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Regarding China: any fears of China are overblown, much like the 1990/80s fear of a resurgent Japan. Quite frankly, this thread is full of unwarranted China fearmongering, so ima step in.
China faces systemic issues, geopolitical and otherwise, that hampers it from being anything more than a regional power for some time. China has multiple strong neighbors that it has some form of ongoing dispute with (Russia [yes, Russia the issue of Chinese migrants in Siberia and near the border has always been an issue that's only temporarily been smoothed over by the Ukraine thing], India, South Korea/Japan, most of ASEAN, etc.), who would be very concerned and threatened if China was some aggressive expansionist. Unlike the US (where our neighbors are Canada and Mexico), this severely hampers China's ability to project power outside it's immediate borders, with all these multiple security issues it will have to face. The ability of China to challenge current US assets in the region and the large, disparate web of US allies in the Pacific ranges from ridiculous to doubtful in both the near and medium term, and China cannot hope to sustain long-term military spending growth at the same pace indefinitely (see below).
Instead of painting China as an aggressor, it is perhaps time to take a more nuanced view of their foreign policy objectives.
a) One China policy. This mostly covers current issues with Hong Kong, Tibet (which the Chinese consider Chinese), and also the status of Taiwan. The ultimate goal of the PRC is to reunify China, including Taiwan, as one nation. This is ideally done peacefully, and the CCP is nothing if not patient. China has no reason to start a war over Taiwan unless Taiwan votes for full on independence (which a) is something China considers to be a full on breach of the One China policy and b) the US guarantee of Taiwan is no longer in effect; the US guarantee only covers unprovoked attacks, which makes it a difficult choice for us), which is not something that is likely to happen in the near future due to Constitutional amendment requirements (neither is a vote for reunification). In regards to Taiwan, as that's the main area here that is likely to instigate armed conflict (the US and other Western nations, quite frankly, don't care enough about Tibet or Xinjiang to start something unless there's full-on genocide), the military option for China is the last resort; China will saber-rattle and ramp up military exercises in the straits if there's a pan-Green president trying to push for independence among the populace, but outside of something catastrophic for both China and Taiwan, this is unlikely to escalate into an armed conflict and attempted annexation. The goal is to develop increasingly closer ties between China and Taiwan so that eventually, when political reforms are adopted in the PRC, Taiwan will vote for reunification. Aggression in regards to Taiwan will 1) cost a significant amount, in at the time of the intervention, and in the future (as a war will obviously destroy a great deal of infrastructure on both sides of the strait), even without US guarantee (though that's still rather important), and 2) hamper Chinese diplomacy/relations with both its myriad neighbors, various autonomous regions such as HK, and internationally. These are costs China will not pay unless they see no other option.
b) Island disputes. Much like Taiwan, most of this is saber-rattling, in order to appease nationalists at home (Vietnam is another prime example of this in their disputes). Quite frankly, most of the islands are insignificant minus the potential for oil and fish in the area (and are better of neutral due to some of their importance, eg. the Spratlys, to major shipping lanes), and that kind of minor/moderate economic benefit is not worth getting into a modern war over, when such a war would destroy the closely interconnected regional economy of East Asia, which would cost far more than any potential benefits. Beyond that, China's not the only one with disputes in the region; disputes exist between South Korea and Japan, SEA countries have disputes with one another, etc. It's a regional mess that's going to take some time to sort out. The only remarkable thing here to note is that Chinese/Korean disputes with Japan are highly nationalistic for historical reasons, and are at times responses to the actions of specific segments of Japanese society.
I had to answer a few questions on China's recent 2014 Working Report to the Poltiburo to someone from RIA Novosti. I can summarize the info I gave to her, but a quick summary of relevant points here:
+ Show Spoiler +1) China's economy has slowed down quite significantly, and will likely decline in the future still. They can stabilize it at ~7.5%, as in the Paper, but the fact they are no longer shooting for a double digit growth rate is telling. The Chinese economy is in flux at the moment; it hasn't been the "cheap labor" economy for quite some time (nations like Vietnam. This raises two issues, one of political legitimacy (given economic growth and nationalism are the two main planks of the CCP) and one of socio-economics (there remains a massive poor, rural population base, and an urban population that equals and at times exceeds the West in terms of pure consumption [trust me, I've been back to see]; if growth can no longer sustain the upward mobility of the former, and further declines in growth will raise that question, then there will be issues). There's a reason why the Working Paper of 2014 embraced economic and fiscal reform quite readily, and which Western analysts have been advocating for some time now. Everything from financial/monetary reform (ending capital controls and instituting banking reform, hoping to avoid the continuous development of domestic investment bubbles, eg. the Chinese real estate markets as a prime example), to "free trade" reforms (to bring Chinese domestic companies up to international standards/competitiveness, now that they have the domestic Chinese market more or less cornered), etc. 2) China's proposed military spending increase of ~10% is neither threatening (given similar increases over the past few decades), and is also indicative of possible fiscal issues, given the overall decline from the 12.2% increase last year. With economic decline in the forecast, and demographic issues (see below), consistent military increases isn't really sustainable for China in the long term due to a combination of fiscal, economic, and demographic issues. And really, China would have to measure its spending not against the US, but against the US+Pacific allies. 3) Demographic issues exacerbate all the above. China's population is aging at a rather significant pace (to mention nothing of the gender imbalance between men/women and the issues thereof). Indeed, the IMF and other analysts all point towards China hitting its Lewis Point (aka when the Chinese economy truly becomes a "labor shortage" economy) sometime in ~2020-2025, with the labor force already shrinking since 2012. An aging population has multiple ramifications for fiscal policy (more money/increase demand for medical and social services, less money coming in as fewer workers support more elderly.), most notably military spending, and also has obvious economic ramifications. Beyond that, aging/older populations are much more risk adverse, which makes the chance of war in the region more and more remote.
I'm at severe disagreement with the confrontational attitude over the Asia Development Bank issue; the most prudent move would be to simply join the damn bank as a founding member. We can interpret it as a challenge to post-WWII institutions like the IMF and the World Bank or, perhaps, as an attempt for China to take an active responsibility in East Asian economic development, and one we should have little issue supporting (given how much we still moan over the Europeans never taking up their share of responsibility in NATO since, well, it's founding). Granted, the Europeans breaking ranks with the US over this is most certainly not appreciated (at a time when they're depending on US military assets in Europe even more, and nations like Great Britain cutting their budgets below the symbolic 2% level), but eh. I've been very unimpressed with Obama's handling of foreign policy as of late so just something else to chalk up.
On Russia, I remain convinced that this whole Ukraine crisis could've been averted if the new Ukrainian government had an ounce of diplomatic foresight/acumen and realized they should do what Canada does, as a first step, but now it's too late, and everyone in the danged region are busy shafting themselves. But you can take my views with a grain of salt here since I've been impressed by my org to help the Russia House with their World Russia Forum (gonna be so much pro-Putin there; ah well). And I just put out a massive PSA on China and don't feel like writing one for Russia.
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Norway28926 Posts
Educational post, thank you! Even more so because it caters to my previous belief. 
Anyway, China does not have an imperialist streak going, definitely not militarily. There certainly seems to be some animosity towards the Chinese in many neighboring countries (and going by Amy Chua's World on Fire, this is largely caused by there being an economically and socially highly privileged Chinese minority in most of those neighboring countries, which may or may not have been a conscious Chinese policy of the past decades), and I can see how some conflicts can arise through these Chinese minorities being targeted by the majority population.
Honestly, I think both with China and Russia, there still is this sphere of influence thinking (and the US should thread extremely lightly before criticizing anyone here, what with the Monroe doctrine and an extremely dirty history in Latin America). As Tolkien above me suggests, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Tibet are considered China by the Chinese. I'm not defending Chinese actions here - I am generally very supportive towards succession claims and it's my impression that especially Tibet is oppressed in a fairly brutal fashion - but there's a big difference between Chinese action regarding these three, or regarding the small island disputes, and thinking that China is some sort of existential threat to any of her other neighbors. Russia, I can understand how any former Soviet state with a significant Russian contingent would be worried, but the notion that Russia is even remotely likely to invade Poland or head westward after that, that's not grounded in reality. Like, I can see them invading the 'russian-dominated' regions of Estonia, and I think if Belarus were to suddenly want to make a westward shift, it wouldn't be positively received, but there's no need to fear a Russian attempt at reestablishing a cold-war split of Europe..
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I would still point out that this is Go, not chess or StarCraft. This isn't one side wins and the other side loses in an all-or-nothing battle, or in the nuclear world, everyone loses and takes the crazy bet that they can have a couple more survivors than everyone else. This is push and pull and influence events that will occur in 20-30 years. And I can understand the Obama administration's desperation in feeling that the US looks like it will be in an increasingly weaker position and feels unsettled that China looks like it might be in a very strong position in 2050. Things like AIIB give an alarming feeling that America could find itself in a hostile situation with China and allies like Britain and Japan, allies we assume would always agree with us, are suddenly saying the Chinese have some merit and maybe America should re-think its position. This is a small step but definitely a very scary slope that America doesn't want to slide down.
EDIT: Would also point out that the Chinese nine-dash line in the South China Sea has become greedier over time. It's fine to say China doesn't have real ambitions outside of what they strongly believe to be Chinese territory, but I don't think that precludes them from claiming more territory over time, especially when you mix in nationalism and increased contempt for their neighbors.
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Norway28926 Posts
No disagreement there..
But as a European, I can only state that any attempts at strong-armed diplomacy alienates us, not brings us closer. The Marshall plan (combined with the NATO alliance) was absolutely brilliant and succeeded in creating strong, lasting relations between Western Europe and the US, relations deriving from gratitude and acknowledgment of it being mutually beneficial. And while it might seem like the translatlantic relationship has eroded in the past decade, fact is, Obama has made it stronger.. Anti-US sentiments (in the EU) are still lower post-obama than pre-obama, even if we are largely disappointed with him also. I'm not saying you're advocating strong-armed diplomacy regarding Europe, but I think there tends to be a relation between disappointment with Obama's foreign policy and wanting the US to be more firm and assertive. I'm also not saying that Obama has been as firm and assertive as the president of the US must be in every regard of his foreign policy - but regarding Europe and rebuilding US-European relations, firm assertiveness is not what has been lacking.
NSA scandals and the morally questionable drone policy aren't making things better, but the big blow to transatlantic relations was dealt by the bush administration. It's not an easy thing to repair, especially not when the average European's view of the US is incredibly lacking in nuance and our media tends to expose your crazies more than the sensible ones.
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Cayman Islands24199 Posts
it's not very productive to characterize criticism of china as fear of chinese imperialism etc. it is obviously a regional power, with limited ambitions of overtaking the u.s.'s scope of influence, but china's reach is not the main issue, it is the way their regime thinks and the rules they bend with their gravity, so to speak.
human rights is also a very real issue, so is reasonable behavior to neighbors. yes, the u.s. has seen its share of transgressions, but the u.s. has also gone through its own existential and moral crisis that has introduced reciprocity and valuing the lives of others into some of its thinking. in comparison, chinese state organs still run communist era propaganda pieces for both foreign and internal manipulation. you'd think they are at open war with all of its neighbors. still a useful idiot for buying into this idea of a civil chinese state. without deterrence china will see no reason to behave well.
it is important to not reflexively see criticism of china as simply nationalistic partisanship. that stuff is completely ridiculous tbh. however, i will submit that if you do not see important problems with china and russia etc, and distinguish american action, your views do smear over important value questions because of a simplistic framework of equivocal conflict between two 'powers.'
but ok, if foreign policy aspiration is limited to keeping things humming at home i'm sure we could have worked out a deal with all sorts of regional powers largely interested in neighborhood bully status. yes, american position is interventionistic, but it is also value laden in a way that distinguishes it from imperialism. china would obviously characterize american pacific fleet etc as imperialistic meddling, but they also would call their taiwan invasion a liberation or something without the presence of american ships in the area.
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it is important to not reflexively see criticism of china as simply nationalistic partisanship. that stuff is completely ridiculous tbh. however, i will submit that if you do not see important problems with china and russia etc, and distinguish american action, your views do smear over important value questions because of a simplistic framework of equivocal conflict between two 'powers.'
While it is true that viewing the entire international arena through the vapid lens of geopolitical game theory is an inhuman abstraction, your entire characterisation of China as some kind of latter-day Obrigkeitsstaat is itself an inhuman abstraction, which is fundamentally based on an assumption of the incestuous relationship between "values" and "power" that you at first purport to reject.
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Cayman Islands24199 Posts
china is still very meaningfully an authoritarian state,(though who the authority is, is a more complex question than usual, and it is also strategic and rationalistic) i dont see how you can challenge this really. and no, this is simply a factual observation, not a conjecture.
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On March 23 2015 20:29 Liquid`Drone wrote:No disagreement there.. But as a European, I can only state that any attempts at strong-armed diplomacy alienates us, not brings us closer. The Marshall plan (combined with the NATO alliance) was absolutely brilliant and succeeded in creating strong, lasting relations between Western Europe and the US, relations deriving from gratitude and acknowledgment of it being mutually beneficial. And while it might seem like the translatlantic relationship has eroded in the past decade, fact is, Obama has made it stronger.. Anti-US sentiments (in the EU) are still lower post-obama than pre-obama, even if we are largely disappointed with him also. I'm not saying you're advocating strong-armed diplomacy regarding Europe, but I think there tends to be a relation between disappointment with Obama's foreign policy and wanting the US to be more firm and assertive. I'm also not saying that Obama has been as firm and assertive as the president of the US must be in every regard of his foreign policy - but regarding Europe and rebuilding US-European relations, firm assertiveness is not what has been lacking. NSA scandals and the morally questionable drone policy aren't making things better, but the big blow to transatlantic relations was dealt by the bush administration. It's not an easy thing to repair, especially not when the average European's view of the US is incredibly lacking in nuance and our media tends to expose your crazies more than the sensible ones.
Speak for Yourself. Europe doesnt end at Baltic/German border. Most people in Poland feel that US/Europe policy on Russia has been too lenient. For many years Poland has been advocating harsher and united stance on Russia. Yet everyone was rejecting it as "bias, panic, historical sentiment". Now we can say with grim smile "I told You so", but its already too late. People are dying in Ukraine. And its because West refused to act when the time was right. We want US to get more involved. We want American bases on our soil. Amrican rockets/planes in those bases. We feel that Garmany, France, Uk will sell us for cheaper oil. And the only way to guarantee our safty is to make sure that US will be forced to intervene once shit hit the fan. Hopefull it wont come to that.
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Oh there are plenty of issues with China, with the governance of the CCP, and their claims. Indeed, I attended a rather interesting CSIS event with the Taiwan ambassador (alright, he's officially not an ambassador because we don't recognize Taiwan, but...you know) on the status and effect of Taiwan's de jure non-inclusion into international institutions, like the WHO during the SARS crisis, like 2 weeks ago. (He and the Republican Congressman tried to be extremely muted on the impending 2015 elections, but both voiced a concern about another outspoken pan-Green president starting another Taiwan Strait crisis and were generally supportive of current incumbent Ma Ying-jeou's policies). In any event, the issue of reunification is far away, especially with Hong Kong clearly showing that the "One China, X System" policy won't work under the current political regime.
Chinese minorities in SEA countries are relatively old and primarily ethnic; they consider themselves ethnic Chinese/Han, but generally have very little in the way of loyalty or ties to Beijing outside of intense economic cooperation that characterizes much of East Asia, and don't consider it to be their nationality. And China doesn't offer the opportunity for dual/moresome citizenship. Trust me on this, I know. Unlike Russia and former SSRs (where it remains in living memory for most of the older generation), it's a rather muted relationship.
Things like AIIB give an alarming feeling that America could find itself in a hostile situation with China and allies like Britain and Japan, allies we assume would always agree with us, are suddenly saying the Chinese have some merit and maybe America should re-think its position. This is a small step but definitely a very scary slope that America doesn't want to slide down.
Mostly because I think our position on it is stupid and it's best to just join as a founding member to moderate China, improve their development standards (because that's literally the main issue we've been raising), or destroy it from within (if we're going down that route) rather than try an unsuccessful boycott.
EDIT: Would also point out that the Chinese nine-dash line in the South China Sea has become greedier over time. It's fine to say China doesn't have real ambitions outside of what they strongly believe to be Chinese territory, but I don't think that precludes them from claiming more territory over time, especially when you mix in nationalism and increased contempt for their neighbors.
1) China has been growing more assertive with their territorial claims over the islands yes. Mainly with the Spratlys, but this is both due to a) an unhappy economic forecast, and b) a recent transition of leadership (and being assert).
2) Contempt for its neighbors...? Uh. The main reason for these claims are either a) there is a compelling economic reason for them (possible oil in the EEZ, proximity to vital shipping lanes, etc.), and b) they already hold them (Paracel islands for ex.). How else are they going to claim more than a bunch of relatively uninhabited islands, exactly? Moreover this is a confusing basis for a forecasting. Since, you know, Chinese investment drives alot of the growth in SEA.
Human rights, unless the violations are egregious, ultimately play little role in state-level diplomacy and foreign policy, and especially not between Great Powers. Well, alright, no, that's not entirely true at all, as human rights can, with lobbying, influence state-level decision making. But in terms of threat analysis: a shoddy human rights record plays little to no part. China has organ harvesting, so what? How does that affect and threaten the US in any way, shape or form?
china's reach is not the main issue, it is the way their regime thinks and the rules they bend with their gravity, so to speak.
That assumes a permanence in the political institutions of the PRC (which is increasingly going to have to move towards political reforms, as the decline in economic growth and the weight force it to).
As for deterrence: what deterrence does boycotting the AIIB bank serve exactly? In any event, I'm nowhere stating that China does not need to be deterred. But the idea of the looming threat of China is a ridiculous notion, when Chinese military spending can't hope to catch up to the US, let alone to the US+Pacific allies. On the issue of islands (China's disputes in the East Asia Sea are likely to remain disputes for quite some time), it'll come down to if ASEAN can resolve their disputes long enough to coordinate on the issue in the South China Sea and finally bring it up for internationalization. Really, while a nuisance, they're not going to spark a war. It just comes down to their neighbors getting their heads out of their petty squabbles, in SEA terms.
Finally, in comparison, chinese state organs still run communist era propaganda pieces for both foreign and internal manipulation. you'd think they are at open war with all of its neighbors. still a useful idiot for buying into this idea of a civil chinese state.
While I will not dispute that Chinese state media churns out impressive amounts of propaganda in conjunction with (increasingly unsuccessfully) squashing dissent in regards to the CCP and to independence movements, I will question whether or not you've actually read or watched Chinese-run media, or lived in China, because everything that follows is not true at all.
As a note, I am probably one of the most ardent foreign policy interventionist you'll find.
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Cayman Islands24199 Posts
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On March 23 2015 21:18 Silvanel wrote:Show nested quote +On March 23 2015 20:29 Liquid`Drone wrote:No disagreement there.. But as a European, I can only state that any attempts at strong-armed diplomacy alienates us, not brings us closer. The Marshall plan (combined with the NATO alliance) was absolutely brilliant and succeeded in creating strong, lasting relations between Western Europe and the US, relations deriving from gratitude and acknowledgment of it being mutually beneficial. And while it might seem like the translatlantic relationship has eroded in the past decade, fact is, Obama has made it stronger.. Anti-US sentiments (in the EU) are still lower post-obama than pre-obama, even if we are largely disappointed with him also. I'm not saying you're advocating strong-armed diplomacy regarding Europe, but I think there tends to be a relation between disappointment with Obama's foreign policy and wanting the US to be more firm and assertive. I'm also not saying that Obama has been as firm and assertive as the president of the US must be in every regard of his foreign policy - but regarding Europe and rebuilding US-European relations, firm assertiveness is not what has been lacking. NSA scandals and the morally questionable drone policy aren't making things better, but the big blow to transatlantic relations was dealt by the bush administration. It's not an easy thing to repair, especially not when the average European's view of the US is incredibly lacking in nuance and our media tends to expose your crazies more than the sensible ones. Speak for Yourself. Europe doesnt end at Baltic/German border. Most people in Poland feel that US/Europe policy on Russia has been too lenient. For many years Poland has been advocating harsher and united stance on Russia. Yet everyone was rejecting it as "bias, panic, historical sentiment". Now we can say with grim smile "I told You so", but its already too late. People are dying in Ukraine. And its because West refused to act when the time was right. We want US to get more involved. We want American bases on our soil. Amrican rockets/planes in those bases. We feel that Garmany, France, Uk will sell us for cheaper oil. And the only way to guarantee our safty is to make sure that US will be forced to intervene once shit hit the fan. Hopefull it wont come to that.
You, some of the Visegrad, Finland, and the Baltics, certainly.
No doubt why you've been increasing military spending and may even hit the 2% mark that we've spent decades moaning about!
:D
On a more serious note, Poland's position on Russia has been quite clear for the past decade/more. Both within NATO internal debates (they've always been part of the "Russia first" camp, so to speak), and in overall policy debates.
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Poland IS spending 2% (as of this year i think but still).
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That's because Japan is involved in one and the primary focus of the domestic article and not in the other. Trust me, the rhetoric towards Japan has softened (well, up until very recently with Abe increasing Japanese military spending).
On March 23 2015 21:37 Silvanel wrote:
Poland IS spending 2% (as of this year i think but still).
Incorrect; it's been spending 1.8% of GDP for years. The recent round of spending increases that's been proposed will bring it up to, iirc, ~1.95%, by 2016.
Nonetheless, it's appreciated, at a time when the UK is cutting the budget below 2%.
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Norway28926 Posts
On March 23 2015 21:18 Silvanel wrote:Show nested quote +On March 23 2015 20:29 Liquid`Drone wrote:No disagreement there.. But as a European, I can only state that any attempts at strong-armed diplomacy alienates us, not brings us closer. The Marshall plan (combined with the NATO alliance) was absolutely brilliant and succeeded in creating strong, lasting relations between Western Europe and the US, relations deriving from gratitude and acknowledgment of it being mutually beneficial. And while it might seem like the translatlantic relationship has eroded in the past decade, fact is, Obama has made it stronger.. Anti-US sentiments (in the EU) are still lower post-obama than pre-obama, even if we are largely disappointed with him also. I'm not saying you're advocating strong-armed diplomacy regarding Europe, but I think there tends to be a relation between disappointment with Obama's foreign policy and wanting the US to be more firm and assertive. I'm also not saying that Obama has been as firm and assertive as the president of the US must be in every regard of his foreign policy - but regarding Europe and rebuilding US-European relations, firm assertiveness is not what has been lacking. NSA scandals and the morally questionable drone policy aren't making things better, but the big blow to transatlantic relations was dealt by the bush administration. It's not an easy thing to repair, especially not when the average European's view of the US is incredibly lacking in nuance and our media tends to expose your crazies more than the sensible ones. Speak for Yourself. Europe doesnt end at Baltic/German border. Most people in Poland feel that US/Europe policy on Russia has been too lenient. For many years Poland has been advocating harsher and united stance on Russia. Yet everyone was rejecting it as "bias, panic, historical sentiment". Now we can say with grim smile "I told You so", but its already too late. People are dying in Ukraine. And its because West refused to act when the time was right. We want US to get more involved. We want American bases on our soil. Amrican rockets/planes in those bases. We feel that Garmany, France, Uk will sell us for cheaper oil. And the only way to guarantee our safty is to make sure that US will be forced to intervene once shit hit the fan. Hopefull it wont come to that.
From my perspective, your NATO membership is a guarantee of your safety because it ensures that the US will intervene - and thus also that Russia will not act. Ukraine did not have that, and from my perspective, the desire of many Ukrainians to have NATO membership partially forced Russia's hand (when we're looking at international relations from a realpolitik-perspective) because they had to act now to ensure that Ukraine, and especially Crimea, stayed within their sphere of influence rather than becoming part of the West. Poland has already made the shift (in the past 15 years, you've gone from eastern to central europe!) and is safe.
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On March 23 2015 21:13 oneofthem wrote:
china is still very meaningfully an authoritarian state,(though who the authority is, is a more complex question than usual, and it is also strategic and rationalistic) i dont see how you can challenge this really. and no, this is simply a factual observation, not a conjecture.
Because calling China an authoritarian state does not relate in any meaningful way to the values which she purportedly represents in the world. Her indifference to human rights and adversarial party politics has very little to do with her political structure. Unless your objection is merely that "authoritarianism" is itself the "value" you object to, and which you believe China incarnates. But that in turn, robbed of its circumstantial contexts, is just a cynical abstraction about the nature of political power.
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On March 23 2015 21:44 MoltkeWarding wrote:Show nested quote +On March 23 2015 21:13 oneofthem wrote:
china is still very meaningfully an authoritarian state,(though who the authority is, is a more complex question than usual, and it is also strategic and rationalistic) i dont see how you can challenge this really. and no, this is simply a factual observation, not a conjecture. Her indifference to human rights and adversarial party politics has very little to do with her political structure.
You are begging the question in a pretty glaring manner with this statement.
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On March 23 2015 21:41 Liquid`Drone wrote:Show nested quote +On March 23 2015 21:18 Silvanel wrote:On March 23 2015 20:29 Liquid`Drone wrote:No disagreement there.. But as a European, I can only state that any attempts at strong-armed diplomacy alienates us, not brings us closer. The Marshall plan (combined with the NATO alliance) was absolutely brilliant and succeeded in creating strong, lasting relations between Western Europe and the US, relations deriving from gratitude and acknowledgment of it being mutually beneficial. And while it might seem like the translatlantic relationship has eroded in the past decade, fact is, Obama has made it stronger.. Anti-US sentiments (in the EU) are still lower post-obama than pre-obama, even if we are largely disappointed with him also. I'm not saying you're advocating strong-armed diplomacy regarding Europe, but I think there tends to be a relation between disappointment with Obama's foreign policy and wanting the US to be more firm and assertive. I'm also not saying that Obama has been as firm and assertive as the president of the US must be in every regard of his foreign policy - but regarding Europe and rebuilding US-European relations, firm assertiveness is not what has been lacking. NSA scandals and the morally questionable drone policy aren't making things better, but the big blow to transatlantic relations was dealt by the bush administration. It's not an easy thing to repair, especially not when the average European's view of the US is incredibly lacking in nuance and our media tends to expose your crazies more than the sensible ones. Speak for Yourself. Europe doesnt end at Baltic/German border. Most people in Poland feel that US/Europe policy on Russia has been too lenient. For many years Poland has been advocating harsher and united stance on Russia. Yet everyone was rejecting it as "bias, panic, historical sentiment". Now we can say with grim smile "I told You so", but its already too late. People are dying in Ukraine. And its because West refused to act when the time was right. We want US to get more involved. We want American bases on our soil. Amrican rockets/planes in those bases. We feel that Garmany, France, Uk will sell us for cheaper oil. And the only way to guarantee our safty is to make sure that US will be forced to intervene once shit hit the fan. Hopefull it wont come to that. From my perspective, your NATO membership is a guarantee of your safety because it ensures that the US will intervene - and thus also that Russia will not act. Ukraine did not have that, and from my perspective, the desire of many Ukrainians to have NATO membership partially forced Russia's hand (when we're looking at international relations from a realpolitik-perspective) because they had to act now to ensure that Ukraine, and especially Crimea, stayed within their sphere of influence rather than becoming part of the West. Poland has already made the shift (in the past 15 years, you've gone from eastern to central europe!) and is safe.
Something like that.
There are three main issues when discussing Ukraine:
1) Geopolitical. Geopolitically, the thought of having Crimea under NATO control is not good for the Russians. Having the Black Sea fleet stationed at a leased NATO port? Uh... Also Ukraine, for better or for worse, has had a long history with Russia so the sudden establishment of a pro-EU/NATO government in Kiev is extremely concerning from a security perspective, what with the missile shield being built in Poland/East Europe and all.
2) Continued NATO encroachment, from the eyes of the Russians. The Russians continue to perpetuate the myth that Gorbachev was promised NATO would not expand past a reunified Germany. It's all rubbish, but still: consider the eastward expansion of NATO from a Russian perspective.
3) The Russian minority is indeed a legitimate concern of Moscow (and the main official impetus of Russia's intervention). Mostly because Kiev went and made the boneheaded decision to make Ukrainian the official language of Ukraine, with no provisions for Russian, which provides Moscow with the moral and official reason for intervention. Had they an ounce of foresight, they would've spent the entire time after Euromaidan emphasizing the protection of Russians within Ukraine (aka, the Canada route), and most of the time reaffirming their ties with Russia proper. This would've made intervention significantly more difficult, and deprived Moscow of a relatively legitimate moral casus belli.
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On March 23 2015 21:39 Lord Tolkien wrote:That's because Japan is involved in one and the primary focus of the domestic article and not in the former. Trust me, the rhetoric towards Japan has softened (well, up until very recently with Abe increasing Japanese military spending). Show nested quote +On March 23 2015 21:37 Silvanel wrote:
Poland IS spending 2% (as of this year i think but still). Incorrect; it's been spending 1.8% of GDP for years. The recent round of spending increases that's been proposed will bring it up to, iirc, ~1.95%, by 2016. Nonetheless, it's appreciated, at a time when the UK is cutting the budget below 2%.
Actualy it has been 1,95% for quite few years now. Its 2,27% this year.
http://dziennikzbrojny.pl/artykuly/art,9,40,7914,inne,wydarzenia,budzet-mon-w-2015-roku (In polish, very detailed analysis).
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Cayman Islands24199 Posts
On March 23 2015 21:44 MoltkeWarding wrote:Show nested quote +On March 23 2015 21:13 oneofthem wrote:
china is still very meaningfully an authoritarian state,(though who the authority is, is a more complex question than usual, and it is also strategic and rationalistic) i dont see how you can challenge this really. and no, this is simply a factual observation, not a conjecture. Because calling China an authoritarian state does not relate in any meaningful way to the values which she purportedly represents in the world. Her indifference to human rights and adversarial party politics has very little to do with her political structure. Unless your objection is merely that "authoritarianism" is itself the "value" you object to, and which you believe China incarnates. But that in turn, robbed of its circumstantial contexts, is just a cynical abstraction about the nature of political power.
this is simply obtuse. the domestic authoritarian status of the CCP, which is stronger than ever, is obviously relevant to the status of human rights, including political rights within china.
as far as fp is concerned, china is still involved in the racialist/nationalist frame of view, although to what extent this is simply instrumental to making the ccp the face of the "chinese race" is an open question. if SEA reverted to a bunch of tributaries to the dynasty it would probably be ideal. the Party is still the sole voice and actor for China's fp, and this results in the confrontational and propagandistic styled communication strategy.
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On March 23 2015 21:52 Silvanel wrote:Show nested quote +On March 23 2015 21:39 Lord Tolkien wrote:That's because Japan is involved in one and the primary focus of the domestic article and not in the former. Trust me, the rhetoric towards Japan has softened (well, up until very recently with Abe increasing Japanese military spending). On March 23 2015 21:37 Silvanel wrote:
Poland IS spending 2% (as of this year i think but still). Incorrect; it's been spending 1.8% of GDP for years. The recent round of spending increases that's been proposed will bring it up to, iirc, ~1.95%, by 2016. Nonetheless, it's appreciated, at a time when the UK is cutting the budget below 2%. Actualy it has been 1,95% for quite few years now. Its 2,27% this year. http://dziennikzbrojny.pl/artykuly/art,9,40,7914,inne,wydarzenia,budzet-mon-w-2015-roku (In polish, very detailed analysis).
Interesting discrepancy; I've been getting my figures elsewhere, from the World Bank and from NATO.
http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20140224_140224-PR2014-028-Defence-exp.pdf
They had it pegged at ~1.7-1.8 GDP.
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