Russo-Ukrainian War Thread - Page 227
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{CC}StealthBlue
United States41117 Posts
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Sermokala
United States13738 Posts
Putin needs to either fold or throw all his chips in and I don't know if he can do either. The Kharkiv offensive has snipped off the best supply route for the eastern front. Rail travel from the Moscow wearhouses will need to travel hundreds of kilometers more each way each trip. Ukraine has even more equipment from the best Russian stocks. They're even doing airstrikes. 8 tactical missile pods are all that are needed to volley down the kertch bridge to make the entire southern front unsupportable. The current Russian army in Ukraine cannot win and can only defend throughout the harsh winter in hostile lands. Even if he declares war but not the full mobilization, which I have doubts about being feasible to do at all, he will have to throw hundreds of thousands of concripts in winter that he can't supply that he doesn't have the officer corps for that he doesn't have the equipment for. Conscripts being thrown against hardened units who are armed with the knowledge of what will happen if they break and run to their families by the ones attacking them. I'm just scared of how putin will react to losing not if anymore. | ||
Magic Powers
Austria3709 Posts
On September 21 2022 12:40 Sermokala wrote: I'm just scared of how putin will react to losing not if anymore. This uncertainty is a problem indeed. But I think it can be analyzed. So far Putin has only punished Ukraine, not other countries, despite setbacks and other bad news. This is a pattern of behavior, likely driven by militaristic limitations. Putin, I think, keeps threatening the nuclear option out of fear of a second front opening, not because he intends to make use of it in the case of a defeat by the hands of Ukraine. If he wanted to punish other countries for sending aid to Ukraine, he likely would've already done so, no? | ||
Ardias
Russian Federation605 Posts
https://www.interfax.ru/russia/863177 First to be conscripted are those, who have completed military service previously, and who have certain military specializations (i.e. not simple riflemen, but more complicated ones). Mobilized soldiers would get additional training, and will recieve all payments and benefits as the contract soldiers serving in Ukraine. Edit: Shoigu announced that 300 000 men would be mobilized. Conscripts won't be sent to Ukraine, however (though I wonder if it would apply to the rear areas of the 4 Russian-controlled regions after referendums are held). | ||
r00ty
Germany1037 Posts
Very unfortunate, but to be expected. Support for more military aid for Ukraine will increase. The war and senseless death will continue. | ||
Magic Powers
Austria3709 Posts
https://apnews.com/f64f9c91f24fc81bc8cc65e8bc7748f4 | ||
Oukka
Finland1683 Posts
Another key question is when will the new units be combat ready? Without basing it on anything, I will assume that it takes January at least for these new units to be properly organised, equipped and trained. Doesn't mean that they won't be sent in earlier, too, but that seems more like replacing losses in existing units than adding new strength. | ||
Deleted User 137586
7859 Posts
- Partial mobilization: only some reservists + regional governors get to decide how many people to send. Shoigu mentions 300k, this number is almost certainly baloney, just like his claim of 5900 casualties on the RU side. - Referenda - New threat to nuke when RU territorial integrity is violated (this has been known to be fake for a while: attacks in Belgorod, Kursk and Crimea, UA troops conducting operations across their northern border, etc.) This seems to be the first thread outlining the Western military perspective, it's in Finnish so excuse my hasty translation: - RU leadership is in panic after defeats, they fear losing Luhansk too, and these new laws and partial mobilization won't improve the situation. - Long punishments for surrender or refusal to serve won't improve personnel problems, or bring quality soldiers. Quite the opposite, defections to the UA side may increase, and more people will try to get out of the army. - RU cannot do full mobilization, because it doesn't have the infrastructure, they don't have equipment that isn't from the 70s and 80s, they don't even have infantry gear, and they don't have people to train the reserves. - RU war industry cannot increase production because they lack materials, components, production tools, and qualified workers. Also, the domestic and economic risks are great. That's why Putin went for partial mobilization. - Partial mobilization won't change the situation on the front in the near months. Quickly gathered reserves will be thrown into the Donbas to stop the UA offensive. Their combat effectiveness is low. More capable troops will take several months to compile. - Putin threatens the use of nukes, hoping that it would weaken Western support towards UA, and could get the West to coerce UA to sign a peace treaty. I doubt it will succeed. - Putin hasn't declared war, because it would be a personal risk to Putin. A special operation can be ended at any time, a war can only be lost or won, and losing a war would impact Putin personally. And here's your customary Rainer Saks for today, written before Putin's speech. September 21 overview of the previous day. Certainly, the referendums organized by Russia and the subsequent political moves are an important development in the war in Ukraine. Russia's main goal is to regain the initiative that it completely lost. Although the Russian president postponed his planned address for last night, it probably won't change their planned moves too much. What can be concluded: - since the beginning of the offensive in Ukraine in the last week of August, the political leadership of Russia has not spoken much. At first, they tried to hide the invasion, but after the Izyum disaster, it was no longer possible. - The Russian leadership has realized the extent of their military defeat and the hopeless situation of their army to bring about a turn on the battlefield. Russia has run out of reserves. Yesterday, the sources of the Ukrainian army announced that Russia will withdraw its paratroopers from Syria (This is Putin's personal prestige project). In addition, the Ukrainians claim that Russia has moved conscript units to the border areas of Ukraine. They then have to provide logistical support and would be an emergency cover unit if the Russian front were to completely collapse. - Obviously, such haste with political moves is also related to a slight panic. This means that the situation of their military in the Kherson region and Northern Donbass is much worse than it appears. On the other hand, of course, it is necessary to hurry so that Ukraine does not have time to organize attacks, so that the already fictitious and simulated referendums do not become completely ridiculous. Russia is likely to try to achieve the following. - The most important thing is to regain the initiative and give the impression that Russia can still escalate the conflict and still has some resources to win the war. - An important hope was the psychological impact on Western countries. If the occupied territories are annexed, it would be like threatening the continuation of the attacks on Ukraine, that it is an attack on Russia, and declaring a state of war and mobilization. It is known that Western countries have not supplied Ukraine with more capable weapons on the grounds that Ukraine could then attack Russian territory. Now, yesterday, all the important players in the West made statements that they do not recognize the referendums and that the politics of Ukraine will not change. Hopefully it will stay that way - Russia no longer has the ability to form so-called volunteer reserves. Even to hold the areas currently occupied, there will soon be no more troops. Since Russia has not been able to initiate any process of peace talks suitable for it, preparations for the winter campaign are being made during the last month. For this, however, it would obviously be necessary to carry out a mobilization. Since the rhetoric of the past has been quite the opposite, now referendums and other political and legislative initiatives are creating a suitable political context for this. - Russia is definitely not planning a general mobilization. On the one hand, there is no capacity for this, and there is also no need to bring together nearly 2 million men who cannot be organized, trained, or equipped. This is what the Russian leadership will certainly do. Since the use of conscripts in war would be a very high domestic political risk, it is plausible that the mobilization would affect only a small part of the reserve. It is a separate story that these units will not achieve special combat capability during the next 3-4 months. And this if they were mobilized today. - In military terms, Russia will not be able to achieve a revolution in the near future. Preparations are being made so that the front does not collapse during the winter and new attacks can be launched in the spring. On the part of Ukraine, it certainly mobilizes and motivates to invade faster. I hope not to make hasty moves. - In the direction of Lyman, Ukrainian units continue to pressurize, there were no changes in the terrain during yesterday's day. - In the direction of Lyssyshchansk/Severodonetsk, there are no changes on the front line either. Ukraine has made several successful long-range fire attacks on Russian rears throughout the northern Donbass region. It seemed that in the coming days the Ukrainian units would be able to push forward more - In the direction of Bahmut, Russian units continued with unsuccessful offensive attempts south of the city. - Russian units were also more active in the vicinity of the city of Donetsk yesterday, but remained in their positions. - There are no changes on the southern front. In the city of Melitopol, there were at least two major hits in places where Russian troops were stationed yesterday. - In the Kherson region, Ukrainian units are making at least a little progress every day. But more important were the Ukrainian attacks of the last two days in the Kahovka and Kherson regions on Russian units trying to cross the river. The losses of the Russian side in this region remain very high. The initiative on the fronts continues to be in the hands of Ukraine, the Russian side has not been able to do much except attacks on civilian infrastructure. + Show Spoiler + Original: 21. septembri ülevaade eelneva päeva kohta. Kindlasti on venemaa korraldatavad referendumid ja sellele järgnevad poliitilised käigud oluline areng Ukraina sõjas. Venemaa peamine eesmärk on saada tagasi täielikult kaotatud initsiatiiv. Kuigi vene president lükkas edasi oma eile õhtuks plaanitud pöördumise, ei muuda see ilmselt liiga palju nende plaanitud käike. Mida võib järeldada: - alates Ukraina pealetungi algusest augusti viimasel nädalal, ei ole venemaa poliitiline juhtkond eriti sõna võtnud. Pealetungi üritati alguses maha salata, aga peale Izjumi katastroofi see ei olnud enam võimalik. - Venemaa juhtkonnale on kohale jõudnud nende sõjalise kaotuse ulatus ning nende armee lootusetu olukord pöörde toomiseks sõjaväljal. Venemaal on reservid otsa lõppenud. Eile teatasid Ukraina armee allikad, et venemaa toob ära oma dessantväelased Süüriast (See on Putini isiklik prestiiži projekt) Lisaks väidavad ukrainlased, et venemaa on liigutanud ajateenijate üksuseid Ukraina piiriäärsetesse oblastitesse. Need siis peavad tagama logistika toetust ja oleks hädapärased katte üksused, kui vene rinne peaks päris kokku kukkuma. - Ilmsesti on selline kiirustamine poliitiliste käikudega seotud ka kerge paanikaga. See tähendab, et nende sõjaväe olukord Hersoni piirkonnas ja Põhja-Donbassis on palju halvem, kui see välja paistab. Teisalt muidugi on vaja kiirustada sellepärast, et Ukraina ei jõuaks korraldada rünnakuid, et niigi fiktiivsed ja simuleeritud referendumid ei muutuks täiesti naeruväärseks. Venemaa tõenäoliselt taotleb järgnevat. - Kõige olulisem on saada tagasi initsiatiiv ja jätta mulje, et venemaa suudab ikka veel konflitki eskaleerida ning omab veel mingeid ressursse sõja võitmiseks. - Oluline lootus oli psüholoogilisel mõjul lääneriikidele. Kui annekteerida okupeeritud alad, siis saaks nagu ähvardada Ukraina rünnakute jätkumisega, et tegemist on venemaa ründamisega ning kuulutatakse välja sõjaseisukord ja mobilisatsioon. Lääneriigid teadupärast ei ole tarninud Ukranale võimekamat relvastust põhjendusega, et Ukraina võib rünnata siis venemaa territooriumi. Nüüd aga tegid eile kõik olulised tegijad läänes ära avaldused, et nemad referendumeid ei tunnusta ja Ukraina poliitika ei muutu. Loodetavasti nii ka jääb - venemaal ei ole enam võimet moodustada nn vabatahtlikest reserve. Isegi selleks, et hoida praeguseks hõivatud alasid, ei jätku peagi enam vägesid. Kuna venemaa ei ole suutnud algatada mitte ühtegi talle sobivad rahuläbrääkimiste protsessi, siis üritatakse viimase kuu jooksul teha ettevalmistusi talvekampaaniaks. Selleks oleks vaja aga ilmselgelt läbi viia mobilisatsioon. Kuna seninie retoorika on olnud lausa vastupidine, siis nüüd luuakse referendumite ja muude poliitiliste ja seadusandlike initsiatiividega selleks sobivat poliitilist konteksti. - Üldmobilisatsiooni venemaa kindlasti ei plaani. Selleks ei ole ühelt poolt võimekust ning puudub ka vajadus tuua kokku ligi 2 milj meest, keda ei suudeta organiseerida, välja õpetada ega ka varustada. Seda venemaa juhtkond kindlasti ka adub. Kuna ajateenijate kasutamine sõjas oleks väga suur sisepoliitiline risk, on usutav, et mobilisatsioon puudutaks vaid väikest osa reservi. Omaette lugu on, et jägneva 3-4 kuu jooksul need üksused erilist võitlusvõimet ei saavuta. Ja seda juhul, kui neid mobiliseeritaks juba täna. - Sõjalises plaanis ei suuda venemaa lähiajal murrangut saavutada. Tehakse ettevalmistusi , et rinne talve jooksul kokku ei kukuks ja kevadel oleks võimalik uusi rünnakuid ette võtta. Ukraina poolt see kindlasti mobiliseerib ja motiveerib kiiremini peale tungima. Loodetavasti mitte rabistama. - Lõmani suunal Ukraina üksused jätkavad survet, muudatusi maastikul eilse päeva jooksul ei olnud. - Lõssõstšanski/Severodonetski suunal ei ole ka muudatusi rindejoonel märgata. Ukraina on teinud kogu Põhja-Donbassi piirkonnas mitu edukat kaugtulerünnakut vene tagalasse. Näis kas lähipäevil suudavad Ukraina üksused rohkem edasi pressida - Bahmuti suunal jätkasid vene üksused linnast lõunas edutute pealetungikatsetega. - Ka Donetski linna ümbruses olid vene üksused eile aktiivsemad, kuid jäid oma positisoonidele. - Lõunarindel muudatusi ei ole. Melitopoli linnas oli eilse päeva jooksul vähemalt kaks suuremat tabamust vene vägede paikenmiskohtades. - Hersoni piirkonnas on Ukraina üksused iga päev vähemalt pisut edenenud. Aga olulisemad olid kahe viimase päeva Ukraina rünnakud Kahovka ja Hersoni piirkonnas jõe ületust üritatavatele vene üksustele. Vene poole kaotused selles piirkonnas püsivad väga suured. Intisatiiv rinnetel on jätkuvalt Ukraina käes, vene pool suurt midagi peale tsiviiltaristu rünnakute ei ole suutnud ette võtta. Edit: P.S. The Russians are calling this "mogilazatsija" - "mogila" means "grave". | ||
maybenexttime
Poland5440 Posts
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FueledUpAndReadyToGo
Netherlands30548 Posts
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maybenexttime
Poland5440 Posts
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Ardias
Russian Federation605 Posts
On September 21 2022 16:04 Ghanburighan wrote: Here's a nice summary thread: - Partial mobilization: only some reservists + regional governors get to decide how many people to send. Shoigu mentions 300k, this number is almost certainly baloney, just like his claim of 5900 casualties on the RU side. To clarify some points: 5900 KIA mentioned are referring only to the AFRF themselves. These do not include Rosgvardia (these are subject to Ministry of Internal Affairs, Chechens would also go in this cathegory), border guards (these are subject to FSB), Wagner and other mercenary/volunteer units (they are not part of AFRF structure) and LDPR forces (these have their own separate counting, DPR recently published their own numbers, with about 3k dead and 13k wounded). This number also doesn't include WIA, MIA and POWs. Governors were handling what Kadyrov was proposing, so called "self-mobilization", which was basically the increased recruitment campaign for volunteers. Current mobilization is handled through military commisariats, which are answering directly to MoD, not to the governors. And since around 250 000 people go through AFRF as conscripts yearly, 300 000 reservists with previous experience in the army do not seem as an unreachable number (though how well it will go on practice remains to be seen). As for the reasons for mobilization - regardless of losses, Russian contract army simply doesn't have the numbers to face UA fully mobilized army. In June/July I was posting numbers. For Russia, according to Politico article, there were around 150k men on the front and 300+k total contributing to war effort, while Ukraine officials stated that their army ranges from 700k (Zelensky) to 1 million (Arahmiya). | ||
maybenexttime
Poland5440 Posts
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Vinekh
128 Posts
I guess, there is a possibility to deploy men in Belarus and repeat the Kyiv offensive. This, or maybe Russia will force Belarus to enter the war. | ||
r00ty
Germany1037 Posts
I think sending Leopard tanks does not make sense. It's a complicated system, training and establishing a supply chain will take time. Are main battle tanks the factor in this war? I doubt it. I would: -Buy all available T72s and other systems, they have experience with and the infrastructure for: Send them to Ukraine. -Deliver more conventional and rocket artillery. KRAD, M777, PzH 2000 and HIMARS/MARS are effectively used, send as much as we can. -Open the vaults for ammunitions. There's other forms of improvement than the 500km ATACMS missiles: Delivering 150km precision missiles should be the first step and we should not wait. -As mentioned, we need to get contractors on the ground in Ukraine to make the supply chains less complicated and they should be accompanied by modern anti air and missile systems. The Russian air force can't take control now, we don't need jets on the ground to basically enforce a no fly zone. Another sad day for all Ukrainians and Russians who will keep dieing in this senseless conflict. | ||
Deleted User 137586
7859 Posts
On September 21 2022 17:39 r00ty wrote: There is a lot that can be done without just sending new weapon systems. General Wesley Clarke, mentioned in this CNN interview + Show Spoiler +, that most NATO sponsored equipment must be dragged back to Poland for repair and maintenance at the moment. Western contractors in Ukraine would make a huge difference here. I think sending Leopard tanks does not make sense. It's a complicated system, training and establishing a supply chain will take time. Are main battle tanks the factor in this war? I doubt it. I would: -Buy all available T72s and other systems, they have experience with and the infrastructure for: Send them to Ukraine. -Deliver more conventional and rocket artillery. KRAD, M777, PzH 2000 and HIMARS/MARS are effectively used, send as much as we can. -Open the vaults for ammunitions. There's other forms of improvement than the 500km ATACMS missiles: Delivering 150km precision missiles should be the first step and we should not wait. -As mentioned, we need to get contractors on the ground in Ukraine to make the supply chains less complicated and they should be accompanied by modern anti air and missile systems. The Russian air force can't take control now, we don't need jets on the ground to basically enforce a no fly zone. Another sad day for all Ukrainians and Russians who will keep dieing in this senseless conflict. The difference between T72s and Leopard 2s is twofold. - Most freely available T72s were already sent to UA. There are more than 2000 Leopard 2s near UA, so getting less than 100 of them sent among all nations shouldn't be that hard. But, this must be allowed by DE, as the export of DE-made equipment needs their approval. Maintenance facilities, spare parts, and trainers are freely available nearby. (This is also why Abrams would be a worse choice, distances increase.) - Leopard 2s are much more survivable and will allow UA to conduct combined arms offensives with fewer casualties. And these are necessary to take back territory. UA has shown the ability to maintain its current Western equipment and use them effectively. It's odd to assume it cannot do so with tanks when it can use and maintain complex howitzers such as the PZH 2000. Tbh, they should have been sent for this autumn offensive, but they definitely should be sent now, because: - UA showcased exemplary capability to conduct combined arms offensives in Kharkiv, - Setting up training and maintenance will take a while. - RU wants to escalate, but its lines are vulnerable to collapse in the short-to-medium term. | ||
Gorsameth
Netherlands21359 Posts
As for Nukes. Russia always threatens with nukes because its the only threat they have left. No one cares about military threats because Russia doesn't have a military to spare and with gas already (mostly) cut they can't threaten with that anymore either. And its a completely empty threat outside of an invasion of Russia itself because MAD. | ||
Magic Powers
Austria3709 Posts
On September 21 2022 16:49 FueledUpAndReadyToGo wrote: What is the logic between Shoigu lying that they only lost 5900 troops, and also calling a mass mobilization? Like the lie makes it harder to justify the action. In recent weeks the official Russian narrative has shifted to Russia having shown (too) much restraint and goodwill but now - since the evil NATO hasn't stopped providing military aid to Ukraine - Russia has no choice left other than to increase mobilization to finally break the Ukrainian lines (i.e. the gloves must come off). This story suits Putin as well as the hardliners. The "gesture of goodwill" has been a consistent lie by Russian officials, so I think it's them staying consistent with their propaganda playbook. Meanwhile at the front since Ukraine's counter offensive, Russia has focused its bombing efforts more on the Luhansk and Donetsk region. Ukraine however keeps repelling most of the offensive movements and is itself making tiny progress here and there. It feels less like another stalemate this time and more like the looming of another major Russian gesture of goodwill. | ||
Ardias
Russian Federation605 Posts
On September 21 2022 18:03 Ghanburighan wrote: The difference between T72s and Leopard 2s is twofold. - Most freely available T72s were already sent to UA. There are more than 2000 Leopard 2s near UA, so getting less than 100 of them sent among all nations shouldn't be that hard. But, this must be allowed by DE, as the export of DE-made equipment needs their approval. Maintenance facilities, spare parts, and trainers are freely available nearby. (This is also why Abrams would be a worse choice, distances increase.) - Leopard 2s are much more survivable and will allow UA to conduct combined arms offensives with fewer casualties. And these are necessary to take back territory. UA has shown the ability to maintain its current Western equipment and use them effectively. It's odd to assume it cannot do so with tanks when it can use and maintain complex howitzers such as the PZH 2000. Tbh, they should have been sent for this autumn offensive, but they definitely should be sent now, because: - UA showcased exemplary capability to conduct combined arms offensives in Kharkiv, - Setting up training and maintenance will take a while. - RU wants to escalate, but its lines are vulnerable to collapse in the short-to-medium term. Artesimo was underlining problems with Leo2 few pages ago though: 1) They are all in active service (so those who will send them would weaken their own armed forces, while thousands of M1s are sitting in storage) 2) They are thinly dispersed in small numbers (100-200) between dozen of countries (While most of the M1s are in US, so decision to deliver them is based on their will only, rather on the will of many). 3) Plus maintenance and ammunition costs would be beard by Germany, which has much less capacity and money than US. 4) There are 10+k M1s produced against 3,5k Leo2 produced. So the M1 seems more convinient option, though their transfer would be more costly, but not unbearably so. US somehow managed to deliver hundreds of them to Iraq and Afghanistan, when they wanted to. Though looking at Slovenia sending their modernized T-55, there could be another options with older models. Another important thing is that those T-55s are armed with 105-mm L7 cannon, so somebody must start to supply those shells to UA as well. | ||
maybenexttime
Poland5440 Posts
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