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On April 15 2012 03:20 Chained wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 03:08 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 02:58 Iskusstvo wrote:
Okay, I heard an interesting development on this: Lets say you wake up in one of these machines, you have memories of yourself going to the facility where it is housed, and seeing two identical booth-style machines side by side, one on the left, and another on the right. However, you cannot remember anything beyond that.
You get out of the booth, which turns out to be the left one, and out of the opposite booth to the right comes an apparently identical copy of you. You get chatting, and you both have the same memories and personality down to every single detail, even not remembering if you went into the left or right booth.
Now, the question is, is there any way of determining which one of you is the 'real' (i.e. the one which is not a copy) you? (Assuming for simplicity's sake that there was no external evidence which might prove which booth 'the original' went into) If not, should you kill the other anyway, just because there shouldn't be another one of you? Unlike the original problem this is easy. If there was no logging by the operators there is no way to determine which one is you. That follows from the definition of how the machine works I would say. And killing the other "you" would be a murder, so no you should not do it. Its funny I always have trouble playing single player games by myself (I need someone watching or Ill watch someone else, someone to talk to basically) so having another me solves that problem. lol If this happens though, do we think the same since we are the same in every way O.O?
You would thin the same in the beginning, but since the point 0, you would start having different experiences due to being in different places and thus would gradually start thinking differently. That reinforces the idea that gradual continuity is what defines "me". And teleporters in question violate that. On the other hand teleporter that works on the principle of creating a wormhole that can transport you as a whole (unlike Stargate where you are still deconstructed), would be perfectly fine in this regard and would have no issues with multiple copies as there is no possibility of such.
On April 15 2012 03:20 Chained wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 03:12 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 02:33 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 02:26 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 01:56 GreEny K wrote:
I wouldn't share the thoughts of the other me, our minds would not be connected. I would have to say no... From my point of view, getting into that machine is the end for me. But the copy is a perfect copy. An instant before you teleport, your memories and thoughts would be copied over. So while it isn't the same consciousness, it IS an exact copy of it, so it may as well be the same one. I would do it for sure. And you would cease to exist with someone else exactly like you living instead of you. Basically your proposition is that if two bodies are the same they are the same person, that is patently absurd, as such technology would allow to create multiple exactly the same bodies. That wasn't specified by the OP. The OP doesn't say that the tech can create multiple bodies. Think of it like the process of copying destroys the original, and only one copy can be made at a time. If your memories are identical, and the body is identical, what else is there? What distinguishes the copy from the original? Nothing. I agree, if you think about it, its even a less of a change then getting some kind of organ transplant. I see it as transferring memory from one harddrive to the other with it being the same exact harddrive.
Actually it is very different from transferring memory between harddrives. I think that for example some process of transfering consciousness to a computer might be possible without killing you, because it does not necessarily break the continuity of your existence if it is done gradually. This teleport on the other hand will kill you and create a copy, no continuity.
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On April 15 2012 04:04 Millitron wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 03:46 Maitolasi wrote:On April 15 2012 03:43 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 03:38 Maitolasi wrote:
I don't think some people understand what this means.
Are you seriously saying that you would kill yourself just so an exact copy of yourself (that's not you) could be made in another place? If its an exact copy, memories and all, then it IS me. To everyone else it is exactly you. But YOU would be dead. No, only my original physical form is dead. My consciousness lives on. Even if the teleportation takes time, so there is a break in that consciousness, it doesn't make a difference. When you go to sleep, there is a break in your consciousness, but you don't think you suddenly have a new consciousness every time you wake up. Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 03:52 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 03:12 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 02:33 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 02:26 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 01:56 GreEny K wrote:
I wouldn't share the thoughts of the other me, our minds would not be connected. I would have to say no... From my point of view, getting into that machine is the end for me. But the copy is a perfect copy. An instant before you teleport, your memories and thoughts would be copied over. So while it isn't the same consciousness, it IS an exact copy of it, so it may as well be the same one. I would do it for sure. And you would cease to exist with someone else exactly like you living instead of you. Basically your proposition is that if two bodies are the same they are the same person, that is patently absurd, as such technology would allow to create multiple exactly the same bodies. That wasn't specified by the OP. The OP doesn't say that the tech can create multiple bodies. Think of it like the process of copying destroys the original, and only one copy can be made at a time. If your memories are identical, and the body is identical, what else is there? What distinguishes the copy from the original? Nothing. It is possible that copying might require the destruction of the original. But nothing in the laws of physics prevents creation of multiple copies. Especially not in any of the mentioned sci-fi universes. So you are actually trying to contend that if there are 5 bodies with the same memories and bodies there is nothing to distinguish them ? Because you are actually saying that. What about physical continuity, that is what distinguishes them. That distinguishes the original and the copy in the standard teleport scenario, that is what distinguishes original and the copy in the scenario with the original surviving, that is what distinguishes original and copies in the scenario with multiple copies. Nice simple (not that simple as you can start making even crazier scenarios) distinction that unlike the alternatives does not violate logical principles. No, I'm contending that that wasn't specified by the OP. Since the whole thing is hypothetical anyways, we can't really diverge from what is defined by the question, or we could say absolutely anything at all could happen. Unless we stick with what is defined in the OP, we could make up any rules we wanted for this kind of teleportation. Little off-topic: Firefox's spellcheck doesn't recognize teleportation or even teleport 
Well I'm still concious on some level because I'm dreaming while I'm asleep. Also the atoms in my body are the same when I wake up as they were when I went to sleep (more or less). I still can't understand how people think that if an exact copy of them were to appear in front of them that they would suddenly be incontrol of the other body.
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I'm kind of confused, are you teleporting or cloning yourself? or are both = in the sense that teleport = 100% you, clone = 100% you.
And why exactly do you have to kill the clone? especially if it's not 'you'. Who better to get along with, than yourself.
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On April 15 2012 03:53 sickoota wrote:
The everyday continuity of consciousness is an illusion. You are not the same person every time you wake up. You are not the same person every time you blink. Teleportation in this manner is really no different from what happens any time you go to sleep or even just walk around. You are not one continuous person in the manner most conceive of themselves, just a succession of different states of consciousness in time. People saying a copy of you wouldn't really be "you" are operating off some unsubstantiated, illusory definition of self.
No they are operating based on the normal definition of self. Continuity of yourself is not illusion, between two points in time there is only very limited change to "you". So it easily satisfies requirements for continuity. Continuity does not mean you never change, Continuity means exactly : succession of different (but similar enough) states of consciousness in time. So you basically said that continuity is illusion, because continuity is a fact. Nice contradiction 
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Everyone who is arguing that the copy wouldn't be "you" can only be construed as arguing from an abrahamic/Cartesian conception of "soul" or something similar. Thats the only way I can think of to make their arguments coherent - some non-material source of "self" that the machine would be unable to replicate. What if someone was dosed with surgical grade anesthetic, transported, and then awoken - how would that differ in any meaningful way from the hypothetical transportation machine? Remember that our bodies are constantly remaking its cells, replacing your "self" every few years - but even if it didn't I fail to see how these particular atoms somehow contain the basis for your continuous selfhood whereas some identical atoms of the same elements configured identically would lose this same selfhood...
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I do get what people are trying to say, and I do understand that the copy made will have EVERYTHING that the original has, and to itself, and to everyone around it, it will BE the original.
But from the original's point of view, it is something new, and the original is gone. You are only dead from the perspective of the former self.
I will make a parallel to the movie "Impostor" ( http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0160399/ ), where the main character is being chased by the government who believes that he is a cybernetic-like clone who was given the same memories as the original (basically, an almost identical being but with a bomb instead of a heart), and all throughout the movie, the viewer and the character itself struggles to find out if that is, indeed true.
So, if I had the memories, thoughts, etc. of the former me, I would inevitably think and act the same. But the former me would, in fact, be dead. Would it matter? To the actual me, no. To the former me, maybe. If you look at it this way, it's all about "what really happens after you die". But it would not really translate into simply "teleporting" since it is clearly indicated that the original would stop existing, would be destroyed. So something IS lost in the process. No matter how you twist it. We are merely discussing about how that loss can/will be perceived, imho.
Also, if you have not watched that movie, it's quite well made. Give it a shot.
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On April 15 2012 04:17 mcc wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 03:53 sickoota wrote:
The everyday continuity of consciousness is an illusion. You are not the same person every time you wake up. You are not the same person every time you blink. Teleportation in this manner is really no different from what happens any time you go to sleep or even just walk around. You are not one continuous person in the manner most conceive of themselves, just a succession of different states of consciousness in time. People saying a copy of you wouldn't really be "you" are operating off some unsubstantiated, illusory definition of self. No they are operating based on the normal definition of self. Continuity of yourself is not illusion, between two points in time there is only very limited change to "you". So it easily satisfies requirements for continuity. Continuity does not mean you never change, Continuity means exactly : succession of different (but similar enough) states of consciousness in time. So you basically said that continuity is illusion, because continuity is a fact. Nice contradiction
What exactly are you trying to argue? If you accept my definition of continuity then obviously the machine would satisfy those requirements (succession of similar states of consciousness). My opponents seem to be asserting that there is some other sort of continuity which this machine would violate. Are you agreeing with me or arguing with me? Or just quibbling
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On April 15 2012 04:04 Millitron wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 03:46 Maitolasi wrote:On April 15 2012 03:43 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 03:38 Maitolasi wrote:
I don't think some people understand what this means.
Are you seriously saying that you would kill yourself just so an exact copy of yourself (that's not you) could be made in another place? If its an exact copy, memories and all, then it IS me. To everyone else it is exactly you. But YOU would be dead. No, only my original physical form is dead. My consciousness lives on. Even if the teleportation takes time, so there is a break in that consciousness, it doesn't make a difference. When you go to sleep, there is a break in your consciousness, but you don't think you suddenly have a new consciousness every time you wake up. Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 03:52 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 03:12 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 02:33 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 02:26 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 01:56 GreEny K wrote:
I wouldn't share the thoughts of the other me, our minds would not be connected. I would have to say no... From my point of view, getting into that machine is the end for me. But the copy is a perfect copy. An instant before you teleport, your memories and thoughts would be copied over. So while it isn't the same consciousness, it IS an exact copy of it, so it may as well be the same one. I would do it for sure. And you would cease to exist with someone else exactly like you living instead of you. Basically your proposition is that if two bodies are the same they are the same person, that is patently absurd, as such technology would allow to create multiple exactly the same bodies. That wasn't specified by the OP. The OP doesn't say that the tech can create multiple bodies. Think of it like the process of copying destroys the original, and only one copy can be made at a time. If your memories are identical, and the body is identical, what else is there? What distinguishes the copy from the original? Nothing. It is possible that copying might require the destruction of the original. But nothing in the laws of physics prevents creation of multiple copies. Especially not in any of the mentioned sci-fi universes. So you are actually trying to contend that if there are 5 bodies with the same memories and bodies there is nothing to distinguish them ? Because you are actually saying that. What about physical continuity, that is what distinguishes them. That distinguishes the original and the copy in the standard teleport scenario, that is what distinguishes original and the copy in the scenario with the original surviving, that is what distinguishes original and copies in the scenario with multiple copies. Nice simple (not that simple as you can start making even crazier scenarios) distinction that unlike the alternatives does not violate logical principles. No, I'm contending that that wasn't specified by the OP. Since the whole thing is hypothetical anyways, we can't really diverge from what is defined by the question, or we could say absolutely anything at all could happen. Unless we stick with what is defined in the OP, we could make up any rules we wanted for this kind of teleportation. Little off-topic: Firefox's spellcheck doesn't recognize teleportation or even teleport
One question, do you believe in some immaterial soul ? Because if you do not, consciousness is linked to the body. So the teleporter does not transfer your consciousness, it creates a copy of it. Nothing of the original exists anymore.
OP's teleporter allows multiple copies, he specifically mentions sci-fi teleporters, basically all of them allow that. Not that it is necessary to make the argument that you are in fact dead.
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On April 15 2012 04:05 Lixler wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 03:56 Krohm wrote:On April 15 2012 03:43 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 03:38 Maitolasi wrote:
I don't think some people understand what this means.
Are you seriously saying that you would kill yourself just so an exact copy of yourself (that's not you) could be made in another place? If its an exact copy, memories and all, then it IS me. No it wouldn't be YOU. You would be dead. What now exists is a perfect copy of you but it isn't you. I raised this question with my ex-girlfriend ages ago and we briefly debated about it. Except we were talking about immortality via cloning like in the movie The 6th Day. The problem is even raised in the movie when the scientists wife tells her husband that she isn't her. (After she died and was cloned/copied) I just don't get how anyone could agree to that. Your perception ceases to exist. You are gone; dead. Your copy has it's own perception. There's nothing meaningfully different between a killed and copied self and the typical concept of the self. The perception of your past self is just as dead, and the tie between physical makeup is just as strong. Particles aren't actually identifiable little corpuscles, it means nothing to say "I'm made up of matter that's the exact same, but it isn't the same matter." There's nothing that defines "you" other than your physical makeup, and an ideal physical copy preserves this physical makeup just as well as it's preserved in regular daily life. It would really be something special if you could point to what actually changes in the die + copy case that stays the same in a typical day.
I already did, gradual physical continuity.
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On April 15 2012 04:23 mcc wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 04:04 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 03:46 Maitolasi wrote:On April 15 2012 03:43 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 03:38 Maitolasi wrote:
I don't think some people understand what this means.
Are you seriously saying that you would kill yourself just so an exact copy of yourself (that's not you) could be made in another place? If its an exact copy, memories and all, then it IS me. To everyone else it is exactly you. But YOU would be dead. No, only my original physical form is dead. My consciousness lives on. Even if the teleportation takes time, so there is a break in that consciousness, it doesn't make a difference. When you go to sleep, there is a break in your consciousness, but you don't think you suddenly have a new consciousness every time you wake up. On April 15 2012 03:52 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 03:12 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 02:33 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 02:26 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 01:56 GreEny K wrote:
I wouldn't share the thoughts of the other me, our minds would not be connected. I would have to say no... From my point of view, getting into that machine is the end for me. But the copy is a perfect copy. An instant before you teleport, your memories and thoughts would be copied over. So while it isn't the same consciousness, it IS an exact copy of it, so it may as well be the same one. I would do it for sure. And you would cease to exist with someone else exactly like you living instead of you. Basically your proposition is that if two bodies are the same they are the same person, that is patently absurd, as such technology would allow to create multiple exactly the same bodies. That wasn't specified by the OP. The OP doesn't say that the tech can create multiple bodies. Think of it like the process of copying destroys the original, and only one copy can be made at a time. If your memories are identical, and the body is identical, what else is there? What distinguishes the copy from the original? Nothing. It is possible that copying might require the destruction of the original. But nothing in the laws of physics prevents creation of multiple copies. Especially not in any of the mentioned sci-fi universes. So you are actually trying to contend that if there are 5 bodies with the same memories and bodies there is nothing to distinguish them ? Because you are actually saying that. What about physical continuity, that is what distinguishes them. That distinguishes the original and the copy in the standard teleport scenario, that is what distinguishes original and the copy in the scenario with the original surviving, that is what distinguishes original and copies in the scenario with multiple copies. Nice simple (not that simple as you can start making even crazier scenarios) distinction that unlike the alternatives does not violate logical principles. No, I'm contending that that wasn't specified by the OP. Since the whole thing is hypothetical anyways, we can't really diverge from what is defined by the question, or we could say absolutely anything at all could happen. Unless we stick with what is defined in the OP, we could make up any rules we wanted for this kind of teleportation. Little off-topic: Firefox's spellcheck doesn't recognize teleportation or even teleport One question, do you believe in some immaterial soul ? Because if you do not, consciousness is linked to the body. So the teleporter does not transfer your consciousness, it creates a copy of it. Nothing of the original exists anymore. OP's teleporter allows multiple copies, he specifically mentions sci-fi teleporters, basically all of them allow that. Not that it is necessary to make the argument that you are in fact dead.
Edit: To rejoin in:
But being dead isn't a problem to me if I'm also (so far as I'm aware) instantly recreated without having been dead. I don't fear dying as a concept so dying even on a daily basis if I were able to still just continue wouldn't be an issue. I can't see any way that my mind wouldn't still continue on in the example, and that's the only bit of me that I really need to keep identical, and so long as it would be I don't see the problem.
If infinite parallel universes were to exist, there would also then exist an identical copy of me and I'm quite fine with that too.
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On April 15 2012 04:18 sickoota wrote:
Everyone who is arguing that the copy wouldn't be "you" can only be construed as arguing from an abrahamic/Cartesian conception of "soul" or something similar. Thats the only way I can think of to make their arguments coherent - some non-material source of "self" that the machine would be unable to replicate. What if someone was dosed with surgical grade anesthetic, transported, and then awoken - how would that differ in any meaningful way from the hypothetical transportation machine? Remember that our bodies are constantly remaking its cells, replacing your "self" every few years - but even if it didn't I fail to see how these particular atoms somehow contain the basis for your continuous selfhood whereas some identical atoms of the same elements configured identically would lose this same selfhood...
I'm arguing that the teleported self wouldn't be you and it's not from any religious standpoint. My argument is that in the process YOU are destroyed and will cease to exist and die. Then an exact clone of yourself will be created at the end portal.
The consciousness that will be controlling the body at the end portal will be completely identical to the one that was destroyed during transportation but it will not make it any different from dying in a natural way. Just because someone made a clone of you doesn't mean that you are that clone.
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On April 15 2012 04:21 sickoota wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 04:17 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 03:53 sickoota wrote:
The everyday continuity of consciousness is an illusion. You are not the same person every time you wake up. You are not the same person every time you blink. Teleportation in this manner is really no different from what happens any time you go to sleep or even just walk around. You are not one continuous person in the manner most conceive of themselves, just a succession of different states of consciousness in time. People saying a copy of you wouldn't really be "you" are operating off some unsubstantiated, illusory definition of self. No they are operating based on the normal definition of self. Continuity of yourself is not illusion, between two points in time there is only very limited change to "you". So it easily satisfies requirements for continuity. Continuity does not mean you never change, Continuity means exactly : succession of different (but similar enough) states of consciousness in time. So you basically said that continuity is illusion, because continuity is a fact. Nice contradiction What exactly are you trying to argue? If you accept my definition of continuity then obviously the machine would satisfy those requirements (succession of similar states of consciousness). My opponents seem to be asserting that there is some other sort of continuity which this machine would violate. Are you agreeing with me or arguing with me? Or just quibbling
I am arguing with you as the machine violates the physical continuity in the most fundamental fashion. It actually completely destroys your body. There is no continuity when you use the machine. Your body completely ceases to exists and copy is created elsewhere. And to react to your other post about soul. Your conclusions are strange. It is actually the other way around the only way to say that the copy is you is if there is a immaterial soul. Because then there can be some continuity between the old body and new body. Immaterial soul would be the only thing that would make the teleport possibly not kill you. If you do not believe in the soul, then teleport of such kind is creating duplicates that are not you as there is no continuity between the old and the new. And how do you even explain multiple copies or the original not dying in your approach. The physical continuity approach easily deals with all those problems. So would the soul approach, but since souls do not exist it has slight problem But your approach does not deal with them in any logical way.
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On April 15 2012 04:12 Maitolasi wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 04:04 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 03:46 Maitolasi wrote:On April 15 2012 03:43 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 03:38 Maitolasi wrote:
I don't think some people understand what this means.
Are you seriously saying that you would kill yourself just so an exact copy of yourself (that's not you) could be made in another place? If its an exact copy, memories and all, then it IS me. To everyone else it is exactly you. But YOU would be dead. No, only my original physical form is dead. My consciousness lives on. Even if the teleportation takes time, so there is a break in that consciousness, it doesn't make a difference. When you go to sleep, there is a break in your consciousness, but you don't think you suddenly have a new consciousness every time you wake up. On April 15 2012 03:52 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 03:12 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 02:33 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 02:26 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 01:56 GreEny K wrote:
I wouldn't share the thoughts of the other me, our minds would not be connected. I would have to say no... From my point of view, getting into that machine is the end for me. But the copy is a perfect copy. An instant before you teleport, your memories and thoughts would be copied over. So while it isn't the same consciousness, it IS an exact copy of it, so it may as well be the same one. I would do it for sure. And you would cease to exist with someone else exactly like you living instead of you. Basically your proposition is that if two bodies are the same they are the same person, that is patently absurd, as such technology would allow to create multiple exactly the same bodies. That wasn't specified by the OP. The OP doesn't say that the tech can create multiple bodies. Think of it like the process of copying destroys the original, and only one copy can be made at a time. If your memories are identical, and the body is identical, what else is there? What distinguishes the copy from the original? Nothing. It is possible that copying might require the destruction of the original. But nothing in the laws of physics prevents creation of multiple copies. Especially not in any of the mentioned sci-fi universes. So you are actually trying to contend that if there are 5 bodies with the same memories and bodies there is nothing to distinguish them ? Because you are actually saying that. What about physical continuity, that is what distinguishes them. That distinguishes the original and the copy in the standard teleport scenario, that is what distinguishes original and the copy in the scenario with the original surviving, that is what distinguishes original and copies in the scenario with multiple copies. Nice simple (not that simple as you can start making even crazier scenarios) distinction that unlike the alternatives does not violate logical principles. No, I'm contending that that wasn't specified by the OP. Since the whole thing is hypothetical anyways, we can't really diverge from what is defined by the question, or we could say absolutely anything at all could happen. Unless we stick with what is defined in the OP, we could make up any rules we wanted for this kind of teleportation. Little off-topic: Firefox's spellcheck doesn't recognize teleportation or even teleport Well I'm still concious on some level because I'm dreaming while I'm asleep. Also the atoms in my body are the same when I wake up as they were when I went to sleep (more or less). I still can't understand how people think that if an exact copy of them were to appear in front of them that they would suddenly be incontrol of the other body.
Ok fine, instead of being asleep, how about when you get general anesthetic for a surgery? You definitely aren't even partially conscious then.
You also don't actually know the atoms are the same particular atoms. As has been said before, any to atoms of the same isotope are indistinguishable. When you go to sleep, you have no way to know for sure whether or not you are still composed of the same atoms, since there is no way to tell two atoms of the same isotope apart.
It isn't an exact copy appearing in front of me. The information contained in my "consciousness" is loaded into an identical body, after the destruction of the original. There is only ever one "me" at any given time.
On April 15 2012 04:23 mcc wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 04:04 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 03:46 Maitolasi wrote:On April 15 2012 03:43 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 03:38 Maitolasi wrote:
I don't think some people understand what this means.
Are you seriously saying that you would kill yourself just so an exact copy of yourself (that's not you) could be made in another place? If its an exact copy, memories and all, then it IS me. To everyone else it is exactly you. But YOU would be dead. No, only my original physical form is dead. My consciousness lives on. Even if the teleportation takes time, so there is a break in that consciousness, it doesn't make a difference. When you go to sleep, there is a break in your consciousness, but you don't think you suddenly have a new consciousness every time you wake up. On April 15 2012 03:52 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 03:12 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 02:33 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 02:26 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 01:56 GreEny K wrote:
I wouldn't share the thoughts of the other me, our minds would not be connected. I would have to say no... From my point of view, getting into that machine is the end for me. But the copy is a perfect copy. An instant before you teleport, your memories and thoughts would be copied over. So while it isn't the same consciousness, it IS an exact copy of it, so it may as well be the same one. I would do it for sure. And you would cease to exist with someone else exactly like you living instead of you. Basically your proposition is that if two bodies are the same they are the same person, that is patently absurd, as such technology would allow to create multiple exactly the same bodies. That wasn't specified by the OP. The OP doesn't say that the tech can create multiple bodies. Think of it like the process of copying destroys the original, and only one copy can be made at a time. If your memories are identical, and the body is identical, what else is there? What distinguishes the copy from the original? Nothing. It is possible that copying might require the destruction of the original. But nothing in the laws of physics prevents creation of multiple copies. Especially not in any of the mentioned sci-fi universes. So you are actually trying to contend that if there are 5 bodies with the same memories and bodies there is nothing to distinguish them ? Because you are actually saying that. What about physical continuity, that is what distinguishes them. That distinguishes the original and the copy in the standard teleport scenario, that is what distinguishes original and the copy in the scenario with the original surviving, that is what distinguishes original and copies in the scenario with multiple copies. Nice simple (not that simple as you can start making even crazier scenarios) distinction that unlike the alternatives does not violate logical principles. No, I'm contending that that wasn't specified by the OP. Since the whole thing is hypothetical anyways, we can't really diverge from what is defined by the question, or we could say absolutely anything at all could happen. Unless we stick with what is defined in the OP, we could make up any rules we wanted for this kind of teleportation. Little off-topic: Firefox's spellcheck doesn't recognize teleportation or even teleport One question, do you believe in some immaterial soul ? Because if you do not, consciousness is linked to the body. So the teleporter does not transfer your consciousness, it creates a copy of it. Nothing of the original exists anymore. OP's teleporter allows multiple copies, he specifically mentions sci-fi teleporters, basically all of them allow that. Not that it is necessary to make the argument that you are in fact dead.
No, I don't believe in an immaterial soul, and thats actually a big reason why I'm ok with it. If consciousness is linked to the body, it can be measured and recreated. Assuming it can be recreated with 100% accuracy, its the same consciousness at either end of the teleporter. Just like how two atoms of the same element are indistinguishable, so too are these consciousnesses. So if you only have one of the copies, (original or otherwise), you must assume it is the same consciousness.
If sci-fi teleporters could make copies, why don't they raise armies like that? Why does the Federation have more than one red-shirt? Why not just have thousands of copies of that one red-shirt? Since they don't do this, the only explanation is that they can't, because its too good of an idea to pass up for no reason.
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On April 15 2012 04:31 Maitolasi wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 04:18 sickoota wrote:
Everyone who is arguing that the copy wouldn't be "you" can only be construed as arguing from an abrahamic/Cartesian conception of "soul" or something similar. Thats the only way I can think of to make their arguments coherent - some non-material source of "self" that the machine would be unable to replicate. What if someone was dosed with surgical grade anesthetic, transported, and then awoken - how would that differ in any meaningful way from the hypothetical transportation machine? Remember that our bodies are constantly remaking its cells, replacing your "self" every few years - but even if it didn't I fail to see how these particular atoms somehow contain the basis for your continuous selfhood whereas some identical atoms of the same elements configured identically would lose this same selfhood... I'm arguing that the teleported self wouldn't be you and it's not from any religious standpoint. My argument is that in the process YOU are destroyed and will cease to exist and die. Then an exact clone of yourself will be created at the end portal. The consciousness that will be controlling the body at the end portal will be completely identical to the one that was destroyed during transportation but it will not make it any different from dying in a natural way. Just because someone made a clone of you doesn't mean that you are that clone.
Sorry to be brief but that's not really an argument (at least not a very rigorous one). You state your conclusion (this teleportation machine would kill you) without an argument as to why. You could've been destroyed and rebuilt in your sleep and you would never know. You could be destroyed and rebuilt every second and you would never know. What exactly is "killed" when you go through this machine?
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On April 15 2012 04:27 Iyerbeth wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 04:23 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 04:04 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 03:46 Maitolasi wrote:On April 15 2012 03:43 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 03:38 Maitolasi wrote:
I don't think some people understand what this means.
Are you seriously saying that you would kill yourself just so an exact copy of yourself (that's not you) could be made in another place? If its an exact copy, memories and all, then it IS me. To everyone else it is exactly you. But YOU would be dead. No, only my original physical form is dead. My consciousness lives on. Even if the teleportation takes time, so there is a break in that consciousness, it doesn't make a difference. When you go to sleep, there is a break in your consciousness, but you don't think you suddenly have a new consciousness every time you wake up. On April 15 2012 03:52 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 03:12 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 02:33 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 02:26 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 01:56 GreEny K wrote:
I wouldn't share the thoughts of the other me, our minds would not be connected. I would have to say no... From my point of view, getting into that machine is the end for me. But the copy is a perfect copy. An instant before you teleport, your memories and thoughts would be copied over. So while it isn't the same consciousness, it IS an exact copy of it, so it may as well be the same one. I would do it for sure. And you would cease to exist with someone else exactly like you living instead of you. Basically your proposition is that if two bodies are the same they are the same person, that is patently absurd, as such technology would allow to create multiple exactly the same bodies. That wasn't specified by the OP. The OP doesn't say that the tech can create multiple bodies. Think of it like the process of copying destroys the original, and only one copy can be made at a time. If your memories are identical, and the body is identical, what else is there? What distinguishes the copy from the original? Nothing. It is possible that copying might require the destruction of the original. But nothing in the laws of physics prevents creation of multiple copies. Especially not in any of the mentioned sci-fi universes. So you are actually trying to contend that if there are 5 bodies with the same memories and bodies there is nothing to distinguish them ? Because you are actually saying that. What about physical continuity, that is what distinguishes them. That distinguishes the original and the copy in the standard teleport scenario, that is what distinguishes original and the copy in the scenario with the original surviving, that is what distinguishes original and copies in the scenario with multiple copies. Nice simple (not that simple as you can start making even crazier scenarios) distinction that unlike the alternatives does not violate logical principles. No, I'm contending that that wasn't specified by the OP. Since the whole thing is hypothetical anyways, we can't really diverge from what is defined by the question, or we could say absolutely anything at all could happen. Unless we stick with what is defined in the OP, we could make up any rules we wanted for this kind of teleportation. Little off-topic: Firefox's spellcheck doesn't recognize teleportation or even teleport One question, do you believe in some immaterial soul ? Because if you do not, consciousness is linked to the body. So the teleporter does not transfer your consciousness, it creates a copy of it. Nothing of the original exists anymore. OP's teleporter allows multiple copies, he specifically mentions sci-fi teleporters, basically all of them allow that. Not that it is necessary to make the argument that you are in fact dead. Edit: To rejoin in: But being dead isn't a problem to me if I'm also (so far as I'm aware) instantly recreated without having been dead. I don't fear dying as a concept so dying even on a daily basis if I were able to still just continue wouldn't be an issue. I can't see any way that my mind wouldn't still continue on in the example, and that's the only bit of me that I really need to keep identical, and so long as it would be I don't see the problem. If infinite parallel universes were to exist, there would also then exist an identical copy of me and I'm quite fine with that too.
By dead in this discussion is not meant biologically dead. But as in cease to exist altogether. So you can only die once and it is final. Point is again that you ceased to exist. The copy is more like your identical twin, you might be even the same at some point in time (twins at that moment the cell split, you and your copy at the time when the machine starts to create him), but saying you are the copy is like saying you are your identical twin.
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On April 15 2012 04:36 sickoota wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 04:31 Maitolasi wrote:On April 15 2012 04:18 sickoota wrote:
Everyone who is arguing that the copy wouldn't be "you" can only be construed as arguing from an abrahamic/Cartesian conception of "soul" or something similar. Thats the only way I can think of to make their arguments coherent - some non-material source of "self" that the machine would be unable to replicate. What if someone was dosed with surgical grade anesthetic, transported, and then awoken - how would that differ in any meaningful way from the hypothetical transportation machine? Remember that our bodies are constantly remaking its cells, replacing your "self" every few years - but even if it didn't I fail to see how these particular atoms somehow contain the basis for your continuous selfhood whereas some identical atoms of the same elements configured identically would lose this same selfhood... I'm arguing that the teleported self wouldn't be you and it's not from any religious standpoint. My argument is that in the process YOU are destroyed and will cease to exist and die. Then an exact clone of yourself will be created at the end portal. The consciousness that will be controlling the body at the end portal will be completely identical to the one that was destroyed during transportation but it will not make it any different from dying in a natural way. Just because someone made a clone of you doesn't mean that you are that clone. Sorry to be brief but that's not really an argument (at least not a very rigorous one). You state your conclusion (this teleportation machine would kill you) without an argument as to why. You could've been destroyed and rebuilt in your sleep and you would never know. You could be destroyed and rebuilt every second and you would never know. What exactly is "killed" when you go through this machine?
Read the OP again.
"This is a common thing in science fiction where you are 'teleported' by a machine that kills you, then reconstructs an exact copy of your body and mind at another point"
Also if I was killed in my sleep I would never know because I would be dead
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On April 15 2012 04:33 mcc wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 04:21 sickoota wrote:On April 15 2012 04:17 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 03:53 sickoota wrote:
The everyday continuity of consciousness is an illusion. You are not the same person every time you wake up. You are not the same person every time you blink. Teleportation in this manner is really no different from what happens any time you go to sleep or even just walk around. You are not one continuous person in the manner most conceive of themselves, just a succession of different states of consciousness in time. People saying a copy of you wouldn't really be "you" are operating off some unsubstantiated, illusory definition of self. No they are operating based on the normal definition of self. Continuity of yourself is not illusion, between two points in time there is only very limited change to "you". So it easily satisfies requirements for continuity. Continuity does not mean you never change, Continuity means exactly : succession of different (but similar enough) states of consciousness in time. So you basically said that continuity is illusion, because continuity is a fact. Nice contradiction What exactly are you trying to argue? If you accept my definition of continuity then obviously the machine would satisfy those requirements (succession of similar states of consciousness). My opponents seem to be asserting that there is some other sort of continuity which this machine would violate. Are you agreeing with me or arguing with me? Or just quibbling I am arguing with you as the machine violates the physical continuity in the most fundamental fashion. It actually completely destroys your body. There is no continuity when you use the machine. Your body completely ceases to exists and copy is created elsewhere. And to react to your other post about soul. Your conclusions are strange. It is actually the other way around the only way to say that the copy is you is if there is a immaterial soul. Because then there can be some continuity between the old body and new body. Immaterial soul would be the only thing that would make the teleport possibly not kill you. If you do not believe in the soul, then teleport of such kind is creating duplicates that are not you as there is no continuity between the old and the new. And how do you even explain multiple copies or the original not dying in your approach. The physical continuity approach easily deals with all those problems. So would the soul approach, but since souls do not exist it has slight problem But your approach does not deal with them in any logical way.
What exactly is in-continuous between these two bodies? I guess we're arguing in a very strange space to begin with, I don't think that saying that this machine would "violate physical continuity" is really an argument about whether the two people would be the same more than for the impossibility of such a machine in the first place. Without a soul there is no way to differentiate between the two bodies in any respect other than their location. If there were two identical copies of my body then there would be two identical copies of me.My consciousness would be continuous up to a point when it would "fork" and two identical copies would be made, both equally me - again only a problem if you believe in an uncopyable "soul".
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On April 15 2012 04:41 Maitolasi wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 04:36 sickoota wrote:On April 15 2012 04:31 Maitolasi wrote:On April 15 2012 04:18 sickoota wrote:
Everyone who is arguing that the copy wouldn't be "you" can only be construed as arguing from an abrahamic/Cartesian conception of "soul" or something similar. Thats the only way I can think of to make their arguments coherent - some non-material source of "self" that the machine would be unable to replicate. What if someone was dosed with surgical grade anesthetic, transported, and then awoken - how would that differ in any meaningful way from the hypothetical transportation machine? Remember that our bodies are constantly remaking its cells, replacing your "self" every few years - but even if it didn't I fail to see how these particular atoms somehow contain the basis for your continuous selfhood whereas some identical atoms of the same elements configured identically would lose this same selfhood... I'm arguing that the teleported self wouldn't be you and it's not from any religious standpoint. My argument is that in the process YOU are destroyed and will cease to exist and die. Then an exact clone of yourself will be created at the end portal. The consciousness that will be controlling the body at the end portal will be completely identical to the one that was destroyed during transportation but it will not make it any different from dying in a natural way. Just because someone made a clone of you doesn't mean that you are that clone. Sorry to be brief but that's not really an argument (at least not a very rigorous one). You state your conclusion (this teleportation machine would kill you) without an argument as to why. You could've been destroyed and rebuilt in your sleep and you would never know. You could be destroyed and rebuilt every second and you would never know. What exactly is "killed" when you go through this machine? Read the OP again. "This is a common thing in science fiction where you are 'teleported' by a machine that kills you, then reconstructs an exact copy of your body and mind at another point" Also if I was killed in my sleep I would never know because I would be dead
He means that after the reconstruction, there is no way to tell it happened. It could happen to you every single night, and you could not possibly notice.
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On August 05 2010 18:37 Narwhal wrote:
I like your sig.
i like your sig
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On April 15 2012 04:38 mcc wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 04:27 Iyerbeth wrote:On April 15 2012 04:23 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 04:04 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 03:46 Maitolasi wrote:On April 15 2012 03:43 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 03:38 Maitolasi wrote:
I don't think some people understand what this means.
Are you seriously saying that you would kill yourself just so an exact copy of yourself (that's not you) could be made in another place? If its an exact copy, memories and all, then it IS me. To everyone else it is exactly you. But YOU would be dead. No, only my original physical form is dead. My consciousness lives on. Even if the teleportation takes time, so there is a break in that consciousness, it doesn't make a difference. When you go to sleep, there is a break in your consciousness, but you don't think you suddenly have a new consciousness every time you wake up. On April 15 2012 03:52 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 03:12 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 02:33 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 02:26 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 01:56 GreEny K wrote:
I wouldn't share the thoughts of the other me, our minds would not be connected. I would have to say no... From my point of view, getting into that machine is the end for me. But the copy is a perfect copy. An instant before you teleport, your memories and thoughts would be copied over. So while it isn't the same consciousness, it IS an exact copy of it, so it may as well be the same one. I would do it for sure. And you would cease to exist with someone else exactly like you living instead of you. Basically your proposition is that if two bodies are the same they are the same person, that is patently absurd, as such technology would allow to create multiple exactly the same bodies. That wasn't specified by the OP. The OP doesn't say that the tech can create multiple bodies. Think of it like the process of copying destroys the original, and only one copy can be made at a time. If your memories are identical, and the body is identical, what else is there? What distinguishes the copy from the original? Nothing. It is possible that copying might require the destruction of the original. But nothing in the laws of physics prevents creation of multiple copies. Especially not in any of the mentioned sci-fi universes. So you are actually trying to contend that if there are 5 bodies with the same memories and bodies there is nothing to distinguish them ? Because you are actually saying that. What about physical continuity, that is what distinguishes them. That distinguishes the original and the copy in the standard teleport scenario, that is what distinguishes original and the copy in the scenario with the original surviving, that is what distinguishes original and copies in the scenario with multiple copies. Nice simple (not that simple as you can start making even crazier scenarios) distinction that unlike the alternatives does not violate logical principles. No, I'm contending that that wasn't specified by the OP. Since the whole thing is hypothetical anyways, we can't really diverge from what is defined by the question, or we could say absolutely anything at all could happen. Unless we stick with what is defined in the OP, we could make up any rules we wanted for this kind of teleportation. Little off-topic: Firefox's spellcheck doesn't recognize teleportation or even teleport One question, do you believe in some immaterial soul ? Because if you do not, consciousness is linked to the body. So the teleporter does not transfer your consciousness, it creates a copy of it. Nothing of the original exists anymore. OP's teleporter allows multiple copies, he specifically mentions sci-fi teleporters, basically all of them allow that. Not that it is necessary to make the argument that you are in fact dead. Edit: To rejoin in: But being dead isn't a problem to me if I'm also (so far as I'm aware) instantly recreated without having been dead. I don't fear dying as a concept so dying even on a daily basis if I were able to still just continue wouldn't be an issue. I can't see any way that my mind wouldn't still continue on in the example, and that's the only bit of me that I really need to keep identical, and so long as it would be I don't see the problem. If infinite parallel universes were to exist, there would also then exist an identical copy of me and I'm quite fine with that too. By dead in this discussion is not meant biologically dead. But as in cease to exist altogether. So you can only die once and it is final. Point is again that you ceased to exist. The copy is more like your identical twin, you might be even the same at some point in time (twins at that moment the cell split, you and your copy at the time when the machine starts to create him), but saying you are the copy is like saying you are your identical twin.
That's not entirely a fair comparisson as my identical twin would have to have thought all the same things I had and experienced all the same things and felt the same things. It would e a copy of me and not what I currently am, sure. I have no problem with what I currently am ceasing to exist if an exact copy exists somewhere else. I would see it like falling asleep and waking up.
I do see your point in that my current mind would cease to exist and the person I am now would be dead forever. But in this particular instance I see that kind of death as unimportant.
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EPT
