EPTedit: im happy u say "we". Sheep needs to stay in herd.
Nuclear Launch Detected... =o - Page 47
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food
United States1951 Posts
edit: im happy u say "we". Sheep needs to stay in herd. | ||
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HnR)hT
United States3468 Posts
 But to say that the weather defeated the Germans is ridiculous. Saying the Panther is superior to the T-34 is like saying scouts are better than mutalisks. Panthers are much bigger than T-34s, and weren't produced in anywhere near the same quantities. The T-34 (along with the KV-1) was revolutionary when it first came out. In any case, by "superiority in tanks" one doesn't mean "having technologically more advanced" tanks or "pound for pound more powerful tanks". One means having an overall advantage in tank forces. | ||
KwarK
United States42695 Posts
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Faronel
United States658 Posts
On December 13 2008 07:41 food wrote: another sheep in the herd. I don't cry, i barf seeing shit like you post. Go "warm your tank up" lmfao. Russians had resistance to winter +2 and winter armor +3. What a pity. edit: im happy u say "we". Sheep needs to stay in herd. Fool, Russians fully upped and had +3, +3. Durrrr Edit: you're stupid food. :D | ||
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food
United States1951 Posts
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HnR)hT
United States3468 Posts
On December 13 2008 08:03 food wrote: if only u realized what kind of offense people take when they being called "russians" and they not. USSR consisted of 15 republics at that time, some of them - Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus. You calling Georgians Russians, GOOD JOB SIR. In that case we should say Axis instead of Germans too. They had Finland, Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria fighting directly alongside them in the USSR. | ||
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rei
United States3594 Posts
On December 13 2008 07:54 Kwark wrote: Rei, you keep ignoring my point about a viable solution that creates a long term peace and saves lives. Assuming that a ceasefire saves lives medium term, which is doubtful as I've already argued, it is still not a viable solution to the war. I'm judging the nuking by two standards, not one, whereas you keep seem to insisting that I'm judging purely on lives saved. I ignore it because it is irrelevant to my argument, which is "those people who justify nuking of japan with the lives it saves are hypocrites" and i'm not arguing about "those people who justify nuking of japan with the lives it saves and other viable solutions that creates long term peace and saves lives are hypocrites" If you are saying nuking of japan is only half your argument then good for you, you are only half a hypocrite. and i am not insisting you are judging purely on lives saved, i never did say that, quote me if i did. all i said was the people who justify nuking of japan with lives it saved are judging purely on lives saved. it was you who made the connection between yourself and these people it was you who engage my argument in an attempt to defend your ignorance.and as a result change your position as you are arguing, because you realize that I said is true, and you needed an out so you introduced your second standard, or a second argument which is nuking japan is justify because it creates long term peace. Your first reply to me. + Show Spoiler + On December 11 2008 08:33 Kwark wrote: Given that Japan had to be compelled to surrender, that Japan intended to contest invasion with lethal force and that lethal force applied to soldiers causes death invading Japan saved lives. Happy now? your second reply to me + Show Spoiler + On December 12 2008 13:47 Kwark wrote: Ceasefire with Japan was impossible. The Japan that committed the rape of Nanking had to be broken, destroyed in pride and spirit. Letting that Japan continue to exist would be comparable to not breaking up Germany after WW1. It was a threat to the world to let it exist. The post war constitution of Japan was profoundly pacifist. Do you honestly believe a peaceful ceasefire in which the officials remained in power would result in the same paradigm shift in Japan? your 3rd reply to me + Show Spoiler + On December 12 2008 14:43 Kwark wrote: Erm. No, it isn't pretty clear to anyone logical. And stop being such an ass. You're purely trolling here. You're saying the nuke or invade is a false choice and yet you're not presenting an alternative. Peaceful ceasefire? Just not realistic. Japan was militaristic, expansionist and showed a sadistic disregard for the lives of everyone non Japanese. You're acting as if you're somehow better than everyone else in this topic because they disagree with you while basing your argument on some vague suggestion that things would be better if everyone got along. Yeah, being nice to each other > nuking. Well done. You'll get no argument from me there. But assuming everyone can't play nice, which is a very accurate assumption in this scenario, killing 200,000 > killing 1,000,000. The manner of death isn't important, that nukes were used makes no difference. 4th + Show Spoiler + On December 12 2008 14:49 Kwark wrote: And how the fuck is it hypocritical? If you're in a situation where at least 200,000 people must die but you can choose to increase that significantly then you choose to kill 200,000 to save lives. Simple. Where is the hypocrisy? 5th + Show Spoiler + On December 12 2008 15:07 Kwark wrote: No. You are still wrong. Of the available choices, of which peace treaty was not one, nuking saved lives. My first priority is a permanent conclusion to the war which invalidates the peace treaty. The second priority is fewest lives killed which invalidates invasion. So of the 3 options we are left with 1. There is still no hypocrisy and you are still being an ass. Please go re-evaluate your life and perhaps start being less of one. 6th + Show Spoiler + On December 12 2008 15:09 Kwark wrote: Your entire argument relies upon premise 3 which, as cz and I keep pointing out, is invalid. Thus your entire argument is invalid. That you keep repeating the same argument over and over and calling us hypocrites doesn't make it valid. You can claim black is white til you're blue in the face but it's not. 7th (first time you introduce your 2nd argument while claiming you have already put it out there and i just ignored it.) + Show Spoiler + On December 12 2008 16:12 Kwark wrote: And what about my argument that death count alone is not the only goal? A viable solution needs to create a stable peace as well. Which invalidates 3. Furthermore the Cold War was the only time in human history two superpowers have coexisted and not gone to war until only one remained. It was simply not worth it in a nuclear world. Stalin was a fairly insane guy but Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a clear message in the only language he understood. In 1945 the Soviet Union did not push their luck in Europe. I didn't quote many of your posts intended for pure personal insults, and only quote ones that have an argument. As you can see after Kwark read + Show Spoiler + Kwark in an argument, all premise has to stand along. Take that premise 3 out of context see if it hold true. Because if you do that and I ask you the question does a peace treaty demonstrate the motive for no more killing? and you have to answer with an Yes or no, you are not allow to clarify your answer to a specific case. Do you see what i am trying to say here? You seen how lawers do this in the movies, this is what i was trying to get across but you are not seeing it. I have failed you in my last post because I did not construct my words in such a way that you can understand. now your argument on why my 3rd premise being invalid is because in the special case of japan the peace treaty does not work, which I fucking agreed with you. But it does not removed the fact that you have answered "yes" to my question that validate the stand alone premise. Oh by the way, when you use japan to even attempt to disapprove a peace treaty in motive wants no more death, you are demonstrating the fallacy of affirming the consequence and ignoratio elenchi and Denying the antecedent ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affirming_the_consequent and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ignoratio_elenchi and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denying_the_antecedent) Let me explain if you don't understand, when you say the propose peace treaty does not work on japan vs usa scenario(which i agree with), therefor ALL motives of a peace treaty is not aimed to stop more death,(my 3rd premise says only about peace treaty, and nothing of japan) you are generalizing and try to make a case against my premise base on one example out of all the other peace treaty signed in history. which does not even directly address to my promise. The easiest fallacy you have made trying to invalidate my 3rd premise is http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denying_the_antecedent For those of you who doesn't know what we are talking about and want to learn how to talk someone into realizing they are a hypocrite here is the argument i made. feel free to discover yourselves by clicking this spoiler + Show Spoiler + Here is my argument: premises: 1) your argument makes the decision on whether to nuke japan or not by the amount of lives it saves( Less death = better) 2) your argument contains two options to choose from which both cause deaths(nuke, or invade). 3) a seize fire peace treaty aims to stop the war which leads to no death. 4) base on the method of decision(choose the least life lost), the 3rd option is the best choice. 5) the choice made was "nuking of japan" 6) Hypocrisy is the act of preaching a certain belief, religion or way of life, but not, in fact, holding these same virtues oneself. Conclusion: Your argument says that the decision is made base on the number of lives it saved, but nuking japan was not justified by the number of lives it saved because of premise #4. By preaching the belief of making the decision base on least death caused, but in fact(nuked japan) not making the decision base on least death caused is Hypocrisy. (Supported by premise #1, #2, #5 and #6) After you said this + Show Spoiler + On December 12 2008 15:09 Kwark wrote: Your entire argument relies upon premise 3 which, as cz and I keep pointing out, is invalid. Thus your entire argument is invalid. That you keep repeating the same argument over and over and calling us hypocrites doesn't make it valid. You can claim black is white til you're blue in the face but it's not. and i totally destroyed your argument with all the fallacies you created, I guess you have nothing else? I think you are ready to submit to the fact that you are indeed a hypocrite, tried to deny that to yourself. but at the end the truth hurts does it? Oh and this is not a trolling attempt, or I would have been banned by any of the admins who's been reading this. if i am really excessive trolling, and flaming massive people to be hypocrites they will know, I see them as equals in logic and they can distinguish me from a troll. My premises are valid and my argument is sound, and they who belief nuking of japan can be justify by the least number of casualties are hypocrite which I logically proved. you shift to the second argument. now you are arguing about nuking is justify by long term peace instead of nuking is justify by saving lives. | ||
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food
United States1951 Posts
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MoltkeWarding
5195 Posts
Btw Russians, on the whole, only had superiority in tank #'s. as the panzer tank variant, the Panther, was a direct answer to Russia's T-34 and was in fact superior to the T-34. As for the 1941 Order of Battle, the USSR had a slight superiority in manpower (a Soviet division was considerably smaller than a German or Western division in nominal strength,) something like a 8:1 superiority in tanks, 5:1 superiority in aircraft, and similar figures for Artillery. Soviet shortages included locomotives (in which American supply DID make a considerable contribution to Soviet martial capabilities later in the war, as opposed to their deliveries of second-rate tanks or aircraft,) professional officers and especially modern doctrine. The superiority of aircraft did not prevent Germany from establishing air superiority against qualitatively inferior aircraft with inexperienced pilots, and even the Medium and Heavy Soviet Tanks which were qualitatively superior to anything wielded by the Germans suffered from bad training, bad doctrine, and bad communications. Stories of experienced Germans tank crews outmanoeuvring T-34s in their Skoda 38s are common. However, on the broader issue of the failure of Typhoon, here is what Liddell Hart says, in his Epilogue summary of the Second World War says about the failure of Typhoon: What were the key factors in their failure? The autumn mud and snow were the obvious ones. But more fundamental was the Germans' miscalculation of the reserves that Stalin could bring up from the depths of Russia. They reckoned on meeting 200 divisions, and by mid-August had beaten those. But by then a further 160 had appeared on the scene. By the time these in turn had been overcome, autumn had arrived, and when the Germans pushed on toward Moscow in the mud, they again found fresh armies blocking the route. Another basic factor was Russia's continued primitiveness, despite all the technical progress achieved since the Soviet Revolution. It was not only a matter of the extraordinary endurance of her soldiers and people, but the primitiveness of her roads. If her road system had been developed comparable to that of the West, she would have been overrun almost as quickly as France. Even as it was, however, the invasion might have succeeded if the panzer forces had driven right on for Moscow in the summer, without waiting for the infantry- as Guderian had urged, only to be overruled on this occasion by Hitler and the older heads of the army.... The time factor must be accounted for in every narrative of the initial stages of Barbarossa. The fall of Smolensk in early August barely six weeks after Barbarossa gave AGC a good chance of driving on Moscow before the intervention of mud made their mobile forces ineffective, but the fact that Moscow was not defined as a main objective, that the two Panzer Groups of AGC were sent North and South to seize Leningrad and commit the pocket battle of Kiev was possibly a decisive decision which delayed Typhoon for two months, which gave the Russians time to rebuild their central front after the shattering defeats at Smolensk. Secondly, the grave problems facing the Heer after December 7, even though more serious than they appear in retrospect, was more than the power of the red army to break given the circumstances. The Red Army's counterattacks failed to break the German "hedgehog" defense because they did not possess sufficient strength or logistical capability of holding bulges made between German strongpoints, which dominated the defensive and logistical geography of the front. In retrospect, it's clear that Hitler's hold order of Dec 41 was the best possible psychological reaction to the situation, as well as the Red Army's incapacity to break this system of defense. Finally, after 1942, possibly even after 1941, Hitler was fighting a war of limited objectives, to enact a Frederican strategy of exhausting and splitting his enemies. While it may have been hopeless to fulfill his original objectives after Dec 1941, it was certainly not a hopeless cause of fighting a successful defense. Stalin was more inclined to deal with Hitler than most are trained to believe, and Hitler's continuous gambles to create a strong bargaining position by winning a major psychological victory incrementally weakened his position, as succeess breeds ambition and failure breeds dissatisfaction. It's also worth mentioning, that although in sheer numbers, the USSR outproduced Germany; in 1942 by several factors, not adjusted for quality, the USSR was employing a larger share of her human and industrial potential to warfare than Germany, even by 1944. By 1944, German production was rising to meet the Russians in quantitative figures, even with the bombing campaign of the Western Powers intensifying. In that case we should say Axis instead of Germans too. They had Finland, Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria fighting directly alongside them in the USSR. A slight correction, of some small historical interest: Bulgaria never declared war on the USSR, and maintained good relations with the USSR throughout the war, even though it was at war with Britain and America. This aided Bulgaria's political standing in 1944 and its defection, and it even managed to win a sliver of disputed territory from Romania in the general peace. On the other side, the UK declared war on Finland under Soviet pressure, but America and Finland were also never at war. | ||
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MoltkeWarding
5195 Posts
By WHICH side? I hope you aren't meaning to include the conduct of the Nazis in their aggression against Russia in this. Obviously the difference between German treatment of Russian and Western POWs and Civilians is well documented, but even their brutalities against the Russian population was partial, and not comparable to the plight of the Jews. The point is that World War 2 cannot be seen as a moral anarchy, where its actors lacked references for normative values. | ||
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HnR)hT
United States3468 Posts
On December 13 2008 08:58 MoltkeWarding wrote: As for the 1941 Order of Battle, the USSR had a slight superiority in manpower (a Soviet division was considerably smaller than a German or Western division in nominal strength,) something like a 8:1 superiority in tanks, 5:1 superiority in aircraft, and similar figures for Artillery. Actually the USSR did not have superiority in manpower in 1941. According to David Glantz (from When Titans Clashed), the ratio of manpower on June 22nd was 1.4:1 in Germany's favor. This includes Germany's allies. IIRC the Red Army had 2.9 million troops mobilized in western military districts at the time of the invasion. The initial invading force was well over 3 million. Soviet shortages included locomotives (in which American supply DID make a considerable contribution to Soviet martial capabilities later in the war, as opposed to their deliveries of second-rate tanks or aircraft,) professional officers and especially modern doctrine. In fact the Red Army possessed a very advanced doctrine of Deep Operations, which had been developed in the mid-30's. However, extreme logistical problems and a shortage of trained military personnel meant that the Soviets could not properly execute their own doctrine (at least till much later into the war). The superiority of aircraft did not prevent Germany from establishing air superiority against qualitatively inferior aircraft with inexperienced pilots, The principal reason for Germany's total air supremacy in 1941 is the fact that a substantial portion of Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground in the first hours of the invasion. The aircraft were parked in neat rows in forward-deployed runways, whose locations were very well-known to the enemy by the time of the invasion. Incidentally, it is a misleading and simplistic statement to call Soviet aircraft at the time "qualitatively inferior". While most were obsolete (the same was true of the Luftwaffe), there were some state-of-the-art fighters and bombers. The real problem (aside from the planes destroyed on the ground) was the lack of experienced pilots and an outdated tactical doctrine. and even the Medium and Heavy Soviet Tanks which were qualitatively superior to anything wielded by the Germans suffered from bad training, bad doctrine, and bad communications. Stories of experienced Germans tank crews outmanoeuvring T-34s in their Skoda 38s are common. The vast majority of Soviet tanks were light tanks (T-25, BT-7, etc), many were badly maintained, had missing parts, were worn out, and were in unacceptable condition for actual combat. In the initial border battles, more than half of Soviet tanks broke down before actually reaching the battlefield. However, on the broader issue of the failure of Typhoon, here is what Liddell Hart says, in his Epilogue summary of the Second World War says about the failure of Typhoon: Liddell Hart did not have access to relevant Soviet sources, so anything he says about operations in the Soviet-German war is bound to be biased toward Germany and should be taken with a grain of salt. Aside from his condescending remarks about Russian "primitiveness", he completely ignores the considerable forces of the Soviet South-Western Front in his little "what-if" scenario. The need to eliminate this threat is the reason the German drive west stopped at Smolensk in the summer. The fact that these forces could have threatened AGC's flank in the hypothetical "early" advance on Moscow is always ignored. The time factor must be accounted for in every narrative of the initial stages of Barbarossa. The fall of Smolensk in early August barely six weeks after Barbarossa gave AGC a good chance of driving on Moscow before the intervention of mud made their mobile forces ineffective, but the fact that Moscow was not defined as a main objective, that the two Panzer Groups of AGC were sent North and South to seize Leningrad and commit the pocket battle of Kiev was possibly a decisive decision which delayed Typhoon for two months, which gave the Russians time to rebuild their central front after the shattering defeats at Smolensk. To describe the outcome of Smolensk for the Soviet Union as a "shattering defeat" is completely misleading. It was a minor turning point after which the Germans could no longer successfully pursue more than 1 strategic objective at a time. It is not obvious that the decision to deal with the forces of the South-Western Front in the south was wrong. Secondly, the grave problems facing the Heer after December 7, even though more serious than they appear in retrospect, was more than the power of the red army to break given the circumstances. The Red Army's counterattacks failed to break the German "hedgehog" defense because they did not possess sufficient strength or logistical capability of holding bulges made between German strongpoints, which dominated the defensive and logistical geography of the front. In retrospect, it's clear that Hitler's hold order of Dec 41 was the best possible psychological reaction to the situation, as well as the Red Army's incapacity to break this system of defense. I'm not sure I understand the first sentence. It is certainly true that the Red Army didn't have sufficient strength or logistics to achieve the over-ambitious objectives of the winter counteroffensive. I agree that Hitler's hold order was right under the circumstances. Finally, after 1942, possibly even after 1941, Hitler was fighting a war of limited objectives, to enact a Frederican strategy of exhausting and splitting his enemies. While it may have been hopeless to fulfill his original objectives after Dec 1941, it was certainly not a hopeless cause of fighting a successful defense. Of course - I don't know anyone who would contend otherwise. Stalin was more inclined to deal with Hitler than most are trained to believe, Based on what? I can't see the possibility of a German-Soviet truce after Barbarossa under any circumstances. Certainly not after the populace had been thoroughly inundated with the "kill all Fritzes" propaganda (as well as having legitimate reasons to hate Hitlerite Germany). and Hitler's continuous gambles to create a strong bargaining position by winning a major psychological victory incrementally weakened his position, as succeess breeds ambition and failure breeds dissatisfaction. The vagaries of life, eh? It's also worth mentioning, that although in sheer numbers, the USSR outproduced Germany; in 1942 by several factors, not adjusted for quality, the USSR was employing a larger share of her human and industrial potential to warfare than Germany, even by 1944. By 1944, German production was rising to meet the Russians in quantitative figures, even with the bombing campaign of the Western Powers intensifying. Indeed. The Red Army was suffering terrible shortages in 1941-42 because so much of Russia's industry and population had been concentrated in European Russia. Using the maximum share of human and industrial potential was a matter of life and death. | ||
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HnR)hT
United States3468 Posts
On December 13 2008 09:25 MoltkeWarding wrote: Obviously the difference between German treatment of Russian and Western POWs and Civilians is well documented, but even their brutalities against the Russian population was partial, and not comparable to the plight of the Jews. The point is that World War 2 cannot be seen as a moral anarchy, where its actors lacked references for normative values. You can say that about anything. If the Eastern Front was not moral anarchy, then almost nothing in the history of human affiars qualifies. | ||
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food
United States1951 Posts
On December 13 2008 10:17 HnR)hT wrote: Actually the USSR did not have superiority in manpower in 1941. According to David Glantz (from When Titans Clashed), the ratio of manpower on June 22nd was 1.4:1 in Germany's favor. This includes Germany's allies. IIRC the Red Army had 2.9 million troops mobilized in western military districts at the time of the invasion. The initial invading force was well over 3 million. It is obvious that the West border armies of USSR were not outnumbering Germans, it is a matter of a prepared and well guided invasion, which supposes concentrating on key directions/regions. Actually, that's what blitzkrieg was all about. Nothing new here, fact is, USSR outnumbered Germans in troops total and while being invaded, started using up its human resource, further outnumbering German armies by huge margins. In fact the Red Army possessed a very advanced doctrine of Deep Operations, which had been developed in the mid-30's. However, extreme logistical problems and a shortage of trained military personnel meant that the Soviets could not properly execute their own doctrine (at least till much later into the war). That's just irrelevant, such doctrine always existed since the times of Russian Empire, it's obvious that Soviets had inferior personnel and lacked training in all aspects. In fact, they executed talented commanders/officers throughout the 1930's, which resulted in the lack of proficient personnel. The principal reason for Germany's total air supremacy in 1941 is the fact that a substantial portion of Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground in the first hours of the invasion. The aircraft were parked in neat rows in forward-deployed runways, whose locations were very well-known to the enemy by the time of the invasion. Not entirely true, it did affect the outcome, but at the start of the war Germans had SUPERIOR air force and pilots, it's not even questioned by any respectable historian. Soviets had huge amount of stone-age planes, some pilots mentioned sitting on a frying pan so that bullets wont pierce right through the aircraft tearing that ass apart. All of that allowed Germans to dominate air with significantly smaller numbers of aircrafts. The vast majority of Soviet tanks were light tanks (T-25, BT-7, etc), many were badly maintained, had missing parts, were worn out, and were in unacceptable condition for actual combat. In the initial border battles, more than half of Soviet tanks broke down before actually reaching the battlefield. They had inferior tanks until they started massive production of T-34, which was one of the weapons that won the war for Soviets. If he's talking about T-34, he means the later period in the war when T-34 was built massively and replaced most other types. It proved to be most effective tank of that time. To describe the outcome of Smolensk for the Soviet Union as a "shattering defeat" is completely misleading. It was a minor turning point after which the Germans could no longer successfully pursue more than 1 strategic objective at a time. It is not obvious that the decision to deal with the forces of the South-Western Front in the south was wrong. It was a shattering defeat no matter how you look at it. Soviets were very lucky to escape with 200k troops and delay further advance for Germans. The only thing that diminishes the outcome is time that wasn't working for Germany. Soviets got extra weeks to regroup and rebuild which was the key to them winning that war in the end. Everything else you wrote seems fair, not going to argue. I love how this thread derailed for like 100th time ^_^ | ||
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HnR)hT
United States3468 Posts
On December 13 2008 11:09 food wrote: It is obvious that the West border armies of USSR were not outnumbering Germans, it is a matter of a prepared and well guided invasion, which supposes concentrating on key directions/regions. He was not talking about numerical superiority at breakthrough points in actual battles (where Germans typically achieved 4:1 or better superiority), we are talking about the total number of troops mobilized in the western military districts of the Soviet Union. Actually, that's what blitzkrieg was all about. Nothing new here, fact is, USSR outnumbered Germans in troops total and while being invaded, started using up its human resource, further outnumbering German armies by huge margins. The USSR never outnumbered German armies by "huge" margins. The ratio never exceeded 2:1 before mid-1944. Again, here we are NOT talking about tactical numerical superiority at breakthrough points during an offensive - we are talking the total number of mobilized troops. That's just irrelevant, such doctrine always existed since the times of Russian Empire, it's obvious that Soviets had inferior personnel and lacked training in all aspects. In fact, they executed talented commanders/officers throughout the 1930's, which resulted in the lack of proficient personnel. It's irrelevant? It directly refutes one of his assertions. And Deep Operations existed since the times of the Russian Empire?? WTF are you smoking? :O Not entirely true, it did affect the outcome, but at the start of the war Germans had SUPERIOR air force and pilots, it's not even questioned by any respectable historian. And not questioned by me, either. So I don't know why you bring it up. Soviets had huge amount of stone-age planes, some pilots mentioned sitting on a frying pan so that bullets wont pierce right through the aircraft tearing that ass apart. All of that allowed Germans to dominate air with significantly smaller numbers of aircrafts. Name me an early battle where Germans had fewer planes. You're just wrong, here. The Luftwaffe ruled the skies from the get-go, after a staggering amount of Soviet equipment was destroyed on the ground. They had inferior tanks until they started massive production of T-34, which was one of the weapons that won the war for Soviets. If he's talking about T-34, he means the later period in the war when T-34 was built massively and replaced most other types. It proved to be most effective tank of that time. He's talking about the summer of 1941, not late in the war. It was a shattering defeat no matter how you look at it. Soviets were very lucky to escape with 200k troops and delay further advance for Germans. The only thing that diminishes the outcome is time that wasn't working for Germany. Soviets got extra weeks to regroup and rebuild which was the key to them winning that war in the end. This is also totally false. The sacrifice of troops in Smolensk bought time to establish a coherent defense along the Moscow direction. | ||
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HnR)hT
United States3468 Posts
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IzzyCraft
United States4487 Posts
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MoltkeWarding
5195 Posts
Actually the USSR did not have superiority in manpower in 1941. According to David Glantz (from When Titans Clashed), the ratio of manpower on June 22nd was 1.4:1 in Germany's favor. This includes Germany's allies. IIRC the Red Army had 2.9 million troops mobilized in western military districts at the time of the invasion. The initial invading force was well over 3 million. For the Wehrmacht and Germany's allies, we have a much clearer picture of the strength of the invading army: 148 divisions on the entire eastern front, of which 28 were reserves, and the initial striking power of the German army at the outset was circa 120 divisions; Italian, Spanish, and Hungarian elements would not immediately come into play, and the only substantial satellite role was played by Romania in the Siege of Odessa in the opening phases. From the Russian deployment, there's a good summary in Magenheimer's Hitler's war: 189 divisions in the First Line, with a completed mobilizational count of over 300 units. According to the same source, between June and December, Halder's identification of 160 new major formations was not wide off the mark (177 infantry and 55 Armoured "divisions") Based on this count, the USSR's first strategic line disposed of about as many forces as attacking German troops (minus reserves,) and withheld a much larger strategic reserve, even in the pre-mobilization phase. In fact the Red Army possessed a very advanced doctrine of Deep Operations, which had been developed in the mid-30's. However, extreme logistical problems and a shortage of trained military personnel meant that the Soviets could not properly execute their own doctrine (at least till much later into the war). Army theoreticians of every country had some comparable theory, including the British, whose classifications of armour probably resembles Soviet doctrines more than either resembled German. There were proponents of breakthrough doctrines in Britain, France as well as America well before the Second World War. This does not mean, however, that these theories were used or adapted as conventional theory for their respective army organizations. This can be seen in the lacklustre pace of Anglo-American campaigns in North Africa and Italy, as well as the Soviet inability to use it to its advantage for most of the war. In comparison to the German rates of advance, the allied counteroffensives were painfully slow given their material superiority. (Of course, the Germans were more skilled in mobile defensive warfare than the allies had been in 1940 or the Soviets in 1941, again highlighting the differences between conception, adoptation, and application.) In any case, it's not appropriate to speak of Soviet offensive theory in the context of 1941. The principal reason for Germany's total air supremacy in 1941 is the fact that a substantial portion of Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground in the first hours of the invasion. The aircraft were parked in neat rows in forward-deployed runways, whose locations were very well-known to the enemy by the time of the invasion. Traditional sources give us a figure of 1 200 aircraft destroyed within the first 24 hours, and several thousand more within the first week. In light of the vastly expanded estimate of the total size of the Red Air Force, offensive airstrikes alone are incapable of explaining the vast disadvantages of the Red Air Force for years to come, particularly with their ability to recoup their losses at a much faster rate. The vast majority of Soviet tanks were light tanks (T-25, BT-7, etc), many were badly maintained, had missing parts, were worn out, and were in unacceptable condition for actual combat. In the initial border battles, more than half of Soviet tanks broke down before actually reaching the battlefield. Even the T-26s outgunned the German light tanks, which composed about a third of the German invading armour, and if the logistical and infrastructural problems faced by Soviet armour dampened their effectiveness, the argument is doubly effective for their opponents, whose entire offensive plan was predicated on their use. To describe the outcome of Smolensk for the Soviet Union as a "shattering defeat" is completely misleading. It was a minor turning point after which the Germans could no longer successfully pursue more than 1 strategic objective at a time. It is not obvious that the decision to deal with the forces of the South-Western Front in the south was wrong. Unless you regard the complete annihilation of the Soviet central front as the criterion for defeat, I don't see how it's misleading. All contemporary observers certainly saw it that way, and that in retrospect the defeat was not as complete as it might have been does not mitigate the size of the bag lost in the encirclement. No one denies that the turn to the North or South did not carry valid strategic reasoning, and it's only in retrospect that we are capable of rewinding to these counterfactual hypotheses to see how they bore out. The primary considerations of turning South were: 1) To master the USSR's most productive industrial and agricultural assets, and prevention of the USSR of making use of the same. 2) To effect the annihilation of Soviet forces as the primary objective, rather than winning space 3) That Moscow itself will not an important political goal In retrospect, we know that 1) was ineffective, 2) was a more convincing temporary argument, but in light of underestimating the Soviet abilities to replace their losses, retrospectively dubious unless success in the South could be combined with some permanent strategic gain and 3) itself is questionable, due not only to Moscow's strategic position in the USSR's infrastructure, but the questionable behaviour of Stalin himself, who in the event refused to follow an Alexandrian strategy of abandoning the capital, and was determined to make his stand there. The decision to halt before Moscow and turn to the flanks was based on the following strategic calculation: that eliminating Soviet field armies was a more effective means of victory than political decapitation. In the long-run, the former calculation was followed based on an underestimation of Soviet reserves, with exaggerated notions of the military consequences of pocketing 600 000 men in the Ukraine. This, along with exaggerated notions of the vital economic importance of the Ukraine brought about this decision. In light of what were reasonable assumptions at the time, no one will call the strategic decision a character or intellectual error, and yet it was most probably a strategic error nonetheless. Based on what? I can't see the possibility of a German-Soviet truce after Barbarossa under any circumstances. It was hardly possible, but this is largely because of Hitler and not Stalin. In 1941, Hitler refused to listen to any peace feelers proposed by Stalin, who was prepared to cede considerable territory. In 1943, Hitler refused to abandon all his gains and withdraw to the frontier of 1940, and in 1944, to the frontier of 1914. He only felt that he could make peace if he held a reasonably strong hand. On the other hand, Stalin, who was always more suspicious of the West than he was of Hitler, feared that the West would be inclined to make their own peace with Hitler, or alternatively, that they would wait out the war to see Germany and the USSR bleed themselves dry, a strategic calculation he himself held in 1939 vis-a-vis German and the West, or that they may default on their promises to him concerning his post-war gains. Stalin, whatever his public demeanour, would always feel a closer affinity to the leader of Germany than to his allies. You can say that about anything. If the Eastern Front was not moral anarchy, then almost nothing in the history of human affiars qualifies. And that was more or less my implication. Nothing in the history of human affairs qualifies, because there is no such thing as a completely amoral being. Note that this was said in response to previous posts that war by necessity creates an ethics-free enviornment where the ends justify the means. | ||
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food
United States1951 Posts
On December 13 2008 10:17 HnR)hT wrote: He was not talking about numerical superiority at breakthrough points in actual battles (where Germans typically achieved 4:1 or better superiority), we are talking about the total number of troops mobilized in the western military districts of the Soviet Union. That's exactly what I said. And he actually SPECIFICALLY mentioned that as well. Slightly bigger numbers for manpower, but less located in the western districts. Which has obvious reasoning behind it, which i stated. Germany achieved better concentration since they were preparing for invasion, unlike USSR that had their troops spread out. The USSR never outnumbered German armies by "huge" margins. The ratio never exceeded 2:1 before mid-1944. Again, here we are NOT talking about tactical numerical superiority at breakthrough points during an offensive - we are talking the total number of mobilized troops. In 1943 those numbers were estimated 3 mil Germany vs 5.5mil USSR. Those are huge margins. Those are even huger margins when you're far away from the mainland and enemies population exceeds yours. Cut the bullshit. It's irrelevant? It directly refutes one of his assertions. And Deep Operations existed since the times of the Russian Empire?? WTF are you smoking? :O It was first used during Napoleon invasion, I'm not referring to some "Deep Operations" doctrine specifically but the idea of attacking the enemy from the rear while conducting operations on a huge front and causing damage there, guerrilla warfare was always a part of it anyways. It's only a common sense while enemy is stretching out inside your territory. This isn't even possible to achieve without Germany stepping inside the USSR which leaves the bullshit idea of losing battles on the border due to not perfecting that "doctrine" aside. Actually, Soviets never brought this up as something that gave them a key to victory. That's what you said: The principal reason for Germany's total air supremacy in 1941 is the fact that a substantial portion of Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground in the first hours of the invasion. Also: Name me an early battle where Germans had fewer planes. You're just wrong, here. The Luftwaffe ruled the skies from the get-go, after a staggering amount of Soviet equipment was destroyed on the ground. 4k to 11k aircraft isn't outnumbering? Come on, whats wrong with you. This is also totally false. The sacrifice of troops in Smolensk bought time to establish a coherent defense along the Moscow direction. You can read one more time and tell me what's false. You are stating same fucking thing. It still doesn't change the fact that Germans crushed USSR forces in this battle. | ||
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EmeraldSparks
United States1451 Posts
On December 13 2008 06:13 HnR)hT wrote: Germany had virtually zero chance after Stalingrad. It was a turning point, if not the turning point, of THE WHOLE WAR, not just on the eastern front. The battle resulted in a million(!!!) Axis casualties, an entire German army eliminated, and a spectacular Soviet counteroffensive that liberated the entire territory that the Germans spent the year of 1942 conquering. In addition, greatly increased Soviet production from factories in the far east had just kicked in, which meant that the Red Army would henceforth have substantial superiority in tanks and artillery. That they had no chance of defeating the Soviet Union was clear, but that the Germany proper would be invaded and annihilated was not. On December 13 2008 06:13 HnR)hT wrote: That the Russian winter was somehow decisive in the failure of Typhoon is an absolute falsity. Don't believe the Cold War era documentaries which show the German army effortlessly advancing until the winter sets in, at which point they all start freezing to death. Russian troops are not immune to the winter, you know. In truth, the German army was pushing ever more slowly against an ever stiffer resistance from late October and throughout the entire month of November. In early December, after the Germans have ground completely to a hault, the Red Army launched a strategic counterattack which resulted in the first ever strategic defeat of the Wehrmacht. Typhoon was not far from succeeding; the Germans managed to advance within fifteen miles of the city; not that it wasn't fortified, but given a few more weeks of unfrozen tanks Moscow itself would have likely fallen. It didn't reduce the German's effectiveness to zero as you seem to think I believe, but it is unquestionable that it severely retarded the overall German advance. As for bad strategic decisions, Hitler could have ended the war earlier in his favor had he not made a number of amazingly bad decisions; obviously, hypotheticals such as "what if Russian winters weren't cold" are even dumber, but oh well. As a disclaimer - the last thing I picked up anything on WWII was over three years ago, and the only relevant expertise I have comes from reading a lot of library books (basically I emptied my local library) whose names I have all forgotten by now, so it could be that my memory plays tricks on me (or I'm stupid) so anything I can contribute is probably pretty questionable. | ||
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selboN
United States2523 Posts
On November 02 2008 14:44 DoctorHelvetica wrote: The ground assault would have resulted in more casualties on both sides. The job of the American Government is to protect American lives at any cost. We did exactly that. Truth | ||
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