NOTE: When providing a source, please provide a very brief summary on what it's about and what purpose it adds to the discussion. The supporting statement should clearly explain why the subject is relevant and needs to be discussed. Please follow this rule especially for tweets.
Your supporting statement should always come BEFORE you provide the source.
On August 26 2022 19:27 Silvanel wrote: Ukraine had capabilities of targeting Russian cities even pre-war (Tochka-U for example). HIMARS and MLRS also have enough range. So have many drones. Biełgorod is even close enough to be targeted by long-range ammo from Krab or similar system. Still, there is agreement in place that Ukrainians won't use those weapons for that purpose. I guess they were hoping Germany will provide weapons under the same condition.
Wasn't the super high range ammunition for himars excluded from the deal specifically because of this reason? At least officially.
I also think 'weapons not capable of targeting russia' is a simplification of a more complex agreement not to supply things with a certain range, because that could strike deep into russian territory. Because if you put me next to the russian border with a stone, I too can strike target russian territory. Pick a good spot or give me a sling and I might even be able to target some russian city. I assume internally the definition is a lot less lax than 'can't target russian cities' and that is just the easy phrase that can be used as a simple explanation for the public. It perfectly describes the reasoning, gives a rough idea of limitations without getting into details where you then have to justify why you exactly pick X kilometres as your nono zone.
A) there's a distinction between not supplying weapons with certain range and supplying such weapons under the explicit condition that UA doesn't use them to strike RU.
B) in diplomacy, timing is a factor. Germany forgot this.
Ukraine is claiming they hit a Hotel housing Russian airborne troops. Killing about 200 soldiers.
In the occupied Kadiivka, Luhansk region, Ukrainian soldiers attacked the base of the Russian army located in the Donbas Hotel, killing 200 Russian Elite Airborne troops as a result.
Source: Serhii Haidai, the Head of Luhansk Regional Military Administration, on Telegram
Quote: "In the temporarily occupied Kadiivka (Stakhanov), Luhansk region, Ukrainian soldiers destroyed a Russian army base, which they had set up in the Donbas Hotel. Two hundred elite military airborne troops of the Russian Federation were killed."
Details: Haidai noted that the Russian army had been based in the hotel since 2014.
Russian media claims that on the morning of 26 August, the Armed Forces of Ukraine fired 10 HIMARS missiles at Kadiivka.
On August 26 2022 21:54 Ghanburighan wrote: Two things:
A) there's a distinction between not supplying weapons with certain range and supplying such weapons under the explicit condition that UA doesn't use them to strike RU.
B) in diplomacy, timing is a factor. Germany forgot this.
Okay, so Germany delivered PzH2000, MARS-II and lately also Vulcano ammo (which not even the Bundeswehr uses yet)... Obviously Germany is totally holding back on its delivery of long-range weapon platforms.
On August 26 2022 21:54 Ghanburighan wrote: Two things:
A) there's a distinction between not supplying weapons with certain range and supplying such weapons under the explicit condition that UA doesn't use them to strike RU.
B) in diplomacy, timing is a factor. Germany forgot this.
Okay, so Germany delivered PzH2000, MARS-II and lately also Vulcano ammo (which not even the Bundeswehr uses yet)... Obviously Germany is totally holding back on its delivery of long-range weapon platforms.
That's what makes the statement so nonsensical. The support is there. Everyone agrees. But it does feel like it's being sent behind Scholz's back or he forgot or something.
According to a NATO report Russia is pulling out all it's fighter jets out of the Crimea region due to HIMAR strikes on bases, and outposts.
Russia is pulling all of its fighter jets out of Crimea in an apparent response to recent explosions at Russian military outposts in the region, a secret NATO report seen by Insider said.
Russia has already moved ten aircraft — six Su-35S and four MiG-31BM jets — out of Crimea and into Russia and is set to continue until all fighter jets are removed, the report, which was dated August 22, said.
The first ten jets were moved from Belbek airfield in Crimea to Kushchevskaya and Marinovka, two regions in Russia, the report said.
"Russia has dispersed 10x fighter aircraft from Crimea to other airfields in mainland Russia to likely prevent further losses from Ukrainian attacks," the report said.
The report was referring to a series of apparent attacks in Crimea, the Ukrainian region that Russia illegally annexed in 2014. Ukraine has not claimed responsibility for the explosions, though Ukrainian officials have suggested that it was involved.
Multiple explosions hit Saki airbase and Russia's navy headquarters in Sevastopol, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has made it clear that his ultimate goal is to retake occupied Crimea.
As Insider previously reported, moving these assets farther from the front lines could make it harder for Russia to use them in operations in Ukraine.
Belbek airfield, which is near Sevastopol, is "Russia's primary airfield providing support in southern Ukraine and the Black Sea," the NATO report said.
The report noted that at the time of its publication, 32 Russian fighter jets remained in Belbek airfield: They were mostly the Su-27 Flanker J fighter jets, but there were also a small number of SU-35Ss and MiG-31BMs.
These aircraft are "likely insufficient" to maintain the same level of air support in the region, the report said.
Russia has also increased the number of its tactical surface-to-air missiles in Crimea to defend against attacks by Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, the report said.
"Ukrainian UAVs are hard for Russia to target due to poor IADS (Integrated Air Defense System) C2, likely a weakness across the full spectrum of Russia's armed forces' efforts in the Ukraine conflict," the report said.
On August 26 2022 21:54 Ghanburighan wrote: Two things:
A) there's a distinction between not supplying weapons with certain range and supplying such weapons under the explicit condition that UA doesn't use them to strike RU.
B) in diplomacy, timing is a factor. Germany forgot this.
Okay, so Germany delivered PzH2000, MARS-II and lately also Vulcano ammo (which not even the Bundeswehr uses yet)... Obviously Germany is totally holding back on its delivery of long-range weapon platforms.
That's what makes the statement so nonsensical. The support is there. Everyone agrees. But it does feel like it's being sent behind Scholz's back or he forgot or something.
I feel like we would need at the original quote and its context to determine that. Because at the moment I am more leaning towards someone picking the interpretation that fits their narrative and running with it. Language is ambiguous.
On August 26 2022 21:54 Ghanburighan wrote: Two things:
A) there's a distinction between not supplying weapons with certain range and supplying such weapons under the explicit condition that UA doesn't use them to strike RU.
B) in diplomacy, timing is a factor. Germany forgot this.
Okay, so Germany delivered PzH2000, MARS-II and lately also Vulcano ammo (which not even the Bundeswehr uses yet)... Obviously Germany is totally holding back on its delivery of long-range weapon platforms.
That's what makes the statement so nonsensical. The support is there. Everyone agrees. But it does feel like it's being sent behind Scholz's back or he forgot or something.
I feel like we would need at the original quote and its context to determine that. Because at the moment I am more leaning towards someone picking the interpretation that fits their narrative and running with it. Language is ambiguous.
I think he is saying Germany could do more, and is just posing on doing "something". As could and should other countries do as well, including mine.
As for original topic yes, Germany has been in Putin's "pocket" whether or not you guys like it, you can blame your green party for that.
On August 26 2022 21:54 Ghanburighan wrote: Two things:
A) there's a distinction between not supplying weapons with certain range and supplying such weapons under the explicit condition that UA doesn't use them to strike RU.
B) in diplomacy, timing is a factor. Germany forgot this.
Okay, so Germany delivered PzH2000, MARS-II and lately also Vulcano ammo (which not even the Bundeswehr uses yet)... Obviously Germany is totally holding back on its delivery of long-range weapon platforms.
That's what makes the statement so nonsensical. The support is there. Everyone agrees. But it does feel like it's being sent behind Scholz's back or he forgot or something.
I feel like we would need at the original quote and its context to determine that. Because at the moment I am more leaning towards someone picking the interpretation that fits their narrative and running with it. Language is ambiguous.
I think he is saying Germany could do more, and is just posing on doing "something". As could and should other countries do as well, including mine.
As for original topic yes, Germany has been in Putin's "pocket" whether or not you guys like it, you can blame your green party for that.
If you are insisting that this is because of nuclear, then no. not at all and I am too tired of going over this again. TLDR: more complex, nuclear would probably not have changed much. You can think what you want about the decision to quit nuclear (which happened under merkel btw...), but this current crisis is no argument for it. As long as gas was cheap and reliable, there is no way people will replace its infrastructure just for the sake of it.
You would have needed deliberate efforts to get rid of gas heating (subsidising installing electrical heating, stuff like that), and for industry there is no alternative it seems (which is why they are experimenting with using less of it / secretly bought up reserves shortly after the start of the war).
Yes, reliance on russian gas not so great in hindsight, but we already covered that.
So it appears the situation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant was a lot worse that previously reported. With power only reconnected early this morning.
On August 26 2022 21:54 Ghanburighan wrote: Two things:
A) there's a distinction between not supplying weapons with certain range and supplying such weapons under the explicit condition that UA doesn't use them to strike RU.
B) in diplomacy, timing is a factor. Germany forgot this.
Okay, so Germany delivered PzH2000, MARS-II and lately also Vulcano ammo (which not even the Bundeswehr uses yet)... Obviously Germany is totally holding back on its delivery of long-range weapon platforms.
That's what makes the statement so nonsensical. The support is there. Everyone agrees. But it does feel like it's being sent behind Scholz's back or he forgot or something.
I feel like we would need at the original quote and its context to determine that. Because at the moment I am more leaning towards someone picking the interpretation that fits their narrative and running with it. Language is ambiguous.
I think he is saying Germany could do more, and is just posing on doing "something". As could and should other countries do as well, including mine.
As for original topic yes, Germany has been in Putin's "pocket" whether or not you guys like it, you can blame your green party for that.
If you are insisting that this is because of nuclear, then no. not at all and I am too tired of going over this again. TLDR: more complex, nuclear would probably not have changed much. You can think what you want about the decision to quit nuclear (which happened under merkel btw...), but this current crisis is no argument for it. As long as gas was cheap and reliable, there is no way people will replace its infrastructure just for the sake of it.
You would have needed deliberate efforts to get rid of gas heating (subsidising installing electrical heating, stuff like that), and for industry there is no alternative it seems (which is why they are experimenting with using less of it / secretly bought up reserves shortly after the start of the war).
Yes, reliance on russian gas not so great in hindsight, but we already covered that.
I'm sorry I'm just trying to understand. More nuclear wouldn't have made sense with the cheap russian gas available but also because so many houses were gas-heated as well increasing electricity generation wouldn't have mad sense from the other end?
I think that we're going to be stuck always at the point of "well now it doesn't make sense to go nuclear but it would have been great to make that effort a decade ago." until we crack energy storage tech.
On August 26 2022 21:54 Ghanburighan wrote: Two things:
A) there's a distinction between not supplying weapons with certain range and supplying such weapons under the explicit condition that UA doesn't use them to strike RU.
B) in diplomacy, timing is a factor. Germany forgot this.
Okay, so Germany delivered PzH2000, MARS-II and lately also Vulcano ammo (which not even the Bundeswehr uses yet)... Obviously Germany is totally holding back on its delivery of long-range weapon platforms.
That's what makes the statement so nonsensical. The support is there. Everyone agrees. But it does feel like it's being sent behind Scholz's back or he forgot or something.
I feel like we would need at the original quote and its context to determine that. Because at the moment I am more leaning towards someone picking the interpretation that fits their narrative and running with it. Language is ambiguous.
I think he is saying Germany could do more, and is just posing on doing "something". As could and should other countries do as well, including mine.
As for original topic yes, Germany has been in Putin's "pocket" whether or not you guys like it, you can blame your green party for that.
Guy's, it's a thread, you can just go back a few posts and see what was said, you don't need to invent your own interpretation.
The problem from the beginning was that RU was interpretating Scholz's words as incentive to do more nuclear blackmail.
On August 27 2022 08:54 {CC}StealthBlue wrote: So it appears the situation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant was a lot worse that previously reported. With power only reconnected early this morning.
It's power lines that were damaged. Of course our technichians fixed lines going to Kherson and Melitopol first, talked with my friend from the former on Thursday evening about it. Then they fixed those leading to Ukraine. Russia plans to cut them eventually, but it requires preemptive work to do so.
On August 26 2022 21:54 Ghanburighan wrote: Two things:
A) there's a distinction between not supplying weapons with certain range and supplying such weapons under the explicit condition that UA doesn't use them to strike RU.
B) in diplomacy, timing is a factor. Germany forgot this.
Okay, so Germany delivered PzH2000, MARS-II and lately also Vulcano ammo (which not even the Bundeswehr uses yet)... Obviously Germany is totally holding back on its delivery of long-range weapon platforms.
That's what makes the statement so nonsensical. The support is there. Everyone agrees. But it does feel like it's being sent behind Scholz's back or he forgot or something.
I feel like we would need at the original quote and its context to determine that. Because at the moment I am more leaning towards someone picking the interpretation that fits their narrative and running with it. Language is ambiguous.
I think he is saying Germany could do more, and is just posing on doing "something". As could and should other countries do as well, including mine.
As for original topic yes, Germany has been in Putin's "pocket" whether or not you guys like it, you can blame your green party for that.
If you are insisting that this is because of nuclear, then no. not at all and I am too tired of going over this again. TLDR: more complex, nuclear would probably not have changed much. You can think what you want about the decision to quit nuclear (which happened under merkel btw...), but this current crisis is no argument for it. As long as gas was cheap and reliable, there is no way people will replace its infrastructure just for the sake of it.
You would have needed deliberate efforts to get rid of gas heating (subsidising installing electrical heating, stuff like that), and for industry there is no alternative it seems (which is why they are experimenting with using less of it / secretly bought up reserves shortly after the start of the war).
Yes, reliance on russian gas not so great in hindsight, but we already covered that.
I'm sorry I'm just trying to understand. More nuclear wouldn't have made sense with the cheap russian gas available but also because so many houses were gas-heated as well increasing electricity generation wouldn't have mad sense from the other end?
I think that we're going to be stuck always at the point of "well now it doesn't make sense to go nuclear but it would have been great to make that effort a decade ago." until we crack energy storage tech.
No, this has nothing to do with pro/against nuclear. It is strictly against the very common talking point of uninformed people that germany quitting nuclear or that the greens are to blame for this, when it really is a mix of the infrastructure that is in place historically, as well as the fact that that it was just plain old greed.
The reliance on gas is not the problem, but relying heavily on a single supplier. Cheap russian gas made us not build up any infrastructure for other suppliers and thus create this dependency on russia (though I like how people keep jumping between us being dependent and russia being dependent on us buying their gas, but lets not get into that...)
Cheap nuclear energy is also a conception that has its downfalls, both generally, but also historically. Germany used to have nuclear power, but out electricity still was expensive in comparison. I think this is in part due to illegal price agreements between electricity companies though, we do have a history of that. And ofc like I hinted at, the electricity cost alone is not the problem since the infrastructure for gas/oil heating is in place, extremely common and very well accepted. You got an entire industry that is specialised in building, installing and maintaining these heating systems, that you gotta care for as well. That is why you would need strong political will to displace gas, since it would not be an easy choice and upset an industry / the people in it. You would have to build up an alternative (For example, yesterday I read an article that heat pumps are not that common in germany, in part due to them and companies that can install/service them just being rare, though a lot of older buildings are also just not suited for them because of weak insulation), through programs that support this new industry as well as the shift for industry that is getting weakened / replaced.
Which is why my conclusion is that the only thing that could have prevented this reliance on russia would have been a targeted political effort to do so.
The 'bet you want nuclear back' is just a smug almost kneejerk-like reaction that has gotten common these days, the reasons for which would derail the thread, so I am not getting into it. But I do think it is very important to understand that our reliance on russian gas was a choice that we do not get to excuse it with 'well the greens made us quit nuclear 10years ago, there were no other options'. We have to understand where the political decision comes from and be honest about it: Gas was cheap, it was a great deal for us until recently, and even after all probably worth it. The risk seemed not worth it to diversify our gas imports, so we consciously didn't do it, even after 2014.'
On August 26 2022 21:54 Ghanburighan wrote: Two things:
A) there's a distinction between not supplying weapons with certain range and supplying such weapons under the explicit condition that UA doesn't use them to strike RU.
B) in diplomacy, timing is a factor. Germany forgot this.
Okay, so Germany delivered PzH2000, MARS-II and lately also Vulcano ammo (which not even the Bundeswehr uses yet)... Obviously Germany is totally holding back on its delivery of long-range weapon platforms.
That's what makes the statement so nonsensical. The support is there. Everyone agrees. But it does feel like it's being sent behind Scholz's back or he forgot or something.
I feel like we would need at the original quote and its context to determine that. Because at the moment I am more leaning towards someone picking the interpretation that fits their narrative and running with it. Language is ambiguous.
I think he is saying Germany could do more, and is just posing on doing "something". As could and should other countries do as well, including mine.
As for original topic yes, Germany has been in Putin's "pocket" whether or not you guys like it, you can blame your green party for that.
Guy's, it's a thread, you can just go back a few posts and see what was said, you don't need to invent your own interpretation.
The problem from the beginning was that RU was interpretating Scholz's words as incentive to do more nuclear blackmail.
Interesting interpretation, but not one that seems plausible at all. The nuclear scare is definitely directed at the west/europe in general, and has been a constant thing, blaming a single statement for it and with such confidence seems strange to phrase it nicely.
Artesimo, read the thread before replying. Nuclear blackmail refers to RU Zaporozhizhia NPP occupation.
Regarding nuclear energy in DE, keeping plants active would limit RU leverage by keeping electricity prices from doing this:
The price is well above prediction, so there's something going on besides market economics. Hope your regulators have teeth...
***
Rainer Saks continues to look at the broader picture in the absence of changes on the front, this time looking at manpower issues across RU.
The President of Russia signed a directive to increase the strength of the Russian army by about 130 thousand men from the beginning of next year, thus exceeding the limit of 2 million men. This is a nomenclature of positions, not the formation of specific military units, and in fact it was played out simply as an information op. New units of volunteers are currently being formed in Russia, this is happening at a kind of lazy pace in the outlying areas, and even more poorly in the larger centers. Information about the big losses is slowly getting to people. It is even worse with field training, as this year the training of conscripts (officers are in UA) suffers very badly. At the moment, the question is not even that Russia will form a reserve for a new offensive, but that new units will be formed to replace those fighting at the front. In order to go on a larger attack, it would be necessary to declare at least a partial mobilization. Russia has currently sent all its forces against Ukraine, except for the part of the fleet that is located in other seas - but the crews of these fleets have also been reduced to a minimum, and most of the men have been sent to fight in Ukraine as infantry, or they are used to patch up holes in the thinning composition of the Black Sea fleet. Of course, another part of the air force protects the entire border area and there are also strategic missile forces. But all these abilities are now much smaller compared to before. The contingent in Syria has also been reduced to a minimum, which explains Russia's interest in maintaining functioning normal relations with Turkey. It is also not possible to bring more soldiers from other bases, the contingent left there is already so small that it is not possible to influence military activities in Ukraine. And the most important. This week, Russia handed over control of the city of Lachin to Azerbaijan. A year before the agreed deadline. This city is located in the area between Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, the Azeri territory, which was conquered by Armenian forces (with Russian support) in the war of the early 90s. The most important road from Armenia to Karabakh goes through this territory, and it is now in the hands of Azerbaijan. An alternative road is being built to the north, but it is not ready yet and the passages there are very poor at the moment. For Russia, therefore, good relations with Azerbaijan are more important than strong support for the old ally Armenia. However, the real reason is primarily that Russia no longer has enough military power to control the situation on the ground. In the bigger picture, this is a clear sign of the decline of Russian influence in the Caucasus. + Show Spoiler +
Original
Venemaa president kirjutas alla käskkirjale suurendada alates järgmise aasta algusest venemaa armee kooseisu ca 130 tuh mehe võrra, ületades seega 2 miljoni mehe piiri. Tegemist on ametikohtade nomenklatuuriga, mitte konkreetsete väeüksuste moodustamisega ning tegelikult mängiti see välja lihtsalt infoopsina. Venemaal moodustatakse hetkel vabatahtlike uusi üksuseid, mis toimub mingis laisas tempos ääremaadel, suuremates keskustes aga väga kesiselt. Info suurtes kaotustest hakkab inimesteni vaikselt kohale jõudma. Välajõppega on veelgi halvemini, nagu kannatab sellel aastal väga korralikult ka ajateenijate väljaõpe (ohvitserid sõjas). Küsimus ei ole hetkel isegi selles, et venemaa moodustaks resrve uueks pealetungiks, vaid uusi üksusi moodustatakse rindel võitlevate väljavahetamiseks. Suuremale rünnakule minemiseks oleks vaja välja kuulutada vähemalt osaline mobilisatsioon. Venemaa on praegu Ukraina vastu saatnud kogu oma väe, Välja arvatud see osa laevastikust, mis paikneb muudel meredel- aga ka nende laevastike meeskonnad on viidud minimaalseks ja suurem osa mehi on saadetud Ukrainas jalaväena sõtta, või lapitakse nendega auke Musta Mere laevastiku hõrenevas koosseisus. Loomulikult kaitseb veel mingi osa lennuväge kogu piiriala ning on ka strateegilised raketiväed. Aga kõik need võimed on praegu võrreldes varasemaga palju väiksemaks jäänud. Minimaalseks on viidud ka kontigent Süürias, mis selgitab vene huvi hoida toimivaid normaalseid suhteid Türgiga. Ka muudest baasidest enam sõdureid ära tuua ei ole võimalik, liiati on sinna jäänud kontigent juba nii väike, et sellega sõjategevust Ukrainas mõjutada ei ole võimalik. Ja kõige olulisem. Sellel nädalal andis Venemaa kontrolli Latšini linna üle Aserbaidžanile. Aasta enne kokkulepitud tähtaega. See linn asub Armeenia ja Mägi-Karabahhi enklaavi vahelisel alal, aserite territooriumil, mille Armeenia väed (venemaa toetusel) vallutasid 90-date alguse sõjas. Siit läheb kõige olulisem tee Armeeniast Karabahhi ning see on nüüd Aserbaidžani käes. Ehitatakse küll alternatiivset teed põhja pool, aga see pole veel valmis ja sealsed läbipääsud on praegu väga viletsad. Venemaa jaoks seega on head suhted Aserbaidžaniga olulisemad, kui vana liitlase Armeenia tugev toetamine. Tegelik põhjus on aga eelkõige selles, et Venemaal ei jätku enam sõjalist jõud kohapeal olukorda kontrolli all hoida. Suuremas pildis on see selge märk venemaa mõju kahanemisest Kaukaasias.
Nuclear blackmail refers to RU Zaporozhizhia NPP occupation.
And it is still unclear what Scholz actually said and in what context.
Regarding nuclear energy in DE, keeping plants active would limit RU leverage by keeping electricity prices from doing this
Why do you believe that keeping the nuclear plants running would significantly change the electricity prices? The max. share of nuclear power in the german electricity mix was what, 30%? Last year it was still more than 10%. Do you really think 10% more produced by old crappy and expensive nuclear power plants would change that much? Would german nuclear power plants handle the summer heat better than french plants? Who pays for keeping the waste around? Does Estonia volunteer to store that stuff?
If you want to put blame on Germany then point at the right spot. Why did Germany not invest heavily in regenerative energy production? That would have solved every Problem without pushing the real cost (CO2 & nuclear waste) in the future and without being dependent on energy or fossil fuel imports from Russia or other shady countries.
The price is well above prediction, so there's something going on besides market economics. Hope your regulators have teeth...
Read my posts before replying then, I was responding to 2 different things:
Your completely unfounded comment of the ZNPP occupationa, as well as the topic of energy.
But at least I am glad to hear to have confirmation that you actually think scholz is to blame for russians ZNPP shenanigans... When you said I should read the thread I did went back because I thought I missed you referring to the energy crisis with the nuclear blackmail. So my point stands: you would need some strong evidence to show that this is directed at germany and not the west as a whole. They have been trying to throw shit like this at the wall to see was stick the entire time, first with the chernobyl exclusion zone, now with the ZNPP. It is completely in line with their attempts at eroding support for western aid and been a constant thing. But sure, despite being a constant thing since early august its because of a single statement that is completely in line with what the US has been saying so far...
This is embarrassing. I didn't make the claim. The claim was made by the previous chancellor of foreign affairs of Estonia (among his many FP and espionage credentials), so I tend to bow to his expertise on these matters over randoms on the internet.
Enjoy, my dear German Defence Brigade: a nice article about how your intelligence services don't seem to do their jobs anymore.
Remember that these intelligence services are supposed to advise one of UA's largest supporters with veto powers in NATO and the EU (as far as FP is concerned).
EPT
