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On April 17 2012 02:57 CptCutter wrote: when you guys log into your starcraft 2 accounts, does it matter whether the account you logged into was your original or a copy? to me, it doesnt actually matter as nothing is affected by it being either. when you create your account for starcraft 2 and play games, only the information is transported and stored. your computer then reconstructs a new profile by getting your account information, so in a sense, i see this problem as exactly the same thing. If you are killed, moved and reconstructed, that is still you just different atoms would be used.
ill ask something, if you were to break down 2 peoples bodies into atoms and mixed them together, would you be able to tell which atoms belonged to which person? because what this question seems like to me is that you seem to believe that the atoms that make up your body belong to you and cannot be replaced, and that this assortment of atoms is what defines you. (which is completely wrong to begin with since most/if not all cells in your body break down and get replaced by new ones)
i would prefer to think of myself as similar to a computer program. it does not matter what machine the program runs on, it is the program and the way it runs that defines what it is.
The problem with people arguing as you do is that you see human bodies as something static. They are not they are biochemical processes. You cannot break down process and reconstruct it. You can create new process that is functionally identical. Problem is the original process is no longer. That is why any deconstruction whatsoever is irreversible, as at the point when the process stops, your existence ended for good. You are the process, you are not the static structure.
Anyway, this is still a good discussion as it allowed me to understand the problem deeper, beyond the apparent nonsense of multiple people being one person. In the beginning that was the only apparent thing. But thinking about it I now also see the why behind the requirement for continuity. The continuity requirement follows from the fact that we are not in fact static structures. We are biochemical processes, and as such are intimately linked to the physical substrate in which those happen. Consciousness and all mental states are artifacts of those processes (or subprocesses themselves). Process cannot be deconstructed and reconstructed as it is defined by its continuous existence in time.
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Reading this thread has made me realize that the only way I would use a teleportation device would be if it were a continuosly open portal and I could stick my hand through it and move it on the other side while still standing at the entering point. That way I could be sure that the biochemical processes in me that make me who I am would not die during transportation like in the OP.
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On April 17 2012 03:51 mcc wrote:Show nested quote +On April 17 2012 02:57 CptCutter wrote: when you guys log into your starcraft 2 accounts, does it matter whether the account you logged into was your original or a copy? to me, it doesnt actually matter as nothing is affected by it being either. when you create your account for starcraft 2 and play games, only the information is transported and stored. your computer then reconstructs a new profile by getting your account information, so in a sense, i see this problem as exactly the same thing. If you are killed, moved and reconstructed, that is still you just different atoms would be used.
ill ask something, if you were to break down 2 peoples bodies into atoms and mixed them together, would you be able to tell which atoms belonged to which person? because what this question seems like to me is that you seem to believe that the atoms that make up your body belong to you and cannot be replaced, and that this assortment of atoms is what defines you. (which is completely wrong to begin with since most/if not all cells in your body break down and get replaced by new ones)
i would prefer to think of myself as similar to a computer program. it does not matter what machine the program runs on, it is the program and the way it runs that defines what it is.
The problem with people arguing as you do is that you see human bodies as something static. They are not they are biochemical processes. You cannot break down process and reconstruct it. You can create new process that is functionally identical. Problem is the original process is no longer. That is why any deconstruction whatsoever is irreversible, as at the point when the process stops, your existence ended for good. You are the process, you are not the static structure. Anyway, this is still a good discussion as it allowed me to understand the problem deeper, beyond the apparent nonsense of multiple people being one person. In the beginning that was the only apparent thing. But thinking about it I now also see the why behind the requirement for continuity. The continuity requirement follows from the fact that we are not in fact static structures. We are biochemical processes, and as such are intimately linked to the physical substrate in which those happen. Consciousness and all mental states are artifacts of those processes (or subprocesses themselves). Process cannot be deconstructed and reconstructed as it is defined by its continuous existence in time.
By what metric are you saying the original process is no longer? As far as the OP states, the "copy" is identical to the "original", including the notion that it IS the original. So, why isn't it?
Tell me how this teleportation is different from any other circumstance in which you lose conciousness (sleep being the most obvious one).
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On April 17 2012 03:51 mcc wrote:Show nested quote +On April 17 2012 02:57 CptCutter wrote: when you guys log into your starcraft 2 accounts, does it matter whether the account you logged into was your original or a copy? to me, it doesnt actually matter as nothing is affected by it being either. when you create your account for starcraft 2 and play games, only the information is transported and stored. your computer then reconstructs a new profile by getting your account information, so in a sense, i see this problem as exactly the same thing. If you are killed, moved and reconstructed, that is still you just different atoms would be used.
ill ask something, if you were to break down 2 peoples bodies into atoms and mixed them together, would you be able to tell which atoms belonged to which person? because what this question seems like to me is that you seem to believe that the atoms that make up your body belong to you and cannot be replaced, and that this assortment of atoms is what defines you. (which is completely wrong to begin with since most/if not all cells in your body break down and get replaced by new ones)
i would prefer to think of myself as similar to a computer program. it does not matter what machine the program runs on, it is the program and the way it runs that defines what it is.
The problem with people arguing as you do is that you see human bodies as something static. They are not they are biochemical processes. You cannot break down process and reconstruct it. You can create new process that is functionally identical. Problem is the original process is no longer. That is why any deconstruction whatsoever is irreversible, as at the point when the process stops, your existence ended for good. You are the process, you are not the static structure. Anyway, this is still a good discussion as it allowed me to understand the problem deeper, beyond the apparent nonsense of multiple people being one person. In the beginning that was the only apparent thing. But thinking about it I now also see the why behind the requirement for continuity. The continuity requirement follows from the fact that we are not in fact static structures. We are biochemical processes, and as such are intimately linked to the physical substrate in which those happen. Consciousness and all mental states are artifacts of those processes (or subprocesses themselves). Process cannot be deconstructed and reconstructed as it is defined by its continuous existence in time. Isn't it interesting that the self is defined in something the self has never and can never perceive, and that a self lacking the requirements for being the self would still feel just as much the self as if he really was the self? Continuity is a nonsense and vague concept that doesn't really solve anything. You just have to arbitrarily define rates of bodily change that are okay, but that isn't how the grammar of the word "self" is actually used.
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On April 17 2012 00:16 lorkac wrote: What if we're thinking of this backwards. Would you be okay with the clone being killed off? They clone you for war or something--would you be okay with sending your clone off to die in your stead? Now would you reverse those roles? If nothing mattered--just that one of you survived--then it wouldn't matter if the death was supposedly instant (teleportation) or if the death took years (war, torture, PTSD, etc...)
I really like your idea of trying to think about the situation in a different way (though I disagree that instant death and torturous deaths would be the same scenario).
As soon as two beings exist, I'd say it's best for neither to die (don't kill my clone!). However, if one being can only exist as a byproduct of the destruction of another being, and then it turns out that both beings are equivalent in worth, than it doesn't matter either way (and if we say the reconstructed being is preferable to our current being, because the new teleported location is preferable, then the logical thing to do would be to teleport).
However... I see why the breaking-of-continuity thing is messing with some people (and not with others).
My answer is that I would not choose to teleport, unless I really needed or wanted to teleport for some reason. And then after the first teleport I'd probably be okay with doing it more often. Which I realize isn't entirely rational... but hey.
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On April 17 2012 03:40 Demonhunter04 wrote: Before this issue can be considered, we have to wonder - if such a technology became real, how would we know that the consciousness did or didn't transfer over? The clone, having every memory and being every bit the same as the original, would think that it had just teleported instead of being created.
The consciousness itself needs to be "found" in some way before we can really consider this issue.
Well if this technology is real there is no reason to destroy the original and so we could put the two copies side by side and analyze their experience. The problem with this scenario is that if you assume you aren't destroyed but merely cloned perfectly do you wake up in both bodies?
It would appear that death teleportation does in fact kill you (unless you do wake up in both bodies). There may be no physical consequences of the teleportation (a "you" still exists, so do your genes, and I would say, so does the contextual history of being you), but the process itself would be the same as if you died any other way and that might mean premature oblivion or perhaps even suicide if you believe in a god or soul.
The reality is that if this technology was real the implications on our understanding and mastery of the universe would be far more than just whether or not we could identify a "conciousness". It's far better to approach the teleporter as a magical device to limit the consequences implied by developing this kind of technology.
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On April 17 2012 04:14 Sbrubbles wrote:Show nested quote +On April 17 2012 03:51 mcc wrote:On April 17 2012 02:57 CptCutter wrote: when you guys log into your starcraft 2 accounts, does it matter whether the account you logged into was your original or a copy? to me, it doesnt actually matter as nothing is affected by it being either. when you create your account for starcraft 2 and play games, only the information is transported and stored. your computer then reconstructs a new profile by getting your account information, so in a sense, i see this problem as exactly the same thing. If you are killed, moved and reconstructed, that is still you just different atoms would be used.
ill ask something, if you were to break down 2 peoples bodies into atoms and mixed them together, would you be able to tell which atoms belonged to which person? because what this question seems like to me is that you seem to believe that the atoms that make up your body belong to you and cannot be replaced, and that this assortment of atoms is what defines you. (which is completely wrong to begin with since most/if not all cells in your body break down and get replaced by new ones)
i would prefer to think of myself as similar to a computer program. it does not matter what machine the program runs on, it is the program and the way it runs that defines what it is.
The problem with people arguing as you do is that you see human bodies as something static. They are not they are biochemical processes. You cannot break down process and reconstruct it. You can create new process that is functionally identical. Problem is the original process is no longer. That is why any deconstruction whatsoever is irreversible, as at the point when the process stops, your existence ended for good. You are the process, you are not the static structure. Anyway, this is still a good discussion as it allowed me to understand the problem deeper, beyond the apparent nonsense of multiple people being one person. In the beginning that was the only apparent thing. But thinking about it I now also see the why behind the requirement for continuity. The continuity requirement follows from the fact that we are not in fact static structures. We are biochemical processes, and as such are intimately linked to the physical substrate in which those happen. Consciousness and all mental states are artifacts of those processes (or subprocesses themselves). Process cannot be deconstructed and reconstructed as it is defined by its continuous existence in time. By what metric are you saying the original process is no longer? As far as the OP states, the "copy" is identical to the "original", including the notion that it IS the original. So, why isn't it? Tell me how this teleportation is different from any other circumstance in which you lose conciousness (sleep being the most obvious one).
Sleeping isn't the same as completely ending all activity for a short amount of time. I understand why people still argue about this.. because it's pretty hard to explain on both ends, but here goes.
Nobody is saying that if you are teleported (meaning you are deconstructed and then constructed again perfectly) that it's not exactly the same human acting in exactly the same ways. The problem is that the original (who no longer exists) will have absolutely no experiences post-teleportation. That instance of yourself is gone; dead. Yet people read this argument and commonly say, "Ya, if I come out exactly the same then why not?" Well the answer is cause you're gonna die. A copy of you will live on. "But if the copy is exactly the same as the original, why are you saying it's different?"
It's not, but the original is dead now. It's people's egos that just assume the universe is gonna grab their own specific first-person-view (or "soul" if that helps) and teleport it along with the deconstructed atoms. Negative. It's just going to start up a fresh new install of Windows, but also re-install all your programs and music again. But it's still technically different computer, even if it's identical.
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How is being disassembled (and "killed") and put back together exactly the same somewhere else any different than experiencing a length of time without being disassembled? I'm me because of my memory of my experiences. As each indivisible unit of time passes, I "die" and a new me with the memory of the "dead" me goes on. What's important is that the integrity of my memory remains intact and that I continue to exist in the same form for everyone around me.
Whether I live normally for a moment in one place or use this "killing and teleporting" machine, the me from a moment ago will be gone and the me of the next moment will have his moment. I'd use it.
On April 17 2012 04:46 Meatt wrote: It's not, but the original is dead now. It's people's egos that just assume the universe is gonna grab their own specific first-person-view (or "soul" if that helps) and teleport it along with the deconstructed atoms. Negative. It's just going to start up a fresh new install of Windows, but also re-install all your programs and music again. But it's still technically different computer, even if it's identical. The idea that your perspective is anything more than a biological analog of a history of your chronologically ordered sensory inputs seems off. There isn't a "soul" to feel an intangible loss when our body stops functioning. The organism that's destroyed will simply cease to be and it'd have no qualms with that, because it doesn't exist anymore. The organism that is created would be you. It would have your memory and your form. It would carry on your existence as an entity to the rest of the universe. You would carry on living no differently than if you had stood still for a fraction of a second, since that version of you would just be you with your memory and form.
When someone dies they don't weep. It's the people around them that experience loss.
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Yeah this whole idea is freaky. But you'll never know if it kills you. Because like the OP said. The person on the other end believes it is you and shares all your memories. So it would claim that it is the same person and nothing happened. Even if in all reality you do not share conciousness with who came out on the other end.
So I'd be pretty worried about doing it.
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On April 17 2012 03:51 mcc wrote: The problem with people arguing as you do is that you see human bodies as something static. They are not they are biochemical processes. You cannot break down process and reconstruct it. You can create new process that is functionally identical. Problem is the original process is no longer. That is why any deconstruction whatsoever is irreversible, as at the point when the process stops, your existence ended for good. You are the process, you are not the static structure.
I agree with this and this is what I think. In order for example to become a completely uploaded brain machine, you should substitute all your neurons with artificial neurons one by one while you would still remain conscious and be unaware of the process happening. Moreover, the only way to teleport someone somewhere without losing the stream of consciousness (and thus not dying) would be obtaining a process with which you could actually share one stream of consciousness (one person) in 2 bodies at the same time (probably dealing with some kind of "delay" issue, since consciousness has a fixed refresh time, approximately 12.5 ms) and deleting parts of the original body in a gradual process. To the people who say:"Ok, but the world could be destroying itself 10021029129 times/second", that's actually the point, if this condition doesn't break the stream of consciousness (and it doesn't since consciousness is on a different refresh time), you actually won't die. The only real problem I have yet to solve is about dreamless sleep; if this condition actually stops the stream of consciousness completely, then what I have said above wouldn't be true, and actually we would be dying every day; what I think instead is that even when we have dreamless sleep, some kind of consciousness related process is anyway going on (and the fact you can wake up immediately with a painful stimulus triggering the activating reticular formation in your brainstem is a suggestive proof this could be true).
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On April 17 2012 04:14 Sbrubbles wrote:Show nested quote +On April 17 2012 03:51 mcc wrote:On April 17 2012 02:57 CptCutter wrote: when you guys log into your starcraft 2 accounts, does it matter whether the account you logged into was your original or a copy? to me, it doesnt actually matter as nothing is affected by it being either. when you create your account for starcraft 2 and play games, only the information is transported and stored. your computer then reconstructs a new profile by getting your account information, so in a sense, i see this problem as exactly the same thing. If you are killed, moved and reconstructed, that is still you just different atoms would be used.
ill ask something, if you were to break down 2 peoples bodies into atoms and mixed them together, would you be able to tell which atoms belonged to which person? because what this question seems like to me is that you seem to believe that the atoms that make up your body belong to you and cannot be replaced, and that this assortment of atoms is what defines you. (which is completely wrong to begin with since most/if not all cells in your body break down and get replaced by new ones)
i would prefer to think of myself as similar to a computer program. it does not matter what machine the program runs on, it is the program and the way it runs that defines what it is.
The problem with people arguing as you do is that you see human bodies as something static. They are not they are biochemical processes. You cannot break down process and reconstruct it. You can create new process that is functionally identical. Problem is the original process is no longer. That is why any deconstruction whatsoever is irreversible, as at the point when the process stops, your existence ended for good. You are the process, you are not the static structure. Anyway, this is still a good discussion as it allowed me to understand the problem deeper, beyond the apparent nonsense of multiple people being one person. In the beginning that was the only apparent thing. But thinking about it I now also see the why behind the requirement for continuity. The continuity requirement follows from the fact that we are not in fact static structures. We are biochemical processes, and as such are intimately linked to the physical substrate in which those happen. Consciousness and all mental states are artifacts of those processes (or subprocesses themselves). Process cannot be deconstructed and reconstructed as it is defined by its continuous existence in time. By what metric are you saying the original process is no longer? As far as the OP states, the "copy" is identical to the "original", including the notion that it IS the original. So, why isn't it? Tell me how this teleportation is different from any other circumstance in which you lose conciousness (sleep being the most obvious one). Identical structure is not the same as "sameness". And the original process is no longer because it ceased to be completely for a time. Process is bound by existing continuously in time by its nature/definition. When I sleep my biochemical processes continue, I still function continuously. Consciousness does not need to be active at all times and I think it is not even needed for self-identity necessarily.
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On April 17 2012 05:04 NyKaL wrote:Show nested quote +On April 17 2012 03:51 mcc wrote: The problem with people arguing as you do is that you see human bodies as something static. They are not they are biochemical processes. You cannot break down process and reconstruct it. You can create new process that is functionally identical. Problem is the original process is no longer. That is why any deconstruction whatsoever is irreversible, as at the point when the process stops, your existence ended for good. You are the process, you are not the static structure.
I agree with this and this is what I think. In order for example to become a completely uploaded brain machine, you should substitute all your neurons with artificial neurons one by one while you would still remain conscious and be unaware of the process happening. Moreover, the only way to teleport someone somewhere without losing the stream of consciousness (and thus not dying) would be obtaining a process with which you could actually share one stream of consciousness (one person) in 2 bodies at the same time (probably dealing with some kind of "delay" issue, since consciousness has a fixed refresh time, approximately 12.5 ms) and deleting parts of the original body in a gradual process. To the people who say:"Ok, but the world could be destroying itself 10021029129 times/second", that's actually the point, if this condition doesn't break the stream of consciousness (and it doesn't since consciousness is on a different refresh time), you actually won't die. The only real problem I have yet to solve is about dreamless sleep; if this condition actually stops the stream of consciousness completely, then what I have said above wouldn't be true, and actually we would be dying every day; what I think instead is that even when we have dreamless sleep, some kind of consciousness related process is anyway going on (and the fact you can wake up immediately with a painful stimulus triggering the activating reticular formation in your brainstem is a suggestive proof this could be true). I disagree with the necessity for continuous consciousness, it is not like bees are not themselves, even though they lack consciousness. Consciousness is just one of the artifacts of the process that we are. Consciousness is probably needed to have discussions about the whole thing
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I'll never be able to bear the moral burden of going 3 gate Blink Stalker again...
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On April 17 2012 05:08 mcc wrote:I disagree with the necessity for continuous consciousness, it is not like bees are not themselves, even though they lack consciousness. Consciousness is just one of the artifacts of the process that we are. Consciousness is probably needed to have discussions about the whole thing  I never claimed the necessity of a continous consciousness I spoke about a "consciousness-related process", which is actually unconscious and required to mantain your very self. Thus, I have to say we find ourselves in agreement.
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On April 17 2012 05:04 NyKaL wrote:Show nested quote +On April 17 2012 03:51 mcc wrote: The problem with people arguing as you do is that you see human bodies as something static. They are not they are biochemical processes. You cannot break down process and reconstruct it. You can create new process that is functionally identical. Problem is the original process is no longer. That is why any deconstruction whatsoever is irreversible, as at the point when the process stops, your existence ended for good. You are the process, you are not the static structure.
I agree with this and this is what I think. In order for example to become a completely uploaded brain machine, you should substitute all your neurons with artificial neurons one by one while you would still remain conscious and be unaware of the process happening. Moreover, the only way to teleport someone somewhere without losing the stream of consciousness (and thus not dying) would be obtaining a process with which you could actually share one stream of consciousness (one person) in 2 bodies at the same time (probably dealing with some kind of "delay" issue, since consciousness has a fixed refresh time, approximately 12.5 ms) and deleting parts of the original body in a gradual process. To the people who say:"Ok, but the world could be destroying itself 10021029129 times/second", that's actually the point, if this condition doesn't break the stream of consciousness (and it doesn't since consciousness is on a different refresh time), you actually won't die. The only real problem I have yet to solve is about dreamless sleep; if this condition actually stops the stream of consciousness completely, then what I have said above wouldn't be true, and actually we would be dying every day; what I think instead is that even when we have dreamless sleep, some kind of consciousness related process is anyway going on (and the fact you can wake up immediately with a painful stimulus triggering the activating reticular formation in your brainstem is a suggestive proof this could be true). Both bodies and processes are 100% physical. You can take a snapshot of either and physically reconstruct them exactly as they were.
The problem here is one of interpretation. A process running on your computer is not what you see on your monitor. That is an interpretation of what's happening physically inside your computer's memory. You could, within an instant, physically cut the logic paths and charge states from a circuit currently composing a process and replace it with an identical one without disrupting anything.
What you believe you're feeling as a human being, somehow more than just your physical body, is just an interpretation. We've evolved to interpret input and memory this way because it was supposedly helpful to survival. Anything that physically exists in our universe is explicitly capable of being reproduced.
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On April 17 2012 04:21 Lixler wrote:Show nested quote +On April 17 2012 03:51 mcc wrote:On April 17 2012 02:57 CptCutter wrote: when you guys log into your starcraft 2 accounts, does it matter whether the account you logged into was your original or a copy? to me, it doesnt actually matter as nothing is affected by it being either. when you create your account for starcraft 2 and play games, only the information is transported and stored. your computer then reconstructs a new profile by getting your account information, so in a sense, i see this problem as exactly the same thing. If you are killed, moved and reconstructed, that is still you just different atoms would be used.
ill ask something, if you were to break down 2 peoples bodies into atoms and mixed them together, would you be able to tell which atoms belonged to which person? because what this question seems like to me is that you seem to believe that the atoms that make up your body belong to you and cannot be replaced, and that this assortment of atoms is what defines you. (which is completely wrong to begin with since most/if not all cells in your body break down and get replaced by new ones)
i would prefer to think of myself as similar to a computer program. it does not matter what machine the program runs on, it is the program and the way it runs that defines what it is.
The problem with people arguing as you do is that you see human bodies as something static. They are not they are biochemical processes. You cannot break down process and reconstruct it. You can create new process that is functionally identical. Problem is the original process is no longer. That is why any deconstruction whatsoever is irreversible, as at the point when the process stops, your existence ended for good. You are the process, you are not the static structure. Anyway, this is still a good discussion as it allowed me to understand the problem deeper, beyond the apparent nonsense of multiple people being one person. In the beginning that was the only apparent thing. But thinking about it I now also see the why behind the requirement for continuity. The continuity requirement follows from the fact that we are not in fact static structures. We are biochemical processes, and as such are intimately linked to the physical substrate in which those happen. Consciousness and all mental states are artifacts of those processes (or subprocesses themselves). Process cannot be deconstructed and reconstructed as it is defined by its continuous existence in time. Isn't it interesting that the self is defined in something the self has never and can never perceive, and that a self lacking the requirements for being the self would still feel just as much the self as if he really was the self? Continuity is a nonsense and vague concept that doesn't really solve anything. You just have to arbitrarily define rates of bodily change that are okay, but that isn't how the grammar of the word "self" is actually used. That is not what I am saying. The copy is self lacking requirement's to be the same self as the original. It is though its own independent self. No problem there. And actually it perfectly fits the usage/meaning of the word self. And the vagueness problems are unavoidable whenever you talk about mapping abstract words onto real-life phenomena. Your approach is not better, actually much worse. And the rate of allowed changes is actually not arbitrary in most situations, it follows from biology of human species. The only situations where problems arise is where human word goes into areas disconnected from biology. Like the example with complete extreme amnesia. Human word is unclear what self means in that situation. Biology is rather clear. And even with all the problems even the human word is mostly understood to mean exactly what biological approach says. That continuity of the process is what defines self in the end and person with amnesia is still the original self.
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On April 17 2012 04:21 TheRealPaciFist wrote:Show nested quote +On April 17 2012 00:16 lorkac wrote: What if we're thinking of this backwards. Would you be okay with the clone being killed off? They clone you for war or something--would you be okay with sending your clone off to die in your stead? Now would you reverse those roles? If nothing mattered--just that one of you survived--then it wouldn't matter if the death was supposedly instant (teleportation) or if the death took years (war, torture, PTSD, etc...) I really like your idea of trying to think about the situation in a different way (though I disagree that instant death and torturous deaths would be the same scenario). As soon as two beings exist, I'd say it's best for neither to die (don't kill my clone!). However, if one being can only exist as a byproduct of the destruction of another being, and then it turns out that both beings are equivalent in worth, than it doesn't matter either way (and if we say the reconstructed being is preferable to our current being, because the new teleported location is preferable, then the logical thing to do would be to teleport). However... I see why the breaking-of-continuity thing is messing with some people (and not with others). My answer is that I would not choose to teleport, unless I really needed or wanted to teleport for some reason. And then after the first teleport I'd probably be okay with doing it more often. Which I realize isn't entirely rational... but hey.
I too believe that there is a big difference between a painless teleport death and a painful teleport death. But I you honestly believe that the clone living on in place of you is as goods you existing--then it wouldn't matter whether your death was painful or not. We could make the hypothetical "the clone doesn't remember the pain" argument--and I still wouldn't be able to handle the idea of willfully going into a painful/painless death for the sake of some clone. Because, in the end, that's what this debate is about right? Is the clone good enough to replace me? Is the clone good enough to take over my life.
For example, say you dont die. Your clone takes over your job, your kids, your wife, your life. Would it be okay since he has you memories anyway? Would it be okay if someone shot you after the cloning process as opposed to it being a by-product?
People keep comparing it to sleep because they want to believe that it is a seem less transition from old you to new you. Because they're still having a hard time accepting the concept that when you die--you die. The new you is a different you. He will have your experiences--but you wont have his.
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On April 17 2012 05:05 mcc wrote:Show nested quote +On April 17 2012 04:14 Sbrubbles wrote:On April 17 2012 03:51 mcc wrote:On April 17 2012 02:57 CptCutter wrote: when you guys log into your starcraft 2 accounts, does it matter whether the account you logged into was your original or a copy? to me, it doesnt actually matter as nothing is affected by it being either. when you create your account for starcraft 2 and play games, only the information is transported and stored. your computer then reconstructs a new profile by getting your account information, so in a sense, i see this problem as exactly the same thing. If you are killed, moved and reconstructed, that is still you just different atoms would be used.
ill ask something, if you were to break down 2 peoples bodies into atoms and mixed them together, would you be able to tell which atoms belonged to which person? because what this question seems like to me is that you seem to believe that the atoms that make up your body belong to you and cannot be replaced, and that this assortment of atoms is what defines you. (which is completely wrong to begin with since most/if not all cells in your body break down and get replaced by new ones)
i would prefer to think of myself as similar to a computer program. it does not matter what machine the program runs on, it is the program and the way it runs that defines what it is.
The problem with people arguing as you do is that you see human bodies as something static. They are not they are biochemical processes. You cannot break down process and reconstruct it. You can create new process that is functionally identical. Problem is the original process is no longer. That is why any deconstruction whatsoever is irreversible, as at the point when the process stops, your existence ended for good. You are the process, you are not the static structure. Anyway, this is still a good discussion as it allowed me to understand the problem deeper, beyond the apparent nonsense of multiple people being one person. In the beginning that was the only apparent thing. But thinking about it I now also see the why behind the requirement for continuity. The continuity requirement follows from the fact that we are not in fact static structures. We are biochemical processes, and as such are intimately linked to the physical substrate in which those happen. Consciousness and all mental states are artifacts of those processes (or subprocesses themselves). Process cannot be deconstructed and reconstructed as it is defined by its continuous existence in time. By what metric are you saying the original process is no longer? As far as the OP states, the "copy" is identical to the "original", including the notion that it IS the original. So, why isn't it? Tell me how this teleportation is different from any other circumstance in which you lose conciousness (sleep being the most obvious one). Identical structure is not the same as "sameness". And the original process is no longer because it ceased to be completely for a time. Process is bound by existing continuously in time by its nature/definition. When I sleep my biochemical processes continue, I still function continuously. Consciousness does not need to be active at all times and I think it is not even needed for self-identity necessarily.
You say you function continuously while you sleep, but how are you sure of that? You don't know anything except that which your senses tell you, and asleep you aren't being told anything. How can you be sure the world wasn't created this morning, right as you woke up?
Here's a scenario for you. You're in deep sleep. Some scientists lift you up without waking you up, put you into the teleportation machine, which deconstructs you and reconstructs you 10 meters from your current position. The scientists take your "clone", still asleep, and put him into your bed. Your clone wakes up, without a clue as to what happened during the night. He thinks he's you. He is identical to you. He is you. How can you be sure this didn't happen last night?
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On April 17 2012 05:12 FliedLice wrote:I'll never be able to bear the moral burden of going 3 gate Blink Stalker again... 
The stalker doesnt die when it blinks. The argument is not about teleportation--it's about states of self awareness and the validities thereof.
Unless youre admitting that going 3gate blink is cheesy as fuck and you feel the guilt of your actions for using it--then I totally agree with you 
Lol (obviously this was just for an imba toss punchline--ignore this post if you're actually discussing the topic)
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On April 17 2012 05:22 lorkac wrote: People keep comparing it to sleep because they want to believe that it is a seem less transition from old you to new you. Because they're still having a hard time accepting the concept that when you die--you die. The new you is a different you. He will have your experiences--but you wont have his. I have the experiences of me from 20 seconds ago, but he doesn't have my experiences from those 20 seconds. Am I still the same me? The me of the future will always have experiences the me of the past didn't have, that seems like faulty logic.
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