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The frog is being boiled, but why?
I thought the discussion on Ukraine being sacrificed was interesting from a point of view of how much weaponry is being donated so here are some numbers I just want to throw out.
- The European union is giving Ukraine 3,5 billion a month during 2023 for a total of about 18 billion euros (total needed economic aid is about 3-4 billion euros).
- An F16 costs ~28 million euros or so (12,8 - 80 mil US depending on modell)
= for the economic (not military aid) of one month Europe could fund about 50 F-16.
- The US has ~900 F16 in inventory slated to be replaced by F35's (about 1400 fighter aircraft in total).
- The US builds 150 F35 a year.
= the loss of 150 F16 on US military readiness and an additional 50 every 12 months is negligible.
150 4th gen fighters and a replacement of 50 per year would drastically change the war in Ukraine, possibly end it within months. Europe alone could fund this with equivalent of 3 months of economic aid and then 1 month of aid / year.
So from an economic perspective if this would shorten the war by more than 4 months this makes economic sense.
And yet here we are finally giving 10 tanks here, 50 Bradlys there.
Is the frog being boiled slowly because they don't want it to start a nuclear war?
Or is it being boiled slowly because they don't want it to jump out of the pan before it's done?
Or some other reasons?
And yes there is probably logistics and training involved but simply funding the transfer of 150 jets and giving the timeline for it would drastically change the equation for staying in Ukraine for Russia. Instead every single weapon transfer is hush hush and just a little at a time.
Why?
And if not aircraft why not simply state "20 self propelled 155 mm howitzers each month until the war ends and we will boost shell production to x in y amount of time".
Simply the amount of economic aid given in relationship to weapons sent makes no sense to me.
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for fighters specifically you likely run into issues with Russian AA. The west usually doesn't operate fighters in area's where they don't have control and getting the level of control to safely operate fighters would likely require attacking Russian AA inside Russia's own borders, a step the West is sofar unwilling to take. So not sending fighters makes sense.
But for the rest, it would all have to come from America probably because the countries of the EU don't really have that big a military, let alone a military surplus. I seriously question if the EU would even be able to provide 20 155mm howitzers a month for any length of time without eating directly into active service equipment, which they are imo understandably not entirely thrilled to do.
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Some speculation I've seen on the amount and type of aid sent is due to China. China basically stating what red lines there are before they step in and help Russia. It is very hard to tell if that is true or not since it is top level discussions.
Stuff like this was published https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-red-line-biden-and-xis-secret-ukraine-talks-revealed/
Something I don't see discussed enough here is the amount of third party aid the US and other actors are facilitating. Buying equipment and ammunition for Ukraine in South East Asia, Korea etc.
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On January 12 2023 03:34 CuddlyCuteKitten wrote:
The frog is being boiled, but why?
I thought the discussion on Ukraine being sacrificed was interesting from a point of view of how much weaponry is being donated so here are some numbers I just want to throw out.
- The European union is giving Ukraine 3,5 billion a month during 2023 for a total of about 18 billion euros (total needed economic aid is about 3-4 billion euros).
- An F16 costs ~28 million euros or so (12,8 - 80 mil US depending on modell)
= for the economic (not military aid) of one month Europe could fund about 50 F-16.
- The US has ~900 F16 in inventory slated to be replaced by F35's (about 1400 fighter aircraft in total).
- The US builds 150 F35 a year.
= the loss of 150 F16 on US military readiness and an additional 50 every 12 months is negligible.
150 4th gen fighters and a replacement of 50 per year would drastically change the war in Ukraine, possibly end it within months. Europe alone could fund this with equivalent of 3 months of economic aid and then 1 month of aid / year.
So from an economic perspective if this would shorten the war by more than 4 months this makes economic sense.
And yet here we are finally giving 10 tanks here, 50 Bradlys there.
Is the frog being boiled slowly because they don't want it to start a nuclear war?
Or is it being boiled slowly because they don't want it to jump out of the pan before it's done?
Or some other reasons?
And yes there is probably logistics and training involved but simply funding the transfer of 150 jets and giving the timeline for it would drastically change the equation for staying in Ukraine for Russia. Instead every single weapon transfer is hush hush and just a little at a time.
Why?
And if not aircraft why not simply state "20 self propelled 155 mm howitzers each month until the war ends and we will boost shell production to x in y amount of time".
Simply the amount of economic aid given in relationship to weapons sent makes no sense to me.
Not arguing the overall sentiment of this argument but in the specific case of fighter jets, back in 1999 when NATO was bombing Yugoslavia, the Serbs shot down an F-117 Nighthawk and potentially sold the tech to a US adversary (I think China)
BBC article on it: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12266973
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As much as it would be great to give Ukraine an unlimited amount of weaponry, there's a limit on training, especially on the advanced platforms. An F-16 isn't just a pilot (which is a year+ by itself). Take an aircraft carrier, with ~80-90 aircraft
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nimitz-class_aircraft_carrier
The air wing by itself is almost 2500 people.
You need close to 30 people trained for each flightworthy airframe, which is a lot of manpower to crew even a dozen planes, even ignoring the amount of training needed to make that happen.
Bleeding Russia dry is beneficial for the West. While it is the best chance for the west to test/use their weapons, it's not out of the realm of possibility for the most advanced weapons to be captured and sent to China for example. Being able to reverse engineer Western tech/armaments is a pretty big reason why there's a lot of the best stuff being held in reserve.
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On January 12 2023 02:01 Yurie wrote:Show nested quote +On January 11 2023 23:16 plasmidghost wrote:
Poland's transferring Leopard tanks to Ukraine. I didn't see an exact number, but probably around 14. I assume with this, they both got permission from Germany and other countries like Finland may follow suit soon
I've seen people argue that keeping squads of modern tanks together is suboptimal. The main thing they have over older tanks is their sensor suites. Seeing the enemy first. If that is true then making them "command" tanks for squadrons of older tanks is a better idea, make them act like spotters. The downside is of course that logistics becomes more complex when you mix things. But if you keep them on the same front service should be doable.
Thinking in "tank divisions" and such is rather outdated nowadays. Modern warfare calls for a few tanks assisted by plenty of infantry since the biggest threat to a tank aside from another tank is infantry. It's especially true for urban warfare, where you'll have infantry protecting the tank from enemy infantry while the tank helps infantry clear open ground and entrenched enemy positions.
On January 12 2023 03:34 CuddlyCuteKitten wrote:
The frog is being boiled, but why?
I thought the discussion on Ukraine being sacrificed was interesting from a point of view of how much weaponry is being donated so here are some numbers I just want to throw out.
- The European union is giving Ukraine 3,5 billion a month during 2023 for a total of about 18 billion euros (total needed economic aid is about 3-4 billion euros).
- An F16 costs ~28 million euros or so (12,8 - 80 mil US depending on modell)
= for the economic (not military aid) of one month Europe could fund about 50 F-16.
- The US has ~900 F16 in inventory slated to be replaced by F35's (about 1400 fighter aircraft in total).
- The US builds 150 F35 a year.
= the loss of 150 F16 on US military readiness and an additional 50 every 12 months is negligible.
150 4th gen fighters and a replacement of 50 per year would drastically change the war in Ukraine, possibly end it within months. Europe alone could fund this with equivalent of 3 months of economic aid and then 1 month of aid / year.
So from an economic perspective if this would shorten the war by more than 4 months this makes economic sense.
And yet here we are finally giving 10 tanks here, 50 Bradlys there.
Is the frog being boiled slowly because they don't want it to start a nuclear war?
Or is it being boiled slowly because they don't want it to jump out of the pan before it's done?
Or some other reasons?
And yes there is probably logistics and training involved but simply funding the transfer of 150 jets and giving the timeline for it would drastically change the equation for staying in Ukraine for Russia. Instead every single weapon transfer is hush hush and just a little at a time.
Why?
And if not aircraft why not simply state "20 self propelled 155 mm howitzers each month until the war ends and we will boost shell production to x in y amount of time".
Simply the amount of economic aid given in relationship to weapons sent makes no sense to me.
It is a slowly boiling frog. Since the early stages of this conflict it was rather obvious that NATO forces could just sweep in there and end Russia within a week if they wanted (and by that I mean all of Russia, not just Russian forces in Ukraine), but this would risk escalation to a nuclear conflict. To avoid that the West needs Ukraine to win but not overwhelmingly so that Russia would just keep sending more and more men and equipment into the grinder until it bleeds itself dry.
It's sad but that's the unfortunate reality we have to live in thanks to the nuclear warfare being invented.
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Too bad the Financial Times is locked behind a paywall. Think the major problem is that China is more fearful of sanctions, and manufacturing slowly but surely leaving the country. They have no room for error while at the same time trying to keep up a front for Russia.
Beijing is planning to reorient its foreign policy away from Moscow fearing a decline in Russia's economic and political clout as a direct result of its disastrous invasion of Ukraine and Putin's eventual downfall, the Financial Times reported on Tuesday, citing anonymous Chinese officials and regional experts.
Though Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping pledged to strengthen bilateral ties during a video conference in late December, sources told the FT that mistrust towards the Russian leader is growing among the upper echelons of the Chinese Communist Party.
“The invasion decision was made by a very small group of people. China shouldn’t simply follow Russia,” the FT quoted one anonymous Chinese official as saying. “Putin is crazy.”
China, according to the outlet’s sources and contrary to the widely accepted version of events, was not aware of the Kremlin’s plan to launch a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine last year and expected a limited military operation at most.
During a meeting on Feb. 4, Putin reportedly informed Xi that Russia “would not rule out taking whatever measures possible if eastern Ukrainian separatists attack Russian territory and cause humanitarian disasters.”
Beijing’s failure to obtain accurate intelligence on Putin's plans left it unprepared for the invasion and resulted in the demotion of China’s then-vice-minister of foreign affairs and top Russia expert Le Yucheng, according to the FT.
Anonymous Chinese officials told the outlet they believed the Kremlin’s goals in Ukraine were doomed to failure and that Russia would emerge from the conflict as a “minor power.”
However, Beijing still has much to gain from its relationship with the Kremlin in the short term, seeing its closeness to Putin as a useful bargaining chip in its relationship with Europe, the FT sources said.
China is also hoping to profit from the post-war reconstruction boom in Ukraine, officials said.
Source
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Russia has nothing to offer China except a market to sell to and China has that by default because Russia can't sell to the West due to sanctions. There is no need to keep up the pretence with Russia falling further and further.
China has and will only care about 1 thing. China.
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On January 12 2023 03:34 CuddlyCuteKitten wrote:
The frog is being boiled, but why?
[...]
Is the frog being boiled slowly because they don't want it to start a nuclear war?
Or is it being boiled slowly because they don't want it to jump out of the pan before it's done?
Or some other reasons?
[...]
Simply the amount of economic aid given in relationship to weapons sent makes no sense to me.
It was always stated openly that western powers do not intent to be dragged into the war and as long as Russia follows the logic of victory by escalation that is a serious risk.
A single Russian miscalculation around NATO countries can easily start uncontrollable escalation spiral and before you know it a NATO-Russia land-war in eastern Europe.
As long as Russia considers itself as winning it's unlikely to turn to risky scenarios like that.
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On January 12 2023 04:41 Manit0u wrote:
It is a slowly boiling frog. Since the early stages of this conflict it was rather obvious that NATO forces could just sweep in there and end Russia within a week if they wanted (and by that I mean all of Russia, not just Russian forces in Ukraine), but this would risk escalation to a nuclear conflict.
I don't know what world you are living in but NATO forces could never "end Russia" within a week.
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United States42716 Posts
On January 12 2023 05:41 raynpelikoneet wrote:Show nested quote +On January 12 2023 04:41 Manit0u wrote:
It is a slowly boiling frog. Since the early stages of this conflict it was rather obvious that NATO forces could just sweep in there and end Russia within a week if they wanted (and by that I mean all of Russia, not just Russian forces in Ukraine), but this would risk escalation to a nuclear conflict. I don't know what world you are living in but NATO forces could never "end Russia" within a week.
Iraq was a serious power at the time of the first gulf war. An army larger than Russia’s today, equipped with the best Soviet hardware, experienced from years of war with Iran. America took air supremacy in about 3 hours and the war was won in a day.
Russia is weaker than Iraq was then, NATO is stronger. It wouldn’t take a week.
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On January 12 2023 06:11 KwarK wrote:Show nested quote +On January 12 2023 05:41 raynpelikoneet wrote:On January 12 2023 04:41 Manit0u wrote:
It is a slowly boiling frog. Since the early stages of this conflict it was rather obvious that NATO forces could just sweep in there and end Russia within a week if they wanted (and by that I mean all of Russia, not just Russian forces in Ukraine), but this would risk escalation to a nuclear conflict. I don't know what world you are living in but NATO forces could never "end Russia" within a week. Iraq was a serious power at the time of the first gulf war. An army larger than Russia’s today, equipped with the best Soviet hardware, experienced from years of war with Iran. America took air supremacy in about 3 hours and the war was won in a day. Russia is weaker than Iraq was then, NATO is stronger. It wouldn’t take a week.
It took about half a year of build-up and required a lot of allies in the region to come through. They also didn't have to cover thousands of km from the staging point to their target.
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United States42716 Posts
On January 12 2023 06:40 Acrofales wrote:Show nested quote +On January 12 2023 06:11 KwarK wrote:On January 12 2023 05:41 raynpelikoneet wrote:On January 12 2023 04:41 Manit0u wrote:
It is a slowly boiling frog. Since the early stages of this conflict it was rather obvious that NATO forces could just sweep in there and end Russia within a week if they wanted (and by that I mean all of Russia, not just Russian forces in Ukraine), but this would risk escalation to a nuclear conflict. I don't know what world you are living in but NATO forces could never "end Russia" within a week. Iraq was a serious power at the time of the first gulf war. An army larger than Russia’s today, equipped with the best Soviet hardware, experienced from years of war with Iran. America took air supremacy in about 3 hours and the war was won in a day. Russia is weaker than Iraq was then, NATO is stronger. It wouldn’t take a week. It took about half a year of build-up and required a lot of allies in the region to come through. They also didn't have to cover thousands of km from the staging point to their target.
They actually did launch flights directly from the US to Iraq. America’s force projection is nuts.
Point is that modern warfare is won by air control and Russia can’t even establish that against Ukraine. A conventional war between NATO vs Russia wouldn’t take long.
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This is unfortunately moot, because nuclear weapons do exist. You can't just drive into Moscow.
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On January 12 2023 06:40 Acrofales wrote:Show nested quote +On January 12 2023 06:11 KwarK wrote:On January 12 2023 05:41 raynpelikoneet wrote:On January 12 2023 04:41 Manit0u wrote:
It is a slowly boiling frog. Since the early stages of this conflict it was rather obvious that NATO forces could just sweep in there and end Russia within a week if they wanted (and by that I mean all of Russia, not just Russian forces in Ukraine), but this would risk escalation to a nuclear conflict. I don't know what world you are living in but NATO forces could never "end Russia" within a week. Iraq was a serious power at the time of the first gulf war. An army larger than Russia’s today, equipped with the best Soviet hardware, experienced from years of war with Iran. America took air supremacy in about 3 hours and the war was won in a day. Russia is weaker than Iraq was then, NATO is stronger. It wouldn’t take a week. It took about half a year of build-up and required a lot of allies in the region to come through. They also didn't have to cover thousands of km from the staging point to their target.
The thing is, you wouldn't need to cover thousands of kilometers. Russia is big but most of its population and power is concentrated in just a few cities, which just happen to be pretty close to the eastern borders of Europe. It's one of the reasons why Russia is so desperate to subjugate and control countries like Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia. They want to keep a buffer zone between them and NATO. Moscow is <1k km from Helsinki or Kyiv. That's not an unfathomable distance to cover with modern aircraft (or drones for that matter).
On January 12 2023 07:12 gobbledydook wrote:
This is unfortunately moot, because nuclear weapons do exist. You can't just drive into Moscow.
That was the entire point of this discussion. NATO would absolutely demolish Russia in conventional warfare within moments but it can't because of nuclear threat. That's why we find ourselves in this pickle, where Ukraine has to suffer because the war has to be won in a way that doesn't feel too threatening to Russia.
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Russian Federation610 Posts
On January 12 2023 01:23 raynpelikoneet wrote:Question Ardias: Show nested quote +People here seem to underestimate an importance of proper infantry coverage in modern warfare. In fact, with drones, MANPADS, ATGMs, thermals and proper comms to direct support assets (artillery and aviation) infantry is now much more potent than it ever was throughout 20th century. I think this is entirely correct, depending on the landscape though. Show nested quote +So not to diminish AFU efforts, but it wouldn't be easy ride for them in 2023. If everything is going as well as UA officials were suggesting, Ukrainian military is supposed to be a million+ strong force. If they really butcher Russians 1 to 8, how did they even managed to lose Soledar within a week? Idk what you're actually referring to, but 1 to 8 deaths is kind of what you would expect for a defender in "normal" circumstances. Is this a number somewhat believable, because i have heard better numbers been thrown out for Ukranians, and even they didn't sound too much out of place?
Latest Ukraine death count that they officially posted was 13k dead, while Russian death count, which is regularly posted by major Ukrainian news agencies like UNIAN, is estimated to be 100k+.
Thing is, death count poses somewhat 3-4 times wounded at the minimum (you can check US dead-to-wounded counting in major conflict since WW2, and even then 3-4 times wounded is 1950-60s number, but let's take it at that, since it compares well with DPR official figures). So if there are 100k+ Russians dead, there are supposed to be 300-400k wounded. How could it be with all Russian Ground Forces+Airborne+Naval Infantry being around 360-370 thousands men at the start of the war and that number includes tens, if not hundreds of thousands conscripts and refusniks who did not participate in Ukraine war. I'll remind you that from 1 million Russian soldiers before 24 Feb more than quarter (270 thousands to be exact) were conscripts, who didn't take part in the war, besided several separate occasions and later border skirmishes from Belarus to LPR. IIRC before mobilization in Russia even started the death count claimed by Ukraine was around 70k+ men (which translates to overall casualities of 300-350 thousands with all dead, wounded, POWs and missing). There would be simply no one on the frontline from Russian side by the start of mobilization if it was true.
Also I would like to see historical examples (generalised, not single, if possible) where 1 to 8 losses were normal for defenders in 20th century. Also, does this logic applies to Ukraine's Balakliya, Kherson, Lyman and Svatovo-Kreminaya offensives?
On January 12 2023 01:08 JimmiC wrote:Show nested quote +On January 12 2023 01:00 Ardias wrote:People here seem to underestimate an importance of proper infantry coverage in modern warfare. In fact, with drones, MANPADS, ATGMs, thermals and proper comms to direct support assets (artillery and aviation) infantry is now much more potent than it ever was throughout 20th century. And if we are talking about "human waves", it's really more applicable to Ukraine than to Russia, since throughout the war it's Ukraine who always had much more manpower under arms. And about "no further mobilization" - it's kinda strange to hear it after Ukrainian Parliament extended again the state of mobilization again - https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/ukraine-extends-martial-law-mobilization-for-90-days-until-feb-19/2733341They simply did not stop with it since the start of the war. Meanwhile Russia had tons of equipment, but no people to man it due to general understrength of newly formed divisions, a bunch of people who refused to fight in Ukraine (we discussed those "500s" or "refusniks" before) and the fact that a lot of regular infantry is still made of conscripts, which, besides couple of brief occasions, were not allowed to be sent to Ukraine (Chechen wars syndrom still holding). That's why (and that I know firsthand from two separate witnesses) the supposedly elite 4th Guards Tank Division went into Ukraine having more tanks than infantrymen (!) in their tank BTGs (literally 30 tanks were covered just by a platoon of 3 BMPs with around 20 dismounted soldiers). So yes, Russians lost more equipment than Ukraine, but that doesn't mean they lost proportionally more men for that. Russian units, up until recently at least, were heavily mechanized (the exception being LDPR reservists, and Rosgvardia, though latter aren't supposed to be running tanks anyway), while Ukraine had 30 territorial brigades with no heavy vehicles at all, plus a bunch of separate rifle battalions as well as National Guard units which were just infantry with trucks and cars as their transport at most. So there is much more infantymen per one tank or IFV in Ukraine than it was in Russia, at least until mobilization kicked in. Also increased supply by the West may just mean that Ukraine starts to run out of Soviet-era equipment. Even with all the trophies it is seen that Ukraine has problems with repair and maintenance. There are very little occasions of BMP-3 and BTR-82 being used, despite many claimed to be captured. Ukrainian tanks are often seen with tracks from different models (like T-72 running with T-55 or T-62 wheels) which is not a good sign, since different wheels just don;t work correctly on the tank of other type (especially if it's heavier one). What production Ukraine had before the war was hammered by cruise missiles as well. Russia on the other hand still gearing up it's military production. I heard about the plans for 350-400 T-90M to be produced this year, and it doesn't include other models like T-72B3M (or after some recent upgrades I heard it's being called T-72B4M), T-80BVM and even T-62M. BMP-3 production is also gearing up with its production plant working with no weekends of vacations allowed. So not to diminish AFU efforts, but it wouldn't be easy ride for them in 2023. If everything is going as well as UA officials were suggesting, Ukrainian military is supposed to be a million+ strong force. If they really butcher Russians 1 to 8, how did they even managed to lose Soledar within a week? Havn't the Russians been attacking their for basically the entire war? Either side can pick a super small area put all their power towards in and make small gains. The question is the cost, the overall strategic advantage it provides and whether or not they can hold it.
After Balakliya (which was in early September) only Wagner and some DPR units around Donetsk continued offensive attempts. Kherson fron was on defensive from early August until retreat, same goes for Zaporizhie, and LPR territory after retreat from Balakliya.
My point was that with balance of forces and supposed kill/death count Ukraine shouldn't have any problems defending Bakhmut or Soledar, since it's still much more numerical superior to Russians and Russia is losing it's edge on vehicles, missiles and artillerty/rocket shells.
On January 12 2023 01:16 warding wrote:
Ardias, what we've seen so far is an army (RU) with vastly greater stocks of artillery, armored vehicles, planes, rockets get their asses handed to them by Ukraine.
You're saying UA had a manpower advantage and that now RU may get an upper hand with more mobilized people to man their armored vehicles. Fair argument but what about:
- Piss poor organization and command and control in the RU army;
- Piss poor training in RU army, vs NATO training tens of thousands of UA troops;
- Vastly better intelligence capabilities by NATO aiding Ukraine;
- Better and better NATO systems coming online for UA. We've already seen the difference HIMARS did with only a couple dozen units.
I think there's this idea of Russia as inheriting the Soviet Union's reputation for being a manpower and industrial superpower. In reality, you only have to take Ukraine + the EU countries that have been the more hardcore UA advocates (DK, CZ, NO, FIN, SWE, NL, PL, LT, LV, EE, CZ) and you have a block with an economy 2.5 times bigger than Russia's, around the same number of people and a much more advanced industrial base. This without counting France, Germany, the UK, Spain, Italy, Turkey, or the United States.
So UA has what, 700k mobilized, is supported by a vastly superior industrial base with vastly superior military stocks than Russia, and Russia's advantage in artillery stocks seems to be dwindling. The only big difference I see is that UA is reluctant to lose men, while Russia's leadership does not give a rat's butt if they lose half a million lives.
Your arguments are fair, and I've discussed them with couple of friends of mine involved in military matters. There was and interesting point in discussion, which stated that Ukraine quickly reached their most important advantages (them being mobilization, Starlink communications, NATO intelligence and recon and long-range artillery with precision missiles), while Russia had to fix their problems gradually. So Ukraine is now sitting at its peak of advantage which was achieved long ago, while Russia is increasing its numbers with mobilized, getting better comms through MoD and volunteers (trust me, volunteers provide a lot of money, enough to equip whole brigades and divisions with modern secure digital network), improving their vehicles, armament and tactics (which were obviously failing at the start of the war).
So basically Russia is still growing in it's capacities and fixing a lot of their flaws, while Ukraine seems to be at peak of their own capacities for a long time, and it's still not enough for a decisive win against Russian forces.
Economy-wise you should check purchasing power parity. Most of the stuff is 2,5-3 times cheaper in Russia than in Western Europe or US, so the difference is smaller. Plus judging modern economy vs war effort necessities as a whole is not correct, since many sectors of Western economy are service ones, not providing much for the war effort itself.
Industrial capacity could not be turned up on a whim, especially, as I understand, in US/Europe, where you can't just say to your workers "you guys now are working 24/7 with no vacations". Last time I checked, you had laws against that. But that's not a problem for Russia.
And new production takes time to be built (new Rheinmetall ammunition plant that is planned to be built in Hungary would start production only in 2027)
On a subject of UA losses - I promised 2Pacalypse bigger post on that (still don't have time for it), but TLDR - based on photos from UA cemeteries alone, that appear in the Internet, I believe their death count being much higher than they want to show. Most of the photos from each cemetery show 100-250 graves (generally marked with UA flags or some other flag, representing their country of origin, or political stance (there are a bunch or red-black flags of Right Sector as well)).
Examples
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74916
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74799
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74679
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74522
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/73829
I've seen photos from around 15 of such, but there are around 33 thousand of cemeteries throughout Ukraine. I'm not claiming that every one is filled like that, but it still raise a question of which isn't being shown due to security and propaganda reasons.
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On January 12 2023 03:53 Yurie wrote:Some speculation I've seen on the amount and type of aid sent is due to China. China basically stating what red lines there are before they step in and help Russia. It is very hard to tell if that is true or not since it is top level discussions. Stuff like this was published https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-red-line-biden-and-xis-secret-ukraine-talks-revealed/ Something I don't see discussed enough here is the amount of third party aid the US and other actors are facilitating. Buying equipment and ammunition for Ukraine in South East Asia, Korea etc.
They had a "program" where the state department opened up to everyone that could make 152mm shells in volume. Shells from China have been found on both sides from possible states that bought from them.
I've been talking about the Pakistan ammo transfers for a while and that has become public recently. The former Czechoslovakian states inherited a military industrial complex that is making a monumental amount of shells and Bulgaria's involvement throughout has been fairly clear, if kept quiet by the west for political reasons. African ammo from Sudan at the minimum has been spotted but I wouldn't be surprised if a lot of Men were sent around the world in black suits with suitcases full of us dollars.
More than just the tech but a lot of classified knowhow has been given over. Sea sparrow ship to air being mounted on regular launchers, HARM missles being mounted on MIG platforms, These things betray involvement from nations that either hasn't advertised this potential before or clearly from a nation like Isreal who hasn't officially supported Ukraine militarily yet.
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Austria4115 Posts
On January 12 2023 10:35 Ardias wrote:Show nested quote +On January 12 2023 01:23 raynpelikoneet wrote:Question Ardias: People here seem to underestimate an importance of proper infantry coverage in modern warfare. In fact, with drones, MANPADS, ATGMs, thermals and proper comms to direct support assets (artillery and aviation) infantry is now much more potent than it ever was throughout 20th century. I think this is entirely correct, depending on the landscape though. So not to diminish AFU efforts, but it wouldn't be easy ride for them in 2023. If everything is going as well as UA officials were suggesting, Ukrainian military is supposed to be a million+ strong force. If they really butcher Russians 1 to 8, how did they even managed to lose Soledar within a week? Idk what you're actually referring to, but 1 to 8 deaths is kind of what you would expect for a defender in "normal" circumstances. Is this a number somewhat believable, because i have heard better numbers been thrown out for Ukranians, and even they didn't sound too much out of place? Latest Ukraine death count that they officially posted was 13k dead, while Russian death count, which is regularly posted by major Ukrainian news agencies like UNIAN, is estimated to be 100k+. Thing is, death count poses somewhat 3-4 times wounded at the minimum (you can check US dead-to-wounded counting in major conflict since WW2, and even then 3-4 times wounded is 1950-60s number, but let's take it at that, since it compares well with DPR official figures). So if there are 100k+ Russians dead, there are supposed to be 300-400k wounded. How could it be with all Russian Ground Forces+Airborne+Naval Infantry being around 360-370 thousands men at the start of the war and that number includes tens, if not hundreds of thousands conscripts and refusniks who did not participate in Ukraine war. I'll remind you that from 1 million Russian soldiers before 24 Feb more than quarter (270 thousands to be exact) were conscripts, who didn't take part in the war, besided several separate occasions and later border skirmishes from Belarus to LPR. IIRC before mobilization in Russia even started the death count claimed by Ukraine was around 70k+ men (which translates to overall casualities of 300-350 thousands with all dead, wounded, POWs and missing). There would be simply no one on the frontline from Russian side by the start of mobilization if it was true. Also I would like to see historical examples (generalised, not single, if possible) where 1 to 8 losses were normal for defenders in 20th century. Also, does this logic applies to Ukraine's Balakliya, Kherson, Lyman and Svatovo-Kreminaya offensives? Show nested quote +On January 12 2023 01:08 JimmiC wrote:On January 12 2023 01:00 Ardias wrote:People here seem to underestimate an importance of proper infantry coverage in modern warfare. In fact, with drones, MANPADS, ATGMs, thermals and proper comms to direct support assets (artillery and aviation) infantry is now much more potent than it ever was throughout 20th century. And if we are talking about "human waves", it's really more applicable to Ukraine than to Russia, since throughout the war it's Ukraine who always had much more manpower under arms. And about "no further mobilization" - it's kinda strange to hear it after Ukrainian Parliament extended again the state of mobilization again - https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/ukraine-extends-martial-law-mobilization-for-90-days-until-feb-19/2733341They simply did not stop with it since the start of the war. Meanwhile Russia had tons of equipment, but no people to man it due to general understrength of newly formed divisions, a bunch of people who refused to fight in Ukraine (we discussed those "500s" or "refusniks" before) and the fact that a lot of regular infantry is still made of conscripts, which, besides couple of brief occasions, were not allowed to be sent to Ukraine (Chechen wars syndrom still holding). That's why (and that I know firsthand from two separate witnesses) the supposedly elite 4th Guards Tank Division went into Ukraine having more tanks than infantrymen (!) in their tank BTGs (literally 30 tanks were covered just by a platoon of 3 BMPs with around 20 dismounted soldiers). So yes, Russians lost more equipment than Ukraine, but that doesn't mean they lost proportionally more men for that. Russian units, up until recently at least, were heavily mechanized (the exception being LDPR reservists, and Rosgvardia, though latter aren't supposed to be running tanks anyway), while Ukraine had 30 territorial brigades with no heavy vehicles at all, plus a bunch of separate rifle battalions as well as National Guard units which were just infantry with trucks and cars as their transport at most. So there is much more infantymen per one tank or IFV in Ukraine than it was in Russia, at least until mobilization kicked in. Also increased supply by the West may just mean that Ukraine starts to run out of Soviet-era equipment. Even with all the trophies it is seen that Ukraine has problems with repair and maintenance. There are very little occasions of BMP-3 and BTR-82 being used, despite many claimed to be captured. Ukrainian tanks are often seen with tracks from different models (like T-72 running with T-55 or T-62 wheels) which is not a good sign, since different wheels just don;t work correctly on the tank of other type (especially if it's heavier one). What production Ukraine had before the war was hammered by cruise missiles as well. Russia on the other hand still gearing up it's military production. I heard about the plans for 350-400 T-90M to be produced this year, and it doesn't include other models like T-72B3M (or after some recent upgrades I heard it's being called T-72B4M), T-80BVM and even T-62M. BMP-3 production is also gearing up with its production plant working with no weekends of vacations allowed. So not to diminish AFU efforts, but it wouldn't be easy ride for them in 2023. If everything is going as well as UA officials were suggesting, Ukrainian military is supposed to be a million+ strong force. If they really butcher Russians 1 to 8, how did they even managed to lose Soledar within a week? Havn't the Russians been attacking their for basically the entire war? Either side can pick a super small area put all their power towards in and make small gains. The question is the cost, the overall strategic advantage it provides and whether or not they can hold it. After Balakliya (which was in early September) only Wagner and some DPR units around Donetsk continued offensive attempts. Kherson fron was on defensive from early August until retreat, same goes for Zaporizhie, and LPR territory after retreat from Balakliya. My point was that with balance of forces and supposed kill/death count Ukraine shouldn't have any problems defending Bakhmut or Soledar, since it's still much more numerical superior to Russians and Russia is losing it's edge on vehicles, missiles and artillerty/rocket shells. Show nested quote +On January 12 2023 01:16 warding wrote:
Ardias, what we've seen so far is an army (RU) with vastly greater stocks of artillery, armored vehicles, planes, rockets get their asses handed to them by Ukraine.
You're saying UA had a manpower advantage and that now RU may get an upper hand with more mobilized people to man their armored vehicles. Fair argument but what about:
- Piss poor organization and command and control in the RU army;
- Piss poor training in RU army, vs NATO training tens of thousands of UA troops;
- Vastly better intelligence capabilities by NATO aiding Ukraine;
- Better and better NATO systems coming online for UA. We've already seen the difference HIMARS did with only a couple dozen units.
I think there's this idea of Russia as inheriting the Soviet Union's reputation for being a manpower and industrial superpower. In reality, you only have to take Ukraine + the EU countries that have been the more hardcore UA advocates (DK, CZ, NO, FIN, SWE, NL, PL, LT, LV, EE, CZ) and you have a block with an economy 2.5 times bigger than Russia's, around the same number of people and a much more advanced industrial base. This without counting France, Germany, the UK, Spain, Italy, Turkey, or the United States.
So UA has what, 700k mobilized, is supported by a vastly superior industrial base with vastly superior military stocks than Russia, and Russia's advantage in artillery stocks seems to be dwindling. The only big difference I see is that UA is reluctant to lose men, while Russia's leadership does not give a rat's butt if they lose half a million lives. Your arguments are fair, and I've discussed them with couple of friends of mine involved in military matters. There was and interesting point in discussion, which stated that Ukraine quickly reached their most important advantages (them being mobilization, Starlink communications, NATO intelligence and recon and long-range artillery with precision missiles), while Russia had to fix their problems gradually. So Ukraine is now sitting at its peak of advantage which was achieved long ago, while Russia is increasing its numbers with mobilized, getting better comms through MoD and volunteers (trust me, volunteers provide a lot of money, enough to equip whole brigades and divisions with modern secure digital network), improving their vehicles, armament and tactics (which were obviously failing at the start of the war). So basically Russia is still growing in it's capacities and fixing a lot of their flaws, while Ukraine seems to be at peak of their own capacities for a long time, and it's still not enough for a decisive win against Russian forces. Economy-wise you should check purchasing power parity. Most of the stuff is 2,5-3 times cheaper in Russia than in Western Europe or US, so the difference is smaller. Plus judging modern economy vs war effort necessities as a whole is not correct, since many sectors of Western economy are service ones, not providing much for the war effort itself. Industrial capacity could not be turned up on a whim, especially, as I understand, in US/Europe, where you can't just say to your workers "you guys now are working 24/7 with no vacations". Last time I checked, you had laws against that. But that's not a problem for Russia. And new production takes time to be built (new Rheinmetall ammunition plant that is planned to be built in Hungary would start production only in 2027) On a subject of UA losses - I promised 2Pacalypse bigger post on that (still don't have time for it), but TLDR - based on photos from UA cemeteries alone, that appear in the Internet, I believe their death count being much higher than they want to show. Most of the photos from each cemetery show 100-250 graves (generally marked with UA flags or some other flag, representing their country of origin, or political stance (there are a bunch or red-black flags of Right Sector as well)). Examples https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74916https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74799https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74679https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74522https://t.me/boris_rozhin/73829I've seen photos from around 15 of such, but there are around 33 thousand of cemeteries throughout Ukraine. I'm not claiming that every one is filled like that, but it still raise a question of which isn't being shown due to security and propaganda reasons.
The Russian army may not necessarily have been >200k strong at the start of the invasion. Some analysts have estimated that it was closer to 100k-150k. We'll probably never know the true numbers, so we can't make good conclusions how this affected the later stages of the war.
What we can say is that not all of the initially mobilized soldiers were actively participating in the fighting during the initial invasion. So that number was probably indeed closer to 100k. This is an important point to keep in mind for the analysis, because not all soldiers have the same role in the army, with some being more passive than the rest for various reasons like field of expertise, level of expertise, age, war strategy (like a focus on bombing, shelling and trench fighting, after tanks were found to be too ineffective by themselves), etc.
What we do know is the official Ukrainian report of nearly 110k KIA Russian soldiers since Feb 24. That would be around 340 KIA/day on average. This number may be inflated, and it likely is, but the true number probably won't be as low as 1/10, but it could be 1/2 or even 1/4. So I think we can work with a range of 27k to 110k KIA, with the true number likely being closer to 27k than 110k.
Regarding wounded, captured and MIA, we can reasonably estimate that at 3-4 times of KIA, with wounded being greater than captured and MIA.
Most of the wounded soldiers eventually return to the battlefield, some sooner and some later than others, so there's a lot of variability there. Since the wounded return, a portion of them add to KIA, and another portion yet again retreats wounded and returns later, otherwise they're captured or MIA.
Captured soldiers are strictly removed from battle unless there's an exchange. However, in the case of the Russian army, they have a policy to send their soldiers into certain death more than the Ukrainian army does (for reasons like disposability due to numbers, quality and systemic differences in war strategy - although since Russia's retreat from the North it does appear that their total casualties and loss of equipment has declined by perhaps 50% or some number in that ballpark, but I can't confirm that independently. The obvious explanation being that they shifted away from frontal assault to longer range bombardment).
About the newly mobilized: they're not up to the same fighting standards. So regardless of whether we're talking about a total of 1.3 million Russian soldiers or instead closer to 700k, it doesn't make a huge difference. Most of the mobilized soldiers cannot be used for active fighting, or at least not productively, because as mentioned Russia's strategy shifted from active combat to shelling, and 600k additional soldiers simply do not fill 600k additional useful roles in artillery or bombing efforts, mostly due to lack of equipment/ammo and also lack of training. Instead these soldiers will be filling the role of setting up defensive positions, digging trenches, moving equipment, etc. They play a mostly supportive role and only a portion of them can reasonably be used for active fighting at the front lines.
So really it was never the case that Russia (or Ukraine) had more or less overwhelming numbers during the invasion than at later stages. What has changed over time on both sides is mostly the strategy, geographics (e.g. the Dnipro), and now winter, with the latter two points negatively impacting Ukrainian offensive efforts very significantly.
Changes in strategy or numbers therefore won't save Russia. They're in better defensive shape for reasons outside of the control on either side, that's why Ukraine is currently stalling. With warmer temperatures this will change fairly rapidly, especially if in the meantime Ukraine can weaken some of Russia's supply lines. That's what Ukraine is likely focusing on right now.
tl;dr Russian or Ukrainian strength of numbers is largely irrelevant for the outcome of the war except for the total duration. Zelensky said there's no need for additional mobilization at the moment. This must be because there are no more gaps to fill in the army, and the gaps that eventually do open up can be filled (probably several times) with the current numbers. Russia must abide by the same logic, they can't miraculously invent useful roles for their newly mobilized.
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On January 12 2023 21:48 Magic Powers wrote:Show nested quote +On January 12 2023 10:35 Ardias wrote:On January 12 2023 01:23 raynpelikoneet wrote:Question Ardias: People here seem to underestimate an importance of proper infantry coverage in modern warfare. In fact, with drones, MANPADS, ATGMs, thermals and proper comms to direct support assets (artillery and aviation) infantry is now much more potent than it ever was throughout 20th century. I think this is entirely correct, depending on the landscape though. So not to diminish AFU efforts, but it wouldn't be easy ride for them in 2023. If everything is going as well as UA officials were suggesting, Ukrainian military is supposed to be a million+ strong force. If they really butcher Russians 1 to 8, how did they even managed to lose Soledar within a week? Idk what you're actually referring to, but 1 to 8 deaths is kind of what you would expect for a defender in "normal" circumstances. Is this a number somewhat believable, because i have heard better numbers been thrown out for Ukranians, and even they didn't sound too much out of place? Latest Ukraine death count that they officially posted was 13k dead, while Russian death count, which is regularly posted by major Ukrainian news agencies like UNIAN, is estimated to be 100k+. Thing is, death count poses somewhat 3-4 times wounded at the minimum (you can check US dead-to-wounded counting in major conflict since WW2, and even then 3-4 times wounded is 1950-60s number, but let's take it at that, since it compares well with DPR official figures). So if there are 100k+ Russians dead, there are supposed to be 300-400k wounded. How could it be with all Russian Ground Forces+Airborne+Naval Infantry being around 360-370 thousands men at the start of the war and that number includes tens, if not hundreds of thousands conscripts and refusniks who did not participate in Ukraine war. I'll remind you that from 1 million Russian soldiers before 24 Feb more than quarter (270 thousands to be exact) were conscripts, who didn't take part in the war, besided several separate occasions and later border skirmishes from Belarus to LPR. IIRC before mobilization in Russia even started the death count claimed by Ukraine was around 70k+ men (which translates to overall casualities of 300-350 thousands with all dead, wounded, POWs and missing). There would be simply no one on the frontline from Russian side by the start of mobilization if it was true. Also I would like to see historical examples (generalised, not single, if possible) where 1 to 8 losses were normal for defenders in 20th century. Also, does this logic applies to Ukraine's Balakliya, Kherson, Lyman and Svatovo-Kreminaya offensives? On January 12 2023 01:08 JimmiC wrote:On January 12 2023 01:00 Ardias wrote:People here seem to underestimate an importance of proper infantry coverage in modern warfare. In fact, with drones, MANPADS, ATGMs, thermals and proper comms to direct support assets (artillery and aviation) infantry is now much more potent than it ever was throughout 20th century. And if we are talking about "human waves", it's really more applicable to Ukraine than to Russia, since throughout the war it's Ukraine who always had much more manpower under arms. And about "no further mobilization" - it's kinda strange to hear it after Ukrainian Parliament extended again the state of mobilization again - https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/ukraine-extends-martial-law-mobilization-for-90-days-until-feb-19/2733341They simply did not stop with it since the start of the war. Meanwhile Russia had tons of equipment, but no people to man it due to general understrength of newly formed divisions, a bunch of people who refused to fight in Ukraine (we discussed those "500s" or "refusniks" before) and the fact that a lot of regular infantry is still made of conscripts, which, besides couple of brief occasions, were not allowed to be sent to Ukraine (Chechen wars syndrom still holding). That's why (and that I know firsthand from two separate witnesses) the supposedly elite 4th Guards Tank Division went into Ukraine having more tanks than infantrymen (!) in their tank BTGs (literally 30 tanks were covered just by a platoon of 3 BMPs with around 20 dismounted soldiers). So yes, Russians lost more equipment than Ukraine, but that doesn't mean they lost proportionally more men for that. Russian units, up until recently at least, were heavily mechanized (the exception being LDPR reservists, and Rosgvardia, though latter aren't supposed to be running tanks anyway), while Ukraine had 30 territorial brigades with no heavy vehicles at all, plus a bunch of separate rifle battalions as well as National Guard units which were just infantry with trucks and cars as their transport at most. So there is much more infantymen per one tank or IFV in Ukraine than it was in Russia, at least until mobilization kicked in. Also increased supply by the West may just mean that Ukraine starts to run out of Soviet-era equipment. Even with all the trophies it is seen that Ukraine has problems with repair and maintenance. There are very little occasions of BMP-3 and BTR-82 being used, despite many claimed to be captured. Ukrainian tanks are often seen with tracks from different models (like T-72 running with T-55 or T-62 wheels) which is not a good sign, since different wheels just don;t work correctly on the tank of other type (especially if it's heavier one). What production Ukraine had before the war was hammered by cruise missiles as well. Russia on the other hand still gearing up it's military production. I heard about the plans for 350-400 T-90M to be produced this year, and it doesn't include other models like T-72B3M (or after some recent upgrades I heard it's being called T-72B4M), T-80BVM and even T-62M. BMP-3 production is also gearing up with its production plant working with no weekends of vacations allowed. So not to diminish AFU efforts, but it wouldn't be easy ride for them in 2023. If everything is going as well as UA officials were suggesting, Ukrainian military is supposed to be a million+ strong force. If they really butcher Russians 1 to 8, how did they even managed to lose Soledar within a week? Havn't the Russians been attacking their for basically the entire war? Either side can pick a super small area put all their power towards in and make small gains. The question is the cost, the overall strategic advantage it provides and whether or not they can hold it. After Balakliya (which was in early September) only Wagner and some DPR units around Donetsk continued offensive attempts. Kherson fron was on defensive from early August until retreat, same goes for Zaporizhie, and LPR territory after retreat from Balakliya. My point was that with balance of forces and supposed kill/death count Ukraine shouldn't have any problems defending Bakhmut or Soledar, since it's still much more numerical superior to Russians and Russia is losing it's edge on vehicles, missiles and artillerty/rocket shells. On January 12 2023 01:16 warding wrote:
Ardias, what we've seen so far is an army (RU) with vastly greater stocks of artillery, armored vehicles, planes, rockets get their asses handed to them by Ukraine.
You're saying UA had a manpower advantage and that now RU may get an upper hand with more mobilized people to man their armored vehicles. Fair argument but what about:
- Piss poor organization and command and control in the RU army;
- Piss poor training in RU army, vs NATO training tens of thousands of UA troops;
- Vastly better intelligence capabilities by NATO aiding Ukraine;
- Better and better NATO systems coming online for UA. We've already seen the difference HIMARS did with only a couple dozen units.
I think there's this idea of Russia as inheriting the Soviet Union's reputation for being a manpower and industrial superpower. In reality, you only have to take Ukraine + the EU countries that have been the more hardcore UA advocates (DK, CZ, NO, FIN, SWE, NL, PL, LT, LV, EE, CZ) and you have a block with an economy 2.5 times bigger than Russia's, around the same number of people and a much more advanced industrial base. This without counting France, Germany, the UK, Spain, Italy, Turkey, or the United States.
So UA has what, 700k mobilized, is supported by a vastly superior industrial base with vastly superior military stocks than Russia, and Russia's advantage in artillery stocks seems to be dwindling. The only big difference I see is that UA is reluctant to lose men, while Russia's leadership does not give a rat's butt if they lose half a million lives. Your arguments are fair, and I've discussed them with couple of friends of mine involved in military matters. There was and interesting point in discussion, which stated that Ukraine quickly reached their most important advantages (them being mobilization, Starlink communications, NATO intelligence and recon and long-range artillery with precision missiles), while Russia had to fix their problems gradually. So Ukraine is now sitting at its peak of advantage which was achieved long ago, while Russia is increasing its numbers with mobilized, getting better comms through MoD and volunteers (trust me, volunteers provide a lot of money, enough to equip whole brigades and divisions with modern secure digital network), improving their vehicles, armament and tactics (which were obviously failing at the start of the war). So basically Russia is still growing in it's capacities and fixing a lot of their flaws, while Ukraine seems to be at peak of their own capacities for a long time, and it's still not enough for a decisive win against Russian forces. Economy-wise you should check purchasing power parity. Most of the stuff is 2,5-3 times cheaper in Russia than in Western Europe or US, so the difference is smaller. Plus judging modern economy vs war effort necessities as a whole is not correct, since many sectors of Western economy are service ones, not providing much for the war effort itself. Industrial capacity could not be turned up on a whim, especially, as I understand, in US/Europe, where you can't just say to your workers "you guys now are working 24/7 with no vacations". Last time I checked, you had laws against that. But that's not a problem for Russia. And new production takes time to be built (new Rheinmetall ammunition plant that is planned to be built in Hungary would start production only in 2027) On a subject of UA losses - I promised 2Pacalypse bigger post on that (still don't have time for it), but TLDR - based on photos from UA cemeteries alone, that appear in the Internet, I believe their death count being much higher than they want to show. Most of the photos from each cemetery show 100-250 graves (generally marked with UA flags or some other flag, representing their country of origin, or political stance (there are a bunch or red-black flags of Right Sector as well)). Examples https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74916https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74799https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74679https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74522https://t.me/boris_rozhin/73829I've seen photos from around 15 of such, but there are around 33 thousand of cemeteries throughout Ukraine. I'm not claiming that every one is filled like that, but it still raise a question of which isn't being shown due to security and propaganda reasons. The Russian army may not necessarily have been >200k strong at the start of the invasion. Some analysts have estimated that it was closer to 100k-150k. We'll probably never know the true numbers, so we can't make good conclusions how this affected the later stages of the war. What we can say is that not all of the initially mobilized soldiers were actively participating in the fighting during the initial invasion. So that number was probably indeed closer to 100k. This is an important point to keep in mind for the analysis, because not all soldiers have the same role in the army, with some being more passive than the rest for various reasons like field of expertise, level of expertise, age, war strategy (like a focus on bombing, shelling and trench fighting, after tanks were found to be too ineffective by themselves), etc. What we do know is the official Ukrainian report of nearly 110k KIA Russian soldiers since Feb 24. That would be around 340 KIA/day on average. This number may be inflated, and it likely is, but the true number probably won't be as low as 1/10, but it could be 1/2 or even 1/4. So I think we can work with a range of 27k to 110k KIA, with the true number likely being closer to 27k than 110k. Regarding wounded, captured and MIA, we can reasonably estimate that at 3-4 times of KIA, with wounded being greater than captured and MIA. Most of the wounded soldiers eventually return to the battlefield, some sooner and some later than others, so there's a lot of variability there. Since the wounded return, a portion of them add to KIA, and another portion yet again retreats wounded and returns later, otherwise they're captured or MIA. Captured soldiers are strictly removed from battle unless there's an exchange. However, in the case of the Russian army, they have a policy to send their soldiers into certain death more than the Ukrainian army does (for reasons like disposability due to numbers, quality and systemic differences in war strategy - although since Russia's retreat from the North it does appear that their total casualties and loss of equipment has declined by perhaps 50% or some number in that ballpark, but I can't confirm that independently. The obvious explanation being that they shifted away from frontal assault to longer range bombardment). About the newly mobilized: they're not up to the same fighting standards. So regardless of whether we're talking about a total of 1.3 million Russian soldiers or instead closer to 700k, it doesn't make a huge difference. Most of the mobilized soldiers cannot be used for active fighting, or at least not productively, because as mentioned Russia's strategy shifted from active combat to shelling, and 600k additional soldiers simply do not fill 600k additional useful roles in artillery or bombing efforts, mostly due to lack of equipment/ammo and also lack of training. Instead these soldiers will be filling the role of setting up defensive positions, digging trenches, moving equipment, etc. They play a mostly supportive role and only a portion of them can reasonably be used for active fighting at the front lines. So really it was never the case that Russia (or Ukraine) had more or less overwhelming numbers during the invasion than at later stages. What has changed over time on both sides is mostly the strategy, geographics (e.g. the Dnipro), and now winter, with the latter two points negatively impacting Ukrainian offensive efforts very significantly. Changes in strategy or numbers therefore won't save Russia. They're in better defensive shape for reasons outside of the control on either side, that's why Ukraine is currently stalling. With warmer temperatures this will change fairly rapidly, especially if in the meantime Ukraine can weaken some of Russia's supply lines. That's what Ukraine is likely focusing on right now.
One other thing to keep in mind is that even if Russia has 850k men in the military total it doesn't mean it can use them all. It's a very big country which means a lot of border that must be protected. Then there's all the military infrastructure inside the country that also can't just be abandoned. A lot of the military will also be typical desk-pushing jobs and people occupying them aren't usually frontline material.
The question here is, how much of its manpower and equipment can Russia actually commit to a war outside of its borders? Half? Three quarters? A third?
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Austria4115 Posts
On January 12 2023 21:59 Manit0u wrote:Show nested quote +On January 12 2023 21:48 Magic Powers wrote:On January 12 2023 10:35 Ardias wrote:On January 12 2023 01:23 raynpelikoneet wrote:Question Ardias: People here seem to underestimate an importance of proper infantry coverage in modern warfare. In fact, with drones, MANPADS, ATGMs, thermals and proper comms to direct support assets (artillery and aviation) infantry is now much more potent than it ever was throughout 20th century. I think this is entirely correct, depending on the landscape though. So not to diminish AFU efforts, but it wouldn't be easy ride for them in 2023. If everything is going as well as UA officials were suggesting, Ukrainian military is supposed to be a million+ strong force. If they really butcher Russians 1 to 8, how did they even managed to lose Soledar within a week? Idk what you're actually referring to, but 1 to 8 deaths is kind of what you would expect for a defender in "normal" circumstances. Is this a number somewhat believable, because i have heard better numbers been thrown out for Ukranians, and even they didn't sound too much out of place? Latest Ukraine death count that they officially posted was 13k dead, while Russian death count, which is regularly posted by major Ukrainian news agencies like UNIAN, is estimated to be 100k+. Thing is, death count poses somewhat 3-4 times wounded at the minimum (you can check US dead-to-wounded counting in major conflict since WW2, and even then 3-4 times wounded is 1950-60s number, but let's take it at that, since it compares well with DPR official figures). So if there are 100k+ Russians dead, there are supposed to be 300-400k wounded. How could it be with all Russian Ground Forces+Airborne+Naval Infantry being around 360-370 thousands men at the start of the war and that number includes tens, if not hundreds of thousands conscripts and refusniks who did not participate in Ukraine war. I'll remind you that from 1 million Russian soldiers before 24 Feb more than quarter (270 thousands to be exact) were conscripts, who didn't take part in the war, besided several separate occasions and later border skirmishes from Belarus to LPR. IIRC before mobilization in Russia even started the death count claimed by Ukraine was around 70k+ men (which translates to overall casualities of 300-350 thousands with all dead, wounded, POWs and missing). There would be simply no one on the frontline from Russian side by the start of mobilization if it was true. Also I would like to see historical examples (generalised, not single, if possible) where 1 to 8 losses were normal for defenders in 20th century. Also, does this logic applies to Ukraine's Balakliya, Kherson, Lyman and Svatovo-Kreminaya offensives? On January 12 2023 01:08 JimmiC wrote:On January 12 2023 01:00 Ardias wrote:People here seem to underestimate an importance of proper infantry coverage in modern warfare. In fact, with drones, MANPADS, ATGMs, thermals and proper comms to direct support assets (artillery and aviation) infantry is now much more potent than it ever was throughout 20th century. And if we are talking about "human waves", it's really more applicable to Ukraine than to Russia, since throughout the war it's Ukraine who always had much more manpower under arms. And about "no further mobilization" - it's kinda strange to hear it after Ukrainian Parliament extended again the state of mobilization again - https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/ukraine-extends-martial-law-mobilization-for-90-days-until-feb-19/2733341They simply did not stop with it since the start of the war. Meanwhile Russia had tons of equipment, but no people to man it due to general understrength of newly formed divisions, a bunch of people who refused to fight in Ukraine (we discussed those "500s" or "refusniks" before) and the fact that a lot of regular infantry is still made of conscripts, which, besides couple of brief occasions, were not allowed to be sent to Ukraine (Chechen wars syndrom still holding). That's why (and that I know firsthand from two separate witnesses) the supposedly elite 4th Guards Tank Division went into Ukraine having more tanks than infantrymen (!) in their tank BTGs (literally 30 tanks were covered just by a platoon of 3 BMPs with around 20 dismounted soldiers). So yes, Russians lost more equipment than Ukraine, but that doesn't mean they lost proportionally more men for that. Russian units, up until recently at least, were heavily mechanized (the exception being LDPR reservists, and Rosgvardia, though latter aren't supposed to be running tanks anyway), while Ukraine had 30 territorial brigades with no heavy vehicles at all, plus a bunch of separate rifle battalions as well as National Guard units which were just infantry with trucks and cars as their transport at most. So there is much more infantymen per one tank or IFV in Ukraine than it was in Russia, at least until mobilization kicked in. Also increased supply by the West may just mean that Ukraine starts to run out of Soviet-era equipment. Even with all the trophies it is seen that Ukraine has problems with repair and maintenance. There are very little occasions of BMP-3 and BTR-82 being used, despite many claimed to be captured. Ukrainian tanks are often seen with tracks from different models (like T-72 running with T-55 or T-62 wheels) which is not a good sign, since different wheels just don;t work correctly on the tank of other type (especially if it's heavier one). What production Ukraine had before the war was hammered by cruise missiles as well. Russia on the other hand still gearing up it's military production. I heard about the plans for 350-400 T-90M to be produced this year, and it doesn't include other models like T-72B3M (or after some recent upgrades I heard it's being called T-72B4M), T-80BVM and even T-62M. BMP-3 production is also gearing up with its production plant working with no weekends of vacations allowed. So not to diminish AFU efforts, but it wouldn't be easy ride for them in 2023. If everything is going as well as UA officials were suggesting, Ukrainian military is supposed to be a million+ strong force. If they really butcher Russians 1 to 8, how did they even managed to lose Soledar within a week? Havn't the Russians been attacking their for basically the entire war? Either side can pick a super small area put all their power towards in and make small gains. The question is the cost, the overall strategic advantage it provides and whether or not they can hold it. After Balakliya (which was in early September) only Wagner and some DPR units around Donetsk continued offensive attempts. Kherson fron was on defensive from early August until retreat, same goes for Zaporizhie, and LPR territory after retreat from Balakliya. My point was that with balance of forces and supposed kill/death count Ukraine shouldn't have any problems defending Bakhmut or Soledar, since it's still much more numerical superior to Russians and Russia is losing it's edge on vehicles, missiles and artillerty/rocket shells. On January 12 2023 01:16 warding wrote:
Ardias, what we've seen so far is an army (RU) with vastly greater stocks of artillery, armored vehicles, planes, rockets get their asses handed to them by Ukraine.
You're saying UA had a manpower advantage and that now RU may get an upper hand with more mobilized people to man their armored vehicles. Fair argument but what about:
- Piss poor organization and command and control in the RU army;
- Piss poor training in RU army, vs NATO training tens of thousands of UA troops;
- Vastly better intelligence capabilities by NATO aiding Ukraine;
- Better and better NATO systems coming online for UA. We've already seen the difference HIMARS did with only a couple dozen units.
I think there's this idea of Russia as inheriting the Soviet Union's reputation for being a manpower and industrial superpower. In reality, you only have to take Ukraine + the EU countries that have been the more hardcore UA advocates (DK, CZ, NO, FIN, SWE, NL, PL, LT, LV, EE, CZ) and you have a block with an economy 2.5 times bigger than Russia's, around the same number of people and a much more advanced industrial base. This without counting France, Germany, the UK, Spain, Italy, Turkey, or the United States.
So UA has what, 700k mobilized, is supported by a vastly superior industrial base with vastly superior military stocks than Russia, and Russia's advantage in artillery stocks seems to be dwindling. The only big difference I see is that UA is reluctant to lose men, while Russia's leadership does not give a rat's butt if they lose half a million lives. Your arguments are fair, and I've discussed them with couple of friends of mine involved in military matters. There was and interesting point in discussion, which stated that Ukraine quickly reached their most important advantages (them being mobilization, Starlink communications, NATO intelligence and recon and long-range artillery with precision missiles), while Russia had to fix their problems gradually. So Ukraine is now sitting at its peak of advantage which was achieved long ago, while Russia is increasing its numbers with mobilized, getting better comms through MoD and volunteers (trust me, volunteers provide a lot of money, enough to equip whole brigades and divisions with modern secure digital network), improving their vehicles, armament and tactics (which were obviously failing at the start of the war). So basically Russia is still growing in it's capacities and fixing a lot of their flaws, while Ukraine seems to be at peak of their own capacities for a long time, and it's still not enough for a decisive win against Russian forces. Economy-wise you should check purchasing power parity. Most of the stuff is 2,5-3 times cheaper in Russia than in Western Europe or US, so the difference is smaller. Plus judging modern economy vs war effort necessities as a whole is not correct, since many sectors of Western economy are service ones, not providing much for the war effort itself. Industrial capacity could not be turned up on a whim, especially, as I understand, in US/Europe, where you can't just say to your workers "you guys now are working 24/7 with no vacations". Last time I checked, you had laws against that. But that's not a problem for Russia. And new production takes time to be built (new Rheinmetall ammunition plant that is planned to be built in Hungary would start production only in 2027) On a subject of UA losses - I promised 2Pacalypse bigger post on that (still don't have time for it), but TLDR - based on photos from UA cemeteries alone, that appear in the Internet, I believe their death count being much higher than they want to show. Most of the photos from each cemetery show 100-250 graves (generally marked with UA flags or some other flag, representing their country of origin, or political stance (there are a bunch or red-black flags of Right Sector as well)). Examples https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74916https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74799https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74679https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74522https://t.me/boris_rozhin/73829I've seen photos from around 15 of such, but there are around 33 thousand of cemeteries throughout Ukraine. I'm not claiming that every one is filled like that, but it still raise a question of which isn't being shown due to security and propaganda reasons. The Russian army may not necessarily have been >200k strong at the start of the invasion. Some analysts have estimated that it was closer to 100k-150k. We'll probably never know the true numbers, so we can't make good conclusions how this affected the later stages of the war. What we can say is that not all of the initially mobilized soldiers were actively participating in the fighting during the initial invasion. So that number was probably indeed closer to 100k. This is an important point to keep in mind for the analysis, because not all soldiers have the same role in the army, with some being more passive than the rest for various reasons like field of expertise, level of expertise, age, war strategy (like a focus on bombing, shelling and trench fighting, after tanks were found to be too ineffective by themselves), etc. What we do know is the official Ukrainian report of nearly 110k KIA Russian soldiers since Feb 24. That would be around 340 KIA/day on average. This number may be inflated, and it likely is, but the true number probably won't be as low as 1/10, but it could be 1/2 or even 1/4. So I think we can work with a range of 27k to 110k KIA, with the true number likely being closer to 27k than 110k. Regarding wounded, captured and MIA, we can reasonably estimate that at 3-4 times of KIA, with wounded being greater than captured and MIA. Most of the wounded soldiers eventually return to the battlefield, some sooner and some later than others, so there's a lot of variability there. Since the wounded return, a portion of them add to KIA, and another portion yet again retreats wounded and returns later, otherwise they're captured or MIA. Captured soldiers are strictly removed from battle unless there's an exchange. However, in the case of the Russian army, they have a policy to send their soldiers into certain death more than the Ukrainian army does (for reasons like disposability due to numbers, quality and systemic differences in war strategy - although since Russia's retreat from the North it does appear that their total casualties and loss of equipment has declined by perhaps 50% or some number in that ballpark, but I can't confirm that independently. The obvious explanation being that they shifted away from frontal assault to longer range bombardment). About the newly mobilized: they're not up to the same fighting standards. So regardless of whether we're talking about a total of 1.3 million Russian soldiers or instead closer to 700k, it doesn't make a huge difference. Most of the mobilized soldiers cannot be used for active fighting, or at least not productively, because as mentioned Russia's strategy shifted from active combat to shelling, and 600k additional soldiers simply do not fill 600k additional useful roles in artillery or bombing efforts, mostly due to lack of equipment/ammo and also lack of training. Instead these soldiers will be filling the role of setting up defensive positions, digging trenches, moving equipment, etc. They play a mostly supportive role and only a portion of them can reasonably be used for active fighting at the front lines. So really it was never the case that Russia (or Ukraine) had more or less overwhelming numbers during the invasion than at later stages. What has changed over time on both sides is mostly the strategy, geographics (e.g. the Dnipro), and now winter, with the latter two points negatively impacting Ukrainian offensive efforts very significantly. Changes in strategy or numbers therefore won't save Russia. They're in better defensive shape for reasons outside of the control on either side, that's why Ukraine is currently stalling. With warmer temperatures this will change fairly rapidly, especially if in the meantime Ukraine can weaken some of Russia's supply lines. That's what Ukraine is likely focusing on right now. One other thing to keep in mind is that even if Russia has 850k men in the military total it doesn't mean it can use them all. It's a very big country which means a lot of border that must be protected. Then there's all the military infrastructure inside the country that also can't just be abandoned. A lot of the military will also be typical desk-pushing jobs and people occupying them aren't usually frontline material. The question here is, how much of its manpower and equipment can Russia actually commit to a war outside of its borders? Half? Three quarters? A third?
To that point I can't say much of use, except for pointing to the obvious problem that Russia has the advantage of nuclear deterrence, allowing them to understaff their borders - or at least that's the idea in theory. In practice I don't know how far Russian generals are willing to push their neglect of defense.
If Ukraine somehow were to decide to invade Russia, and if Putin decided not to retaliate with nukes, would that help Ukraine win the war? I believe it would, mostly because it would stretch the Russian defense line. It was the exact same problem during WW2 when the main battle line between Germany and Russia became overwhelmingly long for both sides. The logistics became very difficult and encirclement was a constant threat. On the other hand this also increased the pace of active fighting, which meant that more mobilization actually had a relevant use. The situation in Ukraine is the opposite, everything is very condensed at the moment, therefore active fighting is now very slow (edit: or to be precise, the movement is slow).
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EPT
