EPTWhat Are You Reading 2015 - Page 19
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corumjhaelen
France6884 Posts
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farvacola
United States18821 Posts
On a side note, has anyone read this? I can't decide if I should write it off at the gate or dive right in. ![[image loading]](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/8/8b/Mind_and_Cosmos_cover.JPG) | ||
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corumjhaelen
France6884 Posts
Neither do I  | ||
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oneofthem
Cayman Islands24199 Posts
for those who want to defend the idea that we should preserve serious discussion of the 'mental', nagels book is a pretty poor place to find support. yablo is way better, basing legitimacy of mental discourses on their content rather than ontological status | ||
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farvacola
United States18821 Posts
On April 10 2015 05:45 corumjhaelen wrote: You don't have a good enchanter to make your life what you want, that's all :p Neither do I Ahh but you and I have the next best thing, which is the enchanter that already exists in our heads! He just needs the right incantations, naturally.  | ||
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bookwyrm
United States722 Posts
On April 10 2015 05:27 oneofthem wrote: well the only decent part of that review is the description of the self as product of a representational process or faculty of mind. you're the one who gave it to me! why don't YOU say what the claims of the book are. If you wanna talk about stuff and not just sort of waltz in and say "this book is right about everything, but unless you assume my methodology already you are wrong, and anyway I can't even tell you what the claim is." it is not a book about ontology in general, and your discussion is pretty much irrelevant and also will not stand in for metzinger's project. much like armchair metaphysics cant stand in for actual scientific theories. the view that you can think about consciousness without thinking about a theory of ontology in general is absurd. There are no "specialized" problems in philosophy - that is when philosophy passes over in sophistry. Heidegger and continental approach to metaphysics, which is what im assuming you are going with here, would offer u little guidance on understanding the particular problem of consciousness. LOL well I can just *assume* I know what YOU think and then we don't even have to bother talking about it! I'm not talking about or invoking Heidegger in any way. you will not be able to explain or diffuse the strength of intuitions such as the cartesian self. Why not?? MY tradition has abandoned this idea for, oh, 200 years. On April 10 2015 05:27 oneofthem wrote: metzingers opponent is basically david chalmers No! Hegel's opponent is basically Spinoza. See, I can play this game too, where you foreclose the discussion by laying out in advance who the "legitimate" philosophers are. | ||
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farvacola
United States18821 Posts
On April 10 2015 05:53 oneofthem wrote: that book is basically the torpedo to nagel's reputation. not because of its sympathy or objective (charitably, making space for serious discussion of thoughts and values in a world of physicalism), but for its poor argumentation and representation of opposing views and also degree of compatibility between physicalism and the world of values. for those who want to defend the idea that we should preserve serious discussion of the 'mental', nagels book is a pretty poor place to find support. yablo is way better, basing legitimacy of mental discourses on their content rather than ontological status What do you think of Peter Hacker? As cliche as this may be, I think a focus on the language at play when people discuss the mind-body problem is the right way to go in terms of figuring out which way to go. I'm reminded of a Paul Ricoeur essay in which he talks about how Descartes' "I think, therefore I am," by virtue of its necessarily limited ability to actually reflect on its referential subject, effectively ends up meaning "I think I think, therefore I think that I am," leading Ricoeur to the conclusion that there's almost always going to be a sort of falsity to a language based, self-referential preposition of absolute truth. I think this says a lot about how a philosophy of the mind must necessarily also be a philosophy of language, but past that, I haven't really made my mind up  | ||
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Carnivorous Sheep
Baa?21242 Posts
On April 10 2015 06:06 farvacola wrote: What do you think of Peter Hacker? As cliche as this may be, I think a focus on the language at play when people discuss the mind-body problem is the right way to go in terms of figuring out which way to go. I'm reminded of a Paul Ricoeur essay in which he talks about how Descartes' "I think, therefore I am," by virtue of its necessarily limited ability to actually reflect on its referential subject, effectively ends up meaning "I think I think, therefore I think that I am," leading Ricoeur to the conclusion that there's almost always going to be a sort of falsity to a language based, self-referential preposition of absolute truth. I think this says a lot about how a philosophy of the mind must necessarily also be a philosophy of language, but past that, I haven't really made my mind up Don't you mean you haven't really made your language up? | ||
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farvacola
United States18821 Posts
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bookwyrm
United States722 Posts
On April 10 2015 06:06 farvacola wrote: I think this says a lot about how a philosophy of the mind must necessarily also be a philosophy of language, but past that, I haven't really made my mind up We can radicalize the claim.... A philosophy of anything must be a philosophy of everything, but "everything" is unthinkable, and so philosophy must necessarily be negative theology | ||
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farvacola
United States18821 Posts
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oneofthem
Cayman Islands24199 Posts
On April 10 2015 06:01 bookwyrm wrote: let me make this easy on you. discussion about the general nature of reality does not stand in for a debunking of the phlogiston. you're the one who gave it to me! why don't YOU say what the claims of the book are. If you wanna talk about stuff and not just sort of waltz in and say "this book is right about everything, but unless you assume my methodology already you are wrong, and anyway I can't even tell you what the claim is." the view that you can think about consciousness without thinking about a theory of ontology in general is absurd. There are no "specialized" problems in philosophy - that is when philosophy passes over in sophistry. LOL well I can just *assume* I know what YOU think and then we don't even have to bother talking about it! I'm not talking about or invoking Heidegger in any way. Why not?? MY tradition has abandoned this idea for, oh, 200 years. No! Hegel's opponent is basically Spinoza. See, I can play this game too, where you foreclose the discussion by laying out in advance who the "legitimate" philosophers are. i'm not dismissing any tradition or particular philosophers, just that they are not engaged in the same discussion really. you should read the book before going off on a rant. | ||
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oneofthem
Cayman Islands24199 Posts
On April 10 2015 06:06 farvacola wrote: What do you think of Peter Hacker? As cliche as this may be, I think a focus on the language at play when people discuss the mind-body problem is the right way to go in terms of figuring out which way to go. I'm reminded of a Paul Ricoeur essay in which he talks about how Descartes' "I think, therefore I am," by virtue of its necessarily limited ability to actually reflect on its referential subject, effectively ends up meaning "I think I think, therefore I think that I am," leading Ricoeur to the conclusion that there's almost always going to be a sort of falsity to a language based, self-referential preposition of absolute truth. I think this says a lot about how a philosophy of the mind must necessarily also be a philosophy of language, but past that, I haven't really made my mind up generally philosophers who grew up with wittgenstein and the linguistic turn will appeal to linguistic practices in resolving problems of consciousness. even dennett appeals to 'the intentional stance', a linguistic phenomenon. i like wittgenstein a great deal but i don't think wittgenstein's primary contribution was captured by oxford style linguistic analysis. hacker represents this linguistic wittgenstein. | ||
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farvacola
United States18821 Posts
On April 10 2015 06:24 oneofthem wrote: generally philosophers who grew up with wittgenstein and the linguistic turn will appeal to linguistic practices in resolving problems of consciousness. even dennett appeals to 'the intentional stance', a linguistic phenomenon. i like wittgenstein a great deal but i don't think wittgenstein's primary contribution was captured by oxford style linguistic analysis. hacker represents this linguistic wittgenstein. I agree; I don't think that sort of analysis is nearly creative enough, but it serves as a nice starting place. For though we must pass over some things in silence, we can still point at them as we go by! | ||
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oneofthem
Cayman Islands24199 Posts
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Nyxisto
Germany6287 Posts
On April 10 2015 04:40 bookwyrm wrote: Wikipedia says that he says that there's no such things as selves because there are only processes. This follows a fortiori from what everybody should have realized by now but somehow hasnt, which is that they arent any such things as things but only processes! There are certainly selves, the mistake is thinking that there are things! What exactly is the difference between a 'sufficiently stable process' and a thing? And what about mathematical objects? | ||
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bookwyrm
United States722 Posts
On April 10 2015 08:00 Nyxisto wrote: What exactly is the difference between a 'sufficiently stable process' and a thing? And what about mathematical objects? I don't think there are any things. There are only stabilities which we perceive as things. Mathematical objects are what Deleuze calls virtualities - they don't exist until you instantiate them, but there is a sense in which they had to be instantiated in that way | ||
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Nyxisto
Germany6287 Posts
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oneofthem
Cayman Islands24199 Posts
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bookwyrm
United States722 Posts
this book just looks like the new version of Consciousness Explained. | ||
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