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On July 25 2022 02:45 Silvanel wrote:
@Ghanburighan
Poland has already worked with S. Korea in military sector (Krab is built on Korean chassis). Also, Abrams is too heavy to be used in some areas of Poland, so if we want the option to use tanks everywhere we need another type. Judging by the size of the deal, there is probably some tech transfer involved. In my opinion, we will be building a Polish version of K2 and/or K9. Those purchases won't leave our borders.
The past suggests it's the very attractive K9.
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On July 25 2022 04:25 Simberto wrote:Show nested quote +On July 25 2022 04:23 maybenexttime wrote:On July 25 2022 03:43 Sent. wrote:
Well it is hard to understand why Kremlin is so reluctant to use Russia's core manpower while using ethnic Russians from their puppet states in eastern Ukraine like an 19th century imperialist power would use people from its African or Asian colonies. Because most Russians are couch patriots by design. They don't mine a genocide next door, as long as they don't have to get their hands dirty. Also, Russia is what matters to Putin. Russians get angry if lots of Russians die. If lots of people from some puppet state die, that doesn't really impact Russia itself a lot.
My point is that the people from the puppet states are literally ethnic Russians who consider themselves Russians and could be easily converted into productive citizens of the Russian Federation. Kremlin is wasting the lives of educated or physically unfit men from those areas while refusing to use way more capable people from the central Russia.
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On July 25 2022 04:51 Sent. wrote:Show nested quote +On July 25 2022 04:25 Simberto wrote:On July 25 2022 04:23 maybenexttime wrote:On July 25 2022 03:43 Sent. wrote:
Well it is hard to understand why Kremlin is so reluctant to use Russia's core manpower while using ethnic Russians from their puppet states in eastern Ukraine like an 19th century imperialist power would use people from its African or Asian colonies. Because most Russians are couch patriots by design. They don't mine a genocide next door, as long as they don't have to get their hands dirty. Also, Russia is what matters to Putin. Russians get angry if lots of Russians die. If lots of people from some puppet state die, that doesn't really impact Russia itself a lot. My point is that the people from the puppet states are literally ethnic Russians who consider themselves Russians and could be easily converted into productive citizens of the Russian Federation. Kremlin is wasting the lives of educated or physically unfit men from those areas while refusing to use way more capable people from the central Russia. Puppet states exist to be used like that for Authoritarian nations. Them being 'ethical Russians' is not something Russia actually cares about, any talk of ethnicity is just a tool to use to control and rile up people. Not an actual moral position.
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Russian Federation605 Posts
On July 25 2022 03:01 Manit0u wrote:Show nested quote +On July 25 2022 02:39 Ardias wrote:On July 24 2022 23:35 Manit0u wrote:On July 24 2022 08:22 plasmidghost wrote:
I had meant to point out the Russians using 85% of their military in Ukraine so far, but that makes me wonder, how accurate would that statement be? You have to take into account that Russia hasn't sent their regular army there. Mostly just conscripts and regional forces (people they don't have to put casualty reports for public). At the beginning of conflict Russia had what, 200k troops sent there? With 40k dead you'd assume that at least twice that number are wounded or otherwise incapable of fighting, making it around 120k incapacitated troops so I'd estimate it at about 60%. That's just the troops, not sure about vehicles and other assets. On July 24 2022 19:12 Simberto wrote:
Quantity has a quality of its own.
I wouldn't wanna be in that field while that is going on. Yeah, but at the same time you don't see any trench lines or burned down armor there. So it seems like an excessive force to saturate an area. We don't really know the context but if it was to say rout a small unit of Ukrainians then it's extremely ineffective (expending thousands of artillery rounds to try and hunt down 20 people or so). It's the opposite. Russia sent only regular troops there, while conscripts remained in Russia, since it's legally prohibited to use them outside Russian border. That's why I think referendums on Russia-controlled territories are important, they will allow Kremlin to use conscripts in defence of these territories in accordance with Russian law. Then how come the people reporting back home or captured by the Ukrainians are saying they were basically drafted and sent to the front without even having any training at all? Most of the Russian forces were people conscripted in the LPR/DNR, conscripts from rural areas or forces of other republics (Chechens, Wagner Group etc.). Aside from a few units of their regular troops in the form of VDV, some marines and spetsnaz there weren't really any signs of their regular army. Most pictures we get are those groups of people with random mismatched equipment and very few wearing any modern gear, body armor or even uniform outfits. Unless you want to tell me that regular infantrymen in Russia go into combat wearing sneakers and colorful school backpacks? Maybe there are some regular troops but I think they're being held back and away from the front. There were also reports that Russia didn't want to send people from around Moscow region etc. as they'd have to report casualties on them and it wouldn't sit well with people.
First of all, I would take any "intercepted comms" and POW reports with a grain of salt. Former is due to restrictions on use of the cellphones in combat zone (though of course there are people who bypass these) as well as ability to easily make up such calls with a lot of native speakers of the language. Latter is due to the fact, that it is quite easy to make POW to tell what you need him to. If you would listen to what UA POWs, they tell a lot of bad stuff about UA military (up to being shot for desertion or being forced to sexual intercourse by the upper rank).
Then there is practice of offering to sign a contract to a conscript, who served for half a year. So, while not being trained too well, he is regular trooper by the law.
LPR and DPR are not "the most of Russian forces". Pre-war they had roughly 35k troops combined (via Military Balance 2021). Mobilization of course increased that number, but not by even hundred thousand. Many people left the region after 2014, and of those remaining, not a lot were fit for service. Plus there is still need to maintain social services at least. My take it that they've probably doubled their pre-war numbers, but not much more.
About backpack and sneakers - clothes and shoes wear down very fast in combat conditions. Especially if you are stuck in battle for months without rotation. So soldiers take what's necessary to fight on from dead bodies or destroyed apartments. Plus, as was already pointed out, on Donbass front Russian and LDPR troops are often mixed up.
About "Russians from Moscow aren't sent to front" - it was discussed here already. Economically depressed regions are the main pool of the manpower to the regular army. Plus in many national republics ways of strength and martial prowess are often encouraged in youth (Chechnya, Dagestan, Buryatia, Tuva, etc.). If you are strong, but can't earn decent money at home, you either can move to big city to find a job, or you can join the army. For many the latter way is much simpler.
And Moscow is the opposite, being the city of most opportunities it gives it's residents much more options to earn money, other than being drilled 24/7. If people from it do enlist in the army, they mostly do it as officers (and bear in mind that study in Moscow isn't equal to be it's resident, there are ton of people coming from all over the country to Moscow universities, military academies included).
And the most important point - I know people with friends and connections in the army. They all report the same thing - conscripts stay behind the border, their contribution is repairing the vehicles and offloading ammunition at most. Plus obituaries do get published in regional media, and I'm yet to see even one conscript there. Officers and regulars only.
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So, less than 24 hours after striking the grain exports deal Russian cruise missiles hit the port in Odessa.
I wonder why are people even bothering to negotiate with Russia at this point?
On July 25 2022 07:32 Ardias wrote:
LPR and DPR are not "the most of Russian forces". Pre-war they had roughly 35k troops combined (cia Military Balance 2021). Mobilization of course increased that number, but not by even hundred thousand. Many people left the region after 2014, and of those remaining, not a lot were fit for service. Plus there is still need to maintain social services at least. My take it that they've probably doubled their pre-war numbers, but not much more.
Wasn't there enforced conscription in LPR/DPR recently? They wanted to raise over 100k new troops there, raising the conscription age to 65 and removing health-related obstacles. There were stories of old and sick pensioners having to hide to avoid being drafted into the army.
Edit:
It all starts to look more and more like WW3. Israel has destroyed a drone factory in Syria where Iran was producing drones (ones that Russia wanted to buy).
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russians say they've destroyed a long range missile(US made) depot in Odessa.
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Are the regular Russian soldiers getting extra financial compensation for fighting in Ukraine? On CNN they said they are hiring mercenaries, basically for 2700-6000$/m depending on military experience.
I can't believe everyone is compensated that well and wonder what that does to the morale of the average Russian conscript, when some Dagestani or Tchechen dude next to them, doing the same thing, gets that kind of money.
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On July 25 2022 07:32 Ardias wrote:
They all report the same thing - conscripts stay behind the border, their contribution is repairing the vehicles and offloading ammunition at most.
This info solved my estimation, that a normal guy with only months training is almost useless for combat missions in modern warfare.
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On July 25 2022 17:20 winteriscoming wrote:Show nested quote +On July 25 2022 07:32 Ardias wrote:
They all report the same thing - conscripts stay behind the border, their contribution is repairing the vehicles and offloading ammunition at most. This info solved my estimation, that a normal guy with only months training is almost useless for combat missions in modern warfare.
It's been a long known fact that you need a regular and professional army since conscription doesn't really work.
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Russian Federation605 Posts
On July 25 2022 16:49 r00ty wrote:
Are the regular Russian soldiers getting extra financial compensation for fighting in Ukraine? On CNN they said they are hiring mercenaries, basically for 2700-6000$/m depending on military experience.
I can't believe everyone is compensated that well and wonder what that does to the morale of the average Russian conscript, when some Dagestani or Tchechen dude next to them, doing the same thing, gets that kind of money.
Both Russian and Ukrainian troopers are recieving increased payments for participating in fighting (called combat payments). In Ukraine it's 100 000 hrivnas a month (or 30 000 if not deployed to the front), in Russia - 200 000 rubles a month (both numbers are hard to estimate in dollars due to both currencies being volatile, but it would be around 2000-4000 dollars a month, just like you said). This figure includes all troopers, both that were serving before the war and who enlisted after its start. Not sure how it works in LDPR at the moment, though I heard that they've boosted financing a bit.
In comparison in peacetime Ukrainian regular enlisted personnel recieved 7000-10000 hrivnas/month (more if they served on Donbass), Russian regular enlisted - 30000-40000 rubles/month (again, much more if they were deployed in combat zone, like Syria). In Wagner people say that payment is similar to regular army, you just get more combat deployments (Syria, Libya, CAR, Mali, Sudan, Mozambique and Ukraine) and hence you are regularly recieving those combat payments.
There is also huge compensations for being wounded or killed (latter go to the families). In Russia 3 million rubles for being wounded and 5 million rubles for the death in combat. In Ukraine Zelensky at the start of the war announced 15 million hrivnas to the families of the deceased.
Of course, due to the large scale of the conflict both countries are struggling with such payments and there are many stories from both sides about payments being delayed or relatives not being able to recieve payment for the dead member of the family. Ukraine is struggling even more than Russia in this regard due to larger number of men mobilized and less money to spare (Russia still has huge profit from exports, while Ukraine is mostly reliant on foreign financial aid, which is still not comparable with Russian profits).
Also Dagestani are in the same line with Russians, or Buryats, or Kalmyks or whomever else in this. It's Chechens who get fancy gear and special treatment (and Kadyrov gets the right to cover the war as he likes, even condradicting the official Kremlin position).
Edit: did some counting, and if estimates of 50 000 combat deaths for Ukraine are correct, at the current exchange rate Ukraine needs to pay their families 20 billion dollars. And if 1 000 000 army estimates by Ukrainian officials are correct, and even 300 000 are directly involved in fighting, it's roughly 1,4 billion dollars in payments a month, or 17 billion a year. That's not counting supplies, fuel, equipment etc. Yearly UA military budget in 2021 was around 4,5 billion USD.
Though for Russia figure is huge as well, since it relies only on domestic weapon production, and has to spend a lot of money there, while Ukraine relies on foreign aid in that department. But still, Russia has more money as long as oil, gas, metal and grain flow.
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On July 25 2022 18:29 Ardias wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On July 25 2022 16:49 r00ty wrote:
Are the regular Russian soldiers getting extra financial compensation for fighting in Ukraine? On CNN they said they are hiring mercenaries, basically for 2700-6000$/m depending on military experience.
I can't believe everyone is compensated that well and wonder what that does to the morale of the average Russian conscript, when some Dagestani or Tchechen dude next to them, doing the same thing, gets that kind of money. Both Russian and Ukrainian troopers are recieving increased payments for participating in fighting (called combat payments). In Ukraine it's 100 000 hrivnas a month (or 30 000 if not deployed to the front), in Russia - 200 000 rubles a month (both numbers are hard to estimate in dollars due to both currencies being volatile, but it would be around 2000-4000 dollars a month, just like you said). This figure includes all troopers, both that were serving before the war and who enlisted after its start. Not sure how it works in LDPR at the moment, though I heard that they've boosted financing a bit. In comparison in peacetime Ukrainian regular enlisted personnel recieved 7000-10000 hrivnas/month (more if they served on Donbass), Russian regular enlisted - 30000-40000 rubles/month (again, much more if they were deployed in combat zone, like Syria). In Wagner people say that payment is similar to regular army, you just get more combat deployments (Syria, Libya, CAR, Mali, Sudan, Mozambique and Ukraine) and hence you are regularly recieving those combat payments. There is also huge compensations for being wounded or killed (latter go to the families). In Russia 3 million rubles for being wounded and 5 million rubles for the death in combat. In Ukraine Zelensky at the start of the war announced 15 million hrivnas to the families of the deceased. Of course, due to the large scale of the conflict both countries are struggling with such payments and there are many stories from both sides about payments being delayed or relatives not being able to recieve payment for the dead member of the family. Ukraine is struggling even more than Russia in this regard due to larger number of men mobilized and less money to spare (Russia still has huge profit from exports, while Ukraine is mostly reliant on foreign financial aid, which is still not comparable with Russian profits). Also Dagestani are in the same line with Russians, or Buryats, or Kalmyks or whomever else in this. It's Chechens who get fancy gear and special treatment (and Kadyrov gets the right to cover the war as he likes, even condradicting the official Kremlin position). Edit: did some counting, and if estimates of 50 000 combat deaths for Ukraine are correct, at the current exchange rate Ukraine needs to pay their families 20 billion dollars. And if 1 000 000 army estimates by Ukrainian officials are correct, and even 300 000 are directly involved in fighting, it's roughly 1,4 billion dollars in payments a month, or 17 billion a year. That's not counting supplies, fuel, equipment etc. Yearly UA military budget in 2021 was around 4,5 billion USD. Though for Russia figure is huge as well, since it relies only on domestic weapon production, and has to spend a lot of money there, while Ukraine relies on foreign aid in that department. But still, Russia has more money as long as oil, gas, metal and grain flow.
Thanks man. That's crazy money considering the average income and might even be a bit more than what Germans got while deployed in Afghanistan for comparison.
Edit: German soldiers got between 30 (logistics at the airport) and 110€ (out and about in the country side) daily added to their salary (of around 3000€/m for a qualified soldier).
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20 billion dollars does not sound like a lot in the face of a war. Especially with EU and USA behind to pay. It's much harder to find capable fighters than the money to pay them. Guess Russia has the same problem
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I think Ukraine will be around 15-20k. They did say that they're losing about 100 men/day which would put a rough estimate around 15k (with 5k added for days of more intense fighting). This would be in line with Russian losses which sit around 35-40k troops now according to the reports.
Edit: I also think that the biggest challenge Russia is facing now is the fact that with every passing day Ukraine is getting stronger as more and more supplies are coming in, troops are being trained outside the country and they have much larger reserve pool of willing candidates to pull from. Whereas Russia's forces and equipment are dwindling with little possibilities of resupplying and strengthening unless they scale their "special operation" into a war and mobilize for it, which will be harder to do as days go by due to sanctions.
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On July 25 2022 21:28 Harris1st wrote:
20 billion dollars does not sound like a lot in the face of a war. Especially with EU and USA behind to pay. It's much harder to find capable fighters than the money to pay them. Guess Russia has the same problem
The problem with relying on someone else to pay for your war is that you are dependent on their goodwill.
Arguably in a long war Russia has winning chances; it is unclear how much economic pain the EU is willing to suffer for a war that is, to be honest, outside their borders. They're helping to defend a friend, but in the end it's only a friend, not one of them.
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United States41959 Posts
On July 26 2022 13:39 gobbledydook wrote:Show nested quote +On July 25 2022 21:28 Harris1st wrote:
20 billion dollars does not sound like a lot in the face of a war. Especially with EU and USA behind to pay. It's much harder to find capable fighters than the money to pay them. Guess Russia has the same problem The problem with relying on someone else to pay for your war is that you are dependent on their goodwill. Arguably in a long war Russia has winning chances; it is unclear how much economic pain the EU is willing to suffer for a war that is, to be honest, outside their borders. They're helping to defend a friend, but in the end it's only a friend, not one of them.
If Ukraine falls the EU has to pay for a military strong enough to deter Russian expansionism. With that in mind propping up Ukraine actually saves money. Far cheaper to fund a Ukrainian buffer than a constant militarized border.
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Here's the mostly autotranslated Rainer Saks update for the day
July 26 summary of the previous day - the activity of Russian units in the northern part of Donbass increased, but a little success was achieved in only one point.
- There was an unsuccessful reconnaissance battle by the Russians in the direction of Harkiv, although the artillery fire was much more active.
- One unsuccessful reconnaissance battle was conducted over several days in the direction of Izjum, otherwise the activity of Russian units in this direction continues to be low.
- In the direction of Kramatorsk/Siversk, daily attempts were made to advance from several places, but there are no signs of success for the Russian units
- In the direction of Bahmut, the activity of Russian units was traditionally the highest. In most cases losses were incurred and no progress was made. Only at the Vuglegorsk power station has progress been made in one section. There's actually non-stop fighting going on throughout this area, so it's a bit arbitrary to present such a fixed moment about the situation. But as of this morning, we can say that Ukraine's defense has held up well.
- Russian units were completely inactive in the southern Donbass. The Ukrainian side continues its attacks on Russian logistics.
- On the southern front, Russian units are engaged in establishing defensive positions, artillery activity is very low. The Russian military command also seems to be afraid of the event of an offensive by Ukraine in this direction.
- In the direction of Kherson, Ukrainian units were the most active. In this area, the activity of the Ukrainian air force exceeds that of the Russian side. But Ukraine continues to focus on destroying Russian control points and supply routes and concentration points. On a daily basis, the Russian side has been trying to push back the Ukrainian forces, but without success. The Russian command has reportedly started building pontoon bridges to replace the ones destroyed by the Ukrainians. At this early, you can't tell whether it's pure information noise or a real action.
- There are continuous reports about sending new weapons to Ukraine. It's a good mix of real supplied equipment, as well as all kinds of plans and speculations. At the moment, we can conclude that in the first half of August, the air defense capability of the Ukrainians, the armored maneuver capability should improve, and Ukraine should also get some more artillery. All kinds of stories about fighters, drones, etc. are initially rather speculations/wishes. In the formation of reserve units, Ukraine is several months ahead of Russia, and without a truce, Russia will not be able to make up for it. Thus, the quality of Ukrainians is constantly increasing, but slowly. As the events in the Kherson region show, it will unfortunately still take time to gain the upper hand.
Losses on the Russian side in the form of dead and wounded are almost 1 battalion tactical group per day. The main cost is still going on the offensive. At the present moment, about half of the military capability of Russia has been used up, i.e. almost the entire group of forces mobilized against Ukraine at the end of February has been used up. All this explains why Russia can actively attack only about 10% of the entire front line.
+ Show Spoiler +
Rainer Saksa ülevaade.
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26. juuli kokkuvõte eelneva päeva kohta - vene üksuste aktiivsus Donbassi põhjaosas kasvas, aga edu saavutati vähekene ainult ühes punktis.
- Harkivi suunal toimus vene poolt üks ebaedukas luurelahing, küll oli märksa aktiivsem suurtükiväe tuletegevus.
- Izjumi suunalt tehti üle mitme päeva ka üks ebaedukas luurelahing, muus osas on vene üksuste aktiivsus sellel suunal jätkuvalt madal.
- Kramatorski/Siverski suunal tehti igapäevased katsed mitmest kohast edasi liikuda, aga märke vene üksuste edu kohta ei ole märgata
- Bahmuti suunal oli vene üksuste aktiivsus traditsiooniliselt kõige kõrgem. Enamasti kanti kaotusi ja edasi ei saadud. Vaid Vuglegorski elektrijaama juures on ühes lõigus edenetud. Kogu selles piirkonnas tegelikult toimuvad katkematult lahingud, nii et sellist fikseeritud momenti olukorra kohta on natuke meelevaldne esitleda. Aga hommikuse seisuga saame öelda, et Ukraina kaitse on kenasti pidanud.
- Lõuna-Donbassi osas olid vene üksused täiesti passiivsed. Ukraina pool jätkab rünnakuid vene logistikale.
- Lõunarindel tegelevad vene üksused kaitsepositsioonide rajamisega, suurtükiväe aktiivsus on väga madal. Vene väejuhatus näib ka sellel suunal Ukraina pealetungi üritust pelgavat.
- Hersoni suunal olid Ukraina üksused kõige aktiivsemad. Selles pirkonnas ületab Ukraina õhuväe aktiivsus vene poole oma. Aga Ukraina on jätkuvalt keskendunud vene juhitmispuntide ja varustusteede ning koondumiskohtade hävtamisele. Vene pool on igapäevaselt üritanud Ukraina vägesid tagasi suruda, kuid ebaedukalt. Vene väejuhatus väidetavalt on asunud ehitama pontoonsildu ukrainlaste hävitatud sildade asemel. Esialgu ei saa sotti, kas see on puhas infomüra, või reaalne aktsioon.
- Ilmub järjest teateid uute relvade saatmise kohta Ukrainasse. See on paras segapudru reaalsetest vedudest, kui ka igasugu plaanidest ning spekulatsioonidest. Praegu võime järeldada, et augusti esimeses pooles peaks paranema ukrainlaste õhutõrje võimekus, soomusmanööver võimekus ning täindust peaks laekuma ka suurtükiväele. Igasugu lood hävitajatest, droonidest etc on esialgu pigem spekulatsioonid/soovid. Reservüksuste moodustamises on Ukrainal venemaa ees mitmekuuline edumaa ning ilma vaherahuta venemaa seda tasa teha ei suuda. Seega kasvab ukrainlaste kvaliteet pidevalt, aga aeglaselt. Nagu näitavad sündmused Hersoni piirkonnas, võtab ülekaalu saavutamine kahjuks ikka veel aega.
Vene poole kaotused on langenute ja haavatute näol peaaegu 1 pataljoni taktikalise gurpi jagu päevas. Põhiline kulu tuleb ikka veel katsetest pealetungile minna. Praeguseks hetkeks on kulunud ca pool vene venemaa kasutuses olnud sõjalisest võimest, ehk kulunud on peaaegu kogu veebruari lõpuks Ukrana vastu koondatud väegrupeering. Kõik see seletab, miks venemaa suudab aktiivselt rünnata veel vaid ca 10% ulatuses kogu rindejoonest.
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On July 26 2022 14:16 KwarK wrote:Show nested quote +On July 26 2022 13:39 gobbledydook wrote:On July 25 2022 21:28 Harris1st wrote:
20 billion dollars does not sound like a lot in the face of a war. Especially with EU and USA behind to pay. It's much harder to find capable fighters than the money to pay them. Guess Russia has the same problem The problem with relying on someone else to pay for your war is that you are dependent on their goodwill. Arguably in a long war Russia has winning chances; it is unclear how much economic pain the EU is willing to suffer for a war that is, to be honest, outside their borders. They're helping to defend a friend, but in the end it's only a friend, not one of them. If Ukraine falls the EU has to pay for a military strong enough to deter Russian expansionism. With that in mind propping up Ukraine actually saves money. Far cheaper to fund a Ukrainian buffer than a constant militarized border.
I don't think this is true for the whole of the EU. I don't think that any Nato memberstate is at risk of an invasion by russia, and the eastern european states that are in Nato already fulfil their required military spending afaik. The border is already constantly militarised through nato bases, so I don't see the big change here. But poland, slovakia, romania and hungary do benefit from having a stable neighbour they can have reliable trade relations with, so for them I would expect it to be worth it.
Not sure if supporting ukraine is an actual net benefit for the whole EU in case of success, but there is more to that question than just financials - like being a smaller state and making sure that just swallowing up another state remains unacceptable. That is a goal worth pursuing, even if ukraine would end up losing.
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On July 26 2022 15:18 Artesimo wrote:Show nested quote +On July 26 2022 14:16 KwarK wrote:On July 26 2022 13:39 gobbledydook wrote:On July 25 2022 21:28 Harris1st wrote:
20 billion dollars does not sound like a lot in the face of a war. Especially with EU and USA behind to pay. It's much harder to find capable fighters than the money to pay them. Guess Russia has the same problem The problem with relying on someone else to pay for your war is that you are dependent on their goodwill. Arguably in a long war Russia has winning chances; it is unclear how much economic pain the EU is willing to suffer for a war that is, to be honest, outside their borders. They're helping to defend a friend, but in the end it's only a friend, not one of them. If Ukraine falls the EU has to pay for a military strong enough to deter Russian expansionism. With that in mind propping up Ukraine actually saves money. Far cheaper to fund a Ukrainian buffer than a constant militarized border. I don't think this is true for the whole of the EU. I don't think that any Nato memberstate is at risk of an invasion by russia, and the eastern european states that are in Nato already fulfil their required military spending afaik. The border is already constantly militarised through nato bases, so I don't see the big change here. But poland, slovakia, romania and hungary do benefit from having a stable neighbour they can have reliable trade relations with, so for them I would expect it to be worth it. Not sure if supporting ukraine is an actual net benefit for the whole EU in case of success, but there is more to that question than just financials - like being a smaller state and making sure that just swallowing up another state remains unacceptable. That is a goal worth pursuing, even if ukraine would end up losing.
The net gain of protecting Ukraine may have been small prior to the war, but now there's additional gain that wasn't on the table before, because pushing back Russia to its own borders would ensure greater safety for EU members, and greater stability all around.
More importantly, it would create a loyal ally in Ukraine, when previously they were rather uninterested in EU membership. Ukrainians now have every reason to want to be part of the EU and NATO. Their disinterest pre-2022 was the main reason why Ukraine didn't apply sooner, but the EU was certainly interested in Ukraine joining. Now both sides are more eager than ever.
There are also other neat little changes that could be done with Ukraine being in the EU. Their railroad system (as of many or all other ex-Soviet countries) doesn't fit the EU standard, making transport by land a hassle. There's a project in planning to change the rail gauge.
https://en.thepage.ua/economy/ukraines-switch-to-european-railway-gauge
This appears to be another element used by Russia against Ukraine in this war, and another of many reasons why Putin doesn't want to surrender.
tl;dr Ukraine may not be that important to the EU right now, but it can be made essential in the future, and losing Ukraine to Russia would be especially bad. It's the potential in both directions that matters so much.
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EPT
