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On January 04 2012 16:51 dmgdnooc wrote:Show nested quote +On January 04 2012 16:01 mcc wrote:On January 04 2012 14:19 dmgdnooc wrote:On January 04 2012 01:40 mcc wrote:On January 03 2012 21:08 dmgdnooc wrote:On January 03 2012 19:51 Yuljan wrote:On January 03 2012 19:36 dmgdnooc wrote:On January 03 2012 18:24 mcc wrote:On January 03 2012 13:04 dmgdnooc wrote:
If the forum must search, in hindsight, for a 'what if' that allows Germany to have won the war it should be considered that, to my mind at least and this is my 2 cents worth, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was Hitler's 1st major error of judgement.
The Polish government was sympathetic to nazi doctrines, being anti-communist and anti-semitic pseudo nazis themselves, and could surely have been pressured into ceding the Danzig corridor and allowing access for a full strength, 1939 or 1940, attack on a grossly under-prepared USSR.
I don't think that, after the intimidation of the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia, there was a certain requirement to invade Poland in order to attack the communist enemy that Hitler loathed so much.
What was required was the application of diplomatic pressure that ensured the security of Germany's western regions and the further passive compliance of Britain, France and Poland.
Poland could be annexed later, France and Britain humiliated later, but leaving the USSR to grow stronger was a mistake.
Upsetting Britain and France out of their appeasement strategy was a gross underestimation of their domestic political liabilities.
But would they have really declared against Germany's invasion of the USSR if Polish sovereignty remained, even if only superficially, intact? I think, most probably, not.
Both countries had strong, politically active and influential internal nazi factions to support the invasion.
And neither seemed to be much interested in attacking Germany even when 70% of its army was engaged in Poland; which was surely the best time to attack and at least level the industrial complexes of the Saar.
It seems to me that the western campaign and the conquest of France served to delay the inevitable invasion of the USSR long enough for the USSR to become strong enough to resist and depleted Germany of men and materiel that were needed for a victory in the east.
But, even under this best case scenario of earlier and stronger invasion, I doubt that victory could have been achieved against the USSR by nazi Germany.
My doubts stem from the nazi's oft demonstrated lethal contempt for all untermensch.
Their unquestioning and unfailing racism against the Slavic peoples transformed a military campaign into a war of extermination that ensured that, even when defeated, Germany's enemies remained enemies to the death.
The peoples of the USSR understood that they were not fighting to retain their autonomy or sense of national pride nor their ancient attachment to the land.
There would be no, further down the road and eventually, benevolent occupational government; only slave labour, starvation and a killing pit, for all Slavs, would follow the nation's defeat.
It seems to me that nazi doctrine ensured that the USSR would fight to the last tooth and fingernail accepting all losses as a price in blood for the survival of the living.
It was the nazi goal, equally in 1939 and 1941, to cleanse the captured territories of inhabitants making way for German settlement.
So, the Slavic peoples of the USSR could never capitulate, never surrender, nazi ideology put them in the invincible position of 'victory or death'.
It is highly unlikely that Poland could have been pressured into ceding Danzig and the corridor, they had rather nationalistic government, but there was extreme mistrust of Germany in Poland and if you check Polish history, they always fought even if the human losses were going to be great and victory unlikely. And even if they ceded the corridor invasion of Soviet Union would be unsuccessful wihout using the rest of Polish territory for staging the invasion, which is even more unlikely scenario. Not even mentioning that German Army that could be used in attack was also much weaker in 1939 than in 1941. The proposed action to make an 'ally' of Poland, thereby side-stepping offence to Britain and France, allows Britain and France to remain non-belligerent and nazi policy in the east to unfold without the complication of a second front in the west. Nazi enmity demanded a war against the USSR, the 'what if' I propose is the what if they were allowed to pursue that war unencumbered by strife in the west. What if the diplomatic manoeuvring had ensured a stable western border and non-aggression with Britain and France rather than stability with the USSR. I suppose that even if the nazi priority had been the destruction of communism and they had been permitted to pursue that aim free from other entanglements that nazi Germany would still have lost in the end. Nazi ideological racism ensured that Slavic resistance would be implacably and unendingly to the death. There could be no surrender and occupation, as there was in France; no overtures of peace, as were made to Britain. The conclusion of the matter in the east, from the nazi pov, was the annihalation of the Slavs as a people and German settlement of the empty lands. I suppose that the 'victory or death' scenario imposed on the USSR ensured their eventual victory. Hitler needed the succesful wars in Poland and France to consolidate his position. There was a plot going on in the military that would have staged a coup if Hitler attacked Czechoslovakia. I have seen a documentary once that described how the population wasnt really happy about the war unlike ww1. Only after the quick victory in poland and the succesful campaign in france did Hitler receive the wide support of the population. I dont think he could have invaded Russia without the prior victories. Czechoslovakia had already been carved up by the time that WW2 began. Germany had annexed the Sudetenland in 1938 and in early 1939 had imposed the occupation of the Czech part of the state, which included the regions of Bohemia, Moravia and Czech Selesia. So I do not see how Czechoslovakia could have been invaded when it was already mostly an occupied region under German administration. The certain early victories of an eastern campaign would have swayed public opinion in favor of the war just as well as the victories over Poland and France did. More so, as an eastern campaign was against the despised Slavs, the hated communist ideology, had the prospect of greater booty and access to resources and, on paper at least, the military objectives seemed certain. The invasion of France, revenge for WW1 and the humiliation of the west, could wait; while being important in the long term, they were not of immediate necessity because Germany could not conceivably expand west. And the invasion of Poland exposed the Saar to immanent destruction while the bulk of the army was elsewhere occupied. OK, so I will repeat myself again, I proposed a 'what if' with the benefit of hindsight and suppose that even with a secure western border and the whole of Germany's forces engaged in the east the campaign would still have failed in the end. It would have failed because there was no political accord that nazism could make with the conquered Slavs, all its ideological force required that the Slavs be annihalated en masse; and the Slavs would never consent to their own annihalation. If 'victory or death' had not been the only options given to the Slavs then Stalin may have been overthrown, an accord entered into, and peace allowed to develop. But nazism conceded no other options to the Slavs and this implacable policy ensured that the Slavs would continue to fight until victory had been achieved. Your scenario is basically : If magic then something happens, because you cannot satisfy your starting assumptions by any other way than magic. There was no way for things to go that way no matter what decision Hitler made. Your scenario is not "what-if with benefit of the hindsight" it is "what-if magic made it so" as there is no way to achieve it by just changing decisions on part of Germany. Also your assumption about sure early victories in the east are far from clear as Wehrmacht was not ready to attack USSR in 1939/40 even more so than Red army was weaker in 1939 compared to 1941. The scenario is one that allows nazi Germany to attack the USSR earlier without the losses incurred in taking the west and leaving an occupying force behind. It is a best case scenario that you can replace with any other that suits you. My assumptions about early vicories are in accord with Stalin's own assesment. He agreed to a secure border and non-aggression pact with Hitler because of his valid fears concerning German military superiority. And that was the situation in 1939. Stalin's assessment was wrong in the sense that though Red army was not adequately prepared to fight Germany so was Germany not ready to fight Soviet Union, and fears do not equal reality, he overestimated Germany's ability. In 1939 Germany encountered quite severe logistical problems in their war against Poland with massive losses of equipment, the same logistical problems and lack of equipment were present in invasion of France, how do you think they would fare in Russia with its vast distances and climate. They had no ability to attack Soviet Union in 1939, that it the fact of life. In all campaigns in 1939-1940 Germany was walking very close to maximum abilities of their armies. On the other hand losses incurred in taking the west were more than outweighed by material and equipment captured in the West (and in Poland) and more importantly between 1939-1941 Germany was finally able to produce enough to think about attacking Soviet Union. Earlier attack was simply not feasible. Not even mentioning that in real-life Hitler would actually have to leave more troops at the western border in your scenario than it took to occupy the west. There was no way he could be sure the allies would not attack when he was in the war with USSR. As someone mentioned it seems you play too much Hearts of Iron to think your plan was even feasible in real life  But that is actually beside the point as my main point of contention was that Poland would not cede the corridor without war in any conceivable scenario other than magic hand-waving. That is why I am saying even your scenario's starting point is not achievable. So how do you as Germany force Poland to cede the corridor. You know that Germany tried to gain it diplomatically and failed and that is what lead to attack on Poland, right ? So OK, Stalin and the USSR military establishment were wrong, with all the information at their disposal, and you are right. And, clearly, I think that the German forces would fair badly in any attempt to conquer Russia, no matter when the attack wa made or how good there equipment and resupply situation was. Nazi ideology demanded an attack on the USSR since, at least, 1925 when Mein Kampf was published. So the thought, the intention and the will had been in existence for some time before 1941. There was no time when an attack on the USSR was feasible; earlier or later it was doomed to failure. I have never played Hearts of Iron, though I have enjoyed many games of Civ, but I have studied WW2 extensively, especially aspects of the Holocaust.
Stalin and USSR military had less information than we do now, so that argument seems strange. In history assessments of enemy abilities were wrong so often that this one is not really surprising.
Anyway, I know that you state that Germany would lose no matter when the attack happened. I agree with that, I am disagreeing with your statement that attacking in 1939/early 1940 would have been more successful than the historical attack in 1941. I pointed out shortcomings of Nazi military in 1939/40 that would make the attack much less successful, because at that time German Army was much weaker than in 1941, barely able to logistically supply itself in Poland and France on much shorter distances. Also at that time German army lacked a lot of equipment that was captured in Poland and in the west.
That is my second point that you did not address at all, other than appeal to Stalin's authority.
On January 04 2012 16:51 dmgdnooc wrote:
You underestimate the value of diplomacy and the gains that can be achieved by its considered application.
The Polish government, wannabe nazis that it was, did not want war with Germany.
There was little trust in the promises of Britain and France and even if they did honor them, as surprisingly they did, there was nothing that they could do about the situation in Poland until after Germany had been conquered.
An agreement that ensured a form of autonomy and guaranteed non-aggression, even alliance, could have conceivably been brokered as an alternative to the destruction of the state.
German diplomacy failed to gain the Danzig corridor because Hitler was not prepared to offer enough for the concession, not because it was not negotiable.
Now, all I have done is set up a scenario that allows my point to be made; that nazi racism ensured defeat, under any circumstance (barring nukes), in an attack on the USSR.
How about you address the point and not the fluff that introduces it.
Poland did not want war with Germany and historically Germany did not want war with Poland even more in 1939. Germans actually did want peaceful solution to the corridor problem. But they were unable to get it anyway. Germany had nothing to offer to Poland for it that would be worth losing for Germany. Despite you calling Poland government wannabe nazis, they did not feel any sympathy towards Germany and unless you show exactly what could have Germany offered them for the corridor, you scenario is magic-based. Your argument that Poland would accept any loss of sovereignity (by saying that autonomy could be offered to them) without going to war is showing absolute lack of knowledge of Polish history and realities of the time.
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On January 03 2012 18:24 Masamune wrote:
The cool thing about this thread is that it's on an international forum where you get to see the war from a German angle with some of the contributions of posters in this thread. Even hearing about stories from posters about their relatives as POWs, be they Russian, French etc. is pretty interesting as well.
Definitely brings a new light to the topic considering most of us have always been taught about WWII from an Allied perspective and lens.
Aye , you're right.
I've got a couple books at home about this.
Two of them are written from the perspective of the common German soldier , in fairness , one is WW1 though.
They are both very old books i've had the luck of getting my hands on when my Grandfather wanted to toss them out since he was moving to an elderly home.
Good reads, they do not offer to much perspective on what propaganda for example was used, they are mostly combat experiences.
Detailed stories of lines being shelled and how it affected them etc.
In this regard , the one about WW1 is somewhat horrific at times to read, the utter madness of being sent to enemy trenches after being shelled for days with practically no chance of any succes.
The WW2 one is from a perspective of a german soldier who was stationed on the eastern front.
He participated in some of the succesfull actions and the failures aswell.
It is well written since you notice a very subtle shift in his " line of thinking" along the way.
I'll look them up if you're interested, maybe they are available still in some way.
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One of the less documented but massively important bit of history during WWII was how Hitler looted, transported, and housed all the artworks from the countries the Nazi occupied. Loot is actually an inaccurate word, given the care Hitler gave to the collection of the works (Hitler prides himself as being an artist and art patron). In the process however, a lot of the works were damaged, destroyed, and apparently forever lost. This dark section of WWII has yet to be researched and brought to light.
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I'd like to make a conjecture here, on the topic of Germany VS Russia.
Suppose The Battle of Britain ends in a German victory. England's airforce is practically a non-entity with this loss, thus England is out of the war as far as Germany is concerned. Sure they still have forces in Africa, but no strategic bombing campaign can be launched.
With no B17's or Lancasters bombing every factory, German forces will fair much better in Russia. I doubt the first push would have gone much better, as the bombing campaign had not really begun at the time. The Russian counter-attack would not have been nearly as effective however, as the Wehrmacht would have been much more prepared.
Whether this would allow a German victory is impossible to tell, I think. I believe it all hinges on the strategic and tactical decision-making skills of the Russian commanders, which to be honest I know little about.
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On January 04 2012 17:25 mcc wrote:Show nested quote +On January 04 2012 16:51 dmgdnooc wrote:On January 04 2012 16:01 mcc wrote:On January 04 2012 14:19 dmgdnooc wrote:On January 04 2012 01:40 mcc wrote:On January 03 2012 21:08 dmgdnooc wrote:On January 03 2012 19:51 Yuljan wrote:On January 03 2012 19:36 dmgdnooc wrote:On January 03 2012 18:24 mcc wrote:On January 03 2012 13:04 dmgdnooc wrote:
If the forum must search, in hindsight, for a 'what if' that allows Germany to have won the war it should be considered that, to my mind at least and this is my 2 cents worth, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was Hitler's 1st major error of judgement.
The Polish government was sympathetic to nazi doctrines, being anti-communist and anti-semitic pseudo nazis themselves, and could surely have been pressured into ceding the Danzig corridor and allowing access for a full strength, 1939 or 1940, attack on a grossly under-prepared USSR.
I don't think that, after the intimidation of the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia, there was a certain requirement to invade Poland in order to attack the communist enemy that Hitler loathed so much.
What was required was the application of diplomatic pressure that ensured the security of Germany's western regions and the further passive compliance of Britain, France and Poland.
Poland could be annexed later, France and Britain humiliated later, but leaving the USSR to grow stronger was a mistake.
Upsetting Britain and France out of their appeasement strategy was a gross underestimation of their domestic political liabilities.
But would they have really declared against Germany's invasion of the USSR if Polish sovereignty remained, even if only superficially, intact? I think, most probably, not.
Both countries had strong, politically active and influential internal nazi factions to support the invasion.
And neither seemed to be much interested in attacking Germany even when 70% of its army was engaged in Poland; which was surely the best time to attack and at least level the industrial complexes of the Saar.
It seems to me that the western campaign and the conquest of France served to delay the inevitable invasion of the USSR long enough for the USSR to become strong enough to resist and depleted Germany of men and materiel that were needed for a victory in the east.
But, even under this best case scenario of earlier and stronger invasion, I doubt that victory could have been achieved against the USSR by nazi Germany.
My doubts stem from the nazi's oft demonstrated lethal contempt for all untermensch.
Their unquestioning and unfailing racism against the Slavic peoples transformed a military campaign into a war of extermination that ensured that, even when defeated, Germany's enemies remained enemies to the death.
The peoples of the USSR understood that they were not fighting to retain their autonomy or sense of national pride nor their ancient attachment to the land.
There would be no, further down the road and eventually, benevolent occupational government; only slave labour, starvation and a killing pit, for all Slavs, would follow the nation's defeat.
It seems to me that nazi doctrine ensured that the USSR would fight to the last tooth and fingernail accepting all losses as a price in blood for the survival of the living.
It was the nazi goal, equally in 1939 and 1941, to cleanse the captured territories of inhabitants making way for German settlement.
So, the Slavic peoples of the USSR could never capitulate, never surrender, nazi ideology put them in the invincible position of 'victory or death'.
It is highly unlikely that Poland could have been pressured into ceding Danzig and the corridor, they had rather nationalistic government, but there was extreme mistrust of Germany in Poland and if you check Polish history, they always fought even if the human losses were going to be great and victory unlikely. And even if they ceded the corridor invasion of Soviet Union would be unsuccessful wihout using the rest of Polish territory for staging the invasion, which is even more unlikely scenario. Not even mentioning that German Army that could be used in attack was also much weaker in 1939 than in 1941. The proposed action to make an 'ally' of Poland, thereby side-stepping offence to Britain and France, allows Britain and France to remain non-belligerent and nazi policy in the east to unfold without the complication of a second front in the west. Nazi enmity demanded a war against the USSR, the 'what if' I propose is the what if they were allowed to pursue that war unencumbered by strife in the west. What if the diplomatic manoeuvring had ensured a stable western border and non-aggression with Britain and France rather than stability with the USSR. I suppose that even if the nazi priority had been the destruction of communism and they had been permitted to pursue that aim free from other entanglements that nazi Germany would still have lost in the end. Nazi ideological racism ensured that Slavic resistance would be implacably and unendingly to the death. There could be no surrender and occupation, as there was in France; no overtures of peace, as were made to Britain. The conclusion of the matter in the east, from the nazi pov, was the annihalation of the Slavs as a people and German settlement of the empty lands. I suppose that the 'victory or death' scenario imposed on the USSR ensured their eventual victory. Hitler needed the succesful wars in Poland and France to consolidate his position. There was a plot going on in the military that would have staged a coup if Hitler attacked Czechoslovakia. I have seen a documentary once that described how the population wasnt really happy about the war unlike ww1. Only after the quick victory in poland and the succesful campaign in france did Hitler receive the wide support of the population. I dont think he could have invaded Russia without the prior victories. Czechoslovakia had already been carved up by the time that WW2 began. Germany had annexed the Sudetenland in 1938 and in early 1939 had imposed the occupation of the Czech part of the state, which included the regions of Bohemia, Moravia and Czech Selesia. So I do not see how Czechoslovakia could have been invaded when it was already mostly an occupied region under German administration. The certain early victories of an eastern campaign would have swayed public opinion in favor of the war just as well as the victories over Poland and France did. More so, as an eastern campaign was against the despised Slavs, the hated communist ideology, had the prospect of greater booty and access to resources and, on paper at least, the military objectives seemed certain. The invasion of France, revenge for WW1 and the humiliation of the west, could wait; while being important in the long term, they were not of immediate necessity because Germany could not conceivably expand west. And the invasion of Poland exposed the Saar to immanent destruction while the bulk of the army was elsewhere occupied. OK, so I will repeat myself again, I proposed a 'what if' with the benefit of hindsight and suppose that even with a secure western border and the whole of Germany's forces engaged in the east the campaign would still have failed in the end. It would have failed because there was no political accord that nazism could make with the conquered Slavs, all its ideological force required that the Slavs be annihalated en masse; and the Slavs would never consent to their own annihalation. If 'victory or death' had not been the only options given to the Slavs then Stalin may have been overthrown, an accord entered into, and peace allowed to develop. But nazism conceded no other options to the Slavs and this implacable policy ensured that the Slavs would continue to fight until victory had been achieved. Your scenario is basically : If magic then something happens, because you cannot satisfy your starting assumptions by any other way than magic. There was no way for things to go that way no matter what decision Hitler made. Your scenario is not "what-if with benefit of the hindsight" it is "what-if magic made it so" as there is no way to achieve it by just changing decisions on part of Germany. Also your assumption about sure early victories in the east are far from clear as Wehrmacht was not ready to attack USSR in 1939/40 even more so than Red army was weaker in 1939 compared to 1941. The scenario is one that allows nazi Germany to attack the USSR earlier without the losses incurred in taking the west and leaving an occupying force behind. It is a best case scenario that you can replace with any other that suits you. My assumptions about early vicories are in accord with Stalin's own assesment. He agreed to a secure border and non-aggression pact with Hitler because of his valid fears concerning German military superiority. And that was the situation in 1939. Stalin's assessment was wrong in the sense that though Red army was not adequately prepared to fight Germany so was Germany not ready to fight Soviet Union, and fears do not equal reality, he overestimated Germany's ability. In 1939 Germany encountered quite severe logistical problems in their war against Poland with massive losses of equipment, the same logistical problems and lack of equipment were present in invasion of France, how do you think they would fare in Russia with its vast distances and climate. They had no ability to attack Soviet Union in 1939, that it the fact of life. In all campaigns in 1939-1940 Germany was walking very close to maximum abilities of their armies. On the other hand losses incurred in taking the west were more than outweighed by material and equipment captured in the West (and in Poland) and more importantly between 1939-1941 Germany was finally able to produce enough to think about attacking Soviet Union. Earlier attack was simply not feasible. Not even mentioning that in real-life Hitler would actually have to leave more troops at the western border in your scenario than it took to occupy the west. There was no way he could be sure the allies would not attack when he was in the war with USSR. As someone mentioned it seems you play too much Hearts of Iron to think your plan was even feasible in real life But that is actually beside the point as my main point of contention was that Poland would not cede the corridor without war in any conceivable scenario other than magic hand-waving. That is why I am saying even your scenario's starting point is not achievable. So how do you as Germany force Poland to cede the corridor. You know that Germany tried to gain it diplomatically and failed and that is what lead to attack on Poland, right ? So OK, Stalin and the USSR military establishment were wrong, with all the information at their disposal, and you are right. And, clearly, I think that the German forces would fair badly in any attempt to conquer Russia, no matter when the attack wa made or how good there equipment and resupply situation was. Nazi ideology demanded an attack on the USSR since, at least, 1925 when Mein Kampf was published. So the thought, the intention and the will had been in existence for some time before 1941. There was no time when an attack on the USSR was feasible; earlier or later it was doomed to failure. I have never played Hearts of Iron, though I have enjoyed many games of Civ, but I have studied WW2 extensively, especially aspects of the Holocaust. Stalin and USSR military had less information than we do now, so that argument seems strange. In history assessments of enemy abilities were wrong so often that this one is not really surprising. Anyway, I know that you state that Germany would lose no matter when the attack happened. I agree with that, I am disagreeing with your statement that attacking in 1939/early 1940 would have been more successful than the historical attack in 1941. I pointed out shortcomings of Nazi military in 1939/40 that would make the attack much less successful, because at that time German Army was much weaker than in 1941, barely able to logistically supply itself in Poland and France on much shorter distances. Also at that time German army lacked a lot of equipment that was captured in Poland and in the west. That is my second point that you did not address at all, other than appeal to Stalin's authority. Show nested quote +On January 04 2012 16:51 dmgdnooc wrote:
You underestimate the value of diplomacy and the gains that can be achieved by its considered application.
The Polish government, wannabe nazis that it was, did not want war with Germany.
There was little trust in the promises of Britain and France and even if they did honor them, as surprisingly they did, there was nothing that they could do about the situation in Poland until after Germany had been conquered.
An agreement that ensured a form of autonomy and guaranteed non-aggression, even alliance, could have conceivably been brokered as an alternative to the destruction of the state.
German diplomacy failed to gain the Danzig corridor because Hitler was not prepared to offer enough for the concession, not because it was not negotiable.
Now, all I have done is set up a scenario that allows my point to be made; that nazi racism ensured defeat, under any circumstance (barring nukes), in an attack on the USSR.
How about you address the point and not the fluff that introduces it.
Poland did not want war with Germany and historically Germany did not want war with Poland even more in 1939. Germans actually did want peaceful solution to the corridor problem. But they were unable to get it anyway. Germany had nothing to offer to Poland for it that would be worth losing for Germany. Despite you calling Poland government wannabe nazis, they did not feel any sympathy towards Germany and unless you show exactly what could have Germany offered them for the corridor, you scenario is magic-based. Your argument that Poland would accept any loss of sovereignity (by saying that autonomy could be offered to them) without going to war is showing absolute lack of knowledge of Polish history and realities of the time.
I agree, that the benefit of hindsight gives a clearer picture of the actual current situation of 1939.
However, the decisions of 1939 were not made with that benefit.
Both Stalin and Hitler knew that the German army was superior to the USSR's and the logistical problems encountered in the invasions of Poland and France were unkown and unaccounted for, thereby having no bearing on the thinking of the time.
But, after overcoming those difficulties, the assumption that they would be similarly overcome in the Russian offensive did have a bearing on the 1941 invasion.
My scenario recognises that the stated objective of nazi Germany was to expand to the east, which made the USSR the ultimate and principal target from the first.
My assumption is that if Britain and France had not declared war on Germany in 1939 that Hitler's attention would have been given to Operation Barbarossa as his first priority.
A shaky assumption I admit, as it seems that Hitler was a man driven by powerful emotions rather than logical assessment. And his desire for revenge for the outcome of WW1 and to humiliate the French and British was a strong motivator of his actions.
Germany was also the strongest of the European powers and it had long been British policy to weaken the strongest and support the 2nd strongest power. So that when France was strongest Britain allied with Germany, and when Germany was strongest Britain allied with France.
I suppose that if the USSR was attacked and not Poland there was still a strong possibility of a declaration being made by Britain and France; but maybe not immediately, the weakening of the USSR was also in their interests.
OK, so we agree, 'Germany would lose no matter when the attack happened'.
I think that because of the fault that I perceive in nazi ideology coupled with the military considerations of the USSR's physical factors (distance, weather, sub standard roads etc).while you appear to believe that the loss would occur purely because of the overriding military factors concerning the geographical nature of the USSR.
Perhaps you have not considered the galvanising effect that the nazi policy of extermination had on the Slavic peoples, perhaps you should.
Germany had much to offer Poland in exchange for the Danzig corridor, but it did not offer enough for the Poles to concede the corridor. Peace, security, technology, capital, alliance and much more I would suppose. I do maintain that diplomacy could have turned the situation but diplomacy failed because Germany did not offer enough for the concession.
Everything is for sale, if the price is right.
I described the Polish government as 'wannabe nazis' because of the anti-semitic legislative programme they had implimented to marginalise and disempower the large Jewish minority. A programme similar in many respects to its German model.
And because of its strongly right wing nationalistic tendencies and the predominance of the military amongst its members.
On second thoughts, maybe they weren't so 'wannabe'.
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On January 04 2012 18:01 Millitron wrote:
I'd like to make a conjecture here, on the topic of Germany VS Russia.
Suppose The Battle of Britain ends in a German victory. England's airforce is practically a non-entity with this loss, thus England is out of the war as far as Germany is concerned. Sure they still have forces in Africa, but no strategic bombing campaign can be launched.
With no B17's or Lancasters bombing every factory, German forces will fair much better in Russia. I doubt the first push would have gone much better, as the bombing campaign had not really begun at the time. The Russian counter-attack would not have been nearly as effective however, as the Wehrmacht would have been much more prepared.
Whether this would allow a German victory is impossible to tell, I think. I believe it all hinges on the strategic and tactical decision-making skills of the Russian commanders, which to be honest I know little about.
The victory in Battle of Britain would not mean no bombing campaign. When US enters the war the bombing campaign would start anyway, just maybe slightly delayed. Also British seeing the inevitable defeat in the air war, could just evacuate their remaining air forces north where they would be quite safe. And could launch some bombing raids from there anyway.
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On January 04 2012 18:01 Millitron wrote:
I'd like to make a conjecture here, on the topic of Germany VS Russia.
Suppose The Battle of Britain ends in a German victory. England's airforce is practically a non-entity with this loss, thus England is out of the war as far as Germany is concerned. Sure they still have forces in Africa, but no strategic bombing campaign can be launched.
With no B17's or Lancasters bombing every factory, German forces will fair much better in Russia. I doubt the first push would have gone much better, as the bombing campaign had not really begun at the time. The Russian counter-attack would not have been nearly as effective however, as the Wehrmacht would have been much more prepared.
Whether this would allow a German victory is impossible to tell, I think. I believe it all hinges on the strategic and tactical decision-making skills of the Russian commanders, which to be honest I know little about.
I'd like to make a conjecture here, on the topic of Miyamoto Musashi vs Bruce L... wait no, erm Germany vs the UK.
Suppose Guderian was a good soldier and his panzer division did not race the Allies to reach the sea, according to HQ orders. Thousands and thousands of men and equipment would've been shipped to the UK and later to Africa! Rommel would've had no chance!
Suppose French tank were resupplied by mobile oil cans and not by useless big-ass trunks, like German panzers. They could've been used!
Suppose De Gaulle had had a better success at launching tank production... German panzers could've been outnumbered!
Suppose France had actually attacked Germany when they invaded Poland, as even Poland adopted a strategy that counted on Allied support, and as their equipment was in fact on par with the german's, quality and quantity-wise!
But then... suppose De Gaulle had fallen off a cliff when he was seven years old, France wouldv'e been a part of Germany...
Oh my... my head is going to explode!
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On January 04 2012 19:46 dmgdnooc wrote:Show nested quote +On January 04 2012 17:25 mcc wrote:On January 04 2012 16:51 dmgdnooc wrote:On January 04 2012 16:01 mcc wrote:On January 04 2012 14:19 dmgdnooc wrote:On January 04 2012 01:40 mcc wrote:On January 03 2012 21:08 dmgdnooc wrote:On January 03 2012 19:51 Yuljan wrote:On January 03 2012 19:36 dmgdnooc wrote:On January 03 2012 18:24 mcc wrote:
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It is highly unlikely that Poland could have been pressured into ceding Danzig and the corridor, they had rather nationalistic government, but there was extreme mistrust of Germany in Poland and if you check Polish history, they always fought even if the human losses were going to be great and victory unlikely. And even if they ceded the corridor invasion of Soviet Union would be unsuccessful wihout using the rest of Polish territory for staging the invasion, which is even more unlikely scenario. Not even mentioning that German Army that could be used in attack was also much weaker in 1939 than in 1941. The proposed action to make an 'ally' of Poland, thereby side-stepping offence to Britain and France, allows Britain and France to remain non-belligerent and nazi policy in the east to unfold without the complication of a second front in the west. Nazi enmity demanded a war against the USSR, the 'what if' I propose is the what if they were allowed to pursue that war unencumbered by strife in the west. What if the diplomatic manoeuvring had ensured a stable western border and non-aggression with Britain and France rather than stability with the USSR. I suppose that even if the nazi priority had been the destruction of communism and they had been permitted to pursue that aim free from other entanglements that nazi Germany would still have lost in the end. Nazi ideological racism ensured that Slavic resistance would be implacably and unendingly to the death. There could be no surrender and occupation, as there was in France; no overtures of peace, as were made to Britain. The conclusion of the matter in the east, from the nazi pov, was the annihalation of the Slavs as a people and German settlement of the empty lands. I suppose that the 'victory or death' scenario imposed on the USSR ensured their eventual victory. Hitler needed the succesful wars in Poland and France to consolidate his position. There was a plot going on in the military that would have staged a coup if Hitler attacked Czechoslovakia. I have seen a documentary once that described how the population wasnt really happy about the war unlike ww1. Only after the quick victory in poland and the succesful campaign in france did Hitler receive the wide support of the population. I dont think he could have invaded Russia without the prior victories. Czechoslovakia had already been carved up by the time that WW2 began. Germany had annexed the Sudetenland in 1938 and in early 1939 had imposed the occupation of the Czech part of the state, which included the regions of Bohemia, Moravia and Czech Selesia. So I do not see how Czechoslovakia could have been invaded when it was already mostly an occupied region under German administration. The certain early victories of an eastern campaign would have swayed public opinion in favor of the war just as well as the victories over Poland and France did. More so, as an eastern campaign was against the despised Slavs, the hated communist ideology, had the prospect of greater booty and access to resources and, on paper at least, the military objectives seemed certain. The invasion of France, revenge for WW1 and the humiliation of the west, could wait; while being important in the long term, they were not of immediate necessity because Germany could not conceivably expand west. And the invasion of Poland exposed the Saar to immanent destruction while the bulk of the army was elsewhere occupied. OK, so I will repeat myself again, I proposed a 'what if' with the benefit of hindsight and suppose that even with a secure western border and the whole of Germany's forces engaged in the east the campaign would still have failed in the end. It would have failed because there was no political accord that nazism could make with the conquered Slavs, all its ideological force required that the Slavs be annihalated en masse; and the Slavs would never consent to their own annihalation. If 'victory or death' had not been the only options given to the Slavs then Stalin may have been overthrown, an accord entered into, and peace allowed to develop. But nazism conceded no other options to the Slavs and this implacable policy ensured that the Slavs would continue to fight until victory had been achieved. Your scenario is basically : If magic then something happens, because you cannot satisfy your starting assumptions by any other way than magic. There was no way for things to go that way no matter what decision Hitler made. Your scenario is not "what-if with benefit of the hindsight" it is "what-if magic made it so" as there is no way to achieve it by just changing decisions on part of Germany. Also your assumption about sure early victories in the east are far from clear as Wehrmacht was not ready to attack USSR in 1939/40 even more so than Red army was weaker in 1939 compared to 1941. The scenario is one that allows nazi Germany to attack the USSR earlier without the losses incurred in taking the west and leaving an occupying force behind. It is a best case scenario that you can replace with any other that suits you. My assumptions about early vicories are in accord with Stalin's own assesment. He agreed to a secure border and non-aggression pact with Hitler because of his valid fears concerning German military superiority. And that was the situation in 1939. Stalin's assessment was wrong in the sense that though Red army was not adequately prepared to fight Germany so was Germany not ready to fight Soviet Union, and fears do not equal reality, he overestimated Germany's ability. In 1939 Germany encountered quite severe logistical problems in their war against Poland with massive losses of equipment, the same logistical problems and lack of equipment were present in invasion of France, how do you think they would fare in Russia with its vast distances and climate. They had no ability to attack Soviet Union in 1939, that it the fact of life. In all campaigns in 1939-1940 Germany was walking very close to maximum abilities of their armies. On the other hand losses incurred in taking the west were more than outweighed by material and equipment captured in the West (and in Poland) and more importantly between 1939-1941 Germany was finally able to produce enough to think about attacking Soviet Union. Earlier attack was simply not feasible. Not even mentioning that in real-life Hitler would actually have to leave more troops at the western border in your scenario than it took to occupy the west. There was no way he could be sure the allies would not attack when he was in the war with USSR. As someone mentioned it seems you play too much Hearts of Iron to think your plan was even feasible in real life But that is actually beside the point as my main point of contention was that Poland would not cede the corridor without war in any conceivable scenario other than magic hand-waving. That is why I am saying even your scenario's starting point is not achievable. So how do you as Germany force Poland to cede the corridor. You know that Germany tried to gain it diplomatically and failed and that is what lead to attack on Poland, right ? So OK, Stalin and the USSR military establishment were wrong, with all the information at their disposal, and you are right. And, clearly, I think that the German forces would fair badly in any attempt to conquer Russia, no matter when the attack wa made or how good there equipment and resupply situation was. Nazi ideology demanded an attack on the USSR since, at least, 1925 when Mein Kampf was published. So the thought, the intention and the will had been in existence for some time before 1941. There was no time when an attack on the USSR was feasible; earlier or later it was doomed to failure. I have never played Hearts of Iron, though I have enjoyed many games of Civ, but I have studied WW2 extensively, especially aspects of the Holocaust. Stalin and USSR military had less information than we do now, so that argument seems strange. In history assessments of enemy abilities were wrong so often that this one is not really surprising. Anyway, I know that you state that Germany would lose no matter when the attack happened. I agree with that, I am disagreeing with your statement that attacking in 1939/early 1940 would have been more successful than the historical attack in 1941. I pointed out shortcomings of Nazi military in 1939/40 that would make the attack much less successful, because at that time German Army was much weaker than in 1941, barely able to logistically supply itself in Poland and France on much shorter distances. Also at that time German army lacked a lot of equipment that was captured in Poland and in the west. That is my second point that you did not address at all, other than appeal to Stalin's authority. On January 04 2012 16:51 dmgdnooc wrote:
You underestimate the value of diplomacy and the gains that can be achieved by its considered application.
The Polish government, wannabe nazis that it was, did not want war with Germany.
There was little trust in the promises of Britain and France and even if they did honor them, as surprisingly they did, there was nothing that they could do about the situation in Poland until after Germany had been conquered.
An agreement that ensured a form of autonomy and guaranteed non-aggression, even alliance, could have conceivably been brokered as an alternative to the destruction of the state.
German diplomacy failed to gain the Danzig corridor because Hitler was not prepared to offer enough for the concession, not because it was not negotiable.
Now, all I have done is set up a scenario that allows my point to be made; that nazi racism ensured defeat, under any circumstance (barring nukes), in an attack on the USSR.
How about you address the point and not the fluff that introduces it.
Poland did not want war with Germany and historically Germany did not want war with Poland even more in 1939. Germans actually did want peaceful solution to the corridor problem. But they were unable to get it anyway. Germany had nothing to offer to Poland for it that would be worth losing for Germany. Despite you calling Poland government wannabe nazis, they did not feel any sympathy towards Germany and unless you show exactly what could have Germany offered them for the corridor, you scenario is magic-based. Your argument that Poland would accept any loss of sovereignity (by saying that autonomy could be offered to them) without going to war is showing absolute lack of knowledge of Polish history and realities of the time. I agree, that the benefit of hindsight gives a clearer picture of the actual current situation of 1939. However, the decisions of 1939 were not made with that benefit. Both Stalin and Hitler knew that the German army was superior to the USSR's and the logistical problems encountered in the invasions of Poland and France were unkown and unaccounted for, thereby having no bearing on the thinking of the time. But, after overcoming those difficulties, the assumption that they would be similarly overcome in the Russian offensive did have a bearing on the 1941 invasion.
They were not overcome, Poland and Allies just were defeated before the logistical and supply problems made it impossible for Germans to continue. That would not be case in Russia. Problem of 1939/40 German army was that they had no capabilities at all for such an operation. They could not overcome those problems as they lacked any means to do so at that time. Only in 1941 they made it so, so possible to launch Barbarossa.
On January 04 2012 19:46 dmgdnooc wrote:
My scenario recognises that the stated objective of nazi Germany was to expand to the east, which made the USSR the ultimate and principal target from the first.
My assumption is that if Britain and France had not declared war on Germany in 1939 that Hitler's attention would have been given to Operation Barbarossa as his first priority.
A shaky assumption I admit, as it seems that Hitler was a man driven by powerful emotions rather than logical assessment. And his desire for revenge for the outcome of WW1 and to humiliate the French and British was a strong motivator of his actions.
Germany was also the strongest of the European powers and it had long been British policy to weaken the strongest and support the 2nd strongest power. So that when France was strongest Britain allied with Germany, and when Germany was strongest Britain allied with France.
I suppose that if the USSR was attacked and not Poland there was still a strong possibility of a declaration being made by Britain and France; but maybe not immediately, the weakening of the USSR was also in their interests.
Declaration of war by France and Britain is not necessary to make it necessary for extremely big chunk of 1939 German army to remain on French borders, mere threat would be enough. Hitler could not gamble on their inactivity as in case of Poland as in this case his army would be much farther to be recalled for a much, much longer period of time. Meaning his attack on Soviet Union would be even that much weaker.
On January 04 2012 19:46 dmgdnooc wrote:
OK, so we agree, 'Germany would lose no matter when the attack happened'.
I think that because of the fault that I perceive in nazi ideology coupled with the military considerations of the USSR's physical factors (distance, weather, sub standard roads etc).while you appear to believe that the loss would occur purely because of the overriding military factors concerning the geographical nature of the USSR.
Perhaps you have not considered the galvanising effect that the nazi policy of extermination had on the Slavic peoples, perhaps you should.
Germany had much to offer Poland in exchange for the Danzig corridor, but it did not offer enough for the Poles to concede the corridor. Peace, security, technology, capital, alliance and much more I would suppose. I do maintain that diplomacy could have turned the situation but diplomacy failed because Germany did not offer enough for the concession.
Everything is for sale, if the price is right.
I described the Polish government as 'wannabe nazis' because of the anti-semitic legislative programme they had implimented to marginalise and disempower the large Jewish minority. A programme similar in many respects to its German model.
And because of its strongly right wing nationalistic tendencies and the predominance of the military amongst its members.
On second thoughts, maybe they weren't so 'wannabe'.
Similar political leanings in some areas do not make countries friends or even more likely to reach a diplomatic deal. Peace and security is not something Germany could offer Poland at all and in this particular case Poland would not choose them over the corridor as they did not do so in reality. Poland would not trade technology for territory. Same for capital. If you think so you severely misunderstand political realities and Polish mindset.
Furthermore Polish territory would be crucial for staging attack on Soviet Russia, without it the invasion is even more unrealistic, so some conquest of Poland is required anyway.
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On January 04 2012 10:28 Skullflower wrote:Show nested quote +On January 02 2012 12:11 FuzzyLord wrote:
Rule of War: Don't attack Russia. Ever. You'll Lose. I thought you weren't supposed to attack Finland?
No, the rule is that a retarded junior officer corps can make attacking anyone an insane proposition
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On January 04 2012 18:01 Millitron wrote:
I'd like to make a conjecture here, on the topic of Germany VS Russia.
Suppose The Battle of Britain ends in a German victory. England's airforce is practically a non-entity with this loss, thus England is out of the war as far as Germany is concerned. Sure they still have forces in Africa, but no strategic bombing campaign can be launched.
With no B17's or Lancasters bombing every factory, German forces will fair much better in Russia. I doubt the first push would have gone much better, as the bombing campaign had not really begun at the time. The Russian counter-attack would not have been nearly as effective however, as the Wehrmacht would have been much more prepared.
Whether this would allow a German victory is impossible to tell, I think. I believe it all hinges on the strategic and tactical decision-making skills of the Russian commanders, which to be honest I know little about.
No, not likely. The Allied bombing campaign didn't really begin in earnest until late 1942, by which point the Russians had already repelled the Germans once at Moscow and were doing it again at Stalingrad. Furthermore, even as the Allies were bombing Germany, the Luftwaffe still kept Luftflotte 4 (the air fleet responsible for the Stalingrad sector) at its peak strength of nearly 900 aircraft, which made it the largest air formation in the world at the time.
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@dmg
Sup Yo, one thing
123 years without a country
suddenly Your country rises
No way You're freaking allying with Your enemy who You fought for eternity. Also, with all the things they've done in Silesia and not only there just after independent Poland was created nobody thought any deals with be it republican or nazi Germany would be good.
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On January 05 2012 00:17 sviatoslavrichter wrote:Show nested quote +On January 04 2012 18:01 Millitron wrote:
I'd like to make a conjecture here, on the topic of Germany VS Russia.
Suppose The Battle of Britain ends in a German victory. England's airforce is practically a non-entity with this loss, thus England is out of the war as far as Germany is concerned. Sure they still have forces in Africa, but no strategic bombing campaign can be launched.
With no B17's or Lancasters bombing every factory, German forces will fair much better in Russia. I doubt the first push would have gone much better, as the bombing campaign had not really begun at the time. The Russian counter-attack would not have been nearly as effective however, as the Wehrmacht would have been much more prepared.
Whether this would allow a German victory is impossible to tell, I think. I believe it all hinges on the strategic and tactical decision-making skills of the Russian commanders, which to be honest I know little about. No, not likely. The Allied bombing campaign didn't really begin in earnest until late 1942, by which point the Russians had already repelled the Germans once at Moscow and were doing it again at Stalingrad. Furthermore, even as the Allies were bombing Germany, the Luftwaffe still kept Luftflotte 4 (the air fleet responsible for the Stalingrad sector) at its peak strength of nearly 900 aircraft, which made it the largest air formation in the world at the time.
How could Luftflotte 4 be kept at full strength when the ground forces were so poorly supplied they were eating rats?
I'm not saying I don't believe it, just that I don't understand how there can be such a disparity in supplies.
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On January 04 2012 13:48 mcc wrote:Show nested quote +On January 04 2012 10:05 SilentchiLL wrote:
I don't think that the situation in Germany after WW1 and the one in Japan after WW2 are comparable in that aspect mcc. Well they share a lot of common aspects, why do you think they are not even comparable ? I am aware of the differences, but there are also similarities.
To be honest there aren't that many common aspects which they wouldn't share with any other nation which just lost a major war, very few which are what you talked about and many differences.
I actually thought about telling you about the similarities and differences, but even after thinking only shortly about them I already piled up more than I'm willing to write down here (guess you could call me lazy, but it would seriously be VERY long) one of the differences would be for example how they saw the war after it was over and how different the wars were, the first world war might have not been looked upon with the remorse it would've deserved in Germany(and ofc way less in the countries of the winning side), although the views on it already changed dramatically because it was the first war in which pretty much every family lost some of it's members and the Germans were deeply pissed because of how the winning countries treated them afterwards, but the Germans still didn't want the second world war until they heard of the big victories in the beginning of it. And compared to all those war crimes committed in WWII the first one was fought in a relatively "nice" way(and yes I'm saying that although I know of the gas attacks and some of the warcrimes commited back then) for example something like a christmas truce (for those of you who want to know more about it, this a good article from wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christmas_truce (gotta say that I think that the German article is much better in my opinion so you might wanna get other sources for it, though that might be just my opinion since there are for example diary entries and other sourced infos about football playing, the united mass, the singing, the sharing of family photos, the giving of presents and other nice acts) ) would have never been possible in the second world war. So the young generations might have been taught that they have done nothing wrong (which you could actually argue for since germany didn't give the initial reason for WWII and pretty much every bigger country in europe wanted the war) but the situation was still completely different than the one in Japan after WWII and saying that they learned nothing out of it isn't true either, which is shown by the reluctance of the German people to start a new war until they heard of the overwhelming victories.
Hope I could help you, even though I only really adressed one or 1.5 points and had to stop myself on several points so I don't write too much by going too much into detail here.
Maybe there is an essay in English or Czech you could look up which compares both if you really want to know more about it.
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Fun fact: Here in Poland we have 2 ways of saying "Just in case".
1: "W razie czego" --- literally "In case of something".
2: "W razie Niemców" --- "In case of Germans".
That's what you get for fighting them for a thousand years and getting blitzkrieged.
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On January 05 2012 22:35 Manit0u wrote:
Fun fact: Here in Poland we have 2 ways of saying "Just in case".
1: "W razie czego" --- literally "In case of something".
2: "W razie Niemców" --- "In case of Germans".
That's what you get for fighting them for a thousand years and getting blitzkrieged.
It's funny that you guys make such a big deal about it and we're just like:
hm, yeah okay we and russia always kinda divided it through history
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On January 03 2012 22:08 Kukaracha wrote:
Edit: however, I will agree that it's never perfect. An example would be the image given to Germany and especially to the German soldiers. The difference bewteen the Einsatzgruppen and the regular Wehrmacht is never underlined, and soldiers are never shown as regular people.
Can you explain what you meant. please? I don't think I understand.
And to add some entertainment to this serious topic: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wojtek_(soldier_bear)
The history of a bear adopted by Polish soldiers from 2nd Corps, which was formed in Middle East from Polish deportees coming from the GULAG camps.
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On January 06 2012 05:47 kornetka wrote:Show nested quote +On January 03 2012 22:08 Kukaracha wrote:
Edit: however, I will agree that it's never perfect. An example would be the image given to Germany and especially to the German soldiers. The difference bewteen the Einsatzgruppen and the regular Wehrmacht is never underlined, and soldiers are never shown as regular people. Can you explain what you meant. please? I don't think I understand. And to add some entertainment to this serious topic: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wojtek_(soldier_bear)The history of a bear adopted by Polish soldiers from 2nd Corps, which was formed in Middle East from Polish deportees coming from the GULAG camps.
I thought I'd follow you and since I already mentioned the christmas truce I quickly googled it and found this nice little site:
http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/trenches.htm
Happyness!
...The two barrels of beer were drunk, and the German officer was right: if it was possible for a man to have drunk the two barrels himself he would have bursted before he had got drunk. French beer was rotten stuff.
Made me laugh ^^
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EPT
