|
and for the sake of consistency, i totally understand what moltke is trying to say.
|
On July 08 2013 02:03 MoltkeWarding wrote:
Physicalist theories of the mind necessarily begin with the assumption that the mind is unreliable.
You're being disingenuous here though. The ways in which the mind is unreliable are understood at least to some extent, and are largely predictable.
|
On July 08 2013 02:04 Reason wrote:Show nested quote +On July 08 2013 02:00 lebowskiguy wrote:
to all those who support the existence of free will:
How do you explain the fact that people with brain damage or people who develop tumors in the area of the brain change their decision process drastically? Many of them develop new violent or psychopathic urges and a different completely character overall. Doesn't this mean that our decision making process is tied to the physiology of our brain?
To those who might suggest that this doesn't count because these brains are altered or impaired:
doesn't this mean that for free will to have a meaning or for moral responsibility to meaningfully come into play we should all have the same type of brain with no alterations? (this is of course never the case as there are not even 2 people with the same brain)
How do we exercise free will if our decision making process is irrefutably tied to the physiology of our brain and therefore the laws of the universe?
(these questions are probably relevant only for the people who have a naturalistic view of the world)
The answer is very simple and has no doubt already been given in this thread. + Show Spoiler +Everything you've said has absolutely nothing to do with the concept of free will.
unless you have your own definition of free will ( do share) everything I have said is relevant to the concept of free will. Try to honor your name and reason with me.
|
On July 08 2013 02:11 lebowskiguy wrote:Show nested quote +On July 08 2013 02:04 Reason wrote:On July 08 2013 02:00 lebowskiguy wrote:
to all those who support the existence of free will:
How do you explain the fact that people with brain damage or people who develop tumors in the area of the brain change their decision process drastically? Many of them develop new violent or psychopathic urges and a different completely character overall. Doesn't this mean that our decision making process is tied to the physiology of our brain?
To those who might suggest that this doesn't count because these brains are altered or impaired:
doesn't this mean that for free will to have a meaning or for moral responsibility to meaningfully come into play we should all have the same type of brain with no alterations? (this is of course never the case as there are not even 2 people with the same brain)
How do we exercise free will if our decision making process is irrefutably tied to the physiology of our brain and therefore the laws of the universe?
(these questions are probably relevant only for the people who have a naturalistic view of the world)
The answer is very simple and has no doubt already been given in this thread. + Show Spoiler +Everything you've said has absolutely nothing to do with the concept of free will. unless you have your own definition of free will ( do share) everything I have said is relevant to the concept of free will. Try to honor your name and reason with me.
He's right though, your conclusion doesn't logically follow from anything you've said so far, and what you've said is not really relevant to free will at all.
|
On July 08 2013 01:54 Signet wrote:
I wouldn't call that an "illusion" though. Something more along the lines of an interpretation. What's in the mind is a map, what's actually out there is the territory.
Ah, but once you move from "illusion" to "interpretation," you are a heretic to the doctrine of physicalism, because you are no longer willing to acknowledge that reality has a single, unitary and logically-reducible language.
You're being disingenuous here though. The ways in which the mind is unreliable are understood at least to some extent, and are largely predictable.
The point is we're back begging the same question as Descartes. You cannot deny that the faculty through which you understand the unreliability of the mind is itself unreliable.
|
Maybe the physiology of the brain limits decision making to certain choices, but within that set of choices there could still be room for free will. If the injury causes a permanent sociopathic affect, then although all the choices may stem from sociopathy, there is still choice among them, and the individual is still free to willingly choose among them.
|
On July 08 2013 02:03 MoltkeWarding wrote:Show nested quote +
Okay, I think I understand what you've tried to do there quoting me that piece but since I don't share your views on this matter that which those words make incredibly obvious to you still eludes me. I could begin to construct a response to your point but I'd prefer you did more than allude to before I do so.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
On evidence, I'm talking about something more than hearsay. No, hearsay is not acceptable evidence as far as I'm concerned and I make no apologies for it.
We rely on hearsay for most of what we know. Fundamentally, there are three paths to justification: authority, experience, and reason. We rely on authority, or "hearsay" to establish every truth which we have not come to independently, and in the field of education, that is pretty much everything we know to be true.
Authority and Hearsay are pretty friggin' different. I wouldn't characterize them as the same at all.
Either way, the whole point of science is to reduce the problem of Argument by Authority. This is why you have to make sure your tests are Repeatable, so that anyone with the proper tools can do them. The whole point of Empiricism and science is that we don't have to rely on just "hearsay" or "personal experience." We can collectively do multiple separate fields of research and have them all culminate in scientific theories and bodies of research.
Show nested quote +What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive. Logical argumentation is a product of consciousness; everything which appears explicitly in the mind. That which is unconscious are the unstated, and unseen assumptions behind them. i.e. Why would you ask "What is this non-material universe you speak of?" rather than "What is this material universe you speak of?" Consciousness is deceptive all the time. When you think your wife is cheating on you because she stays out late, whereas she was merely visiting her ailing mother is a deception of thought. The fact that we intuitively know the mind as the sovereign and uncaused thing, whereas according to physicalism it is apparently the effect of synaptic reflexes is another example of self-deception. Physicalist theories of the mind necessarily begin with the assumption that the mind is unreliable.
But we already know the mind is unreliable. I don't even understand this argument. I don't have to even bring up halluncinations and things like that. People think things that are not true all the time. We've thought false things since the beginning of time. You would have to think that thinking something makes it more likely to be true, which is absurd to the point of making me cross-eyed.
But really, "unreliable" is not the correct word. Logic is not how the brain functions. The brain is much more Bayesian than that, and relies almost entirely on previous information. The brain also is evolutionarily adapted for social behavior, rather than logic, which is why humans are prone to things like the conjunction fallacy, which mistakes plausibility for probability.
On July 08 2013 02:17 MoltkeWarding wrote:Show nested quote +On July 08 2013 01:54 Signet wrote:
I wouldn't call that an "illusion" though. Something more along the lines of an interpretation. What's in the mind is a map, what's actually out there is the territory. Ah, but once you move from "illusion" to "interpretation," you are a heretic to the doctrine of physicalism, because you are no longer willing to acknowledge that reality has a single, unitary and logically-reducible language.
What? No you aren't. I have no idea what you're talking about. Saying that there is an objective reality does not mean that there aren't different perspectives on the same thing. Hell, how would I explain different camera angles???? You're being silly.
And also, physicalism really has very little to do with language.
|
On July 08 2013 02:17 FallDownMarigold wrote:
Maybe the physiology of the brain limits decision making to certain choices, but within that set of choices there could still be room for free will. If the injury causes a permanent sociopathic affect, then although all the choices may stem from sociopathy, there is still choice among them, and the individual is still free to willingly choose among them.
I would agree with this.
Injury that results in a change of behaviour is a constraint upon an individual's free will. The individual still has free will, but the set of choices is constrained.
Similarly for the same person prior to the injury, there were still constraints-it's only in the contrasted scenario is it apparent that new constraints (due to the injury) exist.
|
On July 08 2013 02:11 lebowskiguy wrote:Show nested quote +On July 08 2013 02:04 Reason wrote:On July 08 2013 02:00 lebowskiguy wrote:
to all those who support the existence of free will:
How do you explain the fact that people with brain damage or people who develop tumors in the area of the brain change their decision process drastically? Many of them develop new violent or psychopathic urges and a different completely character overall. Doesn't this mean that our decision making process is tied to the physiology of our brain?
To those who might suggest that this doesn't count because these brains are altered or impaired:
doesn't this mean that for free will to have a meaning or for moral responsibility to meaningfully come into play we should all have the same type of brain with no alterations? (this is of course never the case as there are not even 2 people with the same brain)
How do we exercise free will if our decision making process is irrefutably tied to the physiology of our brain and therefore the laws of the universe?
(these questions are probably relevant only for the people who have a naturalistic view of the world)
The answer is very simple and has no doubt already been given in this thread. + Show Spoiler +Everything you've said has absolutely nothing to do with the concept of free will. unless you have your own definition of free will ( do share) everything I have said is relevant to the concept of free will. Try to honor your name and reason with me.
Very well my good man, I shall do so.
Free will
The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion.
The key here is that free will means at one's own discretion. You do what you want, because you want to do it. Your choices are your own.
The reason you want to do things is entirely dependent upon what your brain tells you that you want. If you alter the brain, so desire is also altered. Yes, our decision making process is more than tied to the physiology of the brain, it's absolutely governed by it.
Free will doesn't mean anything apart from free will. On moral responsibility, what you're saying there is "people that murder are simply acting on their natural impulses and so therefore should not be punished".
We exercise free will the same way we always have, just because we are subject to the laws of the universe doesn't change anything.
On July 08 2013 02:03 MoltkeWarding wrote:Show nested quote +
Okay, I think I understand what you've tried to do there quoting me that piece but since I don't share your views on this matter that which those words make incredibly obvious to you still eludes me. I could begin to construct a response to your point but I'd prefer you did more than allude to before I do so.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
On evidence, I'm talking about something more than hearsay. No, hearsay is not acceptable evidence as far as I'm concerned and I make no apologies for it.
We rely on hearsay for most of what we know. Fundamentally, there are three paths to justification: authority, experience, and reason. We rely on authority, or "hearsay" to establish every truth which we have not come to independently, and in the field of education, that is pretty much everything we know to be true. Show nested quote +What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive. Logical argumentation is a product of consciousness; everything which appears explicitly in the mind. That which is unconscious are the unstated, and unseen assumptions behind them. i.e. Why would you ask "What is this non-material universe you speak of?" rather than "What is this material universe you speak of?" Consciousness is deceptive all the time. When you think your wife is cheating on you because she stays out late, whereas she was merely visiting her ailing mother is a deception of thought. The fact that we intuitively know the mind as the sovereign and uncaused thing, whereas according to physicalism it is apparently the effect of synaptic reflexes is another example of self-deception. Physicalist theories of the mind necessarily begin with the assumption that the mind is unreliable.
You still haven't explained what you meant by the poem...
I understood what you meant by material universe, that is why I asked the other question, there's nothing deceptive there.
I don't believe the mind is uncaused, I have no such self-deception. I'm aware that sometimes I'm certain of something and other times I'm fairly sure, other times yet I'm wildly speculating and other times I'm dreaming. The mind may not be infallible but this does not make logical conclusions reached by this mind any less correct.
Thanks for responses, everything else you mentioned is being discussed in greater detail by others so I'll leave it there.
|
On July 08 2013 02:14 wherebugsgo wrote:Show nested quote +On July 08 2013 02:11 lebowskiguy wrote:On July 08 2013 02:04 Reason wrote:On July 08 2013 02:00 lebowskiguy wrote:
to all those who support the existence of free will:
How do you explain the fact that people with brain damage or people who develop tumors in the area of the brain change their decision process drastically? Many of them develop new violent or psychopathic urges and a different completely character overall. Doesn't this mean that our decision making process is tied to the physiology of our brain?
To those who might suggest that this doesn't count because these brains are altered or impaired:
doesn't this mean that for free will to have a meaning or for moral responsibility to meaningfully come into play we should all have the same type of brain with no alterations? (this is of course never the case as there are not even 2 people with the same brain)
How do we exercise free will if our decision making process is irrefutably tied to the physiology of our brain and therefore the laws of the universe?
(these questions are probably relevant only for the people who have a naturalistic view of the world)
The answer is very simple and has no doubt already been given in this thread. + Show Spoiler +Everything you've said has absolutely nothing to do with the concept of free will. unless you have your own definition of free will ( do share) everything I have said is relevant to the concept of free will. Try to honor your name and reason with me. He's right though, your conclusion doesn't logically follow from anything you've said so far, and what you've said is not really relevant to free will at all.
I assume free will has to do with decision making or else what is it good for?
Free will is (google): the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion.
Everything I have said in that post is 100% relevant. The alterations of your brain change your decision making process, they prove that your decision making process follows material laws; these laws are either probabilistic or deterministic or a combination of both. Now it is you that has to find room for your "free will" concept, because I sure can't
|
On July 08 2013 02:18 DoubleReed wrote:But really, "unreliable" is not the correct word. Logic is not how the brain functions. The brain is much more Bayesian than that, and relies almost entirely on previous information. The brain also is evolutionarily adapted for social behavior, rather than logic, which is why humans are prone to things like the conjunction fallacy, which mistakes plausibility for probability.
While I mostly agree with what you're saying, I just wanted to point out that the initial experiments done on the conjunction fallacy are rather dubious because of the way the questions were posed/worded.
The question about the Soviet Union, for example, may imply that the U.S. breaking relations with the Soviet Union over an invasion is different from the U.S. breaking relations for no reason.
The debiased experiment tends to frame the question more clearly and far fewer people fail that one.
On July 08 2013 02:29 lebowskiguy wrote:Show nested quote +On July 08 2013 02:14 wherebugsgo wrote:On July 08 2013 02:11 lebowskiguy wrote:On July 08 2013 02:04 Reason wrote:On July 08 2013 02:00 lebowskiguy wrote:
to all those who support the existence of free will:
How do you explain the fact that people with brain damage or people who develop tumors in the area of the brain change their decision process drastically? Many of them develop new violent or psychopathic urges and a different completely character overall. Doesn't this mean that our decision making process is tied to the physiology of our brain?
To those who might suggest that this doesn't count because these brains are altered or impaired:
doesn't this mean that for free will to have a meaning or for moral responsibility to meaningfully come into play we should all have the same type of brain with no alterations? (this is of course never the case as there are not even 2 people with the same brain)
How do we exercise free will if our decision making process is irrefutably tied to the physiology of our brain and therefore the laws of the universe?
(these questions are probably relevant only for the people who have a naturalistic view of the world)
The answer is very simple and has no doubt already been given in this thread. + Show Spoiler +Everything you've said has absolutely nothing to do with the concept of free will. unless you have your own definition of free will ( do share) everything I have said is relevant to the concept of free will. Try to honor your name and reason with me. He's right though, your conclusion doesn't logically follow from anything you've said so far, and what you've said is not really relevant to free will at all. I assume free will has to do with decision making or else what is it good for? Free will is (google): the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion. Everything I have said in that post is 100% relevant. The alterations of your brain change your decision making process, they prove that your decision making process follows material laws; these laws are either probabilistic or deterministic or a combination of both. Now it is you that has to find room for your "free will" concept, because I sure can't
No, it isn't. A change in the physiology of your brain is not due to a constraint of necessity or fate. You still act at your own discretion, unless you are suggesting that no one has free will to begin with.
|
On July 07 2013 23:53 Snusmumriken wrote:Show nested quote +On July 07 2013 22:40 Zahir wrote:On July 07 2013 20:02 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 07:26 EatThePath wrote:On July 07 2013 04:23 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 03:15 EatThePath wrote:On July 06 2013 22:34 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 06 2013 17:55 DertoQq wrote:On July 06 2013 17:18 LuckyFool wrote:On July 06 2013 16:26 SnipedSoul wrote:
[quote]
I can make the same argument about the weather. The weather is obscenely complex and cannot be predicted with any sort of accuracy outside of a window of a few days. Hell, we still can't tell with much certainty whether or not it will rain unless there's a ton of dark storm clouds coming.
We know all the basic laws that govern the weather such as chemical composition of the local atmosphere, heat transfer, fluid mechanics, pressure changes, etc. The only thing we cannot figure out about the weather is how all these things interact because it's simply too complex for us to make a proper model.
Is it ignorant to assume that the weather is nothing more than chemicals and thermal energy just because we don't have a complete understanding of it? I see your point but I don't really like the weather analogy. We suck at predicting the weather before it happens, but it's nothing as complicated as the human brain. We can very easily go back and see what happened to cause a weather event to occur. We can't however go back and figure out what prompted a human decision in any way. (Purely from a physical/matter standpoint) A seemingly random shift in the jet stream happens that a forecast didn't account for which changes the weather, we see this and say "well that's why it ended up sunny today!" If only understanding brain activity were as simple as shifts in a jet stream. The Weather / brain analogy is a good one. You're saying that it is not because one is more complicated than the other, how do you know that ? Complexity is something very tricky. Maybe we will be able to create perfect human AI and read mind with 100% accuracy before we can predict the weather. Complexity is not a good argument. We know how a game of starcraft work, but we will probably never (ok maybe someday, never is a long time) be able to predict the perfect way to play (like we can do with games like checkers or tic tac toe), the complexity is simply way too high. Does this mean we don't understand how the game is done ? Or that there is something mystical about starcraft ? We just know for a fact that we don't have the technology to do that. Also, don't underestimate what we know about the brain, unlike everything you might hear (scientists are modest people !), the field of neurology is extremely advanced. The problem of consciousness is not about complexity. You're completely missing the mark. There are many things about what we ordinarily call consciousness or consider part of it that aren't subject to controversy. Aspects of memory for example are likely explainable with physical language alone. The real problem is why im actually experiencing something when I think of a particularly good moment in my life. There is currently no one who can explain or even give something close to a coherent explanaition of how the qualitative aspects of consciousness (qualia) can exist in a purely physical world. In the end we either end up with a physical world we no longer can make sense of, or we pretend there's no ghost in the machine when there clearly is (eliminativists do this). The problem is there is a ghost, that we cannot doubt, but for all we know there really shouldn't be. David Chalmers on Consciousness The appeal to qualia is so misguided; I don't get why this is still a thing. Why can't there be unique states of a system based upon unique inputs? The universe will never be in the same state twice, nor will you or I, first of all because we're different and second for the same reason the universe won't. You make a philosophical hypothetical proposition that qualia could be identified because they could be in principle, and then go on to say that physicalism doesn't handle this. You're right! Why would an impossible hypothetical be manifest in reality? This is no kind of argument against physicalism. 1. How does that have any bearing on the issue at hand? 2. I dont have to make any hypothetical proposition regarding subjective experience, its quite evident to all of us I'd say. To quote Sam Harris, "it's the one thing that cannot be an illusion". There are various reasons for why non-physical explanations of consciousness fail to deliver, but physicalism is just slightly less nonsensical. To refer to qualia is to inject subjectivity into your ontology, and I don't see any grounds for doing this, but more importantly it's just a claim, not an argument. With regard to 2, I agree consciousness doesn't make obvious sense. It need not be intuitive, though? Subjectivity is the one thing any ontology of the world can't do without. To try and circumvent the one truly obvious thing to each and every self-conscious being is just bad science and bad metaphysics. It reminds me of how Moore responds to the skeptic: "This is a hand". Well here the skeptics position is being held by the eliminativist who claims that somehow the very thing that cant be an illusion actually is! I may be mistaken about the unicorn I saw in the forest, I may be mistaken about there being a forest, but its impossible for me to be mistaken about there being the experience of seeing a forest. Indeed few neuroscientists and philosophers of mind hold the elminativist position, among the few are the Churchlands and in some sense Dan Dennett (though it is somewhat unclear to me if he truly is a hardcore elminativist or more of a soft one, I lean towards the latter). More often we find reductionists, but I have yet to see an example of anyone actually making sense of the idea that the actual taste of ice-cream, while not an illusion in the eliminativist sense, is simply neurological activity. That is not to say that epiphenomenalists or property-dualists are in a better place, in my opinion its an even bigger mess in a lot of ways. ps. Some types of epiphenomenalism may be in a similar spot as reductive physicalism with "only" one big issue. Jaegwon Kim holds the position that only intrinsic properties of qualia are epiphenomenal for example, and that qualia as relational properties are reducible. I don't think that position makes any sense whatsoever though. It's not impossible for you to be mistaken about there being experiences, it's impossible for you to NOT be mistaken. Consider that a p zombie (brain without consciousness) would have no way of realizing it wasn't conscious. Assuming that our brains are somehow impervious to the same physical phenomenon that cause beliefs to arise within a theoretical metaphysically 'conscious' person, is to assume to existence of metaphysics from the start. First of all, the possibility of zombies is a pretty hot potato. Not that many would agree that theyre even possible. Secondly, I have no idea what you're saying there. What is a "theoretical metaphysically 'conscious' person" exactly? Why would one assume that "our brains are impervious to the physical phenomenon that cause beliefs to arise", when that is clearly not the case as beliefs, excluding the phenomenal parts, are quite clearly caused by our brains. At the end of the day, assuming zombies are possible, the zombie is still in the same boat as a computer. Or a rock. There is nothing mystical going on when a zombie is "mistaken", and indeed talking about being "mistaken" about having experiences is like talking about a computer being "mistaken". its nonsense. The zombie isn't phenomenally conscious in the first place and its beliefs are thus analogous to the "beliefs" of a computer. I on the other hand cannot be sure about others having experiences, but I cannot doubt my very own phenomenal experiences at this moment.
That's what I'm trying to get at, you literally cannot doubt it, whether it's true or not. The conundrum being discussed is why people feel like they are conscious rather than not feel like they are conscious. My point is how do you rule out the latter possibility? You can't, because the evidence for the former is exactly the same as for the latter: in either case, your brain would believe itself to be conscious, due to its chemical/electrical state being identical in both cases.
|
On July 08 2013 02:03 MoltkeWarding wrote:Show nested quote +
Okay, I think I understand what you've tried to do there quoting me that piece but since I don't share your views on this matter that which those words make incredibly obvious to you still eludes me. I could begin to construct a response to your point but I'd prefer you did more than allude to before I do so.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
On evidence, I'm talking about something more than hearsay. No, hearsay is not acceptable evidence as far as I'm concerned and I make no apologies for it.
We rely on hearsay for most of what we know. Fundamentally, there are three paths to justification: authority, experience, and reason. We rely on authority, or "hearsay" to establish every truth which we have not come to independently, and in the field of education, that is pretty much everything we know to be true. Show nested quote +What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive. Logical argumentation is a product of consciousness; everything which appears explicitly in the mind. That which is unconscious are the unstated, and unseen assumptions behind them. i.e. Why would you ask "What is this non-material universe you speak of?" rather than "What is this material universe you speak of?" Consciousness is deceptive all the time. When you think your wife is cheating on you because she stays out late, whereas she was merely visiting her ailing mother is a deception of thought. The fact that we intuitively know the mind as the sovereign and uncaused thing, whereas according to physicalism it is apparently the effect of synaptic reflexes is another example of self-deception. Physicalist theories of the mind necessarily begin with the assumption that the mind is unreliable.
Are you a solipsist? I'm sure you understand why people are hesitant to accept a position that's unfalsifiable by definition.
|
On July 08 2013 02:32 Zahir wrote:Show nested quote +On July 07 2013 23:53 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 22:40 Zahir wrote:On July 07 2013 20:02 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 07:26 EatThePath wrote:On July 07 2013 04:23 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 03:15 EatThePath wrote:On July 06 2013 22:34 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 06 2013 17:55 DertoQq wrote:On July 06 2013 17:18 LuckyFool wrote:
[quote]
I see your point but I don't really like the weather analogy. We suck at predicting the weather before it happens, but it's nothing as complicated as the human brain. We can very easily go back and see what happened to cause a weather event to occur. We can't however go back and figure out what prompted a human decision in any way. (Purely from a physical/matter standpoint)
A seemingly random shift in the jet stream happens that a forecast didn't account for which changes the weather, we see this and say "well that's why it ended up sunny today!" If only understanding brain activity were as simple as shifts in a jet stream. The Weather / brain analogy is a good one. You're saying that it is not because one is more complicated than the other, how do you know that ? Complexity is something very tricky. Maybe we will be able to create perfect human AI and read mind with 100% accuracy before we can predict the weather. Complexity is not a good argument. We know how a game of starcraft work, but we will probably never (ok maybe someday, never is a long time) be able to predict the perfect way to play (like we can do with games like checkers or tic tac toe), the complexity is simply way too high. Does this mean we don't understand how the game is done ? Or that there is something mystical about starcraft ? We just know for a fact that we don't have the technology to do that. Also, don't underestimate what we know about the brain, unlike everything you might hear (scientists are modest people !), the field of neurology is extremely advanced. The problem of consciousness is not about complexity. You're completely missing the mark. There are many things about what we ordinarily call consciousness or consider part of it that aren't subject to controversy. Aspects of memory for example are likely explainable with physical language alone. The real problem is why im actually experiencing something when I think of a particularly good moment in my life. There is currently no one who can explain or even give something close to a coherent explanaition of how the qualitative aspects of consciousness (qualia) can exist in a purely physical world. In the end we either end up with a physical world we no longer can make sense of, or we pretend there's no ghost in the machine when there clearly is (eliminativists do this). The problem is there is a ghost, that we cannot doubt, but for all we know there really shouldn't be. David Chalmers on Consciousness The appeal to qualia is so misguided; I don't get why this is still a thing. Why can't there be unique states of a system based upon unique inputs? The universe will never be in the same state twice, nor will you or I, first of all because we're different and second for the same reason the universe won't. You make a philosophical hypothetical proposition that qualia could be identified because they could be in principle, and then go on to say that physicalism doesn't handle this. You're right! Why would an impossible hypothetical be manifest in reality? This is no kind of argument against physicalism. 1. How does that have any bearing on the issue at hand? 2. I dont have to make any hypothetical proposition regarding subjective experience, its quite evident to all of us I'd say. To quote Sam Harris, "it's the one thing that cannot be an illusion". There are various reasons for why non-physical explanations of consciousness fail to deliver, but physicalism is just slightly less nonsensical. To refer to qualia is to inject subjectivity into your ontology, and I don't see any grounds for doing this, but more importantly it's just a claim, not an argument. With regard to 2, I agree consciousness doesn't make obvious sense. It need not be intuitive, though? Subjectivity is the one thing any ontology of the world can't do without. To try and circumvent the one truly obvious thing to each and every self-conscious being is just bad science and bad metaphysics. It reminds me of how Moore responds to the skeptic: "This is a hand". Well here the skeptics position is being held by the eliminativist who claims that somehow the very thing that cant be an illusion actually is! I may be mistaken about the unicorn I saw in the forest, I may be mistaken about there being a forest, but its impossible for me to be mistaken about there being the experience of seeing a forest. Indeed few neuroscientists and philosophers of mind hold the elminativist position, among the few are the Churchlands and in some sense Dan Dennett (though it is somewhat unclear to me if he truly is a hardcore elminativist or more of a soft one, I lean towards the latter). More often we find reductionists, but I have yet to see an example of anyone actually making sense of the idea that the actual taste of ice-cream, while not an illusion in the eliminativist sense, is simply neurological activity. That is not to say that epiphenomenalists or property-dualists are in a better place, in my opinion its an even bigger mess in a lot of ways. ps. Some types of epiphenomenalism may be in a similar spot as reductive physicalism with "only" one big issue. Jaegwon Kim holds the position that only intrinsic properties of qualia are epiphenomenal for example, and that qualia as relational properties are reducible. I don't think that position makes any sense whatsoever though. It's not impossible for you to be mistaken about there being experiences, it's impossible for you to NOT be mistaken. Consider that a p zombie (brain without consciousness) would have no way of realizing it wasn't conscious. Assuming that our brains are somehow impervious to the same physical phenomenon that cause beliefs to arise within a theoretical metaphysically 'conscious' person, is to assume to existence of metaphysics from the start. First of all, the possibility of zombies is a pretty hot potato. Not that many would agree that theyre even possible. Secondly, I have no idea what you're saying there. What is a "theoretical metaphysically 'conscious' person" exactly? Why would one assume that "our brains are impervious to the physical phenomenon that cause beliefs to arise", when that is clearly not the case as beliefs, excluding the phenomenal parts, are quite clearly caused by our brains. At the end of the day, assuming zombies are possible, the zombie is still in the same boat as a computer. Or a rock. There is nothing mystical going on when a zombie is "mistaken", and indeed talking about being "mistaken" about having experiences is like talking about a computer being "mistaken". its nonsense. The zombie isn't phenomenally conscious in the first place and its beliefs are thus analogous to the "beliefs" of a computer. I on the other hand cannot be sure about others having experiences, but I cannot doubt my very own phenomenal experiences at this moment. That's what I'm trying to get at, you literally cannot doubt it, whether it's true or not. The conundrum being discussed is why people feel like they are conscious rather than not feel like they are conscious. My point is how do you rule out the latter possibility? You can't, because the evidence for the former is exactly the same as for the latter: in either case, your brain would believe itself to be conscious, due to its chemical/electrical state being identical in both cases.
Actually, you've just ruled out the latter possibility. Not sure if you meant to word that the way you did.
|
On July 08 2013 02:35 politik wrote:Show nested quote +On July 08 2013 02:03 MoltkeWarding wrote:
Okay, I think I understand what you've tried to do there quoting me that piece but since I don't share your views on this matter that which those words make incredibly obvious to you still eludes me. I could begin to construct a response to your point but I'd prefer you did more than allude to before I do so.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
On evidence, I'm talking about something more than hearsay. No, hearsay is not acceptable evidence as far as I'm concerned and I make no apologies for it.
We rely on hearsay for most of what we know. Fundamentally, there are three paths to justification: authority, experience, and reason. We rely on authority, or "hearsay" to establish every truth which we have not come to independently, and in the field of education, that is pretty much everything we know to be true. What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive. Logical argumentation is a product of consciousness; everything which appears explicitly in the mind. That which is unconscious are the unstated, and unseen assumptions behind them. i.e. Why would you ask "What is this non-material universe you speak of?" rather than "What is this material universe you speak of?" Consciousness is deceptive all the time. When you think your wife is cheating on you because she stays out late, whereas she was merely visiting her ailing mother is a deception of thought. The fact that we intuitively know the mind as the sovereign and uncaused thing, whereas according to physicalism it is apparently the effect of synaptic reflexes is another example of self-deception. Physicalist theories of the mind necessarily begin with the assumption that the mind is unreliable. Are you a solipsist? I'm sure you understand why people are hesitant to accept a position that's unfalsifiable by definition.
"Consciousness exists because i am conscious" is just as unfalsifiable. Unfortunately certain organic thinking machines find it compellingly intuitive.
|
On July 08 2013 02:32 Zahir wrote:Show nested quote +On July 07 2013 23:53 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 22:40 Zahir wrote:On July 07 2013 20:02 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 07:26 EatThePath wrote:On July 07 2013 04:23 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 03:15 EatThePath wrote:On July 06 2013 22:34 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 06 2013 17:55 DertoQq wrote:On July 06 2013 17:18 LuckyFool wrote:
[quote]
I see your point but I don't really like the weather analogy. We suck at predicting the weather before it happens, but it's nothing as complicated as the human brain. We can very easily go back and see what happened to cause a weather event to occur. We can't however go back and figure out what prompted a human decision in any way. (Purely from a physical/matter standpoint)
A seemingly random shift in the jet stream happens that a forecast didn't account for which changes the weather, we see this and say "well that's why it ended up sunny today!" If only understanding brain activity were as simple as shifts in a jet stream. The Weather / brain analogy is a good one. You're saying that it is not because one is more complicated than the other, how do you know that ? Complexity is something very tricky. Maybe we will be able to create perfect human AI and read mind with 100% accuracy before we can predict the weather. Complexity is not a good argument. We know how a game of starcraft work, but we will probably never (ok maybe someday, never is a long time) be able to predict the perfect way to play (like we can do with games like checkers or tic tac toe), the complexity is simply way too high. Does this mean we don't understand how the game is done ? Or that there is something mystical about starcraft ? We just know for a fact that we don't have the technology to do that. Also, don't underestimate what we know about the brain, unlike everything you might hear (scientists are modest people !), the field of neurology is extremely advanced. The problem of consciousness is not about complexity. You're completely missing the mark. There are many things about what we ordinarily call consciousness or consider part of it that aren't subject to controversy. Aspects of memory for example are likely explainable with physical language alone. The real problem is why im actually experiencing something when I think of a particularly good moment in my life. There is currently no one who can explain or even give something close to a coherent explanaition of how the qualitative aspects of consciousness (qualia) can exist in a purely physical world. In the end we either end up with a physical world we no longer can make sense of, or we pretend there's no ghost in the machine when there clearly is (eliminativists do this). The problem is there is a ghost, that we cannot doubt, but for all we know there really shouldn't be. David Chalmers on Consciousness The appeal to qualia is so misguided; I don't get why this is still a thing. Why can't there be unique states of a system based upon unique inputs? The universe will never be in the same state twice, nor will you or I, first of all because we're different and second for the same reason the universe won't. You make a philosophical hypothetical proposition that qualia could be identified because they could be in principle, and then go on to say that physicalism doesn't handle this. You're right! Why would an impossible hypothetical be manifest in reality? This is no kind of argument against physicalism. 1. How does that have any bearing on the issue at hand? 2. I dont have to make any hypothetical proposition regarding subjective experience, its quite evident to all of us I'd say. To quote Sam Harris, "it's the one thing that cannot be an illusion". There are various reasons for why non-physical explanations of consciousness fail to deliver, but physicalism is just slightly less nonsensical. To refer to qualia is to inject subjectivity into your ontology, and I don't see any grounds for doing this, but more importantly it's just a claim, not an argument. With regard to 2, I agree consciousness doesn't make obvious sense. It need not be intuitive, though? Subjectivity is the one thing any ontology of the world can't do without. To try and circumvent the one truly obvious thing to each and every self-conscious being is just bad science and bad metaphysics. It reminds me of how Moore responds to the skeptic: "This is a hand". Well here the skeptics position is being held by the eliminativist who claims that somehow the very thing that cant be an illusion actually is! I may be mistaken about the unicorn I saw in the forest, I may be mistaken about there being a forest, but its impossible for me to be mistaken about there being the experience of seeing a forest. Indeed few neuroscientists and philosophers of mind hold the elminativist position, among the few are the Churchlands and in some sense Dan Dennett (though it is somewhat unclear to me if he truly is a hardcore elminativist or more of a soft one, I lean towards the latter). More often we find reductionists, but I have yet to see an example of anyone actually making sense of the idea that the actual taste of ice-cream, while not an illusion in the eliminativist sense, is simply neurological activity. That is not to say that epiphenomenalists or property-dualists are in a better place, in my opinion its an even bigger mess in a lot of ways. ps. Some types of epiphenomenalism may be in a similar spot as reductive physicalism with "only" one big issue. Jaegwon Kim holds the position that only intrinsic properties of qualia are epiphenomenal for example, and that qualia as relational properties are reducible. I don't think that position makes any sense whatsoever though. It's not impossible for you to be mistaken about there being experiences, it's impossible for you to NOT be mistaken. Consider that a p zombie (brain without consciousness) would have no way of realizing it wasn't conscious. Assuming that our brains are somehow impervious to the same physical phenomenon that cause beliefs to arise within a theoretical metaphysically 'conscious' person, is to assume to existence of metaphysics from the start. First of all, the possibility of zombies is a pretty hot potato. Not that many would agree that theyre even possible. Secondly, I have no idea what you're saying there. What is a "theoretical metaphysically 'conscious' person" exactly? Why would one assume that "our brains are impervious to the physical phenomenon that cause beliefs to arise", when that is clearly not the case as beliefs, excluding the phenomenal parts, are quite clearly caused by our brains. At the end of the day, assuming zombies are possible, the zombie is still in the same boat as a computer. Or a rock. There is nothing mystical going on when a zombie is "mistaken", and indeed talking about being "mistaken" about having experiences is like talking about a computer being "mistaken". its nonsense. The zombie isn't phenomenally conscious in the first place and its beliefs are thus analogous to the "beliefs" of a computer. I on the other hand cannot be sure about others having experiences, but I cannot doubt my very own phenomenal experiences at this moment. That's what I'm trying to get at, you literally cannot doubt it, whether it's true or not. The conundrum being discussed is why people feel like they are conscious rather than not feel like they are conscious. My point is how do you rule out the latter possibility? You can't, because the evidence for the former is exactly the same as for the latter: in either case, your brain would believe itself to be conscious, due to its chemical/electrical state being identical in both cases.
Source please.
Are you saying that when you don't feel conscious (i.e. when you are asleep or otherwise unconscious) your brain's state is the same as when you are conscious (i.e. awake)?
That doesn't make sense and doesn't hold up with empirical evidence either.
|
On July 08 2013 02:39 Zahir wrote:Show nested quote +On July 08 2013 02:35 politik wrote:On July 08 2013 02:03 MoltkeWarding wrote:
Okay, I think I understand what you've tried to do there quoting me that piece but since I don't share your views on this matter that which those words make incredibly obvious to you still eludes me. I could begin to construct a response to your point but I'd prefer you did more than allude to before I do so.
What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive.
On evidence, I'm talking about something more than hearsay. No, hearsay is not acceptable evidence as far as I'm concerned and I make no apologies for it.
We rely on hearsay for most of what we know. Fundamentally, there are three paths to justification: authority, experience, and reason. We rely on authority, or "hearsay" to establish every truth which we have not come to independently, and in the field of education, that is pretty much everything we know to be true. What are you referring to when you say the products of conciousness? From what I gather I see no reason to regard them as false or deceptive. Logical argumentation is a product of consciousness; everything which appears explicitly in the mind. That which is unconscious are the unstated, and unseen assumptions behind them. i.e. Why would you ask "What is this non-material universe you speak of?" rather than "What is this material universe you speak of?" Consciousness is deceptive all the time. When you think your wife is cheating on you because she stays out late, whereas she was merely visiting her ailing mother is a deception of thought. The fact that we intuitively know the mind as the sovereign and uncaused thing, whereas according to physicalism it is apparently the effect of synaptic reflexes is another example of self-deception. Physicalist theories of the mind necessarily begin with the assumption that the mind is unreliable. Are you a solipsist? I'm sure you understand why people are hesitant to accept a position that's unfalsifiable by definition. "Consciousness exists because i am conscious" is just as unfalsifiable. Unfortunately certain organic thinking machines find it compellingly intuitive.
I miss the part where I claimed this?
|
On July 08 2013 02:21 Reason wrote:
Very well my good man, I shall do so.
Free will
The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion.
The key here is that free will means at one's own discretion. You do what you want, because you want to do it. Your choices are your own.
The reason you want to do things is entirely dependent upon what your brain tells you that you want. If you alter the brain, so desire is also altered. Yes, our decision making process is more than tied to the physiology of the brain, it's absolutely governed by it.
Free will doesn't mean anything apart from free will. On moral responsibility, what you're saying there is "people that murder are simply acting on their natural impulses and so therefore should not be punished".
We exercise free will the same way we always have, just because we are subject to the laws of the universe doesn't change anything.
In most discussions of free will, it's hard to get everyone agreeing on an exact definition. What you're saying is one (compatibilist) definition, but not all philosophers agree with the idea that free will is compatible with determinism. They'd argue that determinism violates the first part of your definition ("the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate"), and that basically in order to truly have "the ability to act at one's own discretion," the functioning of one's mind cannot come down to the laws of physics. There must be an additional component where you choose A or B, and that regardless of the physical state of your mind right before the decision, you must actually be able to choose A (and all the neurological consequences that implies) or choose B (and all the different neurological consequences that implies). Determinism, some argue, makes it so that only one of A or B is a choice you are physically capable of making.
You still choose A because you "want to" in the sense that your internal narrative and your preference function says that that is what you want, which fits the compatibilist definition of free will. But it doesn't really fit the libertarian definition.
|
On July 08 2013 02:37 Reason wrote:Show nested quote +On July 08 2013 02:32 Zahir wrote:On July 07 2013 23:53 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 22:40 Zahir wrote:On July 07 2013 20:02 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 07:26 EatThePath wrote:On July 07 2013 04:23 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 07 2013 03:15 EatThePath wrote:On July 06 2013 22:34 Snusmumriken wrote:On July 06 2013 17:55 DertoQq wrote:
[quote]
The Weather / brain analogy is a good one. You're saying that it is not because one is more complicated than the other, how do you know that ? Complexity is something very tricky. Maybe we will be able to create perfect human AI and read mind with 100% accuracy before we can predict the weather. Complexity is not a good argument.
We know how a game of starcraft work, but we will probably never (ok maybe someday, never is a long time) be able to predict the perfect way to play (like we can do with games like checkers or tic tac toe), the complexity is simply way too high. Does this mean we don't understand how the game is done ? Or that there is something mystical about starcraft ? We just know for a fact that we don't have the technology to do that.
Also, don't underestimate what we know about the brain, unlike everything you might hear (scientists are modest people !), the field of neurology is extremely advanced.
The problem of consciousness is not about complexity. You're completely missing the mark. There are many things about what we ordinarily call consciousness or consider part of it that aren't subject to controversy. Aspects of memory for example are likely explainable with physical language alone. The real problem is why im actually experiencing something when I think of a particularly good moment in my life. There is currently no one who can explain or even give something close to a coherent explanaition of how the qualitative aspects of consciousness (qualia) can exist in a purely physical world. In the end we either end up with a physical world we no longer can make sense of, or we pretend there's no ghost in the machine when there clearly is (eliminativists do this). The problem is there is a ghost, that we cannot doubt, but for all we know there really shouldn't be. David Chalmers on Consciousness The appeal to qualia is so misguided; I don't get why this is still a thing. Why can't there be unique states of a system based upon unique inputs? The universe will never be in the same state twice, nor will you or I, first of all because we're different and second for the same reason the universe won't. You make a philosophical hypothetical proposition that qualia could be identified because they could be in principle, and then go on to say that physicalism doesn't handle this. You're right! Why would an impossible hypothetical be manifest in reality? This is no kind of argument against physicalism. 1. How does that have any bearing on the issue at hand? 2. I dont have to make any hypothetical proposition regarding subjective experience, its quite evident to all of us I'd say. To quote Sam Harris, "it's the one thing that cannot be an illusion". There are various reasons for why non-physical explanations of consciousness fail to deliver, but physicalism is just slightly less nonsensical. To refer to qualia is to inject subjectivity into your ontology, and I don't see any grounds for doing this, but more importantly it's just a claim, not an argument. With regard to 2, I agree consciousness doesn't make obvious sense. It need not be intuitive, though? Subjectivity is the one thing any ontology of the world can't do without. To try and circumvent the one truly obvious thing to each and every self-conscious being is just bad science and bad metaphysics. It reminds me of how Moore responds to the skeptic: "This is a hand". Well here the skeptics position is being held by the eliminativist who claims that somehow the very thing that cant be an illusion actually is! I may be mistaken about the unicorn I saw in the forest, I may be mistaken about there being a forest, but its impossible for me to be mistaken about there being the experience of seeing a forest. Indeed few neuroscientists and philosophers of mind hold the elminativist position, among the few are the Churchlands and in some sense Dan Dennett (though it is somewhat unclear to me if he truly is a hardcore elminativist or more of a soft one, I lean towards the latter). More often we find reductionists, but I have yet to see an example of anyone actually making sense of the idea that the actual taste of ice-cream, while not an illusion in the eliminativist sense, is simply neurological activity. That is not to say that epiphenomenalists or property-dualists are in a better place, in my opinion its an even bigger mess in a lot of ways. ps. Some types of epiphenomenalism may be in a similar spot as reductive physicalism with "only" one big issue. Jaegwon Kim holds the position that only intrinsic properties of qualia are epiphenomenal for example, and that qualia as relational properties are reducible. I don't think that position makes any sense whatsoever though. It's not impossible for you to be mistaken about there being experiences, it's impossible for you to NOT be mistaken. Consider that a p zombie (brain without consciousness) would have no way of realizing it wasn't conscious. Assuming that our brains are somehow impervious to the same physical phenomenon that cause beliefs to arise within a theoretical metaphysically 'conscious' person, is to assume to existence of metaphysics from the start. First of all, the possibility of zombies is a pretty hot potato. Not that many would agree that theyre even possible. Secondly, I have no idea what you're saying there. What is a "theoretical metaphysically 'conscious' person" exactly? Why would one assume that "our brains are impervious to the physical phenomenon that cause beliefs to arise", when that is clearly not the case as beliefs, excluding the phenomenal parts, are quite clearly caused by our brains. At the end of the day, assuming zombies are possible, the zombie is still in the same boat as a computer. Or a rock. There is nothing mystical going on when a zombie is "mistaken", and indeed talking about being "mistaken" about having experiences is like talking about a computer being "mistaken". its nonsense. The zombie isn't phenomenally conscious in the first place and its beliefs are thus analogous to the "beliefs" of a computer. I on the other hand cannot be sure about others having experiences, but I cannot doubt my very own phenomenal experiences at this moment. That's what I'm trying to get at, you literally cannot doubt it, whether it's true or not. The conundrum being discussed is why people feel like they are conscious rather than not feel like they are conscious. My point is how do you rule out the latter possibility? You can't, because the evidence for the former is exactly the same as for the latter: in either case, your brain would believe itself to be conscious, due to its chemical/electrical state being identical in both cases. Actually, you've just ruled out the latter possibility. Not sure if you meant to word that the way you did.
If you accept that consciousness as we know it is purely a product of the minds chemical electrical state (as I do) then you have already conceded that the mind is "all chemical and electricity", ie, requires no appeal to metaphysics in order to explain. The problem is that many people point to the existence of conscious as being inexplicable by purely physical models of reality. Their argument being "why am I conscious when I might NOT be conscious! You can't explain that" ... I'm responding to that flawed argument by pointing out the unreliability of the evidence presented.
|
On July 08 2013 02:29 wherebugsgo wrote:Show nested quote +On July 08 2013 02:18 DoubleReed wrote:But really, "unreliable" is not the correct word. Logic is not how the brain functions. The brain is much more Bayesian than that, and relies almost entirely on previous information. The brain also is evolutionarily adapted for social behavior, rather than logic, which is why humans are prone to things like the conjunction fallacy, which mistakes plausibility for probability. While I mostly agree with what you're saying, I just wanted to point out that the initial experiments done on the conjunction fallacy are rather dubious because of the way the questions were posed/worded. The question about the Soviet Union, for example, may imply that the U.S. breaking relations with the Soviet Union over an invasion is different from the U.S. breaking relations for no reason. The debiased experiment tends to frame the question more clearly and far fewer people fail that one. Show nested quote +On July 08 2013 02:29 lebowskiguy wrote:On July 08 2013 02:14 wherebugsgo wrote:On July 08 2013 02:11 lebowskiguy wrote:On July 08 2013 02:04 Reason wrote:On July 08 2013 02:00 lebowskiguy wrote:
to all those who support the existence of free will:
How do you explain the fact that people with brain damage or people who develop tumors in the area of the brain change their decision process drastically? Many of them develop new violent or psychopathic urges and a different completely character overall. Doesn't this mean that our decision making process is tied to the physiology of our brain?
To those who might suggest that this doesn't count because these brains are altered or impaired:
doesn't this mean that for free will to have a meaning or for moral responsibility to meaningfully come into play we should all have the same type of brain with no alterations? (this is of course never the case as there are not even 2 people with the same brain)
How do we exercise free will if our decision making process is irrefutably tied to the physiology of our brain and therefore the laws of the universe?
(these questions are probably relevant only for the people who have a naturalistic view of the world)
The answer is very simple and has no doubt already been given in this thread. + Show Spoiler +Everything you've said has absolutely nothing to do with the concept of free will. unless you have your own definition of free will ( do share) everything I have said is relevant to the concept of free will. Try to honor your name and reason with me. He's right though, your conclusion doesn't logically follow from anything you've said so far, and what you've said is not really relevant to free will at all. I assume free will has to do with decision making or else what is it good for? Free will is (google): the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion. Everything I have said in that post is 100% relevant. The alterations of your brain change your decision making process, they prove that your decision making process follows material laws; these laws are either probabilistic or deterministic or a combination of both. Now it is you that has to find room for your "free will" concept, because I sure can't No, it isn't. A change in the physiology of your brain is not due to a constraint of necessity or fate. You still act at your own discretion, unless you are suggesting that no one has free will to begin with.
of course I am suggesting that there is no free will to begin with. The fact that you used your phrasing in what appears as a dismissive manner did probably reveals that you are somewhat ignorant of a heated philosophical debate that has lasted centuries. Also idk what you are saying with the constraint of necessity or fate line. Are we to be held morally responsible for our personality changing brain tumors too?
|
|
|
|
|
|
EPT
