EPTdeath teleportation - Page 28
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smokeyhoodoo
United States1021 Posts
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AcrosstheSky
United States237 Posts
yeah but you would still have the exact same thought processes / memory so you would feel no difference at all. It is you. What makes us, us? Our brain which holds our conciousness. this "machine" would reconstruct/teleport your Brain (and all of it's neural signals, everything) to the destination. Thus it is still YOU because your conciousness was 100% unafffected. If i create a copy of you and your brain, you wouldn't inhabit two bodies; neither would you if you died and a replica was created . Read the op again, your consciousness is now gone, not "unaffected", you're dead. | ||
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Chooser
Australia25 Posts
On April 16 2012 15:57 AcrosstheSky wrote: If i create a copy of you and your brain, you wouldn't inhabit two bodies; neither would you if you died and a replica was created . Read the op again, your consciousness is now gone, not "unaffected", you're dead. That may be true, but then you may be missing the point the poster you quoted was trying to make, i.e. that there is nothing more to being you than something that comprises 'you'. So that 'his' continuing would in effect be him. It does, sort of come down to how people want to define 'identity', as mentioned earlier (perhaps as being a soul that inhabits the 'mind or body'). I would conclude that there is in fact no consciousness in the vague sense most people presume there is (I say vague because it's a view seemingly held very concretely [even by myself, perhaps], and so it's 'vague' to me) Like I've said I then conclude that I don't actually exist. Which is strange to say, to me anyway. Oh and on a tangent, maybe one way of solving the issue is of questioning the morality of killing another being, even if it is in fact 'yourself',but that would be skirting what I think is the actual issue. | ||
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Wegandi
United States2455 Posts
On April 16 2012 14:20 xOny wrote: yeah but you would still have the exact same thought processes / memory so you would feel no difference at all. It is you. What makes us, us? Our brain which holds our conciousness. this "machine" would reconstruct/teleport your Brain (and all of it's neural signals, everything) to the destination. Thus it is still YOU because your conciousness was 100% unafffected. Gah. Just read/listen"A universe from nothing" by Lawrence Krauss and you will all realize how truely insignificant you all are. The amount of people in this thread that think they are special or have some sort of hidden soul blows my mind (unless you are religious.. in which case.. no comment.) You have a lot to learn about life. Perhaps in time. | ||
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frontliner2
Netherlands844 Posts
No thank you sir! | ||
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seppolevne
Canada1681 Posts
On April 16 2012 16:30 Chooser wrote: That may be true, but then you may be missing the point the poster you quoted was trying to make, i.e. that there is nothing more to being you than something that comprises 'you'. So that 'his' continuing would in effect be him. It does, sort of come down to how people want to define 'identity', as mentioned earlier (perhaps as being a soul that inhabits the 'mind or body'). I would conclude that there is in fact no consciousness in the vague sense most people presume there is (I say vague because it's a view seemingly held very concretely [even by myself, perhaps], and so it's 'vague' to me) Like I've said I then conclude that I don't actually exist. Which is strange to say, to me anyway. Oh and on a tangent, maybe one way of solving the issue is of questioning the morality of killing another being, even if it is in fact 'yourself',but that would be skirting what I think is the actual issue. I don't really think there is an issue. You die. There is discontinuity of the body. You said it yourself, there is nothing more to being you than something that comprises you. So if you are destroyed, then you are destroyed. If a copy exactly like you is made, something is made exactly like you. They are not the same thing, from a subjective standpoint. If you are down with dying then by all means, but that is the choice you are making. To die or not. Would you die just to let a copy of yourself be created? | ||
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Chooser
Australia25 Posts
On April 16 2012 22:13 seppolevne wrote: I don't really think there is an issue. You die. There is discontinuity of the body. You said it yourself, there is nothing more to being you than something that comprises you. So if you are destroyed, then you are destroyed. If a copy exactly like you is made, something is made exactly like you. They are not the same thing, from a subjective standpoint. If you are down with dying then by all means, but that is the choice you are making. To die or not. Would you die just to let a copy of yourself be created? As I mentioned in the previous post, I think it can come down to how we define the different terms we use in these discussions; for instance what might constitute a destruction, or what exactly is a discontinuity of the body (or rather you or me) is. I mentioned earlier on, if it is the case that continuity is what constitutes us being us, then that continuity contains changes we realize in ourselves as we live. This being the case, we are changing from moment to moment, we transition through states and 'change.' The teleportation device would recreate you exactly as you were previously, so that there would be no transition between (maybe mental?) (other than physical displacement) states. Also consider that, the teleportation is part of you being yourself, and is part of 'your' continuity, as you retain memory of what occurred immediately before being transported. I'm not arguing for any side in particular, just open to discussion. From my point of view I am attempting to reconcile the notion that I am a being in transition, so that a static me does not exist, so that I shouldn't have any qualms about actually being transported with the thought that I in fact somehow (actually?) would not exist, as I've died. Or we could just be spinning words round and round. edit: Oh and also on what you said about what I said about "There is nothing more to being you than what comprises you" we may be interpreting this in different ways. Since there is something else that is exactly identical to the way you were previously (or now) and there is 'nothing more to being "you" than what comprises you, that other thing that is identical in composition would be you. | ||
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lorkac
United States2297 Posts
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seppolevne
Canada1681 Posts
On April 16 2012 22:41 Chooser wrote: As I mentioned in the previous post, I think it can come down to how we define the different terms we use in these discussions; for instance what might constitute a destruction, or what exactly is a discontinuity of the body (or rather you or me) is. I mentioned earlier on, if it is the case that continuity is what constitutes us being us, then that continuity contains changes we realize in ourselves as we live. This being the case, we are changing from moment to moment, we transition through states and 'change.' The teleportation device would recreate you exactly as you were previously, so that there would be no transition between (maybe mental?) (other than physical displacement) states. Also consider that, the teleportation is part of you being yourself, and is part of 'your' continuity, as you retain memory of what occurred immediately before being transported. I'm not arguing for any side in particular, just open to discussion. From my point of view I am attempting to reconcile the notion that I am a being in transition, so that a static me does not exist, so that I shouldn't have any qualms about actually being transported with the thought that I in fact somehow (actually?) would not exist, as I've died. Or we could just be spinning words round and round. edit: Oh and also on what you said about what I said about "There is nothing more to being you than what comprises you" we may be interpreting this in different ways. Since there is something else that is exactly identical to the way you were previously (or now) and there is 'nothing more to being "you" than what comprises you, that other thing that is identical in composition would be you. No part of human life involves the complete breakdown of your physical form, and I don't think a subjective consciousness would survive it. I think that that happening is enough to consider the new object a completely new entity, however perfectly similar. For your edit: That would be the case for everything but the subjective experience, which happens to be all I care about in this situation. I don't think breakdown and transport would be sufficient for continuity. "Your" life as an objective thing would continue, but 'you' now would not be the one experiencing it. A brand new 'you' with the exact same everything would be created, and respond exactly as you would, but it would be a brand new subjective agent. | ||
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mcc
Czech Republic4646 Posts
On April 15 2012 10:33 Chooser wrote: Also, how does teleportation defy the the continuity of self as a progression, as the continuity is in fact less gradual (or there is a change by a lesser degree) so that it is in fact more 'you'. - There is an 'I'. It defies it because there is no space continuity, the new body has nothing to do with the old one. Continuity is not defined by similarity in structure, that is probably what is the point of misunderstanding. Two exactly same bodies 1 ly/1km/1m apart have no continuity between them. Continuity is defined by gradual change of the original to the new state. In teleportation scenario original is not changed to the copy, original is destroyed. Thus no continuity. | ||
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mcc
Czech Republic4646 Posts
On April 15 2012 11:02 Thezftw wrote: If decomposing and reconstructing something equals the exact same thing, then sure why not? The 'you' that is decomposed wont give a shit because 'you' don't exist as a conscious being anymore, and the reconstructed 'you' wont give a damn as 'you' are still conscious. I could see it as a problem if teleportation somehow altered 'you'. I'm going to teleport to another day by heading to bed now -> The same argument can be used for killing someone without making a copy : "The 'you' that was killed wont give a shit because 'you' don't exist as a conscious being anymore". The point is if you would care before going into the machine, as it is if you would care if someone killed you. After the fact of course you so not care as you are dead in both cases. | ||
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mcc
Czech Republic4646 Posts
On April 15 2012 12:04 KevinIX wrote: What makes you you, though? If "you" is the being made up of your memories and genetics, then killing the old body and recreating a new body would not kill "you". "You" would be transferred over (OP stated the machine perfectly recreates your mind and body). And that is the point, "you" we are talking about is not defined only by structure. It is also defined by history of your body. It is similar to how people often think that our universe is defined by physical laws. But that is not enough, it is defined by laws and history. To add more, some people in this thread say that the only way is through use of quantum teleportation. That is far from truth as there is no reason to assume that quantum level is in any way necessary to recreate the exact same person. Since quantum effects play no significant role in specifics of our personality, much cruder device would be enough to create a being that would functionally be the same as the original. This does not change in any way, that it would not be you. On this example it is even more clear, that being would still remember everything you did and he would think he is you, and yet even at the moment of creation he would even be physically different than you. On the other hand machine that slightly alters all quantum states in your body and thus produces the same result as the crude cloning machine is actually keeping "you" intact, even though structurally both entities are the same. Structural similarities are only small part of what defines "you", historical continuity is necessary. | ||
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mcc
Czech Republic4646 Posts
On April 15 2012 22:42 CubEdIn wrote: So you are saying that a part of you is defined outside the model. Something that you have is not made out of molecules and atoms, and cannot be replicated. There is a difference between a clone and this process, in that the consciousness itself is also transported. So it would be like going to sleep and waking up. Momentary lapse of consciousness and that's that. Yes something that defines me is not made of molecules and atoms. That does not mean it is supernatural. Existing in time is not made of atoms. Actually it is you who is proposing supernatural : "the consciousness itself is also transported". Consciousness cannot be transported unless you are proposing existence of souls. Consciousness is an artifact of the body. And two structurally identical bodies do not produce the same consciousness. They produce functionally identical consciousness. But not the same, as consciousness is an artifact of the specific body. It cannot be transported. The same way as color on one red cube is not transported when we create another red cube. The "redness" is artifact of the object and cannot be transported. In the same way you cannot transport consciousness as consciousness is a process that is happening in THAT body. Creating functionally identical process elsewhere does not suddenly mean both processes are now one process. Easily the fact that original can survive shows what nonsense is the notion that consciousness or "me" is just defined by the structure. Self-identification is continuous process and even though I use consciousness, I doubt consciousness is necessary for self-identification. You cannot disrupt the process, create a new one that behaves the same way and claim it is the same process. The fact that the process was disrupted matters as it is that continuity of the process that defines "me". | ||
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mcc
Czech Republic4646 Posts
On April 16 2012 01:05 shinosai wrote: Just to add a little fun to the mix, from Swinburne: Suppose there is a mad scientist that is going to transfer your consciousness into two separate bodies. These two bodies will be exact replicas of you - they will have all of your experiences, memories, consciousness, etc. However, one body will experience extreme pain and suffering. The other will experience pleasure. Should you be worried? If you think that in the death teleportation, the replica is really YOU, then you should be really, really worried. But if you don't, then you shouldn't be worried at all. Because neither of the new bodies will really be "you". This response is specifically directed at people who argue that a physical "discontinuation" of the body means that it's no longer really "you". Well, then, if your psychological consciousness is transferred into a new body that will experience torture, are you not worried? What do you mean "consciousness is transferred into a new body". As in OP, or some other way ? As there are ways where transferring consciousness into new body is possible without physical "discontinuation". | ||
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mcc
Czech Republic4646 Posts
On April 16 2012 04:05 Tobberoth wrote: Both machines kill you. Even if the copy is made up of the exact same atoms in the exact same position, it's still just a copy. I mean, if you have the technology to break down a person into atoms and rebuild it perfectly, you would have the technology to do the same kind of copy but with other atoms, which would make a perfect copy since a hydrogen atom in my body is identical to any hydrogen atom in the air. IMO, this is the reason why I believe in the soul even though I'm an atheist. Because really, I just can't believe that my consciousness rests in my atoms... the atoms building up my body is just dead matter, you could build a completely identical copy with atoms from other sources... but that obviously wouldn't have my consciousness. It's also the reason I have a mild phobia of sleeping, I find lapse of consciousness very uncomfortable. There is no need for a soul really. Consciousness is still based on atoms, but it is a process, not an atomic structure. When your body is copied on atomic level, new process arises, functionally the same, but it is not the same process. It is the fact that consciousness is not a static structure, but ongoing process that requires continuity for it to be preserved. | ||
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HunterX11
United States1048 Posts
On April 16 2012 15:57 AcrosstheSky wrote: If i create a copy of you and your brain, you wouldn't inhabit two bodies; neither would you if you died and a replica was created . Read the op again, your consciousness is now gone, not "unaffected", you're dead. It is possible to disagree with this. Personally, I think that I would inhabit two bodies (albeit only quite temporarily since the experiences of the two bodies would soon diverge). A body is clearly not synonymous with a person (since our bodies are replaced piece-by-piece over time but we remain the same person), but if one discounts the existence of souls, then I think the best explanation is that a body is an instantiation of a person. If that is the case, I don't see any theoretical reason why there couldn't be two instances of one person (though there are plenty of practical reasons why this would be a tenuous situation, at best). If one created a copy of a person and put it in the exact same environment as the original, I think you would still only have one person, since there would only be one unique pattern of thoughts and memories. One person, two bodies sounds pretty crazy, but then again, copying someone perfeclty sounds pretty crazy, and recreating an exact environment even craizer. | ||
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CptCutter
United Kingdom370 Posts
ill ask something, if you were to break down 2 peoples bodies into atoms and mixed them together, would you be able to tell which atoms belonged to which person? because what this question seems like to me is that you seem to believe that the atoms that make up your body belong to you and cannot be replaced, and that this assortment of atoms is what defines you. (which is completely wrong to begin with since most/if not all cells in your body break down and get replaced by new ones) i would prefer to think of myself as similar to a computer program. it does not matter what machine the program runs on, it is the program and the way it runs that defines what it is. | ||
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Sbrubbles
Brazil5776 Posts
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mcc
Czech Republic4646 Posts
On April 17 2012 02:57 HunterX11 wrote: It is possible to disagree with this. Personally, I think that I would inhabit two bodies (albeit only quite temporarily since the experiences of the two bodies would soon diverge). A body is clearly not synonymous with a person (since our bodies are replaced piece-by-piece over time but we remain the same person), but if one discounts the existence of souls, then I think the best explanation is that a body is an instantiation of a person. If that is the case, I don't see any theoretical reason why there couldn't be two instances of one person (though there are plenty of practical reasons why this would be a tenuous situation, at best). If one created a copy of a person and put it in the exact same environment as the original, I think you would still only have one person, since there would only be one unique pattern of thoughts and memories. One person, two bodies sounds pretty crazy, but then again, copying someone perfeclty sounds pretty crazy, and recreating an exact environment even craizer. That is far from the best explanation and it goes directly against current science. It is impossible for you to be two bodies exactly because there are no souls and thus there is nothing that those two bodies share that would allow "you" as in your consciousness, psyche to share them. There is no physical mechanism for those two bodies to participate on your consciousness, so they cannot be both you. | ||
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Demonhunter04
1530 Posts
The consciousness itself needs to be "found" in some way before we can really consider this issue. | ||
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