Although this thread does not function under the same strict guidelines as the USPMT, it is still a general practice on TL to provide a source with an explanation on why it is relevant and what purpose it adds to the discussion. Failure to do so will result in a mod action.
On July 04 2015 02:48 Sufficiency wrote: What do you think of the likelihood of Belgium broken apart and back to France and the Netherlands?
0
Why not....
Whats the chance of Quebec joining France?
The problem is that Quebec is distant geographically from France. Belgium is right by the doors. Additionally, despite all thr cries of Quebec separation movements, Quebec is not a dominant factor in Canadian national politics - different from the Belgian split which is more 50-50.
Because NL doesn't want Flanders, France doesn't want Wallonia, Wallonia doesn't want to be absorbed by France, and Flanders doesn't want to be absorbed by NL.
And Belgium doesn't to be splitted too, that's not in the scope, and less than 20% of Belgians want that to that to happen. And even if it were to happen, it would be a huge shit for both regions, because of Bruxelles, because of French speaker in the Flanders region, and vis versa. That's just not possible.
You can add that the EU will totally veto it, and I don't see how Wallonia, or even Flanders can survive without being backed up by the EU.
All in all, this won't happen, we don't want that to happen and it is even stupid to think about it.
On July 04 2015 05:22 maartendq wrote: Call me arrogant but I think a Belgian split will cause the EU a much bigger headache than Greece does right now.
Yeah, imagine the mess, Wallonia probably won't have the sufficient economy to join the EU since it is at a very weak level already, Bxl would be a pain in the ass since it's the capital of the EU, so where does it go ? to Wallonia because it's 80% french speaker or Flanders because it is in the Flanders region. That aside, a split would encourage regions like Catalan, Scottish again, Bavaria and I don't know how many dozen of confliactuals regions there is in Europe.
On July 04 2015 05:22 maartendq wrote: Call me arrogant but I think a Belgian split will cause the EU a much bigger headache than Greece does right now.
Yeah, imagine the mess, Wallonia probably won't have the sufficient economy to join the EU since it is at a very weak level already, Bxl would be a pain in the ass since it's the capital of the EU, so where does it go ? to Wallonia because it's 80% french speaker or Flanders because it is in the Flanders region. That aside, a split would encourage regions like Catalan, Scottish again, Bavaria and I don't know how many dozen of confliactuals regions there is in Europe.
It just can't happen
I wouldn't count Bavaria amongst them, their independence ambitions are on a whole (lower) level than the others you mentioned
On July 04 2015 05:22 maartendq wrote: Call me arrogant but I think a Belgian split will cause the EU a much bigger headache than Greece does right now.
Yeah, imagine the mess, Wallonia probably won't have the sufficient economy to join the EU since it is at a very weak level already, Bxl would be a pain in the ass since it's the capital of the EU, so where does it go ? to Wallonia because it's 80% french speaker or Flanders because it is in the Flanders region. That aside, a split would encourage regions like Catalan, Scottish again, Bavaria and I don't know how many dozen of confliactuals regions there is in Europe.
It just can't happen
I wouldn't count Bavaria amongst them, their independence ambitions are on a whole (lower) level than the others you mentioned
Yeah sorry, that was just a region that come out of my mind ^^
Andreas Andreadis, the head of the Association of Hellenic Tourism Enterprises (SETE), said that hotel bookings are down 50,000 a day due to the recent developments in the country. (...) Data released on Wednesday by the Travelplanet 24 and Airtickets websites showed that air ticket bookings by Greek travelers for the July-September period showed a decline of up to 50 percent.
Tourism is around 20% of the Greek economy. With Egypt and Tunisia out of the picture, this is pretty good news for tourism in Portugal and Spain. Thanks Syriza.
On July 04 2015 05:09 mahrgell wrote: Okay, lets quickly check: Does France want that? - No Do the Netherlands want it? - No Does anyone in Belgium want it? - No (if they want anything, it is independence, but if they could only choose an overlord, they would certainly stick with Belgium then NED/FRA) Would anyone else in Europe support it? - No
On July 04 2015 05:09 mahrgell wrote: Okay, lets quickly check: Does France want that? - No Do the Netherlands want it? - No Does anyone in Belgium want it? - No (if they want anything, it is independence, but if they could only choose an overlord, they would certainly stick with Belgium then NED/FRA) Would anyone else in Europe support it? - No
Yet another article relevant to the discussion we had above, although perhaps not specifically about Germany being the devil incarnate (sidenote, I spent my formative years in Munich, 1 through 6 years old, as my parents were teachers in a Greek school there - that was in the 80s. I like ze Germans!).
I don't get it. The debt relief and the reforms are unrelated. Reforms are necessary in ANY case. It's just that in addition to reforms, debt relief is needed (and was apparently non-negotiable, which is fucking stupid by Dijsselbloem and Schauble, but also politically inspired: approving debt relief for Greece is political suicide in Germany and Netherlands at the moment).
The Greeks aren't voting yes or no on debt relief. They are voting yes or no on accepting the austerity terms, which to be fair is kinda pointless: all the creditors require some form of reforms to be accepted before any kind of debt relief can be considered, so voting "No" is not going to suddenly put debt relief on the table.
Well, here are some facts:
- Syriza has proposed fiscal measures amounting to 8bn and has largely agreed to almost all creditor demands (including not levying a 12% tax on big profits in favor of cutting pensions a little more). On the reform side (not counting fiscal measures as reform per se), the creditors and Syriza have long been in agreement about all subjects except collective bargaining - and Syriza proposes that Greece adopt a collective bargaining scheme recommended by the ILO and based on worldwide best practices. I have no clue what the hell creditors want here - a scheme found nowhere else in the world that gives ever more power to employers or something like that is my understanding. That takes care of reforms.
- Debt is unsustainable under any scenario, currently, according to the IMF. Previously it was sustainable under the extremely likely scenario of 4.5% primary surpluses and 3% annual growth, which has only happened 3-4 times ever since we measure these things and includes such relevant to Greece situations as oil-rich Norway, Singapore and similar. This was supposed to happen for several decades, mind you. Very sustainable.
- Debt restructuring/write off was never on the table. Best creditors could do was vague promises of looking into it in the future.
- Creditors proposed financing that would take us right back to the current situation (endless negotiations, economy in limbo) in a few months. Greece asks for at least a 2-year stability period where the economy might possibly get back on track, but apparently that's not in creditors' interests (somehow).
Is it any wonder that Tsipras didn't sign? I don't think so, after all he knows what extend and pretend is all about and wouldn't have a part of it. So what about the creditors? What's the point of their intransigence? Could it be politically motivated, since it certainly doesn't make economic sense? After all, if Tsipras of the far left gets a good compromise, what does that say about the mainstream parties? What does that do for Podemos and others?
So what the creditors aim for is regime change. If Greece votes YES tomorrow, mission accomplished. If Greece votes NO wait for the ECB to not do anything much and the Europeans to not do anything much while they wait for Greece to completely unravel (human cost will be high but, eh, who cares) and the lefties to either go to the drachma while the population mobs them (Tsipras never mentions the drachma, after all) or just capitulate. The hope of SYRIZA is that Europe/ECB care even a little bit about the will of the people and all that and will just sit down after a NO and finalize a proper deal (this proper deal will undoubtedly include many more measures now to recuperate losses due to CCs). I don't see it.
Rock, meet hard place.
edit: Oh, about you wondering why doesn't Greece just implement those reforms and ask for debt relief later. Well, the goal of these programs is to restore market access, which you do by showing the markets that the numbers add up (fiscal position, debt, growth, everything). If debt relief isn't part of the program but a vague excuse for the future (and meanwhile Merkel comes out and says, straight up, that debt is sustainable, and the German Finance Ministry says the same, and you realize debt relief will cost whoever gives it political capital since the public has been indoctrinated about Greeks just spending all the help and doing nothing much to reform themselves) the program itself is doomed to fail. Which is why there needs to be a firm agreement about debt restructuring, not ambiguity.
Yet another article relevant to the discussion we had above, although perhaps not specifically about Germany being the devil incarnate (sidenote, I spent my formative years in Munich, 1 through 6 years old, as my parents were teachers in a Greek school there - that was in the 80s. I like ze Germans!).
I don't get it. The debt relief and the reforms are unrelated. Reforms are necessary in ANY case. It's just that in addition to reforms, debt relief is needed (and was apparently non-negotiable, which is fucking stupid by Dijsselbloem and Schauble, but also politically inspired: approving debt relief for Greece is political suicide in Germany and Netherlands at the moment).
The Greeks aren't voting yes or no on debt relief. They are voting yes or no on accepting the austerity terms, which to be fair is kinda pointless: all the creditors require some form of reforms to be accepted before any kind of debt relief can be considered, so voting "No" is not going to suddenly put debt relief on the table.
Well, here are some facts:
- Syriza has proposed fiscal measures amounting to 8bn and has largely agreed to almost all creditor demands (including not levying a 12% tax on big profits in favor of cutting pensions a little more). On the reform side (not counting fiscal measures as reform per se), the creditors and Syriza have long been in agreement about all subjects except collective bargaining - and Syriza proposes that Greece adopt a collective bargaining scheme recommended by the ILO and based on worldwide best practices. I have no clue what the hell creditors want here - a scheme found nowhere else in the world that gives ever more power to employers or something like that is my understanding. That takes care of reforms.
- Debt is unsustainable under any scenario, currently, according to the IMF. Previously it was sustainable under the extremely likely scenario of 4.5% primary surpluses and 3% annual growth, which has only happened 3-4 times ever since we measure these things and includes such relevant to Greece situations as oil-rich Norway, Singapore and similar. This was supposed to happen for several decades, mind you. Very sustainable.
- Debt restructuring/write off was never on the table. Best creditors could do was vague promises of looking into it in the future.
- Creditors proposed financing that would take us right back to the current situation (endless negotiations, economy in limbo) in a few months. Greece asks for at least a 2-year stability period where the economy might possibly get back on track, but apparently that's not in creditors' interests (somehow).
Is it any wonder that Tsipras didn't sign? I don't think so, after all he knows what extend and pretend is all about and wouldn't have a part of it. So what about the creditors? What's the point of their intransigence? Could it be politically motivated, since it certainly doesn't make economic sense? After all, if Tsipras of the far left gets a good compromise, what does that say about the mainstream parties? What does that do for Podemos and others?
So what the creditors aim for is regime change. If Greece votes YES tomorrow, mission accomplished. If Greece votes NO wait for the ECB to not do anything much and the Europeans to not do anything much while they wait for Greece to completely unravel (human cost will be high but, eh, who cares) and the lefties to either go to the drachma while the population mobs them (Tsipras never mentions the drachma, after all) or just capitulate. The hope of SYRIZA is that Europe/ECB care even a little bit about the will of the people and all that and will just sit down after a NO and finalize a proper deal (this proper deal will undoubtedly include many more measures now to recuperate losses due to CCs). I don't see it.
Rock, meet hard place.
red is wrong. It was offered in a talk between Merkel and Tsipras before the Referendum was called for (it was on Friday, might have even been the day the referendum was announced? Don't really remember)
About the debt being unsustainable part above that. Everyone knows that, even in Germany and I don't agree with the innitial comment that offering debt writeoff would be political suicide at all. What would be political suicide in Germany would be offering that before seeing things improve or without having any kind of agreement beforehand.
Yet another article relevant to the discussion we had above, although perhaps not specifically about Germany being the devil incarnate (sidenote, I spent my formative years in Munich, 1 through 6 years old, as my parents were teachers in a Greek school there - that was in the 80s. I like ze Germans!).
I don't get it. The debt relief and the reforms are unrelated. Reforms are necessary in ANY case. It's just that in addition to reforms, debt relief is needed (and was apparently non-negotiable, which is fucking stupid by Dijsselbloem and Schauble, but also politically inspired: approving debt relief for Greece is political suicide in Germany and Netherlands at the moment).
The Greeks aren't voting yes or no on debt relief. They are voting yes or no on accepting the austerity terms, which to be fair is kinda pointless: all the creditors require some form of reforms to be accepted before any kind of debt relief can be considered, so voting "No" is not going to suddenly put debt relief on the table.
Well, here are some facts:
- Syriza has proposed fiscal measures amounting to 8bn and has largely agreed to almost all creditor demands (including not levying a 12% tax on big profits in favor of cutting pensions a little more). On the reform side (not counting fiscal measures as reform per se), the creditors and Syriza have long been in agreement about all subjects except collective bargaining - and Syriza proposes that Greece adopt a collective bargaining scheme recommended by the ILO and based on worldwide best practices. I have no clue what the hell creditors want here - a scheme found nowhere else in the world that gives ever more power to employers or something like that is my understanding. That takes care of reforms.
- Debt is unsustainable under any scenario, currently, according to the IMF. Previously it was sustainable under the extremely likely scenario of 4.5% primary surpluses and 3% annual growth, which has only happened 3-4 times ever since we measure these things and includes such relevant to Greece situations as oil-rich Norway, Singapore and similar. This was supposed to happen for several decades, mind you. Very sustainable.
- Debt restructuring/write off was never on the table. Best creditors could do was vague promises of looking into it in the future.
- Creditors proposed financing that would take us right back to the current situation (endless negotiations, economy in limbo) in a few months. Greece asks for at least a 2-year stability period where the economy might possibly get back on track, but apparently that's not in creditors' interests (somehow).
Is it any wonder that Tsipras didn't sign? I don't think so, after all he knows what extend and pretend is all about and wouldn't have a part of it. So what about the creditors? What's the point of their intransigence? Could it be politically motivated, since it certainly doesn't make economic sense? After all, if Tsipras of the far left gets a good compromise, what does that say about the mainstream parties? What does that do for Podemos and others?
So what the creditors aim for is regime change. If Greece votes YES tomorrow, mission accomplished. If Greece votes NO wait for the ECB to not do anything much and the Europeans to not do anything much while they wait for Greece to completely unravel (human cost will be high but, eh, who cares) and the lefties to either go to the drachma while the population mobs them (Tsipras never mentions the drachma, after all) or just capitulate. The hope of SYRIZA is that Europe/ECB care even a little bit about the will of the people and all that and will just sit down after a NO and finalize a proper deal (this proper deal will undoubtedly include many more measures now to recuperate losses due to CCs). I don't see it.
Rock, meet hard place.
red is wrong. It was offered in a talk between Merkel and Tsipras before the Referendum was called for (it was on Friday, might have even been the day the referendum was announced? Don't really remember)
About the debt being unsustainable part above that. Everyone knows that, even in Germany and I don't agree with the innitial comment that offering debt writeoff would be political suicide at all. What would be political suicide in Germany would be offering that before seeing things improve or without having any kind of agreement beforehand.
Haven't seen a report of it, nor some text leak or anything - to be fair, haven't seen text leaks of financing terms either but those have at least been widely reported. Hopefully it is true as it shows that Monday needn't be doomsday.
As for it being political suicide, Schaeuble's popularity has been soaring, no? And he's been at the forefront of the hardline camp. So...
edit: Ashoka Mody (former assistant director of IMF's European Department) article does a much better job explaining the situation we're in than I ever could. Ending paragraph: + Show Spoiler +
To be clear, the argument is not that more debt relief be promised in exchange for more austerity now. The argument is that debt relief is needed now to prevent the need for even more debt relief later. It is as much in the creditors’ interest to change course as it is in the Greek interest. Once that premise is accepted, then within that basic framework there is much that the Greeks can do to improve their lot. But such is the momentum, the politics will almost surely subordinate the economic logic. That would be a mistake. At what is surely a pivotal moment in European and global history, at least the facts must be laid out transparently.
Yet another article relevant to the discussion we had above, although perhaps not specifically about Germany being the devil incarnate (sidenote, I spent my formative years in Munich, 1 through 6 years old, as my parents were teachers in a Greek school there - that was in the 80s. I like ze Germans!).
I don't get it. The debt relief and the reforms are unrelated. Reforms are necessary in ANY case. It's just that in addition to reforms, debt relief is needed (and was apparently non-negotiable, which is fucking stupid by Dijsselbloem and Schauble, but also politically inspired: approving debt relief for Greece is political suicide in Germany and Netherlands at the moment).
The Greeks aren't voting yes or no on debt relief. They are voting yes or no on accepting the austerity terms, which to be fair is kinda pointless: all the creditors require some form of reforms to be accepted before any kind of debt relief can be considered, so voting "No" is not going to suddenly put debt relief on the table.
Well, here are some facts:
- Syriza has proposed fiscal measures amounting to 8bn and has largely agreed to almost all creditor demands (including not levying a 12% tax on big profits in favor of cutting pensions a little more). On the reform side (not counting fiscal measures as reform per se), the creditors and Syriza have long been in agreement about all subjects except collective bargaining - and Syriza proposes that Greece adopt a collective bargaining scheme recommended by the ILO and based on worldwide best practices. I have no clue what the hell creditors want here - a scheme found nowhere else in the world that gives ever more power to employers or something like that is my understanding. That takes care of reforms.
- Debt is unsustainable under any scenario, currently, according to the IMF. Previously it was sustainable under the extremely likely scenario of 4.5% primary surpluses and 3% annual growth, which has only happened 3-4 times ever since we measure these things and includes such relevant to Greece situations as oil-rich Norway, Singapore and similar. This was supposed to happen for several decades, mind you. Very sustainable.
- Debt restructuring/write off was never on the table. Best creditors could do was vague promises of looking into it in the future.
- Creditors proposed financing that would take us right back to the current situation (endless negotiations, economy in limbo) in a few months. Greece asks for at least a 2-year stability period where the economy might possibly get back on track, but apparently that's not in creditors' interests (somehow).
Is it any wonder that Tsipras didn't sign? I don't think so, after all he knows what extend and pretend is all about and wouldn't have a part of it. So what about the creditors? What's the point of their intransigence? Could it be politically motivated, since it certainly doesn't make economic sense? After all, if Tsipras of the far left gets a good compromise, what does that say about the mainstream parties? What does that do for Podemos and others?
So what the creditors aim for is regime change. If Greece votes YES tomorrow, mission accomplished. If Greece votes NO wait for the ECB to not do anything much and the Europeans to not do anything much while they wait for Greece to completely unravel (human cost will be high but, eh, who cares) and the lefties to either go to the drachma while the population mobs them (Tsipras never mentions the drachma, after all) or just capitulate. The hope of SYRIZA is that Europe/ECB care even a little bit about the will of the people and all that and will just sit down after a NO and finalize a proper deal (this proper deal will undoubtedly include many more measures now to recuperate losses due to CCs). I don't see it.
Rock, meet hard place.
red is wrong. It was offered in a talk between Merkel and Tsipras before the Referendum was called for (it was on Friday, might have even been the day the referendum was announced? Don't really remember)
About the debt being unsustainable part above that. Everyone knows that, even in Germany and I don't agree with the innitial comment that offering debt writeoff would be political suicide at all. What would be political suicide in Germany would be offering that before seeing things improve or without having any kind of agreement beforehand.
Haven't seen a report of it, nor some text leak or anything - to be fair, haven't seen text leaks of financing terms either but those have at least been widely reported. Hopefully it is true as it shows that Monday needn't be doomsday.
As for it being political suicide, Schaeuble's popularity has been soaring, no? And he's been at the forefront of the hardline camp. So...
edit: Ashoka Mody (former assistant director of IMF's European Department) article does a much better job explaining the situation we're in than I ever could. Ending paragraph: + Show Spoiler +
To be clear, the argument is not that more debt relief be promised in exchange for more austerity now. The argument is that debt relief is needed now to prevent the need for even more debt relief later. It is as much in the creditors’ interest to change course as it is in the Greek interest. Once that premise is accepted, then within that basic framework there is much that the Greeks can do to improve their lot. But such is the momentum, the politics will almost surely subordinate the economic logic. That would be a mistake. At what is surely a pivotal moment in European and global history, at least the facts must be laid out transparently.
TL;DR: There's no leak on it that I'm aware of but Merkel explained to the SPD guys (Merkel = CDU, SPU = their coalition partner) that she crossed red lines (red lines for her CDU guys) offering a 35billion growth package until 2020 (whatever that might be, probably along the lines of the 50bn IMF says is going to be needed?), quickly (?) paying back to greece the ECB interest (no idea what that's in total), debt refinancing for reforms, a third package if greece wants it, and prolonging of the current package for another 5 months to give some time to see if reforms are being done.
I couldn't find the paper itself but it says
Im Gabriel-Papier, vom Sprecher des Bundeswirtschaftsministerium an Journalisten weitergeleitet, wurde (in Originalzitaten) folgendes festgehalten:
, which basicly says the paper has been made pupblic for journalists. So unless it's a lie to begin with it seems to be the case.
Yet another article relevant to the discussion we had above, although perhaps not specifically about Germany being the devil incarnate (sidenote, I spent my formative years in Munich, 1 through 6 years old, as my parents were teachers in a Greek school there - that was in the 80s. I like ze Germans!).
I don't get it. The debt relief and the reforms are unrelated. Reforms are necessary in ANY case. It's just that in addition to reforms, debt relief is needed (and was apparently non-negotiable, which is fucking stupid by Dijsselbloem and Schauble, but also politically inspired: approving debt relief for Greece is political suicide in Germany and Netherlands at the moment).
The Greeks aren't voting yes or no on debt relief. They are voting yes or no on accepting the austerity terms, which to be fair is kinda pointless: all the creditors require some form of reforms to be accepted before any kind of debt relief can be considered, so voting "No" is not going to suddenly put debt relief on the table.
Well, here are some facts:
- Syriza has proposed fiscal measures amounting to 8bn and has largely agreed to almost all creditor demands (including not levying a 12% tax on big profits in favor of cutting pensions a little more). On the reform side (not counting fiscal measures as reform per se), the creditors and Syriza have long been in agreement about all subjects except collective bargaining - and Syriza proposes that Greece adopt a collective bargaining scheme recommended by the ILO and based on worldwide best practices. I have no clue what the hell creditors want here - a scheme found nowhere else in the world that gives ever more power to employers or something like that is my understanding. That takes care of reforms.
- Debt is unsustainable under any scenario, currently, according to the IMF. Previously it was sustainable under the extremely likely scenario of 4.5% primary surpluses and 3% annual growth, which has only happened 3-4 times ever since we measure these things and includes such relevant to Greece situations as oil-rich Norway, Singapore and similar. This was supposed to happen for several decades, mind you. Very sustainable.
- Debt restructuring/write off was never on the table. Best creditors could do was vague promises of looking into it in the future.
- Creditors proposed financing that would take us right back to the current situation (endless negotiations, economy in limbo) in a few months. Greece asks for at least a 2-year stability period where the economy might possibly get back on track, but apparently that's not in creditors' interests (somehow).
Is it any wonder that Tsipras didn't sign? I don't think so, after all he knows what extend and pretend is all about and wouldn't have a part of it. So what about the creditors? What's the point of their intransigence? Could it be politically motivated, since it certainly doesn't make economic sense? After all, if Tsipras of the far left gets a good compromise, what does that say about the mainstream parties? What does that do for Podemos and others?
So what the creditors aim for is regime change. If Greece votes YES tomorrow, mission accomplished. If Greece votes NO wait for the ECB to not do anything much and the Europeans to not do anything much while they wait for Greece to completely unravel (human cost will be high but, eh, who cares) and the lefties to either go to the drachma while the population mobs them (Tsipras never mentions the drachma, after all) or just capitulate. The hope of SYRIZA is that Europe/ECB care even a little bit about the will of the people and all that and will just sit down after a NO and finalize a proper deal (this proper deal will undoubtedly include many more measures now to recuperate losses due to CCs). I don't see it.
Rock, meet hard place.
red is wrong. It was offered in a talk between Merkel and Tsipras before the Referendum was called for (it was on Friday, might have even been the day the referendum was announced? Don't really remember)
About the debt being unsustainable part above that. Everyone knows that, even in Germany and I don't agree with the innitial comment that offering debt writeoff would be political suicide at all. What would be political suicide in Germany would be offering that before seeing things improve or without having any kind of agreement beforehand.
Haven't seen a report of it, nor some text leak or anything - to be fair, haven't seen text leaks of financing terms either but those have at least been widely reported. Hopefully it is true as it shows that Monday needn't be doomsday.
As for it being political suicide, Schaeuble's popularity has been soaring, no? And he's been at the forefront of the hardline camp. So...
edit: Ashoka Mody (former assistant director of IMF's European Department) article does a much better job explaining the situation we're in than I ever could. Ending paragraph: + Show Spoiler +
To be clear, the argument is not that more debt relief be promised in exchange for more austerity now. The argument is that debt relief is needed now to prevent the need for even more debt relief later. It is as much in the creditors’ interest to change course as it is in the Greek interest. Once that premise is accepted, then within that basic framework there is much that the Greeks can do to improve their lot. But such is the momentum, the politics will almost surely subordinate the economic logic. That would be a mistake. At what is surely a pivotal moment in European and global history, at least the facts must be laid out transparently.
TL;DR: There's no leak on it that I'm aware of but Merkel explained to the SPD guys (Merkel = CDU, SPU = their coalition partner) that she crossed red lines (red lines for her CDU guys) offering a 35billion growth package until 2020 (whatever that might be, probably along the lines of the 50bn IMF says is going to be needed?), quickly (?) paying back to greece the ECB interest (no idea what that's in total), debt refinancing for reforms, a third package if greece wants it, and prolonging of the current package for another 5 months to give some time to see if reforms are being done.
Im Gabriel-Papier, vom Sprecher des Bundeswirtschaftsministerium an Journalisten weitergeleitet, wurde (in Originalzitaten) folgendes festgehalten:
, which basicly says the paper has been made pupblic for journalists. So unless it's a lie to begin with it seems to be the case.
The 35bn growth package is just structural EU funds+Juncker plan from a few months ago, those were there already. Not anything new, sadly. And even more sadly, these funds are usually used in co-financing projects together with a country's authorities - meaning Greece is also supposed to spend some to use the funds. This part of the budget has been repeatedly slashed in the recent past so as to hit fiscal targets, the result being that money from the previous structural EU fund package of 2008-2014 was left on the table. The mind boggles and yet, this is what happened.
50bn IMF mentions is financing needs - that is to say, the loans that come due from now till 2018 amount to 50bn and since Greece hasn't got access to markets so as to roll over that debt, it needs to get the financing through a program. This is only related to debt refinancing, nothing to do with budget spending, investments or anything like that.
Unfortunately I can't read German and I don't trust google translate to fully understand these articles so I won't comment further but thank you for the sources regardless.
On July 04 2015 02:48 Sufficiency wrote: What do you think of the likelihood of Belgium broken apart and back to France and the Netherlands?
0
Why not....
There is very little chance that France would absorb Wallonia and that the Netherlands would absorb Flanders.
and besides, this isn't the 19th century where the Dutch have imperial ambitions and want to expand their empire inwards in Europe to create a stronger buffer between them and the German Reich and therefore have designs on fertile Flemish lands, and whatnot
On July 04 2015 02:48 Sufficiency wrote: What do you think of the likelihood of Belgium broken apart and back to France and the Netherlands?
0
Why not....
There is very little chance that France would absorb Wallonia and that the Netherlands would absorb Flanders.
and besides, this isn't the 19th century where the Dutch have imperial ambitions and want to expand their empire inwards in Europe to create a stronger buffer between them and the German Reich and therefore have designs on fertile Flemish lands, and whatnot
One could argue that having the ports of Zeebrugge, Antwerp and Rotterdam in one single country would be very beneficial.
On July 04 2015 05:22 maartendq wrote: Call me arrogant but I think a Belgian split will cause the EU a much bigger headache than Greece does right now.
Yeah, imagine the mess, Wallonia probably won't have the sufficient economy to join the EU since it is at a very weak level already, Bxl would be a pain in the ass since it's the capital of the EU, so where does it go ? to Wallonia because it's 80% french speaker or Flanders because it is in the Flanders region. That aside, a split would encourage regions like Catalan, Scottish again, Bavaria and I don't know how many dozen of confliactuals regions there is in Europe.
On July 04 2015 05:22 maartendq wrote: Call me arrogant but I think a Belgian split will cause the EU a much bigger headache than Greece does right now.
Yeah, imagine the mess, Wallonia probably won't have the sufficient economy to join the EU since it is at a very weak level already, Bxl would be a pain in the ass since it's the capital of the EU, so where does it go ? to Wallonia because it's 80% french speaker or Flanders because it is in the Flanders region. That aside, a split would encourage regions like Catalan, Scottish again, Bavaria and I don't know how many dozen of confliactuals regions there is in Europe.
It just can't happen
Free City of Bruxels yo
Would make sense for the european "capital", similar to how Washington D.C. is a free city, as in it is not part of any of the 50 states. But seeing how much progress we're making with a political union, needing an actual capital is a long ways off.
For everyone who thinks Varoufakis is crazy because of all the spin:
(forgive me for the RT(Putin channel) logo on that video, but I guess that's the only way these things can get onto YT)
In the Dutch media, I haven't seen a single segment that showed Varoufakis or Tsipras in a positive way, from my left-wing, liberal socialist, chomsky-loving, point of view.
I can't imagine how a right wing anti-Europe free market liberal must rage when they see Varoufakis or Tsipras.
In the mean time, Dijsselbloem, Junker and the EC gambling with 240 billion euro. That's how much money we all lose if Greece votes 'no'. If this were poker and this were a 50/50 coin flip, how much has to be in the pot already for you to put in 240 billion? So how much are they winning if Greece votes 'yes'?
Also sick of the line that there won't be a new better deal when a 'no', but the door for negotiation is still open. So they are only going to offer Greece an improved offer if the Greeks vote Syriza out of power?
Only conclusion I can draw is that they are gambling with 240 billion just to stop radical left/anti austerity for succeeding.
In the mean time even the IMF is not supporting a Greek 'no' vote, in veiled terms. That economists like Krugman and Stiglitz think Greece is best to vote 'no', even with the ECB blackmail and the partly executed threat of collapsing the Greek banks on purpose, the IMF now opposing the EC/Euro group, that is pretty extreme.
I predict the Greeks will vote 'yes'. Then, EU will offer Greece a better deal, which they will accept. Then all will lament how Syriza almost destroyed Greece. Then Greeks won't have any way to vote against Greece being the debt junk of the credit dealer Europe, and we can leech every euro out of Greece for the next 50 years.
And if the Greeks do indeed vote 'yes' out of cowardice, maybe that is what they deserve; to be our slaves.
EPT
