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On September 09 2022 02:15 Simberto wrote: I think the core problem with Leopards is that UA military is not trained to use them, and don't have the logistics in place for them.
You can basically just dump T-72 on them, and they can use the immediately, because all of the support for them is already in place. Getting them ready to use Leopards would take longer. I still think that they should get them (if they want them).
It is a core problem for a lot of their stuff. Their military was trained on Soviet stuff and it takes at least a month to train a tank crew on new equipment but apart from that there's the whole supply chain for it, repair crews, different engine types, different screws, different fuel, different labels etc. etc. It's a pretty big undertaking to change the gear you're using, especially when it comes to bigger and more expensive stuff that also requires different supplies and maintenance. Yet another thing to consider is your country's infrastructure. For example Poland couldn't switch to newer Leopards or Abrams tanks in the past because our roads and bridges could not support them so we would end up with tanks that can't move about.
The weight I think is the biggest single concern. Western tanks weigh 40-50% more than a T-72 to T-90 series. There's a lot of soviet era bridges that would've been designed for 40-50 ton tanks, but not 60+ ton tanks. You'd be sending tanks over bridges one by one hoping it doesn't fall, and ruining roads as you went.
Also up until the last week, I don't know if there was a single tank in theater that would've shot off a single combat load to that point if it wasn't being used in an indirect fire role. If you compare a Leopard to a PZH2000, despite being in a similar weight class and complexity, the PZH's have fired so much they've had to replace the barrels, while the Leopard would've sat mostly idle for weeks at a time.
Tanks are cool and all, but artillery has been far, far more effective this conflict.
On September 09 2022 07:13 Magic Powers wrote: I think Ukraine has received tanks, just not from the US. Poland is the main supplier, at least 230. North Macedonia has reportedly also sent a few. At least a handful of tanks from Germany have also been delivered. Other countries are said to prepare tank shipments, but I don't know the current status.
One of the major schemes we're seeing is nations sending equipment indirectly through sending material to one nation to replace stock that goes to Ukraine.
Even Asian states like South Korea and Japan are considering sending things to NATO countries to convince them to send things to Ukraine.
On September 09 2022 08:32 {CC}StealthBlue wrote: Lot of debate on if this is Partisans or regular UA forces. If It is the latter then they are only 14km from the only bridge that crosses the Oskil river(minus pontoons). Whoever is responsible for this seems to prove there is very few Russian forces around.
AFU attack force at Balakleya consists of elements of 93rd and 14th Mechanized, 25th Airborne and 80th Air Assault brigades (1-2 battalion per brigade), supported by few Territorial Defence battalions, SpecOps units and foreign fighters elements (on one of the HMMWV videos shown by Ukraine it was clearly heard "ammo, give me ammo" in English).
This part of the front was lightly guarded by AFRF, and, reportedly, 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade and one artillery regiment from this part of the front were pulled off to participate in Vostok-2022 military exercises. Which left this part of the front completely open, even though Russian OSINT channels were writing about concentration of AFU forces there for at least a week (I was posting that info on 01/09).
At the moment AFU is sweeping the area between Balakleya and Kupyansk, since it was almost empty of Russian forces beside few logistic elements. AFU using mobile groups on HMMWV and similar vehicles to hit those elements, while regular formations are closing behind. AFRF reportedly moving in reserves to the Shevchenkovo area (the village itself is a point of contest atm) and to Kupyansk (currently they have engaged AFU mobile groups on the outskirts of the city). Again, as it was in Kherson area, the large use of RU Air Force is reported.
In the south AFU offensive seems to bog down due to heavy losses https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/07/ukraine-kherson-offensive-casualties-ammunition/ so they would probably be transferring reserves to the Balakleya, since they managed to get a momentum and terrain is more favourable for offensive (less open fields, more forests, easier to cover up from RU Air Force). Plus if they manage to maintain control over currently taken territory, they would effectively cut off AFRF Izyum task force, forcing it to either attempt a breakthrough, or force to withdraw by crossing Oskol river (and potentially hitting them during crossing).
How is the Kherson offensive getting bogged down? It's accomplishing was it was most likely meant to do - bind considerable forces and attrite them over time.
On September 09 2022 07:13 Magic Powers wrote: I think Ukraine has received tanks, just not from the US. Poland is the main supplier, at least 230. North Macedonia has reportedly also sent a few. At least a handful of tanks from Germany have also been delivered. Other countries are said to prepare tank shipments, but I don't know the current status.
One of the major schemes we're seeing is nations sending equipment indirectly through sending material to one nation to replace stock that goes to Ukraine.
Even Asian states like South Korea and Japan are considering sending things to NATO countries to convince them to send things to Ukraine.
It makes a fair amount of sense. Countries at peace can afford to retool their infrastructure and retrain their crews. So ship out stuff that Ukraine can use now and then spend the time and resources to upgrade your military at a slower pace.
On September 09 2022 17:26 maybenexttime wrote: How is the Kherson offensive getting bogged down? It's accomplishing was it was most likely meant to do - bind considerable forces and attrite them over time.
This.
Also supported by today's Rainer Saks update, who seems to confirm the massive gains on the UA side near Kupyansk.
September 9 summary of the previous day
- the Ukrainian offensive in the rear of the Izyum group gained even more momentum. Ukraine continues to actively attack Russian forces in the Kherson region as well. Countermeasures by Russian units in Donbas are modest and unsuccessful. - In the direction of Kharkiv, the Russian side is trying to keep the activity of its artillery high, the city of Kharkiv is also being fired on daily. The front line is firmly controlled by the Ukrainian side. Apparently, they will soon put more pressure on the Russian forces in this region as well. There are opportunities for this especially when advancing from the city of Kharkiv to the northeast, from the city of Staryi Saltiv (where the Ukrainian troops are currently located). In this case, the confusion in the Russian rear would become complete. In addition, large explosions have been heard from the Belgorod region for three nights, apparently, Ukraine is trying to stop the movement of Russian reserves to the region. - The Ukrainian offensive behind the Izyum group was very fast-paced. The Russian side has not been able to hold the Ukrainians, and the Ukrainian troops have moved to the vicinity of the city of Kupyansk. It has been officially confirmed that it has moved to a depth of 50 km in the Russian rear, in fact, it is obviously much further. This 50 km is an area that has also been secured and cleared and where no Russian units are left. Based on the last pieces of information received last night, it can be concluded that the Izyum group has probably lost its major connecting roads by now, there are still some long and poor roads in the north-east direction from Izyum, but the Ukrainian side will probably be able to take them under the control of artillery fire, if they can secure their success so far. In essence, the Izyum grouping is very close to being surrounded. A few days ago it was estimated to stand at 15,000 men, but owing to heavy losses it is now evidently somewhat smaller. Ukraine finally liberated the town of Balakliia yesterday. It was the most important Russian defense stronghold west of Izyum. The Russian units that remained in the city no longer show signs of life, but they were not too many either. The Russian side is trying to collect reserves somewhere and move in the direction of Kupyansk to defend the city. The panic on the Russian leadership side is palpable. The activity of the air force has increased, but so far it has not been possible to contain the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian offensive should reach the point they planned to reach by the weekend, and a longer process to eliminate the Izyum group will begin. We'll see whether Russia will try to bring additional troops to this area, but it's unclear from where. - In the direction of Kramatorsk/Siversk, the Ukrainian side is still more active, although the Russian side also attempted one reconnaissance battle. The Ukrainians have secured their occupied bridgehead on the Siversk Donets River. - At Bakhmut, Russian units continued to try to invade, but without success. Here, too, the reserves do not seem to be sufficient. - Russian low-energy offensive attempts have also continued in the region of Donetsk city, but no success has been detected - The artillery duel continues on the southern front. In the Russian rear, the Russian units located in the Melitopol region were hit the most. Yesterday they started to move echelons from there in the direction of Kherson - a hopeless endeavour. The intensity of attacks in Ukraine has increased slightly. Yesterday, houses of collaborators also exploded in three places. These people were engaged in the preparation of the referendum on joining Russia. There is no point in writing more about this project, it is pure info ops thanks to the Ukrainian attacks. But also in this region, Ukrainian units have the prerequisites to organize offensives. - In the Kherson region, Ukrainian long-range fire attacks continue to be very effective - Russian losses remain very high. Russian command has not been able to create connections to replace the broken bridges. The Ukrainian troops also continue to occupy Russian positions, but the resistance of the Russian units is still so strong that no fast advance has taken place. The Ukrainian side is obviously not in a hurry and focuses on inflicting losses on the Russian forces. All in all, the weekend will show whether the Russian command can find some countermeasures. At the moment, their operations are chaotic and inefficient. However, the Ukrainian forces still seem to have opportunities to organize additional offensives in a couple of places in order to further suppress Russian leadership.
Original 9. septembri kokkuvõte eelneva päeva kohta - Ukraina pealetung Izjumi grupeeringu tagalas kogus veelgi hoogu. Ukraina jätkab aktiivselt vene vägede ründamist ka Hersoni piirkonnas. Vene üksuste vastuüritused Donbassis on tagasihoidlikud ja ebaedukad. - Harkivi suunal üritab vene pool oma suurtükiväe aktiivsust kõrgel hoida, tulistatakse ka Harkivi linna igapäevaselt. Rindejoont konrollib Ukraina pool kindlalt. Ilmselt hakkavad nad ka selles piirkonnas peagi vene vägedele suuremat survet avaldama. Võimalused selleks on olemas eriti Harkivi linnast kirde suunas, Starõi Saltivi linnast (kus Ukraina väed praegu asuvad) edasi tungides,. Sellisel juhul muutuks segadus Vene tagalas täielikuks. Lisaks on juba kollm ööd on kostnud Belgorodi piirkonnast suuremaid plahvatusi, ilmselt üritab Ukraina taksitada vene reservide liikumist piirkonda. - Ukraina pealetung Izjumi grupeeringu tagalas oli väga tempokas. Vene pool ei ole ukrainlasi pidama saanud ning Ukraina väed on liikunud Kupjanski linna lähistele. Ametlikult on kinnitatud, et on liigutud 50 km sügavusele vene tagalas, tegelikult ilmsesti palju kaugemale. See 50 km on siis selline ala, mis on ka julgestatud ja puhastatud ning kus vene üksuseid enam jäänud ei ole. Eile öösel laekunud viimaste infokildude põhjal võib järeldada, et Izjumi grupeering on praeguseks ilmselt oma suuremad ühendusteed kaotanud, jäänud on veel mõned pikad ja viletsad maanteed Izjumist kirde suunal, aga Ukaraina pool suudab need ilmselt võtta ka suurtükitule kontrolli alla, kui nad oma senise edu suudavad ära kindlustada. Sisuliselt on Izjumi grupeering väga lähedal ümberpiirmaisele. Mõned päevad tagasi hinnati selle suuruseks 15000 meest, aga suurte kaotuste tõttu on see nüüd ilmsesti pisut väiksem. Ukraina vabastas eile ka lõplikult Balakalija linna. See oli siis vene kõike olulisem kaitse tugipunkt Izjumist lääne suunal. Linna kotti jäänud vene üksused enam elumärke ei näita, aga need ei olnud ka liiga suured. Vene pool üritab kudagi koguda reserve ja liikuda Kupjanski suunal, et linna kaitsta. Seni on tuntav vene väejuhatuse peataolek. Suurendatud on õhuväe aktiivsust, aga seni ei ole suudetud ukrainlasi ohjeldada. Ukraina pealetung peaks nädalavahetusega jõudma punkti, kuhu nad jõuda plaanisid ning algab pikem protsess Izjumi grupeeringu likvideermiseks. Näis, kuidas venemaa üritab siia piirkonda täiendavaid vägesid tuua, õigemini, kust kohast. - Kramatorski /Siverski suunal on Ukraina pool ikkagi aktiivsem, kuigi vene pool tegi ka ühe luurelahingu katse. Ukrainlased on julgestanud oma Siverski Donetsi jõel hõivatud sillapead. - Bahmuti juures üritasid vene üksused jätkuvalt peale tungida, aga eduta. Ka siia ei näi reserve piisavalt jätkuvat. - Donetski linna piirkonnas on ka vene väheenergilised pealetungi katsed jätkunud, aga edu ei ole tuvastatud - Lõunarindel käib jätkuvalt suurtükiduell. Vene tagalas saab kõige rohkem pihta Melitopoli piirkonnas paiknevad vene üksused. Eile hakati sealt ešelone liigutama Hersoni suunal - lootusetu üritus. Ukraina rünnakute intensiivsus on pisut kasvanud. Eile plahvatasid kolmes kohas ka kollaborantide majad. Need inimesed tegelesid venemaaga ühinemise referendumi ettevalmistamisega. Sellest projektist ei ole mõtet rohkem kirjutada, see on tänud Ukraina rünnakutele puhas infoops. Aga ka siin piirkonnas on Ukraina üksustel eeldused pealetunge korraldada tekkimas. - Hersoni piirkonnas on Ukraina kaugtulerünnakud jätkuvalt väga tõhusad - vene kaotused püsivad väga kõrgel. Vene väejuhatus ei ole suutnud luua ühendusi purustatud sildada asemel. Ukraina väed jätkavad ka vene positisoonide hõivamist, aga vene üksuste vastupanu on veel nii tugev, et väga kiiret edasiliikumist ei ole toimunud. Ukraina pool ka ilmselgelt ei kiirusta ja keskendub vene vägedele kaotuste tekitamisele. Kokkuvõttes näitab nädalavahetus, kas vene väejuhatus suudab mingid vastumeetmed leida. Hetkel on nende tegevus kaootiline ja ebatõhus. Ukraina vägedel aga näikse olevad veel võimalusi korraldada pealetunge paaris kohas lisaks, et vene juhtimist veelgi pärssida.
On September 09 2022 17:26 maybenexttime wrote: How is the Kherson offensive getting bogged down? It's accomplishing was it was most likely meant to do - bind considerable forces and attrite them over time.
This.
Also supported by today's Rainer Saks update, who seems to confirm the massive gains on the UA side near Kupyansk.
- the Ukrainian offensive in the rear of the Izyum group gained even more momentum. Ukraine continues to actively attack Russian forces in the Kherson region as well. Countermeasures by Russian units in Donbas are modest and unsuccessful. - In the direction of Kharkiv, the Russian side is trying to keep the activity of its artillery high, the city of Kharkiv is also being fired on daily. The front line is firmly controlled by the Ukrainian side. Apparently, they will soon put more pressure on the Russian forces in this region as well. There are opportunities for this especially when advancing from the city of Kharkiv to the northeast, from the city of Staryi Saltiv (where the Ukrainian troops are currently located). In this case, the confusion in the Russian rear would become complete. In addition, large explosions have been heard from the Belgorod region for three nights, apparently, Ukraine is trying to stop the movement of Russian reserves to the region. - The Ukrainian offensive behind the Izyum group was very fast-paced. The Russian side has not been able to hold the Ukrainians, and the Ukrainian troops have moved to the vicinity of the city of Kupyansk. It has been officially confirmed that it has moved to a depth of 50 km in the Russian rear, in fact, it is obviously much further. This 50 km is an area that has also been secured and cleared and where no Russian units are left. Based on the last pieces of information received last night, it can be concluded that the Izyum group has probably lost its major connecting roads by now, there are still some long and poor roads in the north-east direction from Izyum, but the Ukrainian side will probably be able to take them under the control of artillery fire, if they can secure their success so far. In essence, the Izyum grouping is very close to being surrounded. A few days ago it was estimated to stand at 15,000 men, but owing to heavy losses it is now evidently somewhat smaller. Ukraine finally liberated the town of Balakliia yesterday. It was the most important Russian defense stronghold west of Izyum. The Russian units that remained in the city no longer show signs of life, but they were not too many either. The Russian side is trying to collect reserves somewhere and move in the direction of Kupyansk to defend the city. The panic on the Russian leadership side is palpable. The activity of the air force has increased, but so far it has not been possible to contain the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian offensive should reach the point they planned to reach by the weekend, and a longer process to eliminate the Izyum group will begin. We'll see whether Russia will try to bring additional troops to this area, but it's unclear from where. - In the direction of Kramatorsk/Siversk, the Ukrainian side is still more active, although the Russian side also attempted one reconnaissance battle. The Ukrainians have secured their occupied bridgehead on the Siversk Donets River. - At Bakhmut, Russian units continued to try to invade, but without success. Here, too, the reserves do not seem to be sufficient. - Russian low-energy offensive attempts have also continued in the region of Donetsk city, but no success has been detected - The artillery duel continues on the southern front. In the Russian rear, the Russian units located in the Melitopol region were hit the most. Yesterday they started to move echelons from there in the direction of Kherson - a hopeless endeavour. The intensity of attacks in Ukraine has increased slightly. Yesterday, houses of collaborators also exploded in three places. These people were engaged in the preparation of the referendum on joining Russia. There is no point in writing more about this project, it is pure info ops thanks to the Ukrainian attacks. But also in this region, Ukrainian units have the prerequisites to organize offensives. - In the Kherson region, Ukrainian long-range fire attacks continue to be very effective - Russian losses remain very high. Russian command has not been able to create connections to replace the broken bridges. The Ukrainian troops also continue to occupy Russian positions, but the resistance of the Russian units is still so strong that no fast advance has taken place. The Ukrainian side is obviously not in a hurry and focuses on inflicting losses on the Russian forces. All in all, the weekend will show whether the Russian command can find some countermeasures. At the moment, their operations are chaotic and inefficient. However, the Ukrainian forces still seem to have opportunities to organize additional offensives in a couple of places in order to further suppress Russian leadership.
Original 9. septembri kokkuvõte eelneva päeva kohta - Ukraina pealetung Izjumi grupeeringu tagalas kogus veelgi hoogu. Ukraina jätkab aktiivselt vene vägede ründamist ka Hersoni piirkonnas. Vene üksuste vastuüritused Donbassis on tagasihoidlikud ja ebaedukad. - Harkivi suunal üritab vene pool oma suurtükiväe aktiivsust kõrgel hoida, tulistatakse ka Harkivi linna igapäevaselt. Rindejoont konrollib Ukraina pool kindlalt. Ilmselt hakkavad nad ka selles piirkonnas peagi vene vägedele suuremat survet avaldama. Võimalused selleks on olemas eriti Harkivi linnast kirde suunas, Starõi Saltivi linnast (kus Ukraina väed praegu asuvad) edasi tungides,. Sellisel juhul muutuks segadus Vene tagalas täielikuks. Lisaks on juba kollm ööd on kostnud Belgorodi piirkonnast suuremaid plahvatusi, ilmselt üritab Ukraina taksitada vene reservide liikumist piirkonda. - Ukraina pealetung Izjumi grupeeringu tagalas oli väga tempokas. Vene pool ei ole ukrainlasi pidama saanud ning Ukraina väed on liikunud Kupjanski linna lähistele. Ametlikult on kinnitatud, et on liigutud 50 km sügavusele vene tagalas, tegelikult ilmsesti palju kaugemale. See 50 km on siis selline ala, mis on ka julgestatud ja puhastatud ning kus vene üksuseid enam jäänud ei ole. Eile öösel laekunud viimaste infokildude põhjal võib järeldada, et Izjumi grupeering on praeguseks ilmselt oma suuremad ühendusteed kaotanud, jäänud on veel mõned pikad ja viletsad maanteed Izjumist kirde suunal, aga Ukaraina pool suudab need ilmselt võtta ka suurtükitule kontrolli alla, kui nad oma senise edu suudavad ära kindlustada. Sisuliselt on Izjumi grupeering väga lähedal ümberpiirmaisele. Mõned päevad tagasi hinnati selle suuruseks 15000 meest, aga suurte kaotuste tõttu on see nüüd ilmsesti pisut väiksem. Ukraina vabastas eile ka lõplikult Balakalija linna. See oli siis vene kõike olulisem kaitse tugipunkt Izjumist lääne suunal. Linna kotti jäänud vene üksused enam elumärke ei näita, aga need ei olnud ka liiga suured. Vene pool üritab kudagi koguda reserve ja liikuda Kupjanski suunal, et linna kaitsta. Seni on tuntav vene väejuhatuse peataolek. Suurendatud on õhuväe aktiivsust, aga seni ei ole suudetud ukrainlasi ohjeldada. Ukraina pealetung peaks nädalavahetusega jõudma punkti, kuhu nad jõuda plaanisid ning algab pikem protsess Izjumi grupeeringu likvideermiseks. Näis, kuidas venemaa üritab siia piirkonda täiendavaid vägesid tuua, õigemini, kust kohast. - Kramatorski /Siverski suunal on Ukraina pool ikkagi aktiivsem, kuigi vene pool tegi ka ühe luurelahingu katse. Ukrainlased on julgestanud oma Siverski Donetsi jõel hõivatud sillapead. - Bahmuti juures üritasid vene üksused jätkuvalt peale tungida, aga eduta. Ka siia ei näi reserve piisavalt jätkuvat. - Donetski linna piirkonnas on ka vene väheenergilised pealetungi katsed jätkunud, aga edu ei ole tuvastatud - Lõunarindel käib jätkuvalt suurtükiduell. Vene tagalas saab kõige rohkem pihta Melitopoli piirkonnas paiknevad vene üksused. Eile hakati sealt ešelone liigutama Hersoni suunal - lootusetu üritus. Ukraina rünnakute intensiivsus on pisut kasvanud. Eile plahvatasid kolmes kohas ka kollaborantide majad. Need inimesed tegelesid venemaaga ühinemise referendumi ettevalmistamisega. Sellest projektist ei ole mõtet rohkem kirjutada, see on tänud Ukraina rünnakutele puhas infoops. Aga ka siin piirkonnas on Ukraina üksustel eeldused pealetunge korraldada tekkimas. - Hersoni piirkonnas on Ukraina kaugtulerünnakud jätkuvalt väga tõhusad - vene kaotused püsivad väga kõrgel. Vene väejuhatus ei ole suutnud luua ühendusi purustatud sildada asemel. Ukraina väed jätkavad ka vene positisoonide hõivamist, aga vene üksuste vastupanu on veel nii tugev, et väga kiiret edasiliikumist ei ole toimunud. Ukraina pool ka ilmselgelt ei kiirusta ja keskendub vene vägedele kaotuste tekitamisele. Kokkuvõttes näitab nädalavahetus, kas vene väejuhatus suudab mingid vastumeetmed leida. Hetkel on nende tegevus kaootiline ja ebatõhus. Ukraina vägedel aga näikse olevad veel võimalusi korraldada pealetunge paaris kohas lisaks, et vene juhtimist veelgi pärssida.
On September 09 2022 17:26 maybenexttime wrote: How is the Kherson offensive getting bogged down? It's accomplishing was it was most likely meant to do - bind considerable forces and attrite them over time.
Aren't these forces are already binded by the fact that bridges through the Dniepr are made unusable? Any forces that could be rapidly deployed, may only travel via barges or helicopters. Most likely the objective was to cut off at least part of the AFRF forces on the west bank of the Dniepr and destroy them using the fact that both reinforcement and retreat options are hindered. Seeing the efforts AFU put into their push through Ingulets in the direction of Sukhoi Stavok suggests that key point of the offensive was Berislav, which would allow to cut AFRF task force in half. AFU still continues to pour forces into that area, though some advancements are also made in the south, near Nikolaev-Kherson highway. Plus AFRF operational directions (Izyum-Kharkov, Avdeevka-Bakhmut-Seversk and Kherson-Energodar-Ugledar-Mariinka) mostly act indepently of each other. Nobody would throw forces from Kharkov to reinforce Kherson. Also if AFRF was gaining few kilometers in a span of few weeks with 5-to-1 losses (figures aren't mine, took it from WP article in previoud post) - it would be not evaluated as "accomplishing what it meant to do", to put it mildly, The reason for this is that AFRF forces on the south (unlike their counterparts near Kharkov, who couldn't be bothered to dig trenches, and were paying the price from AFU as a result) were digging in for months, building several defence lines in the area, even with some concrete bunkers. Even Ukrainian sources acknowleged that https://t.me/uniannet/61039 mentions of 2nd and 3rd defence lines built by AFRF.
I start to think that Balakleya offensive was good improvisation on the part of the AFU, which was based on either assumption or direct knowledge that AFRF will take forces from this part of the front to move them on the Far East for the show-off excersises with China. It's either hubris and incompetence on the part of the command of Kharkov-Izyum operational direction, who reported above that AFU is incapable of major operations in the area (not unlikely, Western Military District command, which is responsible for the area, is comprised of known retards, who were getting command positions in the most prestigeious DIstrict of AFRF through friends and connections), or direct demand from Kremlin leadership, who considered show-off with China more important than the actual war. The result was that this part of the front was guarded with company-sized force of LDPR reservists per 10 (!) kilometers of the front, plus some Rosgvardia units and small separate AFRF elements in the cities and villages.
My point is, that 1) not every unsuccessful action may be attributed to some secret cunning plan (some of our authorities even call the whole Balakleya affair as "setting trap for AFU"). 2) You shouldn't believe that all AFRF forces are equally incompetent. Or all AFU forces are equally competent. This stuff differs very much from unit to unit, from command to command. Speaking for AFRF - Southern Military District showed itself as the best performing, gaining most territory, taking Kherson almost without a fight, holding off AFU offensive despite being in bad supply situation. Western MD (despite being considered "elite") is the most shitty one, failing around Kharkov time and time again, despite clear firepower advantage there, being pushed back almost to the border and now being responsible for Balakleya debacle.
Current info from our side - AFU took Shevchenkovo, there are rumors of some action on Balakleya, probably some AFRF forces left behind, though majority seem to be able to retreat. AFU reached Oskol between Izyum and Kupiansk. AFRF moving a lot of forces into the area - huge columns of vehicles to Kupiansk, and even Mi-26 heavy transport helos were spotted for the first time during the war, moving forces to Kupiansk area en masse. And another thing - weekend will be sunny, but next week there are a lot of rains predicted in the area. These three days could be desisive for the situation in the area.
On September 09 2022 23:39 maybenexttime wrote: Seriously, Kherson was most likely taken because of treason. Everything points towards that being the case.
Advance from Crimea - could be, overall unreadiness of AFU OC "South" - most likely failures of the staff itself, combined with swift actions of Southern MD forces and overall unsuitability of the theather for defence (not including Crimea and Dniepr crossings), since the area is too wide, and lack of settlements and forests make vehicles easy prey for AFRF Air Force. Kherson itself - no, it was a military matter. From the accounts of people there (one is my friend from Kherson, who observed it, his house is near the Dniepr, another is the soldier from 126th Coastal Defence Brigade, though this account is second hand), plus videos from the area - on the morning of 24th Feb, AFRF helos attacked AFU bases and forces near Kherson, dropping an air assault force at the same time, which took the bridge, intercepted some convoys and engaged with AFU recon elements This video is from that day
As well as this https://t.me/milinfolive/76569 On the evening first armored columns came by, went through the bridge and moved further to Nikolayev. https://t.me/rybar/24738?single On 26th few AFU battalions from local training grounds moved near Kheson, some engaged AFRF forces on the west bank on the road to Nikolayev, but around two of them moved to Antonov bridge. On the same day elements of 126th CD Brigade, that were crossing the bridge, rapidly engaged AFU forces, and either destroyed them, or pushed back to the north and west. There was little to no one left to defend the city itself. In Kherson there was supposed to be local Territorial Defence Battalion, but AFU didn't manage to properly mobilize it. Some TDF groups later tried to engage AFRF forces moving into Kherson with Molotovs and RPG-18, but were destroyed by vehicle fire.
On September 10 2022 00:33 Ghanburighan wrote: This is like reading fan faction about an ongoing war. 10/10 entertainment value.
You can't take it at 100% face value. I belive he is being truthful and in good faith providing what perspective he has given the information he has been given. The information we have has to be taken with an equal level of skepticism on how it influences our perspective than with how we consider his perspective.
Kherson being taken was probably a result of a few things that no one knows for sure. Treason did take a good part of it but it was also a mistake to not think that Russia would have wanted to take every major city that it could. Karkhiv Kherson and kyiv being in Russian hands would have crippled the Ukrainian response. They were stopped cold in one, failed to attempt to take the capital but succeeded to take at least one of their targets.
I think people need to change their expectations on what modern war victories mean. the Kherson offensive has succeeded in putting a ton of pressure on the troops that are stuck on the "wrong" side of the Deniper. Supplying what troops are still on that side while evacuating what troops they can, all under fires from Ukrainian positions against ferry points easily spottable, is a horrid situation to be in that doesn't need fixing by the Ukrainians.
Kharkiv on the other hand seems like a stroke of brilliance by the AFU attacking unfortified reservists in a region that had its good troops send across Siberia to play games with China. Ukrainian forces are at the gates of the Rail hub that is servicing the Izium pincer Should they take the city it would need a severodonesk-level effort to simply stabilize their strategic plan in the east. An effort that would mean that the Kherson front continues to bleed. The forces they need for that effort are either sitting in Southern Ukraine or are untested troops they've been cooking south of Moscow.
The Ukrainians knew very well that Russia would try to take Kherson. The local defence had orders to blow up the bridges and block the roads with those "hedgehogs". According to the Ukrainian sources, the head of the Kherson defence (?) couldn't be reached on the day of the invasion. The bridges were not blown up, no defences were set up, the territorial defence units didn't get any dispositions and arms. The resistance the Russians faces was improvised. That looks to me an awful lot like sabotage.
On September 09 2022 17:26 maybenexttime wrote: How is the Kherson offensive getting bogged down? It's accomplishing was it was most likely meant to do - bind considerable forces and attrite them over time.
Aren't these forces are already binded by the fact that bridges through the Dniepr are made unusable? Any forces that could be rapidly deployed, may only travel via barges or helicopters. Most likely the objective was to cut off at least part of the AFRF forces on the west bank of the Dniepr and destroy them using the fact that both reinforcement and retreat options are hindered. Seeing the efforts AFU put into their push through Ingulets in the direction of Sukhoi Stavok suggests that key point of the offensive was Berislav, which would allow to cut AFRF task force in half. AFU still continues to pour forces into that area, though some advancements are also made in the south, near Nikolaev-Kherson highway. Plus AFRF operational directions (Izyum-Kharkov, Avdeevka-Bakhmut-Seversk and Kherson-Energodar-Ugledar-Mariinka) mostly act indepently of each other. Nobody would throw forces from Kharkov to reinforce Kherson. Also if AFRF was gaining few kilometers in a span of few weeks with 5-to-1 losses (figures aren't mine, took it from WP article in previoud post) - it would be not evaluated as "accomplishing what it meant to do", to put it mildly, The reason for this is that AFRF forces on the south (unlike their counterparts near Kharkov, who couldn't be bothered to dig trenches, and were paying the price from AFU as a result) were digging in for months, building several defence lines in the area, even with some concrete bunkers. Even Ukrainian sources acknowleged that https://t.me/uniannet/61039 mentions of 2nd and 3rd defence lines built by AFRF.
I start to think that Balakleya offensive was good improvisation on the part of the AFU, which was based on either assumption or direct knowledge that AFRF will take forces from this part of the front to move them on the Far East for the show-off excersises with China. It's either hubris and incompetence on the part of the command of Kharkov-Izyum operational direction, who reported above that AFU is incapable of major operations in the area (not unlikely, Western Military District command, which is responsible for the area, is comprised of known retards, who were getting command positions in the most prestigeious DIstrict of AFRF through friends and connections), or direct demand from Kremlin leadership, who considered show-off with China more important than the actual war. The result was that this part of the front was guarded with company-sized force of LDPR reservists per 10 (!) kilometers of the front, plus some Rosgvardia units and small separate AFRF elements in the cities and villages.
My point is, that 1) not every unsuccessful action may be attributed to some secret cunning plan (some of our authorities even call the whole Balakleya affair as "setting trap for AFU").
I agree. The breakthrough in the north does not mean that the Kherson offensive was a diversion. War is fluid, pressure in one area forces reactions and may make opportunities elsewhere that can be opportunistically seized. The plan was likely always to take what was available. If Kherson wasn’t reinforced the plan would have been to take it. If Kherson was then the plan would be to exploit openings elsewhere in the line. If those openings presented new targets the plan would be to take those.
That doesn’t mean there was always a master plan to bait with Kherson and envelop Izyum, it means that plans are built to evolve.
On September 09 2022 17:26 maybenexttime wrote: How is the Kherson offensive getting bogged down? It's accomplishing was it was most likely meant to do - bind considerable forces and attrite them over time.
Aren't these forces are already binded by the fact that bridges through the Dniepr are made unusable? Any forces that could be rapidly deployed, may only travel via barges or helicopters. Most likely the objective was to cut off at least part of the AFRF forces on the west bank of the Dniepr and destroy them using the fact that both reinforcement and retreat options are hindered. Seeing the efforts AFU put into their push through Ingulets in the direction of Sukhoi Stavok suggests that key point of the offensive was Berislav, which would allow to cut AFRF task force in half. AFU still continues to pour forces into that area, though some advancements are also made in the south, near Nikolaev-Kherson highway. Plus AFRF operational directions (Izyum-Kharkov, Avdeevka-Bakhmut-Seversk and Kherson-Energodar-Ugledar-Mariinka) mostly act indepently of each other. Nobody would throw forces from Kharkov to reinforce Kherson. Also if AFRF was gaining few kilometers in a span of few weeks with 5-to-1 losses (figures aren't mine, took it from WP article in previoud post) - it would be not evaluated as "accomplishing what it meant to do", to put it mildly, The reason for this is that AFRF forces on the south (unlike their counterparts near Kharkov, who couldn't be bothered to dig trenches, and were paying the price from AFU as a result) were digging in for months, building several defence lines in the area, even with some concrete bunkers. Even Ukrainian sources acknowleged that https://t.me/uniannet/61039 mentions of 2nd and 3rd defence lines built by AFRF.
I start to think that Balakleya offensive was good improvisation on the part of the AFU, which was based on either assumption or direct knowledge that AFRF will take forces from this part of the front to move them on the Far East for the show-off excersises with China. It's either hubris and incompetence on the part of the command of Kharkov-Izyum operational direction, who reported above that AFU is incapable of major operations in the area (not unlikely, Western Military District command, which is responsible for the area, is comprised of known retards, who were getting command positions in the most prestigeious DIstrict of AFRF through friends and connections), or direct demand from Kremlin leadership, who considered show-off with China more important than the actual war. The result was that this part of the front was guarded with company-sized force of LDPR reservists per 10 (!) kilometers of the front, plus some Rosgvardia units and small separate AFRF elements in the cities and villages.
My point is, that 1) not every unsuccessful action may be attributed to some secret cunning plan (some of our authorities even call the whole Balakleya affair as "setting trap for AFU").
I agree. The breakthrough in the north does not mean that the Kherson offensive was a diversion. War is fluid, pressure in one area forces reactions and may make opportunities elsewhere that can be opportunistically seized. The plan was likely always to take what was available. If Kherson wasn’t reinforced the plan would have been to take it. If Kherson was then the plan would be to exploit openings elsewhere in the line. If those openings presented new targets the plan would be to take those.
That doesn’t mean there was always a master plan to bait with Kherson and envelop Izyum, it means that plans are built to evolve.
Or as Moltke puts it: No plan survives first contact with the enemy.
On September 10 2022 00:33 Ghanburighan wrote: This is like reading fan faction about an ongoing war. 10/10 entertainment value.
You can't take it at 100% face value. I belive he is being truthful and in good faith providing what perspective he has given the information he has been given. The information we have has to be taken with an equal level of skepticism on how it influences our perspective than with how we consider his perspective.
Kherson being taken was probably a result of a few things that no one knows for sure. Treason did take a good part of it but it was also a mistake to not think that Russia would have wanted to take every major city that it could. Karkhiv Kherson and kyiv being in Russian hands would have crippled the Ukrainian response. They were stopped cold in one, failed to attempt to take the capital but succeeded to take at least one of their targets.
I think people need to change their expectations on what modern war victories mean. the Kherson offensive has succeeded in putting a ton of pressure on the troops that are stuck on the "wrong" side of the Deniper. Supplying what troops are still on that side while evacuating what troops they can, all under fires from Ukrainian positions against ferry points easily spottable, is a horrid situation to be in that doesn't need fixing by the Ukrainians.
Kharkiv on the other hand seems like a stroke of brilliance by the AFU attacking unfortified reservists in a region that had its good troops send across Siberia to play games with China. Ukrainian forces are at the gates of the Rail hub that is servicing the Izium pincer Should they take the city it would need a severodonesk-level effort to simply stabilize their strategic plan in the east. An effort that would mean that the Kherson front continues to bleed. The forces they need for that effort are either sitting in Southern Ukraine or are untested troops they've been cooking south of Moscow.
Well, I'm pretty sure I also saw the RU propaganda TV show that he's quoting here:
Western Military District command, which is responsible for the area, is comprised of known retards, who were getting command positions in the most prestigeious DIstrict of AFRF through friends and connections
It's all rubbish, meant to spew confusion and disinformation. Best course of action is to ignore it entirely.
It's not in UA's interest to be too forthcoming about plans.
Edit: notice how everybody is already bandwagoning on the idea that UA just got lucky in Kharkiv instead of noticing that UA has run a textbook combined arms operation with effective area denial support at all stages. You can't improvise that. Most countries cannot execute it even with planning.
Looks more like exploiting the thin lines of overextended enemy.
Also, there are some videos of the russian columns reinforcing Kupyansk and Izium. It honestly looks like a historical reenactment of WW2 or something. I don't know how are the russians expecting these ancient vehicles to compete with modern weapons, but I guess we will see.
For real, how can you look at someone calling it 'good improvisation' and take 'they call them lucky' away from that...? He just acknowledged ukraine to fluidly adapt to a weakness they possibly spotted with a probing attack. That would be a more impressive than exercising some long in advance drawn out plan.
Disregarding who might be right here, I feel like Ardias has the best track record out of all of us here when it comes to actually bringing sources whenever you disagree with him while also doing a far better job at critically engaging with them than most of the rest. And yet he keeps having to contest with accusations of russian propaganda, at this point I don't think you get away with just handwaving his stuff as 'russian propaganda'. If you accuse him of that, at least match him with some sources.
If its some 0 Post new account sure, but he is an established poster in this thread.
Surprised that commanders of the UA forces haven't told them to slow down on the offensives to keep the lines solidified and not stretched out. Also no idea if this is genuine.
EPT
