Ukraine Crisis - Page 572

On June 09 2014 02:39 Ghanburighan wrote:


Err, you're still reading things into my words that aren't there. I'm literally saying that the Baltics and Poland are upset that the military capacity of Russia to launch an amphibious assault (invasion by the sea) is being enhanced while Russia has demonstrated the willingness to invade its neighbours and is using language that is unprecedented in its aggressiveness. It doesn't actually matter whether they could already invade or not. The countries are upset at France and Germany for training Russian troops and thus undermining our security. It's basically the same reason why Germany was forced to stop training Russian special forces as they used that training to annex Crimea and it was seen as a replicable model in NATO states.

but they are internally furious at both France and Germany as those ships are intended to invade countries in the Baltic Sea.

On June 09 2014 00:05 zeo wrote:

We have our own geopolitical mastermind here at TL. I don't know what kind of Tom Clancy novel you are living in but making statements such as the ones you just made are silly.

On June 09 2014 02:43 m4ini wrote:



In case you have forgotten.



That's what you're literally saying.

edit: and that's what i have a gripe with. Yes, obviously, they could be used to invade other countries. As could any other weapon. The reason they go to the baltics is because the 197th is stationed in sevastopol, for like thousands of years now. Not because they intend to invade countries in the baltics.

On June 09 2014 02:49 Ghanburighan wrote:


If you'd quote the whole paragraph, the picture would be different. Especially if you included the first post.

The Baltic states and Poland aren't saying much about it (if the US already complained, adding those voices means nothing) but they are internally furious at both France and Germany as those ships are intended to invade countries in the Baltic Sea.

I was explaining that the Baltics and Poland are actually very upset at this move (while they are not showing it for reasons outlined above), and the reason for that is that the Mistrals are amphibious assault ships that can be used to invade hostile soil, and they are stationed near them such that they directly influence the security situation in the region. The ships can be used to launch those assaults on other countries as well, but that's not why the Baltics and Poland are upset. Your own skin is dearer always. Now, please don't propagate the misunderstanding that I was trying to clarify any further.

On June 09 2014 03:41 Ghanburighan wrote:
I corrected the statement you misconstrued such that you 100% agreed with it. I honestly don't know what else you want from me, so I'm closing the thread now.

On June 08 2014 22:17 Simberto wrote:


Most at least try to not lie in a way that can be instantly proven untrue, and kinda roughly stick to deals at least for a while. Just saying one thing and instantly and obviously doing the opposite isn't that common amongst politicians afaik.

On June 09 2014 02:33 m4ini wrote:


Since you should know my stance, let me tell you that mistrals are not by any means purely offensive weapons. Neither for france, nor russia or any country for that matter. Not to mention, the Caesar Kurnikov is homed in sevastopol, belonging to the 197th assault ship brigade. That's another troop carrier, next to 7 other partially big landing ships, all in sevastopol for many, MANY years. And that's not counting many LCACs and whatnot, which are scattered around their country.

IF russia wanted to land in the baltics, they could've done so long ago. The capabilities are there already. So please, stay "neutral", and don't throw around hysterical conclusions.

Poroshenko lost no time saying he hoped to meet with the Russian leadership by mid-June. His first priority is to ease the volatile situation in Eastern Ukraine where pro-Russian militias continue to control pockets of the region.

Ukraine launches airstrikes against gunmen at Donetsk airport
"Russia is our biggest neighbour," the new, pending inauguration, president said, adding that peace in the Donbass region of Ukraine would not be possible without Russian representation.

He'll have his work cut out. The line between where Europe ends and Russia begins runs right through Ukraine, many commentators have observed.

But Poroshenko is predicting that his June meeting will be "more than handshake" because he and Vladimir Putin know each other "quite well."

Perhaps he might even carry a box of those Kiev Evenings with him to Moscow as a kind of peace offering.

Given his plans to divest himself of the chocolate company, a case of sweets might not be quite the provocation it once would have seemed.

On June 09 2014 06:16 JudicatorHammurabi wrote:
But, apparently Poroshenko is not as dumb as I or anyone thought. He most likely realizes he can be out of a regime as fast as Russian armor can move, and is trying to reach out to them diplomatically.

On June 09 2014 06:27 Cheerio wrote:

20 hours ago you were suggesting Poroshenko is going to hard on the conflict, now you are suggesting he is too soft. Perhaps you should not rush to conclusions next time.

On June 09 2014 06:30 JudicatorHammurabi wrote:


He himself said in his inauguration speech he was going to go HAMF and crush the separatists if they did not surrender, make Ukrainian the only state language, Crimea is Ukrainian territory, among other things that would only piss off the separatists more, then he said after he wants to reach out to Russia.

What I see is he followed up a nationalistic speech with a sober realization of the reality of the matter.

I'm simply observing Poroshenko's mannerisms. If he wants to change around how he speaks depending on the audience, that's up to him.

On June 09 2014 06:37 Cheerio wrote:

Ukrainian is the only state language

On June 09 2014 06:40 JudicatorHammurabi wrote:

And this among other things is why no compromise will be reached with the separatists.

On June 09 2014 07:38 Cheerio wrote:


This is the map of the territories before WW1 which later formed Ukraine and the statistics on the mother tongue of their respective populations according to the population census in two empires that Ukraine was part of (years 1897 and 1910). The numbers over the regions are:
1) Українська - Ukrainian
2) Російська - Russian
3) Інші - other languages
As you can see from the circle in the top-right corner, overall only 9,8% of the population had Russian language as a mother tongue.

As a result of urbanization, immigration, and rusification policies the Russian language right now is far more widespread than those numbers would suggest. But many people, especially in Western Ukraine, consider it a very sensitive issue, that Ukraine was russificated, and if both are given equal status, this situation will last forever. According to the latest social polls more than half of the population oppose the state status for Russian language, and the number is constantly increasing.

Before annexation of Crimea, how many schools do you think had Ukrainian as the primary language of education?
+ Show Spoiler +
This is a caricature that sums up the problem of the Russian language in Ukraine

The guy complains that the girl is making him uncomfortable.

For 23 years it was all fine, especially after the 2012 language law, when Russian got the regional status in more than half or the regions. Now after Ukraine turns it's back on Yanukovich and Putin, its suddenly a major problem that people take up arms to solve.

The thing is, its not for Donbass to decide should all of Ukraine have Russian as a state language, its for all of Ukraine to decide. And by making ultimatums they are only making it worse.

P.S. Russian language is a mother tongue for me as well. But I don't want it to have a state status.

At this crucial time in its evolution the Guardian has teamed up with a wide range of regional experts to establish the New East, a network dedicated to covering the latest news and analysis from the post-Soviet world.

Our partners offer unique reporting, analysis and insights about the region that we call the New East, opening up coverage on the often under-reported issues facing these nations.

We are collaborating with Eurasianet, whose specialist reporters offer news and analysis from Russia, central Asia, the Caucasus and more; the Carnegie Moscow Center, which publishes expert research and non-partisan analysis on Russia and the region; Window on Eurasia, a blog from American analyst and former policy adviser Paul Goble; Caucasian Knot, focussing on news and analysis from the Caucasus; and Transitions Online, a non-profit organisation established to strengthen independent news media in the post-communist countries of Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Then there are country specialists. The Interpreter, supported by the Institute of Modern Russia, translates Russian news and analysis into English as well as offering its own take on current affairs. The Calvert Journal shines a light on Russia’s creative side, and the Baltic News Network features the latest on Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

Charter 97 is a pro-opposition news website focussing on Belarus, where the press is heavily censored. Its editor-in-chief, Natalya Radina, was threatened with imprisonment by the country’s KGB security services, and fled to Lithuania, where she continues to publish. Belarusian Association of Journalists is also among our partners, as is Belarus Digest, which offers non-partisan analysis written by Belarusians, and Belarus in Focus, a non-profit which works with Belarusian journalists and promotes democratic values.

We’ll also feature articles from the Guardian’s own correspondents, commission exclusive pieces from regional experts and translate articles from Russian media into English – as well as translating some of our work into Russian. We’ll also provide plenty of opportunities for readers to get involved to help us expand coverage of the remarkable and diverse range of countries that make up the post-Soviet world.
Check it out here

The running theme of Nato’s criticism of Russia is that when it comes to Ukraine, the Kremlin has slipped back into a cold war mentality. But while Russia’s strategic thinking might recall the ruthless geopolitics of the past century, its tactics for military analysts have been a model of warfare in the 21st, employing everything from small groups of unidentifiable specialist personnel to cyber warfare.

In more than a dozen interviews, planners, security officials and members of the intelligence community have spoken of Moscow with universal, if grudging, praise.

Tactically, they say, Russia has waged a dexterous and comprehensive campaign, and has been one step ahead at every turn. The Kremlin’s operations on the ground have been “masterly”, said one.

“I have been impressed. The eminent deniability of it all – this has been an exactly and beautifully calibrated operation . . . silent but deadly effective,” said Jonathan Eyal, international director of the Royal United Services Institute in London. The west “has been off-guard from day one”.

Last week, the north Atlantic military alliance ramped up its efforts to put a lid on matters. On Thursday, while at the summit of the Group of Seven industrialised powers, Nato members outlined plans to toughen sanctions if Russia’s alleged meddling east of the river Dnieper did not stop.

Russia has continued to be strident in its denial of involvement. The foreign ministry said accusations of Russian arms making their way over the border were “the work of the devil”.

Proving that Moscow is entangled in eastern Ukraine may be key to any Nato attempt to reach a diplomatic resolution to the crisis – but Russia’s actions there have been even more difficult to pin down than its involvement in Crimea.
“In Crimea, there was an obvious concentration of forces,” said one senior Nato military officer. “In eastern Ukraine, it’s much more specialist troops. It’s a small number – a very small number. These sort of characters do their work and then disappear very quickly, leaving things to the militias to take over.”

He points to examples where six-man groups, armed with expensive Russian kit such as VSS Vintorez sniper rifles and wearing special forces camouflage, have been observed aiding rebels.

Other figures are of even more interest to Nato intelligence chiefs. In one dossier of photographs seen by the Financial Times, another senior officer from a Nato state pointed not to armed men but to seemingly innocuous individuals among them in civilian garb. These were the men in charge, he said, judging by their positioning, body language and behaviour. They were almost certainly agents of the SVR or the FSB, Russia’s sprawling foreign and domestic intelligence services.
While the evidence is circumstantial at best, the FSB, in particular, has an undoubted long-running involvement in Ukraine – a position it has clung to since the end of the cold war isolated its regional security apparatus there.

“When it comes to near abroad, it is the FSB and not the SVR that is doing the work,” said Nigel Inkster, who was until 2006 director of operations and intelligence for the British agency MI6 and is now director of transnational threats at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London think-tank. “For Russia, [Ukraine] is still regarded as an internal issue.
“Everybody looks at what is happening in east Ukraine and they think in terms of tanks and conventional military capabilities, but the Russian state has always invested heavily in the special services and the intelligence agencies. They are the ones involved here.”

The tactics being used are “classic techniques” of the FSB, Mr Inkster says. He adds that such actions – “planning, incitement, organisation of local forces, and intelligence” – can take place without using large numbers of personnel.
A senior Nato bureaucrat said the sequencing of separatist attacks suggested a guiding hand. Militias first targeted government buildings and communications centres, followed by key supply points and then harder targets such as military installations.

Ukrainian forces have been outwitted several times. In Konstantinovka last month, during an attempted ambush of Russian paramilitaries, the pro-Kiev Donbas militia was ambushed. This week, separatists seized control of two Ukrainian military bases in Luhansk.

Behind these successes lies a well-resourced intelligence machine, according to the Nato narrative. Indeed, this is perhaps what has most impressed Nato strategists.

In classic “humint” – human intelligence – terms, Russia has a longstanding advantage over Kiev. Ukrainian intelligence officials say the government of the ousted president Viktor Yanukovich planted so many spooks within their ranks that they now comprise up to a third of all Ukrainian senior security, counter-intelligence and military intelligence officers.
Then there is cyber space. Russia is widely believed to be the author of a virulent form of malware known as “Snake” that has infected hundreds – possibly thousands – of Ukrainian IT systems, giving operators unfettered access to data.
Nato has yet to develop a suitable response to Russia’s covert activities.

“We would describe it as an influence operation,” said a senior Nato officer. “Russia has very effectively employed all of the tools of power: information, diplomacy, politics, military might – both overt and unconventional – and economic.”
With that in mind, it is ironic that for all of its accusations against Russia, it is Nato that is looking like it is stuck in the Iron Curtain era, as it tries to fly more planes, exercise more troops and sail more ships ever closer to Russia.
Source

Human Rights Watch recognizes that the actions of the insurgents violate Ukrainian law and that the Ukrainian government is entitled to carry out law enforcement and military operations to counter the armed insurrection. We also recognize that the actions of the insurgents, operating in a populated residential area, setting up road blocks in residential areas, and moving in, around, or near to hospital grounds may endanger residents, patients, and healthcare workers at such facilities.

Nevertheless, criminal conduct by the insurgents does not relieve the Ukrainian forces of their obligations to act in accordance with international law in the conduct of their law enforcement and military operations. This is particularly the case with respect to use of lethal force. In Ukraine the obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), such as those which protect the right to life (article 2), bodily integrity (article 3), and liberty and security (article 5), as well as the inviolability of the home (article 8), remain in force during all law enforcement and military operations. (See for example the cases of Ergi v. Turkey, judgment of 28 July 1998, Reports 1998-IV and Isayeva v. Russia (2005), in which the European Court of Human Rights articulated the scope of the state’s obligations in the conduct of counter-insurgency operations.)

Article 2 of the ECHR provides that deprivation of life is not a violation of the right to life “when it results from use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary” in among other things, “action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.” Requiring that use of force be no more than “absolutely necessary” means the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the permitted aims. It also requires an examination of whether the operation was planned and controlled by the authorities so as to minimize, to the greatest extent possible, risk to life. The government’s responsibility will be engaged where they fail to take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of a security operation mounted against an opposing group with a view to avoiding and, in any event, minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life (see Ergi para 79).

In so far as the ongoing hostilities are governed by international humanitarian law, the government also has obligations never to direct attacks at civilians or civilian objects or to engage in indiscriminate attacks, to distinguish at all times between civilian objects and military objectives, and to adhere strictly to the principle of proportionality insofar as attacks that may cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects, in excess of the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, are prohibited. Under international humanitarian law the insurgents are bound by the same obligations, and under human rights standards, all parties must take all feasible measures to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects.

As noted above, Human Rights Watch is aware of physical harm to only one individual among Semyonovka residents and none among the hospital staff and patients. This does not diminish our concern that that the use of unobserved indirect fire, like shelling by mortars, in these two operations against insurgents may not have been a proportionate response to the threat of the insurgents and may not comply with Ukraine’s obligations to protect the right to life and to respect the home and property of its population.

We urge you to review all ongoing operations in Semyonovka, Sloviansk, and elsewhere to ensure that in carrying out counter-insurgency operations, Ukrainian forces are fully aware of all their obligations under international law and that the use of lethal force that may result in the death or injury of civilians or may cause unjustified harm to civilian property and infrastructure is strictly justified under international law.
Read the rest of the post, it documents a large number of incidents.

On June 09 2014 20:56 ZeromuS wrote:


I'm surprised more places don't follow a Canadian model for 2 official languages. I mean, we only have 2 provinces where French is the primary language and the whole country remains bilingual.

Bilingualism is regionally enforced with federal services requiring bilingualism (and additional languages such as mandarin or Punjabi or Urdu etc based on region). Places closest to French primary provinces also incorporate dual languages.

Its unfortunate that the government services can't be rendered to Ukrainians in the language of their choosing especially if they are in the east. Would likely alleviate a lot of tensions.

On June 09 2014 20:56 ZeromuS wrote:


I'm surprised more places don't follow a Canadian model for 2 official languages. I mean, we only have 2 provinces where French is the primary language and the whole country remains bilingual.

Bilingualism is regionally enforced with federal services requiring bilingualism (and additional languages such as mandarin or Punjabi or Urdu etc based on region). Places closest to French primary provinces also incorporate dual languages.

On June 09 2014 21:33 Copymizer wrote:
I'm just sitting here wondering how much different ukranian language is to russian. Is there a minor difference or is it the same with danish and swedish, where there is many similarities, still 2 different languages but for example if swedes talk slow i can pretty much understand what they're saying and with norwegian it's alot easier because my country used to own norway until 200 years ago. i mean just how different is the 2 languages because can i compare it with danish <> swedish <> norwegian vice versa it would make it easier to understand