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Yes, this is a thread on TL that involves religion, but I hate to think that our policy should be to blindly close every such thread. Sam Harris is a writer whose books are both insightful and have sparked many good discussions in the past and as long as the thread doesn't derail I'd like to leave it open. This should be the basic premise for every such thread, no matter how high the odds of it derailing. In that light, these posts that just predict the downfall of this thread (whether it be pre-determined or not) are 1) Not contributing to the discussion 2) Backseat moderating 3) Annoying 4) Actually contributing towards derailing it. I'll keep 2 daying people for this. |
oh man you operate like such a philosopher
but kudos for being precise in your terminology
i haven't read wittgenstein, but i think like him, in that i often view these arguments as mutual misunderstandings of key words, like "free will." he focuses on the semantics and language of it... i think
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Compatibilism is just logically flawed. Determinism doesn't preclude the existence of a consciousness that can weigh options and make decisions on how to act. Free will would necessarily have to be non-deterministic and outside of the laws of nature because were it within the laws of nature it would have to act according to them and therefore isn't free.
Essentially, you are defining free will as having the ability to be determined by immediate internal causes (your brain) and not external causes (someone else forces you to). No determinist would argue against that, your brain is still operating deterministically though, so your position is no different than determinism.
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Compatibilists (aka soft determinists) often define an instance of "free will" as one in which the agent had freedom to act. That is, the agent was not coerced or restrained. Arthur Schopenhauer famously said "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills".[2] In other words, although an agent may often be free to act according to a motive, the nature of that motive is determined. Also note that this definition of free will does not rely on the truth or falsity of Causal Determinism.
from wiki
its still a definition thing
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On March 10 2012 14:41 GGTeMpLaR wrote:Show nested quote +On March 10 2012 14:26 paralleluniverse wrote:On March 10 2012 14:22 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:16 xrapture wrote:On March 10 2012 14:03 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:01 xrapture wrote:On March 10 2012 13:40 paralleluniverse wrote:QM is perfectly random, in the sense that it is impossible to predict. There is no grey area, according to our current understanding of QM, it's truly random. There was a debate during the time QM was discovered. On one side, you had people like Einstein saying that there was some hidden mechanics under QM that we aren't aware of yet, and that the universe is not random, hence "God does not play dice with the Universe", on the other side, I believe were most other physicist who discovered QM, who said the universe is fundamentally random. Then Bell's Inequality was devised to test which was right, and it turned out that unless QM violate certain pinciples of physics, that the universe is fundamentally random, and that there wasn't some hidden mechanism behind it that once we discovered, we could explain away the randomness, i.e. the randomness in QM does not arise out of a lack of understanding of an underlying mechanic, but rather because the universe is in fact random. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_inequalityWhile it doesn't completely rules out hidden variables, it restricts it severely, and the conventional today is that it is more likely that QM is fundamentally random. And even if QM isn't random, but there are hidden variables behind it that we haven't discovered yet, this leads us right back to determinism, and hence no free will still. Yes, I believe that both conclusions equate to no free will. "there is no grey area, according to our current understanding of QM, it's truly random." There can not be free will if events are random, correct? And like you said, if there are hidden variables we are right back to determinism. How exactly does the fact that there is no randomness in the universe result in no free will? Free will is not dependent on that at all. Because if QM randomness if a result of hidden variables, then it is a causal effect. Determinism states that the future is simply a result of a series of past events-- components in a long equation. If the reason for QM randomness is just another component in the equation it is an aid for an argument for determinism. You didn't answer my question because you just explained how the fact that there are no random events in the universe supports the notion that everything is caused out of necessity. That doesn't answer my question of how there can be no free will because of it. Here, this might clarify because apparently no one thinks anything besides the top left or bottom right box exists: ![[image loading]](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/7b/DeterminismXFreeWill.jpg/800px-DeterminismXFreeWill.jpg) Compatiblist believe in a different type of "free will", i.e. the ability to act according to ones intention, even if that intention isn't free. So that diagram isn't really accurate. The usual definition of free will is more like the ability to act according to your will regardless of the state of nature. Compatiblists don't believe in this type of free will. Theologians do. The intention is free actually, it just so happens that what is chosen is a result of necessity according to our understanding of causation. The "usual" (?) definition of free will being acting independent of necessity is meaningless to even argue against if you hold the view that the world is deterministic and it just results in both sides of the argument (free will vs determinism) going around in circles because they have different understandings of how the universe operates.
If the intention to act in a certain way is a result of causation as you say (and which I agree with), then how is it free?
Your definition of free must be quite wonky to make it fit.
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On March 10 2012 16:14 paralleluniverse wrote:Show nested quote +On March 10 2012 14:41 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:26 paralleluniverse wrote:On March 10 2012 14:22 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:16 xrapture wrote:On March 10 2012 14:03 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:01 xrapture wrote:On March 10 2012 13:40 paralleluniverse wrote:QM is perfectly random, in the sense that it is impossible to predict. There is no grey area, according to our current understanding of QM, it's truly random. There was a debate during the time QM was discovered. On one side, you had people like Einstein saying that there was some hidden mechanics under QM that we aren't aware of yet, and that the universe is not random, hence "God does not play dice with the Universe", on the other side, I believe were most other physicist who discovered QM, who said the universe is fundamentally random. Then Bell's Inequality was devised to test which was right, and it turned out that unless QM violate certain pinciples of physics, that the universe is fundamentally random, and that there wasn't some hidden mechanism behind it that once we discovered, we could explain away the randomness, i.e. the randomness in QM does not arise out of a lack of understanding of an underlying mechanic, but rather because the universe is in fact random. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_inequalityWhile it doesn't completely rules out hidden variables, it restricts it severely, and the conventional today is that it is more likely that QM is fundamentally random. And even if QM isn't random, but there are hidden variables behind it that we haven't discovered yet, this leads us right back to determinism, and hence no free will still. Yes, I believe that both conclusions equate to no free will. "there is no grey area, according to our current understanding of QM, it's truly random." There can not be free will if events are random, correct? And like you said, if there are hidden variables we are right back to determinism. How exactly does the fact that there is no randomness in the universe result in no free will? Free will is not dependent on that at all. Because if QM randomness if a result of hidden variables, then it is a causal effect. Determinism states that the future is simply a result of a series of past events-- components in a long equation. If the reason for QM randomness is just another component in the equation it is an aid for an argument for determinism. You didn't answer my question because you just explained how the fact that there are no random events in the universe supports the notion that everything is caused out of necessity. That doesn't answer my question of how there can be no free will because of it. Here, this might clarify because apparently no one thinks anything besides the top left or bottom right box exists: Compatiblist believe in a different type of "free will", i.e. the ability to act according to ones intention, even if that intention isn't free. So that diagram isn't really accurate. The usual definition of free will is more like the ability to act according to your will regardless of the state of nature. Compatiblists don't believe in this type of free will. Theologians do. The intention is free actually, it just so happens that what is chosen is a result of necessity according to our understanding of causation. The "usual" (?) definition of free will being acting independent of necessity is meaningless to even argue against if you hold the view that the world is deterministic and it just results in both sides of the argument (free will vs determinism) going around in circles because they have different understandings of how the universe operates. If the intention to act in a certain way is a result of causation as you say (and which I agree with), then how is it free? Your definition of free must be quite wonky to make it fit.
I find this post quite ironic. Your definition of "free" strikes me as completely off the mark, because you seem to be able to conclude "natural laws" => "no freedom". How strange and incomprehensible must a definition of "freedom" be if it is incompatible with the lawfulness of the natural world? Let me ask you this: Can a society be "free" or at least more "free" than another society or would you say that this is impossible because "particles obey natural laws". Imagine going to a political seminar and propose such a notion. You would be rightfully laughed off the stage. Somehow you were able to convince yourself that it all makes sense when applied to "freedom of the will", however.
In my view the only comprehensible way to think about freedom is in relevant "can do"s. In this respect there is a clear progression in freedom from stones to bugs to mice to monkey to men. Or as Dennett puts it: Freedom evolves!
I find it really odd that you seem to agree to some extent, but then say that this is "just semantics". On the contrary, proposing an incomprehensible concept and then moving on to show that "it does not exist" can only succeed at the "semantic" level of language analysis. For in order to find out whether something "really exists" by looking at the world, you first need to have a comprehensible concept which is suitable for inspection.
The concept of "free will" is not hollow nor meaningless precisely because its causes and effects can be studied and are consequential. There is certainly a lot of confusion around it and religion is maybe mainly responsible for this, since they are pushing their rather incomprehensible theological interpretations (free will as a miracle). But saying that "free will does not exist" or "is 'only' an illusion" means to compound the confusion not clearing it up.
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Not sure if this has been posted, but the brilliant scientist Dr. Michio Kaku has something to say about this little argument.
[unsupported embed: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jint5kjoy6I&feature=relmfu]
For some reason normal embing doesnt work for me so I have to use this stupid method. If a mod wants to edit that out and fix it please do.
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On March 10 2012 12:05 L3gendary wrote:Show nested quote +On March 10 2012 10:47 seppolevne wrote:On March 10 2012 09:35 L3gendary wrote:
In no way does QM make free will possible. The wave function is still deterministic and all it does is make things more random. Randomness is really the opposite of free will, it'd be like judging whether you should kill someone based on a coin flip. Ofc QM isn't completely random in the sense that everything is equally probably. Instead it describes the probabilities of different scenarios. The human brain doesn't have the power to somehow change these probabilities. What do you mean the waveform is deterministic? Like it always collapses the same way under the exact same conditions? The evolution of the wavefunction is deterministic. Once it is measured it collapses to a random point and then continues evolving deterministically. If you could determine the wavefunction of the universe at any point in time you could determine it at any point in the future or past. But that wavefunction would also contain all the cases for things that weren't realized. There are different interpretations (many worlds, copenhagen etc) of what the wavefunction really is so I'm not going go into it much further because it doesn't relate to this discussion. My point was that the probabilities themselves evolve deterministically and can't just be changed because of somebody willing it.
But there is a difference of possibility between the measured and unmeasured universe, isn't that what the double-slit experiment was about?
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On March 05 2012 22:10 Skilledblob wrote:
and I dont understand why someone has to bring up religion all the time. Religion is no answer, religion is an option. If some more understood this then we could stop lots of these childish religion yes/no discussions.
I agree. The sooner we stop talking about these stupid myths, the sooner they'll die.
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On March 10 2012 16:14 paralleluniverse wrote:Show nested quote +On March 10 2012 14:41 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:26 paralleluniverse wrote:On March 10 2012 14:22 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:16 xrapture wrote:On March 10 2012 14:03 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:01 xrapture wrote:On March 10 2012 13:40 paralleluniverse wrote:QM is perfectly random, in the sense that it is impossible to predict. There is no grey area, according to our current understanding of QM, it's truly random. There was a debate during the time QM was discovered. On one side, you had people like Einstein saying that there was some hidden mechanics under QM that we aren't aware of yet, and that the universe is not random, hence "God does not play dice with the Universe", on the other side, I believe were most other physicist who discovered QM, who said the universe is fundamentally random. Then Bell's Inequality was devised to test which was right, and it turned out that unless QM violate certain pinciples of physics, that the universe is fundamentally random, and that there wasn't some hidden mechanism behind it that once we discovered, we could explain away the randomness, i.e. the randomness in QM does not arise out of a lack of understanding of an underlying mechanic, but rather because the universe is in fact random. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_inequalityWhile it doesn't completely rules out hidden variables, it restricts it severely, and the conventional today is that it is more likely that QM is fundamentally random. And even if QM isn't random, but there are hidden variables behind it that we haven't discovered yet, this leads us right back to determinism, and hence no free will still. Yes, I believe that both conclusions equate to no free will. "there is no grey area, according to our current understanding of QM, it's truly random." There can not be free will if events are random, correct? And like you said, if there are hidden variables we are right back to determinism. How exactly does the fact that there is no randomness in the universe result in no free will? Free will is not dependent on that at all. Because if QM randomness if a result of hidden variables, then it is a causal effect. Determinism states that the future is simply a result of a series of past events-- components in a long equation. If the reason for QM randomness is just another component in the equation it is an aid for an argument for determinism. You didn't answer my question because you just explained how the fact that there are no random events in the universe supports the notion that everything is caused out of necessity. That doesn't answer my question of how there can be no free will because of it. Here, this might clarify because apparently no one thinks anything besides the top left or bottom right box exists: Compatiblist believe in a different type of "free will", i.e. the ability to act according to ones intention, even if that intention isn't free. So that diagram isn't really accurate. The usual definition of free will is more like the ability to act according to your will regardless of the state of nature. Compatiblists don't believe in this type of free will. Theologians do. The intention is free actually, it just so happens that what is chosen is a result of necessity according to our understanding of causation. The "usual" (?) definition of free will being acting independent of necessity is meaningless to even argue against if you hold the view that the world is deterministic and it just results in both sides of the argument (free will vs determinism) going around in circles because they have different understandings of how the universe operates. If the intention to act in a certain way is a result of causation as you say (and which I agree with), then how is it free? Your definition of free must be quite wonky to make it fit.
It isn't wonky I just think you're confusing motive with intention. Intention is what you mean to accomplish by acting in a certain way and given that you are free to choose whether to act or not, it follows that your intentions can be free as well.
I'll grant that motive doesn't seem like something that would be free though.
@MiraMax goes into a lot more detail on why the hard determinist definition of free being presented here constantly is the wonky one.
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On March 10 2012 15:26 L3gendary wrote:
Compatibilism is just logically flawed. Determinism doesn't preclude the existence of a consciousness that can weigh options and make decisions on how to act. Free will would necessarily have to be non-deterministic and outside of the laws of nature because were it within the laws of nature it would have to act according to them and therefore isn't free.
Essentially, you are defining free will as having the ability to be determined by immediate internal causes (your brain) and not external causes (someone else forces you to). No determinist would argue against that, your brain is still operating deterministically though, so your position is no different than determinism.
You're using the wrong definition of free will for a compatibilist so it's obviously going to be logically flawed when you attack the wrong argument. The meaningless definition obviously can't exist because it requires a violation of the law of physics, aka it requires the impossible be possible (within a deterministic framework, which is something that we all have good reason to accept).
The compatibilist definition of free will is more common sense than the above one because that one is meaningless, why bother using a meaningless word? That's the entire point of this definition because the whole argument is just one of verbal meanings which both sides disagree on. Of course no determinist would argue with it because it's common sense and brings the two ideas, both of which are naturally intuitive, together in a perfectly logical argument.
It's very different from the deterministic position because it doesn't have to deal with the problems that arise from saying "free will doesn't exist" or bother wasting time in circular arguments that never lead anywhere. However, if you'd rather have circular arguments on whether free will exists or not and lose individual responsibility for actions, feel free (or not?) to continue using the silly, nonsensical definition of free will
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On March 11 2012 01:31 GGTeMpLaR wrote:Show nested quote +On March 10 2012 16:14 paralleluniverse wrote:On March 10 2012 14:41 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:26 paralleluniverse wrote:On March 10 2012 14:22 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:16 xrapture wrote:On March 10 2012 14:03 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:01 xrapture wrote:On March 10 2012 13:40 paralleluniverse wrote:QM is perfectly random, in the sense that it is impossible to predict. There is no grey area, according to our current understanding of QM, it's truly random. There was a debate during the time QM was discovered. On one side, you had people like Einstein saying that there was some hidden mechanics under QM that we aren't aware of yet, and that the universe is not random, hence "God does not play dice with the Universe", on the other side, I believe were most other physicist who discovered QM, who said the universe is fundamentally random. Then Bell's Inequality was devised to test which was right, and it turned out that unless QM violate certain pinciples of physics, that the universe is fundamentally random, and that there wasn't some hidden mechanism behind it that once we discovered, we could explain away the randomness, i.e. the randomness in QM does not arise out of a lack of understanding of an underlying mechanic, but rather because the universe is in fact random. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_inequalityWhile it doesn't completely rules out hidden variables, it restricts it severely, and the conventional today is that it is more likely that QM is fundamentally random. And even if QM isn't random, but there are hidden variables behind it that we haven't discovered yet, this leads us right back to determinism, and hence no free will still. Yes, I believe that both conclusions equate to no free will. "there is no grey area, according to our current understanding of QM, it's truly random." There can not be free will if events are random, correct? And like you said, if there are hidden variables we are right back to determinism. How exactly does the fact that there is no randomness in the universe result in no free will? Free will is not dependent on that at all. Because if QM randomness if a result of hidden variables, then it is a causal effect. Determinism states that the future is simply a result of a series of past events-- components in a long equation. If the reason for QM randomness is just another component in the equation it is an aid for an argument for determinism. You didn't answer my question because you just explained how the fact that there are no random events in the universe supports the notion that everything is caused out of necessity. That doesn't answer my question of how there can be no free will because of it. Here, this might clarify because apparently no one thinks anything besides the top left or bottom right box exists: Compatiblist believe in a different type of "free will", i.e. the ability to act according to ones intention, even if that intention isn't free. So that diagram isn't really accurate. The usual definition of free will is more like the ability to act according to your will regardless of the state of nature. Compatiblists don't believe in this type of free will. Theologians do. The intention is free actually, it just so happens that what is chosen is a result of necessity according to our understanding of causation. The "usual" (?) definition of free will being acting independent of necessity is meaningless to even argue against if you hold the view that the world is deterministic and it just results in both sides of the argument (free will vs determinism) going around in circles because they have different understandings of how the universe operates. If the intention to act in a certain way is a result of causation as you say (and which I agree with), then how is it free? Your definition of free must be quite wonky to make it fit. It isn't wonky I just think you're confusing motive with intention. Intention is what you mean to accomplish by acting in a certain way and given that you are free to choose whether to act or not, it follows that your intentions can be free as well. I'll grant that motive doesn't seem like something that would be free though.
How are you free to choose whether you act or not?
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On March 11 2012 01:37 seppolevne wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 01:31 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 16:14 paralleluniverse wrote:On March 10 2012 14:41 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:26 paralleluniverse wrote:On March 10 2012 14:22 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:16 xrapture wrote:On March 10 2012 14:03 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:01 xrapture wrote:On March 10 2012 13:40 paralleluniverse wrote:QM is perfectly random, in the sense that it is impossible to predict. There is no grey area, according to our current understanding of QM, it's truly random. There was a debate during the time QM was discovered. On one side, you had people like Einstein saying that there was some hidden mechanics under QM that we aren't aware of yet, and that the universe is not random, hence "God does not play dice with the Universe", on the other side, I believe were most other physicist who discovered QM, who said the universe is fundamentally random. Then Bell's Inequality was devised to test which was right, and it turned out that unless QM violate certain pinciples of physics, that the universe is fundamentally random, and that there wasn't some hidden mechanism behind it that once we discovered, we could explain away the randomness, i.e. the randomness in QM does not arise out of a lack of understanding of an underlying mechanic, but rather because the universe is in fact random. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_inequalityWhile it doesn't completely rules out hidden variables, it restricts it severely, and the conventional today is that it is more likely that QM is fundamentally random. And even if QM isn't random, but there are hidden variables behind it that we haven't discovered yet, this leads us right back to determinism, and hence no free will still. Yes, I believe that both conclusions equate to no free will. "there is no grey area, according to our current understanding of QM, it's truly random." There can not be free will if events are random, correct? And like you said, if there are hidden variables we are right back to determinism. How exactly does the fact that there is no randomness in the universe result in no free will? Free will is not dependent on that at all. Because if QM randomness if a result of hidden variables, then it is a causal effect. Determinism states that the future is simply a result of a series of past events-- components in a long equation. If the reason for QM randomness is just another component in the equation it is an aid for an argument for determinism. You didn't answer my question because you just explained how the fact that there are no random events in the universe supports the notion that everything is caused out of necessity. That doesn't answer my question of how there can be no free will because of it. Here, this might clarify because apparently no one thinks anything besides the top left or bottom right box exists: Compatiblist believe in a different type of "free will", i.e. the ability to act according to ones intention, even if that intention isn't free. So that diagram isn't really accurate. The usual definition of free will is more like the ability to act according to your will regardless of the state of nature. Compatiblists don't believe in this type of free will. Theologians do. The intention is free actually, it just so happens that what is chosen is a result of necessity according to our understanding of causation. The "usual" (?) definition of free will being acting independent of necessity is meaningless to even argue against if you hold the view that the world is deterministic and it just results in both sides of the argument (free will vs determinism) going around in circles because they have different understandings of how the universe operates. If the intention to act in a certain way is a result of causation as you say (and which I agree with), then how is it free? Your definition of free must be quite wonky to make it fit. It isn't wonky I just think you're confusing motive with intention. Intention is what you mean to accomplish by acting in a certain way and given that you are free to choose whether to act or not, it follows that your intentions can be free as well. I'll grant that motive doesn't seem like something that would be free though. How are you free to choose whether you act or not?
Right now, in complete accordance with the casual laws of the universe (as far as we know), the option to either post this or not is completely up to me. What follows will have had to be necessity out of a result of casual laws, but that isn't incompatible with the fact that I could hypothetically have chosen otherwise or with the fact that I did in fact choose what had to have happened..
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On March 11 2012 01:44 GGTeMpLaR wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 01:37 seppolevne wrote:On March 11 2012 01:31 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 16:14 paralleluniverse wrote:On March 10 2012 14:41 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:26 paralleluniverse wrote:On March 10 2012 14:22 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:16 xrapture wrote:On March 10 2012 14:03 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:01 xrapture wrote:
[quote]
Yes, I believe that both conclusions equate to no free will.
"there is no grey area, according to our current understanding of QM, it's truly random." There can not be free will if events are random, correct?
And like you said, if there are hidden variables we are right back to determinism.
How exactly does the fact that there is no randomness in the universe result in no free will? Free will is not dependent on that at all. Because if QM randomness if a result of hidden variables, then it is a causal effect. Determinism states that the future is simply a result of a series of past events-- components in a long equation. If the reason for QM randomness is just another component in the equation it is an aid for an argument for determinism. You didn't answer my question because you just explained how the fact that there are no random events in the universe supports the notion that everything is caused out of necessity. That doesn't answer my question of how there can be no free will because of it. Here, this might clarify because apparently no one thinks anything besides the top left or bottom right box exists: Compatiblist believe in a different type of "free will", i.e. the ability to act according to ones intention, even if that intention isn't free. So that diagram isn't really accurate. The usual definition of free will is more like the ability to act according to your will regardless of the state of nature. Compatiblists don't believe in this type of free will. Theologians do. The intention is free actually, it just so happens that what is chosen is a result of necessity according to our understanding of causation. The "usual" (?) definition of free will being acting independent of necessity is meaningless to even argue against if you hold the view that the world is deterministic and it just results in both sides of the argument (free will vs determinism) going around in circles because they have different understandings of how the universe operates. If the intention to act in a certain way is a result of causation as you say (and which I agree with), then how is it free? Your definition of free must be quite wonky to make it fit. It isn't wonky I just think you're confusing motive with intention. Intention is what you mean to accomplish by acting in a certain way and given that you are free to choose whether to act or not, it follows that your intentions can be free as well. I'll grant that motive doesn't seem like something that would be free though. How are you free to choose whether you act or not? Right now, in complete accordance with the casual laws of the universe (as far as we know), the option to either post this or not is completely up to me. What follows will have had to be necessity out of a result of casual laws, but that isn't incompatible with the fact that I could hypothetically have chosen otherwise or with the fact that I did in fact choose what had to have happened..
But you only ever do one thing. You don't need to have a choice to have options.
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On March 11 2012 01:46 seppolevne wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 01:44 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 11 2012 01:37 seppolevne wrote:On March 11 2012 01:31 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 16:14 paralleluniverse wrote:On March 10 2012 14:41 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:26 paralleluniverse wrote:On March 10 2012 14:22 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 14:16 xrapture wrote:On March 10 2012 14:03 GGTeMpLaR wrote:
[quote]
How exactly does the fact that there is no randomness in the universe result in no free will? Free will is not dependent on that at all.
Because if QM randomness if a result of hidden variables, then it is a causal effect. Determinism states that the future is simply a result of a series of past events-- components in a long equation. If the reason for QM randomness is just another component in the equation it is an aid for an argument for determinism. You didn't answer my question because you just explained how the fact that there are no random events in the universe supports the notion that everything is caused out of necessity. That doesn't answer my question of how there can be no free will because of it. Here, this might clarify because apparently no one thinks anything besides the top left or bottom right box exists: Compatiblist believe in a different type of "free will", i.e. the ability to act according to ones intention, even if that intention isn't free. So that diagram isn't really accurate. The usual definition of free will is more like the ability to act according to your will regardless of the state of nature. Compatiblists don't believe in this type of free will. Theologians do. The intention is free actually, it just so happens that what is chosen is a result of necessity according to our understanding of causation. The "usual" (?) definition of free will being acting independent of necessity is meaningless to even argue against if you hold the view that the world is deterministic and it just results in both sides of the argument (free will vs determinism) going around in circles because they have different understandings of how the universe operates. If the intention to act in a certain way is a result of causation as you say (and which I agree with), then how is it free? Your definition of free must be quite wonky to make it fit. It isn't wonky I just think you're confusing motive with intention. Intention is what you mean to accomplish by acting in a certain way and given that you are free to choose whether to act or not, it follows that your intentions can be free as well. I'll grant that motive doesn't seem like something that would be free though. How are you free to choose whether you act or not? Right now, in complete accordance with the casual laws of the universe (as far as we know), the option to either post this or not is completely up to me. What follows will have had to be necessity out of a result of casual laws, but that isn't incompatible with the fact that I could hypothetically have chosen otherwise or with the fact that I did in fact choose what had to have happened.. But you only ever do one thing. You don't need to have a choice to have options.
Explain how it would be a violation of the casual laws of the universe had I hypothetically chosen otherwise.
Or an even harder challenge, explain how I didn't in fact choose to make the only truly possible decision I could have made.
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I have 4 arguments against the free will proponents, sadly unanswered several times. As we all now the universe is governed by fundamental rules and these applies to humans. More specifically, cause and effect, both in terms of our daily lives and in our biology.
Another problem will free will is that when in time did we start to have free will? 10000 BC or what?
If it happened over night you might call it supernatural intervention, i doubt that. If it happened gradually i would say it's an parallel process to the human condition, namely self-consciousness. As we grew more aware of are being we thought that our inherent nature was driven by our mind. However we were unaware of the fact that our ancestors was driven by and still is genes & environment.
If you think that free will was developed during the ages of human evolution you must then realize that free will could be measured. Have humans reached full free will potential, how far have dogs come and how will we determine if machines/AI have free will?
If humans had free will we would be restricted by a many factors such as emotions, bodily needs, social interaction and environment. In the past and sadly still in present times these restrictions are more centered around survival as food, shelter and water is a necessity for human life.
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On March 11 2012 01:50 archonOOid wrote:
I have 4 arguments against the free will proponents, sadly unanswered several times. As we all now the universe is governed by fundamental rules and these applies to humans. More specifically, cause and effect, both in terms of our daily lives and in our biology.
Another problem will free will is that when in time did we start to have free will? 10000 BC or what?
If it happened over night you might call it supernatural intervention, i doubt that. If it happened gradually i would say it's an parallel process to the human condition, namely self-consciousness. As we grew more aware of are being we thought that our inherent nature was driven by our mind. However we were unaware of the fact that our ancestors was driven by and still is genes & environment.
If you think that free will was developed during the ages of human evolution you must then realize that free will could be measured. Have humans reached full free will potential, how far have dogs come and how will we determine if machines/AI have free will?
If humans had free will we would be restricted by a many factors such as emotions, bodily needs, social interaction and environment. In the past and sadly still in present times these restrictions are more centered around survival as food, shelter and water is a necessity for human life.
-Impossible to answer for sure given we still have missing knowledge on how the human mind and consciousness precisely works. Irrelevant to whether it exists or not though, us being unable to precisely pinpoint the date it originated as a mutation isn't an argument against it's existence.
-It doesn't follow that it can be measured just because it was a result of an evolutionary process (which is likely the best explanation we have right now). In assuming it could be, you're really misunderstanding evolution as a sort of progression towards a sort of "uber human" which every trait can be objectively measured as positive in all environments, which is not the case.
-Last point isn't an argument against free will either, just an acknowledgment of it's limitations. Yes we have free will, that does not mean we can choose to do the impossible, such as choose to not have a heart attack or choose to grow another kidney. We are still constrained by casual laws.
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On March 10 2012 19:06 Pretty Aluminum wrote:
Not sure if this has been posted, but the brilliant scientist Dr. Michio Kaku has something to say about this little argument.
[unsupported embed: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jint5kjoy6I&feature=relmfu]
For some reason normal embing doesnt work for me so I have to use this stupid method. If a mod wants to edit that out and fix it please do.
So I'm really not sure where he stands because he's all over the place in that video and concludes with some random, irrelevant fun-fact of the scientific phenomena of vision.
It seems like he endorses determinism to begin with, then rejects it in favor of free will by accepting that since there is inherent uncertainty in the universe, it must be a result of randomness (which is really surprising).
Just because there is uncertainty in the universe does not deduce that there is randomness in the universe, but if you do accept randomness as existing in the universe, it is not determined. Then, just because determinism is false does not mean free will is true. I found that to just be rhetorical dancing rather than anything related to discussion of free will at all.
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On March 11 2012 01:36 GGTeMpLaR wrote:Show nested quote +On March 10 2012 15:26 L3gendary wrote:
Compatibilism is just logically flawed. Determinism doesn't preclude the existence of a consciousness that can weigh options and make decisions on how to act. Free will would necessarily have to be non-deterministic and outside of the laws of nature because were it within the laws of nature it would have to act according to them and therefore isn't free.
Essentially, you are defining free will as having the ability to be determined by immediate internal causes (your brain) and not external causes (someone else forces you to). No determinist would argue against that, your brain is still operating deterministically though, so your position is no different than determinism. You're using the wrong definition of free will for a compatibilist so it's obviously going to be logically flawed when you attack the wrong argument. The meaningless definition obviously can't exist because it requires a violation of the law of physics, aka it requires the impossible be possible (within a deterministic framework, which is something that we all have good reason to accept). The compatibilist definition of free will is more common sense than the above one because that one is meaningless, why bother using a meaningless word? That's the entire point of this definition because the whole argument is just one of verbal meanings which both sides disagree on. Of course no determinist would argue with it because it's common sense and brings the two ideas, both of which are naturally intuitive, together in a perfectly logical argument. It's very different from the deterministic position because it doesn't have to deal with the problems that arise from saying "free will doesn't exist" or bother wasting time in circular arguments that never lead anywhere. However, if you'd rather have circular arguments on whether free will exists or not and lose individual responsibility for actions, feel free (or not?) to continue using the silly, nonsensical definition of free will
Again, the definition of free will which I used (i.e. not the compatibilists definition), is the type of free will theologians claim we have, and what most layman probably believe we have. that we're able to freely choose our actions at every moment. So this definition is not meaningless, people ascribe meaning to it.
You might not think we have this type of free will, I certainly don't, but some people do.
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On March 11 2012 02:28 paralleluniverse wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 01:36 GGTeMpLaR wrote:On March 10 2012 15:26 L3gendary wrote:
Compatibilism is just logically flawed. Determinism doesn't preclude the existence of a consciousness that can weigh options and make decisions on how to act. Free will would necessarily have to be non-deterministic and outside of the laws of nature because were it within the laws of nature it would have to act according to them and therefore isn't free.
Essentially, you are defining free will as having the ability to be determined by immediate internal causes (your brain) and not external causes (someone else forces you to). No determinist would argue against that, your brain is still operating deterministically though, so your position is no different than determinism. You're using the wrong definition of free will for a compatibilist so it's obviously going to be logically flawed when you attack the wrong argument. The meaningless definition obviously can't exist because it requires a violation of the law of physics, aka it requires the impossible be possible (within a deterministic framework, which is something that we all have good reason to accept). The compatibilist definition of free will is more common sense than the above one because that one is meaningless, why bother using a meaningless word? That's the entire point of this definition because the whole argument is just one of verbal meanings which both sides disagree on. Of course no determinist would argue with it because it's common sense and brings the two ideas, both of which are naturally intuitive, together in a perfectly logical argument. It's very different from the deterministic position because it doesn't have to deal with the problems that arise from saying "free will doesn't exist" or bother wasting time in circular arguments that never lead anywhere. However, if you'd rather have circular arguments on whether free will exists or not and lose individual responsibility for actions, feel free (or not?) to continue using the silly, nonsensical definition of free will Again, the definition of free will which I used (i.e. not the compatibilists definition), is the type of free will theologians claim we have, and what most layman probably believe we have. that we're able to freely choose our actions at every moment. So this definition is not meaningless, people ascribe meaning to it. You might not think we have this type of free will, I certainly don't, but some people do.
Actually, if you look at (http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/2nd_annual_online_philoso/files/shaun_nichols.pdf), compatibilism is the most common sense and intuitive position held by most laymen (if we take laymen to be philosophically uneducated undergraduates, granted I've never read the source book in the study that he cites
Philosophical Psychology), in addition to being popular among professional philosophers as well.
Theologians are of no concern to me in the sense that I wouldn't waste time arguing with anyone who tried to say that it's possible that the impossible be possible (which is essentially their definition of free will that you're arguing against) any more than I would waste time arguing with anyone who tried to tell me the earth is 6,000 years old.
I have serious doubts about the credibility of anyone to argue that free will and determinism are incompatible. Under this assumption, the only way around compatibilism is to show that the universe is in fact indetermined (while QM makes this the much more likely route, it's still impossible to know whether or not there are no causes behind it).
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On March 11 2012 01:36 GGTeMpLaR wrote:Show nested quote +On March 10 2012 15:26 L3gendary wrote:
Compatibilism is just logically flawed. Determinism doesn't preclude the existence of a consciousness that can weigh options and make decisions on how to act. Free will would necessarily have to be non-deterministic and outside of the laws of nature because were it within the laws of nature it would have to act according to them and therefore isn't free.
Essentially, you are defining free will as having the ability to be determined by immediate internal causes (your brain) and not external causes (someone else forces you to). No determinist would argue against that, your brain is still operating deterministically though, so your position is no different than determinism. You're using the wrong definition of free will for a compatibilist so it's obviously going to be logically flawed when you attack the wrong argument. The meaningless definition obviously can't exist because it requires a violation of the law of physics, aka it requires the impossible be possible (within a deterministic framework, which is something that we all have good reason to accept). The compatibilist definition of free will is more common sense than the above one because that one is meaningless, why bother using a meaningless word? That's the entire point of this definition because the whole argument is just one of verbal meanings which both sides disagree on. Of course no determinist would argue with it because it's common sense and brings the two ideas, both of which are naturally intuitive, together in a perfectly logical argument. It's very different from the deterministic position because it doesn't have to deal with the problems that arise from saying "free will doesn't exist" or bother wasting time in circular arguments that never lead anywhere. However, if you'd rather have circular arguments on whether free will exists or not and lose individual responsibility for actions, feel free (or not?) to continue using the silly, nonsensical definition of free will
No your definition of free will is meaningless because it isn't really free at all. You've just redefined the word and are arguing semantics. It doesn't reconcile anything. It would be like if i say my definition of free will is an apple and apples exist therefore free will exists.
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EPT
