EPT+ Show Spoiler +
a draft. i lost my trainof thought after greeting some friends as i was getting off the bus. this will be written over the weekend.
woot, a good line has been found. will work on it tomorrow.
do we need metaphilosophy
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oneofthem
Cayman Islands24199 Posts
+ Show Spoiler + a draft. i lost my trainof thought after greeting some friends as i was getting off the bus. this will be written over the weekend. woot, a good line has been found. will work on it tomorrow. | ||
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BuGzlToOnl
United States5918 Posts
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QuanticHawk
United States32113 Posts
can i reserve a space for comment too?? | ||
micronesia
United States24753 Posts
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Wizard
Poland5055 Posts
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Deleted User 3420
24492 Posts
can anyone put into laymans terms what he is trying to say | ||
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Rev0lution
United States1805 Posts
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HeadBangaa
United States6512 Posts
"What is then meta-philosophy, or attempts thereof." - what? "An empirical description of an activity." - noun, check - adjective, check - ... "talking about logic as a natural process would assume certain characteristics of the logical process and invalidate" - what? I don't mean to nitpick, oneofthem. I have some breadth in philosophy, and was looking forward to reading this. Maybe you could revise your wording? | ||
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oneofthem
Cayman Islands24199 Posts
i am trying to be nice to too many theories of language at once. it is much easier to just criticise one theory, so at least i'll have a language to use. | ||
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zer0das
United States8519 Posts
Sorry. :d | ||
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oneofthem
Cayman Islands24199 Posts
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Hot_Bid
Braavos36390 Posts
look at this sentence: the color problem in philosophy of mind says, sense-datum is incommensurable with empirical description, the reverse is true, empirical description is incommensurable with the activity so, while that statement sounds really complicated and smart, it basically means, in normal speak: you can't prove data from your senses. "philosophy of mind" = philosophy that deals with whether mind or body is one or separate "sense datum" = data from your senses. "incommensurable" = can't compare "empirical description" = description able to be proved i'm guessing you mean that "you can't prove data from your senses" because it's all just perception in your mind. please stop loading your sentences with excess verbiage and intentionally complex terms. i know it makes you sound smart and there are subtle distinctions and arguable reasons for why you use the words you do, but those distinctions don't matter to 99.99% of this forum. i'd advise taking a writing course on how to write simplistically and without so many grammatical errors. it's much harder to convey complicated meanings simply than to do what you're doing in this entry. | ||
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oneofthem
Cayman Islands24199 Posts
granted that line is utterly confusing taken out of context, but that 'normal speak' is way off. it is not in the ball park. the problem is normally understood as, the impression of colors is not necessarily accounted for by a sufficient causal theory of color, or, a sufficient causal theory of color does not have to account for the impression of color. (this account is not getting the useful picture here, but essentially it is the same. the impression of color is a feature of active expression of the faculty of color that also has some rational value, so to speak. the causal description is entirely another way of looking at the situation. incommensurability refers to the way languages involving these two aspects do not seem to connect to each other.) but thanks for the other points, i should not have used sense datum and there are grammatical errors or awkwardness. i realise i need to work on me communication skills, but i want to lay out some drafts first. it is still a work in progress. in any case, it is already hard enough to find a word that is even expressive of some of these ideas, asking for many of them is a bit too much. i will try to make up the lack of good words with more examples, hopefully one will work. i wrote this on a train of thought i lost, and im really writing to myself first, then smoothing it over. it is not a presentable product. | ||
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xM(Z
Romania5298 Posts
on topic: i think you can't make a case like yours complete without taking in to account the dream world and what happens there. "claim: reason as activity." do people reason in their dreams?. the activity is present but it is the result of reasoning?. is the conscient state a prerequisite to reason?. is ones dream world his mirror? your whole case can be explained more easily and have scientific weight if you would simply explain how the brain works and why (how - it's decently easy, why - it's not known). basically you have to answer to this question: why, when he same stimuli are applied to different brains, they "light" (react) differently. more, if you can prove that the way a brain reacts is determined by experience and association and not by some intrinsic value which it has since god knows when, not only you will be able to quantize people but you will be able to create a collective intelligence which will share the same traits. if you can't, the relativism wins and the only way for you to uphold absolute logical truths is by force. | ||
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oneofthem
Cayman Islands24199 Posts
here's an analogy: amy likes coffee, she says 'yay coffee" had amy not been to england, she would not have liked coffee/had amy not been does amy still like coffee, yes. the 'amy not been england' is not amy. if you are familiar with sellars' myth of the given, that is a good introduction to this problem. | ||
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zulu_nation8
China26351 Posts
From what I know, language is the expression of causal logic, so as long as you're writing stuff, you can't metaphilosophize outside of the limit that language has set. And I don't think anyone has. Besides that there's still tons of metaphilosophizing to be done. And from the post above me, there are concepts of synchronicity in Jung, unconscious, etc, but those don't get very far because they're based on deductive reasoning, although very brilliant and sick deductive reasoning. These issues were addressed very nicely by Bertrand Russell at the start of the 20th century. It's been a long time since then so I assume there's been plenty of new stuff since. All the continental concepts such as discourse, deconstruction, etc, attacks what we assume, or our contingencies in society, science, literature, philosophy, etc, and not the logic part after them. | ||
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zulu_nation8
China26351 Posts
IS there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it? This question, which at first sight might not seem difficult, is really one of the most difficult that can be asked. When we have realized the obstacles in the way of a straightforward and confident answer, we shall be well launched on the study of philosophy -- for philo sophy is merely the attempt to answer such ultimate questions, not carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in ordinary life and even in the sciences, but critically, after exploring all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realizing all the vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas. In daily life, we assume as certain many things which, on a closer scrutiny, are found to be so full of apparent contradictions that only a great amount of thought enables us to know what it is that we really may believe. In the search for certainty, it is natural to begin with our present experiences, and in some sense, no doubt, knowledge is to be derived from them. But any statement as to what it is that our immediate experiences make us know is very likely to be wrong. It seems to me that I am now sitting in a chair, at a table of a certain shape, on which I see sheets of paper with writing or print. By turning my head I see out of the window buildings and clouds and the sun. I believe that the sun is about ninety-three million miles | ||
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zulu_nation8
China26351 Posts
http://www.ditext.com/russell/russell.html Talking about color, sense datum To return to the table. It is evident from what we have found, that there is no colour which preeminently appears to be the colour of the table, or even of any one particular part of the table -- it appears to be of different colours from different points of view, and there is no reason for regarding some of these as more really its colour than others. And we know that even from a given point of view the colour will seem different by artificial light, or to a colour-blind man, or to a man wearing blue spectacles, while in the dark there will be no colour at all, though to touch and hearing the table will be unchanged. This colour is not something which is inherent in the table, but something depending upon the table and the spectator and the way the light falls on the table. When, in ordinary life, we speak of the colour of the table, we only mean the sort of colour which it will seem to have to a normal spectator from an ordinary point of view under usual conditions of light. But the other colours which appear under other conditions have just as good a right to be considered real; and therefore, to avoid favouritism, we are compelled to deny that, in itself, the table has any one particular colour. | ||
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oneofthem
Cayman Islands24199 Posts
and reading russell is a bad experience for me, since i dont think he's clear at all, perhaps because of the sincerity with which he uses certain terms when he's bungling them. "The same thing applies to the texture. With the naked eye one can see the gram, but otherwise the table looks smooth and even. If we looked at it through a microscope, we should see roughnesses and hills and valleys, and all sorts of differences that are imperceptible to the naked eye. Which of these is the 'real' table? We are naturally tempted to say that what we see through the microscope is more real, but that in turn would be changed by a still more powerful microscope. If, then, we cannot trust what we see with the naked eye, why should we trust what we see through a microscope? Thus, again, the confidence in our senses with which we began deserts us. " "Thus, again, the confidence in our senses with which we began deserts us." well, hold on there, it is the confidence in our conceptual derivatives from our senses that desert us. if you were to authentically engage in teh process of feeling the table, it feels the same, but you'd be less apt to say it is smooth as your conceptual scheme has now been shifted by an awareness of the microscopic texture. but of course, such an observation as russell's did something, and this is because, the argument is tracing the logical structure of 'table' the concept as it felt to russell. similar problem with teh color sense. it is not necessary for you to say 'table is red,' a certain conceptual framework, when you want to physically see the red. you open your functional eye and that's it. does it still make sense for you to say, the table looks red to me, yes, but the trouble is that, your conceptual framework has now extended beyond seeing and into the realm of reasoning with other logical objects of certain shape. if you have come to doubt 'table is red,' you are not abandoning the red, but the logic scheme of 'table is red.' "yet their occurrence is a sign of something existing independently of us, something differing " the questino here would be, 'why does this make sense.' 'a sign of something existing independently of us' is a logical category with a distinct shape. it is not 'Something.' it is fine to do honest analysis with these concepts, being sincere to its logical shape, but one is apt to substitute another in its place, such is the temptation of the language. And russell takes the plunge! "But if the reality is not what appears, have we any means of knowing whether there is any reality at all?" "but if the reality is not what it appears," this is in itself an expression of hte logical structure of 'reality' the concept. not 'the' expression, but it uses the logical relation between 'reality' and 'concept' and hope to make some confusion out of it. if your awareness of reality changed because of 'looking at the table through a red glasses,' it does not mean 'REALITY' changed, it is merely an operation in the conceptual framework of 'reality,' that a concept of reality has been replaced. everything is normal, nothing to see here except a torture of reason. now look, the above is a descriptive account of what russell was doing. the part of russell that was criticized was a similarly descriptive argument. what would make one of us right or wrong is in analysing the things we talk about, and this analysis derives its 'data' from actual operation of the thinking mechanism. there is no hope of solving metaphilsophical problems without paying close attention to the logical form of the concepts we use. the rest are confused babble. regardless of what becomes of this particular argument, it has not changed anything in a person saying 'table is red' except the metaphilosophical attitudes 'inferred' from such notions. I had the whole thing clearly mapped out during dinner, but hey, what can you do about an lost idea. one benefit of working out ideas in your head is the lack of a referential or descriptive layer. | ||
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oneofthem
Cayman Islands24199 Posts
the main point is, the immanent nature of logic is an integral part of the logical structure of actual operations in logical thinking. to talk outside of them and attempt to marginalise them is either careless or wrong, an attitude of disrespect for what hilary putnam would call, the 'normative,' this is present in both analytical and continental philosophy. (i cited putnam's normative because i think it is used in an unconventional http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/PUTREN.html) again, things are much easier if i could have something to attack and deconstruct, a positive position is rather difficult to map out. | ||
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