|
NOTE: When providing a source, please provide a very brief summary on what it's about and what purpose it adds to the discussion. The supporting statement should clearly explain why the subject is relevant and needs to be discussed. Please follow this rule especially for tweets.
Your supporting statement should always come BEFORE you provide the source. |
On April 16 2026 13:18 Manit0u wrote:
You are aware of course that such an agreement is impossible to even draft? Russia's and Ukraine's goals for this war run in total opposition to each other so it's not feasible to make an agreement where both sides get to have most of their goals fulfilled. Of course it's not possible as a mutually welcomed agreement.
Such "favorable peace agreement" can only possibly be favorable for one side - the one that would have happened to start winning hard enough and thus impose their conditions on the losing side.
My point was that a semi-frozen war is not something either Ukraine or Russian ultimately want - yet it still something they might end up with if neither side can achieve what they want and they both eventually get too exhausted.
It was a counterpoint to what Harris1st wrote re: "I don't think frozen or semi-frozen war is an option, because Ukraine doesn't want it" (short version).
Of course they don't want it - it's not something they would actively choose. But they also didn't choose to have this war in the first place, yet here we are. 
|
This kinda harkers back to when Trump kept agreeing to deals with Russia, and a lot of people thought a peace was imminent. They all failed to ask themselves the simple question: "Yeah, but what if Ukraine says no?"
In the current landscape, there is no possibility of the conflict slowly dying down into a frozen conflict, because Ukraine knows that this would be hugely beneficial to Russia. It would give them the breathing room they need to rearm, so they can finish the invasion later. The only chance Ukraine has to survive is to keep pushing. Therefore, this war can only really end in capitulation
This is different from 2014, when the conflict did actually freeze. This is because at the time it was believed that continuing the conflict would push Russia to invade, so it was beneficial not to push any further (Many disagreed at the time as well, but they Ukraine had a weak leader back then). Of course, we've since learned that this was a mistaken belief, one not to be repeated.
|
On April 16 2026 19:57 Excludos wrote:
In the current landscape, there is no possibility of the conflict slowly dying down into a frozen conflict, because Ukraine knows that this would be hugely beneficial to Russia Here you're saying again what Harris1st said - there's no possibility of this because Ukraine doesn't want it / knows it is bad.
This requires Ukraine to have capability to keep pushing for as long as it's necessary.
And as long as they do have this capability - of course they will not take the option of a slow frozen conflict.
But I mentioned several times in my messages that I see it as something that can happen if both sides are exhausted i.e. if/when they don't have capabilities to really push anymore. This is the hypothetical - but I'd guess quite probable - scenario I was talking about.
I.e. it's not about what Ukraine or Russia want - only what they actually can do.
Now they can push so they push, but will they be able to keep this forever?
|
On April 16 2026 19:06 ZeroByte13 wrote:Show nested quote +On April 16 2026 13:18 Manit0u wrote:
You are aware of course that such an agreement is impossible to even draft? Russia's and Ukraine's goals for this war run in total opposition to each other so it's not feasible to make an agreement where both sides get to have most of their goals fulfilled. Of course it's not possible as a mutually welcomed agreement. Such "favorable peace agreement" can only possibly be favorable for one side - the one that would have happened to start winning hard enough and thus impose their conditions on the losing side. My point was that a semi-frozen war is not something either Ukraine or Russian ultimately want - yet it still something they might end up with if neither side can achieve what they want and they both eventually get too exhausted. It was a counterpoint to what Harris1st wrote re: "I don't think frozen or semi-frozen war is an option, because Ukraine doesn't want it" (short version). Of course they don't want it - it's not something they would actively choose. But they also didn't choose to have this war in the first place, yet here we are.
It's not only that Ukraine doesn't WANT it. It's they simply CAN'T do it. EU money would ebb meanwhile Russia can prepare for another go. It is not an option.
EDIT: Outside pressure (US, EU) for UA to take that semi-peace deal would have to be immense. Like billions on the table. Otherwise I don't ever see UA taking a deal
|
Maybe I'm not clear enough and we're talking about different things here.
In my understanding a frozen conflict doesn't necessarily have to be agreed upon by both sides - or even one of them.
What if both sides will just eventually have no resources left - or no political will - to spend them at a rate required for a hot active conflict?
As I understand it, for long time neither UA or RU can take much territory from each other. Their offensives mostly lead to bigger losses for comparatively little gain.
At least according to this map - please correct me if it shows wrong data - there have been no noticeable changes since summer 2023.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qld1FTthMww I understand that progress is not measured in sq.km necessarily - but if situation (balance) on the frontlines would have had changed significantly, eventually it would affect ability to control territory, I think?
But it looks like it's more or less the same since summer 2023.
So if it keeps going like this for 2-3 more years - a lot of manpower, equipment and ammo lost, little to no progress - I can see RU and even UA eventually stopping doing offensives.
Without striking any deals or agreements, just out of necessity, because they simply cannot do it - or justify it - anymore.
Maybe I'm wrong, only time will tell if we'll see this hypothetical case becoming a reality.
If there is noticeable progress - of course the more successful side will want to press their advantage for as long as they can.
|
United States43902 Posts
Ukraine isn’t engaged in large scale counteroffensives at this time because their theory of victory does not depend upon them. Russia entered this war with considerable but finite resources which are being exhausted. We saw Russia run out of shells and change its strategy by necessity. We saw it run out of tanks. Despite considerable tax hikes and spending cuts we’ve seen Russia’s war chest eroded.
Russia entered the war with no debt and one of the largest sovereign wealth funds of any country. Debt is now being shuffled back and forth between various state owned entities that know it won’t be repaid but don’t want to write it off. The sovereign wealth fund has halved in value, despite dramatic increases in gold values.
The current lines are maintained by Russia through constant exertion. People see little movement and imagine a stable environment but it is closer to a sinking boat pumping out water to stay afloat. The pace cannot be maintained, reserves are being visibly consumed, and when exhaustion finally takes its toll we will see the “stable” front lines collapse.
German troops were still in France in 1918 when it was no longer possible for the war effort to be sustained. Russian tanks were in West Germany when the Warsaw Pact collapsed. Looking only at the movement of the front and ignoring the exertion required to keep it static leads to surprises.
|
That's why I said
On April 17 2026 02:48 ZeroByte13 wrote:I understand that progress is not measured in sq.km necessarily - but if situation (balance) on the frontlines would have had changed significantly, eventually it would affect ability to control territory, I think?
But it looks like it's more or less the same since summer 2023. When do you predict we'll see significant progress?
I remember hearing - actually even saying it myself too - that yeah, eventually one side will lose capability to keep their positions, it will start collapsing and then we might see rapid changes.
And logically yeah, of course any warchests should be used up eventually - but when do you think it will happen? 2027? 2028?
So far I've been hearing "1-2 more years" since 2023 - maybe from different people, mind you, it's hard to keep track of people's predictions. But I can't help but start thinking if we won't find ourselves in the same situation in 2027 or even 2028, i.e. thinking that surely soon the situation will change.
I'm not saying it's what I expect to happen - but I wouldn't be surprised by now.
|
On April 16 2026 21:57 ZeroByte13 wrote:Show nested quote +On April 16 2026 19:57 Excludos wrote:
In the current landscape, there is no possibility of the conflict slowly dying down into a frozen conflict, because Ukraine knows that this would be hugely beneficial to Russia Here you're saying again what Harris1st said - there's no possibility of this because Ukraine doesn't want it / knows it is bad. This requires Ukraine to have capability to keep pushing for as long as it's necessary. And as long as they do have this capability - of course they will not take the option of a slow frozen conflict. But I mentioned several times in my messages that I see it as something that can happen if both sides are exhausted i.e. if/when they don't have capabilities to really push anymore. This is the hypothetical - but I'd guess quite probable - scenario I was talking about. I.e. it's not about what Ukraine or Russia want - only what they actually can do. Now they can push so they push, but will they be able to keep this forever?
I don't think you appreciate the fact that a frozen conflict is the same as capitulation for Ukraine. It's not an option for them if they want to survive. It will never get dialled down to a "Well, both sides got tired of fighting each other". They simply can't afford that and still exist as a country
|
United States43902 Posts
On April 17 2026 03:15 ZeroByte13 wrote:That's why I said Show nested quote +On April 17 2026 02:48 ZeroByte13 wrote:I understand that progress is not measured in sq.km necessarily - but if situation (balance) on the frontlines would have had changed significantly, eventually it would affect ability to control territory, I think?
But it looks like it's more or less the same since summer 2023. When do you predict we'll see significant progress? I remember hearing - actually even saying it myself too - that yeah, eventually one side will lose capability to keep their position and then we might see rapid changes. And logically yeah, of course any warchests should be used up eventually - but when do you think it will happen? 2027? 2028? So far I've been hearing "1-2 more years" since 2023 - maybe from different people, mind you, it's hard to keep track of people's predictions.
It depends. Ukraine got substantially kneecapped by the Trump administration which both reduced their ability to attrit Russia and boosted Russian exports.
There are too many variables to produce an absolute prediction, in 2024 2026 could have been a realistic number with a Harris presidency. A lot of previously unknown factors have broken Putin’s way.
But while the rate of decline of Russian resources has seen acceleration and deceleration the direction has been consistent, each day Russia is weaker than the day before. The economies that underwrite the Ukrainian efforts continue to grow and continue to pivot towards the war.
To reuse the analogy of a sinking ship, I may not know exactly when the ship will sink but I can see that the amount of water inside the hull increases daily. Some days by a lot, some days by a little, but it increases. It’ll sink.
And the water pushing into the hole in the hull isn’t getting equally exhausted, the pressure remains, it’s just physics. The pumps will hold out for as long as they can but they won’t defeat physics.
|
I think we could for sure see a scenario where both sides stop trying to actively gain ground.
There's really no frontline right now, it's a big gray zone.
Right now Russia is focusing on interdicting Ukrainian logistics and drone operators (because Ukrainian frontline troops are dug in and hard to find). This creates an area with very little Ukrainian presence. Russia can then infiltrate that area with small units of infantry to take ground, allowing them to move their drone operators and artillery up, allowing them to interdict logistics further up. And repeat.
Ukraine is focusing mainly on killing those troops to prevent this from happening, as it's much easier to kill enemies trying to advance.
If Russia stopped trying to advance with small groups of infantry then Ukraine would also shift its focus to attacking enemy logistics. It's still not going to be static. If one side is winning in an area they will gradually push back the other sides drone capability to the point that infantry can relatively safely advance and take ground. That's what happened in the early Ukrainian "counter attack". They didn't really attack the Russian side, there were just no opposition left so they could secure that area.
I think for sure this kind of scenario would benefit Ukraine. Russia is trying to exhaust Ukrainian troops across the board, creating a scenario where parts of the front collapses because they are spread so thin, since manpower is the biggest problem for Ukraine. If you aren't attacking manpower is no longer a problem. If no one is actively moving in 1 guy resupplied by drones can hold a position indefinitely.
Ukraines victory condition is Russians getting to exhausted by the war that they give up their ambitions. Even some kind of "static" war still requires continued commitment. It will only get marginally cheaper for Russia if they stop attacking.
And politically stopping the attempts to take more ground is conceding you can't win for Russia, and Ukraine confirming that they can't lose to their allies as long as they have support.
|
|
|
|
|
|
EPT
