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On April 15 2012 02:58 Iskusstvo wrote:
Okay, I heard an interesting development on this: Lets say you wake up in one of these machines, you have memories of yourself going to the facility where it is housed, and seeing two identical booth-style machines side by side, one on the left, and another on the right. However, you cannot remember anything beyond that.
You get out of the booth, which turns out to be the left one, and out of the opposite booth to the right comes an apparently identical copy of you. You get chatting, and you both have the same memories and personality down to every single detail, even not remembering if you went into the left or right booth.
Now, the question is, is there any way of determining which one of you is the 'real' (i.e. the one which is not a copy) you? (Assuming for simplicity's sake that there was no external evidence which might prove which booth 'the original' went into) If not, should you kill the other anyway, just because there shouldn't be another one of you?
Unlike the original problem this is easy. If there was no logging by the operators there is no way to determine which one is you. That follows from the definition of how the machine works I would say. And killing the other "you" would be a murder, so no you should not do it.
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On April 15 2012 02:33 mcc wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 02:26 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 01:56 GreEny K wrote:
I wouldn't share the thoughts of the other me, our minds would not be connected. I would have to say no... From my point of view, getting into that machine is the end for me. But the copy is a perfect copy. An instant before you teleport, your memories and thoughts would be copied over. So while it isn't the same consciousness, it IS an exact copy of it, so it may as well be the same one. I would do it for sure. And you would cease to exist with someone else exactly like you living instead of you. Basically your proposition is that if two bodies are the same they are the same person, that is patently absurd, as such technology would allow to create multiple exactly the same bodies.
That wasn't specified by the OP. The OP doesn't say that the tech can create multiple bodies. Think of it like the process of copying destroys the original, and only one copy can be made at a time.
If your memories are identical, and the body is identical, what else is there? What distinguishes the copy from the original? Nothing.
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On April 15 2012 03:04 mcc wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 02:47 Iyerbeth wrote:
I don't believe the parts that make me up aremore important than the result and if the result was that I would remember stepping in to a machine and then stepping out of the machine (with no horrible death in between, just ceasing to exist in one place) and I knew for certain that I would still be me on t he other end, I'd go along with it.
Hell, I might even ask if they could make some improvements on the other end. Ok, now imagine, you step into the machine, information about you are copied and then you are brutally and painfully murdered. Then in another place 5 copies of you are created all of them remembering that they stepped into the machine and are now stepping out of it without anything bad happening. Still sure about that ?
Brutally and painfully murdered would probably change my mind on it, even with the new version of me not remembering it. As to there being 5 of me, I'm not sure that would really bother me though I do prefer just the one. So long as the concept I recognise as "me" is still around that's really all I care about in that regard. I might change my mind after giving it more thought but so long as the other me's were free to do what they wanted and weren't slaves or something I can't see it changing my mind.
I guess what I'm trying to say is I don't feel I have to be absolutely unique to be happy and myself (and I don't believe in anything like a soul to worry about).
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I don't understand one thing, why are people assuming that they will "step out" of the other machine, or "keep being alive", it's not how this works (to my understanding).
The machine analyzes every atom/molecule/etc, and sends the INFORMATION to another place, which then reconstructs your being based on the information it received. It does not send the actual molecules and then puts them back together, right?
In which case, it would be like destroying a hard drive, reading the information straight from the disks, and sending that information to be written on another hard drive. Sure, it's the same information, but the original hard drive is gone.
So yes, the other person would be like you, in every matter, but it will be a new-born version of you, with all the life experience you had and whatnot. The YOU that entered the machine is gone.
If, on the other hand, you assume that it transports the actual molecules to the other place, then it didn't kill you, just... took you apart for a little while.
The end result is the same, in both cases, but in the first case, something is lost in the process, and that something is the "you" you used to be.
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On April 15 2012 03:08 mcc wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 02:58 Iskusstvo wrote:
Okay, I heard an interesting development on this: Lets say you wake up in one of these machines, you have memories of yourself going to the facility where it is housed, and seeing two identical booth-style machines side by side, one on the left, and another on the right. However, you cannot remember anything beyond that.
You get out of the booth, which turns out to be the left one, and out of the opposite booth to the right comes an apparently identical copy of you. You get chatting, and you both have the same memories and personality down to every single detail, even not remembering if you went into the left or right booth.
Now, the question is, is there any way of determining which one of you is the 'real' (i.e. the one which is not a copy) you? (Assuming for simplicity's sake that there was no external evidence which might prove which booth 'the original' went into) If not, should you kill the other anyway, just because there shouldn't be another one of you? Unlike the original problem this is easy. If there was no logging by the operators there is no way to determine which one is you. That follows from the definition of how the machine works I would say. And killing the other "you" would be a murder, so no you should not do it.
Its funny I always have trouble playing single player games by myself (I need someone watching or Ill watch someone else, someone to talk to basically) so having another me solves that problem. lol If this happens though, do we think the same since we are the same in every way O.O?
On April 15 2012 03:12 Millitron wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 02:33 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 02:26 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 01:56 GreEny K wrote:
I wouldn't share the thoughts of the other me, our minds would not be connected. I would have to say no... From my point of view, getting into that machine is the end for me. But the copy is a perfect copy. An instant before you teleport, your memories and thoughts would be copied over. So while it isn't the same consciousness, it IS an exact copy of it, so it may as well be the same one. I would do it for sure. And you would cease to exist with someone else exactly like you living instead of you. Basically your proposition is that if two bodies are the same they are the same person, that is patently absurd, as such technology would allow to create multiple exactly the same bodies. That wasn't specified by the OP. The OP doesn't say that the tech can create multiple bodies. Think of it like the process of copying destroys the original, and only one copy can be made at a time. If your memories are identical, and the body is identical, what else is there? What distinguishes the copy from the original? Nothing.
I agree, if you think about it, its even a less of a change then getting some kind of organ transplant. I see it as transferring memory from one harddrive to the other with it being the same exact harddrive.
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Interesting OP, unfortunately i don't take time to think out things like paradoxes because they usually make me frustrated and give me a headache, kinda like math... -__-
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No, I wouldn't do it. No matter how you look at it, you would be dead and the new copy of yourself wouldn't be 'you', even if it would be completely indistinguishable to other people and it would THINK it was you.
I think the more interesting question is just how much of 'you' would need to be transported manually in order for an artificial body to remain the same consciousness.
Just your brain? Just a part of your brain?
It sort of follows the old thought experiment about becoming a cyborg: You slowly replace all of your body with machinery, at what point do you cease to be you? Do you even cease to be you at 100% mechanical/0% organic?
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On April 15 2012 03:20 Chained wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 03:08 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 02:58 Iskusstvo wrote:
Okay, I heard an interesting development on this: Lets say you wake up in one of these machines, you have memories of yourself going to the facility where it is housed, and seeing two identical booth-style machines side by side, one on the left, and another on the right. However, you cannot remember anything beyond that.
You get out of the booth, which turns out to be the left one, and out of the opposite booth to the right comes an apparently identical copy of you. You get chatting, and you both have the same memories and personality down to every single detail, even not remembering if you went into the left or right booth.
Now, the question is, is there any way of determining which one of you is the 'real' (i.e. the one which is not a copy) you? (Assuming for simplicity's sake that there was no external evidence which might prove which booth 'the original' went into) If not, should you kill the other anyway, just because there shouldn't be another one of you? Unlike the original problem this is easy. If there was no logging by the operators there is no way to determine which one is you. That follows from the definition of how the machine works I would say. And killing the other "you" would be a murder, so no you should not do it. Its funny I always have trouble playing single player games by myself (I need someone watching or Ill watch someone else, someone to talk to basically) so having another me solves that problem. lol If this happens though, do we think the same since we are the same in every way O.O? Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 03:12 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 02:33 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 02:26 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 01:56 GreEny K wrote:
I wouldn't share the thoughts of the other me, our minds would not be connected. I would have to say no... From my point of view, getting into that machine is the end for me. But the copy is a perfect copy. An instant before you teleport, your memories and thoughts would be copied over. So while it isn't the same consciousness, it IS an exact copy of it, so it may as well be the same one. I would do it for sure. And you would cease to exist with someone else exactly like you living instead of you. Basically your proposition is that if two bodies are the same they are the same person, that is patently absurd, as such technology would allow to create multiple exactly the same bodies. That wasn't specified by the OP. The OP doesn't say that the tech can create multiple bodies. Think of it like the process of copying destroys the original, and only one copy can be made at a time. If your memories are identical, and the body is identical, what else is there? What distinguishes the copy from the original? Nothing. I agree, if you think about it, its even a less of a change then getting some kind of organ transplant. I see it as transferring memory from one harddrive to the other with it being the same exact harddrive.
Its even closer than that. It might not be the same exact hard drive, but its the same model of hard drive. and RAM too, since you would remember short-term things as well, hopefully.
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I don't think some people understand what this means.
Are you seriously saying that you would kill yourself just so an exact copy of yourself (that's not you) could be made in another place?
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On April 15 2012 03:38 Maitolasi wrote:
I don't think some people understand what this means.
Are you seriously saying that you would kill yourself just so an exact copy of yourself (that's not you) could be made in another place?
If its an exact copy, memories and all, then it IS me.
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you die and a copy is made of you who thinks he is you...
Would you teleport.. ofcourse not, what a stupid question
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On April 15 2012 03:43 Millitron wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 03:38 Maitolasi wrote:
I don't think some people understand what this means.
Are you seriously saying that you would kill yourself just so an exact copy of yourself (that's not you) could be made in another place? If its an exact copy, memories and all, then it IS me.
To everyone else it is exactly you.
But YOU would be dead.
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I never actually thought about teleportation this way.... So if the machine fucked up and didnt kill me the other me would have seperate thoughts and feelings to me from that moment? Nah I will steer clear of it
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On April 15 2012 03:12 Millitron wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 02:33 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 02:26 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 01:56 GreEny K wrote:
I wouldn't share the thoughts of the other me, our minds would not be connected. I would have to say no... From my point of view, getting into that machine is the end for me. But the copy is a perfect copy. An instant before you teleport, your memories and thoughts would be copied over. So while it isn't the same consciousness, it IS an exact copy of it, so it may as well be the same one. I would do it for sure. And you would cease to exist with someone else exactly like you living instead of you. Basically your proposition is that if two bodies are the same they are the same person, that is patently absurd, as such technology would allow to create multiple exactly the same bodies. That wasn't specified by the OP. The OP doesn't say that the tech can create multiple bodies. Think of it like the process of copying destroys the original, and only one copy can be made at a time. If your memories are identical, and the body is identical, what else is there? What distinguishes the copy from the original? Nothing.
It is possible that copying might require the destruction of the original. But nothing in the laws of physics prevents creation of multiple copies. Especially not in any of the mentioned sci-fi universes.
So you are actually trying to contend that if there are 5 bodies with the same memories and bodies there is nothing to distinguish them ? Because you are actually saying that. What about physical continuity, that is what distinguishes them. That distinguishes the original and the copy in the standard teleport scenario, that is what distinguishes original and the copy in the scenario with the original surviving, that is what distinguishes original and copies in the scenario with multiple copies. Nice simple (not that simple as you can start making even crazier scenarios) distinction that unlike the alternatives does not violate logical principles.
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The everyday continuity of consciousness is an illusion. You are not the same person every time you wake up. You are not the same person every time you blink. Teleportation in this manner is really no different from what happens any time you go to sleep or even just walk around. You are not one continuous person in the manner most conceive of themselves, just a succession of different states of consciousness in time. People saying a copy of you wouldn't really be "you" are operating off some unsubstantiated, illusory definition of self.
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On April 15 2012 03:12 Iyerbeth wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 03:04 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 02:47 Iyerbeth wrote:
I don't believe the parts that make me up aremore important than the result and if the result was that I would remember stepping in to a machine and then stepping out of the machine (with no horrible death in between, just ceasing to exist in one place) and I knew for certain that I would still be me on t he other end, I'd go along with it.
Hell, I might even ask if they could make some improvements on the other end. Ok, now imagine, you step into the machine, information about you are copied and then you are brutally and painfully murdered. Then in another place 5 copies of you are created all of them remembering that they stepped into the machine and are now stepping out of it without anything bad happening. Still sure about that ? Brutally and painfully murdered would probably change my mind on it, even with the new version of me not remembering it. As to there being 5 of me, I'm not sure that would really bother me though I do prefer just the one. So long as the concept I recognise as "me" is still around that's really all I care about in that regard. I might change my mind after giving it more thought but so long as the other me's were free to do what they wanted and weren't slaves or something I can't see it changing my mind. I guess what I'm trying to say is I don't feel I have to be absolutely unique to be happy and myself (and I don't believe in anything like a soul to worry about).
You are missing the point of the other 5 in my scenario. It is not about problems with uniqueness. It is that all of them will have the same concept of "me". All of them would think they are the original "me". But the original me would be dead, brutally and painfully. To make it clearer. You go into the machine, your 5 (or even just one) copies are created in the destination, and then you are brutally murdered. If you are in the destination, who was brutally murdered as they both existed in paralel for a time.
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On April 15 2012 03:43 Millitron wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 03:38 Maitolasi wrote:
I don't think some people understand what this means.
Are you seriously saying that you would kill yourself just so an exact copy of yourself (that's not you) could be made in another place? If its an exact copy, memories and all, then it IS me.
No it wouldn't be YOU. You would be dead. What now exists is a perfect copy of you but it isn't you.
I raised this question with my ex-girlfriend ages ago and we briefly debated about it. Except we were talking about immortality via cloning like in the movie The 6th Day. The problem is even raised in the movie when the scientists wife tells her husband that she isn't her. (After she died and was cloned/copied)
I just don't get how anyone could agree to that. Your perception ceases to exist. You are gone; dead. Your copy has it's own perception.
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On April 15 2012 03:14 CubEdIn wrote:
I don't understand one thing, why are people assuming that they will "step out" of the other machine, or "keep being alive", it's not how this works (to my understanding).
The machine analyzes every atom/molecule/etc, and sends the INFORMATION to another place, which then reconstructs your being based on the information it received. It does not send the actual molecules and then puts them back together, right?
In which case, it would be like destroying a hard drive, reading the information straight from the disks, and sending that information to be written on another hard drive. Sure, it's the same information, but the original hard drive is gone.
So yes, the other person would be like you, in every matter, but it will be a new-born version of you, with all the life experience you had and whatnot. The YOU that entered the machine is gone.
If, on the other hand, you assume that it transports the actual molecules to the other place, then it didn't kill you, just... took you apart for a little while.
The end result is the same, in both cases, but in the first case, something is lost in the process, and that something is the "you" you used to be.
I think it is the same problem in both cases. Even if they send the particles with you, all the particles of the same type are interchangable. If they were not, every time you eat and your body repairs something you would cease to exist and new you would start to exist. It is possible to look at it like that, but I think the normal concept of "me" would not fit into that approach.
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On April 15 2012 03:46 Maitolasi wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 03:43 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 03:38 Maitolasi wrote:
I don't think some people understand what this means.
Are you seriously saying that you would kill yourself just so an exact copy of yourself (that's not you) could be made in another place? If its an exact copy, memories and all, then it IS me. To everyone else it is exactly you. But YOU would be dead.
No, only my original physical form is dead. My consciousness lives on. Even if the teleportation takes time, so there is a break in that consciousness, it doesn't make a difference. When you go to sleep, there is a break in your consciousness, but you don't think you suddenly have a new consciousness every time you wake up.
On April 15 2012 03:52 mcc wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 03:12 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 02:33 mcc wrote:On April 15 2012 02:26 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 01:56 GreEny K wrote:
I wouldn't share the thoughts of the other me, our minds would not be connected. I would have to say no... From my point of view, getting into that machine is the end for me. But the copy is a perfect copy. An instant before you teleport, your memories and thoughts would be copied over. So while it isn't the same consciousness, it IS an exact copy of it, so it may as well be the same one. I would do it for sure. And you would cease to exist with someone else exactly like you living instead of you. Basically your proposition is that if two bodies are the same they are the same person, that is patently absurd, as such technology would allow to create multiple exactly the same bodies. That wasn't specified by the OP. The OP doesn't say that the tech can create multiple bodies. Think of it like the process of copying destroys the original, and only one copy can be made at a time. If your memories are identical, and the body is identical, what else is there? What distinguishes the copy from the original? Nothing. It is possible that copying might require the destruction of the original. But nothing in the laws of physics prevents creation of multiple copies. Especially not in any of the mentioned sci-fi universes. So you are actually trying to contend that if there are 5 bodies with the same memories and bodies there is nothing to distinguish them ? Because you are actually saying that. What about physical continuity, that is what distinguishes them. That distinguishes the original and the copy in the standard teleport scenario, that is what distinguishes original and the copy in the scenario with the original surviving, that is what distinguishes original and copies in the scenario with multiple copies. Nice simple (not that simple as you can start making even crazier scenarios) distinction that unlike the alternatives does not violate logical principles.
No, I'm contending that that wasn't specified by the OP. Since the whole thing is hypothetical anyways, we can't really diverge from what is defined by the question, or we could say absolutely anything at all could happen. Unless we stick with what is defined in the OP, we could make up any rules we wanted for this kind of teleportation.
Little off-topic: Firefox's spellcheck doesn't recognize teleportation or even teleport 
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On April 15 2012 03:56 Krohm wrote:Show nested quote +On April 15 2012 03:43 Millitron wrote:On April 15 2012 03:38 Maitolasi wrote:
I don't think some people understand what this means.
Are you seriously saying that you would kill yourself just so an exact copy of yourself (that's not you) could be made in another place? If its an exact copy, memories and all, then it IS me. No it wouldn't be YOU. You would be dead. What now exists is a perfect copy of you but it isn't you. I raised this question with my ex-girlfriend ages ago and we briefly debated about it. Except we were talking about immortality via cloning like in the movie The 6th Day. The problem is even raised in the movie when the scientists wife tells her husband that she isn't her. (After she died and was cloned/copied) I just don't get how anyone could agree to that. Your perception ceases to exist. You are gone; dead. Your copy has it's own perception.
There's nothing meaningfully different between a killed and copied self and the typical concept of the self. The perception of your past self is just as dead, and the tie between physical makeup is just as strong. Particles aren't actually identifiable little corpuscles, it means nothing to say "I'm made up of matter that's the exact same, but it isn't the same matter." There's nothing that defines "you" other than your physical makeup, and an ideal physical copy preserves this physical makeup just as well as it's preserved in regular daily life. It would really be something special if you could point to what actually changes in the die + copy case that stays the same in a typical day.
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EPT
