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On September 28 2023 02:47 Magic Powers wrote: For the last few weeks I've not seen many people here claim that Ukraine is celebrating victory after victory. Would be somewhat outrageous to do so because there aren't too many obvious signs of that.
From my observation the Ukrainian advances have all but halted. Reports have been coming in that progress is usually being negated quite swiftly.
That doesn't mean the offensive is over. Russia is losing a lot, but these numbers are boring to people watching from the sidelines. Adding +100 on top of 10000 doesn't seem like much to people who aren't looking at the bigger picture. It's more interesting and more visually obvious when large regions are swiftly being captured.
There is relentless forward movement by Ukraine. We can even see it here with zeo’s steady goalposts going from “Ukraine can’t even take X” to “Ukraine has lost a million men in futile attacks over X” to “Russia still materially controls X” and then finally “where is X? Never heard of it”.
The line is being pushed back.
I hate to disagree, but in recent days and even weeks there hasn't been meaningful territorial progress for Ukraine. The pace has been reduced so much that it's hardly recognizable on a map anymore. The pace is no longer creeping, currently it's non-existent.
That's not to say that Russia isn't losing a lot - they're still very significantly outperforming Ukraine in that aspect, losing troops and hardware in very significant quantities, while Ukraine only really matches them in drone losses (for obvious reasons).
I don't think Ukraine's strategy is ideal. The reports of them getting pushed back every time they advance are disappointing. It indicates that there's something seriously wrong with the command. It makes little sense to clear an area over and over, only to hand it back to the enemy every time. An outpost has to be established that can be used to continue pushing further and create more threats in various directions. That's what the US has been proposing and Zelensky has been rejecting it.
This week in the east they secured control of Andriivka and Klishchiivka against very stubborn resistance.
In the south they have come off their victory in Robotyne and are already in the next settlement, Novoprokopivka. Again against very stubborn resistance.
You’re welcome to make the argument that you’d like them to take ground faster but they are taking ground, and in multiple directions at once. The Russians keep picking settlements and declaring that this is where they will make their stand as they pour reserves and matériel into contesting every inch. And they keep losing those settlements. The advance may be slow but it’s inexorable.
This kind of trench by trench warfare is very dynamic. You fight in a grey zone that you can’t simply move into and occupy because it puts you in range of artillery and helicopters without your counterbattery and anti air being able to move in to deny the enemy. They’re not taking and then giving up ground taken for laughs, you’re misunderstanding what it means to secure territory. The victory in the mud is just one of many victories needed to secure a grey zone.
I understand that progress is progress, but meaningful progress is different. Currently Ukraine isn't making territorial progress, and the last few weeks have generally been extremely slow. At this rate the war would last for a century, and I'm not exaggerating. We have to look at other indicators for success if we want to argue that Ukraine is still making progress. Territorial gains don't cut it. We can compare casualties and things like that, but otherwise we only have speculation.
I'm not impressed by Kyiv's approach. The loss of life will be staggering if this continues. I think they should listen more to the US and take a much more aggressive approach somewhere in Zaporizhzhia, as that would minimize casualties on both sides and it'd more likely promise to end the war in a reasonable timeframe.
If the US wanted Ukraine to fight the war their way they could have trained Ukraine on an overwhelming air force and provided it. The US has been reluctant to give Ukraine half the things Ukraine says it needs. I have a lot of trouble with the idea that there’s some great way of simply breaking through and winning that Ukraine knows about but isn’t doing. Not least because I can’t possibly conceive of what that might be against a wall of anti tank obstacles, mines, and presighted artillery backed up by attack helicopters capable of devastating armour from a safe distance.
Ukraine is incentivized more than anyone to minimize the Ukrainian blood spent. There is no non attritional way of doing this. They’ve asked for the tool that can bypass trenches and the US has refused.
Russia is hardly losing aircraft or tanks anymore because they're hardly using them. They don't need them in this defensive stance, as they'd get destroyed in much larger quantities if they used them at leisure. What this shows to me is that Russian troops are too comfortable. They're not forced to turn up the heat to hold off Ukrainian assaults, they can just recapture lost ground with artillery fire over and over again. That's extremely lazy, and it's been working well enough. Emphasis on "well enough", because this is Putin's war, not Russia's. He doesn't care about any of this per se, he only cares about his seat in power, and thus indirectly he cares about the outcome of the war. His ideal scenario is a forever war, and that's exactly what he's currently getting.
You can't argue with the numbers, Ukrainian advance has slowed down over time and it keeps slowing down, and right now as we speak it's even stopped completely. The numbers clearly show that this war will continue forever if there's not a huge change in the strategy at some point. That would ruin not only Russia, but also Ukraine. Because it's not just about persevering, it's about life and it's about living.
I'm never going to side with zeo morally speaking, but I'm starting to understand where his argument is coming from. Objectively speaking he has a point. Ukraine is not winning this war right now with the current methods.
I'd argue that we don't know.
Realistically the terrain barely matters. It matters in the sense that it is a way to force fights, and bad things could happen if a lot of terrain gets lost.
But currently, this is about attrition. It is not about this village or that road. The question is which sides loses more stuff, and which side can keep it up for longer before some important category of stuff is just no longer available in the necessary quantities.
It would be nice if Ukraine could just end this end recover all their territory quickly, and maybe that will happen. A breakthrough can be fast and hard. But i assume that this will be an attrition thing for a while, until one side runs out of people or stuff.
A "war of attrition" is the least favorable of all types of war. It's a term coined specifically for wars that have no clear direction and no end in sight. Such wars end typically when one side is more or less objectively forced to surrender. WW1 ended not through attrition, but when one side was forced to surrender due to overwhelming pressure. The attritional aspect lasted several years and it led nowhere. During WW2 both sides specifically avoided a war of attrition because they had learned from WW1 that attrition would only prolong the war instead of deciding it.
There's no objective reason why Ukrainian troops shouldn't push with as much force as they can right now instead of later. If they split Russia's defense lines, they can start bombarding their supply lines near the Sea for the rest of the winter, and that with little to no risk of a Russian offensive. If they let winter happen before the offensive is fruitful, that only gives Russia even more time to dig in. And that's the one thing Ukraine should avoid at great cost, because it'll only increase the cost for them later during the war.
That’s not why WW1 ended. Germany became unable to sustain the war effort because consumption (attrition) exceeded production by a critical amount for a sustained period.
It’s also not why WW2 ended. I really don’t know where you learned your history. A war either ends because one side is fully attrited or because it reaches a point where making whatever concessions are required for peace is preferable to a continuation of war (a mutually satisfactory peace). Both WW1 and WW2 were decided by absolute victory and unconditional surrender due to the losers no longer having any capacity to continue fighting.
On September 27 2023 22:06 Silvanel wrote: SS entered service in 2002 and were not decomissioned yet, it is not museum piece it is still in active service. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Storm_Shadow
You can’t buy new ones, they’re not in active production. By museum piece I don’t mean useless or inactive, I mean that it’s a relic of the last generation, left over, inherited.
If Britain were to enter a serious peer war today we would spend our inheritance of storm shadows but it’s not what we would rearm ourselves with. It’s not what we would manufacture to fight a current war against, for example, Germany with.
It’s like the Russian T-80s. They have them, the cannon still works, you’re no less dead for being shot with a round launched from a T-80. But nobody in Russia is building new production lines for new T-80s.
You only have a few years after something goes out of production to restart before restarting is materially no cheaper than making a new line from scratch. Skilled workers move away. The floppy discs get lost. People retire or die. The industrial infrastructure decays.
All the main European nations wanted some bought some twenty years ago when they were built. They didn’t tend to fire them and so they didn’t really need more.
A handful have been sold outside of Europe since then but the only operator listed in the last 7 years is an unspecified number for Greece, although they already had some from 2003.
Your own link says as much. Britain didn’t place an order for more storm shadows, Britain made a RFP for new cruise missiles. The author notes that storm shadow is a cruise missile and that this could be for replenishment of stocks after they were supplied to Ukraine. What it does not say is that there is an active production line churning them out which makes sense if you look at the order history.
In the early 2000s they made and sold thousands. In the early 2010s they made and sold hundreds. In the late 2010s they sold none. In the early 2020s Greece asked for some.
I flatter myself that I know quite a lot about the economics of manufacturing as I have previously worked as a plant controller for a defence contractor before my current position. No orders = no production line.
MBDA may have bid on Britain’s RFP. I don’t know. But they won’t have spent the last decade building cruise missiles non stop in the hope that demand might suddenly come back. No contract, no production. These are made to order weapons.
Your initial arguments were: "You can’t buy new ones, they’re not in active production. By museum piece I don’t mean useless or inactive, I mean that it’s a relic of the last generation, left over, inherited." and "If Britain were to enter a serious peer war today we would spend our inheritance of storm shadows but it’s not what we would rearm ourselves with.It’s not what we would manufacture to fight a current war against, for example, Germany with."
But per your own link: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Storm_Shadow "In 2017, a joint contract to upgrade the respective Storm Shadow/SCALP stockpiles in French and British service was signed. It is expected to sustain the missile until its planned withdrawal from service in 2032.[9][10] The Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon, currently being developed by the two countries and Italy, is intended to replace it."
Then we look at this "Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon" https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_Cruise/Anti-Ship_Weapon And see that: "The planning assumption for service entry for Future Cruise /Anti-Ship Weapon on the Type 26 Frigate and Typhoon aircraft is 2028 and 2030 respectively".[16] and "In November the First Sea Lord, Admiral Tony Radakin, told the House of Commons Select Defence Committee that options for FC/ASW were still "being looked at" including potential hypersonic weapons. Were a collaborative approach still to be pursued, this might delay the introduction of these weapons until the 2030s.[19]"
So if SS is the last generation, what is the next one? And what would Britain rearm itself with to fight a current war, if supposed replacement for SS is coming into service in 2028 at the very best?
Also in reply to that particular point:
On September 28 2023 04:27 KwarK wrote: Your own link says as much. Britain didn’t place an order for more storm shadows, Britain made a RFP for new cruise missiles. The author notes that storm shadow is a cruise missile and that this could be for replenishment of stocks after they were supplied to Ukraine. What it does not say is that there is an active production line churning them out which makes sense if you look at the order history.
As far as I understand English, to "step up" is a synonym to "improve", "increase", "enlarge" etc. And not a synonym to "restart", "start anew", "create" etc. Which implies that it means "to increase the scale of something that already exists". But you are free to correct me if I'm wrong, it's not my first language after all.
And about T-80s and T-14s, and tank/armour development in general - current improvements in tank designs are much more about battlefield control, communication and active protection (because no armor can protect you from everything). All these things do not require the drastic innovations in the design features, which why even after Cold War tank design didn't change basically (Leclerc, K2, Type 10), and every nation focused on covering the weak spots, improving optics, C2 and active protection. T-14 was a daunting project, expensive, made in an era of cooperation between Russia and the West and heavily reliant on complex electronics. It was well fitting in the theme of Serdyukov's idea of professional smaller brigade units, but it most likely would not fit the theme of mass army, partially mobilized and requiring hundred+ tanks a month. Add to that its price, Western sanctions, problems with development, and you would get a tank that would do more harm than good. You may draw parallel between King Tiger and Panther in WW2 for Germany, if you wish. Or M6 and M4 for the US.
T-80 is reanimated most likely due to the engine potential. Average T-72 diesel engine is 830 hp, current diesel engine of T-90M is 1130 hp. T-80s standard turbine is 1000 hp, and the one placed on T-80U was 1250 hp. There are claims of possibility of the 1500 hp engine being developed. T-80 also has better reverse speed, which is also an issue for the main T-72/T-90 line. Other than that, it could be equipped with the same electronic as T-90M (there are also talks that new T-80 would receive T-90 turrets, since old T-80 turrets were produced on currently non-existant plant), so there is a possibility of it being just turbined T-90. In any case, when your army is at full scale war, you need tried and true stuff which is ready to be mass produced, not a few wunderwaffes.
On September 28 2023 02:47 Magic Powers wrote: For the last few weeks I've not seen many people here claim that Ukraine is celebrating victory after victory. Would be somewhat outrageous to do so because there aren't too many obvious signs of that.
From my observation the Ukrainian advances have all but halted. Reports have been coming in that progress is usually being negated quite swiftly.
That doesn't mean the offensive is over. Russia is losing a lot, but these numbers are boring to people watching from the sidelines. Adding +100 on top of 10000 doesn't seem like much to people who aren't looking at the bigger picture. It's more interesting and more visually obvious when large regions are swiftly being captured.
There is relentless forward movement by Ukraine. We can even see it here with zeo’s steady goalposts going from “Ukraine can’t even take X” to “Ukraine has lost a million men in futile attacks over X” to “Russia still materially controls X” and then finally “where is X? Never heard of it”.
The line is being pushed back.
I hate to disagree, but in recent days and even weeks there hasn't been meaningful territorial progress for Ukraine. The pace has been reduced so much that it's hardly recognizable on a map anymore. The pace is no longer creeping, currently it's non-existent.
That's not to say that Russia isn't losing a lot - they're still very significantly outperforming Ukraine in that aspect, losing troops and hardware in very significant quantities, while Ukraine only really matches them in drone losses (for obvious reasons).
I don't think Ukraine's strategy is ideal. The reports of them getting pushed back every time they advance are disappointing. It indicates that there's something seriously wrong with the command. It makes little sense to clear an area over and over, only to hand it back to the enemy every time. An outpost has to be established that can be used to continue pushing further and create more threats in various directions. That's what the US has been proposing and Zelensky has been rejecting it.
This week in the east they secured control of Andriivka and Klishchiivka against very stubborn resistance.
In the south they have come off their victory in Robotyne and are already in the next settlement, Novoprokopivka. Again against very stubborn resistance.
You’re welcome to make the argument that you’d like them to take ground faster but they are taking ground, and in multiple directions at once. The Russians keep picking settlements and declaring that this is where they will make their stand as they pour reserves and matériel into contesting every inch. And they keep losing those settlements. The advance may be slow but it’s inexorable.
This kind of trench by trench warfare is very dynamic. You fight in a grey zone that you can’t simply move into and occupy because it puts you in range of artillery and helicopters without your counterbattery and anti air being able to move in to deny the enemy. They’re not taking and then giving up ground taken for laughs, you’re misunderstanding what it means to secure territory. The victory in the mud is just one of many victories needed to secure a grey zone.
I understand that progress is progress, but meaningful progress is different. Currently Ukraine isn't making territorial progress, and the last few weeks have generally been extremely slow. At this rate the war would last for a century, and I'm not exaggerating. We have to look at other indicators for success if we want to argue that Ukraine is still making progress. Territorial gains don't cut it. We can compare casualties and things like that, but otherwise we only have speculation.
I'm not impressed by Kyiv's approach. The loss of life will be staggering if this continues. I think they should listen more to the US and take a much more aggressive approach somewhere in Zaporizhzhia, as that would minimize casualties on both sides and it'd more likely promise to end the war in a reasonable timeframe.
If the US wanted Ukraine to fight the war their way they could have trained Ukraine on an overwhelming air force and provided it. The US has been reluctant to give Ukraine half the things Ukraine says it needs. I have a lot of trouble with the idea that there’s some great way of simply breaking through and winning that Ukraine knows about but isn’t doing. Not least because I can’t possibly conceive of what that might be against a wall of anti tank obstacles, mines, and presighted artillery backed up by attack helicopters capable of devastating armour from a safe distance.
Ukraine is incentivized more than anyone to minimize the Ukrainian blood spent. There is no non attritional way of doing this. They’ve asked for the tool that can bypass trenches and the US has refused.
Russia is hardly losing aircraft or tanks anymore because they're hardly using them. They don't need them in this defensive stance, as they'd get destroyed in much larger quantities if they used them at leisure. What this shows to me is that Russian troops are too comfortable. They're not forced to turn up the heat to hold off Ukrainian assaults, they can just recapture lost ground with artillery fire over and over again. That's extremely lazy, and it's been working well enough. Emphasis on "well enough", because this is Putin's war, not Russia's. He doesn't care about any of this per se, he only cares about his seat in power, and thus indirectly he cares about the outcome of the war. His ideal scenario is a forever war, and that's exactly what he's currently getting.
You can't argue with the numbers, Ukrainian advance has slowed down over time and it keeps slowing down, and right now as we speak it's even stopped completely. The numbers clearly show that this war will continue forever if there's not a huge change in the strategy at some point. That would ruin not only Russia, but also Ukraine. Because it's not just about persevering, it's about life and it's about living.
I'm never going to side with zeo morally speaking, but I'm starting to understand where his argument is coming from. Objectively speaking he has a point. Ukraine is not winning this war right now with the current methods.
I'd argue that we don't know.
Realistically the terrain barely matters. It matters in the sense that it is a way to force fights, and bad things could happen if a lot of terrain gets lost.
But currently, this is about attrition. It is not about this village or that road. The question is which sides loses more stuff, and which side can keep it up for longer before some important category of stuff is just no longer available in the necessary quantities.
It would be nice if Ukraine could just end this end recover all their territory quickly, and maybe that will happen. A breakthrough can be fast and hard. But i assume that this will be an attrition thing for a while, until one side runs out of people or stuff.
A "war of attrition" is the least favorable of all types of war. It's a term coined specifically for wars that have no clear direction and no end in sight. Such wars end typically when one side is more or less objectively forced to surrender. WW1 ended not through attrition, but when one side was forced to surrender due to overwhelming pressure. The attritional aspect lasted several years and it led nowhere. During WW2 both sides specifically avoided a war of attrition because they had learned from WW1 that attrition would only prolong the war instead of deciding it.
There's no objective reason why Ukrainian troops shouldn't push with as much force as they can right now instead of later. If they split Russia's defense lines, they can start bombarding their supply lines near the Sea for the rest of the winter, and that with little to no risk of a Russian offensive. If they let winter happen before the offensive is fruitful, that only gives Russia even more time to dig in. And that's the one thing Ukraine should avoid at great cost, because it'll only increase the cost for them later during the war.
That’s not why WW1 ended. Germany became unable to sustain the war effort because consumption (attrition) exceeded production by a critical amount for a sustained period.
It’s also not why WW2 ended. I really don’t know where you learned your history. A war either ends because one side is fully attrited or because it reaches a point where making whatever concessions are required for peace is preferable to a continuation of war (a mutually satisfactory peace). Both WW1 and WW2 were decided by absolute victory and unconditional surrender due to the losers no longer having any capacity to continue fighting.
Germany surrendered (in WW1) because they had a leader who cared about the fate of the German people when it became clear that the war cannot be won and Germany could only endure losses until the inevitable fall. Hitler didn't care until the bitter end, he even explicitely stated that he'd rather see Germany destroyed and the German people extinguished than continue with a shameful record.
When you understand this distinction, you also understand that wars are not strictly won through force. Force is the factor that decides which side can destroy more of the other side. Force however is not a direct predictor of the end of a war itself. Otherwise Vietnam would've never gone the way it did. Or Iraq. Or Afghanistan. It's the mentality of the loser that decides the point of surrender, and surrender is what truly ends the war. Otherwise the war continues forever.
Currently Ukraine doesn't have the force required to get Putin to surrender. I'd like to remind you that after Zaporizhzhia there are several other oblasts to reclaim. Reclaiming the East of Ukraine won't be any easier, if anything it'll be harder. This is why I've kept saying from the start that they need absolutely everything from their allies. Every last bit of what we have must go to Ukraine. Every bomber, every fighter jet, every drone, every missile, every bullet, every armor, every bit of intelligence. That's why I criticized some countries' leaderships (mostly Germany but also France and the US) so harshly, because they were clearly not determined to help Ukraine to the fullest. And I'm still not sure that they are.
On September 27 2023 22:06 Silvanel wrote: SS entered service in 2002 and were not decomissioned yet, it is not museum piece it is still in active service. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Storm_Shadow
You can’t buy new ones, they’re not in active production. By museum piece I don’t mean useless or inactive, I mean that it’s a relic of the last generation, left over, inherited.
If Britain were to enter a serious peer war today we would spend our inheritance of storm shadows but it’s not what we would rearm ourselves with. It’s not what we would manufacture to fight a current war against, for example, Germany with.
It’s like the Russian T-80s. They have them, the cannon still works, you’re no less dead for being shot with a round launched from a T-80. But nobody in Russia is building new production lines for new T-80s.
You only have a few years after something goes out of production to restart before restarting is materially no cheaper than making a new line from scratch. Skilled workers move away. The floppy discs get lost. People retire or die. The industrial infrastructure decays.
All the main European nations wanted some bought some twenty years ago when they were built. They didn’t tend to fire them and so they didn’t really need more.
A handful have been sold outside of Europe since then but the only operator listed in the last 7 years is an unspecified number for Greece, although they already had some from 2003.
Your own link says as much. Britain didn’t place an order for more storm shadows, Britain made a RFP for new cruise missiles. The author notes that storm shadow is a cruise missile and that this could be for replenishment of stocks after they were supplied to Ukraine. What it does not say is that there is an active production line churning them out which makes sense if you look at the order history.
In the early 2000s they made and sold thousands. In the early 2010s they made and sold hundreds. In the late 2010s they sold none. In the early 2020s Greece asked for some.
I flatter myself that I know quite a lot about the economics of manufacturing as I have previously worked as a plant controller for a defence contractor before my current position. No orders = no production line.
MBDA may have bid on Britain’s RFP. I don’t know. But they won’t have spent the last decade building cruise missiles non stop in the hope that demand might suddenly come back. No contract, no production. These are made to order weapons.
Your initial arguments were: "You can’t buy new ones, they’re not in active production. By museum piece I don’t mean useless or inactive, I mean that it’s a relic of the last generation, left over, inherited." and "If Britain were to enter a serious peer war today we would spend our inheritance of storm shadows but it’s not what we would rearm ourselves with.It’s not what we would manufacture to fight a current war against, for example, Germany with."
But per your own link: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Storm_Shadow "In 2017, a joint contract to upgrade the respective Storm Shadow/SCALP stockpiles in French and British service was signed. It is expected to sustain the missile until its planned withdrawal from service in 2032.[9][10] The Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon, currently being developed by the two countries and Italy, is intended to replace it."
Then we look at this "Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon" https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_Cruise/Anti-Ship_Weapon And see that: "The planning assumption for service entry for Future Cruise /Anti-Ship Weapon on the Type 26 Frigate and Typhoon aircraft is 2028 and 2030 respectively".[16] and "In November the First Sea Lord, Admiral Tony Radakin, told the House of Commons Select Defence Committee that options for FC/ASW were still "being looked at" including potential hypersonic weapons. Were a collaborative approach still to be pursued, this might delay the introduction of these weapons until the 2030s.[19]"
So if SS is the last generation, what is the next one? And what would Britain rearm itself with to fight a current war, if supposed replacement for SS is coming into service in 2028 at the very best?
On September 28 2023 04:27 KwarK wrote: Your own link says as much. Britain didn’t place an order for more storm shadows, Britain made a RFP for new cruise missiles. The author notes that storm shadow is a cruise missile and that this could be for replenishment of stocks after they were supplied to Ukraine. What it does not say is that there is an active production line churning them out which makes sense if you look at the order history.
As far as I understand English, to "step up" is a synonym to "improve", "increase", "enlarge" etc. And not a synonym to "restart", "start anew", "create" etc. Which implies that it means "to increase the scale of something that already exists". But you are free to correct me if I'm wrong, it's not my first language after all.
And about T-80s and T-14s, and tank/armour development in general - current improvements in tank designs are much more about battlefield control, communication and active protection (because no armor can protect you from everything). All these things do not require the drastic innovations in the design features, which why even after Cold War tank design didn't change basically (Leclerc, K2, Type 10), and every nation focused on covering the weak spots, improving optics, C2 and active protection. T-14 was a daunting project, expensive, made in an era of cooperation between Russia and the West and heavily reliant on complex electronics. It was well fitting in the theme of Serdyukov's idea of professional smaller brigade units, but it most likely would not fit the theme of mass army, partially mobilized and requiring hundred+ tanks a month. Add to that its price, Western sanctions, problems with development, and you would get a tank that would do more harm than good. You may draw parallel between King Tiger and Panther in WW2 for Germany, if you wish. Or M6 and M4 for the US.
T-80 is reanimated most likely due to the engine potential. Average T-72 diesel engine is 830 hp, current diesel engine of T-90M is 1130 hp. T-80s standard turbine is 1000 hp, and the one placed on T-80U was 1250 hp. There are claims of possibility of the 1500 hp engine being developed. T-80 also has better reverse speed, which is also an issue for the main T-72/T-90 line. Other than that, it could be equipped with the same electronic as T-90M (there are also talks that new T-80 would receive T-90 turrets, since old T-80 turrets were produced on currently non-existant plant), so there is a possibility of it being just turbined T-90. In any case, when your army is at full scale war, you need tried and true stuff which is ready to be mass produced, not a few wunderwaffes.
You’re welcome to believe that they maintained their initial production line and workforce capable of making thousands through a decade of nobody buying them if you like. You’re welcome to believe that they kept buying inputs from their critical component suppliers through that decade. You’re welcome to believe they didn’t retask their workforce to projects with a product someone was buying and retool their equipment to meet new contracts.
Based on my expert knowledge of the field I do not share that belief. Idle capacity is expensive and producing products with no buyers is ruinously expensive.
As for what they’d replace it with, you already answered that question. There’s a new project to design and build a new weapon to replace them, they’re at the end of their service life and receiving updates for compatibility and maintenance only.
Consider the inverse, if they’re modern weapons for the needs of the present day would there already be a replacement designed and being built so that they could be retired in 5 years? The fact that the successor is slated to enter service in 2028 is evidence for my point, not yours. This is not the weapon we would want to build, that’s why we’re actively trying to build a different one and planning to retire this one.
On September 28 2023 07:01 KwarK wrote: You’re welcome to believe that they maintained their initial production line and workforce capable of making thousands through a decade of nobody buying them if you like. You’re welcome to believe that they kept buying inputs from their critical component suppliers through that decade. You’re welcome to believe they didn’t retask their workforce to projects with a product someone was buying and retool their equipment to meet new contracts.
Based on my expert knowledge of the field I do not share that belief. Idle capacity is expensive and producing products with no buyers is ruinously expensive.
As for what they’d replace it with, you already answered that question. There’s a new project to design and build a new weapon to replace them, they’re at the end of their service life and receiving updates for compatibility and maintenance only.
Consider the inverse, if they’re modern weapons for the needs of the present day would there already be a replacement designed and being built so that they could be retired in 5 years? The fact that the successor is slated to enter service in 2028 is evidence for my point, not yours. This is not the weapon we would want to build, that’s why we’re actively trying to build a different one and planning to retire this one.
I wasn't arguing about whether or not there is/was the capacity to send tenfold more to Ukraine or only 20% more. I know with absolute certainty 20% more was possible, and I believe way more than that was also possible. But that's not the point of contention. The point is that Ukraine is currently not up to the task, and that's presumably due to a combination of factors. One being that Zelensky is apparently unwilling to follow a proven concept of war that would more likely result in a much better outcome than the current approach. I think Zelensky is holding back because he's afraid. I suspect he's mostly afraid that, if the Ukrainian offensive officially fails, support may dry up. And I think this fear is what drives his current war strategy of a creeping advance. And it's what I think is the reason that Ukraine has been seeing fewer and fewer gains over the last few months instead of more and more.
Edit: only now noticed that last comment was in response to Ardias. I'll go to bed.
If you're looking at the swapping of land to determine how successful Ukraine is right now, you're judging success in an overly simplistic way. Retaking land is great but it's not always an indicator of success. The enemy can give up land to trick you into overextending for example. There are other metrics of success like amor and personnel casualties. Russia is also expending a lot of man power to conduct very frequent counter attacks to slow Ukraine's progress at the cost of sound military strategy for what could be a variety of reasons, from trying to buy time to hoping to achieve political goals given by Putin.
Russian forces continue to expend significant combat power on counterattacking to hold their current positions and appear to be resisting the operationally sound course of action of falling back to prepared defensive positions further south. The Russian command constructed a multi-echeloned defense in southern Ukraine that would have allowed the Russian command to deploy defending Russian forces in depth throughout subsequent defensive layers. Russian forces have instead expended considerable amounts of manpower, materiel, and effort to hold the forwardmost defensive positions in southern Ukraine and have only withdrawn to subsequent defensive positions at the direct threat of Ukrainian advances.[25] Russian forces’ elastic defense requires that one echelon of Russian forces slows a Ukrainian tactical advance while a second echelon of forces counterattacks to roll back that advance. Counterattacking requires significant morale and relatively high combat capabilities, and the Russian military appears to rely on relatively elite units and formations to counterattack, likely at the expense of these forces’ degradation.[26]
Some Russian and Ukrainian sources have acknowledged that some Russian counterattacks in the wider Robotyne area have been senseless.[27] A defense in depth should afford these units respite from further degradation through withdrawal to a subsequent defensive layer. This withdrawal would allow the Russian command to conserve critical combat power for more operationally significant counterattacks and efforts to attrit attacking Ukrainian forces, although the task of conducting an orderly withdrawal under fire or pursuit is quite challenging and risky. American military analysts Michael Kofman and Rob Lee recently assessed that Russian forces have underutilized the depth of their defense and have yet to execute “a true defense in depth” in which Russian forces trade “space for attrition” and that the Russian command’s decision to defend forward has allowed Ukrainian artillery units to attrit Russian forces.[28] ISW concurs with this assessment. ISW has observed a concerted Ukrainian effort to attrit Russian forces even as Ukrainian forces make significant tactical gains, and the Russian resistance to withdrawing to defensive positions further south is likely compounding the asymmetric attrition gradient Ukrainian forces are trying to create. Russian counterattacks aimed at holding forward positions have been tactically significant, but it remains unclear if these counterattacks will have lasting operational importance.
The Russian military command may be ordering these counterattacks to buy time, but it is unclear how the Kremlin intends to use time bought at such a price. Russian forces appear to be unwilling to surrender tactical areas and are focusing instead on fighting for every meter instead of benefiting from the depth of their prepared defenses. Ukrainian military journalist Konstyantyn Mashovets observed that the Russian military command is achieving its objective of buying more time from these counterattacks but questioned what the Russian military command intends to do with this time.[29] Mashovets argued that the sacrifice of combat-ready forces and assets during defensive operations only makes sense in two situations: if it allows time to organize defensive systems at another prepared line or if it buys time for the organization of a more substantial counterattack or counteroffensive. Mashovets added that both scenarios assume that Russia has additional reserves and the ability to rapidly deploy these reserves to a new defensive line or an operational direction where it plans to carry out a new offensive.[30] Mashovets concluded that regardless of the Russian intent behind buying time, the Russian military command still needs additional reinforcements in the western Zaporizhia direction in addition to forces already concentrated on this frontline for Russian forces’ current counterattacks to be operationally sound.
The Russian sacrifice of combat power to hold every meter may alternatively be intended to support the Kremlin’s informational and hybrid warfare objectives. Russian President Vladimir Putin first acknowledged the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive on June 9 by emphasizing two key and persistent narratives: that Ukrainian forces will not achieve significant successes due to well-prepared Russian defenses and that the Ukrainian forces are suffering heavy losses in personnel and Western military equipment.[31] Putin and the Kremlin have been framing Russian defensive operations as a major battlefield victory, and persistent Russian counterattacks allow the Kremlin to claim these operations as individual victories amidst the general lack of Russian battlefield advances elsewhere. These efforts likely intend to erode support and trust in Ukrainian forces in Ukraine and the West. Putin may have ordered the Russian military command to hold all Russia’s initial defensive positions to create the illusion that Ukrainian counteroffensives have not achieved any tactical or operational effects despite substantial Western support. This informational undertaking can only succeed in the long run if Russian forces can actually prevent Ukrainian forces from breaking through and liberating large areas, however.
The Russian resistance to ceding ground may also be tied to Russian military commanders’ and officials’ attempts to use the counteroffensive to achieve political goals, or it could result from Putin’s micromanagement. A Kremlin insider source claimed that Putin reportedly gave Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu a deadline of one month until early October 2023 to improve the situation on the frontlines, stop Ukrainian counteroffensives, and have Russian forces regain the initiative to launch an offensive operation against a larger city.[32] The insider‘s claim, if true, may indicate that the Russian military command may be ordering relentless counterattacks in hopes of forcing the Ukrainian counteroffensive to culminate, even at a high cost to Russian military capabilities. ISW has previously observed instances in which the Russian MoD, fearing the imminent loss of Putin’s favor, intensified its efforts to purge commanders who offered honest but negative views and advice and pursued unachievable military objectives at the expense of Russian forces.[33] The Russian MoD, for example, launched an unsuccessful and costly offensive on Vuhledar in February 2023 to undermine the domestic Russian informational effects of the Wagner Group’s progress in Bakhmut and maintain favor with Putin.[34] Russian insider sources and milbloggers who have advocated for Teplinsky claimed that Shoigu has been focusing on setting conditions to convince Putin to remove Teplinsky from command – which would likely be achievable if Shoigu is able to achieve Putin’s objectives during the counteroffensive.[35] One pro-Teplinsky channel even claimed that Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov had already removed Teplinsky from overseeing the defensive operation in southern Ukraine, although ISW cannot confirm the validity of this claim at this time.[36]
On September 28 2023 07:01 KwarK wrote: You’re welcome to believe that they maintained their initial production line and workforce capable of making thousands through a decade of nobody buying them if you like. You’re welcome to believe that they kept buying inputs from their critical component suppliers through that decade. You’re welcome to believe they didn’t retask their workforce to projects with a product someone was buying and retool their equipment to meet new contracts.
Based on my expert knowledge of the field I do not share that belief. Idle capacity is expensive and producing products with no buyers is ruinously expensive.
As for what they’d replace it with, you already answered that question. There’s a new project to design and build a new weapon to replace them, they’re at the end of their service life and receiving updates for compatibility and maintenance only.
Consider the inverse, if they’re modern weapons for the needs of the present day would there already be a replacement designed and being built so that they could be retired in 5 years? The fact that the successor is slated to enter service in 2028 is evidence for my point, not yours. This is not the weapon we would want to build, that’s why we’re actively trying to build a different one and planning to retire this one.
I never claimed that they are capable of being built in thousands. Please quote me on that if I did, or you are putting words in my mouth. However you claimed that they were not built at all. Which isn't true. Plant had export contracts n 2012-2022 period (Egypt, Greece, Qatar, India, and now Ukraine) as well as modernization program for existing stock.
Answering the bolded part - every military complex is RnDing the new stuff. However for SS replacement isn't even designed yet (they still access what types of missiles they will be building), much less being built. 2028 was just the planned date in July 2021, and it was moved to unspecified 2030s later that year.
Answering the underlined part - whatever you want does not matter. I want a can of beer to teleport to my table, it doesn't mean it will do so. The fact is that Storm Shadow is the current mainstay as well as most modern British/French/Italian cruise missile, and the only one to be produced for His Majesty's Armed Forces in next 5-10 years should UK go to war. Which means that either: 1) "30-year old NATO gear" is the best UK/France/Italy are capable of, or; 2) Ukraine is supplied with the most modern Western cruise missiles (as well as provided targeting by current Western intelligence means), and it is normal for serially produced weaponry to be 20-30 years old in design (Kalibr and Iskander are similar in that regard). The latter makes it harder to paint Russians as braindead retards though.
PS: I guess you would also argue that F-15 was an obsolete plane in 1993, because first serial F-22s were deployed in 2003.
At a very high level, the frontlines haven't moved very far - it's definitely a battle of attrition, and more likely to be won by artillery/counter battery fire than anything in the absence of major airforce involvement.
There's a bit of movement from Ukraine into the Russian lines, but it is slow, and there's still a number of defensive lines to break through, provided Russia can still man them.
It's hard to say from a laymans perspective given the two sides say either: 1. Ukraine is bleeding men for every inch they take because offense into prepared positions is hard AF 2. Ukraine is minimizing loss of life by choosing slower tactics and attritioning the artillery/logistics before making gains.
These positions are pretty far apart and until one side folds, we aren't likely to see which is true. What we do know is that we don't see too many Western vehicles knocked out in offensive operations which points to careful use of them.
I'm fairly biased towards 2. and I personally think that Russia has lost fire supremacy in local regions which is enabling the advances.
At some point, one side will run out of resources, either defensively or offensively, and a breakthrough can happen with reduced resistance until forces are reconstituted and reengaged.
So the source zeo mentioned yesterday turned out to be old losses that russia published now (1 month old), as expected cannot trust russian sources, see video:
At a very high level, the frontlines haven't moved very far - it's definitely a battle of attrition, and more likely to be won by artillery/counter battery fire than anything in the absence of major airforce involvement.
There's a bit of movement from Ukraine into the Russian lines, but it is slow, and there's still a number of defensive lines to break through, provided Russia can still man them.
It's hard to say from a laymans perspective given the two sides say either: 1. Ukraine is bleeding men for every inch they take because offense into prepared positions is hard AF 2. Ukraine is minimizing loss of life by choosing slower tactics and attritioning the artillery/logistics before making gains.
These positions are pretty far apart and until one side folds, we aren't likely to see which is true. What we do know is that we don't see too many Western vehicles knocked out in offensive operations which points to careful use of them.
I'm fairly biased towards 2. and I personally think that Russia has lost fire supremacy in local regions which is enabling the advances.
At some point, one side will run out of resources, either defensively or offensively, and a breakthrough can happen with reduced resistance until forces are reconstituted and reengaged.
Please keep in mind that the Insitute for the Study of War is run by Victoria Nulands sister-in-law - Kimberly Kagan. Her husband Frederick Kagan, works as a visiting analyst and along with his wife recieves the lions share of ISWs donations/budget as their saleries. Frederick Kagan is the brother of neocon Robert Kagan. Robert, in turn, is married to US Deputy Secretary of State Victoria 'let them eat cake' Nuland.
A very interesting wiki page but just find her husband and follow from there.
This 'think-tank' has a vested interest in pro-Kiev skewing of facts and 'analysis' while doing contract work for US government agencies as 'independants'
@sertas We didnt lose 27 vehicles in one day on one road yesterday, we lost 27 vehicles in one day on one road a month ago! Ha! So what if they are geolocated to a place we were not near a month ago? A copetuber told me it was the truth. He also told me many many Russians died in a massive onslaught of Ukrainian troops and equipment looking at the thumbnail but no gains were made because its a small scale war of attrition now with super smart limited units.
Those NATO vehicles are actually Russian losses btw
At a very high level, the frontlines haven't moved very far - it's definitely a battle of attrition, and more likely to be won by artillery/counter battery fire than anything in the absence of major airforce involvement.
There's a bit of movement from Ukraine into the Russian lines, but it is slow, and there's still a number of defensive lines to break through, provided Russia can still man them.
It's hard to say from a laymans perspective given the two sides say either: 1. Ukraine is bleeding men for every inch they take because offense into prepared positions is hard AF 2. Ukraine is minimizing loss of life by choosing slower tactics and attritioning the artillery/logistics before making gains.
These positions are pretty far apart and until one side folds, we aren't likely to see which is true. What we do know is that we don't see too many Western vehicles knocked out in offensive operations which points to careful use of them.
I'm fairly biased towards 2. and I personally think that Russia has lost fire supremacy in local regions which is enabling the advances.
At some point, one side will run out of resources, either defensively or offensively, and a breakthrough can happen with reduced resistance until forces are reconstituted and reengaged.
Please keep in mind that the Insitute for the Study of War is run by Victoria Nulands sister-in-law - Kimberly Kagan. Her husband Frederick Kagan, works as a visiting analyst and along with his wife recieves the lions share of ISWs donations/budget as their saleries. Frederick Kagan is the brother of neocon Robert Kagan. Robert, in turn, is married to US Deputy Secretary of State Victoria 'let them eat cake' Nuland.
A very interesting wiki page but just find her husband and follow from there.
This 'think-tank' has a vested interest in pro-Kiev skewing of facts and 'analysis' while doing contract work for US government agencies as 'independants'
@sertas We didnt lose 27 vehicles in one day one one road yesterday, we lost 27 vehicles in one day one one road a month ago! Ha! So what if they are geolocated to a place we were not near a month ago? A copetuber told me it was the truth
Nah it just mean you blindly post stuff and then bam, you look like an idiot. Then resorting to schoolground tactics of "It's not me, it's you", you are really impressing me with your level of reasoning lately.
On September 28 2023 05:28 KwarK wrote: Ukraine is incentivized more than anyone to minimize the Ukrainian blood spent. There is no non attritional way of doing this. They’ve asked for the tool that can bypass trenches and the US has refused.
That's a little harsh. There is only so much political will to aid Ukraine and US has been making reasonable choices given the allotted budget and dubious western unity.
At a very high level, the frontlines haven't moved very far - it's definitely a battle of attrition, and more likely to be won by artillery/counter battery fire than anything in the absence of major airforce involvement.
There's a bit of movement from Ukraine into the Russian lines, but it is slow, and there's still a number of defensive lines to break through, provided Russia can still man them.
It's hard to say from a laymans perspective given the two sides say either: 1. Ukraine is bleeding men for every inch they take because offense into prepared positions is hard AF 2. Ukraine is minimizing loss of life by choosing slower tactics and attritioning the artillery/logistics before making gains.
These positions are pretty far apart and until one side folds, we aren't likely to see which is true. What we do know is that we don't see too many Western vehicles knocked out in offensive operations which points to careful use of them.
I'm fairly biased towards 2. and I personally think that Russia has lost fire supremacy in local regions which is enabling the advances.
At some point, one side will run out of resources, either defensively or offensively, and a breakthrough can happen with reduced resistance until forces are reconstituted and reengaged.
Please keep in mind that the Insitute for the Study of War is run by Victoria Nulands sister-in-law - Kimberly Kagan. Her husband Frederick Kagan, works as a visiting analyst and along with his wife recieves the lions share of ISWs donations/budget as their saleries. Frederick Kagan is the brother of neocon Robert Kagan. Robert, in turn, is married to US Deputy Secretary of State Victoria 'let them eat cake' Nuland.
A very interesting wiki page but just find her husband and follow from there.
This 'think-tank' has a vested interest in pro-Kiev skewing of facts and 'analysis' while doing contract work for US government agencies as 'independants'
@sertas We didnt lose 27 vehicles in one day one one road yesterday, we lost 27 vehicles in one day one one road a month ago! Ha! So what if they are geolocated to a place we were not near a month ago? A copetuber told me it was the truth
Nah it just mean you blindly post stuff and then bam, you look like an idiot. Then resorting to schoolground tactics of "It's not me, it's you", you are really impressing me with your level of reasoning lately.
zeo has completely made up the claim that Ukraine lost 27 vehicles in just one day. It's strictly a lie. If that number were reflective of the real losses, then at that rate the total vehicle losses just from Ukraine since the start of the war would be in or near the tens of thousands by now. The reported numbers don't come even remotely close to that - not on Russia's side either by the way, even though they've lost far more vehicles (and generally everything more except for drones).
In reality the observed losses from the footage have most likely accumulated in the same location over the span of at least several days but perhaps weeks. And it's also not clear which of them are Ukrainian and which are Russian as the footage is of low quality. It's also not clear if any of the vehicles were recovered or will be recovered at some point.
A more accurate number of Ukrainian vehicle losses throughout the war is within the low thousands. That would be 2-5 per day on average. Not even close to the 27 figure, that's why zeo's claim can only be described as propaganda. Russia on the other hand would've been losing 4-20 per day. So it's been maybe 2:1 or 3:1 in Ukraine's favor. It's fairly clear that Ukraine has been fighting a much more efficient war in most aspects, and continues to do so. Russia is only outcompeting Ukraine in the totality of existing hardware.
On September 28 2023 05:28 KwarK wrote: Ukraine is incentivized more than anyone to minimize the Ukrainian blood spent. There is no non attritional way of doing this. They’ve asked for the tool that can bypass trenches and the US has refused.
That's a little harsh. There is only so much political will to aid Ukraine and US has been making reasonable choices given the allotted budget and dubious western unity.
Is it reasonable that there have been no talks of sending a fleet of bombers to Ukraine? That's one of the most essential tools for Ukraine to win the war as they could reach far out targets at a high rate. Sure, HIMARS are absolutely amazing, but they're a relatively slow ground unit, their reach is somewhat limited, and they're limited to missiles. It doesn't force Russia to spend their best missile capacity to shoot down aircraft. Bombers can send all kinds of threats into annexed territory, ranging from missiles to large swaths of drones. They can appear and disappear anywhere on the radar any moment in various quantities. Combined with fighter jets they could make the deciding difference in this war. After all, that's exactly how the US always gains control of territory.
They need long range missiles. ATACMS is the nobrainer since the launch platform is already in UA in numbers.
Alternative long range systems like Taurus or JASSM would need a launch platform which Ukraine doesn't have currently. F16 is (JASSM) or potentially could be (Taurus) that platform, but won't be in Ukraine for quite a while. Anything in the air other than a platform for long range standoff missiles would get shot out of the sky by Russian air defense.
On September 28 2023 05:28 KwarK wrote: Ukraine is incentivized more than anyone to minimize the Ukrainian blood spent. There is no non attritional way of doing this. They’ve asked for the tool that can bypass trenches and the US has refused.
That's a little harsh. There is only so much political will to aid Ukraine and US has been making reasonable choices given the allotted budget and dubious western unity.
Is it reasonable that there have been no talks of sending a fleet of bombers to Ukraine? That's one of the most essential tools for Ukraine to win the war as they could reach far out targets at a high rate. Sure, HIMARS are absolutely amazing, but they're a relatively slow ground unit, their reach is somewhat limited, and they're limited to missiles. It doesn't force Russia to spend their best missile capacity to shoot down aircraft. Bombers can send all kinds of threats into annexed territory, ranging from missiles to large swaths of drones. They can appear and disappear anywhere on the radar any moment in various quantities. Combined with fighter jets they could make the deciding difference in this war. After all, that's exactly how the US always gains control of territory.
The reason is very simple.
Russian Air defence.
Oh and Western doctrine isn't that into bombers. We don't have many and most nations probably don't have any ordinance for them at all. While everyone has fighters and missiles.
Like the entire US airforce only has 140 bombers, 20 of are B-2's that no one is ever getting.
Most modern combat aircrafts are multirole fighter-bombers with bombing capability. Vast majority of air-to-ground ordnance are bombs. Either dumb or guided. Both statements are true for every country with major airforce, US included.
On September 28 2023 18:30 zatic wrote: UA doesn't need "bombers" WTF.
They need long range missiles. ATACMS is the nobrainer since the launch platform is already in UA in numbers.
Alternative long range systems like Taurus or JASSM would need a launch platform which Ukraine doesn't have currently. F16 is (JASSM) or potentially could be (Taurus) that platform, but won't be in Ukraine for quite a while. Anything in the air other than a platform for long range standoff missiles would get shot out of the sky by Russian air defense.
Ukraine has been using its own bombers to great effect. They played a key role in stopping the invasion. So of course Ukraine could need more of the same. Why wouldn't they? There's only one reason not to give them more, which is that certain types of bombers may have requirements that can't be met in Ukraine right now. But those requirements can be established over time, so talks of sending them should've started long ago.
Here's an older article on Ukraine's bomber fleet during the earlier days of the war. They lost most of their small fleet, but apparently they had more in reserve. They've been using them throughout much of the war. I think they still have some in operation today, but I can't confirm that.
If bombers were so useless, why would Ukraine have relied on its tiny fleet to the point of risking them all getting shot down? Because they are in fact highly useful. Like, seriously. Why are so many armchair strategists suddenly popping up claiming that this or that type of unit would be useless in this war? Losses are expected, that doesn't mean reinforcements are useless. That's a highly defeatist attitude. Like imagine you're playing PvT and people say you shouldn't build 12 carriers because you're going to lose 10 of them. That loss is perfectly acceptable if the carriers win the game for you while protecting many of the other protoss units, thus being overall very cost-effective.
They need to rely on their tiny number of SU-24 as a launch platform for Storm Shadow.
Which is exactly what I said - what they need are long range strike capabilities, not "bombers". Since the US doesn't want to send the most obvious choice - ATACMS - other systems are being used. Like Storm Shadow. Which needs an airborne platform.
The key capability here is not the launch platform - this can be and will likely be F16 in the future - , but the missile.
And since you are the one bringing up armchair generals: Your own admission that you can't confirm whether Su-24 is still flying or not alone is enough to tell everyone that you have no idea what you are talking about.
EPT
