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On July 10 2013 09:59 wherebugsgo wrote:
Uncaused events are not problematic-you need to define what you mean by that. Like I said, look up indeterminism on Wikipedia.
Specifically, look at the necessary but insufficient and probabilistic causation entries.
The probabilistic causation one doesn't seem promising to me at all. I mean, the notion that causes increase the probabilities of their effects is definitely true, not matter what theory of causality you subscribe to (determinism would argue that causes increase that probability to one). The problem is that they need to show that this probability is non-zero. I haven't seen any actual proof of such a claim other than the sort of tedious argument that, yes, strictly speaking correlation doesn't imply causation, but to argue that such a thing is meaningfully applicable here is to claim that, given an infinite number of literally identical trials, at least one trial would violate its probable cause. Considering we have a grand total of zero macroscopic occurrences of this out of the entirety of observed events, then probabilistic causation remains merely hypothetical. Also the idea of "raising probabilities" seems to imply classical causation. How does A increase the probability of B? Does it probabilistically increase the probability of B, and so on and so forth?
As for necessity, that term is so nebulously defined that philosophers basically can't make up their minds as to how to even meaningfully talk about it. It's also a sort of ad hoc definition of causality IMO, because it's tautologically true (in a sense) because if A caused B in the past, then A was by definition necessary and sufficient for B. It's impossible to actually talk meaningfully about necessity and sufficiency without referring to the other, which hinders things greatly.
Pretty much every example I saw on that page was taking something that's not strictly true in a specific sense and yet seems true in a general sense and then talking about necessity and sufficiency based on that. When we say that smoking probably causes cancer, what we actually mean is that smoking has certain physiological affects on the body which, through a chain of events which may or may not occur depending on an incalculable number of variables involving the mutation of DNA, can result in a condition we call "cancer." So while it's true that smoking, colloquially, "causes" cancer, what actually causes cancer is a particular kind of mutation in DNA, which is caused by certain environmental factors, and so on and so forth all the way back to smoking a cigarette. Our probabilistic assessment is based on the fact that we can't track the interaction of smoking a cigarette and the entire human body in anything approaching specificity, not that there's some step where we just say "yeah, and then they flip a coin."
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Indeed i do think the brain is all chemistry and chemical electricity .
On my own, i've thought about this a little bit. I think what consciousness actually is, is nothing but darwinian method happening in the brain. There are all these linkages that store memory in the brain. Each one of these linkages fight over the other linkages to try and win -out in the battle of ideas. And only threw a learning experience does the brain set up these linkages (memories) to favor one over the other to tip the scales in favor of a certain set of linkages. (memories can contain any aspect of life)
The consciousness we experience i fully expect is a electrochemical fight within the brain . If you think how we actually think as a human, there is no such thing as just 1 idea. Our minds are racing with ideas and these ideas battle out and the resultant of that is a decision is made.
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On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:Show nested quote +On July 10 2013 09:59 wherebugsgo wrote:
Uncaused events are not problematic-you need to define what you mean by that. Like I said, look up indeterminism on Wikipedia.
Specifically, look at the necessary but insufficient and probabilistic causation entries. The probabilistic causation one doesn't seem promising to me at all. I mean, the notion that causes increase the probabilities of their effects is definitely true, not matter what theory of causality you subscribe to (determinism would argue that causes increase that probability to one). The problem is that they need to show that this probability is non-zero. I haven't seen any actual proof of such a claim other than the sort of tedious argument that, yes, strictly speaking correlation doesn't imply causation, but to argue that such a thing is meaningfully applicable here is to claim that, given an infinite number of literally identical trials, at least one trial would violate its probable cause. Considering we have a grand total of zero macroscopic occurrences of this out of the entirety of observed events, then probabilistic causation remains merely hypothetical. Also the idea of "raising probabilities" seems to imply classical causation. How does A increase the probability of B? Does it probabilistically increase the probability of B, and so on and so forth?
Given the bolded, I don't quite understand what you are trying to argue in the following sentences. You seem to agree with the notion of probabilistic causation. What I don't understand is what you are trying to say is the problem with it.
Can you explain what you mean by:
The problem is that they need to show that this probability is non-zero. ?
I also don't quite understand why the scale of an event has anything to do with its causes. You can certainly take an event A and try to cause another event B with it. If the cause has any sort of meaningful rate of failure or if there can be multiple mutually exclusive effects then of course sometimes event B will not occur. You seem to be arguing that such events cannot exist, which is perplexing.
On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:
As for necessity, that term is so nebulously defined that philosophers basically can't make up their minds as to how to even meaningfully talk about it. It's also a sort of ad hoc definition of causality IMO, because it's tautologically true (in a sense) because if A caused B in the past, then A was by definition necessary and sufficient for B. It's impossible to actually talk meaningfully about necessity and sufficiency without referring to the other, which hinders things greatly.
Necessity is not nebulously defined. All it means is that for event B to occur, event A must have preceded it. The other way around is not necessarily true, which is what separates determinism from indeterminism. Determinism states that given a set of conditions, you will always see the same event occur afterward. That's not true in practice, and it's almost trivial to show that if you have studied QM (among other things) at all.
Sufficiency means that if x causes y, then if x has been observed you will definitely see y. However this does not imply the opposite, because y can have multiple causes.
What exactly is nebulous or unclear about this?
On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:
Pretty much every example I saw on that page was taking something that's not strictly true in a specific sense and yet seems true in a general sense and then talking about necessity and sufficiency based on that. When we say that smoking probably causes cancer, what we actually mean is that smoking has certain physiological affects on the body which, through a chain of events which may or may not occur depending on an incalculable number of variables involving the mutation of DNA, can result in a condition we call "cancer." So while it's true that smoking, colloquially, "causes" cancer, what actually causes cancer is a particular kind of mutation in DNA, which is caused by certain environmental factors, and so on and so forth all the way back to smoking a cigarette. Our probabilistic assessment is based on the fact that we can't track the interaction of smoking a cigarette and the entire human body in anything approaching specificity, not that there's some step where we just say "yeah, and then they flip a coin."
You seem to be making the same mistake that Einstein did. You seem to attribute the use of probability in the determination of causes as a consequence of us not fully understanding physical processes that occur. (the "God does not play with dice" quote basically)
However, quantum mechanics shows that you are simply wrong. There ARE physical processes that are not deterministic. In fact almost the entirety of modern physics is predicated on this idea and there are mountains of evidence for the assertion that not everything is deterministic.
So again, in order to show that the statement "everything has a cause" holds true, you need to provide evidence for such an assertion. You need to show why this evidence excludes uncaused events-specifically, why uncaused events are not possible, and you need to show how, in particular, the universe's beginning has a cause (as it is certainly an event that occurred) and what that means, since this "cause" has to be outside of the realm we know to be observable, by definition of what "universe" means. (it has to both occur "before" time existed, which doesn't really make sense, and "outside" space, because neither space nor time exist without the universe)
If you cannot see why the beginning of the universe specifically is a problem with this blanket definition of causality then I really don't know what else to say.
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On July 10 2013 10:43 wherebugsgo wrote:Show nested quote +On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:On July 10 2013 09:59 wherebugsgo wrote:
Uncaused events are not problematic-you need to define what you mean by that. Like I said, look up indeterminism on Wikipedia.
Specifically, look at the necessary but insufficient and probabilistic causation entries. The probabilistic causation one doesn't seem promising to me at all. I mean, the notion that causes increase the probabilities of their effects is definitely true, not matter what theory of causality you subscribe to (determinism would argue that causes increase that probability to one). The problem is that they need to show that this probability is non-zero. I haven't seen any actual proof of such a claim other than the sort of tedious argument that, yes, strictly speaking correlation doesn't imply causation, but to argue that such a thing is meaningfully applicable here is to claim that, given an infinite number of literally identical trials, at least one trial would violate its probable cause. Considering we have a grand total of zero macroscopic occurrences of this out of the entirety of observed events, then probabilistic causation remains merely hypothetical. Also the idea of "raising probabilities" seems to imply classical causation. How does A increase the probability of B? Does it probabilistically increase the probability of B, and so on and so forth? Given the bolded, I don't quite understand what you are trying to argue in the following sentences. You seem to agree with the notion of probabilistic causation. What I don't understand is what you are trying to say is the problem with it. Can you explain what you mean by: ? I also don't quite understand why the scale of an event has anything to do with its causes. You can certainly take an event A and try to cause another event B with it. If the cause has any sort of meaningful rate of failure or if there can be multiple mutually exclusive effects then of course sometimes event B will not occur. You seem to be arguing that such events cannot exist, which is perplexing. Show nested quote +On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:
As for necessity, that term is so nebulously defined that philosophers basically can't make up their minds as to how to even meaningfully talk about it. It's also a sort of ad hoc definition of causality IMO, because it's tautologically true (in a sense) because if A caused B in the past, then A was by definition necessary and sufficient for B. It's impossible to actually talk meaningfully about necessity and sufficiency without referring to the other, which hinders things greatly. Necessity is not nebulously defined. All it means is that for event B to occur, event A must have preceded it. The other way around is not necessarily true, which is what separates determinism from indeterminism. Determinism states that given a set of conditions, you will always see the same event occur afterward. That's not true in practice, and it's almost trivial to show that if you have studied QM (among other things) at all. Sufficiency means that if x causes y, then if x has been observed you will definitely see y. However this does not imply the opposite, because y can have multiple causes. What exactly is nebulous or unclear about this? Show nested quote +On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:
Pretty much every example I saw on that page was taking something that's not strictly true in a specific sense and yet seems true in a general sense and then talking about necessity and sufficiency based on that. When we say that smoking probably causes cancer, what we actually mean is that smoking has certain physiological affects on the body which, through a chain of events which may or may not occur depending on an incalculable number of variables involving the mutation of DNA, can result in a condition we call "cancer." So while it's true that smoking, colloquially, "causes" cancer, what actually causes cancer is a particular kind of mutation in DNA, which is caused by certain environmental factors, and so on and so forth all the way back to smoking a cigarette. Our probabilistic assessment is based on the fact that we can't track the interaction of smoking a cigarette and the entire human body in anything approaching specificity, not that there's some step where we just say "yeah, and then they flip a coin." You seem to be making the same mistake that Einstein did. You seem to attribute the use of probability in the determination of causes as a consequence of us not fully understanding physical processes that occur. (the "God does not play with dice" quote basically) However, quantum mechanics shows that you are simply wrong. There ARE physical processes that are not deterministic. In fact almost the entirety of modern physics is predicated on this idea and there are mountains of evidence for the assertion that not everything is deterministic. So again, in order to show that the statement "everything has a cause" holds true, you need to provide evidence for such an assertion. You need to show why this evidence excludes uncaused events-specifically, why uncaused events are not possible, and you need to show how, in particular, the universe's beginning has a cause (as it is certainly an event that occurred) and what that means, since this "cause" has to be outside of the realm we know to be observable, by definition of what "universe" means. (it has to both occur "before" time existed, which doesn't really make sense, and "outside" space, because neither space nor time exist without the universe) If you cannot see why the beginning of the universe specifically is a problem with this blanket definition of causality then I really don't know what else to say.
You have a much better understanding of QM than I do, so I'll stop arguing about this. My approach to causality is mostly based on what philosophy I've studied, so I'm out of my depth arguing about quantum phenomena. I will say that nobody has disagreed with me so nicely as to say I'm making the same mistake as Einstein before, though.
When I say "necessary" is unclear, I'm talking about what's mentioned here. Philosophers don't really agree on what the word *actually* means, basically.
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I did take some QM courses (but must not be mistaken for an expert), but i agree with wherebugsgo up to this point completely.
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On July 10 2013 10:50 Shiori wrote:Show nested quote +On July 10 2013 10:43 wherebugsgo wrote:On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:On July 10 2013 09:59 wherebugsgo wrote:
Uncaused events are not problematic-you need to define what you mean by that. Like I said, look up indeterminism on Wikipedia.
Specifically, look at the necessary but insufficient and probabilistic causation entries. The probabilistic causation one doesn't seem promising to me at all. I mean, the notion that causes increase the probabilities of their effects is definitely true, not matter what theory of causality you subscribe to (determinism would argue that causes increase that probability to one). The problem is that they need to show that this probability is non-zero. I haven't seen any actual proof of such a claim other than the sort of tedious argument that, yes, strictly speaking correlation doesn't imply causation, but to argue that such a thing is meaningfully applicable here is to claim that, given an infinite number of literally identical trials, at least one trial would violate its probable cause. Considering we have a grand total of zero macroscopic occurrences of this out of the entirety of observed events, then probabilistic causation remains merely hypothetical. Also the idea of "raising probabilities" seems to imply classical causation. How does A increase the probability of B? Does it probabilistically increase the probability of B, and so on and so forth? Given the bolded, I don't quite understand what you are trying to argue in the following sentences. You seem to agree with the notion of probabilistic causation. What I don't understand is what you are trying to say is the problem with it. Can you explain what you mean by: The problem is that they need to show that this probability is non-zero. ? I also don't quite understand why the scale of an event has anything to do with its causes. You can certainly take an event A and try to cause another event B with it. If the cause has any sort of meaningful rate of failure or if there can be multiple mutually exclusive effects then of course sometimes event B will not occur. You seem to be arguing that such events cannot exist, which is perplexing. On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:
As for necessity, that term is so nebulously defined that philosophers basically can't make up their minds as to how to even meaningfully talk about it. It's also a sort of ad hoc definition of causality IMO, because it's tautologically true (in a sense) because if A caused B in the past, then A was by definition necessary and sufficient for B. It's impossible to actually talk meaningfully about necessity and sufficiency without referring to the other, which hinders things greatly. Necessity is not nebulously defined. All it means is that for event B to occur, event A must have preceded it. The other way around is not necessarily true, which is what separates determinism from indeterminism. Determinism states that given a set of conditions, you will always see the same event occur afterward. That's not true in practice, and it's almost trivial to show that if you have studied QM (among other things) at all. Sufficiency means that if x causes y, then if x has been observed you will definitely see y. However this does not imply the opposite, because y can have multiple causes. What exactly is nebulous or unclear about this? On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:
Pretty much every example I saw on that page was taking something that's not strictly true in a specific sense and yet seems true in a general sense and then talking about necessity and sufficiency based on that. When we say that smoking probably causes cancer, what we actually mean is that smoking has certain physiological affects on the body which, through a chain of events which may or may not occur depending on an incalculable number of variables involving the mutation of DNA, can result in a condition we call "cancer." So while it's true that smoking, colloquially, "causes" cancer, what actually causes cancer is a particular kind of mutation in DNA, which is caused by certain environmental factors, and so on and so forth all the way back to smoking a cigarette. Our probabilistic assessment is based on the fact that we can't track the interaction of smoking a cigarette and the entire human body in anything approaching specificity, not that there's some step where we just say "yeah, and then they flip a coin." You seem to be making the same mistake that Einstein did. You seem to attribute the use of probability in the determination of causes as a consequence of us not fully understanding physical processes that occur. (the "God does not play with dice" quote basically) However, quantum mechanics shows that you are simply wrong. There ARE physical processes that are not deterministic. In fact almost the entirety of modern physics is predicated on this idea and there are mountains of evidence for the assertion that not everything is deterministic. So again, in order to show that the statement "everything has a cause" holds true, you need to provide evidence for such an assertion. You need to show why this evidence excludes uncaused events-specifically, why uncaused events are not possible, and you need to show how, in particular, the universe's beginning has a cause (as it is certainly an event that occurred) and what that means, since this "cause" has to be outside of the realm we know to be observable, by definition of what "universe" means. (it has to both occur "before" time existed, which doesn't really make sense, and "outside" space, because neither space nor time exist without the universe) If you cannot see why the beginning of the universe specifically is a problem with this blanket definition of causality then I really don't know what else to say. You have a much better understanding of QM than I do, so I'll stop arguing about this. My approach to causality is mostly based on what philosophy I've studied, so I'm out of my depth arguing about quantum phenomena. I will say that nobody has disagreed with me so nicely as to say I'm making the same mistake as Einstein before, though. When I say "necessary" is unclear, I'm talking about what's mentioned here. Philosophers don't really agree on what the word *actually* means, basically.
Yeah QM is pretty...mindblowing. It really is not intuitive at all, which is why it's so dangerous for your understanding to apply everyday intuition to physical phenomena (and this is something that physicists in particular should be wary of). As Feynman famously said, "I think I can safely say that no one understands quantum mechanics." If you are interested at all in the subject I'd suggest that you read Feynman's books, along with an Introduction to Quantum Mechanics by Griffiths, which is the textbook I used for undergrad intro to QM here at Berkeley.
+ Show Spoiler [random] +at some point in the future I hope to do research on quantum computing; it's quite interesting what's possible when you're not restricted to discrete bits like in classical computers.
Philosophically it may be okay to say that "everything has a cause" but even in the realm of philosophy you have a first-cause problem. If everything has a cause, then by definition the first cause needs a cause too...and so on and so forth. It's much easier not to make this assumption because then you have not made an assumption that you are incapable of supporting/logically explaining.
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On July 10 2013 10:50 Shiori wrote:Show nested quote +On July 10 2013 10:43 wherebugsgo wrote:On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:On July 10 2013 09:59 wherebugsgo wrote:
Uncaused events are not problematic-you need to define what you mean by that. Like I said, look up indeterminism on Wikipedia.
Specifically, look at the necessary but insufficient and probabilistic causation entries. The probabilistic causation one doesn't seem promising to me at all. I mean, the notion that causes increase the probabilities of their effects is definitely true, not matter what theory of causality you subscribe to (determinism would argue that causes increase that probability to one). The problem is that they need to show that this probability is non-zero. I haven't seen any actual proof of such a claim other than the sort of tedious argument that, yes, strictly speaking correlation doesn't imply causation, but to argue that such a thing is meaningfully applicable here is to claim that, given an infinite number of literally identical trials, at least one trial would violate its probable cause. Considering we have a grand total of zero macroscopic occurrences of this out of the entirety of observed events, then probabilistic causation remains merely hypothetical. Also the idea of "raising probabilities" seems to imply classical causation. How does A increase the probability of B? Does it probabilistically increase the probability of B, and so on and so forth? Given the bolded, I don't quite understand what you are trying to argue in the following sentences. You seem to agree with the notion of probabilistic causation. What I don't understand is what you are trying to say is the problem with it. Can you explain what you mean by: The problem is that they need to show that this probability is non-zero. ? I also don't quite understand why the scale of an event has anything to do with its causes. You can certainly take an event A and try to cause another event B with it. If the cause has any sort of meaningful rate of failure or if there can be multiple mutually exclusive effects then of course sometimes event B will not occur. You seem to be arguing that such events cannot exist, which is perplexing. On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:
As for necessity, that term is so nebulously defined that philosophers basically can't make up their minds as to how to even meaningfully talk about it. It's also a sort of ad hoc definition of causality IMO, because it's tautologically true (in a sense) because if A caused B in the past, then A was by definition necessary and sufficient for B. It's impossible to actually talk meaningfully about necessity and sufficiency without referring to the other, which hinders things greatly. Necessity is not nebulously defined. All it means is that for event B to occur, event A must have preceded it. The other way around is not necessarily true, which is what separates determinism from indeterminism. Determinism states that given a set of conditions, you will always see the same event occur afterward. That's not true in practice, and it's almost trivial to show that if you have studied QM (among other things) at all. Sufficiency means that if x causes y, then if x has been observed you will definitely see y. However this does not imply the opposite, because y can have multiple causes. What exactly is nebulous or unclear about this? On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:
Pretty much every example I saw on that page was taking something that's not strictly true in a specific sense and yet seems true in a general sense and then talking about necessity and sufficiency based on that. When we say that smoking probably causes cancer, what we actually mean is that smoking has certain physiological affects on the body which, through a chain of events which may or may not occur depending on an incalculable number of variables involving the mutation of DNA, can result in a condition we call "cancer." So while it's true that smoking, colloquially, "causes" cancer, what actually causes cancer is a particular kind of mutation in DNA, which is caused by certain environmental factors, and so on and so forth all the way back to smoking a cigarette. Our probabilistic assessment is based on the fact that we can't track the interaction of smoking a cigarette and the entire human body in anything approaching specificity, not that there's some step where we just say "yeah, and then they flip a coin." You seem to be making the same mistake that Einstein did. You seem to attribute the use of probability in the determination of causes as a consequence of us not fully understanding physical processes that occur. (the "God does not play with dice" quote basically) However, quantum mechanics shows that you are simply wrong. There ARE physical processes that are not deterministic. In fact almost the entirety of modern physics is predicated on this idea and there are mountains of evidence for the assertion that not everything is deterministic. So again, in order to show that the statement "everything has a cause" holds true, you need to provide evidence for such an assertion. You need to show why this evidence excludes uncaused events-specifically, why uncaused events are not possible, and you need to show how, in particular, the universe's beginning has a cause (as it is certainly an event that occurred) and what that means, since this "cause" has to be outside of the realm we know to be observable, by definition of what "universe" means. (it has to both occur "before" time existed, which doesn't really make sense, and "outside" space, because neither space nor time exist without the universe) If you cannot see why the beginning of the universe specifically is a problem with this blanket definition of causality then I really don't know what else to say. You have a much better understanding of QM than I do, so I'll stop arguing about this. My approach to causality is mostly based on what philosophy I've studied, so I'm out of my depth arguing about quantum phenomena. I will say that nobody has disagreed with me so nicely as to say I'm making the same mistake as Einstein before, though. When I say "necessary" is unclear, I'm talking about what's mentioned here. Philosophers don't really agree on what the word *actually* means, basically.
I'll argue on shiori's behalf.
He is definitely not making the same misunderstanding as Einstein and unfortunately, I think you need to spend more time thinking about the oddness of quantum mechanics and the process of thermodynamics.
Quantum theory is not at all that you cannot understand a quantity. In fact it is quite the contrary. To explain, I ask you to see David Bohm's quantum theory book. Lets start with several formula's to establish this claim. Pg. 152 on explaining the relationship of determinism and causual laws. section 11. States that there are two properties which you can know with some certainty. Given information about 1 you have less information about the other. the Formula is from heisenbergs uncertainty principle.
dx=p/m dt
Thus, when probing at the quantum level the more information that you acquire about momenutm the less you know about the position. Thus it is not that you do not know with a certainty a position, but you lose information about the velocity. Thus, the underlying principle is that if you know where it is you have no information how fast its going. It is a fact that a state is chosen and kept when matter interacts. Thus once the position is know the information on velocity is lost. Matter is more deterministic the less the distance probed. In fact so much so that there is a certainty that matter is within a given region. This is like schrodinger's cat. Once it has made a decision it is still there. it is in fact the act of deciding that is important. Once decided the state remains the same. until its decided there is flux. Matter is in a decided state once interacted with. The laws of quantum mechanics break down at higher levels. The idea is in quantum packets of information. These packets are derived from wave functions based off of Fourier series. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle guides that within a certain level of certainty things do happen. So much so that at larger distances the system does behave in a causal deterministic like fashion. That is the beauty of the heisenberg uncertainty principle. I recommend chapter 9 from this book for further consideration as well as an in depth analysis of the schrodingers equation from quantum field theory by Steven Wienberg.
Now that you know that the system does in fact work in a causal fashion, the general laws can be applied. These are what you find in a biophysics textbook. One that I believe that is particularly good on biophysics is by weiss at
(http://www.amazon.com/Cellular-Biophysics-Vols-1-2/dp/0262231883/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1373423065&sr=1-1&keywords=weiss)
The book starts with flux as wavefunctions as described in quantum theory becoming the diffusion and conduction equations known in other dicsiplines. The use of the continuity equation results in ficks second law and the laws of thermodynamics. You run into similar problems as you do in quantum theory where you separate the time varying equations and the probabilistic equilibrium processes. These build into moments of the gaussian equations leading to known problem of the electrochemical gradiant. The electrochemical gradient determines that in order to keep the body charged energy must be utilized as demonstrated via ion pumps. Hodgkin and huxley defined these pumps. The cells can further be modeled as electrical circuits given the phospholipid bilayer. Once modeled as circuits the circuits are applied in networks to simulate neural phonemenon. This process is described in part 2.
Despite your hangup on using the term deterministic vs causal, you have completely misunderstood the fundamental theory of the heisenberg uncertainty principle and its implications into determinism.
I highly suggest both of these books for the mathematically inclined and that you reevaluate your understanding of thermodynamics and your description of rolling dice. If you throw a dice 10^25th power you'd be surpized and average you'd be surprised how accurate that actually is and how difficult given the causality of the nature of everyday life the stranger the world of quantum interactions actually is.
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On July 10 2013 11:39 tokinho wrote:Show nested quote +On July 10 2013 10:50 Shiori wrote:On July 10 2013 10:43 wherebugsgo wrote:On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:On July 10 2013 09:59 wherebugsgo wrote:
Uncaused events are not problematic-you need to define what you mean by that. Like I said, look up indeterminism on Wikipedia.
Specifically, look at the necessary but insufficient and probabilistic causation entries. The probabilistic causation one doesn't seem promising to me at all. I mean, the notion that causes increase the probabilities of their effects is definitely true, not matter what theory of causality you subscribe to (determinism would argue that causes increase that probability to one). The problem is that they need to show that this probability is non-zero. I haven't seen any actual proof of such a claim other than the sort of tedious argument that, yes, strictly speaking correlation doesn't imply causation, but to argue that such a thing is meaningfully applicable here is to claim that, given an infinite number of literally identical trials, at least one trial would violate its probable cause. Considering we have a grand total of zero macroscopic occurrences of this out of the entirety of observed events, then probabilistic causation remains merely hypothetical. Also the idea of "raising probabilities" seems to imply classical causation. How does A increase the probability of B? Does it probabilistically increase the probability of B, and so on and so forth? Given the bolded, I don't quite understand what you are trying to argue in the following sentences. You seem to agree with the notion of probabilistic causation. What I don't understand is what you are trying to say is the problem with it. Can you explain what you mean by: The problem is that they need to show that this probability is non-zero. ? I also don't quite understand why the scale of an event has anything to do with its causes. You can certainly take an event A and try to cause another event B with it. If the cause has any sort of meaningful rate of failure or if there can be multiple mutually exclusive effects then of course sometimes event B will not occur. You seem to be arguing that such events cannot exist, which is perplexing. On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:
As for necessity, that term is so nebulously defined that philosophers basically can't make up their minds as to how to even meaningfully talk about it. It's also a sort of ad hoc definition of causality IMO, because it's tautologically true (in a sense) because if A caused B in the past, then A was by definition necessary and sufficient for B. It's impossible to actually talk meaningfully about necessity and sufficiency without referring to the other, which hinders things greatly. Necessity is not nebulously defined. All it means is that for event B to occur, event A must have preceded it. The other way around is not necessarily true, which is what separates determinism from indeterminism. Determinism states that given a set of conditions, you will always see the same event occur afterward. That's not true in practice, and it's almost trivial to show that if you have studied QM (among other things) at all. Sufficiency means that if x causes y, then if x has been observed you will definitely see y. However this does not imply the opposite, because y can have multiple causes. What exactly is nebulous or unclear about this? On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:
Pretty much every example I saw on that page was taking something that's not strictly true in a specific sense and yet seems true in a general sense and then talking about necessity and sufficiency based on that. When we say that smoking probably causes cancer, what we actually mean is that smoking has certain physiological affects on the body which, through a chain of events which may or may not occur depending on an incalculable number of variables involving the mutation of DNA, can result in a condition we call "cancer." So while it's true that smoking, colloquially, "causes" cancer, what actually causes cancer is a particular kind of mutation in DNA, which is caused by certain environmental factors, and so on and so forth all the way back to smoking a cigarette. Our probabilistic assessment is based on the fact that we can't track the interaction of smoking a cigarette and the entire human body in anything approaching specificity, not that there's some step where we just say "yeah, and then they flip a coin." You seem to be making the same mistake that Einstein did. You seem to attribute the use of probability in the determination of causes as a consequence of us not fully understanding physical processes that occur. (the "God does not play with dice" quote basically) However, quantum mechanics shows that you are simply wrong. There ARE physical processes that are not deterministic. In fact almost the entirety of modern physics is predicated on this idea and there are mountains of evidence for the assertion that not everything is deterministic. So again, in order to show that the statement "everything has a cause" holds true, you need to provide evidence for such an assertion. You need to show why this evidence excludes uncaused events-specifically, why uncaused events are not possible, and you need to show how, in particular, the universe's beginning has a cause (as it is certainly an event that occurred) and what that means, since this "cause" has to be outside of the realm we know to be observable, by definition of what "universe" means. (it has to both occur "before" time existed, which doesn't really make sense, and "outside" space, because neither space nor time exist without the universe) If you cannot see why the beginning of the universe specifically is a problem with this blanket definition of causality then I really don't know what else to say. You have a much better understanding of QM than I do, so I'll stop arguing about this. My approach to causality is mostly based on what philosophy I've studied, so I'm out of my depth arguing about quantum phenomena. I will say that nobody has disagreed with me so nicely as to say I'm making the same mistake as Einstein before, though. When I say "necessary" is unclear, I'm talking about what's mentioned here. Philosophers don't really agree on what the word *actually* means, basically. I'll argue on shiori's behalf. He is definitely not making the same misunderstanding as Einstein and unfortunately, I think you need to spend more time thinking about the oddness of quantum mechanics and the process of thermodynamics.
Is the bolded directed at me?
My statement with regard to the misunderstanding that Einstein made was in reference to what Shiori wrote here:
Our probabilistic assessment is based on the fact that we can't track the interaction of smoking a cigarette and the entire human body in anything approaching specificity, not that there's some step where we just say "yeah, and then they flip a coin."
I interpreted the bolded to mean "we don't have an adequate understanding of the processes that cause these events and thus we rely on probabilities to determine them". In other words there is this underlying implication that the only reason quantum mechanics relies on probabilities is because we are not at a sufficient understanding yet to explain these phenomena deterministically.
This is precisely why Einstein never made any progress with respect to a deterministic counterproposal to quantum mechanics.
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On July 10 2013 11:53 wherebugsgo wrote:Show nested quote +On July 10 2013 11:39 tokinho wrote:On July 10 2013 10:50 Shiori wrote:On July 10 2013 10:43 wherebugsgo wrote:On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:On July 10 2013 09:59 wherebugsgo wrote:
Uncaused events are not problematic-you need to define what you mean by that. Like I said, look up indeterminism on Wikipedia.
Specifically, look at the necessary but insufficient and probabilistic causation entries. The probabilistic causation one doesn't seem promising to me at all. I mean, the notion that causes increase the probabilities of their effects is definitely true, not matter what theory of causality you subscribe to (determinism would argue that causes increase that probability to one). The problem is that they need to show that this probability is non-zero. I haven't seen any actual proof of such a claim other than the sort of tedious argument that, yes, strictly speaking correlation doesn't imply causation, but to argue that such a thing is meaningfully applicable here is to claim that, given an infinite number of literally identical trials, at least one trial would violate its probable cause. Considering we have a grand total of zero macroscopic occurrences of this out of the entirety of observed events, then probabilistic causation remains merely hypothetical. Also the idea of "raising probabilities" seems to imply classical causation. How does A increase the probability of B? Does it probabilistically increase the probability of B, and so on and so forth? Given the bolded, I don't quite understand what you are trying to argue in the following sentences. You seem to agree with the notion of probabilistic causation. What I don't understand is what you are trying to say is the problem with it. Can you explain what you mean by: The problem is that they need to show that this probability is non-zero. ? I also don't quite understand why the scale of an event has anything to do with its causes. You can certainly take an event A and try to cause another event B with it. If the cause has any sort of meaningful rate of failure or if there can be multiple mutually exclusive effects then of course sometimes event B will not occur. You seem to be arguing that such events cannot exist, which is perplexing. On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:
As for necessity, that term is so nebulously defined that philosophers basically can't make up their minds as to how to even meaningfully talk about it. It's also a sort of ad hoc definition of causality IMO, because it's tautologically true (in a sense) because if A caused B in the past, then A was by definition necessary and sufficient for B. It's impossible to actually talk meaningfully about necessity and sufficiency without referring to the other, which hinders things greatly. Necessity is not nebulously defined. All it means is that for event B to occur, event A must have preceded it. The other way around is not necessarily true, which is what separates determinism from indeterminism. Determinism states that given a set of conditions, you will always see the same event occur afterward. That's not true in practice, and it's almost trivial to show that if you have studied QM (among other things) at all. Sufficiency means that if x causes y, then if x has been observed you will definitely see y. However this does not imply the opposite, because y can have multiple causes. What exactly is nebulous or unclear about this? On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:
Pretty much every example I saw on that page was taking something that's not strictly true in a specific sense and yet seems true in a general sense and then talking about necessity and sufficiency based on that. When we say that smoking probably causes cancer, what we actually mean is that smoking has certain physiological affects on the body which, through a chain of events which may or may not occur depending on an incalculable number of variables involving the mutation of DNA, can result in a condition we call "cancer." So while it's true that smoking, colloquially, "causes" cancer, what actually causes cancer is a particular kind of mutation in DNA, which is caused by certain environmental factors, and so on and so forth all the way back to smoking a cigarette. Our probabilistic assessment is based on the fact that we can't track the interaction of smoking a cigarette and the entire human body in anything approaching specificity, not that there's some step where we just say "yeah, and then they flip a coin." You seem to be making the same mistake that Einstein did. You seem to attribute the use of probability in the determination of causes as a consequence of us not fully understanding physical processes that occur. (the "God does not play with dice" quote basically) However, quantum mechanics shows that you are simply wrong. There ARE physical processes that are not deterministic. In fact almost the entirety of modern physics is predicated on this idea and there are mountains of evidence for the assertion that not everything is deterministic. So again, in order to show that the statement "everything has a cause" holds true, you need to provide evidence for such an assertion. You need to show why this evidence excludes uncaused events-specifically, why uncaused events are not possible, and you need to show how, in particular, the universe's beginning has a cause (as it is certainly an event that occurred) and what that means, since this "cause" has to be outside of the realm we know to be observable, by definition of what "universe" means. (it has to both occur "before" time existed, which doesn't really make sense, and "outside" space, because neither space nor time exist without the universe) If you cannot see why the beginning of the universe specifically is a problem with this blanket definition of causality then I really don't know what else to say. You have a much better understanding of QM than I do, so I'll stop arguing about this. My approach to causality is mostly based on what philosophy I've studied, so I'm out of my depth arguing about quantum phenomena. I will say that nobody has disagreed with me so nicely as to say I'm making the same mistake as Einstein before, though. When I say "necessary" is unclear, I'm talking about what's mentioned here. Philosophers don't really agree on what the word *actually* means, basically. I'll argue on shiori's behalf. He is definitely not making the same misunderstanding as Einstein and unfortunately, I think you need to spend more time thinking about the oddness of quantum mechanics and the process of thermodynamics. Is the bolded directed at me? My statement with regard to the misunderstanding that Einstein made was in reference to what Shiori wrote here: Show nested quote +Our probabilistic assessment is based on the fact that we can't track the interaction of smoking a cigarette and the entire human body in anything approaching specificity, not that there's some step where we just say "yeah, and then they flip a coin." I interpreted the bolded to mean "we don't have an adequate understanding of the processes that cause these events and thus we rely on probabilities to determine them". In other words there is this underlying implication that the only reason quantum mechanics relies on probabilities is because we are not at a sufficient understanding yet to explain these phenomena deterministically. This is precisely why Einstein never made any progress with respect to a deterministic counterproposal to quantum mechanics.
It is clearly directed at your statement. And yes, you do not understand the heisenberg uncertainty principle nor thermodynamics.
We may not understand the mechanisms for a particular event, but neurons do not act of quantum events. To believe that that information in neurons is passed via quantum bits is clearly the wrong picture and a clear misunderstanding of transmission of information in the nervous system. I suggest learning about synaptic vesicles, neurotransmitters, and the biophysics of electrochemical behavior with is different than what is explained in griffiths electrical text (http://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Electrodynamics-Edition-David-Griffiths/dp/013805326X) which do not focus on the chemical or biophysical aspects of the nervous system.
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On July 10 2013 12:01 tokinho wrote:Show nested quote +On July 10 2013 11:53 wherebugsgo wrote:On July 10 2013 11:39 tokinho wrote:On July 10 2013 10:50 Shiori wrote:On July 10 2013 10:43 wherebugsgo wrote:On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:On July 10 2013 09:59 wherebugsgo wrote:
Uncaused events are not problematic-you need to define what you mean by that. Like I said, look up indeterminism on Wikipedia.
Specifically, look at the necessary but insufficient and probabilistic causation entries. The probabilistic causation one doesn't seem promising to me at all. I mean, the notion that causes increase the probabilities of their effects is definitely true, not matter what theory of causality you subscribe to (determinism would argue that causes increase that probability to one). The problem is that they need to show that this probability is non-zero. I haven't seen any actual proof of such a claim other than the sort of tedious argument that, yes, strictly speaking correlation doesn't imply causation, but to argue that such a thing is meaningfully applicable here is to claim that, given an infinite number of literally identical trials, at least one trial would violate its probable cause. Considering we have a grand total of zero macroscopic occurrences of this out of the entirety of observed events, then probabilistic causation remains merely hypothetical. Also the idea of "raising probabilities" seems to imply classical causation. How does A increase the probability of B? Does it probabilistically increase the probability of B, and so on and so forth? Given the bolded, I don't quite understand what you are trying to argue in the following sentences. You seem to agree with the notion of probabilistic causation. What I don't understand is what you are trying to say is the problem with it. Can you explain what you mean by: The problem is that they need to show that this probability is non-zero. ? I also don't quite understand why the scale of an event has anything to do with its causes. You can certainly take an event A and try to cause another event B with it. If the cause has any sort of meaningful rate of failure or if there can be multiple mutually exclusive effects then of course sometimes event B will not occur. You seem to be arguing that such events cannot exist, which is perplexing. On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:
As for necessity, that term is so nebulously defined that philosophers basically can't make up their minds as to how to even meaningfully talk about it. It's also a sort of ad hoc definition of causality IMO, because it's tautologically true (in a sense) because if A caused B in the past, then A was by definition necessary and sufficient for B. It's impossible to actually talk meaningfully about necessity and sufficiency without referring to the other, which hinders things greatly. Necessity is not nebulously defined. All it means is that for event B to occur, event A must have preceded it. The other way around is not necessarily true, which is what separates determinism from indeterminism. Determinism states that given a set of conditions, you will always see the same event occur afterward. That's not true in practice, and it's almost trivial to show that if you have studied QM (among other things) at all. Sufficiency means that if x causes y, then if x has been observed you will definitely see y. However this does not imply the opposite, because y can have multiple causes. What exactly is nebulous or unclear about this? On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:
Pretty much every example I saw on that page was taking something that's not strictly true in a specific sense and yet seems true in a general sense and then talking about necessity and sufficiency based on that. When we say that smoking probably causes cancer, what we actually mean is that smoking has certain physiological affects on the body which, through a chain of events which may or may not occur depending on an incalculable number of variables involving the mutation of DNA, can result in a condition we call "cancer." So while it's true that smoking, colloquially, "causes" cancer, what actually causes cancer is a particular kind of mutation in DNA, which is caused by certain environmental factors, and so on and so forth all the way back to smoking a cigarette. Our probabilistic assessment is based on the fact that we can't track the interaction of smoking a cigarette and the entire human body in anything approaching specificity, not that there's some step where we just say "yeah, and then they flip a coin." You seem to be making the same mistake that Einstein did. You seem to attribute the use of probability in the determination of causes as a consequence of us not fully understanding physical processes that occur. (the "God does not play with dice" quote basically) However, quantum mechanics shows that you are simply wrong. There ARE physical processes that are not deterministic. In fact almost the entirety of modern physics is predicated on this idea and there are mountains of evidence for the assertion that not everything is deterministic. So again, in order to show that the statement "everything has a cause" holds true, you need to provide evidence for such an assertion. You need to show why this evidence excludes uncaused events-specifically, why uncaused events are not possible, and you need to show how, in particular, the universe's beginning has a cause (as it is certainly an event that occurred) and what that means, since this "cause" has to be outside of the realm we know to be observable, by definition of what "universe" means. (it has to both occur "before" time existed, which doesn't really make sense, and "outside" space, because neither space nor time exist without the universe) If you cannot see why the beginning of the universe specifically is a problem with this blanket definition of causality then I really don't know what else to say. You have a much better understanding of QM than I do, so I'll stop arguing about this. My approach to causality is mostly based on what philosophy I've studied, so I'm out of my depth arguing about quantum phenomena. I will say that nobody has disagreed with me so nicely as to say I'm making the same mistake as Einstein before, though. When I say "necessary" is unclear, I'm talking about what's mentioned here. Philosophers don't really agree on what the word *actually* means, basically. I'll argue on shiori's behalf. He is definitely not making the same misunderstanding as Einstein and unfortunately, I think you need to spend more time thinking about the oddness of quantum mechanics and the process of thermodynamics. Is the bolded directed at me? My statement with regard to the misunderstanding that Einstein made was in reference to what Shiori wrote here: Our probabilistic assessment is based on the fact that we can't track the interaction of smoking a cigarette and the entire human body in anything approaching specificity, not that there's some step where we just say "yeah, and then they flip a coin." I interpreted the bolded to mean "we don't have an adequate understanding of the processes that cause these events and thus we rely on probabilities to determine them". In other words there is this underlying implication that the only reason quantum mechanics relies on probabilities is because we are not at a sufficient understanding yet to explain these phenomena deterministically. This is precisely why Einstein never made any progress with respect to a deterministic counterproposal to quantum mechanics. It is clearly directed at your statement. And yes, you do not understand the heisenberg uncertainty principle nor thermodynamics. We may not understand the mechanisms for a particular event, but neurons do not act of quantum events. To believe that that information in neurons is passed via quantum bits is clearly the wrong picture and a clear misunderstanding of transmission of information in the nervous system. I suggest learning about synaptic vesicles, neurotransmitters, and the biophysics of electrochemical behavior with is different than what is explained in griffiths electrical text (http://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Electrodynamics-Edition-David-Griffiths/dp/013805326X) which do not focus on the chemical or biophysical aspects of the nervous system.
Where did I suggest that information in neurons is passed by quantum bits??
You seem to be putting words in my mouth.
The entire discussion I was having with regards to causality had to do with the fact that quantum mechanics is not deterministic, and that not all events necessarily must have a cause. Or do you disagree with those statements?
I also don't understand how you can say that I don't understand the Heisenberg uncertainty principle or thermodynamics. That's pretty perplexing too.
e: the rest of your post was mostly just regurgitation of very basic QM principles...which I still don't see how that has any bearing on the following statements:
"QM is not deterministic (unlike classical physics)"
"Not all events have to have a cause"
and
"Einstein believed that QM was an incomplete theory because 'God does not play dice'."
If you don't understand why I made the third statement with regard to Shiori's statements about probability and physical phenomena then perhaps I misinterpreted what Shiori was trying to say, or perhaps instead you are unaware of the similarity of his statement to the motivation for historic searches for a "hidden variable theory." As described here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hidden_variable_theory#Declaration_of_completeness_of_quantum_mechanics
also, neurons individually are definitely on the scale to be affected by quantum events. The answer to the question "Are neurons affected by quantum mechanical phenomena" is certainly yes. Whether or not this translates over to larger scale nervous systems is another question entirely, though. I'm not making any claims about the brain and whether its behavior is noticably affected by quantum mechanics-that is far out of the scope of my expertise. (although from what I've read on the topic it's actually a matter of debate among scientists. Stuff like quantum cognition seems quite interesting, though I haven't had the time to really look at it)
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On July 10 2013 12:04 wherebugsgo wrote:Show nested quote +On July 10 2013 12:01 tokinho wrote:On July 10 2013 11:53 wherebugsgo wrote:On July 10 2013 11:39 tokinho wrote:On July 10 2013 10:50 Shiori wrote:On July 10 2013 10:43 wherebugsgo wrote:On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:On July 10 2013 09:59 wherebugsgo wrote:
Uncaused events are not problematic-you need to define what you mean by that. Like I said, look up indeterminism on Wikipedia.
Specifically, look at the necessary but insufficient and probabilistic causation entries. The probabilistic causation one doesn't seem promising to me at all. I mean, the notion that causes increase the probabilities of their effects is definitely true, not matter what theory of causality you subscribe to (determinism would argue that causes increase that probability to one). The problem is that they need to show that this probability is non-zero. I haven't seen any actual proof of such a claim other than the sort of tedious argument that, yes, strictly speaking correlation doesn't imply causation, but to argue that such a thing is meaningfully applicable here is to claim that, given an infinite number of literally identical trials, at least one trial would violate its probable cause. Considering we have a grand total of zero macroscopic occurrences of this out of the entirety of observed events, then probabilistic causation remains merely hypothetical. Also the idea of "raising probabilities" seems to imply classical causation. How does A increase the probability of B? Does it probabilistically increase the probability of B, and so on and so forth? Given the bolded, I don't quite understand what you are trying to argue in the following sentences. You seem to agree with the notion of probabilistic causation. What I don't understand is what you are trying to say is the problem with it. Can you explain what you mean by: The problem is that they need to show that this probability is non-zero. ? I also don't quite understand why the scale of an event has anything to do with its causes. You can certainly take an event A and try to cause another event B with it. If the cause has any sort of meaningful rate of failure or if there can be multiple mutually exclusive effects then of course sometimes event B will not occur. You seem to be arguing that such events cannot exist, which is perplexing. On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:
As for necessity, that term is so nebulously defined that philosophers basically can't make up their minds as to how to even meaningfully talk about it. It's also a sort of ad hoc definition of causality IMO, because it's tautologically true (in a sense) because if A caused B in the past, then A was by definition necessary and sufficient for B. It's impossible to actually talk meaningfully about necessity and sufficiency without referring to the other, which hinders things greatly. Necessity is not nebulously defined. All it means is that for event B to occur, event A must have preceded it. The other way around is not necessarily true, which is what separates determinism from indeterminism. Determinism states that given a set of conditions, you will always see the same event occur afterward. That's not true in practice, and it's almost trivial to show that if you have studied QM (among other things) at all. Sufficiency means that if x causes y, then if x has been observed you will definitely see y. However this does not imply the opposite, because y can have multiple causes. What exactly is nebulous or unclear about this? On July 10 2013 10:17 Shiori wrote:
Pretty much every example I saw on that page was taking something that's not strictly true in a specific sense and yet seems true in a general sense and then talking about necessity and sufficiency based on that. When we say that smoking probably causes cancer, what we actually mean is that smoking has certain physiological affects on the body which, through a chain of events which may or may not occur depending on an incalculable number of variables involving the mutation of DNA, can result in a condition we call "cancer." So while it's true that smoking, colloquially, "causes" cancer, what actually causes cancer is a particular kind of mutation in DNA, which is caused by certain environmental factors, and so on and so forth all the way back to smoking a cigarette. Our probabilistic assessment is based on the fact that we can't track the interaction of smoking a cigarette and the entire human body in anything approaching specificity, not that there's some step where we just say "yeah, and then they flip a coin." You seem to be making the same mistake that Einstein did. You seem to attribute the use of probability in the determination of causes as a consequence of us not fully understanding physical processes that occur. (the "God does not play with dice" quote basically) However, quantum mechanics shows that you are simply wrong. There ARE physical processes that are not deterministic. In fact almost the entirety of modern physics is predicated on this idea and there are mountains of evidence for the assertion that not everything is deterministic. So again, in order to show that the statement "everything has a cause" holds true, you need to provide evidence for such an assertion. You need to show why this evidence excludes uncaused events-specifically, why uncaused events are not possible, and you need to show how, in particular, the universe's beginning has a cause (as it is certainly an event that occurred) and what that means, since this "cause" has to be outside of the realm we know to be observable, by definition of what "universe" means. (it has to both occur "before" time existed, which doesn't really make sense, and "outside" space, because neither space nor time exist without the universe) If you cannot see why the beginning of the universe specifically is a problem with this blanket definition of causality then I really don't know what else to say. You have a much better understanding of QM than I do, so I'll stop arguing about this. My approach to causality is mostly based on what philosophy I've studied, so I'm out of my depth arguing about quantum phenomena. I will say that nobody has disagreed with me so nicely as to say I'm making the same mistake as Einstein before, though. When I say "necessary" is unclear, I'm talking about what's mentioned here. Philosophers don't really agree on what the word *actually* means, basically. I'll argue on shiori's behalf. He is definitely not making the same misunderstanding as Einstein and unfortunately, I think you need to spend more time thinking about the oddness of quantum mechanics and the process of thermodynamics. Is the bolded directed at me? My statement with regard to the misunderstanding that Einstein made was in reference to what Shiori wrote here: Our probabilistic assessment is based on the fact that we can't track the interaction of smoking a cigarette and the entire human body in anything approaching specificity, not that there's some step where we just say "yeah, and then they flip a coin." I interpreted the bolded to mean "we don't have an adequate understanding of the processes that cause these events and thus we rely on probabilities to determine them". In other words there is this underlying implication that the only reason quantum mechanics relies on probabilities is because we are not at a sufficient understanding yet to explain these phenomena deterministically. This is precisely why Einstein never made any progress with respect to a deterministic counterproposal to quantum mechanics. It is clearly directed at your statement. And yes, you do not understand the heisenberg uncertainty principle nor thermodynamics. We may not understand the mechanisms for a particular event, but neurons do not act of quantum events. To believe that that information in neurons is passed via quantum bits is clearly the wrong picture and a clear misunderstanding of transmission of information in the nervous system. I suggest learning about synaptic vesicles, neurotransmitters, and the biophysics of electrochemical behavior with is different than what is explained in griffiths electrical text (http://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Electrodynamics-Edition-David-Griffiths/dp/013805326X) which do not focus on the chemical or biophysical aspects of the nervous system. Where did I suggest that information in neurons is passed by quantum bits?? You seem to be putting words in my mouth. The entire discussion I was having with regards to causality had to do with the fact that quantum mechanics is not deterministic, and that not all events necessarily must have a cause. Or do you disagree with those statements? I also don't understand how you can say that I don't understand the Heisenberg uncertainty principle or thermodynamics. That's pretty perplexing too. e: the rest of your post was mostly just regurgitation of very basic QM principles...which I still don't see how that has any bearing on the following statements: "QM is not deterministic (unlike classical physics)" "Not all events have to have a cause" and "Einstein believed that QM was an incomplete theory because 'God does not play dice'." If you don't understand why I made the third statement with regard to Shiori's statements about probability and physical phenomena then perhaps I misinterpreted what Shiori was trying to say, or perhaps instead you are unaware of the similarity of his statement to the motivation for historic searches for a "hidden variable theory." As described here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hidden_variable_theory#Declaration_of_completeness_of_quantum_mechanicsalso, neurons individually are definitely on the scale to be affected by quantum events. The answer to the question "Are neurons affected by quantum mechanical phenomena" is certainly yes. Whether or not this translates over to larger scale nervous systems is another question entirely, though. I'm not making any claims about the brain and whether its behavior is noticably affected by quantum mechanics-that is far out of the scope of my expertise. (although from what I've read on the topic it's actually a matter of debate among scientists. Stuff like quantum cognition seems quite interesting, though I haven't had the time to really look at it)
I see that you are more aware than I had given you credit for initially.
I decided to just change my answer and drop it.
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decided to converse in private to avoid derailing ^^
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Yes, as the evidence suggests. Behavior and beliefs are at bottom, physical. The concept of a soul or some metaphysical mind is ridiculous. If you damage a part of the brain that parses speech, you will cease to understand language, if you damage the part of the brain that enables empathy, you will cease to feel empathy, if you damage a certain part of the brain you will cease to have facial recognition, but when you damage the whole brain at death ( braindeath ), people think they will rise from the grave understanding english and recognizing faces of old loves ones. Obviously ludicrous.
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On July 10 2013 12:04 wherebugsgo wrote:
also, neurons individually are definitely on the scale to be affected by quantum events. The answer to the question "Are neurons affected by quantum mechanical phenomena" is certainly yes. Whether or not this translates over to larger scale nervous systems is another question entirely, though. I'm not making any claims about the brain and whether its behavior is noticably affected by quantum mechanics-that is far out of the scope of my expertise. (although from what I've read on the topic it's actually a matter of debate among scientists. Stuff like quantum cognition seems quite interesting, though I haven't had the time to really look at it)
Most defnitely no. A neuron is on the scale of micrometers while quantum mechanics happen at atomic scale (tenths of nanometers). So you have at least 3 orders od magnitude that separate them, so no, quantum mechanics effects are not seen at a neuron scale.
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On July 10 2013 02:36 Reason wrote:
Has it not been discussed repeatedly that determinism and free will are not mutually exclusive?
Again this all depends on your definition of free will...
Well yes, I was in a huge discussion about it, however, I think it's pretty obvious from the topic development that when we use the term "free will", we pretty much have to restrict ourselves to it in the methaphysical sense, which is indeed mutually exclusive with determinism (that's pretty much the whole point). I mean, I'm a compatibilism myself in a sense that I consider the choices we make real choices and we are always forced to take responsibility for them, even though metaphysically, the factors leading us to the choice was out of our control.
What I was getting at with my post though was more that he said "deterministic but not PREdetermined" even though a deterministic system will always be predetermined by definition, since the same initial state always has to produce the same output, meaning if you know the whole initial state, you will always be able to predict the output.
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the claim of something being pre-determined implies knowledge of the first ever causation.
determinism just works in chunks within a frame of reference.
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1. Science is a description of the world, it can predict the future. It doesn't state, how the world really is.
2. Naive reductionism is not the answer. You cannot describe morals through electrons (Putnam).
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On July 10 2013 17:55 xM(Z wrote:
the claim of something being pre-determined implies knowledge of the first ever causation.
determinism just works in chunks within a frame of reference.
It doesn't really. I agree with your sentiment that determinism only works in chunks within a frame of reference, but that frame of reference would be our whole universe since the big bang since that's the first causation we can get back to. Whether or not, and how, the big bang was caused, is actually irrelevant since everything has been predetermined since that point (according to determinism) and we can't even know what was before the big bang unless we come up with a way to reproduce it (since big bangs initial singularity obscures anything which could possibly be before that point).
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On July 10 2013 18:04 Tobberoth wrote:Show nested quote +On July 10 2013 17:55 xM(Z wrote:
the claim of something being pre-determined implies knowledge of the first ever causation.
determinism just works in chunks within a frame of reference. It doesn't really. I agree with your sentiment that determinism only works in chunks within a frame of reference, but that frame of reference would be our whole universe since the big bang since that's the first causation we can get back to. Whether or not, and how, the big bang was caused, is actually irrelevant since everything has been predetermined since that point (according to determinism) and we can't even know what was before the big bang unless we come up with a way to reproduce it (since big bangs initial singularity obscures anything which could possibly be before that point).
the first part of your post contradicts the second. the big bang idea is not proven. it's just a theory.
as of right now, believing in a big bang is believing in pre-determinsm. it's the same as believing in God.
after the big bang theory gets proven you can speak of determinism within that frame of reference.
(edited for clarity, i think)
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On July 10 2013 09:28 Reason wrote:Show nested quote +On July 10 2013 09:24 wherebugsgo wrote:On July 10 2013 02:09 Shiori wrote:On July 10 2013 02:03 Rassy wrote:On July 09 2013 19:43 Tobberoth wrote:On July 09 2013 15:52 wherebugsgo wrote:
To say you have no control, none whatsoever, over your decision making process (because of no-will) is to state that you accept an idea that is incompatible with reality as we know it. Why do you say that? I'd say its completely compatible with reality as we know it, since everything we know has a cause, it makes sense decisions will too. I mean... have you ever made a decision without any form of cause or reasoning? Yes. People do this all the time lol. Like for example when hanging up a poster of adorable kittens on a wall. Studys have shown that the reasoning for an action is often made after the action, more as a tool to justify the action in hindsight, then as the original impulse for the action. Are you telling me that every decission you make you make after reasoning? "since everything we know has a cause" No, there are quiet a few events in physics wich have no known cause at all, and most people agree that this is not simply because we dont know the cause, but because there is no cause. Eh...it's not really accurate to say there are "uncaused" things in physics. There are always criteria/restrictions which limit the situation substantially. For example, different elementary particles have different mean lifetimes, which implies that, for some reason, one elementary particle tends to decay more rapidly than another. If causality was violated in one instance, it would necessarily be violated in all instances, because it would be rational and expected that any and all things can happen spontaneously. It doesn't really make sense to say that certain things can be uncaused in distinctly different ways, IMO, because that suggests that some innate difference in those things affects the uncaused event. If uncaused events cannot exist, can you explain what causes the radioactive decay of particles? How about quantum fluctuations? The beginning of the universe? We can't say for sure that nothing can be uncaused. (If the beginning of the universe was caused by something...what caused that? You have the problem of an infinite chain here) Isn't an uncaused event more problematic than an infinite chain of events? How do you measure which is "more problematic"? Given the scope of existence and what we know (and/or think we know) about the universe, isn't infinity more plausible than an uncaused event?
Infinity will always remain, no matter what you try. even with stochastic events as the base of the whole universe you will have areas of infinity.
The most elementary "particle" of the universe is the change for a 0 dimensional point or hole to apear out of nowhere.
From these points and holes or rather the change,annything can be build. Strings, fotons, electrons and so on.
Ludwigvan Germany. July 10 2013 17:57. Posts 1922
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1. Science is a description of the world, it can predict the future. It doesn't state, how the world really is.
2. Naive reductionism is not the answer. You cannot describe morals through electrons (Putnam).
Yes you can, you just need alot of imagination and make a huge amount of steps. morals are just emergent from electrons (and a few other particles). Wich are emergent from ,in the end, a change.
People underestimate the power of probability once you get to a near infinite amount of probabilitys.
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