I know there are some really great minds on this forum so I am hoping someone can help. I'm taking part in this philosophy/book club and we are reading Wittgenstein, and it's really interesting, but it's quickly turning into everyone sucking on wittgenstein's balls (me included) and there is not much of a dialectic forming.
I agree with Wittgenstein's main language argument, namely that we can't use language to penetrate truths about the world since the primary function of language is to facilitate communication between people. Thus, philosophers for centuries have been making the same mistake to try to answer questions like: "What is 'Virtue'?", or "What is 'Knowledge'"?, and so on. You can't extract these words from their context and make them mean something. IE: People can talk about virtue or knowledge without any confusion what so ever, but as soon as you "pluck" the word out of its context and start posing the question "What is virtue?" we get extremely puzzled to our very foundation and no longer know what to think (socrates effect). This is because Wittgenstein says there is no such thing in reality that corresponds to what we think of as "an essence" of Virtue, or Knowledge (What Plato would call Forms). In short, we are mistaken to think abstracted words have meaning and that there there is some sort of fundamental link between language and reality, etc. Words do not have fixed meanings but rather a "family" of meanings
As such, most philosophical problems we have, such as freewill vs predetermination, etc arise out of a misunderstanding of the language we use. Essentially, because words like "Free" and "Will" are taken out of their original contexts entirely to mean something completely nonsensical in this new metaphysical context, and predetermination is a word that has emerged from the scientific world that we now we try to use to describe our mode of existence... Therefore, Philosophy should be used as an activity of clarification; aka unraveling the reasons (as described above) why there has been so much damn confusion in Philosophy. If we did this, Wittgenstein thinks there would be no more philosophical problems.
This is some pretty deep shit and I oversimplified a lot of it, if not inaccurately represented some of his ideas. I'm kind of new at this, so I was hoping someone more learned in the philosophy world could tell me what happened to Philosophy after Wittgenstein. It seems to me that a lot of philosophers have just pushed him to the side and kept going on about their business. Do they have good arguments for dismissing what he is saying?
TL;DR: I'm not smart enough to propose a counter-argument to Wittgenstein, or know anyone that has done so, can you help me? or steer me in the right direction?
word are simply representations of a greater idea. to see words like free and will and death and rape and mearly words makes them all the same. One must know and understand the difference between what one person is trying to communicate to even philosophi.
I made that up on the spot how do you think?
aka words arn't just words they mean something and that meaning is what you debate.
On June 14 2011 14:19 sermokala wrote: word are simply representations of a greater idea. to see words like free and will and death and rape and mearly words makes them all the same. One must know and understand the difference between what one person is trying to communicate to even philosophi.
I made that up on the spot how do you think?
aka words arn't just words they mean something and that meaning is what you debate.
The problem is that people have a hard time agreeing on their meaning.
Rape has several clerical definitions. Free will? If you ask Joe what it is, he'll say one thing. If you ask Bob, he'll say another. Get the two of them to talk about it, and they'll spend four hours arguing semantics.
On June 14 2011 14:13 zizou21 wrote: I agree with Wittgenstein's main language argument, namely that we can't use language to penetrate truths about the world since the primary function of language is to facilitate communication between people. Thus, philosophers for centuries have been making the same mistake to try to answer questions like: "What is 'Virtue'?", or "What is 'Knowledge'"?, and so on. You can't extract these words from their context and make them mean something. IE: People can talk about virtue or knowledge without any confusion what so ever, but as soon as you "pluck" the word out of its context and start posing the question "What is virtue?" we get extremely puzzled to our very foundation and no longer know what to think (socrates effect). This is because Wittgenstein says there is no such thing in reality that corresponds to what we think of as "an essence" of Virtue, or Knowledge (What Plato would call Forms). In short, we are mistaken to think abstracted words have meaning and that there there is some sort of fundamental link between language and reality, etc. Words do not have fixed meanings but rather a "family" of meanings
Sure, the function of language is to facilitate communication, but communication has to have content.
We're not just pushing around arbitrary (yet somehow hollow) words according to some system of grammar anymore than you arbitrarily push around arbitrary (yet somehow meaningless) symbols according to a system of mathematics when you prove theorems. You're (very clearly, at least to me) exploring the possible legal manipulations of the system to prove truths that are the consequences of other truths.
Asking "What is knowledge?" just asks what the connection between the language and the reality is. Yes, the language-to-reality connections themselves are somewhat arbitrary -- obviously we can use the word "knowledge" to refer to the reality of what knowledge is, just as we could use "conocimiento" from Spanish or "0110101101101110011011110111011101101100011001010110010001100111011001010000110100001010" from the ASCII table -- but it doesn't mean the things we're talking about are suddenly not real. Just because we're using English words to describe free will and predetermination doesn't mean that there aren't actual differences between free will and predetermination.
The difference between one thing and its negation being true has very real implications about the other types of truths that would consequently hold in reality as a result.
I'm not trained in this modern philosophical jargon, in fact I eschew it, but I think I'll be helpful because often the best way to identify and reconcile with an unsettling feeling is to separate yourself from the argument a bit. Don't allow yourself to become a slave to the argumentation. Think about the conclusions and ramifications of the arguments and ask yourself if that's what you think is correct. I'll try to ask some questions that clarify his position and identify problematic elements and maybe throw in some suggestions of my own.
On June 14 2011 14:13 zizou21 wrote: I know there are some really great minds on this forum so I am hoping someone can help. I'm taking part in this philosophy/book club and we are reading Wittgenstein, and it's really interesting, but it's quickly turning into everyone sucking on wittgenstein's balls (me included) and there is not much of a dialectic forming.
I agree with Wittgenstein's main language argument, namely that we can't use language to penetrate truths about the world since the primary function of language is to facilitate communication between people. Thus, philosophers for centuries have been making the same mistake to try to answer questions like: "What is 'Virtue'?", or "What is 'Knowledge'"?, and so on. You can't extract these words from their context and make them mean something. IE: People can talk about virtue or knowledge without any confusion what so ever, but as soon as you "pluck" the word out of its context and start posing the question "What is virtue?" we get extremely puzzled to our very foundation and no longer know what to think (socrates effect). This is because Wittgenstein says there is no such thing in reality that corresponds to what we think of as "an essence" of Virtue, or Knowledge (What Plato would call Forms). In short, we are mistaken to think abstracted words have meaning and that there there is some sort of fundamental link between language and reality, etc. Words do not have fixed meanings but rather a "family" of meanings.
I think that most people would agree with Wittgenstein's most famous arguments about language shaping the way we think and not merely being a neutral medium. To what extent does this color our ability to communicate though? Socrates/Plato frequently encountered people who couldn't precisely explain what they believed or why they believed it. That is not the same thing as saying that philosophical minds can't agree upon a fixed definition for things like 'vitrtue' or 'knowledge' and that's Socrates' goal in many dialogues. I hope that what Wittgenstein means is that we should attempt to break down these differences in definition in like manner because...
If he denies that language can be used to communicate about abstract things in any meaningful fashion, because it's impossible to know how disparate the definitions are, then..
1)He's essentially banished these concepts. How can you enforce virtue when you're not sure that you're even talking about the same thing.
2) He's established a solipsism, and communication no longer matters because anything external can be regarded at best as useful stimuli.
All in all, I find that position a bit silly. I have no idea if what you think is blue is the same as what I think is blue, but if I point to a blue carpet, you will most likely agree with me that it's blue.
As such, most philosophical problems we have, such as freewill vs predetermination, etc arise out of a misunderstanding of the language we use. Essentially, because words like "Free" and "Will" are taken out of their original contexts entirely to mean something completely nonsensical in this new metaphysical context, and predetermination is a word that has emerged from the scientific world that we now we try to use to describe our mode of existence... Therefore, Philosophy should be used as an activity of clarification; aka unraveling the reasons (as described above) why there has been so much damn confusion in Philosophy. If we did this, Wittgenstein thinks there would be no more philosophical problems.
As a political theorist, it's so amusing to me to watch people try to sweep the world under the rug in one fell swoop. Does he really think that there are no serious controversies (for lack of a better word) to be had in philosophy? That it's all just one big misunderstanding?
This is some pretty deep shit and I oversimplified a lot of it, if not inaccurately represented some of his ideas. I'm kind of new at this, so I was hoping someone more learned in the philosophy world could tell me what happened to Philosophy after Wittgenstein. It seems to me that a lot of philosophers have just pushed him to the side and kept going on about their business. Do they have good arguments for dismissing what he is saying?
TL;DR: I'm not smart enough to propose a counter-argument to Wittgenstein, or know anyone that has done so, can you help me? or steer me in the right direction?
I hope that helped a little bit. I prefer using simple arguments like a battering ram.
And remember, when in doubt, make a meta-argument out of it!!!
P.S. There's a semi-famous book, called Wittgenstein's Poker, about an encounter he had with Popper. I spit on Popper's name, but there might be some interesting stuff in there.
On June 14 2011 14:13 zizou21 wrote: I know there are some really great minds on this forum so I am hoping someone can help. I'm taking part in this philosophy/book club and we are reading Wittgenstein, and it's really interesting, but it's quickly turning into everyone sucking on wittgenstein's balls (me included) and there is not much of a dialectic forming.
I agree with Wittgenstein's main language argument, namely that we can't use language to penetrate truths about the world since the primary function of language is to facilitate communication between people. Thus, philosophers for centuries have been making the same mistake to try to answer questions like: "What is 'Virtue'?", or "What is 'Knowledge'"?, and so on. You can't extract these words from their context and make them mean something. IE: People can talk about virtue or knowledge without any confusion what so ever, but as soon as you "pluck" the word out of its context and start posing the question "What is virtue?" we get extremely puzzled to our very foundation and no longer know what to think (socrates effect). This is because Wittgenstein says there is no such thing in reality that corresponds to what we think of as "an essence" of Virtue, or Knowledge (What Plato would call Forms). In short, we are mistaken to think abstracted words have meaning and that there there is some sort of fundamental link between language and reality, etc. Words do not have fixed meanings but rather a "family" of meanings
As such, most philosophical problems we have, such as freewill vs predetermination, etc arise out of a misunderstanding of the language we use. Essentially, because words like "Free" and "Will" are taken out of their original contexts entirely to mean something completely nonsensical in this new metaphysical context, and predetermination is a word that has emerged from the scientific world that we now we try to use to describe our mode of existence... Therefore, Philosophy should be used as an activity of clarification; aka unraveling the reasons (as described above) why there has been so much damn confusion in Philosophy. If we did this, Wittgenstein thinks there would be no more philosophical problems.
This is some pretty deep shit and I oversimplified a lot of it, if not inaccurately represented some of his ideas. I'm kind of new at this, so I was hoping someone more learned in the philosophy world could tell me what happened to Philosophy after Wittgenstein. It seems to me that a lot of philosophers have just pushed him to the side and kept going on about their business. Do they have good arguments for dismissing what he is saying?
TL;DR: I'm not smart enough to propose a counter-argument to Wittgenstein, or know anyone that has done so, can you help me? or steer me in the right direction?
So by "Wittgenstein's argument" I assume you mean his later work that led into ordinary language philosophy i.e. Philosophical Investigations. I would then direct you to his earlier work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Vienna circle.
I would give you arguments if this was a scientific matter, but philosophical arguments have to be understood before you use them.
On June 14 2011 14:43 Jerubaal wrote: I'm not trained in this modern philosophical jargon, in fact I eschew it, but I think I'll be helpful because often the best way to identify and reconcile with an unsettling feeling is to separate yourself from the argument a bit. Don't allow yourself to become a slave to the argumentation. Think about the conclusions and ramifications of the arguments and ask yourself if that's what you think is correct. I'll try to ask some questions that clarify his position and identify problematic elements and maybe throw in some suggestions of my own.
On June 14 2011 14:13 zizou21 wrote: I know there are some really great minds on this forum so I am hoping someone can help. I'm taking part in this philosophy/book club and we are reading Wittgenstein, and it's really interesting, but it's quickly turning into everyone sucking on wittgenstein's balls (me included) and there is not much of a dialectic forming.
I agree with Wittgenstein's main language argument, namely that we can't use language to penetrate truths about the world since the primary function of language is to facilitate communication between people. Thus, philosophers for centuries have been making the same mistake to try to answer questions like: "What is 'Virtue'?", or "What is 'Knowledge'"?, and so on. You can't extract these words from their context and make them mean something. IE: People can talk about virtue or knowledge without any confusion what so ever, but as soon as you "pluck" the word out of its context and start posing the question "What is virtue?" we get extremely puzzled to our very foundation and no longer know what to think (socrates effect). This is because Wittgenstein says there is no such thing in reality that corresponds to what we think of as "an essence" of Virtue, or Knowledge (What Plato would call Forms). In short, we are mistaken to think abstracted words have meaning and that there there is some sort of fundamental link between language and reality, etc. Words do not have fixed meanings but rather a "family" of meanings.
I think that most people would agree with Wittgenstein's most famous arguments about language shaping the way we think and not merely being a neutral medium. To what extent does this color our ability to communicate though? Socrates/Plato frequently encountered people who couldn't precisely explain what they believed or why they believed it. That is not the same thing as saying that philosophical minds can't agree upon a fixed definition for things like 'vitrtue' or 'knowledge' and that's Socrates' goal in many dialogues. I hope that what Wittgenstein means is that we should attempt to break down these differences in definition in like manner because...
If he denies that language can be used to communicate about abstract things in any meaningful fashion, because it's impossible to know how disparate the definitions are, then..
1)He's essentially banished these concepts. How can you enforce virtue when you're not sure that you're even talking about the same thing.
2) He's established a solipsism, and communication no longer matters because anything external can be regarded at best as useful stimuli.
All in all, I find that position a bit silly. I have no idea if what you think is blue is the same as what I think is blue, but if I point to a blue carpet, you will most likely agree with me that it's blue.
As such, most philosophical problems we have, such as freewill vs predetermination, etc arise out of a misunderstanding of the language we use. Essentially, because words like "Free" and "Will" are taken out of their original contexts entirely to mean something completely nonsensical in this new metaphysical context, and predetermination is a word that has emerged from the scientific world that we now we try to use to describe our mode of existence... Therefore, Philosophy should be used as an activity of clarification; aka unraveling the reasons (as described above) why there has been so much damn confusion in Philosophy. If we did this, Wittgenstein thinks there would be no more philosophical problems.
As a political theorist, it's so amusing to me to watch people try to sweep the world under the rug in one fell swoop. Does he really think that there are no serious controversies (for lack of a better word) to be had in philosophy? That it's all just one big misunderstanding?
This is some pretty deep shit and I oversimplified a lot of it, if not inaccurately represented some of his ideas. I'm kind of new at this, so I was hoping someone more learned in the philosophy world could tell me what happened to Philosophy after Wittgenstein. It seems to me that a lot of philosophers have just pushed him to the side and kept going on about their business. Do they have good arguments for dismissing what he is saying?
TL;DR: I'm not smart enough to propose a counter-argument to Wittgenstein, or know anyone that has done so, can you help me? or steer me in the right direction?
I hope that helped a little bit. I prefer using simple arguments like a battering ram.
And remember, when in doubt, make a meta-argument out of it!!!
P.S. There's a semi-famous book, called Wittgenstein's Poker, about an encounter he had with Popper. I spit on Popper's name, but there might be some interesting stuff in there.
Wittgenstein makes none of those conclusions. Don't mistake a hastily composed summary for his actual arguments.
i dunno.. i think wittgenstein summed up human knowledge pretty well there. language is just a tool that we use to communicate and it has inherent contradictions, people have their own definitions of words, which leads to arguments. maybe all the later philosophers realised that he had made philosophy obsolete and that it would put them out of a job so they just ignored him!
The ordinary language movement (Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin et al) presupposes a "prestabilized harmony" in the way the use of common language works. But not every concept just may be clarified by looking how we use it on a daily basis. Take "justice" for instance:I would argue that the term combines a bundle of very different ideas (e.g.liberalism, equality and so forth) and thus if you want to analyze concepts more lucid you just have to go further than just taking a look at its used by john doe. A similar problem occurs for "knowledge" if you confront it with Gettier-cases. That said in Philosophy I generally sympathize with an Wittgensteinian approach but if you don`t want to limit yourself to the critical stance you will not get very far with your investigtion soley on categorizing "language games".
Wittgenstein was such an interesting philosopher to me. I just love his works even if they are a bit extravagant. Like someone else said, It sounds like you're talking about his later works. In which case, see his earlier works and then Vienna Circle :D Pretty much dead on.
On June 14 2011 14:43 Jerubaal wrote: P.S. There's a semi-famous book, called Wittgenstein's Poker, about an encounter he had with Popper. I spit on Popper's name, but there might be some interesting stuff in there.
the book is really good actually, popper was delivering a lecture in front of some of the greatest philosophers in the world, wittgenstein was irritated by what he was saying and picked up a poker and was waving it around when he shouted "name an objective moral truth!" to which popper replies "that you shouldn't threaten visiting lecturers with a poker" and wittgenstein stormed off. the book isn't really that philosophical though, its more a basic biography of both people and outlining their thought and why their background and thought drew them to conflict. very interesting book but not really one which analyses the philosophy in depth.
I had no idea who this Wittgenstein was before this thread. But according to his pic in wikipedia, he looks like Dr. House. So it's safe to assume he's bad ass. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgenstein
On June 14 2011 14:13 zizou21 wrote: I know there are some really great minds on this forum so I am hoping someone can help. I'm taking part in this philosophy/book club and we are reading Wittgenstein, and it's really interesting, but it's quickly turning into everyone sucking on wittgenstein's balls (me included) and there is not much of a dialectic forming.
I agree with Wittgenstein's main language argument, namely that we can't use language to penetrate truths about the world since the primary function of language is to facilitate communication between people. Thus, philosophers for centuries have been making the same mistake to try to answer questions like: "What is 'Virtue'?", or "What is 'Knowledge'"?, and so on. You can't extract these words from their context and make them mean something. IE: People can talk about virtue or knowledge without any confusion what so ever, but as soon as you "pluck" the word out of its context and start posing the question "What is virtue?" we get extremely puzzled to our very foundation and no longer know what to think (socrates effect). This is because Wittgenstein says there is no such thing in reality that corresponds to what we think of as "an essence" of Virtue, or Knowledge (What Plato would call Forms). In short, we are mistaken to think abstracted words have meaning and that there there is some sort of fundamental link between language and reality, etc. Words do not have fixed meanings but rather a "family" of meanings
As such, most philosophical problems we have, such as freewill vs predetermination, etc arise out of a misunderstanding of the language we use. Essentially, because words like "Free" and "Will" are taken out of their original contexts entirely to mean something completely nonsensical in this new metaphysical context, and predetermination is a word that has emerged from the scientific world that we now we try to use to describe our mode of existence... Therefore, Philosophy should be used as an activity of clarification; aka unraveling the reasons (as described above) why there has been so much damn confusion in Philosophy. If we did this, Wittgenstein thinks there would be no more philosophical problems.
This is some pretty deep shit and I oversimplified a lot of it, if not inaccurately represented some of his ideas. I'm kind of new at this, so I was hoping someone more learned in the philosophy world could tell me what happened to Philosophy after Wittgenstein. It seems to me that a lot of philosophers have just pushed him to the side and kept going on about their business. Do they have good arguments for dismissing what he is saying?
TL;DR: I'm not smart enough to propose a counter-argument to Wittgenstein, or know anyone that has done so, can you help me? or steer me in the right direction?
So by "Wittgenstein's argument" I assume you mean his later work that led into ordinary language philosophy i.e. Philosophical Investigations. I would then direct you to his earlier work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Vienna circle.
I would give you arguments if this was a scientific matter, but philosophical arguments have to be understood before you use them.
On June 14 2011 14:43 Jerubaal wrote: I'm not trained in this modern philosophical jargon, in fact I eschew it, but I think I'll be helpful because often the best way to identify and reconcile with an unsettling feeling is to separate yourself from the argument a bit. Don't allow yourself to become a slave to the argumentation. Think about the conclusions and ramifications of the arguments and ask yourself if that's what you think is correct. I'll try to ask some questions that clarify his position and identify problematic elements and maybe throw in some suggestions of my own.
On June 14 2011 14:13 zizou21 wrote: I know there are some really great minds on this forum so I am hoping someone can help. I'm taking part in this philosophy/book club and we are reading Wittgenstein, and it's really interesting, but it's quickly turning into everyone sucking on wittgenstein's balls (me included) and there is not much of a dialectic forming.
I agree with Wittgenstein's main language argument, namely that we can't use language to penetrate truths about the world since the primary function of language is to facilitate communication between people. Thus, philosophers for centuries have been making the same mistake to try to answer questions like: "What is 'Virtue'?", or "What is 'Knowledge'"?, and so on. You can't extract these words from their context and make them mean something. IE: People can talk about virtue or knowledge without any confusion what so ever, but as soon as you "pluck" the word out of its context and start posing the question "What is virtue?" we get extremely puzzled to our very foundation and no longer know what to think (socrates effect). This is because Wittgenstein says there is no such thing in reality that corresponds to what we think of as "an essence" of Virtue, or Knowledge (What Plato would call Forms). In short, we are mistaken to think abstracted words have meaning and that there there is some sort of fundamental link between language and reality, etc. Words do not have fixed meanings but rather a "family" of meanings.
I think that most people would agree with Wittgenstein's most famous arguments about language shaping the way we think and not merely being a neutral medium. To what extent does this color our ability to communicate though? Socrates/Plato frequently encountered people who couldn't precisely explain what they believed or why they believed it. That is not the same thing as saying that philosophical minds can't agree upon a fixed definition for things like 'vitrtue' or 'knowledge' and that's Socrates' goal in many dialogues. I hope that what Wittgenstein means is that we should attempt to break down these differences in definition in like manner because...
If he denies that language can be used to communicate about abstract things in any meaningful fashion, because it's impossible to know how disparate the definitions are, then..
1)He's essentially banished these concepts. How can you enforce virtue when you're not sure that you're even talking about the same thing.
2) He's established a solipsism, and communication no longer matters because anything external can be regarded at best as useful stimuli.
All in all, I find that position a bit silly. I have no idea if what you think is blue is the same as what I think is blue, but if I point to a blue carpet, you will most likely agree with me that it's blue.
As such, most philosophical problems we have, such as freewill vs predetermination, etc arise out of a misunderstanding of the language we use. Essentially, because words like "Free" and "Will" are taken out of their original contexts entirely to mean something completely nonsensical in this new metaphysical context, and predetermination is a word that has emerged from the scientific world that we now we try to use to describe our mode of existence... Therefore, Philosophy should be used as an activity of clarification; aka unraveling the reasons (as described above) why there has been so much damn confusion in Philosophy. If we did this, Wittgenstein thinks there would be no more philosophical problems.
As a political theorist, it's so amusing to me to watch people try to sweep the world under the rug in one fell swoop. Does he really think that there are no serious controversies (for lack of a better word) to be had in philosophy? That it's all just one big misunderstanding?
This is some pretty deep shit and I oversimplified a lot of it, if not inaccurately represented some of his ideas. I'm kind of new at this, so I was hoping someone more learned in the philosophy world could tell me what happened to Philosophy after Wittgenstein. It seems to me that a lot of philosophers have just pushed him to the side and kept going on about their business. Do they have good arguments for dismissing what he is saying?
TL;DR: I'm not smart enough to propose a counter-argument to Wittgenstein, or know anyone that has done so, can you help me? or steer me in the right direction?
I hope that helped a little bit. I prefer using simple arguments like a battering ram.
And remember, when in doubt, make a meta-argument out of it!!!
P.S. There's a semi-famous book, called Wittgenstein's Poker, about an encounter he had with Popper. I spit on Popper's name, but there might be some interesting stuff in there.
Wittgenstein makes none of those conclusions. Don't mistake a hastily composed summary for his actual arguments.
Then there's no reason for this thread.
The OP made some comments that could either be possible interpretations of his works or arguments made by people in his group. I proposed several lines of argumentation- some even contradictory.
The point of this thread is to push the OP into some critical thinking, not 'tell him how it is'. God forbid I should contribute to the attitude that has turned philosophy in the English speaking world and beyond into a recondite circle-jerk.
Most contemporary "analytic" philosophers are not Wittgensteinian. The turn away from Wittgenstein happened in the `60s and `70s. Relevant work includes:
Fodor: the first essays in Representations, the beginning of Language of Thought.
Grice, from Studies in the Way of Words: "Prolegomena", "Logic and Conversation", "Postwar Oxford Philosophy", "The Causal Theory of Perception".
Putnam, The Meaning of 'Meaning', The Nature of Mental States (and many other essays in Mind, Language and Reality, Collected Papers Volume Two.)
Kripke, Naming and Necessity
Some of these are not focused on engaging with Wittgenstein, but lay out alternative frameworks.
just counter by saying hes gay, and that the theories he made up later in his life completely contradicted everything hey said before, yet he still remained that arrogant im-100%-sure-im-right guy
arguing that every philosophical problem emanates out of misunderstood semantics is so counter-intuitive it shouldnt even need arguing against. there are concepts that might be understood differently by different people in different times or of different ethnicity, but there was always a broad enough base of people using language to discuss problems about fundamental stuff, sharing the same meaning for the words they used.
to argue that all metaphysical problems arise out of semantics and dont really exist is like dennett arguing that there is no mind you are only imagining that you exist. its so stupid it shouldnt need arguing against, its just people using semantics to try to trick you, in wittgenstein's case, trick you into thinking that every problem is just a semantic one
On June 14 2011 14:43 Jerubaal wrote: P.S. There's a semi-famous book, called Wittgenstein's Poker, about an encounter he had with Popper. I spit on Popper's name, but there might be some interesting stuff in there.
the book is really good actually, popper was delivering a lecture in front of some of the greatest philosophers in the world, wittgenstein was irritated by what he was saying and picked up a poker and was waving it around when he shouted "name an objective moral truth!" to which popper replies "that you shouldn't threaten visiting lecturers with a poker" and wittgenstein stormed off. the book isn't really that philosophical though, its more a basic biography of both people and outlining their thought and why their background and thought drew them to conflict. very interesting book but not really one which analyses the philosophy in depth.
On June 14 2011 15:42 summerloud wrote: arguing that every philosophical problem emanates out of misunderstood semantics is so counter-intuitive it shouldnt even need arguing against.
Does he say all or does he say most?
I never read this guy, but I always thought the large majority of disagreements between humans come from semantics. Not all of course, but the overwhelming majority.
I've never heard of Wittgenstein but I do like phlosophy and all that. I recently did an assignment for uni where we were asked in the situation I was researching "What ought to happen?" and looked into philosophy.
I looked up David Hume with his "is-ought" problem he came up with in the 1700's. The is-ought problem in my eyes is pretty much that you have no ethical standing to assert what ought to happen in a situation from what is happening. It's like an ethical dilema, there is an issue and there are 2 sides saying what ought to happen which are both in complete conflict, who's ought should you go with? Hume's is-ought problem swoops in and says in theory noone is right. Ever.
But this cant be? We should be able to know what ought to happen right? Of course. I argued that the use of science can be applied to circumnavigate this issue. If we know what our values are or what we value we can use science to achieve it. Science is a tool that we use to get what we want. Internet is the best way to communicate over long distances. Giving someone a smile is what you ought to do in a social setting to make someone comfortable and gain trust instead of flipping them the bird etc. We observe what is good, productive, what works and then choose avenues to get what we want or outcomes we want. Good = properity, happiness. Bad = counter productive, harmful.
Philosophy is so deep and so general it's not applicable in real life. In terms that are useful to you and I when approaching an issue. You have to assess things in a real setting. Like the statement "rape is bad". To a normal person, obviously this is true. It hurts people mentally and physically. We observe this pain and suffering and determine that it is a bad thing because of this. It's harmfull and counterproductive. If rape made people feel good and there was a need to increase the human population you could say rape is good because its not hurting anyone and helps the cause of human population etc. But you could be all like "what is rape", "what is language", "how do we actually know what we know" and conclude that we can never know what rape is or if it is intrisically good or bad.
Science. The process of observing and understanding reality helps us make decisions morally in the real world. And to combat humes is-ought problem, its not that you can determine an ought from an is. It's you cant get an is without choosing certain oughts. We decide what oughts are good and bad and we have damn good reason why we choose these. Because who would argue in the real world that WW3 nuclear war should happen, it's counter productive to our prosperity and is bad in terms that are useful.
Ummm i kinda went on a rant there, not entirley thought out or complete but I hope it makes sense I only had a 20min break from work to think and write this up lol oh well back to work...
On June 14 2011 14:43 Jerubaal wrote: Don't allow yourself to become a slave to the argumentation. Think about the conclusions and ramifications of the arguments and ask yourself if that's what you think is correct.
So you are saying that I should see if the logical conclusion of an argument suits me in order to decide whether I should dismiss the premises? Shouldn't it be the other way around? I check whether the premises are true and accept whatever follows from them? Otherwise I will say "God exists" and any argument with a conclusion to the contrary will be dismissed along with its premises.
On June 14 2011 14:43 Jerubaal wrote: If he denies that language can be used to communicate about abstract things in any meaningful fashion, because it's impossible to know how disparate the definitions are, then..
1)He's essentially banished these concepts. How can you enforce virtue when you're not sure that you're even talking about the same thing.
2) He's established a solipsism, and communication no longer matters because anything external can be regarded at best as useful stimuli.
All in all, I find that position a bit silly. I have no idea if what you think is blue is the same as what I think is blue, but if I point to a blue carpet, you will most likely agree with me that it's blue.
As a political theorist, it's so amusing to me to watch people try to sweep the world under the rug in one fell swoop. Does he really think that there are no serious controversies (for lack of a better word) to be had in philosophy? That it's all just one big misunderstanding?
I didn't read him like that. I always understood him and the ordinary language school like this: If we ask what "virtue" is, we are talking at a too abstract level. We should rather see what "virtue" is defined as: A bundle of morally good behaviors/intentions/effects and then ask "Is murder wrong?" "Is homosexuality wrong?". After we have concluded what is "good" we can package all that together into virtue. The other way around, to argue what virtue is and draw conclusions about whether murder is good or bad is twisting things around and will lead to disputes that are none.
On June 14 2011 14:43 Jerubaal wrote: I hope that helped a little bit. I prefer using simple arguments like a battering ram.
And remember, when in doubt, make a meta-argument out of it!!!
P.S. There's a semi-famous book, called Wittgenstein's Poker, about an encounter he had with Popper. I spit on Popper's name, but there might be some interesting stuff in there.
What is a meta-argument? An argument about an argument?
Why would you spit on Popper? The guy that brought you falsification to science, "discovered" what a good scientific theory must have and said that philosophy must be understandable for everyone?
I've never heard of Wittgenstein but I do like phlosophy and all that. I recently did an assignment for uni where we were asked in the situation I was researching "What ought to happen?" and looked into philosophy.
I looked up David Hume with his "is-ought" problem he came up with in the 1700's. The is-ought problem in my eyes is pretty much that you have no ethical standing to assert what ought to happen in a situation from what is happening. It's like an ethical dilema, there is an issue and there are 2 sides saying what ought to happen which are both in complete conflict, who's ought should you go with? Hume's is-ought problem swoops in and says in theory noone is right. Ever.
But this cant be? We should be able to know what ought to happen right? Of course. I argued that the use of science can be applied to circumnavigate this issue. If we know what our values are or what we value we can use science to achieve it. Science is a tool that we use to get what we want. Internet is the best way to communicate over long distances. Giving someone a smile is what you ought to do in a social setting to make someone comfortable and gain trust instead of flipping them the bird etc. We observe what is good, productive, what works and then choose avenues to get what we want or outcomes we want. Good = properity, happiness. Bad = counter productive, harmful.
Philosophy is so deep and so general it's not applicable in real life. In terms that are useful to you and I when approaching an issue. You have to assess things in a real setting. Like the statement "rape is bad". To a normal person, obviously this is true. It hurts people mentally and physically. We observe this pain and suffering and determine that it is a bad thing because of this. It's harmfull and counterproductive. If rape made people feel good and there was a need to increase the human population you could say rape is good because its not hurting anyone and helps the cause of human population etc. But you could be all like "what is rape", "what is language", "how do we actually know what we know" and conclude that we can never know what rape is or if it is intrisically good or bad.
Science. The process of observing and understanding reality helps us make decisions morally in the real world. And to combat humes is-ought problem, its not that you can determine an ought from an is. It's you cant get an is without choosing certain oughts. We decide what oughts are good and bad and we have damn good reason why we choose these. Because who would argue in the real world that WW3 nuclear war should happen, it's counter productive to our prosperity and is bad in terms that are useful.
Ummm i kinda went on a rant there, not entirley thought out or complete but I hope it makes sense I only had a 20min break from work to think and write this up lol oh well back to work...
You are overstating Hume's argument. The is-ought fallacy only wishes to say that "just because it is, does not mean that it is ought to be". It shows the divide between a normative argument, what should be, and a descriptive argument, what is.
Less abstract: Just because the world was green, does not mean that a green world is good. At the same time: Just because people have always murdered each other, does not mean that murder is good. That is what the is-ought fallacy is.
Now, when you say WW3 is bad because it creates suffering, then you are combining a descriptive argument "War creates suffering" with a normative argument "suffering is bad". The divide here is, that we could have another normative framework, another moral system, that told us that suffering makes us better people. In their moral system it would be "WW3 is good, because it creates suffering".
See? We can describe what is and we can develop a normative or moral system, but one can never be concluded from the other.
On June 14 2011 15:42 summerloud wrote: just counter by saying hes gay, and that the theories he made up later in his life completely contradicted everything hey said before, yet he still remained that arrogant im-100%-sure-im-right guy
arguing that every philosophical problem emanates out of misunderstood semantics is so counter-intuitive it shouldnt even need arguing against. there are concepts that might be understood differently by different people in different times or of different ethnicity, but there was always a broad enough base of people using language to discuss problems about fundamental stuff, sharing the same meaning for the words they used.
to argue that all metaphysical problems arise out of semantics and dont really exist is like dennett arguing that there is no mind you are only imagining that you exist. its so stupid it shouldnt need arguing against, its just people using semantics to try to trick you, in wittgenstein's case, trick you into thinking that every problem is just a semantic one
On June 14 2011 14:43 Jerubaal wrote: P.S. There's a semi-famous book, called Wittgenstein's Poker, about an encounter he had with Popper. I spit on Popper's name, but there might be some interesting stuff in there.
the book is really good actually, popper was delivering a lecture in front of some of the greatest philosophers in the world, wittgenstein was irritated by what he was saying and picked up a poker and was waving it around when he shouted "name an objective moral truth!" to which popper replies "that you shouldn't threaten visiting lecturers with a poker" and wittgenstein stormed off. the book isn't really that philosophical though, its more a basic biography of both people and outlining their thought and why their background and thought drew them to conflict. very interesting book but not really one which analyses the philosophy in depth.
Yeah that's it more or less (except for the "he is gay" part). I remember Deleuze saying that Wittgenstein "feel" like new while it is, in fact, a big backstep in the past. I think Wittgenstein's argument about language is good to describe a certain pathological philosophy (for exemple, the french pseudo philosophy represented by Bernard Henry Levi nowadays), but one should not read wittgenstein too close.
For exemple, Becker said in some book, that he did not care about the big picture of Wittgenstein's theory, but he was more concerned, when he read, about what he could use for his own work. That's how I read wittgenstein myself.
On June 14 2011 14:43 Jerubaal wrote: Don't allow yourself to become a slave to the argumentation. Think about the conclusions and ramifications of the arguments and ask yourself if that's what you think is correct.
So you are saying that I should see if the logical conclusion of an argument suits me in order to decide whether I should dismiss the premises? Shouldn't it be the other way around? I check whether the premises are true and accept whatever follows from them? Otherwise I will say "God exists" and any argument with a conclusion to the contrary will be dismissed along with its premises.
Why change your opinion when you can rationalize the one you already have?
First of all, a disclaimer: I'm not a Wittgenstein-scholar, and I'm not a so-called "analytical" philosopher, so I will focus on the argument as presented by the OP.
Ok, here we go:
"You can't extract these words [(virtue, knowledge, etc.)] from their context and make them mean something."
The operative word here being, of course, 'context'. There's a kernel of truth to this, which can't be denied. Many philosophical discussions (prior to Kant) operated in an obscurantist fashion, "philosophizing" on some arcane concept like "virtue", without any consideration of its transcendental justification. However, "taking words out of context and throwing them around" is not a very accurate description of modern philosophy. Puzzlement may be the beginning stage of philosophy, but it is only the beginning stage. Indeed, this is what separates philosophy from theology. So let's try to overcome our puzzlement: - Wittgenstein says that we can only understand words in the context of proper sentences (we label this contextualism). - If contextualism is only meant a proposition about the nature of language, then it is trivial (true). - If we, however, draw an anti-essentialist conclusion about the nature of reality as such, it is something else entirely. ("This [puzzlement] is because Wittgenstein says there is no such thing in reality that corresponds to what we think of as "an essence" of Virtue, or Knowledge (What Plato would call Forms)").
Clearly, you are dealing with two very different propositions - one trivial and one radical. And you even seem to get at this yourself:
"In short, we are mistaken to think abstracted words have meaning and that there there is some sort of fundamental link between language and reality, etc."
Simply put, my criticism of your position is the following: language may well be contextual in nature, and it may well be that we form our understanding of reality through language. But surely language originates in reality, not the other way around. The pre-condition for understanding anything at all, however minimally, must be that concepts refer to something real.
If you want to expand your thinking on this, you could read some of the philosophers (from Kant onwards) that try to investigate what this something is, and what the conditions for gaining knowledge on it are. I recommend at random: Kant, Hegel (although he is nails) and Husserl.
On June 14 2011 19:01 Kurfyrst wrote: First of all, a disclaimer: I'm not a Wittgenstein-scholar, and I'm not a so-called "analytical" philosopher, so I will focus on the argument as presented by the OP.
Ok, here we go:
"You can't extract these words [(virtue, knowledge, etc.)] from their context and make them mean something."
The operative word here being, of course, 'context'. There's a kernel of truth to this, which can't be denied. Many philosophical discussions (prior to Kant) operated in an obscurantist fashion, "philosophizing" on some arcane concept like "virtue", without any consideration of its transcendental justification. However, "taking words out of context and throwing them around" is not a very accurate description of modern philosophy. Puzzlement may be the beginning stage of philosophy, but it is only the beginning stage. Indeed, this is what separates philosophy from theology. So let's try to overcome our puzzlement: - Wittgenstein says that we can only understand words in the context of proper sentences (we label this contextualism). - If contextualism is only meant a proposition about the nature of language, then it is trivial (true). - If we, however, draw an anti-essentialist conclusion about the nature of reality as such, it is something else entirely. ("This [puzzlement] is because Wittgenstein says there is no such thing in reality that corresponds to what we think of as "an essence" of Virtue, or Knowledge (What Plato would call Forms)").
Clearly, you are dealing with two very different propositions - one trivial and one radical. And you even seem to get at this yourself:
"In short, we are mistaken to think abstracted words have meaning and that there there is some sort of fundamental link between language and reality, etc."
Simply put, my criticism of your position is the following: language may well be contextual in nature, and it may well be that we form our understanding of reality through language. But surely language originates in reality, not the other way around. The pre-condition for understanding anything at all, however minimally, must be that concepts refer to something real.
If you want to expand your thinking on this, you could read some of the philosophers (from Kant onwards) that try to investigate what this something is, and what the conditions for gaining knowledge on it are. I recommend at random: Kant, Hegel (although he is nails) and Husserl.
The way you explained your own view is really clear, and I learned from it so I wanted to say how thankful I am. You're great. I see a direct link with my own work on ideology, where ideologies are defined by some as the contrary of practice (the young marx) and, on the other side, other sees it as a some kind of outcome from practice. Marx said himself that ideology was "the language of culture". That's interesting, well at least for me.
On June 14 2011 19:01 Kurfyrst wrote: Many philosophical discussions (prior to Kant) operated in an obscurantist fashion, "philosophizing" on some arcane concept like "virtue", without any consideration of its transcendental justification.
[...]
"In short, we are mistaken to think abstracted words have meaning and that there there is some sort of fundamental link between language and reality, etc."
Simply put, my criticism of your position is the following: language may well be contextual in nature, and it may well be that we form our understanding of reality through language. But surely language originates in reality, not the other way around. The pre-condition for understanding anything at all, however minimally, must be that concepts refer to something real.
First, the majority of obscuratism is, according to analytical philosophers, being practiced by rather modern philosophers such as almost everyone in the Hegelian tradition, from Hegel over Derrida to Butler. Even Kant has been criticized as being intentionally obscure, but he just may be enormously complex.
To your second point, the key word is probably "abstract". Things like virtue, knowledge, logic are aggregate concepts. They include various phenomena and patterns we can experience. The limited Wittgenstein argument here would be that the aggregates, the abstract concepts themselves do not exist as a singular entity but only their constituent phenomena do.
On June 14 2011 19:01 Kurfyrst wrote: Simply put, my criticism of your position is the following: language may well be contextual in nature, and it may well be that we form our understanding of reality through language. But surely language originates in reality, not the other way around. The pre-condition for understanding anything at all, however minimally, must be that concepts refer to something real.
To your second point, the key word is probably "abstract". Things like virtue, knowledge, logic are aggregate concepts. They include various phenomena and patterns we can experience. The limited Wittgenstein argument here would be that the aggregates, the abstract concepts themselves do not exist as a singular entity but only their constituent phenomena do.
(See bold) This isn't so clear to me. What is significant about the idea that we can experience these phenomena? Can we, as a matter of fact? I would argue that whatever one thinks one observes or experiences is related to one's own interpretation of it, even if it is a fundamental interpretation done at a subconscious level. The same is true of what you call the aggregate concepts, although such concepts seem to involve a "higher order" interpretation.
It seems to me that a lot of philosophers have just pushed him to the side and kept going on about their business. Do they have good arguments for dismissing what he is saying?
Wittgenstein is very influential until today. It depends of course on the philosophical school that you are looking at. But inside the whole mind/body debate his work is still quite important.
Regarding him being brushed aside, I would say that mostly refers to his earlier work (Tractatus). But that more or less accounts for the whole school of logical positivism. Try to find a course on Carnap "The Logical Structure of the World". When discussing the book it should become quite clear why logical positivism is being disregarded nowadays.
What I was wondering is how do you read him in English? I'm German which might also be the reason that he was discussed a lot in university but still the style in which he is writing is very unique and I find it difficult to imagine who one would translate it. I had a literature course on the Tractatus and half of the time we spend discussing wording choices and dissecting his sentences.
For people that are not aware of how Wittgenstein was writing, one should know that he would "distill" his texts. Meaning that he would write a long manuscript and then start to reduce it to what he perceived are the core sentences of the text. The result is that most of his texts can almost be considered poetic.
Understanding it though becomes quite an ordeal because you need to very carefully take apart every sentence in order to recover the "full" meaning. It also means that you usually use a ton of auxiliary literature.
I don't know too much about philosophy, but please enlighten me why this stuff is "genius"? It doesn't take a genius to realize that most debates end up being separated by the meaning of the word and the language. An average highschooler knows that :\
Just seems like a bunch of high-class people with tophats trying to intelligently discuss common sense.
On June 14 2011 22:03 Jombozeus wrote: I don't know too much about philosophy, but please enlighten me why this stuff is "genius"? It doesn't take a genius to realize that most debates end up being separated by the meaning of the word and the language. An average highschooler knows that :\
Just seems like a bunch of high-class people with tophats trying to intelligently discuss common sense.
It's genius because they managed to write 400 pg treatises on the subject and get paid to do it. How many high schoolers do you see accomplishing the same feat?
On June 14 2011 19:01 Kurfyrst wrote: Simply put, my criticism of your position is the following: language may well be contextual in nature, and it may well be that we form our understanding of reality through language. But surely language originates in reality, not the other way around. The pre-condition for understanding anything at all, however minimally, must be that concepts refer to something real.
To your second point, the key word is probably "abstract". Things like virtue, knowledge, logic are aggregate concepts. They include various phenomena and patterns we can experience. The limited Wittgenstein argument here would be that the aggregates, the abstract concepts themselves do not exist as a singular entity but only their constituent phenomena do.
(See bold) This isn't so clear to me. What is significant about the idea that we can experience these phenomena? Can we, as a matter of fact? I would argue that whatever one thinks one observes or experiences is related to one's own interpretation of it, even if it is a fundamental interpretation done at a subconscious level. The same is true of what you call the aggregate concepts, although such concepts seem to involve a "higher order" interpretation.
I think you are saying that we cannot experience objective reality, right? That all experience is subjective and we cannot infer objective reality from experience.
First, "can experience" is used rather lax. It implies, that there is a causal chain between what we experience in our mind and what happens in reality. Even subjective reality proponents usually do not have a problem with that, except those that claim that there is no objective reality outside us whatsoever.
How do we interact with objective reality? Let's take touch for example: Our mind tells our arm to move forward, our finger to extend and to touch an object. When the contact happens, two material objects have made contact: our finger and the object. This happened in objective reality, no matter how we experienced it. Most subjective reality proponents won't have a problem with this either, but in the next step, the opinions diverge:
Now the nerves send a signal back to our brain and we "experience" the object in our mind subjectively. We form a picture or model of this, we form a model of us touching the object etc. However you want to describe it, a mental state is formed that corresponds to us touching the object. Here subjective reality proponents claim that your experience of the object may completely differ from mine. What I experience as rough, you might experience as smooth. When I jump into your body, I would experience the object as soft, whereas in my body I experienced the object as hard.
At this point, nobody can disprove that. It doesn't really matter though. When we touch the same object and we talk about it, we agree on a name for the attribute we experienced. We will call the surface as "rough", no matter how we subjectively experienced it. This basically would move the meaning of "rough" away from it's meaning of "roughness", but would mean "the attribute this surface has". Less abstract: The sentence in our mind "The surface is rough" would when spoken to another person mean "The surface has attribute X", X being whatever the person experiences.
Now we have saved our language at least. Whenever we talk about something to another person, we are referring to the actually existing attribute in reality.
Having said this, how can I say that "we can experience objective reality"? First, Okham's Razor. To be able to claim that we experience everything subjectively we have to assume that there is an interpretative disconnect between what exists and what we experience. It also is a little circular. Secondly, subjective reality would assumes a mind-body dualism. Me being a materialist, would say that as the mind is only the product of it's material, another mind will have the exact same experiences to the exact same objects if it is built the same way. Our current understanding of neuro-science heavily implies that our brains do not differ in such a way as to allow for great differences in experiences. This might be disproven in the future though.
So in conclusion, even if we would know that all experiences are subjective, we would still act as if they were an exact match to objective reality. The success of this action would make our theory of subjective reality irrelevant. Secondly, if we agree that mind-body dualism, is false, we cannot but say that our experiences match objective reality.
On June 14 2011 22:03 Jombozeus wrote: I don't know too much about philosophy, but please enlighten me why this stuff is "genius"? It doesn't take a genius to realize that most debates end up being separated by the meaning of the word and the language. An average highschooler knows that :\
Just seems like a bunch of high-class people with tophats trying to intelligently discuss common sense.
It's genius because they managed to write 400 pg treatises on the subject and get paid to do it. How many high schoolers do you see accomplishing the same feat?
So how does that make it genius? They can write a million pages about philosophy on this, and in the end it does nothing, its still common sense that everybody already knows. Thats like saying Bush is a genius because he got paid to destroy countries including his own.
On June 14 2011 22:03 Jombozeus wrote: I don't know too much about philosophy, but please enlighten me why this stuff is "genius"? It doesn't take a genius to realize that most debates end up being separated by the meaning of the word and the language. An average highschooler knows that :\
Just seems like a bunch of high-class people with tophats trying to intelligently discuss common sense.
Well, break down the opposing views of the washington consensus and the chinese model to it's core definitions and show that they are similar.
The point is, it's not obvious. We feel that our contradicting views are diametrically opposed when in fact we just refer to the same thing with different words. That's quite a feat. To then say that *all* controversies are a matter of differing definitions is either genius or crazy.
On June 14 2011 22:03 Jombozeus wrote: I don't know too much about philosophy, but please enlighten me why this stuff is "genius"? It doesn't take a genius to realize that most debates end up being separated by the meaning of the word and the language. An average highschooler knows that :\
Just seems like a bunch of high-class people with tophats trying to intelligently discuss common sense.
It's genius because they managed to write 400 pg treatises on the subject and get paid to do it. How many high schoolers do you see accomplishing the same feat?
So how does that make it genius? They can write a million pages about philosophy on this, and in the end it does nothing, its still common sense that everybody already knows. Thats like saying Bush is a genius because he got paid to destroy countries including his own.
Well then do it. You will be as revered as Derrida.
On June 14 2011 22:03 Jombozeus wrote: I don't know too much about philosophy, but please enlighten me why this stuff is "genius"? It doesn't take a genius to realize that most debates end up being separated by the meaning of the word and the language. An average highschooler knows that :\
Just seems like a bunch of high-class people with tophats trying to intelligently discuss common sense.
This is so cute in my opinion and perfectly shows how influential Wittgenstein was and is. What you are referring to as common sense is something that in philosophy is referred to as Linguistic turn.
Or to be more precise the reason that you think some of the basic ideas of Wittgenstein are common sense is based on the fact that there was a mayor paradigm shift in the western philosophy in the 20th century that is referred to as Linguistic turn.
Or as someone already mentioned... lets just call you Derrida
On June 14 2011 22:03 Jombozeus wrote: I don't know too much about philosophy, but please enlighten me why this stuff is "genius"? It doesn't take a genius to realize that most debates end up being separated by the meaning of the word and the language. An average highschooler knows that :\
Just seems like a bunch of high-class people with tophats trying to intelligently discuss common sense.
Well, break down the opposing views of the washington consensus and the chinese model to it's core definitions and show that they are similar.
The point is, it's not obvious. We feel that our contradicting views are diametrically opposed when in fact we just refer to the same thing with different words. That's quite a feat. To then say that *all* controversies are a matter of differing definitions is either genius or crazy.
On June 14 2011 22:03 Jombozeus wrote: I don't know too much about philosophy, but please enlighten me why this stuff is "genius"? It doesn't take a genius to realize that most debates end up being separated by the meaning of the word and the language. An average highschooler knows that :\
Just seems like a bunch of high-class people with tophats trying to intelligently discuss common sense.
It's genius because they managed to write 400 pg treatises on the subject and get paid to do it. How many high schoolers do you see accomplishing the same feat?
So how does that make it genius? They can write a million pages about philosophy on this, and in the end it does nothing, its still common sense that everybody already knows. Thats like saying Bush is a genius because he got paid to destroy countries including his own.
Well then do it. You will be as revered as Derrida.
Sure thing. For the countries that followed/follows the Washington consensus, privatization of the market and moving towards a free market was the main strategy in order to achieve economic development.
For the Chinese government, its the same damn thing, except they just don't say it.
Nothing is different in the economic sense of the two words. The only difference is that in the Chinese culture, people want to save face and they wont admit that they are moving towards capitalism while everyone already knows it.
The Chinese culture condones the Chinese governments actions while the Western culture will not. In essence they are doing the same thing, and that is maximizing their ability to gain economic development without their government being overthrown (either by being voted out or rebellion). In this sense, the Chinese simply has much more leeway to lie about what they are doing to their people. According to this dude Wittgenstein (and common sense), we are simply talking about the same thing from different angles.
Easy.
EDIT: To Bluespace: I am Chinese, and I have little to do with Western philosophies, so don't make these assumptions. Lets take my grandfather as an example, he was born before Mr. Wittgenstein wrote his theories in 1953. He told me how he felt about language dictating arguments was something he learned when he was young. Given a few decades of buffer time before Western philosophies reaching my society, its easy to conclude that he knew about it with no influence from Wittgenstein. Or put simply, other people have thought of this before him, he is only a purported "genius" because he wrote it down in pretty words.
Reading his "philosophical investigations" on wikipedia, its quite involved. I think Wittgenstein was a major clarifier as to how language was used to define problems, so what I've learned so far is that he served an important practical function.
From what I understand he was trying to explain that you can't simplify things, words to formal concepts because they are necessarily defined by their contexts, so to some extent he views earlier attempts at solving philosophical problems as futile exercises because they start on a wrong premise. Its quite interesting
There's actually a big push going on in epistemology that deals with the issues Wittgenstein raised with philosophy. On the whole, philosophical arguments were made through thought experiments, which are supposed to test what the words applied "really mean." The problem with this, as Wittgenstein states, is that the Language Games we play make these words absurd when taken out of context, when trying to analyze these thought experiments.
Take the Gettier Case for example, which challenged millenia-long holdings on what it meant to "know" something, i.e. it shows that "justified true belief" is not enough to constitute knowledge, as was the consensus up 'till his publishing (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_case)
The problem is, some people still stand on the side that says the Gettier Case does show an example of knowledge. This happened in my own epistemology class, to which my professor, a critic of the old, thought-experiment-oriented analytic philosophy, said, "If I were a responsible epistemologist, I'd beat those intuitions out of you." And this is what it comes down to: we have certain intuitions about what these words are supposed to mean, and only use those intuitions to assess the "true meaning" of the words presented in the case. In their paper, "Normativity And Epistemic Intuitions," Weinberg, Nichols and Stich define these intuitions such: "As we use the notion, an epistemic intuition is simply a spontaneous judgment about the epistemic properties of some specific case – a judgment for which the person making the judgment may be able to offer no plausible justification."
Later on in the same paper, the trio give some evidence showing that there is a huge variance in these epistemic intuitions. And not only that there is variance, but the variance is systematic, and can be traced to cultural norms. For a brief example, someone in East Asia would be more likely to call something an account of knowledge when the rest of his town, or a council of elders, had already called it such.
So to the OP, even though Wittgenstein is a bit outdated now, there's a lot of empirical evidence cropping up supporting the idea that discussing these claims is pointless, because there really is no consensus on them. I'd point you to the paper I quoted above, "Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions": found here.
Of course, there are people who try to defend these intuitions, like Ernest Sosa in his "A Defense of the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy." Essentially, he says that despite WNS's findings, when people within a culture have intuitions that are about in harmony, and we actually are able to talk about things like "knowledge" or "justice" or whatnot.
Sosa's heart is in the right place, but the problem is, he defends a view of epistemology that seems to be in the minority: that we don't need a normative system to tell us how to reason, and is only looking at a positive account, which describes simply how we reason. So this may not be well connected to those lofty ethical arguments, but it points in the same direction.
On June 14 2011 14:19 sermokala wrote: word are simply representations of a greater idea. to see words like free and will and death and rape and mearly words makes them all the same. One must know and understand the difference between what one person is trying to communicate to even philosophi.
I made that up on the spot how do you think?
aka words arn't just words they mean something and that meaning is what you debate.
The problem is that people have a hard time agreeing on their meaning.
Rape has several clerical definitions. Free will? If you ask Joe what it is, he'll say one thing. If you ask Bob, he'll say another. Get the two of them to talk about it, and they'll spend four hours arguing semantics.
There is no linguistic disagreement on free will vs determinism. It is a simple, concise, precisely defined debate. As such, OP's arguments regarding that are irrelevant. For what its worth, free will means action, choice, preference, the praxeological system of describing human behavior. The reason free will is misunderstood is only because of lack of insight to praxeology. And determinism is neurobiology, behaviorism, etc. All well understood concepts.
It is true that the classical debate questions in the OP are impossible to define universally, but that is not because of some grand language barrier, no. It is only because of category error made in the use of those concepts - virtue, value, goodness, are praxeological concepts, and hence must be analyised in that framework. Now Wittgenstein, not having studied this, comes to alternative explanations and makes the same fallacies as many other philosophers due to lack of interdisciplinary open mind.
Continental philosophy and analytical philosophy really can't argue against each other because they are completely different fields. It's like asking a geologist to argue about whether a slightly different-coloured bird is a new species or not.
Realistically we have both limited free will and limited determinism, to say otherwise I strongly believe is nothing more than mental masturbation that ignores how we all live are lives. The great debate over the two always acts as if it must be one extreme or the other, when simple life experience tells us otherwise. Simple example: I was able to choose what I wanted to eat for breakfast, but I can't choose to float to the sun, or eat the sun for breakfast. There are very real constraints on our existence that are seemingly random and definitely out of our control while we are able to make choices within these constraints.
On June 14 2011 23:01 Jombozeus wrote: EDIT: To Bluespace: I am Chinese, and I have little to do with Western philosophies, so don't make these assumptions. Lets take my grandfather as an example, he was born before Mr. Wittgenstein wrote his theories in 1953. He told me how he felt about language dictating arguments was something he learned when he was young. Given a few decades of buffer time before Western philosophies reaching my society, its easy to conclude that he knew about it with no influence from Wittgenstein. Or put simply, other people have thought of this before him, he is only a purported "genius" because he wrote it down in pretty words.
Mr. Wittgenstein was dead in 1953. I guess you looked up when Philosophical Investigations was published and missed the word posthumously somewhere.
You are asking me not to make any assumptions but you cite your grandfather that claims to have had these thoughts in his youth. I know neither your age nor that of your grandfather I will therefore have to assume quite a lot if I would want to figure out when your grandfather got these ideas.
Also I would have to make an assumption on whether or not your grandfather came up with this on his own or maybe someone taught him?
As I have little interest to talk about your grandfather I will just reiterate the core of what I was saying. Maybe there is a Chinese philosopher that had similar ideas earlier or in parallel. The point is that sometimes a profound idea might seem trivial after someone tells you about it. That does not make the idea trivial.
For example a wheel once you've seen it is an extremely trivial things. Still it took humanity forever to make one. So can you really claim that the ideas we are discussing here would seem trivial to you if your grandfather or someone else would have never talked with you about them?
Many linguists have a somewhat simple base view on meaning of words which is: Words mean what people are trying to express when they use them. It might seem stupid for people that think they learned to speak from a dictionary or whatever but it's based on that words are created when we have a use for them not the other way around and that languages generally evolve quite rapidly.
This view is not uncommon in philosophy but it doesn't answer all related philosophical questions for obvious reasons. But having in mind that the order is usually meaning --> word and not word --> meaning can make some philosophical discussions easier.
On June 14 2011 14:13 zizou21 wrote: This is some pretty deep shit
I, for one, fail to see the substance in this thread.
so words have the meaning you give them. Write down the common understanding of it in a dictionary to fixate that meaning and your problem is solved until the word changes its meaning and you have to change the entry accordingly.
On June 14 2011 14:13 zizou21 wrote: This is some pretty deep shit
I, for one, fail to see the substance in this thread.
so words have the meaning you give them. Write down the common understanding of it in a dictionary to fixate that meaning and your problem is solved until the word changes its meaning and you have to change the entry accordingly. + Show Spoiler +
True, most of us here have argued for the standpoint that the meaning of words is negotiated.
You are missing the other important point of Wittgenstein and his followers though: Words influence what can be thought.
Say you want to invent something for which you do not have the words for. How do you think about it? Also, supposedly the meaning of words create their own dynamic which steers an argument on its own. Something like that it is inherent of an apple to fall down and we cannot think of an apple to fall up, which is problematic insofar that we could learn alot about reality if we thought about apples falling up. But we have no words for that (this is a metaphor for "something we do not have words for". Obviously we have the words for apples falling up, but how do you explain a concept that you dont have the words for?)
Most modern philosophy is in some way in a response to Wittgenstein's Investigations and the main arguments in it (private language/beetle in a box/no theory of meaning per se) and such. I think simply looking for arguments against him isn't really the best way to approach the problem. He wasn't someone like Descartes who had clearly outlined metaphysical positions would could be attacked in a similar way.
I think it's much better to say "What can I get out of Wittgenstein?" much in the same way I think it's better to say "What can I get out of Plato?". Ignore the good old rant about the continental philosophy vs analyitic, it's mostly hyperbole. Ignore most of all your intuitions and predispositions towards certain ideas and arguments, this problem holds more people back than anything else. Many of Wittgenstein's arguments seem counter-intuitive and sometimes down right crazy, but you really need to put in effort to see why it is important. In a similar way that Kant's Transcendental Idealism seems absolutely bonkers when you first read it. Get rid of the temptation to see philosophy as a bunch of people trying to prove their right and instead enjoy the ideas on offer.
Though if you are looking for the total opposite of the later Wittgenstein I recommend reading Chomsky's first book on Generative Grammar. It's not as dense as some of the other texts people have suggested. Then there other philosophers that are highly influenced by Wittgenstein that disagree with him on certain major issues (Daniel Denett, Wilfred Sellars, Kripke, Hilary Putnam) of those Daniel Denette is probably the easiest read by far, as you're going to need a Masters in philosophy to really understand Sellars and Kripke (I know I don't)
On the other side of things you have the philosophers that really do agree with Wittgenstein and advocate a kind of Philosophical Quietism (dissolving rather than solving arguments) people like Richard Rorty and John McDowell. Out of them I recommend reading Rorty's 'Contingency, Irony and Solidarity' while it is incredibly wacky and post-modern it gives you a sense of how far you can take certain viewpoints.
TL:DR Get a good book on Wittgenstein (from early to later) really try and ignore you intuition to call him crazy, and get a good grasp of what's saying. Also take a quick look into the early history of analyitic philosophy from Kant to Russell to see just what has upset him about the nature of philosophical argument. Then check out some modern philosophers like Donaldson, Putnam or Searle and see why some philosophers continue to do philosophy after Wittgenstein.
Edit: good introductory video despite Searle's slight bias against him on some issues
I won't answer myself because I know nothing about analytic philosophy (a priori, not really interested)
If by any chance you understand French or Spanish, Deleuze opinion on Wittgenstein in his Abecedaire. It's such a demolition that it's comical. He says Wittgenstein is basically an assassin of philosophy.
Summary in English:
Parnet says, let's move on to W, and Deleuze says, there's nothing in W, and Parnet says, yes, there's Wittgenstein. She knows he's nothing for Deleuze, but it's only a word. Deleuze says, he doesn't like to talk about that... It's a philosophical catastrophe. It's the very type of a "school", a regression of all philosophy, a massive regression. Deleuze considers the Wittgenstein matter to be quite sad. They imposed <ils ont foutu> a system of terror in which, under the pretext of doing something new, it's poverty introduced as grandeur. Deleuze says there isn't a word to express this kind of danger, but that this danger is one that recurs, that it's not the first time that it has arrived. It's serious especially since he considers the Wittgensteinians to be nasty <méchants> and destructive <ils cassent tout>. So in this, there could be an assassination of philosophy, Deleuze says, they are assassins of philosophy, and because of that, one must remain very vigilant. <Deleuze laughs>
I don't have an opinion, although I love Deleuze, who is one of the main figure of contemporary philosophy; maybe the main figure from a certain perspective.
Continental vs analytic philosophers are like cats and dogs, they will never really like each others, I guess.
As someone who is not educated on the topic but has done a fair amount of independent thought and research into it. Wittgenstein is right. Words describing abstract concepts are irreconcilable outside of their context because those things don't actually exist.
Although, one could extend the argument that all things are just arbitrary classifications used for ease of communication. What is a dog? at what point on the evolutionary tree does something stop being a weird rodent thing and start being a canine? We have to arbitrarily make these judgements, and there is no 'truth' to them, they just help us to communicate.
We humans have a nasty habit of searching for 'truth' and 'meaning' in things as if something established what was true and what the meaning of things was before we came along and arbitrarily made it all up.
Therefore best counter argument to Wittgenstein is theism. It's a bit of a jump, but I make it for brevity. For abstract concepts to have a 'true' meaning it would have to be established somehow, how better to establish it then while creating the universe? I personally am non theistic and agree with the arguments presented in the OP.
Just my own opinion on free will. Reality is clearly deterministic, at least in normal conditions (I am no master of physics), this is not compatible with free will. At what point can we change the momentum of the chemical and electrical reactions that govern out behaviour? We can't, but it is convenient for us to think we can and so we have evolved to think that way.
Brotkrumen Germany. June 15 2011 00:14. Posts 98 "...but how do you explain a concept that you dont have the words for?"
You describe it until someone makes up a word for it. It's like a child learning some new word, you have to use words that are already known to the child to explain the new one. Words you already know indeed influence your thinking, that's what they are made for. A completely new word however will make you interested in finding out what it means at best. Either way, looking them up solves these problems. Even if there are no words to even begin to describe the new stuff (which is kinda hard to imagine) you can always rely on pictures to describe something.
The whole thing about 'what is virtue', 'if a tree falls in the forest and nobody is there to witness it, does it make any sound?' is just about us making stuff up and discussing it. There is no real end to this as it is purely based on opinion.
This is of course old news to people in this thread so the whole discussion exists primarily for the sake of discussing. And now i'm ranting as well...
Doesn't Wittgenstein his own thesis on this destroy said thesis as well as its arguments at the same time. Afterall he is immediately runs into the same problems when he has to communicate this idea.
On June 14 2011 14:13 zizou21 wrote: This is because Wittgenstein says there is no such thing in reality that corresponds to what we think of as "an essence" of Virtue, or Knowledge (What Plato would call Forms).
I am not a philosopher by trade, but can we say such a thing with certainty? Certainly nothing we know of would make us believe in the existence of "forms" but this is still just an assumption without proof. How would it affect the argument if there was such an essence?
I'm really just curious. It's impossible to prove an existential negative, I know that, but is this a vital part of his argument? I assume many people who believe in God would claim that God was the ultimate essence and source for many of these concepts (Virtue, Knowledge, Beauty, etc) and I don't really know anything about Wittgenstein's arguments. Do they depend on there being no such absolute source/reference for abstract concepts?
On June 15 2011 01:10 DisneylandSC wrote: Doesn't Wittgenstein his own thesis on this destroy said thesis as well as its arguments at the same time. Afterall he is immediately runs into the same problems when he has to communicate this idea.
No. Wittgenstein doesn't claim that it is impossible to communicate with each other. He just says that philosophical problems arise due to "communication problems". By solving the communication problem, you solve the philosophical problem.
This is also where the criticism comes in. Or as was shown earlier some philosophers go so far as to call him an terrorist because the underlying claim is that all of philosophy is just a giant misunderstanding that can be solved by a "good dictionary". (very oversimplified)
This relates now to his earlier work and as was pointed out, he distanced himself in his later work from this idea.
On June 15 2011 01:10 DisneylandSC wrote: Doesn't Wittgenstein his own thesis on this destroy said thesis as well as its arguments at the same time. Afterall he is immediately runs into the same problems when he has to communicate this idea.
No. Wittgenstein doesn't claim that it is impossible to communicate with each other. He just says that philosophical problems arise due to "communication problems". By solving the communication problem, you solve the philosophical problem.
This is also where the criticism comes in. Or as was shown earlier some philosophers go so far as to call him an terrorist because the underlying claim is that all of philosophy is just a giant misunderstanding that can be solved by a "good dictionary". (very oversimplified)
This relates now to his earlier work and as was pointed out, he distanced himself in his later work from this idea.
Being a mathematician myself I must say I never had this problem. : D
Ugh. I have a love/hate relationship with philosophy. There are so many pseudo-philosophers that just make baseless claims, suffer from logical failures, and shoddy assumptions. Despite this, they spew pages upon pages of intellectual masturbation on the page, as if they are thinking out loud, rather than SAYING SOMETHING. This thread is a perfect example. I made it to the end of page one before I had to stop for my own mental health. It was the same way in my philosophy classes in university. Someone begins an argument "well since computers can't learn they could never...". Well, computers can learn, so I can effectively tune out for the next 15 minutes of your rambling.
Wittgenstein is right, in my opinion, about nearly everything, but I think you confuse having a "family of meanings" with "no meaning". These "essences" you refer to have been approximated by averaging a wide range of connotation and experience. We have a powerful ability to recognize patterns. Absolutely, philosophy suffers because of barriers in language. However, I would argue that this is the mark of a poor philosopher. A good philosopher defines his terms explicitly. When he makes an argument, he says something like "For the sake of this argument, I define consciousness as the sense that one is in control". On complex subjects, one must define sub-terms, too.
In regards to absolute truth... If we all had perfect information and perfect logic we would all agree. So saying that philosophy is about clarification is not at all incorrect.
On June 15 2011 01:38 ToxNub wrote: A good philosopher defines his terms explicitly. When he makes an argument, he says something like "For the sake of this argument, I define consciousness as the sense that one is in control". On complex subjects, one must define sub-terms, too.
In regards to absolute truth... If we all had perfect information and perfect logic we would all agree. So saying that philosophy is about clarification is not at all incorrect.
I definitely agree that terms should be always defined before use. However, one has to define the terms in the description in order for the definition to include any relevant information. For me, the real question has always been: "is this an endless regression of definitions or does it definitively end somewhere?"
I haven't been able to find a proper answer to this question. Is language just a floating body of definitions all depending on each other, an independent system much like mathematics (which Gödel proved not to have any connection to or a basis in a more fundamental system, I believe). Is language just a lonely dictionary that defines all of its words with other words it includes, thus containing a circular argument, petitio principii?
Clearly, some words may be defined by "pointing at things". It is relatively easy to point at the big yellow ball in the sky and say "That's Sun", thus defining the word 'sun'. But how exactly are words like "love", "feeling", "truth" and "soul" ever able to be strictly defined?
If we cannot strictly define the terms we use in practicing philosophy, what's the point in practicing philosophy at all? Because some people find it satisfactory? But then we can all forget about "searching the absolute truth" thingy and accept that a huge portion of philosophy from ancient Greece till Wittgenstein is garbage.
On June 14 2011 14:43 Jerubaal wrote: Don't allow yourself to become a slave to the argumentation. Think about the conclusions and ramifications of the arguments and ask yourself if that's what you think is correct.
So you are saying that I should see if the logical conclusion of an argument suits me in order to decide whether I should dismiss the premises? Shouldn't it be the other way around? I check whether the premises are true and accept whatever follows from them? Otherwise I will say "God exists" and any argument with a conclusion to the contrary will be dismissed along with its premises.
It depends. I can agree with Hobbes that man is fearful of his fellow man and is primarily motivated by material needs in a primitive state. That doesn't mean I have to agree with him that the primary virtue in a society should be greed harnessed for the common good. As Thrasymachus protests, it's easy to get sucked into a line of thinking by following a set of statements that you only half agree with. I'm really asking him to be extra thorough and check the argument from the top-down and inside-out, as well as from bottom up.
On June 14 2011 14:43 Jerubaal wrote: If he denies that language can be used to communicate about abstract things in any meaningful fashion, because it's impossible to know how disparate the definitions are, then..
1)He's essentially banished these concepts. How can you enforce virtue when you're not sure that you're even talking about the same thing.
2) He's established a solipsism, and communication no longer matters because anything external can be regarded at best as useful stimuli.
All in all, I find that position a bit silly. I have no idea if what you think is blue is the same as what I think is blue, but if I point to a blue carpet, you will most likely agree with me that it's blue.
As a political theorist, it's so amusing to me to watch people try to sweep the world under the rug in one fell swoop. Does he really think that there are no serious controversies (for lack of a better word) to be had in philosophy? That it's all just one big misunderstanding?
I didn't read him like that. I always understood him and the ordinary language school like this: If we ask what "virtue" is, we are talking at a too abstract level. We should rather see what "virtue" is defined as: A bundle of morally good behaviors/intentions/effects and then ask "Is murder wrong?" "Is homosexuality wrong?". After we have concluded what is "good" we can package all that together into virtue. The other way around, to argue what virtue is and draw conclusions about whether murder is good or bad is twisting things around and will lead to disputes that are none.
Wait, you're deciding what is good before you've decided what good is? As I said earlier, the problem with virtually every 'philosopher' in the Anglo world of the last century is they seem to regard philosophy as a grammatical exercise. Is there really nothing provocative in the question 'what is virtue?' ? And as someone pointed out earlier, these kinds of views tend to give you excellent definitions and leave you totally unqualified to actually answer any meaningful question.
On June 14 2011 14:43 Jerubaal wrote: I hope that helped a little bit. I prefer using simple arguments like a battering ram.
And remember, when in doubt, make a meta-argument out of it!!!
P.S. There's a semi-famous book, called Wittgenstein's Poker, about an encounter he had with Popper. I spit on Popper's name, but there might be some interesting stuff in there.
What is a meta-argument? An argument about an argument?
Why would you spit on Popper? The guy that brought you falsification to science, "discovered" what a good scientific theory must have and said that philosophy must be understandable for everyone?
[/quote]
Yes, a meta-argument essentially discusses the basis on which you form an argument, the mechanics, the grammar of it, what have you. Wittgenstein is really asking for someone to go meta on him because he's...using language....to discuss language....
I'm mostly being facetious about Popper. Suffice it to say that lots of nice people have said stupid things.
On June 15 2011 01:38 ToxNub wrote: A good philosopher defines his terms explicitly. When he makes an argument, he says something like "For the sake of this argument, I define consciousness as the sense that one is in control". On complex subjects, one must define sub-terms, too.
In regards to absolute truth... If we all had perfect information and perfect logic we would all agree. So saying that philosophy is about clarification is not at all incorrect.
I definitely agree that terms should be always defined before use. However, one has to define the terms in the description in order for the definition to include any relevant information. For me, the real question has always been: "is this an endless regression of definitions or does it definitively end somewhere?"
I haven't been able to find a proper answer to this question. Is language just a floating body of definitions all depending on each other, an independent system much like mathematics (which Gödel proved not to have any connection to or a basis in a more fundamental system, I believe). Is language just a lonely dictionary that defines all of its words with other words it includes, thus containing a circular argument, petitio principii?
Clearly, some words may be defined by "pointing at things". It is relatively easy to point at the big yellow ball in the sky and say "That's Sun", thus defining the word 'sun'. But how exactly are words like "love", "feeling", "truth" and "soul" ever able to be strictly defined?
If we cannot strictly define the terms we use in practicing philosophy, what's the point in practicing philosophy at all? Because some people find it satisfactory? But then we can all forget about "searching the absolute truth" thingy and accept that a huge portion of philosophy from ancient Greece till Wittgenstein is garbage.
Like I mentioned in the part you did not quote (), it's not necessarily a requirement to strictly define each term. As long as you have several approximations. For example, there is no such thing as a "real" circle. But I can show you a series of circle approximations, and perhaps the formula, and you can understand the idea, even though I have not shown you a "real" circle.
Your example of mathematics provides further insight. Look how effective mathematics is, even though it has no fundamental dependence on anything else. I think the same can be said for language.
On June 15 2011 02:46 ToxNub wrote: Like I mentioned in the part you did not quote (), it's not necessarily a requirement to strictly define each term. As long as you have several approximations. For example, there is no such thing as a "real" circle. But I can show you a series of circle approximations, and perhaps the formula, and you can understand the idea, even though I have not shown you a "real" circle.
Your example of mathematics provides further insight. Look how effective mathematics is, even though it has no fundamental dependence on anything else. I think the same can be said for language.
100 % agreed! But the thing is that while language may give us very good approximations, it seems to me that it cannot provide a 100 % sure way of synchronizing the thoughts and term definitions among each and every man. Language clearly makes some kind of communication possible, but to what extent can we use it to correctly describe the vast complexity of the world?
We can approach mutual understanding but will never get there. It will suffice for leisurely pondering and wondering for sure but one must forget about searching for absolute truths in metaphysics.
On June 14 2011 23:27 bonifaceviii wrote: Continental philosophy and analytical philosophy really can't argue against each other because they are completely different fields. It's like asking a geologist to argue about whether a slightly different-coloured bird is a new species or not.
Both continental philosophy and analytic philosophy were derived from Kant's work, so yes you can if you know where to look. Essentially they are different responses to a certain viewpoint.
On June 14 2011 14:13 zizou21 wrote: I know there are some really great minds on this forum so I am hoping someone can help. I'm taking part in this philosophy/book club and we are reading Wittgenstein, and it's really interesting, but it's quickly turning into everyone sucking on wittgenstein's balls (me included) and there is not much of a dialectic forming.
I agree with Wittgenstein's main language argument, namely that we can't use language to penetrate truths about the world since the primary function of language is to facilitate communication between people. Thus, philosophers for centuries have been making the same mistake to try to answer questions like: "What is 'Virtue'?", or "What is 'Knowledge'"?, and so on. You can't extract these words from their context and make them mean something. IE: People can talk about virtue or knowledge without any confusion what so ever, but as soon as you "pluck" the word out of its context and start posing the question "What is virtue?" we get extremely puzzled to our very foundation and no longer know what to think (socrates effect). This is because Wittgenstein says there is no such thing in reality that corresponds to what we think of as "an essence" of Virtue, or Knowledge (What Plato would call Forms). In short, we are mistaken to think abstracted words have meaning and that there there is some sort of fundamental link between language and reality, etc. Words do not have fixed meanings but rather a "family" of meanings
As such, most philosophical problems we have, such as freewill vs predetermination, etc arise out of a misunderstanding of the language we use. Essentially, because words like "Free" and "Will" are taken out of their original contexts entirely to mean something completely nonsensical in this new metaphysical context, and predetermination is a word that has emerged from the scientific world that we now we try to use to describe our mode of existence... Therefore, Philosophy should be used as an activity of clarification; aka unraveling the reasons (as described above) why there has been so much damn confusion in Philosophy. If we did this, Wittgenstein thinks there would be no more philosophical problems.
This is some pretty deep shit and I oversimplified a lot of it, if not inaccurately represented some of his ideas. I'm kind of new at this, so I was hoping someone more learned in the philosophy world could tell me what happened to Philosophy after Wittgenstein. It seems to me that a lot of philosophers have just pushed him to the side and kept going on about their business. Do they have good arguments for dismissing what he is saying?
TL;DR: I'm not smart enough to propose a counter-argument to Wittgenstein, or know anyone that has done so, can you help me? or steer me in the right direction?
So by "Wittgenstein's argument" I assume you mean his later work that led into ordinary language philosophy i.e. Philosophical Investigations. I would then direct you to his earlier work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Vienna circle.
I would give you arguments if this was a scientific matter, but philosophical arguments have to be understood before you use them.
On June 14 2011 14:43 Jerubaal wrote: I'm not trained in this modern philosophical jargon, in fact I eschew it, but I think I'll be helpful because often the best way to identify and reconcile with an unsettling feeling is to separate yourself from the argument a bit. Don't allow yourself to become a slave to the argumentation. Think about the conclusions and ramifications of the arguments and ask yourself if that's what you think is correct. I'll try to ask some questions that clarify his position and identify problematic elements and maybe throw in some suggestions of my own.
On June 14 2011 14:13 zizou21 wrote: I know there are some really great minds on this forum so I am hoping someone can help. I'm taking part in this philosophy/book club and we are reading Wittgenstein, and it's really interesting, but it's quickly turning into everyone sucking on wittgenstein's balls (me included) and there is not much of a dialectic forming.
I agree with Wittgenstein's main language argument, namely that we can't use language to penetrate truths about the world since the primary function of language is to facilitate communication between people. Thus, philosophers for centuries have been making the same mistake to try to answer questions like: "What is 'Virtue'?", or "What is 'Knowledge'"?, and so on. You can't extract these words from their context and make them mean something. IE: People can talk about virtue or knowledge without any confusion what so ever, but as soon as you "pluck" the word out of its context and start posing the question "What is virtue?" we get extremely puzzled to our very foundation and no longer know what to think (socrates effect). This is because Wittgenstein says there is no such thing in reality that corresponds to what we think of as "an essence" of Virtue, or Knowledge (What Plato would call Forms). In short, we are mistaken to think abstracted words have meaning and that there there is some sort of fundamental link between language and reality, etc. Words do not have fixed meanings but rather a "family" of meanings.
I think that most people would agree with Wittgenstein's most famous arguments about language shaping the way we think and not merely being a neutral medium. To what extent does this color our ability to communicate though? Socrates/Plato frequently encountered people who couldn't precisely explain what they believed or why they believed it. That is not the same thing as saying that philosophical minds can't agree upon a fixed definition for things like 'vitrtue' or 'knowledge' and that's Socrates' goal in many dialogues. I hope that what Wittgenstein means is that we should attempt to break down these differences in definition in like manner because...
If he denies that language can be used to communicate about abstract things in any meaningful fashion, because it's impossible to know how disparate the definitions are, then..
1)He's essentially banished these concepts. How can you enforce virtue when you're not sure that you're even talking about the same thing.
2) He's established a solipsism, and communication no longer matters because anything external can be regarded at best as useful stimuli.
All in all, I find that position a bit silly. I have no idea if what you think is blue is the same as what I think is blue, but if I point to a blue carpet, you will most likely agree with me that it's blue.
As such, most philosophical problems we have, such as freewill vs predetermination, etc arise out of a misunderstanding of the language we use. Essentially, because words like "Free" and "Will" are taken out of their original contexts entirely to mean something completely nonsensical in this new metaphysical context, and predetermination is a word that has emerged from the scientific world that we now we try to use to describe our mode of existence... Therefore, Philosophy should be used as an activity of clarification; aka unraveling the reasons (as described above) why there has been so much damn confusion in Philosophy. If we did this, Wittgenstein thinks there would be no more philosophical problems.
As a political theorist, it's so amusing to me to watch people try to sweep the world under the rug in one fell swoop. Does he really think that there are no serious controversies (for lack of a better word) to be had in philosophy? That it's all just one big misunderstanding?
This is some pretty deep shit and I oversimplified a lot of it, if not inaccurately represented some of his ideas. I'm kind of new at this, so I was hoping someone more learned in the philosophy world could tell me what happened to Philosophy after Wittgenstein. It seems to me that a lot of philosophers have just pushed him to the side and kept going on about their business. Do they have good arguments for dismissing what he is saying?
TL;DR: I'm not smart enough to propose a counter-argument to Wittgenstein, or know anyone that has done so, can you help me? or steer me in the right direction?
I hope that helped a little bit. I prefer using simple arguments like a battering ram.
And remember, when in doubt, make a meta-argument out of it!!!
P.S. There's a semi-famous book, called Wittgenstein's Poker, about an encounter he had with Popper. I spit on Popper's name, but there might be some interesting stuff in there.
Wittgenstein makes none of those conclusions. Don't mistake a hastily composed summary for his actual arguments.
Then there's no reason for this thread.
The OP made some comments that could either be possible interpretations of his works or arguments made by people in his group. I proposed several lines of argumentation- some even contradictory.
The point of this thread is to push the OP into some critical thinking, not 'tell him how it is'. God forbid I should contribute to the attitude that has turned philosophy in the English speaking world and beyond into a recondite circle-jerk.
And those lines of argumentation aren't exactly helpful because they aren't direct criticisms of Wittgenstein's work. Let's say that you go and say Wittgenstein's approach will lead you in solipsism (a very extreme conclusion to take). It only diverts the question by bringing up a possible conclusion that could be derived from his work.
What "attitude"?
On June 15 2011 02:42 Jerubaal wrote:
Wait, you're deciding what is good before you've decided what good is? As I said earlier, the problem with virtually every 'philosopher' in the Anglo world of the last century is they seem to regard philosophy as a grammatical exercise. Is there really nothing provocative in the question 'what is virtue?' ? And as someone pointed out earlier, these kinds of views tend to give you excellent definitions and leave you totally unqualified to actually answer any meaningful question.
It is a provocative question. Wittgenstein believes that it is not provocative in a philosophical sense.
Wait, you're deciding what is good before you've decided what good is? As I said earlier, the problem with virtually every 'philosopher' in the Anglo world of the last century is they seem to regard philosophy as a grammatical exercise. Is there really nothing provocative in the question 'what is virtue?' ? And as someone pointed out earlier, these kinds of views tend to give you excellent definitions and leave you totally unqualified to actually answer any meaningful question.
Of course it's provocative! Of course you can discuss virtue!
I can say that while lies are not virtuous, because they deny an individual information they've requested (and it's not the information-giver's place to judge the merits of the question). You can say that they are virtuous, because they seek to quell an unproductive fear. A third person could say that white lies are irrelevant to virtue because they're merely a social pleasantry; both the asker and the answerer know that real information is not being passed.
Eventually, our discussion will be limited by differences in our assumptions and definitions... and we will have to merge our assumptions and definitions to progress further, or end our search for an objective definition of virtue.
On June 15 2011 02:31 Tintti wrote: But then we can all forget about "searching the absolute truth" thingy and accept that a huge portion of philosophy from ancient Greece till Wittgenstein is garbage.
Such words coming from a person discussing the lack of rigorous definitions in ancient philosophy are deeply ironic. I hope you see this.
On June 15 2011 01:38 ToxNub wrote: A good philosopher defines his terms explicitly. When he makes an argument, he says something like "For the sake of this argument, I define consciousness as the sense that one is in control". On complex subjects, one must define sub-terms, too.
In regards to absolute truth... If we all had perfect information and perfect logic we would all agree. So saying that philosophy is about clarification is not at all incorrect.
I definitely agree that terms should be always defined before use. However, one has to define the terms in the description in order for the definition to include any relevant information. For me, the real question has always been: "is this an endless regression of definitions or does it definitively end somewhere?"
I haven't been able to find a proper answer to this question. Is language just a floating body of definitions all depending on each other, an independent system much like mathematics (which Gödel proved not to have any connection to or a basis in a more fundamental system, I believe). Is language just a lonely dictionary that defines all of its words with other words it includes, thus containing a circular argument, petitio principii?
Clearly, some words may be defined by "pointing at things". It is relatively easy to point at the big yellow ball in the sky and say "That's Sun", thus defining the word 'sun'. But how exactly are words like "love", "feeling", "truth" and "soul" ever able to be strictly defined?
If we cannot strictly define the terms we use in practicing philosophy, what's the point in practicing philosophy at all? Because some people find it satisfactory? But then we can all forget about "searching the absolute truth" thingy and accept that a huge portion of philosophy from ancient Greece till Wittgenstein is garbage.
This regression that you are talking about is exactly what Logical positivism tried to do. They hoped that they would end up with a statement that is more or less a logical tautology. Or in other words a statement which is self-evident under basic logic. Unfortunately it does not work and that is where most of the criticism comes in.
So if you are really interested then look into it as well as the Vienna circle. I find the experiment very fascinating as well as the fact that it ultimately fails.
On June 14 2011 23:33 Treemonkeys wrote: Realistically we have both limited free will and limited determinism, to say otherwise I strongly believe is nothing more than mental masturbation that ignores how we all live are lives. The great debate over the two always acts as if it must be one extreme or the other, when simple life experience tells us otherwise. Simple example: I was able to choose what I wanted to eat for breakfast, but I can't choose to float to the sun, or eat the sun for breakfast. There are very real constraints on our existence that are seemingly random and definitely out of our control while we are able to make choices within these constraints.
This is a fundamental misunderstanding of free will and determinism. Free will involves making choices; it has nothing to do with physical limitations. Eating the sun for breakfast is something that as a person you are physically incapable of doing, so the choice does not even exist for you. On the other hand, if you were Galactus, then you could make the choice between eating the sun for breakfast or the moon. Free will vs determinism asks the question of whether you are actually making the choice or whether you are "determined/fated/whatever" to always eat the sun for breakfast.
I'll use an example that doesn't have to do with Galactus. You wake up in the morning and eat a bagel for breakfast. The argument comes down to this: if you think you have free will then you had many choices before. You can eat a bagel, eat cereal, not eat, eat at a breakfast place instead of home, etc. All of those are possible choices you could make and you make one, i.e. eating the bagel. Under determinism, you never made a choice. Given your genetics and your life experiences, conscious and unconscious with all of that sensory input, you will always at this point in time choose to eat a bagel. There was no choice involved, just the illusion of choice.
Many philosophers in history have thought that this question is important since it defines our fundamental existence, and in that sense they are right. But the question is also meaningless because it is literally impossible to create a cohesive argument for one side or the other. Whether or not free will is an illusion, most people think and act assuming they have free will; our entire language is structured in such a way that we assume free will. That is why it is logical and easy to form the question "Have you decided what you want to eat?"
Having said that, I think free will is an exception. Most philosophical questions are not meaningless and lacking in argument. Even if the argument ends coming down to subjective viewpoints (such as most moral arguments) there is still follow up in a person's actions that come from that subjective viewpoint. The free will question changes literally nothing.
Put another way, even if we have trouble defining the abstract meaning of things like virtue, I think it is pretty easy to see that certain philosophical questions necessitate a reply. I believe Camus once said something along the lines of "The only real question in philosophy is whether or not you should kill yourself; everything else is just games." Whether or not you agree with Camus (and I do not), his question is not a question that can be answered by stating that it is semantic in nature. It has very definite repercussions depending on the way you answer it and your argument.
Back to the thread though, I haven't read Wittgenstein and I find this thread confusing since people seem to be arguing not only about the content of his arguments, but also what his arguments actually comprise.
so if i understood this correctly (most probably i didn't^^), here are my thoughts on it: 1) sure language is a representative of things we want to describe (be it objects, actions or whatever). Words were formed by a general consensus about the word being the representative of the thing they want to decribe with it. However, general opinion changes/gets formed over time, so checking back what most people really think of the word at the moment can give it a new meaning. Furthermore some people want to know what exactly one word describes, so they call themselves philosophers and do a check on the word. That is not real philosophy in my opinion, it's just research. Even though some words are unspecified (for example because they summarize a couple of things). Nowadays a lot of "philosophers" spend their time on thinking about words that usually are created without a thing they refer to or they have lost the link to the thing they refer to. Take the term "world peace" as an example - i highly doubt most people knew what is referred to when using "world peace". Does it mean everyone is dead? No world wars? No local wars? No brothers beating each other over who is allowed to use the one computer of the household? In my opinion it was more created as in "war is not good for me. So i wish everyone should not experience war. Therefore i wish for world peace". Now the real philosophy starts: Can "world peace" be reached? Is "world peace" a possible state or just idealism? It is the opposite approach of what we did before: We don't want to communicate things and make up words to describe said things but instead create words, give them a meaning based on what combination of letters we used and check back if there really exists such a thing we are referring to. So the discussion "freewill vs predetermination" is a valid discussion as it discussed whether the things we refer to really exist, and if they do, which one it is. By making up words that represent opposed things we hope to determine which one of them really exists in reality and which one does not. Of course a lot of discussions may be completely pointless (as there is often no perfect evidence (found yet) as in "evolution vs creatism" ). But i would not abandon the word "future" and every philosophy related to it just because i cannot see "future" hopping in the grass when i step out the door. So the science i call "philosophy" is to not just perceive things and describe them with words but logically combining things (or words as representatives of the things) i know of to make up things i haven't perceived yet (with the last step verifying if the theory is correct if that is possible at all; since i haven't detected the thing yet it is usually most unlikely to notice if i assume of it's existence). This is even harder for things that cannot be seen directly, such as "is there a purpose in life?". Also what makes the philosophy of the last years look bad is the fact that it is hard to think of new things that are directly affecting/important to ones life. Inventing a "thing" twice is not possible if you didn't forget it. So you can only once ask yourself if you are living in the real world or in the matrix. Therefore many people come up with either things that are really far away from the average person's life or get all trapped in their battles about the meaning of a word.
2) The language one uses does form ones thoughts in a certain way. Most people only think in the language they learned first (and then translate it just like i do right now), some can think in multiple languages. So they are often bound in how the language they use works, they are limited in the combinations of the words of the language they use, as in the way they combine their informations. It is like an engineer using formulae he knows to create a new machine/program, be it to solve an existing problem, to ease the life or for whatever reason he has. As an engineer is limited by the knowledge he has about physics (and about his target - if you don't know exactly what you are inventing something for the actual inventing progress gets exponentielly harder) the philosopher is limited by the things he knows (assuming he uses mathematic logic sense). So complex languages with more detailed descriptions of things (and more things referred to) are improving the equipment the philosopher can work with (that's why i think english is a poor language :p). But using the referring language instead of being able to express the things meant directly will not disallow the process of finding new things (like statements) through combining known things.
3) Some discussions/validations of theories come down to subjective opinions/morale standards etc. An example would be "Is it okay to eat my own children?" The obvious choice here would be "it is always wrong to eat your own children". But is this really true? There is no perfect solution to this problem, there are arguments for both sides. It usually comes down to what most people agree on is right. This does not make other opinions wrong, it is just that our community is based on the small group of people being opressed by the majority of people, usually for the sake of trying to live and let live. Without those arrangements people could not live next to each other. It still is not a perfect mathmatical answer for ethical/morale based questions. Such problems are also mostly not solvable at all since there is a heavy influence of traditions, sake of the majority and things (like the problem itself) that cannot be measured directly.
sorry 4 wall of text and again sorry if i misunderstood the whole Wittgenstein thing. It's just my thoughts on the ideas i extracted from your first post using my poorly developed translation skills. If i went far OT and/or am completely wrong please tell me so i can recheck the assumptions i based my theories on.
On June 15 2011 02:31 Tintti wrote: But then we can all forget about "searching the absolute truth" thingy and accept that a huge portion of philosophy from ancient Greece till Wittgenstein is garbage.
Such words coming from a person discussing the lack of rigorous definitions in ancient philosophy are deeply ironic. I hope you see this.
Edit: grammar.
I don't see it, care to explain more clearly, please?
Key idea to move beyond Wittgenstein (building on him) is that we are already embedded in our language or bias, but that doesn't mean such biases are a bad thing. In fact, bias (or an unchosen context in which we find ourselves) is our only means (or our only starting point) of getting at knowledge from the past. To put it simply, you received Socrates and Plato via the Renaissance via Modernity. Lots more on Horizonality and critiques of modernity/scientific method, etc...
On June 15 2011 02:31 Tintti wrote: But then we can all forget about "searching the absolute truth" thingy and accept that a huge portion of philosophy from ancient Greece till Wittgenstein is garbage.
Such words coming from a person discussing the lack of rigorous definitions in ancient philosophy are deeply ironic. I hope you see this.
Edit: grammar.
I don't see it, care to explain more clearly, please?
"A huge portion of [something] is garbage". What's a huge portion? A portion of what? Do eastern/"different" thinkers count, or do we only count those strictly recognized by scholars and by themselves as "philosophers"?
What is "being garbage"? Does this mean that their thought process was sterile and useless? Does this mean that the way they thought and the the road they took is to be dismissed and forgotten, as their ultimate goal is considered unattainable? Do you think Plato had no influence on today's world? Must an atheist despise Pascal's work because it is aimed to godly matters?
The irony is that you dismiss a vague group on very vague and somewhat simplistic reasons, while criticizing that group as not being rigorous enough, and maybe simple-minded in their quest for truth.
I heard the argument posted earlier that: "If I point to a blue rug, you'd most likely agree with me that it is blue." That said because, regardless of what your perception of blue is or what my perception of blue is, it does not change. It's a color and has a physical presence.
What if I were to say: "That is a very virtuous rug." Would you be able to agree with me without having the same cultural background as me? What if virtue did not have a meaning to you? How can you point that out physically to someone?
You can't, it's a word that means a status, or has a arbitrary meaning assigned to it. Hence why questions like "What is 'Virtue'?" and "What is 'Knowledge'" exist, and where Whittgenstein bases his argument. He's essentially saying that if such words did not exist, philosophy questions would not need to exist either, since they're simply questioning the physicality of the word.
The problem with Whittgenstein's argument is that these "status" or "arbitrary" words give our language depth, a meaning that goes further than what is "blue" and "hot" or "small". While it's true they pose a problem when taken out of context or recited to those who have no concept of the word, it does not mean they cannot (or should not) be used to describe something.
Enjoying Wittgenstein and understanding his arguments is a good thing! If you don't see any apparent holes it's just because you're able to follow his thinking well. Philosophy and - more importantly - your interest for philosophy wont end with Wittgenstein.
I'm biased from my cognitive science studies, where (especially in linguistics) I've read stuff that focuses on the pragmatic perspective, what people actually do (and get done). A word isn't defined by itself and a definition you can look up in a dictionary might be helpful but in every practical situation a word means whatever people agree upon. The cool thing is that even with such an unreliable language we manage to organize ourselves astoundingly well. The logical shortcomings of language can just as well be seen as crucial optimizations that allow us to communicate in real time with our tremendously limited human brains.
My point is that while Wittgenstein is cool, there's lots of other cool stuff out there. I enjoyed studying philosophy of mind and especially qualia a lot, philosophers didn't get out of their morris chair's after Wittgenstein after all.
On June 15 2011 02:31 Tintti wrote: But then we can all forget about "searching the absolute truth" thingy and accept that a huge portion of philosophy from ancient Greece till Wittgenstein is garbage.
Such words coming from a person discussing the lack of rigorous definitions in ancient philosophy are deeply ironic. I hope you see this.
Edit: grammar.
I don't see it, care to explain more clearly, please?
"A huge portion of [something] is garbage". What's a huge portion? A portion of what? Do eastern/"different" thinkers count, or do we only count those strictly recognized by scholars and by themselves as "philosophers"?
What is "being garbage"? Does this mean that their thought process was sterile and useless? Does this mean that the way they thought and the the road they took is to be dismissed and forgotten, as their ultimate goal is considered unattainable? Do you think Plato had no influence on today's world? Must an atheist despise Pascal's work because it is aimed to godly matters?
The irony is that you dismiss a vague group on very vague and somewhat simplistic reasons, while criticizing that group as not being rigorous enough, and maybe simple-minded in their quest for truth.
Thank you for clarification. You're right, pot calling the kettle black. Is it just me or doest the situation resemble the ending of Wittgenstein's Tractatus? At the very end of the text he compares the book to a ladder that must be thrown away after one has climbed it. In doing so he suggests that through the philosophy of the book one must come to see the utter meaninglessness of philosophy.
It seems to me that this seed of an idea I was talking about in my earlier post is that sort of philosophy that tries to tell philosophy how it should behave. Should this even be possible? Or is this thesis meta-philosophy, rather, and thus immune to its own regulations?
How do you counter the argument of someone who says that, hes right.
We do spend a lot of time arguing over semantics, losing precious time that could be spent actually solving the problem debating whose choice of words was the one who was finished last
Simply put, my criticism of your position is the following: language may well be contextual in nature, and it may well be that we form our understanding of reality through language. But surely language originates in reality, not the other way around. The pre-condition for understanding anything at all, however minimally, must be that concepts refer to something real.
Wittgenstein is trying to purport the futility of philosophy by utilizing language objectively to demonstrate that language itself is contextual and self-defeating. By virtue of this contradiction, the philosophy fails.
No, language necessarily isn't rooted in context. There is a large difference between the definition and connotation of words. The latter seems to be that which has overtaken the attitude of the modern world.
My suggestion is to refer to the Classical philosophers - namely Aristotle. You'll find that in philosophy there are truly only two branches of philosophy: the classical and the modern. Either the thought is rooted at an attempt to demystify the objective reality we inhabit, or otherwise to argue senselessly over ideological theories that ultimately culminate to nothingness.
Honestly, the best (indeed, the only, without reading the source material) refutation I can give of Wittgenstein is that while I agree that the question of what we mean when describe things, whether abastract concepts or concrete objects, should ALSO be asked (hello Socrates), we can't simply throw out the question of what these things actually are. Yes, I know that Wittgenstein is operating like a modern Sartre in a sense, but if that's the case, why discuss ANYTHING?
Frankly, the poster above me may have said it better.
On June 14 2011 22:25 Brotkrumen wrote: I think you are saying that we cannot experience objective reality, right? That all experience is subjective and we cannot infer objective reality from experience.
First, "can experience" is used rather lax. It implies, that there is a causal chain between what we experience in our mind and what happens in reality. Even subjective reality proponents usually do not have a problem with that, except those that claim that there is no objective reality outside us whatsoever.
I fall into the latter group, though to be precise I don't claim that there is no objective reality, I claim there is no possible evidence of one. I refuse to assume the existence of something which by definition is that which no one has ever perceived.
How do we interact with objective reality? Let's take touch for example: Our mind tells our arm to move forward, our finger to extend and to touch an object. When the contact happens, two material objects have made contact: our finger and the object. This happened in objective reality, no matter how we experienced it. Most subjective reality proponents won't have a problem with this either, but in the next step, the opinions diverge:
You say that aggregate concepts, such as valour, do not refer to clear, specific realities, but involve some form of interpretation on our part. My point is that everything does, so this is not an accurate distinction to make. You yourself are using the word "mind" to describe one of your supposedly specific scenarios here, yet the term is unclear because it is, similarly, an idea built from multiple experiences rather than anything specific and concrete.
Besides the point as that may be, if we consider touch specifically, is it possible to answer a simple question about this objective reality that our finger touched the object? I would like to know when this can be said to occur. Is it when a single molecule of the object contacts a single molecule of the finger? There's something which needs clarification here. Are we talking about touch, the sense, or touch, as in physical contact? If we mean the sense, then touch occurs whenever nerves fire, which can include moments that do not appear to correspond to our physical interaction with an object as in your example. If you say that we're talking about purely physical contact (ie. objectively real interaction between objects), then you are guilty of begging the question.
I certainly think you have strong evidence for showing that humans are configured to interpret the world as having an objective reality outside of themselves, but nothing more than that.
Now the nerves send a signal back to our brain and we "experience" the object in our mind subjectively. We form a picture or model of this, we form a model of us touching the object etc. However you want to describe it, a mental state is formed that corresponds to us touching the object. Here subjective reality proponents claim that your experience of the object may completely differ from mine. What I experience as rough, you might experience as smooth. When I jump into your body, I would experience the object as soft, whereas in my body I experienced the object as hard.
At this point, nobody can disprove that. It doesn't really matter though. When we touch the same object and we talk about it, we agree on a name for the attribute we experienced. We will call the surface as "rough", no matter how we subjectively experienced it. This basically would move the meaning of "rough" away from it's meaning of "roughness", but would mean "the attribute this surface has". Less abstract: The sentence in our mind "The surface is rough" would when spoken to another person mean "The surface has attribute X", X being whatever the person experiences.
Now we have saved our language at least. Whenever we talk about something to another person, we are referring to the actually existing attribute in reality.
You are presenting, here, a very weak argument (it's irrelevant), apparently for the express purpose of demolishing it in order to make your point appear stronger than it otherwise would. There is one thing of value here though: you point out how objectivity might relate to language. Still, you don't make it clear how this "saves" language. There are plenty of meaningful examples (to my mind, at least) that you're not dealing with. If I eat a chicken wing and think it's spicy, and, let's say, 50% of people agree that it is spicy, while the rest say that it is simply "bland". What does that say about the chicken wing? Does it have the attribute "spicy"? How about "bland"? How can it have both? Rough, smooth, and so on, have the same problem. They exist in degrees, and these vary within the minds of the people that perceive them. Really, they are all opinions and approximations. In other words, "rough" covers a range of sensations broad enough that individuals can successfully agree upon its usage in a large percentage of cases. Sound familiar? Higher order (I think this is what you are getting at) concepts such as virtue, I agree, do seem to be more controversial ("why?" would indeed be a very good question), but they are not fundamentally different in this way.
Having said this, how can I say that "we can experience objective reality"? First, Okham's Razor. To be able to claim that we experience everything subjectively we have to assume that there is an interpretative disconnect between what exists and what we experience. It also is a little circular.
There is absolutely no need to assume that there is a disconnect between what exists and what we experience. Quite the opposite. One can simply say that what we experience is what exists. It is you who makes the claim that "objective reality" is, in fact, something (outside of our minds, in which it exists as an idea). It may be here that we find the source of our mutual confusion: you believe, perhaps, that I must deny the possibility of a physical form that corresponds to this (or any) idea. A neural pathway, for instance. And this is an awkward challenge to meet, for my view. However, I can defend "my" position by pointing out that, actually, any idea is different between any two minds, or one mind at different moments.
You believe that any physical configuration, replicated perfectly, will respond to the same set of stimuli in precisely the same way. However, I must object that no such case exists anywhere. No two neural pathways are identical down to the smallest detail, and (therefore?) there is no universal form of an idea, or a physical structure that can be shown to replicate it in its entirety. There are 'approximations', but what one makes of this is naturally a matter of interpretation. Simply put, it's a "jump" to go from observing (read: creating) patterns, to concluding that objective reality exists.
Secondly, subjective reality would assumes a mind-body dualism. Me being a materialist, would say that as the mind is only the product of it's material, another mind will have the exact same experiences to the exact same objects if it is built the same way. Our current understanding of neuro-science heavily implies that our brains do not differ in such a way as to allow for great differences in experiences. This might be disproven in the future though.
Mind-body dualism is not my cup of tea, either. I wish you would be more precise in how you approach this issue, because I do not know exactly what aspects of mind-body dualism you believe are entailed in the subjective reality view.
So in conclusion, even if we would know that all experiences are subjective, we would still act as if they were an exact match to objective reality. The success of this action would make our theory of subjective reality irrelevant. Secondly, if we agree that mind-body dualism, is false, we cannot but say that our experiences match objective reality.
This conclusion is drawn from your earlier points? Where did you talk about the success of acting according to one interpretation or the other? In the talk about language?
1. One cannot say, without begging the question, that we would still act as if our experiences were an exact match to objective reality without first knowing what that objective reality is, and thereby determining that it corresponds to our subjective perspectives.
Simply put, my criticism of your position is the following: language may well be contextual in nature, and it may well be that we form our understanding of reality through language. But surely language originates in reality, not the other way around. The pre-condition for understanding anything at all, however minimally, must be that concepts refer to something real.
pretty sure Wittgenstein would disagree with this
He wouldn't disagree. Wittgenstein is by no means a solipsist although some people discussing here seem to think that he is.
Wittgenstein is trying to purport the futility of philosophy by utilizing language objectively to demonstrate that language itself is contextual and self-defeating. By virtue of this contradiction, the philosophy fails.
No, language necessarily isn't rooted in context. There is a large difference between the definition and connotation of words. The latter seems to be that which has overtaken the attitude of the modern world.
My suggestion is to refer to the Classical philosophers - namely Aristotle. You'll find that in philosophy there are truly only two branches of philosophy: the classical and the modern. Either the thought is rooted at an attempt to demystify the objective reality we inhabit, or otherwise to argue senselessly over ideological theories that ultimately culminate to nothingness.
It's not about arguing, it's not about demystify anything, it's about creating concepts. As soon as you have creation of concept, you have philosophy. And the reason you create concepts, is because you have problems; a concept answers to a problem.
That's Deleuze definition, and it's just rock solid. That also makes all the great blabla about the death of philosophy laughable.
Aristotle was doing exactly the same job than Kant, or Sartres, or Spinoza. Your dichotomy is just an opinion, and it's really dry.
EPT
![[image loading]](http://i.imgur.com/2fVqD.gif)
), it's not necessarily a requirement to strictly define each term. As long as you have several approximations. For example, there is no such thing as a "real" circle. But I can show you a series of circle approximations, and perhaps the formula, and you can understand the idea, even though I have not shown you a "real" circle. 
