ghost in the machine when there clearly is (eliminativists do this). The problem is there is a ghost, that we cannot doubt, but for all we know there really shouldn't be. David Chalmers on Consciousness The appeal to qualia is so misguided; I don't get why this is still a thing. Why can't there be unique states of a system based upon unique inputs? The universe will never be in the same state twice, nor will you or I, first of all because we're different and second for the same reason the universe won't. You make a philosophical hypothetical proposition that qualia could be identified because they could be in principle, and then go on to say that physicalism doesn't handle this. You're right! Why would an impossible hypothetical be manifest in reality? This is no kind of argument against physicalism. 1. How does that have any bearing on the issue at hand? 2. I dont have to make any hypothetical proposition regarding subjective experience, its quite evident to all of us I'd say. To quote Sam Harris, "it's the one thing that cannot be an illusion". There are various reasons for why non-physical explanations of consciousness fail to deliver, but physicalism is just slightly less nonsensical. To refer to qualia is to inject subjectivity into your ontology, and I don't see any grounds for doing this, but more importantly it's just a claim, not an argument. With regard to 2, I agree consciousness doesn't make obvious sense. It need not be intuitive, though? Subjectivity is the one thing any ontology of the world can't do without. To try and circumvent the one truly obvious thing to each and every self-conscious being is just bad science and bad metaphysics. It reminds me of how Moore responds to the skeptic: "This is a hand". Well here the skeptics position is being held by the eliminativist who claims that somehow the very thing that cant be an illusion actually is! I may be mistaken about the unicorn I saw in the forest, I may be mistaken about there being a forest, but its impossible for me to be mistaken about there being the experience of seeing a forest. Indeed few neuroscientists and philosophers of mind hold the elminativist position, among the few are the Churchlands and in some sense Dan Dennett (though it is somewhat unclear to me if he truly is a hardcore elminativist or more of a soft one, I lean towards the latter). More often we find reductionists, but I have yet to see an example of anyone actually making sense of the idea that actual taste of ice-cream, while not an illusion, is simply neurological activity. That is not to say that epiphenomenalists or property-dualists are in a better place, in my opinion its an even bigger mess in a lot of ways. But most seem to settle for what Nagel did. ps. Some types of epiphenomenalism may be in a similar spot as reductive physicalism with "only" one big issue. Jaegwon Kim holds the position that only intrinsic properties of qualia are epiphenomenal for example, and that qualia as relational properties are reducible. I don't think that position makes any sense whatsoever though. Can you explain why the notion that the taste of ice cream being simple neurological activity is something anyone needs to make sense of? Seems perfectly reasonable to me and I don't have a problem with this concept at all. I've watched a fair amount of stuff about conciousness and I have to say I'm not familiar with this whole "it's completely inexplicable" in a physical world.... can you explain/discuss this a bit more and maybe give some material on the subject for us lay people? Materialistic reductionism is neither impossible nor inconceivable, and its internal reasonability is not what is at question. What is impossible is an argument where such a system could be verified by the intelligence. Our awareness of the physical universe is basically deductive and inferential. Our awareness of the mind is that Ding an sich. It's akin to a person looking into a smoky mirror, and concluding that he has no eyes, because he sees none in the reflection. Okay, but I still don't see why this justifies believing in fairies. Eh, your very phraseology is intentionally designed to produce a logical, self-evident answer, whereas taken in its literal meaning, such an answer does not issue from the premises at all. You are semantically equating "fairy" with "the non-existent," which already pre-supposes fairies are non-existent, and therefore belief in them to be non-justifiable. Otherwise I do not see why the point is relevant to the question. After all, the non-materialist explanation of the mind satisfies the logical principle of non-contradiction, whereas the materialist explanation of the mind encounters problems. The problem is you are frustrated by the abundance of external evidence about the material universe, whereas most of what we infer about the non-material universe is based on the introspective. Therefore the physicalist model is preferred by some people because it is more logically accessible explanation, although it is fundamentally less logical.
What is this non-material universe you speak of?
Also, thinking back to the original argument, why is verification impossible?
When I said fairies, I'm referring to that which we have no reason, no evidence to believe in. I can't say for sure fairies don't exist but see no reason to believe that they do.
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On July 07 2013 23:33 MoltkeWarding wrote:Show nested quote +On July 07 2013 22:43 Reason wrote:On July 07 2013 22:38 MoltkeWarding wrote:On July 07 2013 20:10 Reason wrote:On July 07 2013 20:02 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 07:26 EatThePath wrote:On July 07 2013 04:23 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 03:15 EatThePath wrote:On July 06 2013 22:34 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 06 2013 17:55 DertoQq wrote:
[quote]
The Weather / brain analogy is a good one. You're saying that it is not because one is more complicated than the other, how do you know that ? Complexity is something very tricky. Maybe we will be able to create perfect human AI and read mind with 100% accuracy before we can predict the weather. Complexity is not a good argument.
We know how a game of starcraft work, but we will probably never (ok maybe someday, never is a long time) be able to predict the perfect way to play (like we can do with games like checkers or tic tac toe), the complexity is simply way too high. Does this mean we don't understand how the game is done ? Or that there is something mystical about starcraft ? We just know for a fact that we don't have the technology to do that.
Also, don't underestimate what we know about the brain, unlike everything you might hear (scientists are modest people !), the field of neurology is extremely advanced.
The problem of consciousness is not about complexity. You're completely missing the mark. There are many things about what we ordinarily call consciousness or consider part of it that aren't subject to controversy. Aspects of memory for example are likely explainable with physical language alone. The real problem is why im actually experiencing something when I think of a particularly good moment in my life. There is currently no one who can explain or even give something close to a coherent explanaition of how the qualitative aspects of consciousness (qualia) can exist in a purely physical world. In the end we either end up with a physical world we no longer can make sense of, or we pretend there's no ghost in the machine when there clearly is (eliminativists do this). The problem is there is a ghost, that we cannot doubt, but for all we know there really shouldn't be. David Chalmers on Consciousness The appeal to qualia is so misguided; I don't get why this is still a thing. Why can't there be unique states of a system based upon unique inputs? The universe will never be in the same state twice, nor will you or I, first of all because we're different and second for the same reason the universe won't. You make a philosophical hypothetical proposition that qualia could be identified because they could be in principle, and then go on to say that physicalism doesn't handle this. You're right! Why would an impossible hypothetical be manifest in reality? This is no kind of argument against physicalism. 1. How does that have any bearing on the issue at hand? 2. I dont have to make any hypothetical proposition regarding subjective experience, its quite evident to all of us I'd say. To quote Sam Harris, "it's the one thing that cannot be an illusion". There are various reasons for why non-physical explanations of consciousness fail to deliver, but physicalism is just slightly less nonsensical. To refer to qualia is to inject subjectivity into your ontology, and I don't see any grounds for doing this, but more importantly it's just a claim, not an argument. With regard to 2, I agree consciousness doesn't make obvious sense. It need not be intuitive, though? Subjectivity is the one thing any ontology of the world can't do without. To try and circumvent the one truly obvious thing to each and every self-conscious being is just bad science and bad metaphysics. It reminds me of how Moore responds to the skeptic: "This is a hand". Well here the skeptics position is being held by the eliminativist who claims that somehow the very thing that cant be an illusion actually is! I may be mistaken about the unicorn I saw in the forest, I may be mistaken about there being a forest, but its impossible for me to be mistaken about there being the experience of seeing a forest. Indeed few neuroscientists and philosophers of mind hold the elminativist position, among the few are the Churchlands and in some sense Dan Dennett (though it is somewhat unclear to me if he truly is a hardcore elminativist or more of a soft one, I lean towards the latter). More often we find reductionists, but I have yet to see an example of anyone actually making sense of the idea that actual taste of ice-cream, while not an illusion, is simply neurological activity. That is not to say that epiphenomenalists or property-dualists are in a better place, in my opinion its an even bigger mess in a lot of ways. But most seem to settle for what Nagel did. ps. Some types of epiphenomenalism may be in a similar spot as reductive physicalism with "only" one big issue. Jaegwon Kim holds the position that only intrinsic properties of qualia are epiphenomenal for example, and that qualia as relational properties are reducible. I don't think that position makes any sense whatsoever though. Can you explain why the notion that the taste of ice cream being simple neurological activity is something anyone needs to make sense of? Seems perfectly reasonable to me and I don't have a problem with this concept at all. I've watched a fair amount of stuff about conciousness and I have to say I'm not familiar with this whole "it's completely inexplicable" in a physical world.... can you explain/discuss this a bit more and maybe give some material on the subject for us lay people? Materialistic reductionism is neither impossible nor inconceivable, and its internal reasonability is not what is at question. What is impossible is an argument where such a system could be verified by the intelligence. Our awareness of the physical universe is basically deductive and inferential. Our awareness of the mind is that Ding an sich. It's akin to a person looking into a smoky mirror, and concluding that he has no eyes, because he sees none in the reflection. Okay, but I still don't see why this justifies believing in fairies. Eh, your very phraseology is intentionally designed to produce a logical, self-evident answer, whereas taken in its literal meaning, such an answer does not issue from the premises at all. You are semantically equating "fairy" with "the non-existent," which already pre-supposes fairies are non-existent, and therefore belief in them to be non-justifiable. Otherwise I do not see why the point is relevant to the question. After all, the non-materialist explanation of the mind satisfies the logical principle of non-contradiction, whereas the materialist explanation of the mind encounters problems.
What? Human minds are not logical like that. It is perfectly possible for people to believe highly contradictory things at the same time. Just because materialism may be less intuitive, is not a reason against it. Many very true things about the world are highly non-intuitive, like germ theory, or heliocentrism, etc. etc.
You're confusing intuition with logic, when they are far, far apart.
The problem is you are frustrated by the abundance of external evidence about the material universe, whereas most of what we infer about the non-material universe is based on the introspective. Therefore the physicalist model is preferred by some people because it is more logically accessible explanation, although it is fundamentally less logical.
Non-materialism is purposefully vague and non-falsifiable. It is fundamentally less logical because you have no evidence for it. And using evidence to believe in things is the very basics of Bayesian Reasoning.
There is no "based on the introspective." This is a nonsense phrase. The non-material universe is based on a bunch of people navel-gazing and making random predictions of how the universe works (many of which have been falsified if they are falsifiable). The non-material universe is destroyed by logical tools like the +5 Razor of Occam.
Remember, the idea that something is not falsifiable means that it is pointless. It means there is no difference between the universe with something and without something. If there is no "external evidence" for something, then it doesn't affect the real world. It doesn't do anything. So either something has external evidence and can be falsified, or something does not have external evidence in which case it doesn't matter. Take your pick. Which non-material universe do you want?
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On July 07 2013 23:29 DertoQq wrote:Show nested quote +On July 07 2013 23:08 xM(Z wrote:On July 07 2013 22:51 DertoQq wrote:On July 07 2013 22:45 xM(Z wrote:On July 07 2013 22:38 DertoQq wrote:On July 07 2013 22:06 xM(Z wrote:On July 07 2013 21:36 DertoQq wrote:On July 07 2013 21:31 xM(Z wrote:On July 07 2013 20:50 gedatsu wrote:On July 07 2013 19:40 xM(Z wrote:
[quote]
but all those tons of causes are determined. my question still stands. Your question has been answered. Maybe you didn't understand the answer, but it is not very complicated. I'll help you out further. Assume the universe is deterministic. If person A believes in determinism, it is because his brain is shaped in such a way that, together with the sum of all the external stimuli it has received, it has come to the conclusion that the universe is deterministic. He happens to be right. If person B does not believe in determinism, it is because his brain is not a complete copy of person A's brain, and because they have not had the exact same experiences in their lives. His opinion happens to be wrong. Different causes lead to different effects. that doesn't explain anything. you just bounce determinism off environment and call it explanation. why would the environment, the one giving you those different experiences, be outside (universal) determinism?. your explanation implies a brain influenced by outside non-determined forces is wrong?. at best for you, it's a mixup of concepts, semantics, but is no way near an explanation for me. when you start from the same premise (everything is determined) then, with the same everything is determined logic, come to two different but equally true conclusions (believe in free will exists, believe in determinism exists) something went terribly wrong. how can the phrase: "i was determined to believe in free will" be wrong? when it follows the deterministic logic. i didn't chose to believe in free will, the determinism made me do it. A kid can be pre-determined to believe that 3*3=6, the fact that he was pre-determined to believe that doesn't made him right. a kid can be pre-determined to believe that free will doesn't exist, the fact that he was pre-determined to believe that doesn't make him right. Being pre-determined to believe something doesn't mean anything. It doesn't make it right or it doesn't make it wrong. It doesn't mean anything. So why are you even talking about it ? you started it . "It doesn't make it right or it doesn't make it wrong" is a fair assessment. but you'd get a problem if determinism and free will (definitions wise) would be opposite/incompatible. in that case there would be no more determinism. you said : "how can the phrase: "i was determined to believe in free will" be wrong? when it follows the deterministic logic. i didn't chose to believe in free will, the determinism made me do it. " Of course it can be wrong, if you believe in something that is wrong, it doesn't matter if you were pre-determined to believe it, you are still wrong. pre-determination doesn't impact the wrong/right in any way. i meant wrong in the context: "i was determined to believe in free will" vs "i was determined to believe in determinism". other then that, you are seeing it wrong - it's not whether or not i was predetermined to believe it, it's more along the lines - the believe was already in my brain before i was aware of it. how can you accuse ME of being wrong if ME had nothing to do with the decision?. best case scenario for you: when determinism made that decision for me, it was wrong (but if you say that, you'll be screwed) Please, you're just arguing over the definitions of words once again (right and wrong in this case). You're simply saying that in a deterministic world you can't be wrong (because you need free-will to be wrong according to you), so you can't be wrong in saying that free-will exist (because free-will doesn't exist). So free-will exist. I sincerely hope you can see why this kind of argument doesn't make any sense. At this point you're just arguing for the sake of it.
that is pretty much it and it makes perfect sense.
edit: just remember that you think i'm wrong. i only think that we are different but equally right/wrong.
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Free will exists in a deterministic world so it makes no sense at all, also just because cause and effect has no random element doesn't make everything "right", it just makes it predictable given all the information.
The phrase "talking to you is like talking to a brick-wall" seems like it was made for you...
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What is this non-material universe you speak of?
Uhm,
A Simple Child,
That lightly draws its breath,
And feels its life in every limb,
What should it know of death?
I met a little cottage Girl:
She was eight years old, she said;
Her hair was thick with many a curl
That clustered round her head.
She had a rustic, woodland air,
And she was wildly clad:
Her eyes were fair, and very fair;
Her beauty made me glad.
"Sisters and brothers, little Maid,
How many may you be?"
"How many? Seven in all," she said
And wondering looked at me.
"And where are they? I pray you tell."
She answered, "Seven are we;
And two of us at Conway dwell,
And two are gone to sea.
"Two of us in the church-yard lie,
My sister and my brother;
And, in the church-yard cottage, I
Dwell near them with my mother."
"You say that two at Conway dwell,
And two are gone to sea,
Yet ye are seven!--I pray you tell,
Sweet Maid, how this may be."
Then did the little Maid reply,
"Seven boys and girls are we;
Two of us in the church-yard lie,
Beneath the church-yard tree."
"You run above, my little Maid,
Your limbs they are alive;
If two are in the church-yard laid,
Then ye are only five."
"Their graves are green, they may be seen,"
The little Maid replied,
"Twelve steps or more from my mother's door,
And they are side by side.
"My stockings there I often knit,
My kerchief there I hem;
And there upon the ground I sit,
And sing a song to them.
"And often after sun-set, Sir,
When it is light and fair,
I take my little porringer,
And eat my supper there.
"The first that died was sister Jane;
In bed she moaning lay,
Till God released her of her pain;
And then she went away.
"So in the church-yard she was laid;
And, when the grass was dry,
Together round her grave we played,
My brother John and I.
"And when the ground was white with snow,
And I could run and slide,
My brother John was forced to go,
And he lies by her side."
"How many are you, then," said I,
"If they two are in heaven?"
Quick was the little Maid's reply,
"O Master! we are seven."
"But they are dead; those two are dead!
Their spirits are in heaven!"
'Twas throwing words away; for still
The little Maid would have her will,
And said, "Nay, we are seven!"
Also, thinking back to the original argument, why is verification impossible?
Proposition A: The products of consciousness are physically-induced illusions.
Proposition B: My consciousness has produced proposition A
Therefore Proposition A is a physically-induced illusion.
Possible, unverifiable. Once you attack the sovereignty of the mind, you cannibalise everything you will ever say from that point on.
When I said fairies, I'm referring to that which we have no reason, no evidence to believe in. I can't say for sure fairies don't exist but see no reason to believe that they do.
I have a reason to believe in fairies. A close friend of mine has seen one. Something like one-tenth of the population of Iceland have claimed to see one. The existence of fairies is attested to amid a large swath of medieval literature. Therefore fairies is not "that which we have no reason, no evidence" to believe in. There is evidence, it's simply unacceptable to you.
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Proposition A: The products of consciousness are physically-induced illusions.
Proposition B: My consciousness has produced proposition A
Therefore Proposition A is a physically-induced illusion.
Illusion? What is this talk of illusion?
My eyes take in reflected light from objects and transmits those images to my brain, where they are rendered and completed and understood using tricks and shortcuts. That's not an 'illusion.' That's something that is physically happening.
I have a reason to believe in fairies. A close friend of mine has seen one. Something like one-tenth of the population of Iceland have claimed to see one. The existence of fairies is attested to amid a large swath of medieval literature. Therefore fairies is not "that which we have no reason, no evidence" to believe in. There is evidence, it's simply unacceptable to you.
Sure, same with aliens, and bigfoot, and all sorts of other hoaxes and shenanigans (including several mutually exclusive religions).
A paraphrase of Hitchens: When us humans lack good evidence, we make due with bad evidence. When humans lack a good theory, we make due with a conspiracy theory.
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On July 08 2013 01:29 MoltkeWarding wrote:+ Show Spoiler +What is this non-material universe you speak of? Uhm, A Simple Child,
That lightly draws its breath,
And feels its life in every limb,
What should it know of death?
I met a little cottage Girl:
She was eight years old, she said;
Her hair was thick with many a curl
That clustered round her head.
She had a rustic, woodland air,
And she was wildly clad:
Her eyes were fair, and very fair;
Her beauty made me glad.
"Sisters and brothers, little Maid,
How many may you be?"
"How many? Seven in all," she said
And wondering looked at me.
"And where are they? I pray you tell."
She answered, "Seven are we;
And two of us at Conway dwell,
And two are gone to sea.
"Two of us in the church-yard lie,
My sister and my brother;
And, in the church-yard cottage, I
Dwell near them with my mother."
"You say that two at Conway dwell,
And two are gone to sea,
Yet ye are seven!--I pray you tell,
Sweet Maid, how this may be."
Then did the little Maid reply,
"Seven boys and girls are we;
Two of us in the church-yard lie,
Beneath the church-yard tree."
"You run above, my little Maid,
Your limbs they are alive;
If two are in the church-yard laid,
Then ye are only five."
"Their graves are green, they may be seen,"
The little Maid replied,
"Twelve steps or more from my mother's door,
And they are side by side.
"My stockings there I often knit,
My kerchief there I hem;
And there upon the ground I sit,
And sing a song to them.
"And often after sun-set, Sir,
When it is light and fair,
I take my little porringer,
And eat my supper there.
"The first that died was sister Jane;
In bed she moaning lay,
Till God released her of her pain;
And then she went away.
"So in the church-yard she was laid;
And, when the grass was dry,
Together round her grave we played,
My brother John and I.
"And when the ground was white with snow,
And I could run and slide,
My brother John was forced to go,
And he lies by her side."
"How many are you, then," said I,
"If they two are in heaven?"
Quick was the little Maid's reply,
"O Master! we are seven."
"But they are dead; those two are dead!
Their spirits are in heaven!"
'Twas throwing words away; for still
The little Maid would have her will,
And said, "Nay, we are seven!" Also, thinking back to the original argument, why is verification impossible? Proposition A: The products of consciousness are physically-induced illusions. Proposition B: My consciousness has produced proposition A Therefore Proposition A is a physically-induced illusion. Possible, unverifiable. Once you attack the sovereignty of the mind, you cannibalise everything you will ever say from that point on. When I said fairies, I'm referring to that which we have no reason, no evidence to believe in. I can't say for sure fairies don't exist but see no reason to believe that they do. I have a reason to believe in fairies. A close friend of mine has seen one. Something like one-tenth of the population of Iceland have claimed to see one. The existence of fairies is attested to amid a large swath of medieval literature. Therefore fairies is not "that which we have no reason, no evidence" to believe in. There is evidence, it's simply unacceptable to you.
Okay, I think I understand what you've tried to do there quoting me that piece but since I don't share your views on this matter that which those words make incredibly obvious to you still eludes me. I could begin to construct a response to your point but I'd prefer you did more than allude to it before I do.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
On evidence, I'm talking about something more than hearsay. No, hearsay is not acceptable evidence as far as I'm concerned and I make no apologies for it.
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On July 08 2013 01:40 DoubleReed wrote:Show nested quote +Proposition A: The products of consciousness are physically-induced illusions.
Proposition B: My consciousness has produced proposition A
Therefore Proposition A is a physically-induced illusion. Illusion? What is this talk of illusion? My eyes take in reflected light from objects and transmits those images to my brain, where they are rendered and completed and understood using tricks and shortcuts. That's not an 'illusion.' That's something that is physically happening.
What you see with your eye is an illusion, for the colour blue is not blue, but the transmission of light-waves along a certain frequency in the spectrum. Some eyes will see this as green, and some eyes which do not reach that part of the light spectrum will see nothing, just as we do not see infrared or ultraviolet light. The frequency of light remains constant, but "blue" is an illusion.
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I wouldn't call that an "illusion" though. Something more along the lines of an interpretation. What's in the mind is a map, what's actually out there is the territory.
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On July 08 2013 01:51 MoltkeWarding wrote:Show nested quote +On July 08 2013 01:40 DoubleReed wrote:Proposition A: The products of consciousness are physically-induced illusions.
Proposition B: My consciousness has produced proposition A
Therefore Proposition A is a physically-induced illusion. Illusion? What is this talk of illusion? My eyes take in reflected light from objects and transmits those images to my brain, where they are rendered and completed and understood using tricks and shortcuts. That's not an 'illusion.' That's something that is physically happening. What you see with your eye is an illusion, for the colour blue is not blue, but the transmission of light-waves along a certain frequency in the spectrum. Some eyes will see this as green, and some eyes which do not reach that part of the light spectrum will see nothing, just as we do not see infrared or ultraviolet light. The frequency of light remains constant, but "blue" is an illusion.
By the same logic all of our sensory experiences are an illusion, but I don't think that's an appropriate term and serves to substantiate your opinion as much as fairies did mine.
Regardless, I don't think this detracts from the sensory information we are given and also I don't think acknowledging this discredits the sovereignty of the human mind in any way.
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to all those who support the existence of free will:
How do you explain the fact that people with brain damage or people who develop tumors in the area of the brain change their decision process drastically? Many of them develop new violent or psychopathic urges and a different completely character overall. Doesn't this mean that our decision making process is tied to the physiology of our brain?
To those who might suggest that this doesn't count because these brains are altered or impaired:
doesn't this mean that for free will to have a meaning or for moral responsibility to meaningfully come into play we should all have the same type of brain with no alterations? (this is of course never the case as there are not even 2 people with the same brain)
How do we exercise free will if our decision making process is irrefutably tied to the physiology of our brain and therefore the laws of the universe?
(these questions are probably relevant only for the people who have a naturalistic view of the world)
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On July 08 2013 01:09 xM(Z wrote:Show nested quote +On July 07 2013 23:29 DertoQq wrote:On July 07 2013 23:08 xM(Z wrote:On July 07 2013 22:51 DertoQq wrote:On July 07 2013 22:45 xM(Z wrote:On July 07 2013 22:38 DertoQq wrote:On July 07 2013 22:06 xM(Z wrote:On July 07 2013 21:36 DertoQq wrote:On July 07 2013 21:31 xM(Z wrote:On July 07 2013 20:50 gedatsu wrote:
[quote]
Your question has been answered. Maybe you didn't understand the answer, but it is not very complicated. I'll help you out further.
Assume the universe is deterministic.
If person A believes in determinism, it is because his brain is shaped in such a way that, together with the sum of all the external stimuli it has received, it has come to the conclusion that the universe is deterministic. He happens to be right.
If person B does not believe in determinism, it is because his brain is not a complete copy of person A's brain, and because they have not had the exact same experiences in their lives. His opinion happens to be wrong.
Different causes lead to different effects. that doesn't explain anything. you just bounce determinism off environment and call it explanation. why would the environment, the one giving you those different experiences, be outside (universal) determinism?. your explanation implies a brain influenced by outside non-determined forces is wrong?. at best for you, it's a mixup of concepts, semantics, but is no way near an explanation for me. when you start from the same premise (everything is determined) then, with the same everything is determined logic, come to two different but equally true conclusions (believe in free will exists, believe in determinism exists) something went terribly wrong. how can the phrase: "i was determined to believe in free will" be wrong? when it follows the deterministic logic. i didn't chose to believe in free will, the determinism made me do it. A kid can be pre-determined to believe that 3*3=6, the fact that he was pre-determined to believe that doesn't made him right. a kid can be pre-determined to believe that free will doesn't exist, the fact that he was pre-determined to believe that doesn't make him right. Being pre-determined to believe something doesn't mean anything. It doesn't make it right or it doesn't make it wrong. It doesn't mean anything. So why are you even talking about it ? you started it . "It doesn't make it right or it doesn't make it wrong" is a fair assessment. but you'd get a problem if determinism and free will (definitions wise) would be opposite/incompatible. in that case there would be no more determinism. you said : "how can the phrase: "i was determined to believe in free will" be wrong? when it follows the deterministic logic. i didn't chose to believe in free will, the determinism made me do it. " Of course it can be wrong, if you believe in something that is wrong, it doesn't matter if you were pre-determined to believe it, you are still wrong. pre-determination doesn't impact the wrong/right in any way. i meant wrong in the context: "i was determined to believe in free will" vs "i was determined to believe in determinism". other then that, you are seeing it wrong - it's not whether or not i was predetermined to believe it, it's more along the lines - the believe was already in my brain before i was aware of it. how can you accuse ME of being wrong if ME had nothing to do with the decision?. best case scenario for you: when determinism made that decision for me, it was wrong (but if you say that, you'll be screwed) Please, you're just arguing over the definitions of words once again (right and wrong in this case). You're simply saying that in a deterministic world you can't be wrong (because you need free-will to be wrong according to you), so you can't be wrong in saying that free-will exist (because free-will doesn't exist). So free-will exist. I sincerely hope you can see why this kind of argument doesn't make any sense. At this point you're just arguing for the sake of it. that is pretty much it and it makes perfect sense. edit: just remember that you think i'm wrong. i only think that we are different but equally right/wrong.
I don't like avoiding debates, but If you think that what I wrote make perfect sense then I really don't know what to say to you, so ... yeah, hf.
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On July 08 2013 01:23 Reason wrote:
Free will exists in a deterministic world so it makes no sense at all, also just because cause and effect has no random element doesn't make everything "right", it just makes it predictable given all the information.
The phrase "talking to you is like talking to a brick-wall" seems like it was made for you...
so, were you talking to me and we agree ... ?
i only used wrong/right in the argument because the determinists called the free willys, wrong. they, introduced the notion of being right/wrong. i used their terminology + logic to prove them otherwise.
or, the only way i would be right, is when you say i'm wrong
shit is sublime, the 3rd generation of humans.
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Okay, I think I understand what you've tried to do there quoting me that piece but since I don't share your views on this matter that which those words make incredibly obvious to you still eludes me. I could begin to construct a response to your point but I'd prefer you did more than allude to before I do so.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
On evidence, I'm talking about something more than hearsay. No, hearsay is not acceptable evidence as far as I'm concerned and I make no apologies for it.
We rely on hearsay for most of what we know. Fundamentally, there are three paths to justification: authority, experience, and reason. We rely on authority, or "hearsay" to establish every truth which we have not come to independently, and in the field of education, that is pretty much everything we know to be true.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
Logical argumentation is a product of consciousness; everything which appears explicitly in the mind. That which is unconscious are the unstated, and unseen assumptions behind them. i.e. Why would you ask "What is this non-material universe you speak of?" rather than "What is this material universe you speak of?" Consciousness is deceptive all the time.
When you think your wife is cheating on you because she stays out late, whereas she was merely visiting her ailing mother is a deception of thought. The fact that we intuitively know the mind as the sovereign and uncaused thing, whereas according to physicalism it is apparently the effect of synaptic reflexes is another example of self-deception.
Physicalist theories of the mind necessarily begin with the assumption that the mind is unreliable.
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On July 08 2013 02:00 lebowskiguy wrote:
to all those who support the existence of free will:
How do you explain the fact that people with brain damage or people who develop tumors in the area of the brain change their decision process drastically? Many of them develop new violent or psychopathic urges and a different completely character overall. Doesn't this mean that our decision making process is tied to the physiology of our brain?
To those who might suggest that this doesn't count because these brains are altered or impaired:
doesn't this mean that for free will to have a meaning or for moral responsibility to meaningfully come into play we should all have the same type of brain with no alterations? (this is of course never the case as there are not even 2 people with the same brain)
How do we exercise free will if our decision making process is irrefutably tied to the physiology of our brain and therefore the laws of the universe?
(these questions are probably relevant only for the people who have a naturalistic view of the world)
The answer is very simple and has no doubt already been given in this thread.
+ Show Spoiler +Everything you've said has absolutely nothing to do with the concept of free will.
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On July 08 2013 01:29 MoltkeWarding wrote:Uhm, Show nested quote +A Simple Child,
That lightly draws its breath,
And feels its life in every limb,
What should it know of death?
I met a little cottage Girl:
She was eight years old, she said;
Her hair was thick with many a curl
That clustered round her head.
She had a rustic, woodland air,
And she was wildly clad:
Her eyes were fair, and very fair;
Her beauty made me glad.
"Sisters and brothers, little Maid,
How many may you be?"
"How many? Seven in all," she said
And wondering looked at me.
"And where are they? I pray you tell."
She answered, "Seven are we;
And two of us at Conway dwell,
And two are gone to sea.
"Two of us in the church-yard lie,
My sister and my brother;
And, in the church-yard cottage, I
Dwell near them with my mother."
"You say that two at Conway dwell,
And two are gone to sea,
Yet ye are seven!--I pray you tell,
Sweet Maid, how this may be."
Then did the little Maid reply,
"Seven boys and girls are we;
Two of us in the church-yard lie,
Beneath the church-yard tree."
"You run above, my little Maid,
Your limbs they are alive;
If two are in the church-yard laid,
Then ye are only five."
"Their graves are green, they may be seen,"
The little Maid replied,
"Twelve steps or more from my mother's door,
And they are side by side.
"My stockings there I often knit,
My kerchief there I hem;
And there upon the ground I sit,
And sing a song to them.
"And often after sun-set, Sir,
When it is light and fair,
I take my little porringer,
And eat my supper there.
"The first that died was sister Jane;
In bed she moaning lay,
Till God released her of her pain;
And then she went away.
"So in the church-yard she was laid;
And, when the grass was dry,
Together round her grave we played,
My brother John and I.
"And when the ground was white with snow,
And I could run and slide,
My brother John was forced to go,
And he lies by her side."
"How many are you, then," said I,
"If they two are in heaven?"
Quick was the little Maid's reply,
"O Master! we are seven."
"But they are dead; those two are dead!
Their spirits are in heaven!"
'Twas throwing words away; for still
The little Maid would have her will,
And said, "Nay, we are seven!" Show nested quote +Also, thinking back to the original argument, why is verification impossible? Proposition A: The products of consciousness are physically-induced illusions. Proposition B: My consciousness has produced proposition A Therefore Proposition A is a physically-induced illusion. Possible, unverifiable. Once you attack the sovereignty of the mind, you cannibalise everything you will ever say from that point on. Show nested quote +When I said fairies, I'm referring to that which we have no reason, no evidence to believe in. I can't say for sure fairies don't exist but see no reason to believe that they do. I have a reason to believe in fairies. A close friend of mine has seen one. Something like one-tenth of the population of Iceland have claimed to see one. The existence of fairies is attested to amid a large swath of medieval literature. Therefore fairies is not "that which we have no reason, no evidence" to believe in. There is evidence, it's simply unacceptable to you.
First off, I don't think spitting out a poem in response to a simple question is very effective. Yes, it makes you appear well read and super academic and awesome, and stuff, but it doesn't really get you any closer to making the people asking you questions understand exactly what you're thinking. If you insist on keeping the poem, you could maybe at least consider attaching an explanation.
Second, with regard to your "proposition A proposition B" tidbit, I think the language you use just makes it seem like you're posing a tricky or important challenge. For starters, the term "product of consciousness" is totally vague. What's a "physically induced illusion"?
Here's my attempt to explain what you are saying there:
A) The products of consciousness -- ideas emanating from the mind, perceptions based on sensory input, mobility governed by intentional motor commands, and the like -- have physical underpinnings and are induced by changes within a structural network of neuronal activity.
B) Sometimes the brain tricks itself though -- that is, the brain produces illusory memories based on incomplete information/injury, or misinterprets sensory information and spits out illusory responses based on any number of causes.
C) Many other minds and many hours of studying the brain caused A) to become well understood. However, just because sometimes B) means ideas and memories aren't accurate representations of reality, it does not mean that what A) says about the brain is also based on illusions. There is no cannibalism of the mind going on here. We can think and conclude without worrying that because illusions are possible, no progress toward better understanding of something is possible.
Third, not all evidence carries the same weight. Historical recollections of a creature existing are weak pieces of evidence. Dated, fossilized bones and ancient, preserved DNA are strong pieces of evidence. Do you perhaps now see why a larger number of people believe dinosaurs existed vs. a smaller number of people believe fairies existed? The evidence for dinosaurs is good evidence while that for fairies is weak to nonexistent. By your example I could justify saying the Lochness Monster is probably real. Hey, a few people out there claim they saw him, so that must mean there's evidence it's out there!
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