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Im not educated on this topic and did not read all answers so i dont know how necessary the bombing were from a strategical or any other point of view.
However if you have to make this decision you imho have absolutly no right to justify it on a moral layer.
If somebody accuses you of mass murder you got to swallow it. Its an outrage to any victim if you do otherwise. A moral person should not be able to justify a deed like that before itself regardless of the necessity. Im aware that is much to ask from any person but its not any person who carires the responseability, though somebody has to.
If someone in the USA today asks the question whether it was justified or not and comes to the conclusion that it was the right decision it should not be used to ease his part of the collective conscience. One kind of conscious mass murder is as bad as any other. Live with it.
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I have not read this thread, the topic is ridiculous, instead lets play fallout 3
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I haven't read through this monstrosity of a thread, so this may have been brought up before, but it's not very well known so I'll say it anyway.
The Soviet Union was obviously looking to expand it's power. During the days between when the bombs were dropped, the Soviet Union occupied what is now North Korea, and they would have occupied South Korea as well, if not for the fact that Japan surrendered to the US, so South Korea became US territory. This, among other things, led to the Korean war, which was incredibly devastating and killed millions of people.
So, obviously nobody could predict that that would happen. However, it's worth pointing out that if the bombs had been dropped sooner, the Korean war might have been prevented. On the other hand, not dropping them might have prevented the war, but at the cost of (maybe) making the whole Korean peninsula be like north Korea today.
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maybe we can just boil this discussion down to this
US government/population circa 1945 - Bombing is justified
Rest of the world circa 1945 - Mixed opinion
Japanese circa 1945 - Not justified
US population now - Mixed opinion
Rest of the world now - Not justified
Can we all agree on this?
If this is true, then the only conclusion we will reach here is that the bombing was justifiable only to those that gained from it.
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On November 03 2008 05:45 TheTyranid wrote:
Think about it. Nukes saved an incredible amount of lives. This invention was probably the most live saving.
If there were no nukes, then USA and USSR would not be afraid of war between each other. Can you imagine how many people would die if the 2 superpowers and their allies went to war with each other?
Tens of millions of lives saved for the cost of what 110,000 + people? Definitely justified.
Man, I been saying this for years at this forum... Russians are CRAZY!
Truman, Stalin, Churchill should all be punished for their crimes just like all the other war criminals.
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With much of the pro us bombing posts in this thread I've only seen one post regarding 911 linking bombing of civilianz as righteous for the side doing it hence if the US was right, so was 911 justifiable by thoose views put forth.
My take on this is that the first bombing might've been ok if they were as pressed, dropping the second? No way. With the information that japan was looking to end the war before the bombings but not unconditional surrender that has been posted in this thread, it puts the leaders of US in a very bad light. But when we look back on thoose things its also clear that bombing of civs was not the same view as it is today for most of us.
It is a shame we havent yet learned to live in peace =)
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You can't say it had no consequence and then cite the Soviet's consequent policies because obviously those were affected by it all. It was both a geopolitical bluff and a move to quickly secure Japan, and it did have some lasting consequences. That it played little role in stopping the CCP or Soviet aggression elsewhere is irrelevant to the decision making at the time.
Stalin had no intention of moving into Western Europe after 1945, regardless of what happened in Japan. This is so well established that it would take a revolutionary and authentic new documentary discovery to overturn. His refusal to support communist parties outside of his sphere of influence and his indifference to the Chinese civil war were fairly symptomatic of his general world view: total domination of the Soviet Union in its assigned sphere of influence, total Anglo-American domination in theirs.
The attribution of expansionist intentions to Stalin and the Soviet Union in the initial hysteria of the Cold War had no substance. A good summary of Stalin's foreign policy and psychology is provided by Kennan in his "Sources of Soviet conduct." Stalin was not a gambler or adventurist. He had been plunged into the Second World War against his will and had no intention of jeopardizing his gains with a third.
Stalin's foreign policy exhibited the traditional Russian attributes of paranoia and insecurity, and its aggressive appearance of maintaining overwhelming armed force in peacetime was not an innovation of communist regimes, but a Russian phenomenon. Furthermore, Stalin was more aware than anyone of the Soviet Union's internal weaknesses, and suffered from underconfidence rather than overconfidence habitually in both domestic and foreign affairs. Although the appearance of the American A-bomb impressed him, it did not cause a fundamental change in his cautious mentality.
I don't know why people insist on applying game theory to well documented historical events. It's as if everyone who ever lived in world history was a rational player aiming at world domination.
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United States10328 Posts
I think this was pretty much an issue of marginal cost vs marginal benefit - let japanese civilians & economy AND lots of american soldiers die in a frontal attack + fire bombing + other stuff, OR nuke them and kill tons of japanese civilians, shock the world, and destroy two cities. I think either way would've sucked, but I suppose the nuke ended it faster...
also when I first saw the topic I was like "OH MAN BOXER" and then realized it did not have to do with boxer.
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I don't think it's fair to compare it to the 9/11 attacks. The A-bombs were dropped during a time of total war that had been raging for years, before the bombs were even dropped Japan had the opportunity to surrender and prevent it. I can't see how you are directly comparing this to 9/11.
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Hungary11291 Posts
It still baffles me how much cold-blooded rationality people are willing to attribute to the decision-makers of the 2nd World War, as if their only interests would have been to "end the war before the Soviets come in" or to "test the potential of the nuklear bomb". Times of war are times where every decision is bound to be "wrong" in some respect, so I can't understand statements like "of course they could have done something else" or "Truman, Stalin, Churchill should all be punished for their crimes just like all the other war criminals." In a situtation where there is no way to oversee the consequences of your actions, what do you choose?
There is a very thin borderline between being apologetic concerning the past and being understanding. There is also a thin line between being condescending and being critical towards the past. Let's not cross either in the wrong direction.
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"I was a twenty-one-year-old second lieutenant of infantry leading a rifle platoon. Although still officially fit for combat, in the German war I had already been wounded in the back and the leg badly enough to be adjudged, after the war, 40 percent disabled.
But even if my leg buckled and I fell to the ground whenever I jumped out of the back of a truck, and even if the very idea of more combat made me breathe in gasps and shake all over, my condition was held to be adequate for the next act.
When the atom bombs were dropped and news began to circulate that "Operation Olympic" would not, after all, be necessary, when we learned to our astonishment that we would not be obliged in a few months to rush up the beaches near Tokyo assault – firing while being machine– gunned, mortared, and shelled, for all the practiced phlegm of our tough facades we broke down and cried with relief and joy.
We were going to live. We were going to grow to adulthood after all. The killing was all going to be over, and peace was actually going to be the state of things." - John Toland, United States Army Forty-fifth Infantry Division
Obviously, soldiers like John Toland would say that the bombs were justified, because it saved their lives.
But how can any of us say whether or not the bomb was justified if we were never there to experience those events, and when we are in no mortal danger? Instead of questioning the morals of others, let us question the morality of ourselves instead.
Would you justify the nuclear bombing of two cities whose populace were related to your mortal enemies whom you had been fighting for years, and who were "...so fanatic, that they used their own dead as booby traps..." to save the lives of you, those around you, and those in your country who were about to go to war?
Would you still think that the bomb was unjustified, that invading the islands of Japan where you would experience "...firing while being machine–gunned, mortared, and shelled..." would be better than dropping a couple of bombs on people that you never cared about?
I believe that times are different now, that we can no longer say whether or not past events were justified. All we can do now is learn from them, so that atrocities such as war may never happen again.
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On November 03 2008 05:00 Boonbag wrote:
LOL 143 people voted yes.
I presume amongst these 143 a good half was under 10 years old. The other half beeing ignorant individuals.
Anyone who thinks voting "yes" is ridiculous has a poor understanding of history. Many University and known historians changed their minds from "no, its not justified" to "yes, it is justified".
I don't have time to really post a complete argument on this (especially since nobody would really read it eitherway) but I'l post up something I wrote 2 years ago or so.
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The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were:
justified / abstain, no indications, can't say, useless / unjustified
United States 31 / 26 / 12
Europe (Aggregated) 4 / 16 / 23
Canada 2 / 5 / 9
Sweden 1 / 4 / 8
Australia 2 / 1 / 4
Germany 1 / 2 / 3
United Kingdom 1 / 1 / 3
France 0 / 1 / 2
Poland 1 / 1 / 1
China 2 / 1 / 0
New Zealand 1 / 1 / 0
Taiwan 1 / 1 / 0
Belgium 0 / 1 / 1
Finland 0 / 1 / 1
Korea 0 / 1 / 1
Netherlands 0 / 1 / 1
Norway 0 / 1 / 1
Chile 0 / 0 / 2
Philippines 1 / 0 / 0
Malaysia 1 / 0 / 0
Russia 0 / 1 / 0
Hungary 0 / 1 / 0
Iceland 0 / 1 / 0
Denmark 0 / 1 / 0
South Africa 0 / 1 / 0
Bulgaria 0 / 0 / 1
Brazil 0 / 0 / 1
Colombia 0 / 0 / 1
Spain 0 / 0 / 1
Singapore 0 / 0 / 1
Mexico 0 / 0 / 1
Vietnam 0 / 0 / 1
Unknown 2 / 2 / 3
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(this was written two years ago for a 20th century history class.
Criticize my grammar if you like, I don't mind but do understand that the Atomic Bomb is FAR more fucking complex than "its wrong to drop nuclear bombs on civilians". Harry Truman knew very well that there could have been an uproar from the citizens from doing such a terrible act but do understand that there was more in play than "just testing their new secret weapons" argument.
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Tinian 1945
The four-engine Enola Gay rumbles. Its captain Colonel Paul W.Tibbets Jr. is worried; a B-29 crashed that same morning. His own bomber might have difficulty taking off as “Little Boy” adds more weight than to what he is accustomed to. A bad takeoff might lead to the complete destruction of the Tinian airfield, home to 500 B-29s. Its bomb load contains the most devastating weapon ever devised by man: the Atomic Bomb. Its destructive power is estimated to be at 15 kilotons of TNT, far more devastating than any previous Allied raids. Tibbets is given the go-ahead signal. There was no problem in the take-off.
The rest as we say is history. This was the coming of a terrifying age: the nuclear era.
The use of the atomic bomb has been debated countless times, too many times. Most of the discussion ends up being extremely repetitive and holds on very basic (and sometimes out rightly false) arguments. One of such argument is that Japan was ready to surrender as long as it kept its Emperor. Such premise shows a lack of research, which this difficult subject needs.
The intent of this paper is to thoroughly look over the question of the atomic bomb: Was it necessary to unleash such a terrifying weapon to bring the war to a rapid conclusion? The Atomic Bomb while terrifying in its nature was justified mainly due to the non-decision of the Imperial Japanese leaders. Moreover, the lack of a reliable alternative proved to be the reason underlying the drop. It was a necessary evil.
Before such views are considered, it is necessary to dwell on the legality of the Atomic bomb. Do the laws of war demonstrate the atomic bomb as being illegal? If so, should the responsible be taken to court?
The Laws of War
A prerequisite to the atomic bomb debate is to understand what the laws of war are. Its intention and objective must be understood. To briefly summarize, it began with Henry Dunant, a Swiss who witnessed the suffering of 40,000 soldiers after the Battle of Solferino . On the account of this abysmal view, he suggested what would later become the First Geneva Convention. Its purpose was to reduce the horrors and suffering caused by war. Some argues that the atomic bomb had clearly impeded the laws of war; it specifically broke the 1928 protocol where it prohibited “the use in war of asphyxiating gas, and of bacteriological methods of warfare” .
While there is no question that it did break that specific law, it does not necessarily mean that it should be branded as a war crime. To do so would be to ignore its real purpose (to lessen unnecessary suffering during wartime). To exemplify this situation, take for instance a law passed which forbids the killing of endangered bears. It forbade anyone to harm the specie in any way. But if a camper is attacked by the animal and the camper kills the bear, he or she will be exempt from the law. The condition left the person no alternatives but to break the law. This is the same with Hiroshima. What the U.S did is to compel an enemy to surrender, and then treated him as a friend after the war. At the same, it served the same purpose as to why the laws of war were made: to lessen unnecessary wartime suffering. By doing so, it is not a war crime. If claimed otherwise, it is because these asserts on false premises such as the retention of Emperor Hirohito would have brought peace.
The Emperor’s Myth
Throughout the countless debacles about Hiroshima, one argument is persistently used by revisionists. This argument contends that Japan would have surrendered if the Allied gave reassurance that Emperor Hirohito stayed in power. It further argues that the Americans deliberately refused to modify their unconditional surrender in order to “test” the atomic bomb on a “live city”. To quote a passage from The Emperors Codes, author Michael Smith writes “For reasons that remain inexplicable, the final declaration of the Potsdam Conference made no attempt to clarify the terms of surrender despite an acceptance by both America and Britain that the Emperor would have to be retained” . His assertion derails from the truth.
When the initial Potsdam declaration asked the Japanese to surrender unconditionally, the Japanese leaders did indeed express their fears of losing its emperor . That is true. Through magic’s intercepted messages, the Allied knew this. What the revisionist does not mention is that modifications were made on the Potsdam declaration. In the final draft (see appendix 1), President Truman modified the terms and now asked “the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces” . It was altered to specifically ask the surrender of its army, not of its Emperor. What was Japan’s reaction to it? It coldly replied “Mokusatsu”. This roughly translates “to withhold comment” or “to kill with silence” . In other words, Japan refused to accept the surrender term despite the reassurance that the Emperor would remain. Likewise, the declaration further reassures that Japan would retain its mainland (Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku) . There is no reason to believe the revisionist argument that U.S deliberately ignored Japan’s peace overture to purposefully test their bomb. Simply said, Japan had no realistic peace propositions.
To understand why Japan lacked any feasible peace propositions, it is essential to examine the Japanese leadership. The country was basically divided between the peace-feelers and the war-mongers. The peace faction consisted of Foreign Minster Togo, Prime Minister Suzuki and Navy Minister Admiral Yonai. On the other side, the war faction comprised of Army Minister General Anami, Army Chief of Staff General Umezu and Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Toyoda . While the peace faction led the country (including its Prime Minister), they had no control whatsoever over its armed force. This is why any peace propositions laid down by the peace faction would be useless. If the Japanese armed force cannot lay down its arms, there is no surrender. Any peace will be null because Japan is unable to truly surrender. It was General Anami who in fact had true power seeing how the army was under his supervision. This man advocated one thing, and that is to continue the war until the “decisive battle”.
It is now imperative to ask the following question: “Why did General Anami want a decisive battle when the war was clearly lost?” To answer that, General Anami did in fact recognize that Japan was in a precarious situation. Historian Liddel Hart writes “On June 20th [Hirohito] summoned to a conference the six members of the inner cabinet […] All six members of the council were in agreement on [a quick peace], but […] the Army minister and the Army and Navy chiefs of staff argued for continued resistance until some mitigating conditions were obtained” . In other words, he did not believe total victory was possible but he was a strong advocate that a decisive battle on Japanese mainland would lead to better terms in Japan’s eventual peace signatory (see appendix 2). One of his demands to the Americans was that Japan would themselves disarm their own armed force. Its intention was to secretly rebuild a new formidable Japanese army in the post-war era . This would simply be unacceptable to the U.S; they wanted a lasting peace, not a renewed war in 20 years. Many Japanese followed this idea of rebuilding the Japanese armed force. Koki Hirota, a Japanese envoy, attempted to create an alliance with the Russians during July of 1945 in the hopes of making Japan a superpower. He told the Russian ambassador: “Japan will increase her naval strength in the future, and that, together with the Russian Army, would make a force unequaled in the world…” .
That being said, the war faction wanted a decisive battle so that they could force the Americans into accepting a term that was simply unacceptable to them. The notion that peace was possible if the Emperor stayed in power is completely absurd. It ignores Japan’s war faction, which wanted to end the war in their terms. The argument of the “Emperor” has long been used and it is time to classify it as myth.
Japan was near-surrender?
Another argument used by revisionist is that Japan was nearing surrender. A USAAF report contends that airpower alone could have brought the Japanese to surrender and alleges that “in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated” . Revisionists further back their argument with quotes from generals such as Dwight Eisenhower such as “the basis of my belief [is] that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary” .
It should first be noted that the USAAF’s report should not be taken as a fact. It is an opinion. Here we enter the realms of conjecture and counterfactual scenarios; the “what ifs”. The problem with such assertions is their underestimation of the Japanese willingness to continue the war. On February 23rd 1945, the USAAF conducted a massif firebombing operation on Tokyo. The death toll was 100,000 Japanese, exceeding Hiroshima itself . Yet, despite this massif concerted effort, the war faction were regardless optimistic in a “decisive battle”. To counter such raids, Japan had even devised plans to bring their populous from urban cities into the rural area . The idea was that if the USAAF were destroying Japanese supply lines that provided the food into the cities, then they should bring the population directly to the food. The air force’s report was too boastful; airpower alone did not seem to be effective enough to bring Japan to surrender.
Both the USAAF and Eisenhower advocate that Japan was near-surrender. Yet, reality seems to tell otherwise. As previously said, the war faction was adamant in having an American landing in the Japanese mainland. How adamant were they? To quote General Anami at a meeting cabinet on August 9th 1945 (2:30pm) “it is far too early to say the war is lost. That we will inflict severe losses on the enemy when he invades Japan is certain, and it is by no means impossible that we may be able to reverse the situation in our favor, pulling victory out of defeat” . Bear in mind the date of the meeting; August 9th 2:30pm. This is approximately 4 hours after the drop of “Fat man” on Nagasaki. General Anami was in favor of continuing the war even after the two bombs were dropped and after the Russian’s declaration of war. The war faction still believed in continuing the war (see appendix 3). This was when Emperor Hirohito decided to forcefully break the deadlock between the war and peace factions because the indecision of the Japanese leaders would otherwise wipe out its people. Only then did General Anami cave in and only reluctantly so, saying “As a Japanese soldier, I must obey my Emperor” (see appendix 9). Even the Army itself was reluctant to accept this. In the aftermath of Hirohito’s ultimate decision, a significant part of the Japanese army attempted a coup d’état to overthrow the Emperor and take over power. This nearly succeeded as the Army even reached the Imperial Palace.
If there was this much reluctance to accept defeat even after USSR’s declaration of war and of the dropping of both bombs, how could we say that airpower alone would have brought the Japanese to its knee? Clearly, there is some kind of underestimation of Japan’s willingness to fight on. It is true that statistically, Japan was on a tight rope (see appendix 4 and 6) but the prediction made by the USAAF and Eisenhower enters the realm of “What ifs”. We can never know with absolutely certainty what might have happened if the atomic bombs were not used but there are strong suggestions that the war could have prolonged beyond 1945. If Japan had not surrendered early as the revisionists speculate, the alternate scenarios would have the unnecessary suffering of many.
Alternate scenarios
Alternate scenarios involving the non-use of the atomic bomb does not fare any better. One of such scenario would have been “Operation Downfall”, the invasion of the Japanese mainland. Estimations predicted that casualties would mount to 1,202,005 American men(see appendix 5) . It is a contested number as revisionists state that there would be only a casualty of approximately 71,000 men . Whichever the real numbers might be, an invasion of the Japanese mainland would have been an extremely risky venture. Remember that the Japanese war faction desired this so that they could inflict the most casualties as possible. Furthermore, major operations rarely go according to plan (if ever) so the numbers of 71,000 or 1,202,005 men should by no means be taken as something “definite”. To exemplify a “plan that went wrong”, Hitler envisaged that the USSR would fall by September of 1941 and he was grossly mistaken. It is not hard to imagine Truman being worried of re-enacting such a disaster. If that was such a case, then Truman’s decision to drop the bomb was primarily to minimize any sort of risks. Had the invasion plans went catastrophically wrong, history would have harshly judged Truman.
Another alternate scenario would have been to starve the Japanese population until it is brought to its knees. This alternative is hardly a more humane than the Atomic Bomb. Its premise was to bring famine through airpower and naval blockades. U.S Admirals and USSAF generals thus advocated that an invasion force was unnecessary (hence minimizing American casualties). Such methods are painfully slow and far too cruel. There would be no real way of knowing when the Japanese would cave and any estimate of Japanese casualties would have been difficult, though it might have went in the millions . The Japanese were already starving by August 1945 (see appendix 6) and if the blockade continued, it would have led to a serious humanitarian catastrophe among the Japanese population. It is not in America’s interest to occupy a dead country.
A quick and swift end to the war was also in the interest of American allies, most notably China. China’s considerable populous was an invaluable asset to American Capitalism. Remember that China actively took part of the Potsdam declaration and is one of the signatories so the country should be considered as a major American ally. That said, the U.S had an obligation to help its Allies as much as possible. A way to do so would be the end of the war as 100,000 Chinese civilians were dying every month . Even if the USAAF’s prediction that the war would be over by November of 1945, the result would be the unnecessary death of 300,000 Chinese civilians. This is taking in account that its prediction would have been correct but as I have written beforehand, its report seemed far too optimistic. Likewise, other countries would have been affected by the prolonging of the war. Do not forget the British prisoners of war captured from Singapore. Neither should the 20,000 Koreans dying every month through Japanese occupation be forgotten . The non-use of the atomic bomb would have saved the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but it would have caused the deaths of many others.
It is thus absurd to not use the atomic bombs. The alternate scenarios are not any better or humane. It would have involved a significant number of U.S involvement and sacrifice. An invasion alone would have caused unnecessary American and Japanese casualties. If such an invasion would have not taken place because it was deemed unnecessary or too risky, defeat on Japan would have been imposed through starvation; a slower and crueller method. Some revisionists may argue that war was going to end by November 1945. Even if that is true, it would have been at the expense of the Chinese, British, Koreans, Filipinos and many others. Because the atomic bomb shortened and saved lives, it seems to me that it differs from the definition of war crimes.
Alternate uses of the Bomb
Revisionist Stephen Shalom argues that the atomic bomb is indeed a war crime because it was used prematurely. He writes “the possibility of each alternative was made known to top officials and there is persuasive evidence that they did not have good reasons for rejecting them” . He ascertains that the following options should have been used by America before its use on a populous city: “(1) Providing a warning first, (2) conducting a demonstration of the bomb’s power, either on some uninhabited area of Japan, a Pacific island, or even at Alamogordo, New Mexico, (3) dropping the bomb on a genuine military target” . Were these options feasible?
Argument 1 is well-intentioned and “moral”, but it involves taking avoidable risks and would serve little benefits in actually winning the war. With the luxury of insight, we know the Atomic Bomb did in fact work. The story was different in 1945. Despite the Trinity test at New Mexico, there was much concern whether it would actually work. In numerous interviews, Paul Warfield Tibbets Jr., captain of the Enola Gay, expressed that “he was sure that the Atomic Bomb was a dud” . Let’s say there is a public announcement of this new arm; what if they turned out to be duds? If Truman publicly announced that they had nuclear arsenals, not only is he revealing a secret weapon but there would be immense pressure to have it worked. The benefits of a “warning” are little- it would merely serve as a propaganda tool and mere pictures wouldn’t be enough to convince the Japanese militarists. All advisors of Truman agreed that a demonstration on Japanese soil or military base is the minimum requirement of its surrender (see appendix 10 and 11). Had the bombs not work, it would only serve to augment the morale of Japanese war faction. Stephen Shalom counters this argument saying that it was considered “a sure thing that it didn’t even have to be tested” . This is pure speculation and is arguable at best. Remember that this is the same nation that called on the British “bluff” of its supposedly great presence in Singapore and “honour of the British Empire” (see appendix 7). In its aftermath, it served on to be a great propaganda tool.
As for the second and third argument, the problem is that it requires the waste of at least one atomic bomb. At this precarious stage of the war, the misuse of such a vital weapon will cost lives. The United States had at its disposal exactly 2 nuclear bombs; it did not have more. Shalom contends that “[More] bombs were in production and the next one would have been available in August, with three more ready in September, and possibly seven more in December” (see Appendix 8). This is factually incorrect. While another was ready for August, it meant it was assembled on Los Alamos. It would still require road transport to the Pacific Coast, transport by warship to Tinian, setting it up, planning the drop, waiting for the perfect weather and the actual drop itself. All of this would have taken the actual drop beyond August . The more time the U.S wastes, needless casualties of many countries mount.
To truly understand why the bomb was actually dropped, we should place ourselves in Truman’s shoes. He was presented with two distinct but conflicting advices. Some scientists recommended that a demonstration on Japanese soil would be sufficient, though this was not widely accepted among the other scientists. The report concluded that there was “no acceptable alternative to direct military use” .
On the other hand, the military position strongly advocated that “it is doubtful whether the first available bombs, of comparatively low efficiency and small size, will be sufficient to break the will or ability of Japan to resist” . In other words, at least two bombs were needed. Truman had to take a decision and he knew that any waste of the weapon could potentially cost lives. America had two atomic bombs in its arsenal- could Truman afford to waste one or should it be used in the most efficient manner? He chose the latter.
Skimming through these reports (see appendix 10 and 11), it should also demystify the revisionist argument that the bomb was dropped solely to scare off the Russians. In the military report (see appendix 11),there is indeed a discussion about how the USSR leadership would react “Russia, and even allied countries which bear less mistrust of our ways and intentions, as well as neutral countries, will be deeply shocked” . But to say that the bomb was solely dropped for the sake of the Cold War is downright false. To even say that it was a major reason underlining the dropping is to disregard the complex circumstance Truman was in. In these reports, there were specific concerns about “how much is enough” to induce a Japanese surrender. The risk entailing a wrong decision would have cost dearly to his reputation. Moral or not, one thing that is irrefutable is that Truman played the “safe cards”; the card with the best odds of minimizing casualties. Truman can hardly be blamed for the course of action he took. Preventing Stalin from reaching Manchuria or Hokkaido was a “bonus”.
Final conclusions
When observing this controversy, it dwells on one specific question: “Does the end justify the means?”. Many revisionists argue that if the Allied gave reassurance that the Emperor would stay in the throne, the war would have ended. They further contend that allied made little or no contact with the peace feelers. To put it simply, it is untrue. The war faction had direct control over the Japanese armed forces and demanded far more than just the retention of the Emperor. Without their consent, any peace propositions were null. The Japanese militarists were adamant in continuing the war because they believed that a decisive battle on Japanese mainland would have turned their war fortunes.
Despite any statistical claim saying otherwise, there is no refuting that a war with Japan beyond 1946 was a distinct possibility. Had the war went beyond 1946 or even just for a few more months, it could have implied catastrophic consequences for many. Would the deaths of millions involving U.S, Japanese, Chinese, Koreans and many others justify the non-use of the atomic bomb? Wasting it on a deserted Japanese land or military based would have had the same disastrous consequences. Truman did not dare to risk losing lives needlessly. His main reason to drop the bomb was to end America’s war with Japan. It wasn’t necessarily for petty revenge or to “experiment”. Once the war ended, its once former enemy was given substantial aids. Had the bombs not been dropped, such aids would have been impossible because a humanitarian crisis was impending in Japan. Did the end justify the mean? This author firmly believes it did.
Captain of the Enola Gay, Paul Warfield Tibbets Jr, recently died on November 1st 2007 at the age of 92. He has no regrets on his role of the bomb. After the war, he went on to say “I knew when I got the assignment it was going to be an emotional thing. We had feelings […] we knew it was going to kill people right and left. But my one driving interest was to do the best job I could so that we could end the killing as quickly as possible” . His words and legacy will forever live in controversy. Let him rest in peace.
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Appendix 1
POTSDAM DECLARATION
(1) PROCLAMATION DEFINING TERMS FOR JAPANESE SURRENDER
(The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIII, No. 318, July 29, 1945)
(1) We - the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.
(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.
(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, WILL mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter destruction of the Japanese homeland.
(4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.
(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.
(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.
(7) Until such a new order is established AND until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.
(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine.
(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.
(10) We don not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be established.
(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.
(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and responsible Government.
(13) We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.
[Emphasis made in bold]
Source:
Monty White & Larry Jewell. “The Japanese Surrender Documents- WWII”. Unknown date of publication. Ibiblio. November 11th 2007. <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/450729a.html>.
Appendix 2
Four conditions that were strongly advocated by the war faction:
• Retention of the emperor (upon which all Japanese leaders agreed)
• No Allied occupation of the Japanese mainland
• Japan would disarm itself
• Japan would try its own war criminals
Source:
Toland, John.“The Rising Sun: the Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945”. United States of America: Modern Library, 1970 (p 910)
Appendix 3
Proclamation by Mayor of Hiroshima August 6th 1945:
“The present catastrophe is a result of a horrible and inhuman air raid. Citizens of Hiroshima, the damage is great, but that is only expected of war. The enemies’ intention is to clearly undermine the fighting spirit of the Japanese people. Keep up your spirit. Do not lose heart”
[Emphasis made in bold]
Proclamation of President Truman after the drop of “Little Boy”:
“It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July the 26th was at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of air, the likes that have never been seen on this Earth”
[Emphasis made in bold]
REMARK:
The Japanese militarists were given a new chance to surrender. They did not. On the contrary, the Japanese were encouraged to hang on and continue the war (see Proclamation by the Mayor of Hiroshima).
Source:
Luke Dunkley & Horacio Queiko. The Passionate Eye: Hiroshima, 60 years ago (documentary). CBC. 2005.
Appendix 4
Statistics of the Japanese War Economy
Selected Japanese Imports (by fiscal year, April 1 to March 30, in tons)
COAL IRON ORE RUBBER FERTILIZER
1941 24,144,617 5,874,674 31,818 1,136,942
1942 19,595,929 4,663,776, 44,085 1,031,039
1943 14,030,076 3,292,956 41,276 581,141
1944 8,294,748 1,073,065 19,595 405,841
1945 1,780,565 129,955 0 137,470
Output percentage in 1945 in comparison with 1944
Electrical output Coal consumption Aluminum Army ordnance Navy ordnance Explosives
50% 50% 9% 44% 57% 45%
Aircraft engine production
June 1944 5,090
July 1945 1,131
Source:
Richard B. Frank. Downfall- The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. New York: Penguin books, 1999. (pg. 81-82)
Appendix 5
Statistics and controversy over the number of U.S casualties in Operation Downfall (comprised of Operation Olympic and Operation Coronet)
Projected Casualties for Olympic and Coronet for a Ninety-Day Campaign
Pacific Experience
Troop list 1,792,700
Killed and missing 314,619
Total casualties 1,202,005
Further Projected Casualties in 1945-1946 (those not involving in Operation Olympic/Operation Coronet)
Killed and Missing Returned to Duty Wounded Evacuated Wounded Total
Navy 2,150 570 2,280 5,000
Marines 2,400 3,780 5,820 12,000
Army 6,400 10,080 15,520 32,000
Total 10,950 14,430 23,620 49,000
MacArthur’s projection of cumulative battle casualties
X-Day to X plus 15 9,727
X-Day to X plus 30 22,576
X-Day to X plus 60 55,906
X-Day to X plus 120 124,935
Source:
Richard B. Frank. Downfall- The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. New York: Penguin books, 1999. (pg. 136-137)
Appendix 6
Statistics of rice calories
Japan’s rice production (in metric tons)
1942 10,027,474
1944 8,783,827
1945 (estimation) 6,355,000
Average Japanese consumptions (in calories)
(Average American consumption in 1941 is 3,400 calories)
1941 2,000
1944 1,900
1945 1,680
Source:
Richard B. Frank. Downfall- The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. New York: Penguin books, 1999. (pg. 350)
Appendix 7
Winston Churchill’s cable to General Wavell on the evening of February 10th 1942.
“I think you ought to realise the way we view the situation in Singapore. It was reported to Cabinet by the C.I.G.S. [Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Alan Brooke] that Percival has over 100,000 [sic] men, of whom 33,000 are British and 17,000 Australian. It is doubtful whether the Japanese have as many in the whole Malay Peninsula.... In these circumstances the defenders must greatly outnumber Japanese forces who have crossed the straits, and in a well-contested battle they should destroy them. There must at this stage be no thought of saving the troops or sparing the population. The battle must be fought to the bitter end at all costs. The 18th Division has a chance to make its name in history. Commanders and senior officers should die with their troops. The honour of the British Empire and of the British Army is at stake. I rely on you to show no mercy to weakness in any form. With the Russians fighting as they are and the Americans so stubborn at Luzon, the whole reputation of our country and our race is involved. It is expected that every unit will be brought into close contact with the enemy and fight it out... “
[Emphasis made in bold]
Source:
Churchill, Winston. The Second World War. Vol IV.
Appendix 9
Anami’s Speech and its implications
At 3:30 pm. [August 14] Anami climbed a small platform. “The Emperor has decided to end the war,” he told the standing audience. “It is, therefore, proper that we abide by the imperial wish.”
“Anami’s speech […] destroyed the possibility of any coup involving high-rank officers.” Leon Sigal points out that Anami, Chief of Staff General Umezu, and the third-highest-ranking officer, General Kenji Doihara, ordered their principal subordinates to pledge that “the Army will act in obedience to the Imperial decision to the last”
[Note: Despite this, a large part of the army attempted at the coup- Defeat was accepted only very reluctantly]
Source:
Alperovitz, Gar. The decision to use the Atomic Bomb. New York: Alfred A.Knopf Inc.,1995 (pg. 652-653)
Appendix 10
Recommendations on the Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons, June 16, 1945
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RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE IMMEDIATE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
A. H. Compton
E. O. Lawrence
J. R. Oppenheimer
E. Fermi
[signature]
J. R. Oppenheimer
For the Panel
June 16, 1945
You have asked us to comment on the initial use of the new weapon. This use, in our opinion, should be such as to promote a satisfactory adjustment of our international relations. At the same time, we recognize our obligation to our nation to use the weapons to help save American lives in the Japanese war.
(1) To accomplish these ends we recommend that before the weapons are used not only Britain, but also Russia, France, and China be advised that we have made considerable progress in our work on atomic weapons, that these may be ready to use during the present war, and that we would welcome suggestions as to how we can cooperate in making this development contribute to improved international relations.
(2) The opinions of our scientific colleagues on the initial use of these weapons are not unanimous: they range from the proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of the military application best designed to induce surrender. Those who advocate a purely technical demonstration would wish to outlaw the use of atomic weapons, and have feared that if we use the weapons now our position in future negotiations will be prejudiced. Others emphasize the opportunity of saving American lives by immediate military use, and believe that such use will improve the international prospects, in that they are more concerned with the prevention of war than with the elimination of this specific weapon. We find ourselves closer to these latter views; we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.
(3) With regard to these general aspects of the use of atomic energy, it is clear that we, as scientific men, have no proprietary rights. It is true that we are among the few citizens who have had occasion to give thoughtful consideration to these problems during the past few years. We have, however, no claim to special competence in solving the political, social, and military problems which are presented by the advent of atomic power.
[Emphasis made in bold]
Source:
A.H Compton, E.O Lawrence, R. Oppenheimer, E. Fermi. “Recommendations on the immediate use of Nuclear Weapons”. Dannen. November 11th 2007. <http://www.dannen.com/decision/scipanel.html>.
Appendix 11
(shortened version)
The Franck Report, June 11, 1945
________________________________________
III. Prospectives of Agreement
The prospect of nuclear warfare and the type of measures which have to be taken to protect a country from total destruction by nuclear bombing, must be as abhorrent to other nations as to the United States. England, France, and the smaller nations of the European continent, with their congeries of people and industries, are in an entirely hopeless situation in the face of such a threat. Russia, and China are the only great nations which could survive a nuclear attack. However, even though these countries value human life less than the peoples of Western Europe and America, and even though Russia, in particular, has an immense space over which its vital industries could be dispersed and a government which can order this dispersion, the day it is convinced that such a measure is necessary - there is no doubt that Russia, too, will shudder at the possibility of a sudden disintegration of Moscow and Leningrad, almost miraculously preserved in the present war, and of its new industrial sites in the Urals and Siberia. Therefore, only lack of mutual trust, and not lack of desire for agreement, can stand in the path of an efficient agreement for the prevention of nuclear warfare.
From this point of view, the way in which nuclear weapons, now secretly developed in this country, will first be revealed to the world appears of great, perhaps fateful importance.
One possible way - which may particularly appeal to those who consider the nuclear bombs primarily as a secret weapon developed to help win the present war - is to use it without warning on an appropriately selected object in Japan. It is doubtful whether the first available bombs, of comparatively low efficiency and small size, will be sufficient to break the will or ability of Japan to resist, especially given the fact that the major cities like Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe already will largely be reduced to ashes by the slower process of ordinary aerial bombing. Certain and perhaps important tactical results undoubtedly can be achieved, but we nevertheless think that the question of the use of the very first available atomic bombs in the Japanese war should be weighed very carefully, not only by military authority, but by the highest political leadership of this country. If we consider international agreement on total prevention of nuclear warfare as the paramount objective, and believe that it can be achieved, this kind of introduction of atomic weapons to the world may easily destroy all our chances of success. Russia, and even allied countries which bear less mistrust of our ways and intentions, as well as neutral countries, will be deeply shocked. It will be very difficult to persuade the world that a nation which was capable of secretly preparing and suddenly releasing a weapon, as indiscriminate as the rocket bomb and a thousand times more destructive, is to be trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such weapons abolished by international agreement. […]
Thus, from the "optimistic" point of view - looking forward to an international agreement on prevention of nuclear warfare - the military advantages and the saving of American lives, achieved by the sudden use of atomic bombs against Japan, may be outweighed by the ensuing loss of confidence and wave of horror and repulsion, sweeping over the rest of the world, and perhaps dividing even the public opinion at home.
[Emphasis made in bold]
Source:
James Franck. “The Franck Report, June 11 1945”. Dannen. November 11th 2007. <http://www.dannen.com/decision/franck.html>.
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I voted "no", but it really depends on what the political goals were. My understanding is that they were essentially dropped to show the weapons off to the Soviet Union, because at that point no one really knew how effective they would actually be.
The reasoning behind this is that the nuclear bombings really didn't do anything noticeably different to the Japanese at the time of their decision-making regarding surrender than the firebombings had already done to countless cities. The Japanese military leadership was obviously not convinced that suffering by the civilian populace was important; otherwise they would have surrendered earlier than that.
In fact, I'd argue that it was because the Soviets defeated the "best" Japanese troops in Manchuria so quickly and decisively that the Japanese military leadership realized that defense of the home islands was impossible.
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I know its long but I think people have to understand right now that the ethics concerning the atomic bomb is more complex than it is. I put it if anyone wanted to understand a broader view on it.
I used to be against the Atomic Bomb for the same reasons that has been put in this topic but the summary:
-In the likeliest of situations, it saved far more lives of pretty much every nations involved
If the Atomic Bomb hasn't been dropped:
A few 10,000s for the Americans (I'm being VERY nice with this stats because its the stats with the least number of predicted casualties). (more if the war is longer)
A few 10,000s for Canadian/Britain (more if the war is longer)
Approximately100,000s Chinese per month through Japanese controlled territory
Approximately 20,000 Koreans per month through Japanese controlled territory
AT LEAST a few thousand Filipinos (pessimistically, it goes in the hundred of thousands)
Soviets (?) depending on how they enter the war
And most of all, the Japanese. Millions of Japanese depending on the course of war taken by the Allied. Either by the Soviet Union direct attack, American invasion, American airbombing and WORSE, American starvation through the naval blockade.
And if you think the war could have ended very soon, please look back at the history books and understand how the Japanese military system works.
The emperor did not have a true say in the military. Remember that he opposed Pearl Harbor and entering war against the U.S in the first place but he is powerless because he has no direct power over the Japanese military.
Thanks guys for understanding. I need to go finish my own hmrks for tommorow :|
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Wasnt justified for shit.
You dont nuke two cities filled with inocent civilians because their gouverment decided to attack you.
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Also for the note, even if I support the Atomic Bomb drop on Hiroshima and Nagasaki:
I oppose the Firebombing of Dresden
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On November 03 2008 09:46 Funnytoss wrote:
I voted "no", but it really depends on what the political goals were. My understanding is that they were essentially dropped to show the weapons off to the Soviet Union, because at that point no one really knew how effective they would actually be.
The reasoning behind this is that the nuclear bombings really didn't do anything noticeably different to the Japanese at the time of their decision-making regarding surrender than the firebombings had already done to countless cities. The Japanese military leadership was obviously not convinced that suffering by the civilian populace was important; otherwise they would have surrendered earlier than that.
In fact, I'd argue that it was because the Soviets defeated the "best" Japanese troops in Manchuria so quickly and decisively that the Japanese military leadership realized that defense of the home islands was impossible.
"Impressing the Soviets" was always a secondary goal.
Harry Truman was reluctant to drop the bombs because he knew very well that it would create a controversy but saw no better way.
ANOTHER IMPORTANT SIDENOTE: The Imperial Japanese military REJECTED offer of surrender by the U.S even AFTER the first Atomic Bomb drop of Hiroshima.
I hope this defies the usual "The Japanese military was ready to surrender within weeks"
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EPT
