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forsooth
United States3648 Posts
On November 06 2013 10:25 YoureFired wrote: This. There shouldn't be an emphasis on the women to defend themselves, the focus needs to be on dismantling the rape culture that makes sexual assault accepted in our society. This had better be a joke. | ||
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frogrubdown
1266 Posts
edit: No offense to ComaDose by the way; it was an honest mistake. On November 09 2013 00:45 ComaDose wrote: Actually if you're claiming the probability that she is wearing sexy clothes is 1 (which you would have to be) you can plug in the numbers and see that this edge case actually does the opposite Applying bayes theorem; the probability of a women giving consent given that she is wearing sexy clothes is actually smaller than the probability she gave consent, when we know she is wearing sexy clothes! i guess this "rule" (read theorem) has inapplicable edge cases. given 'a' is giving consent and 'b' is exposing skin p(a|b) = p(b|a)p(a)/p(b) if p(b) = 1 and 0 < p(b|a), p(a) < 1 then p(a|b) < p(a) What happens in the last part is supposed to be a Bayesian update on b, which is why we are assuming that p(b)=1. Given that p(b) equals one, we get: p(a|b)=p(b|a)p(a). But ComaDose then claims that p(b|a)<1. This is impossible. For all x,y, if p(x)=1 and p(y)!=0, then p(x|y)=1. This follows trivially from the definition of conditional probability. This means that we actually end up with: p(a|b)=p(a) But these aren't equal! Oh yeah, we're updating our beliefs. For Bayesians this means that we will change our original p(a) value to whatever p(a|b) is to make them equal. This is pretty intuitive; updating a on b just is making p(a) (your new prior probability for a) equal to p(a|b) (your old conditional probability of a given b). It's worth noting how obvious ComaDose's wrongness should have been to everyone. He didn't make any strong assumptions other than that we come to know b. Informally put, if ComaDose were right then nothing would be evidence for anything, which would be rather unfortunate. Some Caveats I No one has given a compelling argument that the conditional probability of consent given that you wore sexy clothes is in fact higher than the prior probability of consent. I'm not aware of any statistics on this even existing. II This isn't the only relevant conditional probability. Another, plausibly more important one to consider is the probability of consent given that you both dressed sexily and claimed afterwords that it was rape. Even if the probability of consent given sexy-dress is higher than the prior of consenting, it wouldn't follow that the probability of consent given that [you claimed it was rape and dressed sexily] is higher than the probability of consent given that [you claimed it was rape and did not dress sexily.] Maybe women who dress sexily are more likely to consent but less likely to falsely claim rape because they have less of a reputation to uphold than those who dress modestly? Who knows? I don't take there to be a strong reason to believe that is the case, but I hardly see how it is any less plausible than the arguments given earlier that dressing sexily increases the probability of consent. III It doesn't follow immediately from one's dress potentially being evidence of consent (i.e., p(a|b)>p(a)) that it should be allowed as evidence in court. For it might be absurdly prejudicial evidence, whose prejudicial demerits vastly outweigh its evidential merits. Suppose that dressing sexily increases the probability of consent by 1/1000 of a percent but telling an average jury member that a person dressed sexily increases their belief in consent by 10% because of their biases. Surely the evidence is not worth enough to be allowed in such a case. These numbers were, of course, made up, but the idea that the "evidence" would have a far greater prejudicial effect than it warrants seems plausible. | ||
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farvacola
United States18821 Posts
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frogrubdown
1266 Posts
On November 09 2013 03:01 farvacola wrote: Really? You are going to legitimize this sort of operation as a meaningful way of discussing rape and consent? I am disappointed FRD. In a court you are trying to determine what happened. To do this, it is relevant what counts as evidence of what happened. The conditional probability of something happening given something else is relevant to whether that something else is evidence. In this sense, such conditional probabilities are obviously in principle capable of being relevant to whether something should be allowed in court. I don't see that you've said anything that shows otherwise. In this particular case I don't think there is good reason to allow such things in court, as I thoroughly outlined in my "caveats" section, but that doesn't mean that conditional probabilities cannot even in principle be relevant to something being admissible. That seems like much too strong a principle and much good evidence (e.g., DNA evidence) seems to have become admissible precisely because that principle has not been applied. edit: Some people in this thread, and I don't take you to be among them, have been rather clearly confused about what the probabilities are supposed to mean. At least one poster seems to be under the impression that these probabilities represent degrees of having been raped, and so if wearing sexy clothes increases the probability that means that (regardless of your actual consent) you weren't raped as much as someone who didn't so dress. I'm embarrassed to even have to point out that this isn't what the probabilities mean. They represent degrees of belief based on evidence available. Whether or not the person was actually raped/actually consented is another matter entirely. | ||
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Poffel
471 Posts
More Caveats IV On an abstract level, that argument is sound. So sound, in fact, that it still works if you replace "wears clothing that exposes a lot of skin" with "wears lipstick" or "goes into the vicinity of men". Does being around men increase her absolute chance to get raped? Absolutely: She cannot rape herself all by herself. Does it matter? Absolutely not. V (just for kicks) 1: A woman wearing sexy clothing is more likely to consent to sex than one who doesn't. 2: If everybody involved consents to it, the sexual act isn't rape. Conclusion: Wearing sexy clothing reduces a woman's chance to get raped. Corollary: Nuns are constantly living on the edge. | ||
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farvacola
United States18821 Posts
Furthermore, I'm not buying the notion that, because DNA evidence and other types rely on a token degree of probabilistic reasoning in their implementation, a Bayesian demonstration of provocative clothing's effect on the possibility of consent is worth a thing, neither abstractly nor in practice. It serves as nothing more than an apparently solid ground with which to infringe upon the self-determination of women in choosing how they dress and appear in public, all because it brings with it the whispers of mathematical/logical legitimacy. | ||
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Thieving Magpie
United States6752 Posts
On November 09 2013 02:54 gedatsu wrote: Haven't said that anyone is supposed to do anything. I did ask you to clarify if you thought men were not allowed to do it. Also asked you to clarify whose fault it is that a woman says no. I've never heard a serious evolutionary psychologist claim that and I don't think you have either. Either way, he will have been laughed at by the rest of that scientific community. Evolutionary psychology is a strong, well founded scientific discipline. You say this as if you want to ignore evolution. Women aren't "informed" that their no doesn't always mean no. Women already know that, because they are aware when they say no without meaning no. Seriously, it's as if you have never talked to women. Ask and they will admit to doing this. No, he did not assume that rain = sex. Please take your own advice and reread what he wrote. I said: "Wait, you don't think a culture that tells men to go after women and that tells women that no doesn't always mean no is not rape culture?" You replied: "First of all, I disagree that men and women are "told" those things. It's biological. " Followed by: "Yes, men have a right to chase after women. " And followed by: "And yes, it's a woman's fault when she says no." And then followed by: "Haven't said that anyone is supposed to do anything." And then you try to retort me by saying: " I did ask you to clarify if you thought men were not allowed to do it" As well as including: "Seriously, it's as if you have never talked to women. Ask and they will admit to doing this" Despite my statement being: "you don't think a culture that tells men to go after women and that tells women that no doesn't always mean no " You believe its a biological imperative for men to chase women when you say that its Biological. You believe that its women's fault that when they say no that they don't mean it enough when you say "And yes, it's a woman's fault when she says no" So when I tell you that western culture tells men to chase after women and tells women that their no doesn't always mean no--you don't argue against it by saying "ask they will admit to doing this" because I already say they do when I say "tells women that no doesn't always mean no." That's why its called Rape Culture. Because men feel that they have to go after girls (biological after all right??) and girls play hard to get because "no doesn't always mean no." And because men always push and women often say "no" meaning yes, when rape happens the woman gets blamed for saying no meaning no when her position in society is to say no meaning yes. That's why its called rape CULTURE Not Rape Education Not Rape Teachings Not Rape Commands Not Rape Orders No one is ordering men to rape much like no one is ordering women to play hard to get. Its a CULTURAL zeitgeist shared by both men and women as is the nature of all other cultural aspects of society. Its the reason why someone of your leaning actually believes there is a causal relationship between rape and clothing. Its the reason why someone like you believes its biological for males to go after females (Something not true in nature). Its part of your culture. And much like many cultural beliefs, it is something passively ingrained into your psyche and not something being handed out like candy in holloween. There isn't some rape fairy telling men and women to rape/be raped. So trying to argue that women play hard to get and its their fault that a man gets confused is bullshit. | ||
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DoctorM
United States36 Posts
I'm going to limit my argument to the US because that's where I live. I don't make any opinions about other countries policies. In the US it is innocent until proven guilty, so if there is a disagreement I don't see how anyone can be convicted of rape unless there is absolute proof that one party did not give consent. A first person witness, a video or sound recording. That's all we got. It's not fair to either party, but it's the only way we can say 100% that someone was the perpetrator. There is no culture argument, just one of justice. | ||
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writer22816
United States5775 Posts
On November 09 2013 00:45 ComaDose wrote: Actually if you're claiming the probability that she is wearing sexy clothes is 1 (which you would have to be) you can plug in the numbers and see that this edge case actually does the opposite Applying bayes theorem; the probability of a women giving consent given that she is wearing sexy clothes is actually smaller than the probability she gave consent, when we know she is wearing sexy clothes! i guess this "rule" (read theorem) has inapplicable edge cases. given 'a' is giving consent and 'b' is exposing skin p(a|b) = p(b|a)p(a)/p(b) if p(b) = 1 and 0 < p(b|a), p(a) < 1 then p(a|b) < p(a) This might be news to you. But if p(b) = 1, then imagine that, p(b|a) is also 1. | ||
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Dogfoodboy16
364 Posts
On November 09 2013 03:23 DoctorM wrote: To be frank, the only cause for contention (as I believe is what we can agree on), is the situation in which a man and a woman have a sex act and they disagree about whether there was mutual consent (regardless of who is the point of contention). We have been arguing quite a bit about other cases and that should stop. I'm going to limit my argument to the US because that's where I live. I don't make any opinions about other countries policies. In the US it is innocent until proven guilty, so if there is a disagreement I don't see how anyone can be convicted of rape unless there is absolute proof that one party did not give consent. A first person witness, a video or sound recording. That's all we got. It's not fair to either party, but it's the only way we can say 100% that someone was the perpetrator. There is no culture argument, just one of justice. What if both the man and woman are intoxicated and end up having sex? | ||
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Acritter
Syria7637 Posts
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Thieving Magpie
United States6752 Posts
On November 09 2013 03:23 DoctorM wrote: To be frank, the only cause for contention (as I believe is what we can agree on), is the situation in which a man and a woman have a sex act and they disagree about whether there was mutual consent (regardless of who is the point of contention). We have been arguing quite a bit about other cases and that should stop. I'm going to limit my argument to the US because that's where I live. I don't make any opinions about other countries policies. In the US it is innocent until proven guilty, so if there is a disagreement I don't see how anyone can be convicted of rape unless there is absolute proof that one party did not give consent. A first person witness, a video or sound recording. That's all we got. It's not fair to either party, but it's the only way we can say 100% that someone was the perpetrator. There is no culture argument, just one of justice. I guess it depends on how you see the case. Person A reports rape. Police ask Person B if sexual relations occurred with Person A, Person B verifies. Police arrest him for confirming sex happened. Person B then accuses Person A of slander--suggesting false testimony was presented to maliciously attack ones identity and/or personhood. In the current US system, the accusation of slander and the charge of rape are treated as one case despite my belief that it should be 2 separate cases. Person B does not have the ability to dictate the consent of Person A for much the same reason that Person A cannot dictate the consent of Person B. If Person B agrees that he consented, it does not mean that Person A consented. If treated as two cases, Person B would be required to provide evidence that Person A was maliciously attacking him in some form or fashion through lies. This is where the confusion comes around. There are people who believe Person B does not need evidence to accuse slander while asserting that Person's A's testimony be considered null without proof against it. | ||
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frogrubdown
1266 Posts
On November 09 2013 03:21 farvacola wrote: The problem with utilizing conditional probability as a means of vetting evidence when it comes to a rape trial is that case law and precedent are exponentially heavier, in addition to the fact that juries, and to a lesser extent the justice system in general, does not privy probabilistic logic as a truth bearing standard, as it tends to get in the way of the streamlining of the legal process while also leading courtrooms dangerously close to the chasm of incertitude. In other words, trials carried out with a jury of ones' peers require demonstrations of logic/evidence that are (relatively) easy to digest, and though this may come as a surprise to some, Bayesian reasoning is a foreign language to many a layman. Furthermore, I'm not buying the notion that, because DNA evidence and other types rely on a token degree of probabilistic reasoning in their implementation, a Bayesian demonstration of provocative clothing's effect on the possibility of consent is worth a thing, neither abstractly nor in practice. It serves as nothing more than an apparently solid ground with which to infringe upon the self-determination of women in choosing how they dress and appear in public, all because it brings with it the whispers of mathematical/logical legitimacy. I don't think we actually disagree because I don't think you actually believe the stronger claims you make. If the way rape victims dressed were as good evidence of their consent as DNA evidence is of who produced sperm, then it obviously would be ok to include it in court. The problem is that it isn't. We don't have any good reason to believe it is evidence to any degree, and even if it is it is likely more prejudicial than it is worth. In light of this, that does mean that claims to the contrary likely represent little more than "infringing upon the self-determination of women". But that is a result of the facts about it's evidential merit. It cannot be assumed before such results are established. | ||
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Thieving Magpie
United States6752 Posts
On November 09 2013 03:29 Dogfoodboy16 wrote: What if both the man and woman are intoxicated and end up having sex? Then both can go to court and file rape charges or both can choose to not go to court or one can choose to go to court and file rape charges. Those three options are present whether or not any or none of the parties involved are drunk. In which case, Person A accuses Person B of rape. Person B confesses to sex being involved, but asserts that he was too drunk to be responsible for his actions. And much like killing someone by drunk driving is a lesser punishment than 1st degree murder, a rape is still a rape much like a murder is still a murder. | ||
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farvacola
United States18821 Posts
On November 09 2013 03:32 frogrubdown wrote: I don't think we actually disagree because I don't think you actually believe the stronger claims you make. If the way rape victims dressed were as good evidence of their consent as DNA evidence is of who produced sperm, then it obviously would be ok to include it in court. The problem is that it isn't. We don't have any good reason to believe it is evidence to any degree, and even if it is it is likely more prejudicial than it is worth. In light of this, that does mean that claims to the contrary likely represent little more than "infringing upon the self-determination of women". But that is a result of the facts about it's evidential merit. It cannot be assumed before such results are established. Are you suggesting that Bayesian reason necessarily figures into the establishment of the evidential merit of risque clothing? | ||
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ComaDose
Canada10357 Posts
On November 09 2013 02:58 frogrubdown wrote: I am extremely hesitant to join this thread, as it possibly the single worst I've ever seen on TL. But the anti-rape side of the thread is sadly very poorly representing itself by standing behind an argument of ComaDose that completely misconstrues how Bayesian updating works (severdevil's account doesn't actually spell out the problem). I'll explain what's wrong with it before outlining were the action should actually take place. edit: No offense to ComaDose by the way; it was an honest mistake. What happens in the last part is supposed to be a Bayesian update on b, which is why we are assuming that p(b)=1. Given that p(b) equals one, we get: p(a|b)=p(b|a)p(a). But ComaDose then claims that p(b|a)<1. This is impossible. For all x,y, if p(x)=1 and p(y)!=0, then p(x|y)=1. This follows trivially from the definition of conditional probability. This means that we actually end up with: p(a|b)=p(a) But these aren't equal! Oh yeah, we're updating our beliefs. For Bayesians this means that we will change our original p(a) value to whatever p(a|b) is to make them equal. This is pretty intuitive; updating a on b just is making p(a) (your new prior probability for a) equal to p(a|b) (your old conditional probability of a given b). It's worth noting how obvious ComaDose's wrongness should have been to everyone. He didn't make any strong assumptions other than that we come to know b. Informally put, if ComaDose were right then nothing would be evidence for anything, which would be rather unfortunate. Some Caveats I No one has given a compelling argument that the conditional probability of consent given that you wore sexy clothes is in fact higher than the prior probability of consent. I'm not aware of any statistics on this even existing. II This isn't the only relevant conditional probability. Another, plausibly more important one to consider is the probability of consent given that you both dressed sexily and claimed afterwords that it was rape. Even if the probability of consent given sexy-dress is higher than the prior of consenting, it wouldn't follow that the probability of consent given that [you claimed it was rape and dressed sexily] is higher than the probability of consent given that [you claimed it was rape and did not dress sexily.] Maybe women who dress sexily are more likely to consent but less likely to falsely claim rape because they have less of a reputation to uphold than those who dress modestly? Who knows? I don't take there to be a strong reason to believe that is the case, but I hardly see how it is any less plausible than the arguments given earlier that dressing sexily increases the probability of consent. III It doesn't follow immediately from one's dress potentially being evidence of consent (i.e., p(a|b)>p(a)) that it should be allowed as evidence in court. For it might be absurdly prejudicial evidence, whose prejudicial demerits vastly outweigh its evidential merits. Suppose that dressing sexily increases the probability of consent by 1/1000 of a percent but telling an average jury member that a person dressed sexily increases their belief in consent by 10% because of their biases. Surely the evidence is not worth enough to be allowed in such a case. These numbers were, of course, made up, but the idea that the "evidence" would have a far greater prejudicial effect than it warrants seems plausible. oh neat thanks its been a few years since i took the one statistics course and i've been working with different math with more erm... static methods. but as it relates to the original assertion: his claim was that the probability of a woman getting raped is higher if they are wearing revealing clothing and used Bayes theorem to back it up. so now that you have corrected me that the formula simplifies to p(a|b) = p(a) isn't he still wrong? i.e. it simplifies to a comparison of p(a|b) and p(a) | ||
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frogrubdown
1266 Posts
On November 09 2013 03:45 farvacola wrote: Are you suggesting that Bayesian reason necessarily figures into the establishment of the evidential merit of risque clothing? I'm saying that if someone makes a Bayesian argument for that admissibility you need to actually assess the plausibility of the relevant conditional probabilities to refute them. On November 09 2013 03:46 ComaDose wrote: oh neat thanks its been a few years since i took the one statistics course and i've been working with different math with more erm... static methods. but as it relates to the original assertion: his claim was that the probability of a woman getting raped is higher if they are wearing revealing clothing and used Bayes theorem to back it up. so now that you have corrected me that the formula simplifies to p(a|b) = p(a) isn't he still wrong? Well, I think he's wrong, but it has nothing to do with p(a|b)=p(a). Because the p(a) in this equation is your new credence in a, the credence you get after you update. It's trivial that they will be equal. That doesn't say anything about whether they are equal because p(a) increased during the update or because p(a) decreased in the update, which is what is relevant to whether b is evidence of a. | ||
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Thieving Magpie
United States6752 Posts
On November 09 2013 03:46 ComaDose wrote: oh neat thanks its been a few years since i took the one statistics course and i've been working with different math with more erm... static methods. but as it relates to the original assertion: his claim was that the probability of a woman getting raped is higher if they are wearing revealing clothing and used Bayes theorem to back it up. so now that you have corrected me that the formula simplifies to p(a|b) = p(a) isn't he still wrong? I think thats the conclusions that are made in the Caveats. | ||
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ComaDose
Canada10357 Posts
On November 09 2013 03:48 frogrubdown wrote: I'm saying that if someone makes a Bayesian argument for that admissibility you need to actually assess the plausibility of the relevant conditional probabilities to refute them. Well, I think he's wrong, but it has nothing to do with p(a|b)=p(a). Because the p(a) in this equation is your new credence in a, the credence you get after you update. It's trivial that they will be equal. That doesn't say anything about whether they are equal because p(a) increased during the update or because p(a) decreased in the update, which is what is relevant to whether b is evidence of a. but he said it always increases tho rite? and his "evidence" doesn't show that. like i mean obviously he is wrong morally and logically but mathematically i'm still concerned  with the correct math applied (sorry) it still doesn't suggest what he claimed it did. my work would be so much easier if i could "update" variables | ||
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Severedevil
United States4835 Posts
On November 09 2013 03:46 ComaDose wrote: his claim was that the probability of a woman getting raped is higher if they are wearing revealing clothing and used Bayes theorem to back it up. That was not the claim at hand. The claim at hand is that a woman dressed provocatively is more likely to engage in consensual sex than one who is not dressed provocatively -- that certain modes of dress correlate with sexual intent. Certainly people's clothing choices tend to correlate with their intentions. Frog correctly noted that such a correlation may not carry over to the situation in which a woman claims rape. P(sex was consensual | (provocative attire & sex & rape accusation)) might not be greater than P(sex was consensual | (non-provocative attire & sex & rape accusation)). | ||
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