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Yes, this is a thread on TL that involves religion, but I hate to think that our policy should be to blindly close every such thread. Sam Harris is a writer whose books are both insightful and have sparked many good discussions in the past and as long as the thread doesn't derail I'd like to leave it open. This should be the basic premise for every such thread, no matter how high the odds of it derailing. In that light, these posts that just predict the downfall of this thread (whether it be pre-determined or not) are 1) Not contributing to the discussion 2) Backseat moderating 3) Annoying 4) Actually contributing towards derailing it. I'll keep 2 daying people for this. |
Here's a thought experiment; let's presume universe has no free will. Let's further presume a machine that can gather enough data to tell the future for about a minute ahead.
Put two cards, let's say an ace of spades and an ace of diamonds, face up on a table in front of a contrarian or a free will proponent, use the machine to foretell which they'll pick, tell them the result and then ask them to pick either card. Just how will this go down?
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Religion is a plague that should've become extinct over 1 hundred years ago. Really. Just listen to Debates of Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens and Dave silverman and you will agree...
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On March 11 2012 03:33 Hertzy wrote:
Here's a thought experiment; let's presume universe has no free will. Let's further presume a machine that can gather enough data to tell the future for about a minute ahead.
Put two cards, let's say an ace of spades and an ace of diamonds, face up on a table in front of a contrarian or a free will proponent, use the machine to foretell which they'll pick, tell them the result and then ask them to pick either card. Just how will this go down?
The problem is the same experiment can be done with a computer program instead, which we would all agree has no free will.
Let's say the computer program is given an input either 0 and 1 and gives the opposite output. So if it gets 0 it gives you a 1 and vice versa. Now you use some machine to find out which output you'll get in the future and give that as the input to the computer program. So you can see there's a contradiction here because the computer will always give you the opposite number.
This issue here is that future actions have an effect on the past which violates causality. It makes more sense to look at the world from a quantum mechanical perspective than hard determinism because it doesn't have these contradictions.
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On March 11 2012 03:25 L3gendary wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 01:36 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 15:26 L3gendary wrote:
Compatibilism is just logically flawed. Determinism doesn't preclude the existence of a consciousness that can weigh options and make decisions on how to act. Free will would necessarily have to be non-deterministic and outside of the laws of nature because were it within the laws of nature it would have to act according to them and therefore isn't free.
Essentially, you are defining free will as having the ability to be determined by immediate internal causes (your brain) and not external causes (someone else forces you to). No determinist would argue against that, your brain is still operating deterministically though, so your position is no different than determinism. You're using the wrong definition of free will for a compatibilist so it's obviously going to be logically flawed when you attack the wrong argument. The meaningless definition obviously can't exist because it requires a violation of the law of physics, aka it requires the impossible be possible (within a deterministic framework, which is something that we all have good reason to accept). The compatibilist definition of free will is more common sense than the above one because that one is meaningless, why bother using a meaningless word? That's the entire point of this definition because the whole argument is just one of verbal meanings which both sides disagree on. Of course no determinist would argue with it because it's common sense and brings the two ideas, both of which are naturally intuitive, together in a perfectly logical argument. It's very different from the deterministic position because it doesn't have to deal with the problems that arise from saying "free will doesn't exist" or bother wasting time in circular arguments that never lead anywhere. However, if you'd rather have circular arguments on whether free will exists or not and lose individual responsibility for actions, feel free (or not?) to continue using the silly, nonsensical definition of free will No your definition of free will is meaningless because it isn't really free at all. You've just redefined the word and are arguing semantics. It doesn't reconcile anything. It would be like if i say my definition of free will is an apple and apples exist therefore free will exists.
Actually, I've already explained how your definition is inherently meaningless and you've still done nothing to explain how it isn't. Your straw man apple argument is actually more like your definition than mine because it necessarily follows that if you define free will as making the possible impossible, then it follows that free will is a necessary contradiction and false. It's a circular argument, just like your apple example. Defining free will as the "ability to act or not to act" does not imply existence in the definition like yours implies nonexistence in it's definition.
The compatibilist definition is still free because it still allows individuals to be held personally accountable for their actions, it does reconcile individual responsibility and liberty of choice with a casually determined universe. I haven't redefined the word at all, this notion of "free will" has been around for at least 300 years so it really isn't anything new, it's just a clarification of terms (which is absolutely necessary if you want to talk about any problem at all). Semantics is important because the entire free will vs determinism debate is caused by semantics.
TL;DR: In fighting this intuitively common sense notion of free will and asserting that it isn't actually free will, you're the one arguing semantics.
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On March 11 2012 03:51 GGTeMpLaR wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 03:25 L3gendary wrote:On March 11 2012 01:36 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 15:26 L3gendary wrote:
Compatibilism is just logically flawed. Determinism doesn't preclude the existence of a consciousness that can weigh options and make decisions on how to act. Free will would necessarily have to be non-deterministic and outside of the laws of nature because were it within the laws of nature it would have to act according to them and therefore isn't free.
Essentially, you are defining free will as having the ability to be determined by immediate internal causes (your brain) and not external causes (someone else forces you to). No determinist would argue against that, your brain is still operating deterministically though, so your position is no different than determinism. You're using the wrong definition of free will for a compatibilist so it's obviously going to be logically flawed when you attack the wrong argument. The meaningless definition obviously can't exist because it requires a violation of the law of physics, aka it requires the impossible be possible (within a deterministic framework, which is something that we all have good reason to accept). The compatibilist definition of free will is more common sense than the above one because that one is meaningless, why bother using a meaningless word? That's the entire point of this definition because the whole argument is just one of verbal meanings which both sides disagree on. Of course no determinist would argue with it because it's common sense and brings the two ideas, both of which are naturally intuitive, together in a perfectly logical argument. It's very different from the deterministic position because it doesn't have to deal with the problems that arise from saying "free will doesn't exist" or bother wasting time in circular arguments that never lead anywhere. However, if you'd rather have circular arguments on whether free will exists or not and lose individual responsibility for actions, feel free (or not?) to continue using the silly, nonsensical definition of free will No your definition of free will is meaningless because it isn't really free at all. You've just redefined the word and are arguing semantics. It doesn't reconcile anything. It would be like if i say my definition of free will is an apple and apples exist therefore free will exists. Actually, I've already explained how your definition is inherently meaningless and you've still done nothing to explain how it isn't. Your straw man apple argument is actually more like your definition than mine because it necessarily follows that if you define free will as making the possible impossible, then it follows that free will is a necessary contradiction and false. It's a circular argument, just like your apple example. Defining free will as the "ability to act or not to act" does not imply existence in the definition like yours implies nonexistence in it's definition. The compatibilist definition is still free because it still allows individuals to be held personally accountable for their actions, it does reconcile individual responsibility and liberty of choice with a casually determined universe. I haven't redefined the word at all, this notion of "free will" has been around for at least 300 years so it really isn't anything new, it's just a clarification of terms (which is absolutely necessary if you want to talk about any problem at all). Semantics is important because the entire free will vs determinism debate is caused by semantics. TL;DR: In fighting this intuitively common sense notion of free will and asserting that it isn't actually free will, you're the one arguing semantics.
I still fail to understand how it is free you need to explain this further. If you have a casually determined universe then you could not have acted otherwise so where does the free part of free will come from? Assigning responsibility and accountability for actions is not different than the position of a hard determinist. Just because you could not have acted otherwise doesn't mean you can't assign blame. A person can be the cause of an event and therefore blame worthy. They are not the first cause though and their own actions are caused by other things.
There is really no difference between compatibilism and hard determinism. You are simply using different definitions.
To clarify:
If your definition of free will is: a freedom to act according to one's determined motives without hindrance from other individuals (taken from wikipedia). Then both you and hard determinists agree it exists.
If you definition of free will is: a metaphysical entity that allows an individual to make free decisions and not bound by laws of physics. Then both you and hard determinists agree it doesn't exist.
Both positions are identical but 1 group is using 1 definition and the other group is using another.
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On March 09 2012 18:23 [F_]aths wrote:Show nested quote +On March 09 2012 03:11 LaughingTulkas wrote:On March 08 2012 18:47 [F_]aths wrote:On March 08 2012 12:37 LaughingTulkas wrote:On March 07 2012 23:20 [F_]aths wrote:On March 07 2012 23:12 seppolevne wrote:On March 07 2012 21:11 [F_]aths wrote:On March 07 2012 11:06 gyth wrote:On March 07 2012 09:17 PaqMan wrote:
So what exactly is free will? The arguably illusory notion that we control our own actions. A collection of atoms just following physical laws isn't exercising control in any normal sense of the word. So why do we feel in control, and are we unfairly held responsible for our actions? Was Hilter evil, or just atoms being atoms? Please dont use nazis to make your point. It now can look that I am defending Hitler when I am argue against the existence of actual free will. A person can be evil even when there is no real free will. The moral terms of good and evil don't require free will. If you inflict unnecessary pain and misery, you are evil. You do have choices. If you had a brain tumor which somehow made you inflicting pain, you are probably not seen as evil since the tumor made you do it by bypassing reasoning. As long as you can reason, you can be good or evil. I think you need to spend a little more time realizing the consequences of no free will... Do you mind to explain why? No free will doesn't release you from being responsible. If we could demonstrate right here with absolute certainty that free will doesn't exist, it doesn't mean you can go around an kill people because it was just proven that you had no free will. It would be an evil act regardless. I think he means that you aren't really applying your belief in non free will very accurately. Even in your reply that I'm quoting, you speak as if going around a killing people was a choice. If we could demonstrate right now with absolute certainty that free will didn't exist, and then I went and killed people, it would not be because I chose to on the basis of your argument, as you just demonstrated I cannot chose! In the same way if by chance I didn't go and kill people, it would be because I didn't have the choice to. Either way, it's not my choice, so how are you talking about things as if I was choosing even with the presupposition that I cannot, in fact, choose? Evil really does become meaningless. If you punish me for killing those people, it's not because I am evil that you do it, it's because you are predetermined to punish me, it's not something you chose to do because I was "evil" it just was. If there is no free will, then all that we do is the same as a rock falling when we let it go, it simply happens. It is not good or bad in and of itself, it simply is. And it is because there is no way it could be any different. If this is what you believe, I may disagree with you, but I respect you, because you are consistent to your premises. If you want to play games and say that you can not have free will but still have good and evil, I think you are most likely deceiving yourself (knowingly or unknowingly). If you're offended, don't worry, you were just determined to be offended, just as I was determined to write this post. I see "good" and "evil" as a concept which is useful to describe and value certain actions. The lack of actual free will doesn't render the concept meaningless, I think. Even if the world could be proven to be 100% deterministic (if I understand quantum mechanics right, it is not, but lets assume that for the sake of the argument) we are still obliged, I think, to punish evil actions and increase the goodness in the world. I would see this as important part of the concept of good an evil: The "ought" in it. We can have that ought without free will, because if we act accordingly, we can reduce the misery and increase the well-being of conscious creatures. It is a good act regardless if we chose it by actual free will or not. I still have the feeling that we are discussing different points. Again you are using terminology: "Obliged" "if we act accordingly" "we can reduce..." etc that all implies we are making a rational choice. Be consistent! You don't have a choice, you can't act according to anything except what is determined! If we are 100% deterministic, then whether or not we punish someone for something they do is simply determined. We could be punishing them for something that is wrong, or for something that is right, we don't have a choice in the matter. We cannot try to reduce misery or increase well-being because to choose those values is to make a choice, which is exactly what we cannot do! I must re-iterate: good and evil become meaningless in a deterministic world, everything that is simply is because it cannot be any other way. *snip* In other words, even if the world is provable deterministic, we still need to punish criminals and support goodness. We still need to develop a good moral code and follow it.
We need to do it as opposed to what? What is our other choice (if all our choices are determined)?
Do you understand now? You're still concluding that we need to act as if we had free choice, but we don't under the assumptions are you already granted (complete determinism).
Lets say I grant you (irrationally) that good and evil exits objectively in some way in a deterministic universe. How do I choose good over evil if all my choices are determined?
And then it follows if neither evil or good can be chosen, how can I myself be good or evil? Are they words which really contain meaning in a determined world? And the obvious conclusion is no, they do not hold meaning, and so we conclude that our original assumption was wrong, and that they do not exist.
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On March 05 2012 21:58 Timmsh wrote:Show nested quote +On March 05 2012 21:51 Skilledblob wrote:On March 05 2012 21:48 Timmsh wrote:
@ Skilledblob
It's not your decision to move, at least not in the way you say it is.
We talk about it as if it is our decision, but the 'decision' to move starts in the brain, and it is a reaction on something which makes you move.
Ofcourse there can be internall reasons to make yourself move, but it's not a decision by 'you' (as the overlord controlling the body), merely it's simply cause and effect.
Which causes and which effects is hard to determine, but it's there.
you argue like a priest. "I dont know why it is this way but it has to be this way!" because of XYZ uncontrollable power Sorry dude but you missed the point, I said i don't know the cause, but i do know there is a cause! Which is the most important thing in this discussion, because if you know there is a cause to your decisions, you cannot believe in an 'external controller' you say it is. You said, it's my decision to move, as if you are external of this universe and just control your body. I only said that's not true, and the universe has influence on your decisions in such a way, you only THINK your in controll.
Well Religious people can exactly the same thing
"I can't prove that God exists, but I know that he does!"
I am Atheist btw ;p
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On March 11 2012 04:14 L3gendary wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 03:51 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 11 2012 03:25 L3gendary wrote:On March 11 2012 01:36 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 15:26 L3gendary wrote:
Compatibilism is just logically flawed. Determinism doesn't preclude the existence of a consciousness that can weigh options and make decisions on how to act. Free will would necessarily have to be non-deterministic and outside of the laws of nature because were it within the laws of nature it would have to act according to them and therefore isn't free.
Essentially, you are defining free will as having the ability to be determined by immediate internal causes (your brain) and not external causes (someone else forces you to). No determinist would argue against that, your brain is still operating deterministically though, so your position is no different than determinism. You're using the wrong definition of free will for a compatibilist so it's obviously going to be logically flawed when you attack the wrong argument. The meaningless definition obviously can't exist because it requires a violation of the law of physics, aka it requires the impossible be possible (within a deterministic framework, which is something that we all have good reason to accept). The compatibilist definition of free will is more common sense than the above one because that one is meaningless, why bother using a meaningless word? That's the entire point of this definition because the whole argument is just one of verbal meanings which both sides disagree on. Of course no determinist would argue with it because it's common sense and brings the two ideas, both of which are naturally intuitive, together in a perfectly logical argument. It's very different from the deterministic position because it doesn't have to deal with the problems that arise from saying "free will doesn't exist" or bother wasting time in circular arguments that never lead anywhere. However, if you'd rather have circular arguments on whether free will exists or not and lose individual responsibility for actions, feel free (or not?) to continue using the silly, nonsensical definition of free will No your definition of free will is meaningless because it isn't really free at all. You've just redefined the word and are arguing semantics. It doesn't reconcile anything. It would be like if i say my definition of free will is an apple and apples exist therefore free will exists. Actually, I've already explained how your definition is inherently meaningless and you've still done nothing to explain how it isn't. Your straw man apple argument is actually more like your definition than mine because it necessarily follows that if you define free will as making the possible impossible, then it follows that free will is a necessary contradiction and false. It's a circular argument, just like your apple example. Defining free will as the "ability to act or not to act" does not imply existence in the definition like yours implies nonexistence in it's definition. The compatibilist definition is still free because it still allows individuals to be held personally accountable for their actions, it does reconcile individual responsibility and liberty of choice with a casually determined universe. I haven't redefined the word at all, this notion of "free will" has been around for at least 300 years so it really isn't anything new, it's just a clarification of terms (which is absolutely necessary if you want to talk about any problem at all). Semantics is important because the entire free will vs determinism debate is caused by semantics. TL;DR: In fighting this intuitively common sense notion of free will and asserting that it isn't actually free will, you're the one arguing semantics. I still fail to understand how it is free you need to explain this further. If you have a casually determined universe then you could not have acted otherwise so where does the free part of free will come from? Assigning responsibility and accountability for actions is not different than the position of a hard determinist. Just because you could not have acted otherwise doesn't mean you can't assign blame. A person can be the cause of an event and therefore blame worthy. They are not the first cause though and their own actions are caused by other things. There is really no difference between compatibilism and hard determinism. You are simply using different definitions. To clarify: If your definition of free will is: a freedom to act according to one's determined motives without hindrance from other individuals (taken from wikipedia). Then both you and hard determinists agree it exists. If you definition of free will is: a metaphysical entity that allows an individual to make free decisions and not bound by laws of physics. Then both you and hard determinists agree it doesn't exist. Both positions are identical but 1 group is using 1 definition and the other group is using another.
I don't know how else to explain it, if you accept that the universe is casually determined and accept the compatibilist definition of what free will is (which I think is the intuitive and common sense definition as well), it's fairly hard to argue that the two are mutually exclusive. Just because what happens, happens necessarily, does not mean that an individual did not freely choose what came about.
On the contrary, you can't assign blame if you reject the compatibilist notion of "free will" as actually being "free" because you're rejecting the idea that they had any choice in the matter. In order to assign blame to a person who is the final cause of a crime, you would have to assign blame to the cause of that cause, so on and so forth all the way back to the first cause (if such a thing exists which is a completely different debate) which aside from being absurd in itself, breaks from a practical perspective at the point at which uncertainty arises regarding what any given cause is, which sometimes arises as soon as the initial cause being examined.
There is a difference because while the compatibilist and hard determinist might both recognize the existence of this same behavior, the hard determinist refuses to acknowledge it as free will and so you do not get he same level of individual accountability as a hard determinist that you get as a compatibilist. It's also debatable whether every compatibilist and hard determinist would agree on the same form of casual determinism, but that's less relevant to the former point.
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On March 11 2012 04:50 GGTeMpLaR wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 04:14 L3gendary wrote:On March 11 2012 03:51 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 11 2012 03:25 L3gendary wrote:On March 11 2012 01:36 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 15:26 L3gendary wrote:
Compatibilism is just logically flawed. Determinism doesn't preclude the existence of a consciousness that can weigh options and make decisions on how to act. Free will would necessarily have to be non-deterministic and outside of the laws of nature because were it within the laws of nature it would have to act according to them and therefore isn't free.
Essentially, you are defining free will as having the ability to be determined by immediate internal causes (your brain) and not external causes (someone else forces you to). No determinist would argue against that, your brain is still operating deterministically though, so your position is no different than determinism. You're using the wrong definition of free will for a compatibilist so it's obviously going to be logically flawed when you attack the wrong argument. The meaningless definition obviously can't exist because it requires a violation of the law of physics, aka it requires the impossible be possible (within a deterministic framework, which is something that we all have good reason to accept). The compatibilist definition of free will is more common sense than the above one because that one is meaningless, why bother using a meaningless word? That's the entire point of this definition because the whole argument is just one of verbal meanings which both sides disagree on. Of course no determinist would argue with it because it's common sense and brings the two ideas, both of which are naturally intuitive, together in a perfectly logical argument. It's very different from the deterministic position because it doesn't have to deal with the problems that arise from saying "free will doesn't exist" or bother wasting time in circular arguments that never lead anywhere. However, if you'd rather have circular arguments on whether free will exists or not and lose individual responsibility for actions, feel free (or not?) to continue using the silly, nonsensical definition of free will No your definition of free will is meaningless because it isn't really free at all. You've just redefined the word and are arguing semantics. It doesn't reconcile anything. It would be like if i say my definition of free will is an apple and apples exist therefore free will exists. Actually, I've already explained how your definition is inherently meaningless and you've still done nothing to explain how it isn't. Your straw man apple argument is actually more like your definition than mine because it necessarily follows that if you define free will as making the possible impossible, then it follows that free will is a necessary contradiction and false. It's a circular argument, just like your apple example. Defining free will as the "ability to act or not to act" does not imply existence in the definition like yours implies nonexistence in it's definition. The compatibilist definition is still free because it still allows individuals to be held personally accountable for their actions, it does reconcile individual responsibility and liberty of choice with a casually determined universe. I haven't redefined the word at all, this notion of "free will" has been around for at least 300 years so it really isn't anything new, it's just a clarification of terms (which is absolutely necessary if you want to talk about any problem at all). Semantics is important because the entire free will vs determinism debate is caused by semantics. TL;DR: In fighting this intuitively common sense notion of free will and asserting that it isn't actually free will, you're the one arguing semantics. I still fail to understand how it is free you need to explain this further. If you have a casually determined universe then you could not have acted otherwise so where does the free part of free will come from? Assigning responsibility and accountability for actions is not different than the position of a hard determinist. Just because you could not have acted otherwise doesn't mean you can't assign blame. A person can be the cause of an event and therefore blame worthy. They are not the first cause though and their own actions are caused by other things. There is really no difference between compatibilism and hard determinism. You are simply using different definitions. To clarify: If your definition of free will is: a freedom to act according to one's determined motives without hindrance from other individuals (taken from wikipedia). Then both you and hard determinists agree it exists. If you definition of free will is: a metaphysical entity that allows an individual to make free decisions and not bound by laws of physics. Then both you and hard determinists agree it doesn't exist. Both positions are identical but 1 group is using 1 definition and the other group is using another. I don't know how else to explain it. Just because what happens, happens necessarily, does not mean that an individual did not freely choose what came about.
If it happens necessarily then how could the individual choose otherwise?
No one is doubting the existence of consciousness and the ability to weigh decisions and make a choice. The question is ultimately whether the decision making process is a product of natural laws of motion and hence deterministic or not.
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On March 11 2012 05:03 L3gendary wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 04:50 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 11 2012 04:14 L3gendary wrote:On March 11 2012 03:51 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 11 2012 03:25 L3gendary wrote:On March 11 2012 01:36 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 15:26 L3gendary wrote:
Compatibilism is just logically flawed. Determinism doesn't preclude the existence of a consciousness that can weigh options and make decisions on how to act. Free will would necessarily have to be non-deterministic and outside of the laws of nature because were it within the laws of nature it would have to act according to them and therefore isn't free.
Essentially, you are defining free will as having the ability to be determined by immediate internal causes (your brain) and not external causes (someone else forces you to). No determinist would argue against that, your brain is still operating deterministically though, so your position is no different than determinism. You're using the wrong definition of free will for a compatibilist so it's obviously going to be logically flawed when you attack the wrong argument. The meaningless definition obviously can't exist because it requires a violation of the law of physics, aka it requires the impossible be possible (within a deterministic framework, which is something that we all have good reason to accept). The compatibilist definition of free will is more common sense than the above one because that one is meaningless, why bother using a meaningless word? That's the entire point of this definition because the whole argument is just one of verbal meanings which both sides disagree on. Of course no determinist would argue with it because it's common sense and brings the two ideas, both of which are naturally intuitive, together in a perfectly logical argument. It's very different from the deterministic position because it doesn't have to deal with the problems that arise from saying "free will doesn't exist" or bother wasting time in circular arguments that never lead anywhere. However, if you'd rather have circular arguments on whether free will exists or not and lose individual responsibility for actions, feel free (or not?) to continue using the silly, nonsensical definition of free will No your definition of free will is meaningless because it isn't really free at all. You've just redefined the word and are arguing semantics. It doesn't reconcile anything. It would be like if i say my definition of free will is an apple and apples exist therefore free will exists. Actually, I've already explained how your definition is inherently meaningless and you've still done nothing to explain how it isn't. Your straw man apple argument is actually more like your definition than mine because it necessarily follows that if you define free will as making the possible impossible, then it follows that free will is a necessary contradiction and false. It's a circular argument, just like your apple example. Defining free will as the "ability to act or not to act" does not imply existence in the definition like yours implies nonexistence in it's definition. The compatibilist definition is still free because it still allows individuals to be held personally accountable for their actions, it does reconcile individual responsibility and liberty of choice with a casually determined universe. I haven't redefined the word at all, this notion of "free will" has been around for at least 300 years so it really isn't anything new, it's just a clarification of terms (which is absolutely necessary if you want to talk about any problem at all). Semantics is important because the entire free will vs determinism debate is caused by semantics. TL;DR: In fighting this intuitively common sense notion of free will and asserting that it isn't actually free will, you're the one arguing semantics. I still fail to understand how it is free you need to explain this further. If you have a casually determined universe then you could not have acted otherwise so where does the free part of free will come from? Assigning responsibility and accountability for actions is not different than the position of a hard determinist. Just because you could not have acted otherwise doesn't mean you can't assign blame. A person can be the cause of an event and therefore blame worthy. They are not the first cause though and their own actions are caused by other things. There is really no difference between compatibilism and hard determinism. You are simply using different definitions. To clarify: If your definition of free will is: a freedom to act according to one's determined motives without hindrance from other individuals (taken from wikipedia). Then both you and hard determinists agree it exists. If you definition of free will is: a metaphysical entity that allows an individual to make free decisions and not bound by laws of physics. Then both you and hard determinists agree it doesn't exist. Both positions are identical but 1 group is using 1 definition and the other group is using another. I don't know how else to explain it. Just because what happens, happens necessarily, does not mean that an individual did not freely choose what came about. If it happens necessarily then how could the individual choose otherwise? No one is doubting the existence of consciousness and the ability to weigh decisions and make a choice. The question is ultimately whether the decision making process is a product of natural laws of motion and hence deterministic or not.
The distinction is that just because it is the case that you couldn't have ultimately chosen otherwise, it does not follow that you did not freely choose the only truly possible decision you could have made. It's easily feasible that you could have hypothetically chosen otherwise, the choice to act or not to act still resides within an individual, it just so happens that whatever is chosen was necessarily chosen.
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Seriously, that's just some philosophical mumbo jumbo. Your definiton of free will does not make any sense whatsoever. It's neither free (because you have no influence on it) nor is it will (because there's no such moment/time when you're truly making a decision as an agent).
Making a decision is a physical process (on the most fundamental level). You can't choose to do anything independent of it. It's as absurd as saying it's one's choice that his nails grow...
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You choose what to do, so you have free will , and I read the entire post, even quantum physic will never be able to prove that free will is non-existant, and dont say I am an ignoramus, I am a science student.
Peace.
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On March 11 2012 05:06 GGTeMpLaR wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 05:03 L3gendary wrote:On March 11 2012 04:50 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 11 2012 04:14 L3gendary wrote:On March 11 2012 03:51 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 11 2012 03:25 L3gendary wrote:On March 11 2012 01:36 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 15:26 L3gendary wrote:
Compatibilism is just logically flawed. Determinism doesn't preclude the existence of a consciousness that can weigh options and make decisions on how to act. Free will would necessarily have to be non-deterministic and outside of the laws of nature because were it within the laws of nature it would have to act according to them and therefore isn't free.
Essentially, you are defining free will as having the ability to be determined by immediate internal causes (your brain) and not external causes (someone else forces you to). No determinist would argue against that, your brain is still operating deterministically though, so your position is no different than determinism. You're using the wrong definition of free will for a compatibilist so it's obviously going to be logically flawed when you attack the wrong argument. The meaningless definition obviously can't exist because it requires a violation of the law of physics, aka it requires the impossible be possible (within a deterministic framework, which is something that we all have good reason to accept). The compatibilist definition of free will is more common sense than the above one because that one is meaningless, why bother using a meaningless word? That's the entire point of this definition because the whole argument is just one of verbal meanings which both sides disagree on. Of course no determinist would argue with it because it's common sense and brings the two ideas, both of which are naturally intuitive, together in a perfectly logical argument. It's very different from the deterministic position because it doesn't have to deal with the problems that arise from saying "free will doesn't exist" or bother wasting time in circular arguments that never lead anywhere. However, if you'd rather have circular arguments on whether free will exists or not and lose individual responsibility for actions, feel free (or not?) to continue using the silly, nonsensical definition of free will No your definition of free will is meaningless because it isn't really free at all. You've just redefined the word and are arguing semantics. It doesn't reconcile anything. It would be like if i say my definition of free will is an apple and apples exist therefore free will exists. Actually, I've already explained how your definition is inherently meaningless and you've still done nothing to explain how it isn't. Your straw man apple argument is actually more like your definition than mine because it necessarily follows that if you define free will as making the possible impossible, then it follows that free will is a necessary contradiction and false. It's a circular argument, just like your apple example. Defining free will as the "ability to act or not to act" does not imply existence in the definition like yours implies nonexistence in it's definition. The compatibilist definition is still free because it still allows individuals to be held personally accountable for their actions, it does reconcile individual responsibility and liberty of choice with a casually determined universe. I haven't redefined the word at all, this notion of "free will" has been around for at least 300 years so it really isn't anything new, it's just a clarification of terms (which is absolutely necessary if you want to talk about any problem at all). Semantics is important because the entire free will vs determinism debate is caused by semantics. TL;DR: In fighting this intuitively common sense notion of free will and asserting that it isn't actually free will, you're the one arguing semantics. I still fail to understand how it is free you need to explain this further. If you have a casually determined universe then you could not have acted otherwise so where does the free part of free will come from? Assigning responsibility and accountability for actions is not different than the position of a hard determinist. Just because you could not have acted otherwise doesn't mean you can't assign blame. A person can be the cause of an event and therefore blame worthy. They are not the first cause though and their own actions are caused by other things. There is really no difference between compatibilism and hard determinism. You are simply using different definitions. To clarify: If your definition of free will is: a freedom to act according to one's determined motives without hindrance from other individuals (taken from wikipedia). Then both you and hard determinists agree it exists. If you definition of free will is: a metaphysical entity that allows an individual to make free decisions and not bound by laws of physics. Then both you and hard determinists agree it doesn't exist. Both positions are identical but 1 group is using 1 definition and the other group is using another. I don't know how else to explain it. Just because what happens, happens necessarily, does not mean that an individual did not freely choose what came about. If it happens necessarily then how could the individual choose otherwise? No one is doubting the existence of consciousness and the ability to weigh decisions and make a choice. The question is ultimately whether the decision making process is a product of natural laws of motion and hence deterministic or not. The distinction is that just because it is the case that you couldn't have ultimately chosen otherwise, it does not follow that you did not freely choose the only truly possible decision you could have made. It's easily feasible that you could have hypothetically chosen otherwise, the choice to act or not to act still resides within an individual, it just so happens that whatever is chosen was necessarily chosen.
These are contradictions.
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On March 11 2012 05:33 L3gendary wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 05:06 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 11 2012 05:03 L3gendary wrote:On March 11 2012 04:50 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 11 2012 04:14 L3gendary wrote:On March 11 2012 03:51 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 11 2012 03:25 L3gendary wrote:On March 11 2012 01:36 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 15:26 L3gendary wrote:
Compatibilism is just logically flawed. Determinism doesn't preclude the existence of a consciousness that can weigh options and make decisions on how to act. Free will would necessarily have to be non-deterministic and outside of the laws of nature because were it within the laws of nature it would have to act according to them and therefore isn't free.
Essentially, you are defining free will as having the ability to be determined by immediate internal causes (your brain) and not external causes (someone else forces you to). No determinist would argue against that, your brain is still operating deterministically though, so your position is no different than determinism. You're using the wrong definition of free will for a compatibilist so it's obviously going to be logically flawed when you attack the wrong argument. The meaningless definition obviously can't exist because it requires a violation of the law of physics, aka it requires the impossible be possible (within a deterministic framework, which is something that we all have good reason to accept). The compatibilist definition of free will is more common sense than the above one because that one is meaningless, why bother using a meaningless word? That's the entire point of this definition because the whole argument is just one of verbal meanings which both sides disagree on. Of course no determinist would argue with it because it's common sense and brings the two ideas, both of which are naturally intuitive, together in a perfectly logical argument. It's very different from the deterministic position because it doesn't have to deal with the problems that arise from saying "free will doesn't exist" or bother wasting time in circular arguments that never lead anywhere. However, if you'd rather have circular arguments on whether free will exists or not and lose individual responsibility for actions, feel free (or not?) to continue using the silly, nonsensical definition of free will No your definition of free will is meaningless because it isn't really free at all. You've just redefined the word and are arguing semantics. It doesn't reconcile anything. It would be like if i say my definition of free will is an apple and apples exist therefore free will exists. Actually, I've already explained how your definition is inherently meaningless and you've still done nothing to explain how it isn't. Your straw man apple argument is actually more like your definition than mine because it necessarily follows that if you define free will as making the possible impossible, then it follows that free will is a necessary contradiction and false. It's a circular argument, just like your apple example. Defining free will as the "ability to act or not to act" does not imply existence in the definition like yours implies nonexistence in it's definition. The compatibilist definition is still free because it still allows individuals to be held personally accountable for their actions, it does reconcile individual responsibility and liberty of choice with a casually determined universe. I haven't redefined the word at all, this notion of "free will" has been around for at least 300 years so it really isn't anything new, it's just a clarification of terms (which is absolutely necessary if you want to talk about any problem at all). Semantics is important because the entire free will vs determinism debate is caused by semantics. TL;DR: In fighting this intuitively common sense notion of free will and asserting that it isn't actually free will, you're the one arguing semantics. I still fail to understand how it is free you need to explain this further. If you have a casually determined universe then you could not have acted otherwise so where does the free part of free will come from? Assigning responsibility and accountability for actions is not different than the position of a hard determinist. Just because you could not have acted otherwise doesn't mean you can't assign blame. A person can be the cause of an event and therefore blame worthy. They are not the first cause though and their own actions are caused by other things. There is really no difference between compatibilism and hard determinism. You are simply using different definitions. To clarify: If your definition of free will is: a freedom to act according to one's determined motives without hindrance from other individuals (taken from wikipedia). Then both you and hard determinists agree it exists. If you definition of free will is: a metaphysical entity that allows an individual to make free decisions and not bound by laws of physics. Then both you and hard determinists agree it doesn't exist. Both positions are identical but 1 group is using 1 definition and the other group is using another. I don't know how else to explain it. Just because what happens, happens necessarily, does not mean that an individual did not freely choose what came about. If it happens necessarily then how could the individual choose otherwise? No one is doubting the existence of consciousness and the ability to weigh decisions and make a choice. The question is ultimately whether the decision making process is a product of natural laws of motion and hence deterministic or not. The distinction is that just because it is the case that you couldn't have ultimately chosen otherwise, it does not follow that you did not freely choose the only truly possible decision you could have made. It's easily feasible that you could have hypothetically chosen otherwise, the choice to act or not to act still resides within an individual, it just so happens that whatever is chosen was necessarily chosen. These are contradictions.
Something actually not being the case but hypothetically being so is in no way a contradiction.
I didn't actually post about puppies here but I hypothetically could have. No contradiction at all.
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On March 11 2012 05:23 maybenexttime wrote:
Seriously, that's just some philosophical mumbo jumbo. Your definiton of free will does not make any sense whatsoever. It's neither free (because you have no influence on it) nor is it will (because there's no such moment/time when you're truly making a decision as an agent).
Making a decision is a physical process (on the most fundamental level). You can't choose to do anything independent of it. It's as absurd as saying it's one's choice that his nails grow...
It makes perfect sense, whether you choose to accept it or not is your choice. I don't see how you would accept the alternative absurd definition of it over this one though. You do have an influence on it (so it is free) and you are making a decision as an agent (so it is will).
Never did I deny that it was independent of physical process and that's not the compatibilist position. You're mistaking compatibilism with indeterminism here.
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And how do you have an influence on it? You can't act independent of the universe and physical processes that constitute your mind, conciousness and decisions. There's no freedom in being a passive result of natural phenomenons (either deterministic or random, doesn't matter). You're not an agent the same way a river is not an agent and does not choose to flow a certain path...
I'm not mistaking anything for anything. Your definition is self-contradictory and absurd. You're making up meaningless definitions to suit your point of view. You're claiming that a mental process that's entirely a result of physical phenomenons can be labled as choice, and free at that, despite there being no opportunity for the supposed agent to make any sort of choice. You could say there's choice involved (although that's already stretching it), but there's no will, because will assumes independence from the physical world.
You're essentially saying that a river has free will too. You're saying that a river is making a decision to flow a certain path (and don't tell me this is a straw man, because a human being is no different from a river, other than the fact that it's a more complicated collection of particles).
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On March 11 2012 05:51 GGTeMpLaR wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 05:33 L3gendary wrote:On March 11 2012 05:06 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 11 2012 05:03 L3gendary wrote:On March 11 2012 04:50 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 11 2012 04:14 L3gendary wrote:On March 11 2012 03:51 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 11 2012 03:25 L3gendary wrote:On March 11 2012 01:36 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 15:26 L3gendary wrote:
Compatibilism is just logically flawed. Determinism doesn't preclude the existence of a consciousness that can weigh options and make decisions on how to act. Free will would necessarily have to be non-deterministic and outside of the laws of nature because were it within the laws of nature it would have to act according to them and therefore isn't free.
Essentially, you are defining free will as having the ability to be determined by immediate internal causes (your brain) and not external causes (someone else forces you to). No determinist would argue against that, your brain is still operating deterministically though, so your position is no different than determinism. You're using the wrong definition of free will for a compatibilist so it's obviously going to be logically flawed when you attack the wrong argument. The meaningless definition obviously can't exist because it requires a violation of the law of physics, aka it requires the impossible be possible (within a deterministic framework, which is something that we all have good reason to accept). The compatibilist definition of free will is more common sense than the above one because that one is meaningless, why bother using a meaningless word? That's the entire point of this definition because the whole argument is just one of verbal meanings which both sides disagree on. Of course no determinist would argue with it because it's common sense and brings the two ideas, both of which are naturally intuitive, together in a perfectly logical argument. It's very different from the deterministic position because it doesn't have to deal with the problems that arise from saying "free will doesn't exist" or bother wasting time in circular arguments that never lead anywhere. However, if you'd rather have circular arguments on whether free will exists or not and lose individual responsibility for actions, feel free (or not?) to continue using the silly, nonsensical definition of free will No your definition of free will is meaningless because it isn't really free at all. You've just redefined the word and are arguing semantics. It doesn't reconcile anything. It would be like if i say my definition of free will is an apple and apples exist therefore free will exists. Actually, I've already explained how your definition is inherently meaningless and you've still done nothing to explain how it isn't. Your straw man apple argument is actually more like your definition than mine because it necessarily follows that if you define free will as making the possible impossible, then it follows that free will is a necessary contradiction and false. It's a circular argument, just like your apple example. Defining free will as the "ability to act or not to act" does not imply existence in the definition like yours implies nonexistence in it's definition. The compatibilist definition is still free because it still allows individuals to be held personally accountable for their actions, it does reconcile individual responsibility and liberty of choice with a casually determined universe. I haven't redefined the word at all, this notion of "free will" has been around for at least 300 years so it really isn't anything new, it's just a clarification of terms (which is absolutely necessary if you want to talk about any problem at all). Semantics is important because the entire free will vs determinism debate is caused by semantics. TL;DR: In fighting this intuitively common sense notion of free will and asserting that it isn't actually free will, you're the one arguing semantics. I still fail to understand how it is free you need to explain this further. If you have a casually determined universe then you could not have acted otherwise so where does the free part of free will come from? Assigning responsibility and accountability for actions is not different than the position of a hard determinist. Just because you could not have acted otherwise doesn't mean you can't assign blame. A person can be the cause of an event and therefore blame worthy. They are not the first cause though and their own actions are caused by other things. There is really no difference between compatibilism and hard determinism. You are simply using different definitions. To clarify: If your definition of free will is: a freedom to act according to one's determined motives without hindrance from other individuals (taken from wikipedia). Then both you and hard determinists agree it exists. If you definition of free will is: a metaphysical entity that allows an individual to make free decisions and not bound by laws of physics. Then both you and hard determinists agree it doesn't exist. Both positions are identical but 1 group is using 1 definition and the other group is using another. I don't know how else to explain it. Just because what happens, happens necessarily, does not mean that an individual did not freely choose what came about. If it happens necessarily then how could the individual choose otherwise? No one is doubting the existence of consciousness and the ability to weigh decisions and make a choice. The question is ultimately whether the decision making process is a product of natural laws of motion and hence deterministic or not. The distinction is that just because it is the case that you couldn't have ultimately chosen otherwise, it does not follow that you did not freely choose the only truly possible decision you could have made. It's easily feasible that you could have hypothetically chosen otherwise, the choice to act or not to act still resides within an individual, it just so happens that whatever is chosen was necessarily chosen. These are contradictions. Something actually not being the case but hypothetically being so is in no way a contradiction. I didn't actually post about puppies here but I hypothetically could have. No contradiction at all.
No but that's it you could not have. Let's say a ball went into a net. You could entertain the idea that it had not, that is it hypothetically missed. But if you examine it on a fundamental level you find it could not have done otherwise without violating laws of physics. In much the same way you had no actual choice of what to post when examined on a fundamental level. Hypotheticals only come into play when we ignore laws of physics and talk about wishful thinking.
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On March 11 2012 03:42 L3gendary wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 03:33 Hertzy wrote:
Here's a thought experiment; let's presume universe has no free will. Let's further presume a machine that can gather enough data to tell the future for about a minute ahead.
Put two cards, let's say an ace of spades and an ace of diamonds, face up on a table in front of a contrarian or a free will proponent, use the machine to foretell which they'll pick, tell them the result and then ask them to pick either card. Just how will this go down? The problem is the same experiment can be done with a computer program instead, which we would all agree has no free will. Let's say the computer program is given an input either 0 and 1 and gives the opposite output. So if it gets 0 it gives you a 1 and vice versa. Now you use some machine to find out which output you'll get in the future and give that as the input to the computer program. So you can see there's a contradiction here because the computer will always give you the opposite number. This issue here is that future actions have an effect on the past which violates causality. It makes more sense to look at the world from a quantum mechanical perspective than hard determinism because it doesn't have these contradictions.
True, you can write a computer program that gives a predetermined output in response to an input. However, you can't then expand that program to analyze it's own code and return the output it is not supposed to return, because any output is what the code tells the program to return.
The thought experiment I put forward relies quite heavily on the future being predetermined and determinable in advance. I would argue that if there is some unpredictable phenomenon affecting human decision making, you can call that free will.
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the logical paradox of "free will" is similar to the "chicken and egg" paradox, the answer lies in the perspective you look at it
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On March 11 2012 06:16 maybenexttime wrote:
And how do you have an influence on it? You can't act independent of the universe and physical processes that constitute your mind, conciousness and decisions. There's no freedom in being a passive result of natural phenomenons (either deterministic or random, doesn't matter). You're not an agent the same way a river is not an agent and does not choose to flow a certain path...
I'm not mistaking anything for anything. Your definition is self-contradictory and absurd. You're making up meaningless definitions to suit your point of view. You're claiming that a mental process that's entirely a result of physical phenomenons can be labled as choice, and free at that, despite there being no opportunity for the supposed agent to make any sort of choice. You could say there's choice involved (although that's already stretching it), but there's no will, because will assumes independence from the physical world.
You're essentially saying that a river has free will too. You're saying that a river is making a decision to flow a certain path (and don't tell me this is a straw man, because a human being is no different from a river, other than the fact that it's a more complicated collection of particles).
There is freedom, even in a casually determined universe, the two are not mutually exclusive and if you go back and read the past few pages I've tried to explain in my own words, alternatively you could do some research on the popular compatibilist arguments. The fact that you've compared humans to rivers as having the same level of agency is enough to show that you have a clear misunderstanding of what that word even means to begin with.
You are definitely mistaking the compatibilist definition of free will with the incompatibilist definition of free will because that's the definition that is absurd and meaningless (as I've explained numerous times and no one has really disputed the fact that it is in fact problematic), not to mention redundant and circular.
I'll even bold your misunderstanding of the compatibilist argument since you seem to be under the impression that you aren't making any. Given that you falsely understand the bold to be true, I can see why you would think there would be an inherent contradiction with the former statement of that sentence, however in the bold lies the source of your misunderstanding. Another misunderstanding is in your notion that will somehow has to be independent of the physical world (as if I anywhere claimed to be or used arguments related to dualism or transcendence of reality at all).
Once again, it's sad that I have to point this out but I'm not making up meaningless definitions, compatibilism has been a widely popular (albeit disputed) solution to the free will vs determinism debate for centuries.
If you honestly think a river has sentience like human being, then I really doubt I'll be able to convince you that we do in fact have free will and you most likely won't be able to convince me that rivers have sentience like human beings. It is a straw man regardless of whether you'll admit it or not because you're operating on the assumption that I agree with your notion of living, sentient rivers capable of making decisions. In saying my argument forces me into saying rivers have free will ,something obviously absurd that I never claimed, you are misrepresenting my argument (strawman QED).
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EPT
