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Although this thread does not function under the same strict guidelines as the USPMT, it is still a general practice on TL to provide a source with an explanation on why it is relevant and what purpose it adds to the discussion. Failure to do so will result in a mod action. |
On June 17 2015 01:17 Simberto wrote: I have no idea either, but the same argument could have been made for Ukraine a few years back, and look where we are now.
Well with Crimea they secured access to the Black sea at comparatively little cost and they had a chance to stop further Western integration of Ukraine, but the Baltics are long out of Russia's sphere of influence anyway. I don't think there's anything that would justify an attack on a NATO country.
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One has to admire oneofthem's quick learning curve, at the same time as lamenting his rhetorical dishonesty. When he comprehends the other person's argument to be unanswerable, he pretends that that the other's argument was actually his, and that his former argument was the other person's.
Let us take a look here at the genesis of this phenomenon. oneofthem argues against me that:
answering those questions require information about actual war planning military and political. has nothing to do with your generalities based on fantasized historical principles.
What I actually said:
Needless to say, such a scenario is unthinkable, and militarily unpredictable because no war on such a scale has been fought since 1945, and no military doctrine has been developed to cover such terrae incognitae.
...
The question is senseless, and so is this discussion when placed in a conceptual vacuum.
So oneofthem gets a B on his ability to regurgitate basic information, but an F for plagiarism.
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On June 16 2015 22:51 MoltkeWarding wrote: oneofthem is wrong, as always.
Anyhow, the present rhetoric of imposing costs upon Russia makes her less responsive to our demands, not more. Somewhere along the way, the school of White House game theorists has dropped the instruction manual and picked up a cosmetics kit.
Covert and political warfare of the Dulles-CIA school has had an auspicious run; its reputation embellished by a superhuman mythos that its strategic and moral shortcomings do not receive the attention they deserve. Its key tactic is to elude moral responsibility by the drawing up of uncoordinated punitive laundry list measures against the purported target, and its consequences are entirely unplanned, and therefore inherently chaotic. Why this form of warfare when it is useless? As Aristotle explains in Poetics, the action in theatre is not being performed on the stage, but in the souls of the audiences.
It's not just theatrics. A military industrial complex profits from war, so they make war. It doesn't take a great conspiracy for this to happen, all the generals and managers need to do is enjoy war. Living in a world in which you are the hero while you expand the number of people you get to order about is hella fun. These are monkeys remember, just like us.
On June 17 2015 00:54 oneofthem wrote: basic idea is the utter superiority of u.s. conventional military capability vs russian.
it is also very rich of you to talk of moral responsibility when the issue is whether nato can resist russian aggression.
i expect a 2000 word essay defending the retarded position that russia will attack a nato state
NATO aggression. How did the U.S. react when Russia expanded their alliance with Cuba to include defence? As much as it sucks and shouldn't be, Ukraine is within Russia's sphere of influence, just as Mexico is within the U.S's. You get all up in there and they respond because the risk gets small enough and the reward gets large enough. It doesn't matter if it's a horrific miscalculation by NATO that started this madness or an intentional attempt to make NATO seem more needed, it all results in the same thing. More power and influence for a tiny minority who, collectively, behave like a bunch of short sighted psychopaths. On BOTH sides.
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On June 16 2015 06:02 lord_nibbler wrote:Show nested quote +On June 16 2015 04:41 Chocolate wrote: You're kidding me if you think there will actually be a nuclear war over a baltic country. And you are not thinking through your own scenario! What do you think will happen if one side in this so-called conventional war was actually close to 'winning'? You can't kill thousands of Russians and still expect them to not press the button 'in the name of humanity' for example. Show nested quote +If Russia makes a move, it will be the same as before: Russian troops disguised as rebels and separatists will attempt to start a "civil war." Yes, a likely scenario would play out like this. But here is the thing, there is no 'outside civil war'. Separatists are part of that country's population too! Choosing sides in a civil war is not what a defensive alliance should be involved in. It should not be about helping the leadership of a member country maintaining its control over the entirety of its population by violent means. It was you who claimed it was. So why are you arguing with me? PS: ![[image loading]](https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CHdfgZFWsAAxcYZ.jpg)
Omg that list is hilarious. Its kinda funny, the higher the living standard in a country,the less the people are prepared to fight for it, and the lower the standard, the more the people are willing to fight for it and defend it.
Its a very interesting chart with lots of information,can be interpreted in many ways. Don't think it is that accurate though, its just that in many countrys we can not even imagine having to fight for the existence of our country. I think when there where troops at the border more people would be prepared. 15% is frightening and shamefully low lol (btw I guess its percentage of all adults, or is it percentage of all male adults?)
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On June 16 2015 21:47 MoltkeWarding wrote: Taiguchi does not actually understand the Credit Default Swaps he is citing to support his leitmotif that every nation acted out of a parochial self-interest during this crisis (in contrast, presumably, to his pan-European idealism.) Credit Default Swaps are insurance schemes paid by debt holders to protect themselves against certain credit events, such as defaults. In case of a Greek sovereign debt default, the creditors of the Greek government would have been reimbursed their losses by the institution from which their insurance was purchased; that is to say, CDS redistributes the burdens of default without compounding the total sum of the loss, except in terms of money already paid by the insurees to cover themselves.
When CDS was actually triggered by the de facto default in the haircut deal, it was discovered that both the range and the value of CDS on Greek bonds were negligible, the payouts being barely equivalent to 2% of the losses sustained. So Taiguchi is using evidence whose nature he does not understand to defend an opinion he has already renounced. Voltaire once said that wars go on for the simple reason that they began. So much truer for our loyalty to our own falsehoods.
As for Russia, it is not war, but brinkmanship which is mostly threatening to the European peoples, and I do not only mean this fratricidal confrontation between two portions of a collectively shrinking Western Civilisation; I speak in more prophetic terms. It is important to understand that long after the Americans are absconded from Europe, and NATO relegated to the rust of time, there will remain a handful of Balts and Finns standing between the East Slavs, in their weary hundred millions, and the European seas. At some point, these historically vulnerable peoples will no longer be able to seek their safety in the pretense of being the vanguard of a Western military system; they must rely on their own merits as independent small nations in coping with the realities of their position in the world, a reality which demands prudence, respect, and self-restraint vis-a-vis their greater neighbours.
Collective security on the NATO basis is inherently unsustainable, and may only be secure assuming the predominance of a hegemonic interest within the alliance (the Warsaw Pactisation of NATO) or under temporary conditions of real collective crises. The real precursor to NATO was the interwar petite entente system, and that system is worth comparing, at least in its broad outlines, to the one which prevails in Europe today. In one fundamental respect at least, the weakness exists on the conceptual level: their respective unspoken purposes of converting momentary political advantages into permanent geopolitical features at the expense of rival great powers are purposes quickly undone by the passing of time. The thing that holds NATO together today is not the threat of real conflict, but the absence of real conflict.
That NATO has proven to be less than a political-military monolith is anyhow an event of personal satisfaction. It is not out of cowardice that I never saw the wisdom in pouring Canadian money and lives into subduing Pashtun tribes in Kandahar, to avenge the deaths of a few thousand Americans, or never understood where our national interests are being served in sustaining a war so stupid, that after 14 years we are unable to articulate what we are actually fighting for. NATO is the spirit of Taiguchi haunting the rational world.
Taiguchi is more or less right in what he wrote about the crisis and the cdf,s on page 119 of this thread. And most of the cds did not trigger at all during the debt restructuring due to a special ruling.
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On June 18 2015 00:58 Rassy wrote:Show nested quote +On June 16 2015 06:02 lord_nibbler wrote:On June 16 2015 04:41 Chocolate wrote: You're kidding me if you think there will actually be a nuclear war over a baltic country. And you are not thinking through your own scenario! What do you think will happen if one side in this so-called conventional war was actually close to 'winning'? You can't kill thousands of Russians and still expect them to not press the button 'in the name of humanity' for example. If Russia makes a move, it will be the same as before: Russian troops disguised as rebels and separatists will attempt to start a "civil war." Yes, a likely scenario would play out like this. But here is the thing, there is no 'outside civil war'. Separatists are part of that country's population too! Choosing sides in a civil war is not what a defensive alliance should be involved in. It should not be about helping the leadership of a member country maintaining its control over the entirety of its population by violent means. NATO is most definitely not defensive by name. It was you who claimed it was. So why are you arguing with me? PS: ![[image loading]](https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CHdfgZFWsAAxcYZ.jpg) Omg that list is hilarious. Its kinda funny, the higher the living standard in a country,the less the people are prepared to fight for it, and the lower the standard, the more the people are willing to fight for it and defend it. Its a very interesting chart with lots of information,can be interpreted in many ways. Don't think it is that accurate though, its just that in many countrys we can not even imagine having to fight for the existence of our country. I think when there where troops at the border more people would be prepared. 15% is frightening and shamefully low lol (btw I guess its percentage of all adults, or is it percentage of all male adults?) I don't think it's (only) related to living standars. Finland is right up there at 74%, Sweden's at 55%, Switzerland is "only" at 39% but that should be a LOT lower if it's based just on that. Not supposed to refute anything but you could probably write essays about this and how tons of different things come into play for this, including living standard.
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Hmm yes, we realy have no excuse. Still its a weird list, to see japan at the bottom and then Netherlands and Germany. Not surprised to see the Netherlands there but Germany and japan? So much has changed since ww2 and the suicide zeros,can a populations mentality realy change that much?
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Norway28659 Posts
it makes perfect sense to me that the higher living standard the less willing people are to go to war for their country. Higher living standard means you have more to lose.
But the most important thing I garnered from that list is that whether soldiers of the past are portrayed heroically or not makes a world of difference.
Also, if I were asked 'would you be willing to fight for your country' and my options were 'yes' or 'no' then I don't know what I would answer because it depends entirely on the war. If somehow we lived in some type of parallel universe and Norway was attacked by a merely slightly stronger force who wanted go take our land and women and sack our cities and drink our oil, and where our forces would face off in open combat and where numbers would thus be a necessity to win this defensive war to protect our values, valuables and people, then sure. Sign me up.
However, if we say, were to be invaded by a force as much stronger as us as say, Germany in 1940, it's not so easy. Then I would know that fighting would most likely equate to death, and that not fighting would most likely equate to a somewhat worse life than I had before. And then - that's being Norwegian. Our military champions of yore are actually very highly regarded.
And then, if I were instead German, the question 'would you be willing to fight for your country' would immediately make me think 'would you be willing to invade neighboring countries for lebensraum while genociding a little along the way?' - and I'm surprised 18% said yes to that. (then again, I assume they didn't read the question the same way. )
Still - I do find it pretty terrible that so many would not support our countries joining in to defend NATO allies in the face of a Russian invasion. Firstly, because that looks like a really good version of the first scenario - an outsider invading force of vastly inferior power that would, historically, make life for the invadees significantly worse. Secondly, because a military alliance like NATO is a lot like having a security system for your house. It's not like you're likely to need it, but the fact that it is there is so deterring that it ends up being even way less likely that it'll have to be used.
All that said though, Russia isn't attacking any nato countries. However, this is probably not a good time and age for countries within Russia's sphere of influence to openly speak of a desire to join nato.
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On June 18 2015 01:16 Rassy wrote: Hmm yes, we realy have no excuse. Still its a weird list, to see japan at the bottom and then Netherlands and Germany. Not surprised to see the Netherlands there but Germany and japan? So much has changed since ww2 and the suicide zeros,can a populations mentality realy change that much?
I'm not surprised to see Germany so much at the bottom of the list at all tbh. I mean with WW2 it's pretty obvious that there's massive amounts of aversion towards war in general over here, no matter the scenario.
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On June 18 2015 01:16 Rassy wrote: Hmm yes, we realy have no excuse. Still its a weird list, to see japan at the bottom and then Netherlands and Germany. Not surprised to see the Netherlands there but Germany and japan? So much has changed since ww2 and the suicide zeros,can a populations mentality realy change that much?
Just about all german cities got bombed to a plump towards the end of WW2... Not wanting this to happen again seems perfectly natural to me.
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Finland has 74%, Sweden 55%, I don't think it's directly related to the living standard. I'm guessing the low score of some Western nations is the result of "it's not my problem, why would I risk my life for it" mentality, these people think they live in a group of units instead of a community. Obviously it's different in German case, if you say you're willing to fight for Germany you sound like a nazi.
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I would also consider it a pointless question. If your going to ask a random person on the street if they would fight for their country when war is something that happens on the other side of the world or if an invading army is bearing down on them you get a vastly different response from the same person. That is why so many western nations are that low. We don't have to worry about wars in our backyard and we don't feel like dying in a desert half the world away 'for our country' when that country is not actually in danger.
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On June 18 2015 01:16 Rassy wrote: Hmm yes, we realy have no excuse. Still its a weird list, to see japan at the bottom and then Netherlands and Germany. Not surprised to see the Netherlands there but Germany and japan? So much has changed since ww2 and the suicide zeros,can a populations mentality realy change that much?
Japanese are pretty proud in their pacifistic constitution I think. There's a reason why Abe has a really hard time changing it.
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On June 17 2015 01:27 MoltkeWarding wrote:Show nested quote +On June 17 2015 00:54 oneofthem wrote:On June 16 2015 22:51 MoltkeWarding wrote: oneofthem is wrong, as always.
Anyhow, the present rhetoric of imposing costs upon Russia makes her less responsive to our demands, not more. Somewhere along the way, the school of White House game theorists has dropped the instruction manual and picked up a cosmetics kit.
Covert and political warfare of the Dulles-CIA school has had an auspicious run; its reputation embellished by a superhuman mythos that its strategic and moral shortcomings do not receive the attention they deserve. Its key tactic is to elude moral responsibility by the drawing up of uncoordinated punitive laundry list measures against the purported target, and its consequences are entirely unplanned, and therefore inherently chaotic. Why this form of warfare when it is useless? As Aristotle explains in Poetics, the action in theatre is not being performed on the stage, but in the souls of the audiences. basic idea is the utter superiority of u.s. conventional military capability vs russian. it is also very rich of you to talk of moral responsibility when the issue is whether nato can resist russian aggression. i expect a 2000 word essay defending the retarded position that russia will attack a nato state Such an utter superiority does not exist; since the US military's conventional offensive capabilities which would enable her to conduct large-scale forced entry into enemy territory is oriented against third-rate powers, not a traditional great power. Not true. Although there was to an extent a reorientation of sorts when Robert Gates put emphasis on the need for the U.S. military to focus more on counterinsurgency than it did before (including with regards to the kind of weapon systems being developed), he maintained the need to be prepared for conventional warfare against major powers such as Russia and China - and so have the U.S. secretaries of defense that followed his departure. Rising tensions in the Pacific area with China have given further incentive to analyze these powers' capabilities and plan accordingly. This is not to say that war erupting and ground invasion happening is considered to be a likely scenario, but the U.S. is more than capable of inflicting to Russia the kind of "unacceptable harm" that oneofthem mentioned, without the need to occupy Russian territory.
On June 17 2015 01:27 MoltkeWarding wrote: In the case of a defensive war, Russia does not have to match American power projection capabilities in a symmetrical fashion; she merely needs to extend a credible area-denial capability into the operational areas to achieve what she considers "strategic parity," in accordance with her 2010 military doctrine. Strategic parity does not require tit for tat firepower, it merely requires capabilities sophisticated enough to deny the enemy the ability to impose his military-political objectives in a specific theatre. Needless to say, such a scenario is unthinkable, and militarily unpredictable because no war on such a scale has been fought since 1945, and no military doctrine has been developed to cover such terrae incognitae. There has been plenty of analysis produced by the U.S. military and by the military of other powers (including Russia and China) about non-nuclear warfare conducted on the territories of major powers, in particular China and Russia (including in the case of a conflict between the two with no direct U.S. involvement). The fact that a scenario of the type is extremely unlikely doesn't mean that possibilities haven't been studied on the strategic, operational and even tactical levels. The matter of "inflicting unacceptable harm" to the other is by no means terrae incognitae, and there is no strategic parity on this level between Russia and the U.S. when it comes to conventional warfare. This is not to say, of course, that Russia would be incapable of harming the U.S.
On June 17 2015 01:27 MoltkeWarding wrote: The discussion about whether NATO could resist Russian aggression is pointless, because actual events never follow the trajectory of military planning, particularly not in a military confrontation which has a rational classical foundation as "politics by other means," and especially not when capping the sliding scale of military escalation can only be attained via mutual agreement. In other words, the political objectives of such purported "aggression" become the paramount factor, both in the moral sense and in the physical sense, since total war is absurd. The questions behind the question in this case is more interesting than the questions behind the answers. Your name notwithstanding, you seem to be unfamiliar with military planning, since military planning does take into account political factors - for example possible political objectives to be achieved, or a political framework constraining military action (for example, the refusal to use nuclear weapons, or the necessity to avoid bombing, or possibly violating the airspace of, adjacent countries). The existence of uncertainty is obvious is does not render military planning obsolete or the discussion about whether NATO could resist Russian aggression pointless. The question does have a clear answer, which is "yes, it could", if the political will to resist is there (which it would be, regardless of how public opinion looks right now).
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It could also be a measure of attachment to your state. It might reflect whether or not your country has mandatory military service, so there's a chance the responder has spent time working directly for the state, giving it a chance to explain it's purpose/indoctrinate you. It might be a measure of the trust a person has in the motives of those that propose a war. It could be that in places where free speech is punished you are more likely to get an "acceptable" response, a suspicion that a respondent will be punished for the "wrong" answer.
Those all seem decent enough reasons to me and don't involve shame or a lazy population.
Ultimately the data is a rorschach test, you can throw anything you like at it. Successive test over time might be a little more enlightening.
On June 18 2015 01:29 Liquid`Drone wrote:it makes perfect sense to me that the higher living standard the less willing people are to go to war for their country. Higher living standard means you have more to lose. But the most important thing I garnered from that list is that whether soldiers of the past are portrayed heroically or not makes a world of difference. Also, if I were asked 'would you be willing to fight for your country' and my options were 'yes' or 'no' then I don't know what I would answer because it depends entirely on the war. If somehow we lived in some type of parallel universe and Norway was attacked by a merely slightly stronger force who wanted go take our land and women and sack our cities and drink our oil, and where our forces would face off in open combat and where numbers would thus be a necessity to win this defensive war to protect our values, valuables and people, then sure. Sign me up. However, if we say, were to be invaded by a force as much stronger as us as say, Germany in 1940, it's not so easy. Then I would know that fighting would most likely equate to death, and that not fighting would most likely equate to a somewhat worse life than I had before. And then - that's being Norwegian. Our military champions of yore are actually very highly regarded. And then, if I were instead German, the question 'would you be willing to fight for your country' would immediately make me think 'would you be willing to invade neighboring countries for lebensraum while genociding a little along the way?' - and I'm surprised 18% said yes to that. (then again, I assume they didn't read the question the same way.  ) Still - I do find it pretty terrible that so many would not support our countries joining in to defend NATO allies in the face of a Russian invasion. Firstly, because that looks like a really good version of the first scenario - an outsider invading force of vastly inferior power that would, historically, make life for the invadees significantly worse. Secondly, because a military alliance like NATO is a lot like having a security system for your house. It's not like you're likely to need it, but the fact that it is there is so deterring that it ends up being even way less likely that it'll have to be used. All that said though, Russia isn't attacking any nato countries. However, this is probably not a good time and age for countries within Russia's sphere of influence to openly speak of a desire to join nato.
That's a really terrible analogy, I think - with NATO structured and behaving like it is - it's a security system that makes war much more likely, reasons given above. A security system is a tool, it is not conscious, it can't make decisions and it costs virtually nothing once installed. A better analogy might be a dog, at least that might cost 2% of household income. The dog of course has to be owned solely in order to perform security duties, you'd also have to inform it that it's continued survival was predicated on being a useful burglar deterrent so it has a chance to make a case for it's continued use of limited resources. You'd also have to set up a way for it to communicate with burglars and.... Well it's a better analogy, but still pretty terrible.
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Do we have to choose between Clausewitz and Tolstoï ?
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Taiguchi is more or less right in what he wrote about the crisis and the cdf,s on page 119 of this thread. And most of the cds did not trigger at all during the debt restructuring due to a special ruling.
There were two decisive occasions on the CDS payouts in 2012: one triggering the CDS credit event on March 9 2012, and the other occurring in the process of the CDS auction a week later, whereby the holders of CDS received the difference between the face value of the old bonds, and the market value of the new bonds under the swap deal, which was itself considerably lower than the face value. All in all, the holders of CDS received nearly 80% of the value on the face value of the swapped bonds from the insurers, despite the fact that the triggering event was a consensual bond swap whereby the value of losses could not be fully calculated. Therefore the CDS holders did receive the best possible payout scenario in 2012 when the “triggering credit event” was occasioned, and the payouts themselves, amounting to two and a half billion Euro, were paltry compared to the principal.
Not true. Although there was to an extent a reorientation of sorts when Robert Gates put emphasis on the need for the U.S. military to focus more on counterinsurgency than it did before (including with regards to the kind of weapon systems being developed), he maintained the need to be prepared for conventional warfare against major powers such as Russia and China - and so have the U.S. secretaries of defense that followed his departure. Rising tensions in the Pacific area with China have given further incentive to analyze these powers' capabilities and plan accordingly. This is not to say that war erupting and ground invasion happening is considered to be a likely scenario, but the U.S. is more than capable of inflicting to Russia the kind of "unacceptable harm" that oneofthem mentioned, without the need to occupy Russian territory.,
[Etc.]
Robert Gates’ public articulations, in so far as they meant anything beyond the usual bureaucratese, were largely steering efforts into what he called “broad-spectrum capabilities,” which meant at least an attitudinal abandonment of and switching away from Cold War military planning: that same Cold War military planning which was kept on a withering vine for two decades, despite their obsolescence via basic geographical facts. Ironically, it is the eastern expansion of NATO that has made Cold War planning scenarios once again relevant. However, I am not aware of any contingent operational planning against Russian conventional attack into NATO drawn up since then, and it would seem incredible to me if such planning has occurred which has received any real priority, but I suppose I might be proven wrong in several decades by historians of the future.
Regardless of this rather interesting case of political “nudging,” there is a large chasm between the declarative contents of a Pentagon press conference, and the substance of this discussion, since the US does not have a physical capability of fighting an overwhelmingly beneficial attritional war with Russia on any level short of vast changes to her degree of military mobilization and redistribution of forces around the world; which would fall outside of the discussion when we talk about contingent defensive actions. If we extended such ambitions over the long-run, that would simply be an arms race, not a contingent reactive ability. As of the moment, the United States does not have the physical or technological ability to force entry into Russian airspace or territorial waters with impunity in any scenario of limited or full-scale conventional war. oneofthem is not talking about “unacceptable harm” in the sense of a physical ability to influence a cost-benefit rationale upon a rational actor; he is simply asserting (I think) an acceptable attrition rate in the event of a total conventional war between the United States and Russia, without it escalating into nuclear war, which is not only improbable operationally, but also politically.
It is telling that oneofthem, while accusing others of fantasy-making, clings so strongly to the moral clarity of a fantasy-scenario himself, as when he insists that we abide by the inner assumptions of the aforementioned survey. The question here is geared towards the vetting of irrational fears projected out of current events. The military measures taken by Russia in 2008 as well as last year were reactive and ad hoc, in which neither the political, military nor moral initiative were initially on her side. The questionnaire on the contrary assumes a scenario of complete of moral and political clarity as the backdrop for a “defensive war,” which any clear-headed person who thinks of the real world could not easily buy into. That is why the questionnaire fails as basic research, and its derivative conclusions are cant.
Before you can make assertions like oneofthem does, you have to frame your contexts and goalposts; and it is not only that oneofthem never does so, the lack of thematic and semantic clarity is welcome to him, because it helps him elude statements of absolute falsifiability by which he can be embarrassed when he is inevitably shown to be wrong. Therefore it is not oneofthem’s assertion pasted against a tabula rasa which is wrong; it’s the lack of real semantic content in the whole of his assertion. As it is, saying that the United States can do things “unacceptable” for Russia is like saying that I can seduce your girlfriend with my “irresistible” charm. As so often in the English language, it is verbs which fill our thoughts with virility, while adjectives disguise the fact that we have nothing to say.
That's a really terrible analogy, I think - with NATO structured and behaving like it is - it's a security system that makes war much more likely, reasons given above. A security system is a tool, it is not conscious, it can't make decisions and it costs virtually nothing once installed. A better analogy might be a dog, at least that might cost 2% of household income.
My point, before oneofthem rudely interrupted me for no reason, was really about this: the issue with this “big power” pressuring a “small power” dynamic is that such a natural equilibrium is thrown out of sync by military blocs, in which all petty issues are given a global import due to its ability to trigger a casus foederis. In the long-run, the two momentarily advantageous features of this system; security against historical enemies for small powers, and the extension of imperial reach for large powers each produce their respective shortcomings: in one case, the great power being drawn into minor, peripheral conflicts, giving the tail the ability to wag the dog, and in the other, the de facto loss of external sovereignty for the tail itself.
What is interesting for the moment is that with the expansion of NATO to cover a swathe of weak and insecure states to the east, the United States has managed to expand the advantageous political structure established in the 50s, to wit, the subordination of the alliance's interests to her own via "internal multilateralism," by which the United States can exploit the split among European foreign policy and defense priorities to superimpose her own agenda in collusion with select allies of the moment, as she does presently with Poland and the Baltic States. The modern NATO is not quite analogous to the Peloponnesian League, but it is not quite a Holy Alliance either.
P.S.
Your name notwithstanding, you seem to be unfamiliar with military planning, since military planning does take into account political factors - for example possible political objectives to be achieved, or a political framework constraining military action (for example, the refusal to use nuclear weapons, or the necessity to avoid bombing, or possibly violating the airspace of, adjacent countries).
My historical namesake has little to do with this discussion, since Prussian General Staff planning of the 19th century was quite a different thing from what happens today (although his basic notions about the conflicts between military planning and execution were somewhat channeled in my post.) In the case of Moltke the Younger and the mobilisation of the German army in 1914, the diplomatic flexibility of the German Empire in those decisive days was virtually tethered to the imperatives of a military planning which attained a pedantic level of organisational detail at the expense of strategic flexibility. The German attack into Belgium and France was probably the closest thing we have historically to a faithful execution of large-scale premeditated military planning, where the performance in execution came pretty close to plans; and its consequences are well-known.
Nonetheless, it is not I who am unfamiliar with the multiple dimensions of military planning, but oneofthem, whose one-dimensionality I sought to reproach. Insofar as I expressed scepticism about the possibilities of military planning, it was because of those aforementioned tradeoffs which cause its inherent limitations. You really have to approach a distinct event horizon for something like that to be relevant, and the inherent limitation of this conversation is that oneofthem is rather looking into the sky, perched within his huge cloudy symbols of a low romance.
Therefore before I am troubled with any more peremptory claims, I encourage everyone to escape oneofthem's evil fate of always fighting a rear-guard action against his own words by making sure that they are reading into words/meanings, and not into attitudes, when they object to something I say. We in Western Civilisation are heirs to a great empire of thought, among whose features is an appreciation of psychologically and morally complex problems. Let us not play vile games with simplicity just so that we can prostitute our "courage" before an indifferent audience. This entire argument is unworthy of us.
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Moltke cited an online Hearts of Iron game 8 years ago to call me a coward. Those were the days....
Do you still have that saved game?
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On June 18 2015 08:21 warding wrote: Moltke cited an online Hearts of Iron game 8 years ago to call me a coward. Those were the days....
Do you still have that saved game?
That was your one thousand, three hundred and thirty-seventh post? I thought this was a gaming forum. Shame on you.
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On June 16 2015 22:51 MoltkeWarding wrote: oneofthem is wrong, as always.
Anyhow, the present rhetoric of imposing costs upon Russia makes her less responsive to our demands, not more. Somewhere along the way, the school of White House game theorists has dropped the instruction manual and picked up a cosmetics kit.
Covert and political warfare of the Dulles-CIA school has had an auspicious run; its reputation embellished by a superhuman mythos that its strategic and moral shortcomings do not receive the attention they deserve. Its key tactic is to elude moral responsibility by the drawing up of uncoordinated punitive laundry list measures against the purported target, and its consequences are entirely unplanned, and therefore inherently chaotic. Why this form of warfare when it is useless? As Aristotle explains in Poetics, the action in theatre is not being performed on the stage, but in the souls of the audiences.
"Its reputation embellished by a superhuman mythos that its strategic and moral shortcomings do not receive the attention they deserve?" What?
Why this form of warfare? Perhaps because secret warfare is the only kind that the Public will tolerate since the Vietnam War, at least until 2001. And now after 12+ years of Iraqi occupation the Public is once again weary of anything but wars conducted in the shadows, where it doesn't openly confront them.
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