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On July 30 2013 22:34 WhiteDog wrote:Show nested quote +On July 30 2013 21:26 MiraMax wrote:On July 30 2013 20:45 WhiteDog wrote:On July 30 2013 20:28 Acrofales wrote:On July 30 2013 20:09 WhiteDog wrote:But just as it is not necessary to derive one true nature of the "storm" or of the "cloud" for meteorology to generate true statements about the weather, it is not necessary to have "an unchanging human nature" to derive universally true statements about humans or sentient beings for that matter. And why can you do that for the storm and the cloud ? Because you can test the effect of the storm on the weather all things equals and they will always be the same. Therefore, you don't have to rationally discuss the concept of "storm" or "cloud" to make statement about what happen to the weather when a storm comes by. The effect of a human action everything equal on humanity's "utility", health or morality can never be evaluated. You cannot derive a universal statement out of it, because you cannot get out of the context in which the action have been made. It doesn't mean that someone who kill babies for pleasure is morally good if he thinks it is, it means that you cannot rationally prove to me that killing babies is always morally bad. Talking "rationally" about something doesn't mean you can jump from conclusions to conclusions. Comparaison is not reason. Science is full of questions that can't be proven in any rigorous sense. I realize that in the ongoing discussion with frog you already covered this in parts, but also this notion that knowledge generation has to involve full scale experiments needs to be dispelled. You are mistaking science and reasonning. The fact that every scientific knowledge is based on axiom doesn't mean that the scientific knowledge is impossible to prove. The axiom is not "part" of the scientific knowledge, it is what permit the knowledge, by defining and delimiting the realm of analysis - hence why all sciences needs philosophy. Axioms are a necessity because we cannot test them - that doesn't mean they are "always right". A scientific knowledge is a "systematic enterprise that builds and organizes knowledge in the form of testable explanations and predictions about the universe". Can you make sure predictions in economy, sociology, or any "social" science, like you do in physics or biology ? Do you think laws exists in social sciences ? Can you build laws on morality ? Why do you say that we cannot evaluate morals according to some standard and decide which ones are better? I'd argue that we can, and in fact do. That utilitarianism has lots of problems doesn't mean there isn't some way of measuring how well a norm works... just that the field of experimental ethics is very immature and lacks a proper methodology. How can you define the "some standard" ? That's my point, there are no standard that are not up to controversy. Because that standard doesn't exist, one moral will always be better than another in a specific context. For exemple, evaluate what is more moral between "Killing is right" and "Killing is wrong". The only answers you can give for sure is : in some context, killing is right, is some others, killing is wrong. It is right to kill in war, it is wrong to kill your neighbour because he pissed in your garden, etc. You claim experimentation is needed, but it really isn't. Cosmologists don't experiment, they form a hypothesis and evaluate its predictions by observing the cosmos... not a controlled experiment. Yet cosmology is probably one of the fiellds that has the best claim to be working towards finding truths about the universe, When I say experimentation or "test", I don't necessarily mean controlled environment. In economy they also make experimentation (experience of randomization like in medicine) : they "test" the effect of a specific economical program on an area (say they add computer in schools in Zimbabwe) then they evaluate the effect of the change. My point is, they can't say for sure that what happened in Zimbabwe in 2013 will also exactly happen in Zimbabwe in 2014 or in China in 2013 - I can't entirely separate my conclusions from the context. In cosmology if what I've seen in 2013 does not work in 2014, you have to change your model (because it is wrong). In economy, the same happen, your model is not strictly "wrong", it is not adapted to the situation at hand. On July 30 2013 20:45 MiraMax wrote:On July 30 2013 20:09 WhiteDog wrote:On July 30 2013 16:49 MiraMax wrote:On July 30 2013 02:21 WhiteDog wrote:
The problem is that you are all searching for a definition of "man" that is not supposed to be up to controversy - so you need something to define this man. See your sentence "Given some contingent facts about human beings and some necessary truths about rational agent interaction allowing torturing babies for fun as a general rule will not lead to a flourishing society" : you considers that there are contingent "facts" about human beings (the use of contingent is obviously really problematic because you admit that you can't define man always and everywhere),
I am not really sure what to make of this paragraph. I can only hope you wrote this because you are confused about the meaning of contingent, because none of your conclusions seem to follow. It is a contingent physiological fact that human beings usually have two hands and ten fingers, in the sense that it does not seem logically necessary that we have two hands and ten fingers. The natural sciences are full of contingent facts, but that does not compromise any of the conclusions physicists derive. It is further not at all necessary to be able to describe "one unchanging human nature" for moral realism. What makes you think that? Human beings are complex physical systems, so obviously there will be lots of variety in their reactions. Then give me contingent facts about human nature that would make it possible for you to rationally critic a moral statement everything equal. How can you rationaly prove me that the fact that we have two hands and ten fingers means anything from a moral stand point. But just as it is not necessary to derive one true nature of the "storm" or of the "cloud" for meteorology to generate true statements about the weather, it is not necessary to have "an unchanging human nature" to derive universally true statements about humans or sentient beings for that matter. And why can you do that for the storm and the cloud ? Because you can test the effect of the storm on the weather all things equals and they will always be the same. Therefore, you don't have to rationally discuss the concept of "storm" or "cloud" to make statement about what happen to the weather when a storm comes by. The effect of a human action everything equal on humanity's "utility", health or morality can never be evaluated. You cannot derive a universal statement out of it, because you cannot get out of the context in which the action have been made. It doesn't mean that someone who kill babies for pleasure is morally good if he thinks it is, it means that you cannot rationally prove to me that killing babies is always morally bad. Talking "rationally" about something doesn't mean you can jump from conclusions to conclusions. Comparaison is not reason. Science is full of questions that can't be proven in any rigorous sense. I realize that in the ongoing discussion with frog you already covered this in parts, but also this notion that knowledge generation has to involve full scale experiments needs to be dispelled. You are mistaking science and reasonning. The fact that every scientific knowledge is based on axiom doesn't mean that the scientific knowledge is impossible to prove. The axiom is not "part" of the scientific knowledge, it is what permit the knowledge, by defining and delimiting the realm of analysis - hence why all sciences needs philosophy. Axioms are a necessity because we cannot test them - that doesn't mean they are "always right" (unfalsifiable) but that I don't have the knowledge to falsify them. "Human nature" is unfalsifiable (I can find thousands exemples in our history that any definition of "human nature" is wrong, but it doesn't make it wrong). A scientific knowledge is a "systematic enterprise that builds and organizes knowledge in the form of testable explanations and predictions about the universe". Can you make sure predictions in economy, sociology, or any "social" science, like you do in physics or biology ? Do you think laws exists in social sciences ? Can you build laws on morality ? Your post seems so confused to me that I am afraid that we might be too far apart to communicate with each other meaningfully. I provided you with a contingent fact about human beings that relates to morals: "human beings can suffer". Do I get it right that you think this is a fact, but that it does not relate to morality? If you really do think that the effect of an action on a human beings health cannot be evaluated, then do you also think that nobody could ever really be said to have killed somebody? Or that a meaningful defense against the accusation of killing somebody would be that one did not take the sociological or political context into account sufficiently? Because this view sure sounds rather eccentric to me. Do you understand what everything equal means ? The effect of an action on human beings health CAN be evaluated, but NOT everything equals. I can evaluate that dying of hearth attack at the age of 40 is a bad thing. I cannot strictly, always and everywhere, says that dying is a bad thing - for exemple, is it morally right to die for others ? Finally, if you are an anti-realist about any of the special sciences then I am not surprised that you are an anti-realist about morality. I would be completely happy to conclude that some statements of morality are as truth-apt as some statements in psychology, economics or medicine and I am a realist about all of them. I don't consider that everything that comes out of the "special sciences" is "always" relative or defined by one's point of view. I'm just not a positivist. I know their limits, and their qualities. There is a reason why most economist could not predict the economic crisis, or that no social scientist can really predict with a 100% certainty what someone will buy if you give him 300 dollars despite the fact that we know a lot about how people consume and why they do so. But it has been pointed out to you that neither a 100% predictability nor perfect irrefutability nor completely ignoring relevant context is a prerequisite for moral realism- or any realism. It is a complete mystery to me why you still keep referring to these arguments in light of this... Yes that I agree. I agree that there are moral truth, but that those truth are also relative (to their context) in the way that there are no transcendante absolute references to moral value and beliefs. This was my point since the beginning when I stated (by quoting passeron) that moral statement can be universal as in digital universalism and not logical universalism : for digital universalism, " the general propositions can always be generated by the logical "conjunction" of the singular statements that it resume." Show nested quote +It further seems to me that you don't understand the ceteris paribus clause. In fact you have it completely backwards. It is a limiting assumption precisely to rule out change in relevant context. So if you put up the claim that ceteris paribus killing a human being is immoral, only to go on invalidating it by varying relevant context (but what if we are at war, but what if it's in self-defense...etc.) then this is simply disingenuously violating your own ceteris paribus clause. You could claim that no sufficiently specified context can ever be identified in order to make a moral assessment This could at least be discussed. But you are quite far away from that it seems to me. "It further seems to me that you don't understand the ceteris paribus clause". You need "something" to go from a moral statement in a context to a moral statement ouside of its context. In practice, social scientists use various statistical tools to isolate a specific fact from its context. It does not work perfectly however as the context in social science can never entirely disappear, and it push some people to consider the ceteris paribus clause as some kind of alibi (to make it seems like we are a science like physics) - "there are no camel in the north pole" as Halbwachs said. In this case, you have no something, no tools, no ground on which you can pass from the contextual to the out of context, so I can refute your arguments by using other type of contextual facts. If you had a "something" we could discuss the something, but you don't.
Okay, I guess I will give it a last try and then will just leave it be and am certainly aware that I might misunderstand your whole position and that this is only due to my inability. You state that you think moral truths exist, but are "relative" to some context. I further gather that you think the situation is similar in the social sciences. Finally the way you use "context" you don't seem to mean any specific (social or political) context, but just that (many, most, all) moral truths do not transcend all contingent facts about moral agents. I do not see how any of this would undermine moral realism if it were true and am quite happy to accept it for the most part.
Then again I cannot square these statements of yours with the last paragraph in which you write that I would have no "something", no "tool", no "ground" etc. so that my position cannot even be discussed. I strongly disagree with this assessment naturally.
Sure there is a reason why most economist could not foresee the crisis, but this is not to say that there are no natural "objective" reasons for the crisis. There might after all be a reason why some economists did foresee the crisis. I can further develop a simple economics experiment where the outcome predictability rivals that of physics experiments.
Let me give first you a moral statement which I hold to be universally true: "A moral action that harms a sentient being needs to have some potential redeeming consequence that benefits a sentient being." Do you think this statement is truth-apt? If yes, do you think it is true? If not, what additional context would you need to assess its truth value?
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On July 30 2013 15:55 gneGne wrote:
How would ethics be any less real than physics. Hasn't any of you ever been in a situation where you had a moral choice to make?
Nope, never
Thats one of the advantages of not beeing a moral realist
"A moral action that harms a sentient being needs to have some potential redeeming consequence that benefits a sentient being"
In the "science of moralty" this sentence seems to be true apt and by logically evaluating this sentence i also hold it to be true. At the same time i think it has no meaning since every possible action has this potential, how small and far into the future it might be.
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On July 30 2013 16:43 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On July 30 2013 01:41 Sbrubbles wrote:
I'm not sure you can jump from "torturing babies for fun is morally wrong" to "Given some contingent facts about human beings and some necessary truths about rational agent interaction allowing torturing babies for fun as a general rule will not lead to a flourishing society.". The first sentence makes an ethical assertion while the second one makes a point about how society ought to be, so it sounds odd to say the first meaning to say the second.
I am not sure that I follow you completely. On the face of it, both sentences could be said to be descriptive of a certain state of affairs (note that the second sentence does not contain any ought) or a counterfactual (given that in no society anybody is actually torturing babies). Whether you agree that the semantic content of the two statements is the same/similar/comparable is a different thing altogether and I wholeheartedly admit that it provides only a crude summary of my view. I further think that -given some further philosophical reasoning - from both statements follows an ought, if they are true - that is a moral obligation not to torture babies for fun. I agree with error theorists that this is not any cosmic or categorical imperative, but more in the form of prudence, in the sense that rational agents can and should agree on the fact that not torturing babies for fun should be followed.
I think I phrased it badly. I just meant to say that the statement "torturing babies for fun is morally wrong" is a statement about morals (philosophy) while the statement "Given some contingent facts about human beings and some necessary truths about rational agent interaction allowing torturing babies for fun as a general rule will not lead to a flourishing society" is about anthropology or perhaps sociology.
I could, for example, make the two statements "being lazy is morally wrong" and "being lazy will not lead to a flourishing society". The first statement is about morals and the second about economics. If you want to reach the first statement from the second one, you need to show what bridge you're using, like: "Being lazy will not lead to a flourishing society. It is self-evident that reaching a flourishing society is the goal that determines what is morally right and wrong. Thus, being lazy is morally wrong". But even if you are a realist and make this connection naturally, it doesn't change the fact that those two statements say different things.
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On July 31 2013 00:56 Rassy wrote:Show nested quote +On July 30 2013 15:55 gneGne wrote:
How would ethics be any less real than physics. Hasn't any of you ever been in a situation where you had a moral choice to make? Nope, never Thats one of the advantages of not beeing a moral realist
I'm jealous, I ain't gonna lie
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On July 30 2013 21:00 xM(Z wrote:Show nested quote +On July 30 2013 20:25 Spekulatius wrote:On July 30 2013 20:22 xM(Z wrote:On July 30 2013 19:58 Spekulatius wrote:On July 30 2013 19:54 xM(Z wrote:"The universe" is not an entity capable of inventing stuff. what a narrow minded thing to say hey man!, i remember the times when you were an amoeba and couldn't figure out what shape is ... You must be talking about my ancestors as I have always been human. But that put aside: so what? now use that backwards reasoning, forwards. you will be the ancestor of ... (until you get to "as i have always been the universe")?. it's fun I still don't know what that's supposed to hint at. I was once nonexistent. So? you need continuity in your argument, continuity that goes to infinity and back. upward and downward theoretical (at least) continuity. assertions like can not be proved nor disproved until (by your logic) you get to a superior stage in evolution. so you are purposely limiting yourself in actions/thoughts/decisions untill you get to that superior stage. it makes no sense to me why one would do that. i can think of ways (instances in which) geology wouldn't even exist. Show nested quote +Geology is still right even if planets ceased to exist. There's just nothing to talk about anymore. how would geology affect an AI living inside a computer? existences, totally different then yours, can have different laws. (edit: i managed to switch 2 of my posts. aijlergbaergea)
I have absolutely no idea what you are trying to say.
On July 30 2013 21:08 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On July 30 2013 20:18 Spekulatius wrote:On July 30 2013 19:59 MiraMax wrote:On July 30 2013 18:42 Spekulatius wrote:
@ Lixler:
I think I expressed myself badly in my last post. Of course I do agree with you that dying does not remove a moral system. But this does not in any way mean a moral system is like a law of physics.
You say, moral systems survive their "thinker" just as laws of physics do - I disagree.
You say, a physical system of person X needs to be included in the equation the same way the moral system of person X needs to be included in its respective equation - I disagree.
I tried to compare morals to beauty as I believe they are comparable. And I very strongly believe that if you remove a critical beholder from the equation, the notion of beauty stops to make sense. What is beauty if there is nobody who is appreciating it, rating it or feeling it? Nothing. A notion without content.
I very strongly believe the exact same statement holds true for moral systems. Morals are a human invention. Without humans, nobody would ever think about calling something right or wrong. It is completely implausible to me how there should be any universal statement that is not contingent on a beholder.
ObviousOne phrased it much more bluntly: The universe does not care if something is right or wrong. This means a) that only caring about morality produces moral systems which means it's contingent on the human mind. And b) laws of physics are not relative to the beholder, they do not change depending on who's watching/rating/analyzing.
@ Acrofales:
No. You're not getting the fundamental point I'm trying to make.
Universal truths cannot be discovered (as you claim) because
1. there are no universal truths (see above)
2. if there were universal moral truths, they would not be discoverable because they would not be part of the world outside of your mind. Morals have no anchor in the real world. You would not be able to discover moral truths just as you would not be able to "discover" that you are feeling tired, hungry or alone. The word "discover" does not make any sense in this context.
Again, moral "truths" are fundamentally different from laws of nature. Moral systems are like feelings which are - you agree, I suppose - not universal. Moral systems are like opinions of beauty - not universal. Moral systems are like opinions on taste - check our KMD thread: not universal.
I feel like I'm starting to repeat myself though. I am sorry to interfere, but I find this line of reasoning utterly unconvincing. That moral systems require moral agents and that moral theory is only applicable if moral agents exist is a trivial truism, just like the laws of nature would not be applicable if nature would not exist or like geology would not make sense to anyone if planets had not formed. It might be an interesting exercise to investigate in what respect statements could nonetheless be said to be true if none of the objects in the statement had ever obtained existence, but I fail to see how this is in any way special for morality. I am a realist about psychology for instance, in that I think that psychology as a science can generate true statements about the human psyche and human behavior. Would you agree? If yes, why are you not moved by the argument that without any human, no one could make any sense of psychology. If you disagree, what do you think it is that psychologists are doing? I disagree. Geology is still right even if planets ceased to exist. There's just nothing to talk about anymore. Psychology is still right even if all humans ceased to exist. There's just nobody to talk about anymore. Moral statements are still neither right nor wrong in the absence of humans because they don't have the capacity to be either right or wrong because they're relative statements. Stop comparing laws of nature and moral statements. They're fundamentally different. If you can prove that something is objectively beautiful, I will completely submit to your theory that there can be moral absolutes. Until then, no argument containing laws of nature will have anything to do with moral relativity or absolutism, I'm sorry. Wow ... you just went full circle, or so it seems to me. Before you argued that moral statements cannot be true even though moral agents exist, because they would obviously not be true if moral agents did not exist. Now you say that moral statements are not true without moral agents, because they are obviously not even true when moral agents exist as they are not even capable of being true. Maybe I completely misunderstood you, but I am honestly not sure what to make of this line of reasoning. How can the otherwise perfectly fine geological statement "Earth's continents move due to continental drift" be said to be true given that planet Earth does not exist? It seems to me that whatever definition of truth you come up with here it would work out for any other statement of similar form as well - including moral statements. That was my point.
1st paragraph:
Maybe my view seemed to be developing through several of my posts while I was trying to specify it.
But your 2nd to last sentence in the 1st paragraph states it correctly. Moral statements are not capable of being "true" in the usual way the word is used, because they are relative.
How is planet Earth comparable to a beholder passing moral judgments? You compare the beholder aka the creator of a moral statement to the object of a law of nature. It's a bad example.
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On July 30 2013 23:42 Lixler wrote:Show nested quote +On July 30 2013 18:42 Spekulatius wrote:
@ Lixler:
I think I expressed myself badly in my last post. Of course I do agree with you that dying does not remove a moral system. But this does not in any way mean a moral system is like a law of physics.
You say, moral systems survive their "thinker" just as laws of physics do - I disagree.
You say, a physical system of person X needs to be included in the equation the same way the moral system of person X needs to be included in its respective equation - I disagree.
I tried to compare morals to beauty as I believe they are comparable. And I very strongly believe that if you remove a critical beholder from the equation, the notion of beauty stops to make sense. What is beauty if there is nobody who is appreciating it, rating it or feeling it? Nothing. A notion without content.
I very strongly believe the exact same statement holds true for moral systems. Morals are a human invention. Without humans, nobody would ever think about calling something right or wrong. It is completely implausible to me how there should be any universal statement that is not contingent on a beholder.
ObviousOne phrased it much more bluntly: The universe does not care if something is right or wrong. This means a) that only caring about morality produces moral systems which means it's contingent on the human mind. And b) laws of physics are not relative to the beholder, they do not change depending on who's watching/rating/analyzing.
I don't know how to take these two statements together. Show nested quote +You say, moral systems survive their "thinker" just as laws of physics do - I disagree. Are you trying to take "thinker" broadly here and say that they can't be unhinged totally from all thinkers? I guess that would make sense.
yes.
Let me provide some simple arguments for my views, as you've presented them. I say that a moral system survives its thinker just as laws of physics do. What I mean by this is that any given moral system has no intrinsic connection to the person who is applying it (although that person might feel really good about it, or whatever). Other people can adopt a moral system, both before and after this person's life, people can consider the moral system without believing it themselves, and so on. Surely nobody would make moral judgments if there were no rational agents around, but nobody would make physical judgments, either.
Yes. A moral system is like a pen. It can be used by your heirs and everyone else after you die.
I dunno why you invoke physical judgments though. Trying to interpret the outside world is nothing like saying A is better than B. This is actually my main problem with what you're saying and I get critisized for disagreeing with you on it. You do the same as me though, simply stating the contrary as fact without proof that they are indeed comparable.
I also said that a physical system needs to be included in any physical statement, which system can be linked to a thinker to the same extent that a moral system is. This is trivially true. When I say, for instance, "the chair is under the table," I am invoking a specific set of more or less physical concepts that are accessible to all people who speak English. Another physical system might use these signs to mean something else, or might use different signs to mean the same thing. And with more precise physical statements, like f=ma or e=1/2mv^2, it is obvious that we are taking on a lot of conceptual baggage in order to make our statement. Every statement comes out of a system of concepts that define its precise meaning; this system of concepts surely needs to be applied by a human if it's going to be applied at all, but that doesn't make it a total fiction (or whatever pejoratives you want to call it).
So?
You said that beauty loses its sense if there is no one around to behold it. How about our other classifications, like "green" and "chair" and "born on January 17th?" Does the concept "green" cease to mean anything at all if there is nobody around to see green things? It doesn't seem to me to be so; using the example I used earlier, I can imagine a possible world where everything is green but everyone is red-green colorblind, and green still makes plenty of sense here.
Green is different. "Green" is the word we use for a certain wave length of light that is emitted from a certain object and processed by a functioning human brain and eye. There's no judgment in the word green.
Chair is different, too. Chair is a level plane on pillars made for sitting. No personal value, no judgment.
Born of January 17th means, someone came out of a womb on the day that is marked on january 17th on our gregorian calendar.
All those words do not lose meaning when there's no human around. (Except you mean meaning in a "purpose" kind of way which I don't.)
I am maintaining that the universe does not care about our formulations of the laws of physics, either. The universe moves on as it does, and we can describe events that take place in it with different levels of accuracy and precision, but the universe doesn't care about our formulations. You might be surprised to find out that physical events are always underdetermine physical theory: that is to say, given any amount of physical data, we can always construct more than one physical theory that explains it. This means, badly put, that there is no one objectively right and complete set of physical laws that totally describe the universe. There can be multiple systems that perfectly describe and predict all physical data.
I am surprised to hear you say that with perfect knowledge of the outside world, there could still be two different interpretations that are equally true. I find that hard to believe. Source on that theory?
I want this to show that our formulations of physical laws are unhinged from the universe just like moral laws are: the universe doesn't care at all that Newton was born or that we haven't found a theory of quantum gravity or whatever. We can come up with certain ways of describing physical events, but these certain ways don't matter at all to the universe. Things stand the same, in this respect, with description of moral events. The universe goes on as it does and we lay our moral interpretations over it. The difference between physical laws and moral laws does not lie in mind-dependence.
I agree with your first part. If our interpretations of nature are right or wrong does not change nature. I said a similar thing before in this thread. You're not disproving me or anything. And I'm still weary about what your opinion actually is.
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On July 31 2013 01:23 Sbrubbles wrote:Show nested quote +On July 30 2013 16:43 MiraMax wrote:On July 30 2013 01:41 Sbrubbles wrote:
I'm not sure you can jump from "torturing babies for fun is morally wrong" to "Given some contingent facts about human beings and some necessary truths about rational agent interaction allowing torturing babies for fun as a general rule will not lead to a flourishing society.". The first sentence makes an ethical assertion while the second one makes a point about how society ought to be, so it sounds odd to say the first meaning to say the second.
I am not sure that I follow you completely. On the face of it, both sentences could be said to be descriptive of a certain state of affairs (note that the second sentence does not contain any ought) or a counterfactual (given that in no society anybody is actually torturing babies). Whether you agree that the semantic content of the two statements is the same/similar/comparable is a different thing altogether and I wholeheartedly admit that it provides only a crude summary of my view. I further think that -given some further philosophical reasoning - from both statements follows an ought, if they are true - that is a moral obligation not to torture babies for fun. I agree with error theorists that this is not any cosmic or categorical imperative, but more in the form of prudence, in the sense that rational agents can and should agree on the fact that not torturing babies for fun should be followed. I think I phrased it badly. I just meant to say that the statement "torturing babies for fun is morally wrong" is a statement about morals (philosophy) while the statement "Given some contingent facts about human beings and some necessary truths about rational agent interaction allowing torturing babies for fun as a general rule will not lead to a flourishing society" is about anthropology or perhaps sociology. I could, for example, make the two statements "being lazy is morally wrong" and "being lazy will not lead to a flourishing society". The first statement is about morals and the second about economics. If you want to reach the first statement from the second one, you need to show what bridge you're using, like: "Being lazy will not lead to a flourishing society. It is self-evident that reaching a flourishing society is the goal that determines what is morally right and wrong. Thus, being lazy is morally wrong". But even if you are a realist and make this connection naturally, it doesn't change the fact that those two statements say different things.
Well, you surely agree that there is not and never could be any inherently true meaning of the words "morally right", but that - just like any other string of letters - these words get meaning through their use. And whenever I say something like "x is morally wrong" I in fact do mean to say something like "generally allowing X is detrimental to a flourishing society" or simply "x is detrimental to well-being" or "X causes unnecessary harm". I have no problem accepting that moral statements are semantically thick and can mean several things at once. Furthermore that's what I understand other people to mean when they use this language. That's how I can make sense of moral talk. I can realize that people talk about something real and consequential and important and that's what I understand them to mean.
If you understand something different whenever these words are used then we have first and foremost a semantic disagreement, which we could try to settle. For instance you could tell me what I might be missing according to you, or what you would understand instead. And we can look for common ground and engage in some conceptual clarification.
Or otherwise if we cannot settle our semantic disagreement, we could agree that given my semantic understanding moral facts would reduce to natural facts and that given your semantic understanding there could not be any moral facts or that moral facts would be queer. Like this we might be able to explore each others view without getting entangled in semantic conflicts.
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On July 31 2013 02:23 Spekulatius wrote:Show nested quote +On July 30 2013 21:00 xM(Z wrote:On July 30 2013 20:25 Spekulatius wrote:On July 30 2013 20:22 xM(Z wrote:On July 30 2013 19:58 Spekulatius wrote:On July 30 2013 19:54 xM(Z wrote:"The universe" is not an entity capable of inventing stuff. what a narrow minded thing to say hey man!, i remember the times when you were an amoeba and couldn't figure out what shape is ... You must be talking about my ancestors as I have always been human. But that put aside: so what? now use that backwards reasoning, forwards. you will be the ancestor of ... (until you get to "as i have always been the universe")?. it's fun I still don't know what that's supposed to hint at. I was once nonexistent. So? you need continuity in your argument, continuity that goes to infinity and back. upward and downward theoretical (at least) continuity. assertions like "The universe" is not an entity capable of inventing stuff can not be proved nor disproved until (by your logic) you get to a superior stage in evolution. so you are purposely limiting yourself in actions/thoughts/decisions untill you get to that superior stage. it makes no sense to me why one would do that. i can think of ways (instances in which) geology wouldn't even exist. Geology is still right even if planets ceased to exist. There's just nothing to talk about anymore. how would geology affect an AI living inside a computer? existences, totally different then yours, can have different laws. (edit: i managed to switch 2 of my posts. aijlergbaergea) I have absolutely no idea what you are trying to say. Show nested quote +On July 30 2013 21:08 MiraMax wrote:On July 30 2013 20:18 Spekulatius wrote:On July 30 2013 19:59 MiraMax wrote:On July 30 2013 18:42 Spekulatius wrote:
@ Lixler:
I think I expressed myself badly in my last post. Of course I do agree with you that dying does not remove a moral system. But this does not in any way mean a moral system is like a law of physics.
You say, moral systems survive their "thinker" just as laws of physics do - I disagree.
You say, a physical system of person X needs to be included in the equation the same way the moral system of person X needs to be included in its respective equation - I disagree.
I tried to compare morals to beauty as I believe they are comparable. And I very strongly believe that if you remove a critical beholder from the equation, the notion of beauty stops to make sense. What is beauty if there is nobody who is appreciating it, rating it or feeling it? Nothing. A notion without content.
I very strongly believe the exact same statement holds true for moral systems. Morals are a human invention. Without humans, nobody would ever think about calling something right or wrong. It is completely implausible to me how there should be any universal statement that is not contingent on a beholder.
ObviousOne phrased it much more bluntly: The universe does not care if something is right or wrong. This means a) that only caring about morality produces moral systems which means it's contingent on the human mind. And b) laws of physics are not relative to the beholder, they do not change depending on who's watching/rating/analyzing.
@ Acrofales:
No. You're not getting the fundamental point I'm trying to make.
Universal truths cannot be discovered (as you claim) because
1. there are no universal truths (see above)
2. if there were universal moral truths, they would not be discoverable because they would not be part of the world outside of your mind. Morals have no anchor in the real world. You would not be able to discover moral truths just as you would not be able to "discover" that you are feeling tired, hungry or alone. The word "discover" does not make any sense in this context.
Again, moral "truths" are fundamentally different from laws of nature. Moral systems are like feelings which are - you agree, I suppose - not universal. Moral systems are like opinions of beauty - not universal. Moral systems are like opinions on taste - check our KMD thread: not universal.
I feel like I'm starting to repeat myself though. I am sorry to interfere, but I find this line of reasoning utterly unconvincing. That moral systems require moral agents and that moral theory is only applicable if moral agents exist is a trivial truism, just like the laws of nature would not be applicable if nature would not exist or like geology would not make sense to anyone if planets had not formed. It might be an interesting exercise to investigate in what respect statements could nonetheless be said to be true if none of the objects in the statement had ever obtained existence, but I fail to see how this is in any way special for morality. I am a realist about psychology for instance, in that I think that psychology as a science can generate true statements about the human psyche and human behavior. Would you agree? If yes, why are you not moved by the argument that without any human, no one could make any sense of psychology. If you disagree, what do you think it is that psychologists are doing? I disagree. Geology is still right even if planets ceased to exist. There's just nothing to talk about anymore. Psychology is still right even if all humans ceased to exist. There's just nobody to talk about anymore. Moral statements are still neither right nor wrong in the absence of humans because they don't have the capacity to be either right or wrong because they're relative statements. Stop comparing laws of nature and moral statements. They're fundamentally different. If you can prove that something is objectively beautiful, I will completely submit to your theory that there can be moral absolutes. Until then, no argument containing laws of nature will have anything to do with moral relativity or absolutism, I'm sorry. Wow ... you just went full circle, or so it seems to me. Before you argued that moral statements cannot be true even though moral agents exist, because they would obviously not be true if moral agents did not exist. Now you say that moral statements are not true without moral agents, because they are obviously not even true when moral agents exist as they are not even capable of being true. Maybe I completely misunderstood you, but I am honestly not sure what to make of this line of reasoning. How can the otherwise perfectly fine geological statement "Earth's continents move due to continental drift" be said to be true given that planet Earth does not exist? It seems to me that whatever definition of truth you come up with here it would work out for any other statement of similar form as well - including moral statements. That was my point. 1st paragraph: Maybe my view seemed to be developing through several of my posts while I was trying to specify it. But your 2nd to last sentence in the 1st paragraph states it correctly. Moral statements are not capable of being "true" in the usual way the word is used, because they are relative. How is planet Earth comparable to a beholder passing moral judgments? You compare the beholder aka the creator of a moral statement to the object of a law of nature. It's a bad example.
I am sorry but then I misunderstood your view. You seem nonetheless to be dodging the question I asked.
How is earth comparable to a beholder passing a judgement? Well both are natural phenomena for a start. But your analogy is off. The question should better be phrased "how is making a statement describing an aspect of an event involving the natural phenomenon: 'planet' fundamentally different to making a statement about an aspect of an event involving the natural phenomenon: 'human being'?" Don't you agree? And my answer is: I don't see any.
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"Green" is the word we use for a certain wave length of light that is emitted from a certain object and processed by a functioning human brain and eye.
No. The wavelength which corresponds to what a color-blind man experiences as "green" is a completely different quale than yours. (If you're unsure what qualia is--which I think you might be--you should delve further into theory of mind.) I read this response completely out of context of whatever else you said, but I for whatever reason couldn't help but add on this response.
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@ Miramax
As you expect, I don't agree.
A statement about nature has the capacity to correspond to its factual state, thus has the capability to be true.
A moral statement can never correspond to a factual state of anything because there is no thing which it can correspond to.
Science has its hypotheses and tries to match them to reality. Morals don't, as there is nothing factual that they can be matched with.
If you disagree, tell me why there should be a universally correct moral statement. Why do you believe there is, and do you have any proof?
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On July 31 2013 03:14 cda6590 wrote:Show nested quote +"Green" is the word we use for a certain wave length of light that is emitted from a certain object and processed by a functioning human brain and eye. No. The wavelength which corresponds to what a color-blind man experiences as "green" is a completely different quale than yours. (If you're unsure what qualia is--which I think you might be--you should delve further into theory of mind.) I read this response completely out of context of whatever else you said, but I for whatever reason couldn't help but add on this response.
If this is the meaning of green that Lixler was referring to then I will have to change my answer to his question to: No, I do not think the word "green" has any meaning in a world of red-green colorblind people.
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On July 31 2013 03:22 Spekulatius wrote:Show nested quote +On July 31 2013 03:14 cda6590 wrote:"Green" is the word we use for a certain wave length of light that is emitted from a certain object and processed by a functioning human brain and eye. No. The wavelength which corresponds to what a color-blind man experiences as "green" is a completely different quale than yours. (If you're unsure what qualia is--which I think you might be--you should delve further into theory of mind.) I read this response completely out of context of whatever else you said, but I for whatever reason couldn't help but add on this response. If this is the meaning of green that Lixler was referring to then I will have to change my answer to his question to: No, I do not think the word "green" has any meaning in a world of red-green colorblind people.
Well surely it has "some" meaning, in that a red-green colorblind person probably knows green as an experience that only others are privy to.
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On July 31 2013 03:24 farvacola wrote:Show nested quote +On July 31 2013 03:22 Spekulatius wrote:On July 31 2013 03:14 cda6590 wrote:"Green" is the word we use for a certain wave length of light that is emitted from a certain object and processed by a functioning human brain and eye. No. The wavelength which corresponds to what a color-blind man experiences as "green" is a completely different quale than yours. (If you're unsure what qualia is--which I think you might be--you should delve further into theory of mind.) I read this response completely out of context of whatever else you said, but I for whatever reason couldn't help but add on this response. If this is the meaning of green that Lixler was referring to then I will have to change my answer to his question to: No, I do not think the word "green" has any meaning in a world of red-green colorblind people. Well surely it has "some" meaning, in that a red-green colorblind person probably knows green as an experience that only others are privy to.
Yes, sure. But the question that was asked was: can it be true that something is green when some see it as pink and some see it as blue?
To which I say: no.
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A moral statement can never correspond to a factual state of anything because there is no thing which it can correspond to.
Moral truths are abstract. Unless you believe in some sort of weird metaphysics which discredits the existence of abstract objects you're perfectly capable of corresponding moral statements to something that exists.
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On July 31 2013 03:38 cda6590 wrote:Show nested quote +A moral statement can never correspond to a factual state of anything because there is no thing which it can correspond to. Moral truths are abstract. Unless you believe in some sort of weird metaphysics which discredits the existence of abstract objects you're perfectly capable of corresponding moral statements to something that exists.
Re-read my posts and you might understand what I mean.
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On July 31 2013 00:33 Poffel wrote:Show nested quote +On July 31 2013 00:03 xM(Z wrote:On July 30 2013 23:29 Poffel wrote:On July 30 2013 20:42 xM(Z wrote:For example, in the post above, xM(Z argues that "an alien will be able to understand the cause and effect of newtonian laws/mechanics but it might never understand human morals". I find that hard to believe (and impossible to prove, given that the premise is counterfactual). Newtonian mechanics cannot comprehend the perihelion movement of Merkur. Without theory of relativity (light being subject to gravity), we have no explanation for why it gets dark at night. Newton provides no means to explain photoelectric effects. So why would an alien be able to comprehend our erroneous physics but not our erroneous morals? Wouldn't it need intricate knowledge of the functioning and misfunctioning of the human mind for both? . that was a little out of context i fear. the newtonian perspective was the assertion i had to work with given that it was previously posted. i made no claims about the objective truth of newtonian physics. to generalize, physicalism is self explanatory, moralism needs to be explained then taken at face value. If you make no claims about the objective truth of physics (which particular physical theory we're talking about is irrelevant... name your favorite, I'll google its problems if needed), why do you hold the truth claims of physics in higher esteem than the truth claims of ethics? Also, you might want to clarify your use of the term "physicalism". How can physicalism be "self explanatory" if what physics describes is false? basically this https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism i'm saying physicalism includes ethics based on above definition. This view responds to the challenge of the mind-body problem by claiming that mental states are ultimately physical states, now, it's not fair to say that i believe in it since i see almost everything in contexts that include other contexts. physicalism could be true if you see it as per its definition and both humans and aliens would live in such an universe. for you to be able to flip + Show Spoiler +why do you hold the truth claims of physics in higher esteem than the truth claims of ethics arround, you'd need to define something like the graviton particle (which is hypothetical) that would work for morals/a moral universe (from which we would later extract our ethics). (and i could totally do that too. i could define and prove that faith exists, hypothetically). if, in any argument i look like i'm supporting/encouraging a view, it's only because i want it clearly defined before i switch it 180degrees. Don't take this the wrong way - I don't mean it aggressive or offensive -, but if you have nothing constructive to contribute and contradict yourself on purpose (180 degree switch), consider "if aliens..." a valid objection and disregard the possibility of objective knowledge right from the outset, I don't see that fostering the purpose of clear definitions at all. To the contrary, the language games you're playing seem to be rather about terminological confusion. Also, the bolded sentence sounds like the lexical definition of trolling.
i agree with you but you're wrong. it goes like this: dualism -> binary opposition -> critical (social mainly) theory.
i do not own concepts so i can't contradict myself. i contradict other concepts but, with a purpose (and that, i hope, is not trolling ).
this whole topic is about flipping contexts around then arguing about the disappearance of morals/ethics/truths or flipping contexts, arguing about how the initial assertion doesn't hold water in the second/new context then concluding that the first context must be wrong.
+ Show Spoiler +ex: slavery = ethics, humanity = context. if you define humanity as a white thing, then slavery exists; if you define humanity as a black and white thing, then slavery disappears (don't take that example ad-literam); what is green green, in a colorblind vs non-colorblind context; evaluable truths in an non-evaluative context (=infinity) and so on. i just do them at the same time and it looks confusing. in a black vs white argument i'll just come in and say: hey look, this is gray. ;if neither of them can conceive gray, then you can just walk away knowing that those 2 will never see eye to eye.
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On July 31 2013 02:56 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On July 31 2013 01:23 Sbrubbles wrote:On July 30 2013 16:43 MiraMax wrote:On July 30 2013 01:41 Sbrubbles wrote:
I'm not sure you can jump from "torturing babies for fun is morally wrong" to "Given some contingent facts about human beings and some necessary truths about rational agent interaction allowing torturing babies for fun as a general rule will not lead to a flourishing society.". The first sentence makes an ethical assertion while the second one makes a point about how society ought to be, so it sounds odd to say the first meaning to say the second.
I am not sure that I follow you completely. On the face of it, both sentences could be said to be descriptive of a certain state of affairs (note that the second sentence does not contain any ought) or a counterfactual (given that in no society anybody is actually torturing babies). Whether you agree that the semantic content of the two statements is the same/similar/comparable is a different thing altogether and I wholeheartedly admit that it provides only a crude summary of my view. I further think that -given some further philosophical reasoning - from both statements follows an ought, if they are true - that is a moral obligation not to torture babies for fun. I agree with error theorists that this is not any cosmic or categorical imperative, but more in the form of prudence, in the sense that rational agents can and should agree on the fact that not torturing babies for fun should be followed. I think I phrased it badly. I just meant to say that the statement "torturing babies for fun is morally wrong" is a statement about morals (philosophy) while the statement "Given some contingent facts about human beings and some necessary truths about rational agent interaction allowing torturing babies for fun as a general rule will not lead to a flourishing society" is about anthropology or perhaps sociology. I could, for example, make the two statements "being lazy is morally wrong" and "being lazy will not lead to a flourishing society". The first statement is about morals and the second about economics. If you want to reach the first statement from the second one, you need to show what bridge you're using, like: "Being lazy will not lead to a flourishing society. It is self-evident that reaching a flourishing society is the goal that determines what is morally right and wrong. Thus, being lazy is morally wrong". But even if you are a realist and make this connection naturally, it doesn't change the fact that those two statements say different things. Well, you surely agree that there is not and never could be any inherently true meaning of the words "morally right", but that - just like any other string of letters - these words get meaning through their use. And whenever I say something like "x is morally wrong" I in fact do mean to say something like "generally allowing X is detrimental to a flourishing society" or simply "x is detrimental to well-being" or "X causes unnecessary harm". I have no problem accepting that moral statements are semantically thick and can mean several things at once. Furthermore that's what I understand other people to mean when they use this language. That's how I can make sense of moral talk. I can realize that people talk about something real and consequential and important and that's what I understand them to mean. If you understand something different whenever these words are used then we have first and foremost a semantic disagreement, which we could try to settle. For instance you could tell me what I might be missing according to you, or what you would understand instead. And we can look for common ground and engage in some conceptual clarification. Or otherwise if we cannot settle our semantic disagreement, we could agree that given my semantic understanding moral facts would reduce to natural facts and that given your semantic understanding there could not be any moral facts or that moral facts would be queer. Like this we might be able to explore each others view without getting entangled in semantic conflicts.
Yes, it's a semantic disagreement, and I tried to give my explanation in my post.
As I'm saying, if you insist that "torturing babies for fun is morally wrong" can mean the same that "Given some contingent facts about human beings and some necessary truths about rational agent interaction allowing torturing babies for fun as a general rule will not lead to a flourishing society", the only thing I can tell you is that you're not being nearly clear enough on what you're trying to say. If you said "Given some contingent facts about human beings and some necessary truths about rational agent interaction allowing torturing babies for fun as a general rule will not lead to a flourishing society. A flourishing society is evidently the goal that determines what is morally right and wrong, therefore torturing babies for fun is morally wrong", then you would be making yourself clear
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I'll just step in with my own slightly educated opinion.
"True" and "false" are logical statements that are meaningless outside of logical systems. All logical systems require premises in order to function. Therefore, for a moral statement to be true or false, it must be based off of a set of moral premises that are held by the system. This is fairly straightforward, and doesn't leave room for argument.
Now, what are the moral premises? Some systems have extremely simple moral premises: for example, in monotheistic religions, the moral premise is god (or the holy text being used). Non-monotheistic religions often have some other variety of holy text which provide a similar premise or set of premises. Being an agnostic atheist, I'd prefer to not to use any such premise, not least because there has not yet been any conclusive evidence as to which holy text (if any) is correct. So we are left to purely secular premises for our moral system.
Now, how do we choose our premises? There are some fairly simple guidelines as to which premises NOT to choose: don't choose any premises that preclude the creation of a logical system. That is, "hurting people is good" and "hurting people is bad" can't coexist. But where do we go from there? Even if we cross our fingers and hope that we have a finite set of premises to choose from, we still don't have a way to compare sets of premises. So we need to decide on a goal of our moral system. How do we decide upon that goal? Ultimately, we have to appeal to mob rule by seeing how we can satisfy the personal desires of as many humans as possible, as completely as possible. This gets very iffy but tends to center around the general principles of liberalism with a few safeguards to keep people from hurting one another. I won't get too far into the details of what I think the best system would be, because that's too complex for someone like me.
Now, what do you do about people who disagree? This is the most questionable issue, because we have (continuing from earlier) up to this point never given any way to distinguish between correct and incorrect. Why shouldn't their opinion be weighted equally to yours? The answer to it is rather dull: we have to compromise where possible, and quash where impossible. Unfortunately, although might may not be right, it is generally indistinguishable from it.
So to summarize: morality is based on consensus, for the most part. Long way to get to a simple answer.
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Funny how 'true', 'false' and synonyms have been around for thousands of years and yet formal logical systems have only been around for less than 200 then ;p
edit: more appropriate face.
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So you're disagreeing with his (and my) claim that true and false are notions that do not apply when we talk about moral statements?
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EPT
