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On July 28 2013 07:41 Darkwhite wrote:Show nested quote +On July 28 2013 07:31 Shiori wrote:Why is it good to build bridges which don't fall down? It isn't. It's good to build bridges competently when tasked to build a bridge for the purposes of ferrying people across it safely. The first people who built bridges weren't being immoral just because they didn't have 21st century engineering know-how. Does that make their bridge-building less moral? No. It makes their bridge-building worse in the sense the word "worse" is used in the vernacular i.e. as not preferred with respect to something else. Building bridges that "don't fall down" isn't a good action in itself. I could build tonnes of totally useless bridges in my backyard, which, even if mechanically stable, wouldn't be created from some moral impulse. Why is it good to cure people who's got syphilis? Probably because we know how to cure syphilis, because people want their syphilis to be cured, because we have the means to cure it on a global level, and because there's absolutely no conceivable reason not to cure syphilis. That doesn't mean all of our doctors are moral paragons compared to the rather primitive Hippocrates, though. It's not the properties of actions themselves that are moral/immoral, but the actions and the reasoning for the actions. I mean, Harris thinks that there is an objective moral difference between world A and world B, such that: A= our world. B= a world in which everyone is always suffering all the time, no matter what. He thinks that this difference (i.e. of our world being a better one) is a moral difference, rather than a value judgment or semantic distinction. But how could it be a moral difference? How can hypothetical worlds be moral agents? They're worlds. We wouldn't say rocks are moral or immoral. They're just rocks. Did you just say that curing syphilis is good, but you can't make up your mind on whether our world is better than everyone always suffering?
"Curing syphilis" isn't good in itself; doctors doing their best to apply their medical knowledge to people who need/want it is good. Curing syphilis is just a fact about our level of scientific knowledge. It has no moral character whatsoever.
Our world is certainly something I'd prefer to one in which everyone is suffering, but nevertheless, that says relatively little about the moral character of anything, and it doesn't establish whether well-being is a suitable qualifier for morality.
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On July 28 2013 08:14 ZenithM wrote:Show nested quote +On July 28 2013 08:05 mcc wrote:On July 28 2013 07:59 ZenithM wrote:On July 28 2013 07:54 Nachtwind wrote:On July 28 2013 07:45 i_bE_free wrote:
General discussions are really ok. But I feel like these mumbo jumbo philisophy shit have really no place in a gaming site. I mean I get when we want to discuss circumcision and euthanasia, but this? Metaethics? Are there no philosophy forum where you could discuss this more properly? I think it´s more like people had a course about 1-2 semesters philosophy want to discuss with people that are just talking with their free "uneducated" mind while those first group is repeating the conclusions their profs made while trying to looking like a baws. That´s mostly true for all "*edit* -general" topics in TL. Lol, that's so fucking true haha :D I'd like to have some credentials requirement when one wants to make a thread like this one. More than "I took a master level 1-semester course on that shit" or "I read a bunch of wikipedia pages". At least a lot more references than 2-3 links and names of authors thrown in there. Obviously, it's not that I don't trust you, but I have no way of knowing if it's actually worth reading this wall of text if I want to inform myself. You understand that he is not writing an article, but starting a discussion on the internet. Plus this is philosophical discussion, what credentials are there ?  That's why I said to cite at least some more references (which is actually the common practice on TL for good General threads, I believe). There are some, so I'll just deal with it And you can have credentials about philosophy. I would more easily trust the overview of a PhD student in philosophy than that of a high schooler. But giving credentials is not the common practice on TL, and I won't be the one to change that, obviously.
Are you complaining for your own sake in avoiding misinformation, are you complaining on the behalf of TL denizens too stupid to judge for themselves that a post is (probably with no malicious intent) deluding them?
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On July 28 2013 08:14 ZenithM wrote:Show nested quote +On July 28 2013 08:05 mcc wrote:On July 28 2013 07:59 ZenithM wrote:On July 28 2013 07:54 Nachtwind wrote:On July 28 2013 07:45 i_bE_free wrote:
General discussions are really ok. But I feel like these mumbo jumbo philisophy shit have really no place in a gaming site. I mean I get when we want to discuss circumcision and euthanasia, but this? Metaethics? Are there no philosophy forum where you could discuss this more properly? I think it´s more like people had a course about 1-2 semesters philosophy want to discuss with people that are just talking with their free "uneducated" mind while those first group is repeating the conclusions their profs made while trying to looking like a baws. That´s mostly true for all "*edit* -general" topics in TL. Lol, that's so fucking true haha :D I'd like to have some credentials requirement when one wants to make a thread like this one. More than "I took a master level 1-semester course on that shit" or "I read a bunch of wikipedia pages". At least a lot more references than 2-3 links and names of authors thrown in there. Obviously, it's not that I don't trust you, but I have no way of knowing if it's actually worth reading this wall of text if I want to inform myself. You understand that he is not writing an article, but starting a discussion on the internet. Plus this is philosophical discussion, what credentials are there ? That's why I said to cite at least some more references (which is actually the common practice on TL for good General threads, I believe). There are some, so I'll just deal with it And you can have credentials about philosophy. I would more easily trust the overview of a PhD student in philosophy than that of a high schooler. But giving credentials is not the common practice on TL, and I won't be the one to change that, obviously.
There are good TLers who open threads with good bit of information and argue properly. Other just circlejerk and muddle the issue with their freshman level philosophy.
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On July 28 2013 07:04 EatThePath wrote:Show nested quote +On July 28 2013 06:47 Rassy wrote:
nadafanboy42 Netherlands. July 28 2013 06:24. Posts 188
Nice post, specially the part where you describe ethics as making choises and i think i have a somewhat similar opinnion.
Voted for expressivism in the poll though the later mentioned moral nihilism would probably fit me better.
I dont think there are objectivly "good" and "bad" things you can do. We not only can not know them, objectivly good and bad things dont exist at all and for me it is all subjective.
The only universal moral i can think of is to do that what raises the entropy the least.
High entropy is bad, low entropy is a little bit less bad. (by my personal choise)
Dont have much more to add,though i would like one of the moral realists to provide at least one ethical truth.
They claim that they exist and that it is possible for humans to know at least some of them, and i am realy curious wich ones they have found so far. (bold) This is my starting point for any conceivable moral code I might endorse, but it has so many problems itself. How can know the effects of one's actions specifically for this rubric. What calculus do you use to know whether you should kill X stars to stop the fires but keep N-X alive to fuel humanity to continue the work of managing and forestalling the universe's heat death. Is this even really a good or fulfilling plan anyway? In the event of inescapable heat death, wouldn't a better aim be to produce as much variety as possible in an envelope of thermodynamic possibilities? Not to mention, how much certainty is required to enact this sort of plan? What if heat death is not the ultimate fate, due to net energy flux? (What is dark energy?) Nevertheless this line of thought it still the most (the only?) ascertainable moral pursuit for me that escapes petty subjectivity. I suppose this standpoint is a sort of declaration that emotional needs should not be confused with moral issues. Which is an amusing crabwise denial of expressivism.
I'm not going to say you two are wrong to have your position, but I just want to say that as far as my position, the crux is that I completely reject the description of "petty subjectivity". The key problem with that in my opinion is that it's people starting from a position of believing in objectivity, then after studying the concept deciding that it does not exist, and then keeping their exact same world view based upon objectivity existing, but just adding the lack of objectivity and thus conclude that existence is meaningless. When the proper response in my opinion is to go back to the first assumption, correct it, and then rebuild a new world view from the ground up accounting for the lack of objectivity.
Subjectivity is the centre of our existence, it is the beginning and end point of all knowledge. When I say morality is a choice, that does not mean it is a meaningless choice, in fact when I say so morality becomes even more important and meaningful than if it was objective. To say "Murder is wrong" and "Murder isn't wrong" is not a choice between two equal positions of equal worth. It is a choice between two radically different positions with radically different consequences. It is a choice that is incredibly important to the person making it, and the people around them. My point was that if someone says "I think murder isn't wrong" I don't think you can say "no that is objectively false and I can prove it", but if you continue that understanding you realise that the only response is: "fine, if that is your choice I can't stop you from choosing. But I've decided that murder is wrong and if you try to commit one I will stop you".
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On July 28 2013 08:14 ZenithM wrote:Show nested quote +On July 28 2013 08:05 mcc wrote:On July 28 2013 07:59 ZenithM wrote:On July 28 2013 07:54 Nachtwind wrote:On July 28 2013 07:45 i_bE_free wrote:
General discussions are really ok. But I feel like these mumbo jumbo philisophy shit have really no place in a gaming site. I mean I get when we want to discuss circumcision and euthanasia, but this? Metaethics? Are there no philosophy forum where you could discuss this more properly? I think it´s more like people had a course about 1-2 semesters philosophy want to discuss with people that are just talking with their free "uneducated" mind while those first group is repeating the conclusions their profs made while trying to looking like a baws. That´s mostly true for all "*edit* -general" topics in TL. Lol, that's so fucking true haha :D I'd like to have some credentials requirement when one wants to make a thread like this one. More than "I took a master level 1-semester course on that shit" or "I read a bunch of wikipedia pages". At least a lot more references than 2-3 links and names of authors thrown in there. Obviously, it's not that I don't trust you, but I have no way of knowing if it's actually worth reading this wall of text if I want to inform myself. You understand that he is not writing an article, but starting a discussion on the internet. Plus this is philosophical discussion, what credentials are there ? That's why I said to cite at least some more references (which is actually the common practice on TL for good General threads, I believe). There are some, so I'll just deal with it And you can have credentials about philosophy. I would more easily trust the overview of a PhD student in philosophy than that of a high schooler. But giving credentials is not the common practice on TL, and I won't be the one to change that, obviously.
Now I see the difference in our viewpoint, I did not take OP as some overview. If you see it like that (which it might have been meant to) then I agree.
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On July 28 2013 04:03 frogrubdown wrote:Show nested quote +On July 28 2013 03:40 WhiteDog wrote:On July 28 2013 03:29 frogrubdown wrote:On July 28 2013 03:13 WhiteDog wrote:
I'm a relativist. I don't really understand all the error theory thing.
That it cause problem philosophically doesn't mean much to me, as I come from a sociological background. From a sociological point of view, the theorical talk doesn't mean much.
What we can do on the other side, is see that 1) most ethical behavior or positions are historic, which means that they are not natural ; 2) most individuals have value, moral, taste and judgement that are heavily linked (if not entirely determined by) with their social origin (different social class have different value to be quick). Well, apparently theoretical talk means something to you when that theory happens to be relativism :p More seriously, every metaethical theory will have to come to terms with facts about the historical and cross-cultural differences in ethical beliefs that you discuss in (1) and (2). They will just disagree on what these facts say about metaethics. (As a sidenote, I think you're misreading my use of 'natural'. Think of 'natural' as non-supernatural. Cultures are every bit as natural as rocks on my use). To have a more productive dialogue, I'd think I'd have to know how your relativist views play out philosophically. For instance, what do you think is the meaning and truth conditions of a sentence such 'Murder is wrong'? (Obviously you don't have to be completely precise here. Because, from my point of view, relativism was historically a way to fight the ethnocentrism of the observant for anthropologues, defended by Bronislaw Manilowski. It's not entirelly a theorical talk, as it is a practice as much as a concept. I was hoping to avoid this issue for a little bit in the thread, but I guess I'll discuss it now. Yes, a doctrine given the name "relativism" has frequently been invoked as a weapon against imperialism, especially in social science departments. However, to be blunt, this has never made even the slightest amount of sense. There is no relativist argument for tolerance.My thoughts on this aren't original. They've been published by hundred of philosophers before and you can find them advanced in hundreds of intro philosophy classes at assorted universities. The problem is simply that if what culture you're in determines what is right, then there is no ground from which you can criticize the imperialistic practices of your own culture. It doesn't matter if what the other culture is doing is also right for them, because what's right for them has nothing to do with what's right for you according to relativism. Relativism would be the best news ever for would-be imperialists. I'll quote Bernard Williams: Show nested quote +Let us at this stage of the argument about subjectivism take a brief rest and look round a special view or assemblage of views which has been built on the site of moral disagreements between societies. This is relativism, the anthropologists' heresy, possibly the most absurd view to have been advanced in moral philosophy. In its vulgar and unregenerate form (which I shall consider, since it is both the most distinctive and the most influential form) it consists of three propositions: that 'right' means (can only be coherently understood as meaning) 'right for a given society' ; that 'right for a given society' is to be understood in a functionalist sense ; and that (therefore) it is wrong for people in one society to condemn, interfere with, etc., the values of another society. A view with a long history, it was popular with some liberal colonialists, notably British administrators in places (such as West Africa) in which white men held no land. In that historical role, it may have had, like some other muddled doctrines, a beneficent influence, though modern African nationalism may well deplore its tribalist and conservative implications.
Whatever its results, the view is clearly inconsistent, since it makes a claim in its third proposition, about what is right and wrong in one's dealings with other societies, which uses a nonrelative sense of 'right' not allowed for in the first proposition. The claim that human sacrifice, for instance, was 'right for' the Ashanti comes to be taken as saying that human sacrifice was right among the Ashanti, and this in turn as saying that human sacrifice among the Ashanti was right; i.e., we have no business interfering with it. But this last is certainly not the sort of claim allowed by the theory. The most the theory can allow is the claim that it is right for (i.e., functionally valuable for) our socieity not to interfere with Ashanti society, and, first, this is certainly not all that was meant, and, second, is very dubiously true. From the chapter "Interlude Relativism", worth reading in full. People who call themselves relativists because of arguments like this are really absolutists. They believe in an absolute principle of non-interference in other cultures no matter what your culture thinks about interference (and the individual that disagrees with their culture's ethics are out of luck). Show nested quote +
Also, when I read natural, I instantly oppose it to cultural so I might have misunderstood indeed.
As for your question "Murder is wrong", again from a sociological point of view, every assertions are always linked to a context, historical and sociological : "Murder is wrong in today's society", "Murder is not wrong in war", "It is not wrong to murder a slave when you are a noble in the medieval age in France", etc.
This doesn't answer my question about meaning and truth conditions as fully as I'd hoped.
As I said, it was a question of practice and not a question of right or wrong. Back when Anthropology arise, most anthropologues were evolutionnists. But, what is important, is not that those anthropologues thought that each societies followed the same rail, it is more that they thought that they could understand a society using their own history or culture.
For exemple, they had, in their own society, a certain view of "what is a woman", and considered the society they were studying through the same logic, which is obviously wrong because "woman" does not mean the same in every society (as someone like Margaret Mead showed). Malinowski used "relativism" not to give an explanation on what is right or wrong, but as a way for anthropologue to see a society : they had to accept everything, not take any moral judgement on what they were seeing, and try to actually study the reality that they were facing building their own concept. As I said, it's practical.
that 'right' means (can only be coherently understood as meaning) 'right for a given society' (1); that 'right for a given society' is to be understood in a functionalist sense (2); and that (therefore) it is wrong for people in one society to condemn, interfere with, etc., the values of another society (3)
1 is true from a relativist point of view. 2 is completly false. Social science have gone away from functionalism since 60 years (T. Parsons). Nobody consider that what is "right" for a given society has a function within this society, but that it is right because it is right, and there are cultural, historical and social reason that can explain why this is considered as right and not that.
Hence 3 is also false. We can critic, and progress, in moral as in science, but from a relativist point of view, we have to consider that defining what is right or wrong is a choice - political, in practice, etc. - that crystalize itself throughout history, in institutions, culture, etc., and not something that is given by the "above" (whether that be god, our gene, or our "human condition").
A view with a long history, it was popular with some liberal colonialists, notably British administrators in places (such as West Africa) in which white men held no land. In that historical role, it may have had, like some other muddled doctrines, a beneficent influence, though modern African nationalism may well deplore its tribalist and conservative implications.
Interesting use of history. Completly true, but if you look at the other type of colonialism (mainly France) that had a more activ way of colonizating countries (on the idea that France represented what is "right"), the result is not really better (in fact, it was worse). I'm not sure where the author wants to go there.
It seems like, from the quote you made, the author seems to refute "relativism" on moral grounds rather than logic.
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On July 28 2013 08:25 mcc wrote:Show nested quote +On July 28 2013 08:14 ZenithM wrote:On July 28 2013 08:05 mcc wrote:On July 28 2013 07:59 ZenithM wrote:On July 28 2013 07:54 Nachtwind wrote:On July 28 2013 07:45 i_bE_free wrote:
General discussions are really ok. But I feel like these mumbo jumbo philisophy shit have really no place in a gaming site. I mean I get when we want to discuss circumcision and euthanasia, but this? Metaethics? Are there no philosophy forum where you could discuss this more properly? I think it´s more like people had a course about 1-2 semesters philosophy want to discuss with people that are just talking with their free "uneducated" mind while those first group is repeating the conclusions their profs made while trying to looking like a baws. That´s mostly true for all "*edit* -general" topics in TL. Lol, that's so fucking true haha :D I'd like to have some credentials requirement when one wants to make a thread like this one. More than "I took a master level 1-semester course on that shit" or "I read a bunch of wikipedia pages". At least a lot more references than 2-3 links and names of authors thrown in there. Obviously, it's not that I don't trust you, but I have no way of knowing if it's actually worth reading this wall of text if I want to inform myself. You understand that he is not writing an article, but starting a discussion on the internet. Plus this is philosophical discussion, what credentials are there ? That's why I said to cite at least some more references (which is actually the common practice on TL for good General threads, I believe). There are some, so I'll just deal with it And you can have credentials about philosophy. I would more easily trust the overview of a PhD student in philosophy than that of a high schooler. But giving credentials is not the common practice on TL, and I won't be the one to change that, obviously. Now I see the difference in our viewpoint, I did not take OP as some overview. If you see it like that (which it might have been meant to) then I agree.
This thread is intended to give a primer on the most influential theories in contemporary analytic metaethics while also providing a place to discuss and debate disagreements and to voice opinions.
Quite the ambitious statement, to be frank. I know nothing about metaethics (which I don't think I should be ashamed of), but if I wanted to start somewhere, I'd like what I read to come from a reliable source or cite reliable sources, even if it's just an introduction.
Obviously as others said, there are "good TLers" who just want to make good threads and are knowledgeable enough, so I'm kinda complaining in the air, but it's not that obvious that I can read this OP (we do read OPs, right? :D) and take it at face value.
Okay, sorry about that, I'll stop derailing this thread and let you talk about metaethics to your heart's content, guys :D
There are a lot of threads that just give infos without citing sources, and I don't complain usually, but for once this thread seemed really interesting to me, that's why I made the remark that there could be more sources :D
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On July 28 2013 08:55 ZenithM wrote:Show nested quote +On July 28 2013 08:25 mcc wrote:On July 28 2013 08:14 ZenithM wrote:On July 28 2013 08:05 mcc wrote:On July 28 2013 07:59 ZenithM wrote:On July 28 2013 07:54 Nachtwind wrote:On July 28 2013 07:45 i_bE_free wrote:
General discussions are really ok. But I feel like these mumbo jumbo philisophy shit have really no place in a gaming site. I mean I get when we want to discuss circumcision and euthanasia, but this? Metaethics? Are there no philosophy forum where you could discuss this more properly? I think it´s more like people had a course about 1-2 semesters philosophy want to discuss with people that are just talking with their free "uneducated" mind while those first group is repeating the conclusions their profs made while trying to looking like a baws. That´s mostly true for all "*edit* -general" topics in TL. Lol, that's so fucking true haha :D I'd like to have some credentials requirement when one wants to make a thread like this one. More than "I took a master level 1-semester course on that shit" or "I read a bunch of wikipedia pages". At least a lot more references than 2-3 links and names of authors thrown in there. Obviously, it's not that I don't trust you, but I have no way of knowing if it's actually worth reading this wall of text if I want to inform myself. You understand that he is not writing an article, but starting a discussion on the internet. Plus this is philosophical discussion, what credentials are there ? That's why I said to cite at least some more references (which is actually the common practice on TL for good General threads, I believe). There are some, so I'll just deal with it And you can have credentials about philosophy. I would more easily trust the overview of a PhD student in philosophy than that of a high schooler. But giving credentials is not the common practice on TL, and I won't be the one to change that, obviously. Now I see the difference in our viewpoint, I did not take OP as some overview. If you see it like that (which it might have been meant to) then I agree. Show nested quote +This thread is intended to give a primer on the most influential theories in contemporary analytic metaethics while also providing a place to discuss and debate disagreements and to voice opinions. Quite the ambitious statement, to be frank. I know nothing about metaethics (which I don't think I should be ashamed of), but if I wanted to start somewhere, I'd like what I read to come from a reliable source or cite reliable sources, even if it's just an introduction. Obviously as others said, there are "good TLers" who just want to make good threads and are knowledgeable enough, so I'm kinda complaining in the air, but it's not that obvious that I can read this OP (we do read OPs, right? :D) and take it at face value. Okay, sorry about that, I'll stop derailing this thread and let you talk about metaethics to your heart's content, guys :D There are a lot of threads that just give infos without citing sources, and I don't complain usually, but for once this thread seemed really interesting to me, that's why I made the remark that there could be more sources :D
The OP is going into the third year of his philosophy PhD.
I know he put a lot of work into this post, and it would have taken even longer to cite papers/books for every area. I think it would be better for people to ask for recommended readings if there is a particular area they are interested in reading more about. And if frog's feeling up to it maybe he can add some of those sources to the OP as the discussion in the thread moves along. Other people have been posting articles throughout the thread, too.
If you're looking for a primer with a bibliography, here's one in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. There are also links at the bottom to related entries or you can search the site for topics or philosophers you want to read more about.
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Cayman Islands24199 Posts
realist (naturalist) but i think the difference with expressivism is not so much one of fact with respect to moral statements, but a performative/attitude thing wtih the moral agent
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On July 28 2013 08:23 nadafanboy42 wrote:Show nested quote +On July 28 2013 07:04 EatThePath wrote:On July 28 2013 06:47 Rassy wrote:
nadafanboy42 Netherlands. July 28 2013 06:24. Posts 188
Nice post, specially the part where you describe ethics as making choises and i think i have a somewhat similar opinnion.
Voted for expressivism in the poll though the later mentioned moral nihilism would probably fit me better.
I dont think there are objectivly "good" and "bad" things you can do. We not only can not know them, objectivly good and bad things dont exist at all and for me it is all subjective.
The only universal moral i can think of is to do that what raises the entropy the least.
High entropy is bad, low entropy is a little bit less bad. (by my personal choise)
Dont have much more to add,though i would like one of the moral realists to provide at least one ethical truth.
They claim that they exist and that it is possible for humans to know at least some of them, and i am realy curious wich ones they have found so far. (bold) This is my starting point for any conceivable moral code I might endorse, but it has so many problems itself. How can know the effects of one's actions specifically for this rubric. What calculus do you use to know whether you should kill X stars to stop the fires but keep N-X alive to fuel humanity to continue the work of managing and forestalling the universe's heat death. Is this even really a good or fulfilling plan anyway? In the event of inescapable heat death, wouldn't a better aim be to produce as much variety as possible in an envelope of thermodynamic possibilities? Not to mention, how much certainty is required to enact this sort of plan? What if heat death is not the ultimate fate, due to net energy flux? (What is dark energy?) Nevertheless this line of thought it still the most (the only?) ascertainable moral pursuit for me that escapes petty subjectivity. I suppose this standpoint is a sort of declaration that emotional needs should not be confused with moral issues. Which is an amusing crabwise denial of expressivism. I'm not going to say you two are wrong to have your position, but I just want to say that as far as my position, the crux is that I completely reject the description of "petty subjectivity". The key problem with that in my opinion is that it's people starting from a position of believing in objectivity, then after studying the concept deciding that it does not exist, and then keeping their exact same world view based upon objectivity existing, but just adding the lack of objectivity and thus conclude that existence is meaningless. When the proper response in my opinion is to go back to the first assumption, correct it, and then rebuild a new world view from the ground up accounting for the lack of objectivity. Subjectivity is the centre of our existence, it is the beginning and end point of all knowledge. When I say morality is a choice, that does not mean it is a meaningless choice, in fact when I say so morality becomes even more important and meaningful than if it was objective. To say "Murder is wrong" and "Murder isn't wrong" is not a choice between two equal positions of equal worth. It is a choice between two radically different positions with radically different consequences. It is a choice that is incredibly important to the person making it, and the people around them. My point was that if someone says "I think murder isn't wrong" I don't think you can say "no that is objectively false and I can prove it", but if you continue that understanding you realise that the only response is: "fine, if that is your choice I can't stop you from choosing. But I've decided that murder is wrong and if you try to commit one I will stop you".
I think I was in my way trying to respect the place of subjectivity by making a distinction for the "petty" kind that excuses individual differences indefinitely. But that wasn't very clear at all.
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On July 28 2013 08:52 WhiteDog wrote:Show nested quote +On July 28 2013 04:03 frogrubdown wrote:On July 28 2013 03:40 WhiteDog wrote:On July 28 2013 03:29 frogrubdown wrote:On July 28 2013 03:13 WhiteDog wrote:
I'm a relativist. I don't really understand all the error theory thing.
That it cause problem philosophically doesn't mean much to me, as I come from a sociological background. From a sociological point of view, the theorical talk doesn't mean much.
What we can do on the other side, is see that 1) most ethical behavior or positions are historic, which means that they are not natural ; 2) most individuals have value, moral, taste and judgement that are heavily linked (if not entirely determined by) with their social origin (different social class have different value to be quick). Well, apparently theoretical talk means something to you when that theory happens to be relativism :p More seriously, every metaethical theory will have to come to terms with facts about the historical and cross-cultural differences in ethical beliefs that you discuss in (1) and (2). They will just disagree on what these facts say about metaethics. (As a sidenote, I think you're misreading my use of 'natural'. Think of 'natural' as non-supernatural. Cultures are every bit as natural as rocks on my use). To have a more productive dialogue, I'd think I'd have to know how your relativist views play out philosophically. For instance, what do you think is the meaning and truth conditions of a sentence such 'Murder is wrong'? (Obviously you don't have to be completely precise here. Because, from my point of view, relativism was historically a way to fight the ethnocentrism of the observant for anthropologues, defended by Bronislaw Manilowski. It's not entirelly a theorical talk, as it is a practice as much as a concept. I was hoping to avoid this issue for a little bit in the thread, but I guess I'll discuss it now. Yes, a doctrine given the name "relativism" has frequently been invoked as a weapon against imperialism, especially in social science departments. However, to be blunt, this has never made even the slightest amount of sense. There is no relativist argument for tolerance.My thoughts on this aren't original. They've been published by hundred of philosophers before and you can find them advanced in hundreds of intro philosophy classes at assorted universities. The problem is simply that if what culture you're in determines what is right, then there is no ground from which you can criticize the imperialistic practices of your own culture. It doesn't matter if what the other culture is doing is also right for them, because what's right for them has nothing to do with what's right for you according to relativism. Relativism would be the best news ever for would-be imperialists. I'll quote Bernard Williams: Let us at this stage of the argument about subjectivism take a brief rest and look round a special view or assemblage of views which has been built on the site of moral disagreements between societies. This is relativism, the anthropologists' heresy, possibly the most absurd view to have been advanced in moral philosophy. In its vulgar and unregenerate form (which I shall consider, since it is both the most distinctive and the most influential form) it consists of three propositions: that 'right' means (can only be coherently understood as meaning) 'right for a given society' ; that 'right for a given society' is to be understood in a functionalist sense ; and that (therefore) it is wrong for people in one society to condemn, interfere with, etc., the values of another society. A view with a long history, it was popular with some liberal colonialists, notably British administrators in places (such as West Africa) in which white men held no land. In that historical role, it may have had, like some other muddled doctrines, a beneficent influence, though modern African nationalism may well deplore its tribalist and conservative implications.
Whatever its results, the view is clearly inconsistent, since it makes a claim in its third proposition, about what is right and wrong in one's dealings with other societies, which uses a nonrelative sense of 'right' not allowed for in the first proposition. The claim that human sacrifice, for instance, was 'right for' the Ashanti comes to be taken as saying that human sacrifice was right among the Ashanti, and this in turn as saying that human sacrifice among the Ashanti was right; i.e., we have no business interfering with it. But this last is certainly not the sort of claim allowed by the theory. The most the theory can allow is the claim that it is right for (i.e., functionally valuable for) our socieity not to interfere with Ashanti society, and, first, this is certainly not all that was meant, and, second, is very dubiously true. From the chapter "Interlude Relativism", worth reading in full. People who call themselves relativists because of arguments like this are really absolutists. They believe in an absolute principle of non-interference in other cultures no matter what your culture thinks about interference (and the individual that disagrees with their culture's ethics are out of luck).
Also, when I read natural, I instantly oppose it to cultural so I might have misunderstood indeed.
As for your question "Murder is wrong", again from a sociological point of view, every assertions are always linked to a context, historical and sociological : "Murder is wrong in today's society", "Murder is not wrong in war", "It is not wrong to murder a slave when you are a noble in the medieval age in France", etc.
This doesn't answer my question about meaning and truth conditions as fully as I'd hoped. As I said, it was a question of practice and not a question of right or wrong. Back when Anthropology arise, most anthropologues were evolutionnists. But, what is important, is not that those anthropologues thought that each societies followed the same rail, it is more that they thought that they could understand a society using their own history or culture. For exemple, they had, in their own society, a certain view of "what is a woman", and considered the society they were studying through the same logic, which is obviously wrong because "woman" does not mean the same in every society (as someone like Margaret Mead showed). Malinowski used "relativism" not to give an explanation on what is right or wrong, but as a way for anthropologue to see a society : they had to accept everything, not take any moral judgement on what they were seeing, and try to actually study the reality that they were facing building their own concept. As I said, it's practical. Show nested quote +that 'right' means (can only be coherently understood as meaning) 'right for a given society' (1); that 'right for a given society' is to be understood in a functionalist sense (2); and that (therefore) it is wrong for people in one society to condemn, interfere with, etc., the values of another society (3) 1 is true from a relativist point of view. 2 is completly false. Social science have gone away from functionalism since 60 years (T. Parsons). Nobody consider that what is "right" for a given society has a function within this society, but that it is right because it is right, and there are cultural, historical and social reason that can explain why this is considered as right and not that. Hence 3 is also false. We can critic, and progress, in moral as in science, but from a relativist point of view, we have to consider that defining what is right or wrong is a choice - political, in practice, etc. - that crystalize itself throughout history, in institutions, culture, etc., and not something that is given by the "above" (whether that be god, our gene, or our "human condition"). Show nested quote +A view with a long history, it was popular with some liberal colonialists, notably British administrators in places (such as West Africa) in which white men held no land. In that historical role, it may have had, like some other muddled doctrines, a beneficent influence, though modern African nationalism may well deplore its tribalist and conservative implications. Interesting use of history. Completly true, but if you look at the other type of colonialism (mainly France) that had a more activ way of colonizating countries (on the idea that France represented what is "right"), the result is not really better (in fact, it was worse). I'm not sure where the author wants to go there. It seems like, from the quote you made, the author seems to refute "relativism" on moral grounds rather than logic.
We still seem to be talking at cross purposes here. You're citing a number of things that I for the most part accept about the varieties and sources of ethical beliefs. You also discuss (as does Williams) the role that a set of views described as "relativism" has had in rhetoric concerning our treatment of other people. I have no problem with that stuff, but it doesn't really speak to what I was saying.
My point, and Williams' point, is just that whether or not we should tolerate other practices or engage in imperialism or ethnocentrism has very little to do with relativism. There isn't any plausible argument on the basis of relativism (as a philosophical thesis about what determines goodness) to any conclusions about how we should treat others with different ethical beliefs. If anything, forms of absolutism can come out more tolerant than relativism on these issues, since they can include culture-independent principles of non-interference or judgment.
I understand that you find these philosophical points less interesting than the historical/sociological points you discuss, but I think it's very important to keep the differences in mind when discussing relativism.
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There have been a number of long, appreciated posts that are sort of halfway between general statements about the poster's viewpoint and statements directed at me (and also some less appreciated posts confusingly insulting my character and the existence of this thread). I won't be able to respond to all of these but I hope I end up addressing the most specific questions people have for me.
On July 28 2013 06:27 EatThePath wrote:
Wow this thread might actually raise the bar at TL. Nice work. I found the content in the OP very informatively put but I didn't get much of anything new from it. What I mean to say is, I guess I'm disappointed to learn the state of things because I expected there was a bit more going on in fundamental disagreements and not twiddling with details in order to shore up or undermine the dykes. I don't really see any kind of technical work (like footnote 10) illuminating "ought" any better.
I can sort of see what you're saying here. To be fair, the dispute between the non-naturalists and everyone else is pretty clearly a fundamental one, but if you reject their position out of hand then it's easy to see the remaining views as fiddling about details. If you are committed to a broadly naturalistic picture (and, yes, this is super vague), then I don't think you're going to find disputes about ethics at a much deeper or sexier level than the types of disputes you find here. But I'm all ears if you have suggestions to the contrary.
I voted Error Theory in the poll because I am skeptical of categorical imperatives, but I'm also skeptical of other things so there may be a better label but I am lacking the education to be aware of it. The suggestion that GGTemplar should go with "agnostic" is interesting because it seems like you can make a strong case that the burden of proof is on realists, so agnosticism is some kind of hopeful mystical undecided category where you don't want to stick with skepticism and give them the benefit of the doubt. Fair, sure, but a curious reluctance of commitment when you are in doubt of any of the three theses the OP deals with.
I'm inclined to disagree on the burden issue. Sure, theists for instance have the burden of proof in theological debates because they are advancing a view which posits the existence of a unique unobserved object. But, at least for the naturalistic realists, this is not the case. They do not posit any new objects or properties, just the same old ones you already believe in but organized in a complicated way at a higher level (much like countries are just complicated organizations of natural objects you already believe in). So, to get the burden onto the anti-realists, I don't think they need very much more than the fact that people talk as though realism were true.
Briefly, what I'm saying is based on a charity assumption in semantics combined with the thesis that there are possible referents for moral terms that would make much of the discourse true if those possible referents turned out to be the actual ones.
edit: @nadafanboy, sorry but I'm sort of at a loss for insightful things to respond with or labelings of your view that I feel confident with.
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What an interesting OP. I liked hearing the modern terms for stances that most people here can easily reject or accept, in whole or in part. I'm still getting around to reading more moral philosophers to get a grasp of the evidence, arguments, and historical origins of the field. My interests lean towards the political philosophers and legal philosophers because I argue for big changes in governance.
However, it's just so fascinating to see FGM in the context of a moral realism (and I'd be accurately described as a non-naturalistic moral realist). Can certain traditions be moderately or extremely painful, but not ethically wrong? When does culture do a moral disservice to children (indoctrination), and when is it just teaching of a non-scientific kind? Is that even a knowable ethical truth? I enjoy thinking and writing about those questions.
I watched a video on moral tradition and group selection (prior biologist and philosopher) arguing that he cannot rationally discuss the merits of some traditions (The Why), but admit the results are greatly beneficial for a society (As a discipline on our instincts). He proposed the only truth in tradition is experimentation (laying aside the ethical truths we can know, and focusing on those we don't or perhaps can't know): those groups having some moral philosophies un-evaluatable are an experiment, and within that allowing some to experiment with particular items. One can watch the success of some groups (or subgroups) gained from making that moral change. In essence, deciding by selection where no "rational" decision can really be made. Of course, that success can itself be evaluated and takes us farther and farther away i.e. widespread poverty, disease, lawlessness, and lack of opportunity.
Edit: Video was from an agnostic that questioned his views on religious traditions, but not on religion itself.
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huh. To me, not understanding too much of the OP, the most interesting part of this thread is the langauge people are using. Like, people needlessly use overly roundabout sentence structures that they wouldn't normally use. Not to pick on anyone in particular but sorry but I'm sort of at a loss for insightful things to respond with or labelings of your view that I feel confident with. Wouldn't this sentence be better as I'm not sure what i'd label you. sorry can't help. I realize this is a philosophy thread, but I feel like many things that people are saying here can be expressed in much simpler ways without losing any value. This is just an observation that i thought was interesting. My main point is:
I think the OP doesn't do a very good job of giving "a primer on the most influential theories in contemporary analytic metaethics" - the definitions used and the way he presents them are very meta, and not easily accessible to an outside audience. They might be perfectly serviceable to anyone that already knows all the jargon, but convoluted and obtuse for their intended audience.
I'm fine with the thread being exclusive, but it seems to be set up to be inclusive and could do with many improvements on that front. Even some wikipedia links would be useful.
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Cayman Islands24199 Posts
no that sentence wouldn't be better for the purpose, just as a knife wouldn't be better than a razor at shaving.
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On July 28 2013 12:42 frogrubdown wrote:
I'm inclined to disagree on the burden issue. Sure, theists for instance have the burden of proof in theological debates because they are advancing a view which posits the existence of a unique unobserved object. But, at least for the naturalistic realists, this is not the case. They do not posit any new objects or properties, just the same old ones you already believe in but organized in a complicated way at a higher level (much like countries are just complicated organizations of natural objects you already believe in). So, to get the burden onto the anti-realists, I don't think they need very much more than the fact that people talk as though realism were true.
In the bold part, are you alluding to shenanigans involving the transposition of set theory to morals and ethics? If so any reference for that?
As a layman thanks for the op. Made me want to watch Babylon 5 again
Aren't you leaving out constructivism out of your list though? Relativism seems to fit better with constructivism, since contrary to error theory, it does not believe there is an universal, atemporal, objective, self consistent, albeit unknowable frame of reference. The way the frame is constructed is subjective and depends on circumstances, but is not purely expressivist either.
Another layman observation. For moral realists, what would be the truth value of "killing is wrong"? Would it be false, because it is not always true? Or would it be a nonsensical proposition?
With "murder is wrong", the term is value-laden so saying that it is true is trivial.
If it is nonsensical, is there any relevant question of interest to society that can be treated in a formal general way, without endless circumstantial clarifications?
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I understood around 45% of what the OP was talking about :/
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On July 28 2013 15:33 harlock78 wrote:
Another layman observation. For moral realists, what would be the truth value of "killing is wrong"? Would it be false, because it is not always true? Or would it be a nonsensical proposition?
With "murder is wrong", the term is value-laden so saying that it is true is trivial.
If it is nonsensical, is there any relevant question of interest to society that can be treated in a formal general way, without endless circumstantial clarifications?
The OP doesn't cover moral realism in any great detail because it is a gigantic area of enquiry. There are forms of moral realism which differ radically in terms of what makes a particular moral proposition true or false. For example, certain moral realists, called 'deontologists', would argue that 'murder is wrong' is true on any interpretation in virtue of some categorical imperative (in other words a moral law that must always be adhered to). Other moral realists argue that 'murder is wrong' is true only on particular interpretations. For instance, they might claim that the assassination of a totalitarian dictator demonstrates the falsity of the proposition 'murder is wrong'. This might be because the assassination of the totalitarian dictator brings about greater well-being for the population that is being dictated.
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There seems to be quite some confusion because questions that are quite similar to those lined out in the OP can be raised in sociological and historical approaches to ethic and morals. This schools of thought have contributed enormously to our modern understanding of metaethics, and there is no argument here that the historical and social conditions are irrelevant to any ethical standpoint - quite the contrary, actually. However, to put it bluntly, the algorithms run by the computer you're reading this on don't become erroneous just because Alan Turing was gay.
We mustn't confuse an explanation of when and how a proposition was spoken (or written) with a disconfirmation of said proposition. It's a common fallacy: Nietzsche and Freud did it with their rebuttals of Christian morals, Marx did it when he rejected the 'ruling ethos' as 'ideas of the ruling classes'. However, there is no direct connection between the historical and sociological conditions of its upbringing and the logical and scientific validity of a statement. "Though shalt not kill." doesn't magically become bullshit when you realize that the Biblical history of creation reflects contemporary myths. "Human dignity" isn't an empty term because of our knowledge about the labor conditions of the 18th Century educational elite. Conversely, if there are good ethical reasons to reject slavery because it violates human dignity, then slavery is ethically wrong - and always has been, even if the realization of this truth may not have occured before the new-age.
In short, it does not make sense to evaluate the truth value of a proposition under specific timely conditions because logical evaluation does not depend on time. 1 and 1 is 2, not 1 and 1 becomes 2.
As the OP has explained, there are meaningful reasons to reject the notion of ethical statements having truth values; but none of these are historical or sociological. In other words, while history and sociology can contribute to our understanding of ethics - and even raise suspicion against certain ideas -, the impression that something is right or wrong just because of its history or social embeddedness is not a viable philosophical standpoint but rather a genetic fallacy.
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I have a general question about moral realism, though I know it's too general, covering too wide an area, to get a full answer, but I've wanted to ask it for a while.
Upon re-reading I'm finding I'm asking many different questions but I think it can be summarised under "What definition of 'fact' (or 'truth') are moral realists using, and what are the implications of it?", and due to my choice of example, what I'm asking here affect naturalistic realism in particular. And of course, at the end of the day, these question may simply serve to be a critique of said theories and these questions are debatable as to their ability to be answered
Suppose we took Utilitarianism to be true. We now know that happiness is the ultimate intrinsic good, and should be maximised while pain is minimised. What does it mean to call this a 'fact' though? What does it mean to say this is the truth? Was it true before (and will it continue to be true after) there were things capable of being happy (and does it matter if these beings are intelligent enough formulate the concept of morality?). Or did it become a moral truth as beings with the capacity for happiness began concerning themselves with morality?
If it were always a moral truth of the world that happiness should be maximised, I don't see a way of getting out of the idea that some kind of God made it be so. I mean, perhaps if we were to take the multi-verse theory, the version where each universe has it's own 'laws of physics' etc, perhaps we could say that each universe has it's own moral facts that are arbitrarily and seemingly randomly formed. But what reason do we have for following or adhering to this moral fact? The laws of physics are always ruling over me and I cannot escape them, I can't 'ignore' gravity and just float off into space under normal conditions, but I can quite easily defy this moral fact of happiness maximisation, and so, basically, what's the point of it? If there were a God to 'enforce' it, the 'point' of it may be known, thus my earlier point.
On the other hand, if it only became a moral truth once beings capable of happiness became concerned with morality, I don't see how we can get out of something akin to relativism but on a species, or worldly scale. e.g what is moral truth on this world is 'true' because and only because beings capable of happiness that are concerned with morality exist here. However, in this other galaxy on this other world, where beings capable of 'zooplar' that are concerned with 'gammafornia' exist, the moral truth is to 'devartinate' the 'kinkinque'. This scenario basically falls under Mill's 'proof' of utilitarianism (only evidence x is visible is that x is seen, desired, desirable, etc) which I just don't agree with. We like to be happy and so we try to maximise happiness, sure, cool, but whether that is moral or a moral fact can be derived from it is another issue.
I'll cut it short there because that's probably already too many individual questions in one post.
Maybe I have completely the wrong concept of what truth is, and I hope to be enlightened, but I actually just don't understand what it would mean for there to be a moral truth, let alone how that truth would be found. I understand, of course, that truth can be contingent, it didn't have to be true that I made this post, much in that way that it wouldn't have had to be true that Utilitarianism were true in my hypothetical world, but I seem to have this unshakable thought in my head that if we claim something to be 'moral fact' it is something apart, above, other facts, in a different realm to the fact 'I am sitting in a chair', which is simply unobtainable to us.
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EPT
