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Although this thread does not function under the same strict guidelines as the USPMT, it is still a general practice on TL to provide a source with an explanation on why it is relevant and what purpose it adds to the discussion. Failure to do so will result in a mod action. |
On June 18 2015 08:43 Dapper_Cad wrote:Show nested quote +On June 18 2015 08:21 warding wrote: Moltke cited an online Hearts of Iron game 8 years ago to call me a coward. Those were the days....
Do you still have that saved game? That was your one thousand, three hundred and thirty-seventh post? I thought this was a gaming forum. Shame on you. hey, hearts of iron is a great game!
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On June 18 2015 09:35 Nyxisto wrote:Show nested quote +On June 18 2015 08:43 Dapper_Cad wrote:On June 18 2015 08:21 warding wrote: Moltke cited an online Hearts of Iron game 8 years ago to call me a coward. Those were the days....
Do you still have that saved game? That was your one thousand, three hundred and thirty-seventh post? I thought this was a gaming forum. Shame on you. hey, hearts of iron is a great game!
If you cant jihad, no game is great.
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Since I have nothing better to do, I have put some extra thought into oneofthem’s statement about my passion for historical fantasy. I assume he was referring to my statement that “there will remain a handful of Balts and Finns standing between the East Slavs, in their weary hundred millions, and the European seas.”
The millennium-old friction between the Balt and East Slav on the eastern shores of the Baltic is not a fantasy, nor does the idea of a Baltic bridgehead as a cordon sanitaire originate in 1919 or 1990; they were there during the Teutonic and Swedish eras. The Russian incursions into the Baltic were three; the first wave during the reign of Yaroslav, the second during the reign of Peter the Great, the third in 1940. None of these experiences were felicitous for the Baltic peoples, nor were the Teutonic whirlwinds of the 13th century (which was the real milestone in Baltic history, far more important and enduring than three centuries of Russian rule,) yet it is by virtue of these foreign rulers that the Balts achieved their place in European civilisation. These are the real lines of continuity in the history of the Baltics, not some sentimental conservatism about a military alliance which has already long outlived its usefulness.
Now, there are two important things one must realise about oneofthem; the first being his arduous pursuit of the ignorance of history, and the second his complete indifference to the Baltic peoples, their unique civilisation and culture, and therefore the moral basis for their independence. They are nothing but geopolitical pawns in his mind, as they are indeed in the minds of most Americans policy wonks. These countries are provinces of NATO; and in relation, it is NATO which is the final cause of the Baltic peoples, rather than the reverse. Indeed, in relation to them, he is as the satanic servant Kangars in the Latvian epic:
The Latvians I will urge to go to war.- I know Bearslayer bold will not delay, But in a fearless mood will go once more, With Burtnieks to struggle in the fray, Although they know that death will follow sure, If Kalapuisis they meet and fight. On Latvian soil no warrior can endure Against the dread [Russian] giant's might.
For this reason alone, every Balt who loves his country must beware of the embrace of false friends. At least oneofthem is fairly easy to expose; I did not listen to what Jeb Bush recently said in the Baltics, but whatever he said, I assume that he was a better liar.
Why this form of warfare? Perhaps because secret warfare is the only kind that the Public will tolerate since the Vietnam War, at least until 2001. And now after 12+ years of Iraqi occupation the Public is once again weary of anything but wars conducted in the shadows, where it doesn't openly confront them.
I may have been a little nonchalant about political warfare being mostly fake episodes of pretended activity which is transfigured by its credulous apostles into events of great moral symbolism, through which it ironically achieves its real effects. Occasionally hyperbole is a guilty pleasure for those who hate the meaningless of existence in a democratic world. I wrote the following a few years ago:
The success of the CIA in intervening politically in places such as Italy and Iran in the years preceding 1956 built up exaggerated premises within the American National Security apparatus about the potential of covert warfare. In a way too, covert warfare was a natural political outlet for the bellicose Dulles, who could neither embrace rapprochement with the Soviets, nor initiate an adventurous foreign policy potentially leading to war. The promise of covert warfare as a weapon to subvert and weaken Soviet power without direct military risk had a nascent appeal as a third-way doctrine. That in the end, "[Dulles'] proposed crusade amounted to little more than the intensification of psychological warfare" is certainly true, but that psychological war first began within the United States itself. As the embryonic pressures of the Media Presidency were advancing into the era of McCarthyism and Hydrogen Bombs, the infliction of contradictory imperatives increasingly demanded of the American leadership a policy of dualities, in which both the domestic addiction to "image-making" and the real imperatives of foreign policy may be simultaneously satisfied.
Thus when the Eisenhower administration's first NSC policy review on Eastern Europe was submitted in December 1953, the same limitations to American options in Eastern Europe were enumerated as the report of three years prior. However, due to the priority which the new administration placed on a fundamental change of political attitude, these limitations became the source of considerable incoherence in its basic recommendations: whereas "Incitement to premature revolt" in the satellite states was to be avoided, the United States ought to "Be prepared to exploit any future disturbances similar to the East German riots of 1953." But what form should these preparations take? Should the United States be prepared to exacerbate a popular revolt which she would not have taken the moral responsibility to incite? These doctrinal questions remained unanswered until put to the test in 1956. Furthermore, the report made recommendations on the means which the United States did have at its disposal to attack the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Among these means supposedly at American disposal were "rallying the free world," the utilisation of propaganda and increasing the economic difficulties of the satellite via the continuation of export controls. The impotence of such measures to truly challenge the Soviet Union's hold on Eastern Europe was further diluted by its lack of a comprehensive vision. In drawing up laundry lists of methods through which she might attack the Soviet Union short of war, the United States failed to see local or even regional problems as problems in their own right, rather than as issues subsidiary to victory in the Cold War. The NSC's grandiose long-term aims were reflected in the imprecision of its language. In the report's recommendations on propaganda, for instance, its stated goal of "on one hand avoiding any commitments regarding when and how these people may be liberated and any incitement to premature revolt," and on the other hand seeking to "maintain their faith in the eventual restoration of freedom," left considerable ambiguity as to what the content of such broadcasts into Eastern Europe should seek to achieve.
Moltke cited an online Hearts of Iron game 8 years ago to call me a coward. Those were the days....
Do you still have that saved game?
I was displeased because I paid a lot of money to an internet café to beat the Soviet Union into the mud, and warding's cowardice deprived me of the satisfaction.
Nonetheless, it is not on the tongue, but in the arms that the true tests of courage dwell. Who knows, perhaps one day, warding, incensed at the oppression of a foreign invader, will selflessly lay down his life to protect his people. Perhaps one day, oneofthem will be shredded by a Russian rocket in the cause of Estonian freedom. On that day, I shall prostrate myself before their hallowed graves, and recant my mockery through my tears. Stranger things have happened.
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On June 18 2015 10:58 MoltkeWarding wrote:Show nested quote +Why this form of warfare? Perhaps because secret warfare is the only kind that the Public will tolerate since the Vietnam War, at least until 2001. And now after 12+ years of Iraqi occupation the Public is once again weary of anything but wars conducted in the shadows, where it doesn't openly confront them. I may have been a little nonchalant about political warfare being mostly fake episodes of pretended activity which is transfigured by its credulous apostles into events of great moral symbolism, through which it ironically achieves its real effects. Occasionally hyperbole is a guilty pleasure for those who hate the meaningless of existence in a democratic world. I wrote the following a few years ago:
I have no idea what that means. The meaninglessness of existence in a democratic world leads to hyperbole from you? As opposed to one with kings and queens?
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On June 18 2015 11:26 IgnE wrote:Show nested quote +On June 18 2015 10:58 MoltkeWarding wrote:Why this form of warfare? Perhaps because secret warfare is the only kind that the Public will tolerate since the Vietnam War, at least until 2001. And now after 12+ years of Iraqi occupation the Public is once again weary of anything but wars conducted in the shadows, where it doesn't openly confront them. I may have been a little nonchalant about political warfare being mostly fake episodes of pretended activity which is transfigured by its credulous apostles into events of great moral symbolism, through which it ironically achieves its real effects. Occasionally hyperbole is a guilty pleasure for those who hate the meaningless of existence in a democratic world. I wrote the following a few years ago: I have no idea what that means. The meaninglessness of existence in a democratic world leads to hyperbole from you? As opposed to one with kings and queens?
Yes, hyperbole is merely one way of stopping yourself from being bored by the sameness of everyone else. Other ways include going goth, joining a doomsday cult, cutting yourself, and being Russia.
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i somehow feel that some sexual identity crisis were omitted from that inclusion.
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On June 18 2015 09:04 IgnE wrote:Show nested quote +On June 16 2015 22:51 MoltkeWarding wrote: oneofthem is wrong, as always.
Anyhow, the present rhetoric of imposing costs upon Russia makes her less responsive to our demands, not more. Somewhere along the way, the school of White House game theorists has dropped the instruction manual and picked up a cosmetics kit.
Covert and political warfare of the Dulles-CIA school has had an auspicious run; its reputation embellished by a superhuman mythos that its strategic and moral shortcomings do not receive the attention they deserve. Its key tactic is to elude moral responsibility by the drawing up of uncoordinated punitive laundry list measures against the purported target, and its consequences are entirely unplanned, and therefore inherently chaotic. Why this form of warfare when it is useless? As Aristotle explains in Poetics, the action in theatre is not being performed on the stage, but in the souls of the audiences. "Its reputation embellished by a superhuman mythos that its strategic and moral shortcomings do not receive the attention they deserve?" What? Why this form of warfare? Perhaps because secret warfare is the only kind that the Public will tolerate since the Vietnam War, at least until 2001. And now after 12+ years of Iraqi occupation the Public is once again weary of anything but wars conducted in the shadows, where it doesn't openly confront them.
There is an alternative. Fight wars in the long term interest of the public, not to enrich morons and monsters. The first upside of this strategy is that there would be less war.
It's time to get some British up in here:
On June 18 2015 10:48 lastpuritan wrote:Show nested quote +On June 18 2015 09:35 Nyxisto wrote:On June 18 2015 08:43 Dapper_Cad wrote:On June 18 2015 08:21 warding wrote: Moltke cited an online Hearts of Iron game 8 years ago to call me a coward. Those were the days....
Do you still have that saved game? That was your one thousand, three hundred and thirty-seventh post? I thought this was a gaming forum. Shame on you. hey, hearts of iron is a great game! If you cant jihad, no game is great. ![[image loading]](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/25HE-9AiGtw/mqdefault.jpg)
I beg to differ old chap.
That in the end, "[Dulles'] proposed crusade amounted to little more than the intensification of psychological warfare" is certainly true, but that psychological war first began within the United States itself.
That psychological war perhaps, but they were imitating British methods that were used to great effect during the dubble-you dubble-you one, what what?
Speaking of propaganda, I think our own religious convictions are showing:
On June 18 2015 11:47 MoltkeWarding wrote: Yes, hyperbole is merely one way of stopping yourself from being bored by the sameness of everyone else. Other ways include going goth, joining a doomsday cult, cutting yourself, and being Russia.
Pip pip, old bean. Jolly good show.
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There is an alternative. Fight wars in the long term interest of the public, not to enrich morons and monsters. The first upside of this strategy is that there would be less war.
What wars would that be and general interest of what population,the population of the country that goes to war? In the 20th century several European countries fought colonial wars,the dutch in Indonesia,the british about everywhere,the belgium in congo,france and Germany in north Africa. Those wars where fought in the "general interest of the population", at least that was what propaganda wanted to make us believe. (there was even a slogan in the Netherlands that said as much as "if we loose indonesia we will loose our wealth" (indie verloren,rampspoed geboren)) But I have a feeling that those are not the wars you mean. Are you meaning the "war on terror" and the "war on drugs" ? that's not like a classical war at all. The war in iraq? (can be compared to the colonial wars in 20th century) Could you possibly elaborate a bit further on what wars are fought in the general interest of the public (other then defending against an invading force)
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If i understand correctly, he means is basically "A lot less wars".
A war in the general interest of the population is basically only a defensive war, or possibly a war to defend an ally.
If one were to lose the ethical angle, it is possibly for an offensive war against an enemy that is incapable of defending themselves to provide a net positive to the population through whatever gains can be made at the invaded place, but as the effectiveness of guerilla fighters in Iraq has shown us, those practically don't exist. And the loss of prestige tends to negate any gain of such an endeavor, as can be seen by how much global goodwill the US had to give up for their fun iraq adventures. So i highly doubt that such a war actually exists.
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I'm not an out and out pacifist. However it is difficult to image a war in the long term public interest, though one that was supported by the public might be a start. I believe wars of aggression are against international law in theory, if not in practise, that's another pointer. You're absolutely right that almost any war you can think of has been justified by the aggressive party as a war on barbarism or as a preemptive measure and both rely on a public interest argument -either "theirs" or "ours"- so i guess the key is winnowing the facts from the fiction. You certainly don't want anyone who might substantially benefit from the war close to the decision.
I'm never really going to be able to provide a complete answer... I guess it might have something to do with a community of nations and an international court, sort of like a working version of what we have now...
I certainly dont mean the war on terror or the war on drugs. Both are effectively wars on the powerless and the poor.
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On June 19 2015 00:48 Dapper_Cad wrote: You certainly don't want anyone who might substantially benefit from the war close to the decision
Oops, If you have a war that is in the public interest then the public will benefit from the decision therefore the public should not be involved in the decision, immediately contradicting the previous point.
I think you were right to pick on the phrase "war in the public interest". Its a pretty abhorrent idea really. I feel i was closer to something sane with a working version of what we have now, a working ban on aggressive wars, one that would be backed up be a global, possibly military, reaction against the aggressor.
Edit: pretty much what simberto said.
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Cayman Islands24199 Posts
Lol
the only substance i can gleam from the moltke posts is that nato needs to be dominated by the u.s. for there to be effective response to russia, which is another way of complaining about american domination of poor little europe.
even at the height of the cold war, nato deterrence was successful in europe against a more internationalist and ambitious russia. russia as it stands now is only making threats to nato for domestic drama purposes, to encourage the very same attitudes of disunity and fantastical anti-americanism as displayed by some posters itt.
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Cayman Islands24199 Posts
On June 19 2015 01:28 Dapper_Cad wrote:Show nested quote +On June 19 2015 00:48 Dapper_Cad wrote: You certainly don't want anyone who might substantially benefit from the war close to the decision Oops, If you have a war that is in the public interest then the public will benefit from the decision therefore the public should not be involved in the decision, immediately contradicting the previous point. I think you were right to pick on the phrase "war in the public interest". Its a pretty abhorrent idea really. I feel i was closer to something sane with a working version of what we have now, a working ban on aggressive wars, one that would be backed up be a global, possibly military, reaction against the aggressor. Edit: pretty much what simberto said. when the conversation is 'fite or not' something has already gone horribly wrong already. outside of the fantasy kingdoms warring for individual monarchs etc, modern wars are inflamed by dangerous ideologies/blind arrogance of poewr etc. it's best to identify the harmful types of thought that can lead to wars rather than examining the question of war or pacifism like a set scenario.
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oneofthem is unfamiliar with Soviet history or its foreign policy, so he is projecting his rationalisations against a false historical backdrop and his mind is still littered with domestic Cold War propaganda of the 50s.
Broadly speaking, the really dangerous crucible of the Cold War was the period from 1948 to 1956, where the primary foreign policy objective of the USSR in Europe was the prevention of a reconstituted, rearmed Germany in military alliance with the Anglo-American camp. In this she failed, but apart from contemplating an invasion of Yugoslavia circa 1950, there was never any offensive Soviet intention into Western Europe after the Second World War, with or without the presence of American troops. What the presence of American troops did influence in Europe prior to the Khruschev thaw was give the west diplomatic leverage in the negotiations over the future of Germany.
The Soviet position in Eastern Europe was very precarious after Stalin's death; and their aim was to disgorge as many of their overstretched imperial positions as possible without triggering precisely what happened after 1991: the expansion of a Western military bloc to their gates. Soviet foreign policy under the thaw achieved two things in Europe in spite of a hardening American commitment to military containment: withdrawal from Porkkala in Finland (Finnish adherence to the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line becoming derided by American pundits, but in reality showing how a small nation could deal with its larger neighbours on terms of relative moderation), and withdrawal from Austria. These two successes however were overshadowed by the central problem: the entry of Western Germany into NATO under the guidance of Dulles and Adenauer. This made it virtually impossible for the Soviet Union to retreat from East Germany, and thereby disengage itself from the Western bloc.
The Cold War was not initiated by Dulles and Nitze or the West in general, however its permanence was exacerbated in no small deal when Kennan's containment doctrine was deliberately misinterpreted by his more hawkish successors at the Policy Planning Staff after the "father of containment" was squeezed out by Acheson. Containment strategy, in conjunction with the Marshall Plan was intended to resuscitate Europe politically as actors capable of managing their own defense and foreign policy responsibilities. The military and economic stopgap measures undertaken by the US during the Truman administration was meant to expedite this process. What successive American governments encouraged thereafter was actually the very opposite. The policy decisions adopted by the Eisenhower administration to go "tough on communism," and to militarise the Cold War were enacted via the very "dangerous ideology" which infiltrated the Republican Party during the McCarthyite era, and to whose ideological narratives oneofthem is one of the last remaining pharisees.
Finally, I have to address one of oneofthem's most sophistic contentions, so we can clear the air of the rubbish once and for all. To look soberly at our subject either in the past or present is not some irrational pathology of anti-Americanism. The subject is incidental of course: we can just as easily be accused of Gallophobia, Hibernophobia, Lusitanophobia, etc. The target lies not in our sentiments, but in our understanding. Apparently oneofthem is unable to divorce the latter from the former in himself.
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it's best to identify the harmful types of thought that can lead to wars rather than examining the question of war or pacifism like a set scenario.
It's best to identify harmful types of thought and pretend that all wars begin with the propositional when you do not know enough about the world to understand the unique conditions which underlie each conflict. In reality, there is no "harmful type" of thought which is not in some aspect necessary in human nature, including each of our personal wills to violence. The processing of the world's problems does not lie in the reinvention of human nature, or our transfiguration into the New Soviet Man. Security problems are not most usefully examined as categorical intellectual problems, they are always situational, and their resolutions require more study of contexts, including dare I say, history, and less ideological blather.
General ideas are no proof of the strength, but rather of the insufficiency of the human intellect; for there are in nature no beings exactly alike, no things precisely identical, nor any rules indiscriminately and alike applicable to several objects at once. The chief merit of general ideas is, that they enable the human mind to pass a rapid judgment on a great many objects at once; but, on the other hand, the notions they convey are never otherwise than incomplete, and they always cause the mind to lose as much in accuracy as it gains in comprehensiveness.
The proposition that NATO should defend "The Baltics" against a Russian attack is just such a general idea, and it is the idea that is the trouble, because here Russia is merely the incarnation of "red team" in an imagined war game. And what is the problem with this? I quoted Kennan many years ago on this website, when the possibility of American strikes against Iran was in vogue.
Little of this was perceived, however, on the Western side-and on the American side in particular. Once again, the interest in capabilities triumphed over any evidence concerning intentions. The recognition that the Russians had the weapon, and the necessary carriers, served as sufficient basis for the assumption that they had a desire to use it and would, if not deterred, do so.
In part, this was the product of the actual discipline of peacetime military planning. The planner has to assume an adversary. In the case at hand, the Russians, being the strongest and the most rhetorically hostile, were the obvious candidates. The adversary must then be credited with the evilest of intentions. No need to ask why he should be moved to take certain hostile actions, or whether he would be likely to take them. That he has the capability of taking them suffices. The mere fact that they would be damaging to one's own side is regarded as adequate motive for their execution. In this way not only is there created, for planning purposes, the image of the totally inhuman and totally malevolent adversary, but this image is reconjured daily, week after week, month after month, year after year, until it takes on every feature of flesh and blood and becomes the daily companion of those who cultivate it, so that any attempt on anyone's part to deny its reality appears as an act of treason or frivolity. Thus the planner's dummy of the Soviet political personality took the place of the real thing as the image on which a great deal of American policy, and of American military effort, came to be based.
And that is why in the last analysis, oneofthem is wrong even when he gives us the correct answer to the question, because he is asking the wrong question. The question is not whether we will fight, but whether we will fight for the right reasons.
outside of the fantasy kingdoms warring for individual monarchs etc, modern wars are inflamed by dangerous ideologies/blind arrogance of poewr etc.
Once you let oneofthem draw the demarcation line between "fantasy" and reality, you start drifting towards a platonic conception of the world. Either that or he was a star graduate from the Nick Clegg school of rhetoric.
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Poll: Grexit?Yes (7) 58% No (5) 42% 12 total votes Your vote: Grexit? (Vote): Yes (Vote): No
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Is the question "Do you want it to happen?" or "Do you think it will happen?"
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On June 25 2015 16:16 Laurens wrote: Is the question "Do you want it to happen?" or "Do you think it will happen?" I don't want it to happen but if Greece keeps insisting that beggars can actually be choosers it will happen.
And when it happens it will make the current austerity look like "the good old days".
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On June 25 2015 17:35 maartendq wrote:Show nested quote +On June 25 2015 16:16 Laurens wrote: Is the question "Do you want it to happen?" or "Do you think it will happen?" I don't want it to happen but if Greece keeps insisting that beggars can actually be choosers it will happen. And when it happens it will make the current austerity look like "the good old days".
I doubt the rest of EU is really going to suffer much if grexit were to happen now. A year ago it would have been terrible. Today? Not so much.
EDIT: It's going to be pretty terrible to be Greek though.
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