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On July 09 2013 19:48 Flyingdutchman wrote:Show nested quote +On July 09 2013 18:06 WhiteDog wrote:
Because those structural reform are a mirage : there are no amount of "good reform" that could help the Greek being more competitive than the Germany in a 10 year time. Do you want to make Greece suffer ad vitam eternam ? At some point you got to take the right step and face the fact that the euro is flawed. I will take another exemple : in France, our labor productivity is way better than Germany's, yet our competitivity is not at their level. Why is that ? The question of productivity, competitivity and growth is so complex, if anybody had the answer to help a country get some of those with "intelligent reform", we would know it, considering what we did in under developped countries from 1950 to 1990. The idea of sustainable growth is very good, but I could give you a class on sustainable growth model and you would see how unrealistic those models are. I'd say the Greeks should worry about staying ahead of Zimbabwe. But all joking aside, they don't need to be more productive than Germany on a whole. The way I see it is that the current formal and informal institutional framework is not conductive for sustained growth in the long run. The reason why I feel this is the time for reform is because reform is ultimately only really possible after a crisis, you cannot purely look at this in economical perspective without applying the political constraints to decision making. This does not only apply to Greece but the other countries in EU and the EU political framework as well. The EU monetary union certainly has flaws and they should be adressed, but that does not mean there isn't anything wrong in the long term strategy that the member countries are displaying. Wouldn't it be better if you go back and look at the replay of a game you lost to see where you could have done better instead of going on a forum and crying imba? And when you talk about sustainable growth models, are you talking in the sense of endogenous growth models or sustainable as in natural resources? I was talking about endogenous growth, maybe I should have called it sustained instead of sustainable growth. Quite frankly I am quite surprised at how easy you dismiss things that do enable you to be 'right' yet you embrace things like the rational expectations hypothesis which can just as easily be dismissed when you look at empirical evidence. You must not forget that economic research is done to better understand the sources of growth. They produce stylized facts or indicate some empirical issues that can be built upon to better understand all the complexities you mention. Things like the rational expectation hypothesis are assumptions made to try and explain behaviour in a model. Can you honestly say that you have worked with the mathematical models, as in doing them yourself? If not, it is understandable that you do not realize how much changing the assumptions will affect how well the model fits with what we can observe. It is therefore not very conductive to cherrypick certain assumptions (like the rational expectations hypothesis), when they happen to fit your world view in a theoretical sense and disregard them completely when they don't. That implies you are just trying to be right instead of building your understanding of the real world, which is ultimately the goal of economic academics. I'm not embracing the idea of rational expectancy, it's a weak theory to explain actual economical matter, but in the long run it's the best way we have to explain the impact of inflation on economical behaviors : in the long run, people just behave like inflation was not there to begin with. As I said before, it's something that is widely accepted by economists (that you can't trade off between inflation and unemployment in the long run), from the monetarist to the keynesians (Phelps). Inflation would have huge impact on short term behavior tho.
Talking on endegenous growth models would lead us to a long talk. All I see through those models for the problem we are facing are broad ideas : you should invest in R&D (something that can't be done without the state, so the EU is pushing state to invest more and more in it and help private investment in the research, so more state ?), education is important (again, education has external effect and because of that should be supported by the state), human capital is important (health is important, something that need the state again) public infrastructure help the productivity of private firms (again, we need the state). The more recent models put in light the importance of goods diversity in the economy - so again, it's not something that you can just help with private investment, it's something that comes off after 1) research and innovation (that needs the state) 2) long term strategies by the firms. At no point those models suggest that the solution is budget rigor ? And what can those models do for the Greece of today ? And if I look at empirical evidences, what I see is that inequalities between countries are pretty persistent, and that the competitivity of today's Germany has more to do with German's history than with the strategy your country had for the last 10 years.
Show nested quote + Yet Krugman is for the best but most unrealist solution of all : change the EU to be exactly like the US. Everybody would love that in theory, in practice you still ask Germans to pay Greece bill's for a little time (it will happen eventually, in one form or another). By the way I'm not "for" inflation, I only said it was a possibility.
Why wouldn't you be 'for' inflation if you really believe it is a neutral policy instrument that can solve the debt and deficit problem for Greece? That aside, the quote from Krugman is from 2003 and regarding US deficit spending to finance their war effort. He changed his stance on deficit spending and printing money in the current situation. The quote was primarily given due to the whole 'irresponsible governments' part. I'd suspect that his proposed solution to the political goal fits his view on sound economics, but does not necessarily imply he feels it would be the right policy goal to go for in an economical sense in the first place. In that regard he is mirroring what Friedman said, namely that the policy goal of a political and monetary union is more appropriate to the United states than Europe. Edit: I see I have accidentally cut out a large part of your quote and have therefore not responded to any of it. I have no time left right now, I may come back to it if you want. Inflation would lower the debt, maybe lower unemployment in some countries like France, and it will maybe force some firm to push higher the wages in some countries such as Germany, but it will not help the competitivity problem and the structural problem that exist because of how the euro was built...
It's not your fault, it's me who edited because I thought my response was innapropriate (sustainable development is one of my favorite field, so I accidently let myself get caught into that).
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On July 09 2013 17:35 Flyingdutchman wrote:Show nested quote +On July 09 2013 10:02 Sbrubbles wrote:On July 09 2013 09:52 Flyingdutchman wrote:On July 09 2013 09:41 Sbrubbles wrote:On July 09 2013 07:22 Flyingdutchman wrote:On July 09 2013 07:02 Sbrubbles wrote:On July 09 2013 05:52 Crushinator wrote:On July 09 2013 04:17 Sbrubbles wrote:On July 09 2013 03:11 Rassy wrote: I can ask you one thing. Where inflation goes, wages will want to follow. How can this be any good for the competitiveness of Greece?
I imagine the trick will be to not allow wages to follow. People are easier to accept inflation eating away their purchase power then they are willing to accept lower wages, the end result is the same off course.
What Greece is looking for in this case is not inflation, but currency devaluation, which does create competitiveness by brute-forcing national costs down relative to international costs. Initially, there would probably be a spike in cost of living and a shock to real wages, which would only be socially acceptable because unemployment is so high. This is a quicker and less costly process than lowering wages through years of low GDP output and high unemployment, even though, as you pointed out, the end result is the same. Inflation will come, of course, because eventually workers will eventually react, because the greek economy will have to reoganize and because the greek government is not only irresponsible, but even if it wasn't it would have to cope with difficulty borrowing, probably leading it to print money. But this inflation isn't 1-for-1 with the currency devaluation. This current situation is analogous to a country having an overvalued fixed exchange rate: letting the currency float will bring inflation, but the change in relative prices between foreign and domestic outpaces it. On July 09 2013 03:11 Rassy wrote: My guess is that in this situation the debt would remain in euros, and that greece would be forced to buy euros for its drachmes at the forex markets to pay of its debt. I dont think annyone who has lend monney to greece (amongst others manny central banks) would accept a conversion rate for drachme/euro as the one wich was used at the introduction of the euro. In what ways would Greece be "forced" to do anything in this situation? If they decide to leave the euro (which I really think would already include a partial default), shit will already be flying, so what's to stop them from doing whatever they feel is best? I understand they might choose do a controlled default and accept conditions on their default so that they maintain some access to foreign funds, but that can hardly be called "forced". Of course, my whole argument is theoretically speaking. I doubt any greek government would actually default and leave the euro. I have a firm belief in EU's capacity to muddle through this crisis for a couple more years. If greece defaults on debt, all of its banks will become insolvent, resulting in pretty much immediate bankruptcy. YOu need your banks to introduce a new currency, and the central bank must credibly be able to defend against speculative attacks, or they will be inviting them. Greeks must also be enticed to exchange their euros for the new currency, which no sane Greek will do without a credible banking system. Some of this might be nonsense, so if any proper economist wants to correct me thats fine. Strict capital controls would have to be enacted to keep euros from leaving the country (like was done in Cyprus), at least in imediate term. Greeks would be forced to exchange their euros for the new currency by force of necessity. The bank system would probably have to be reworked, but I'm not really sure how that would go down (wouldn't be pretty, though). Speculative attack on a currency usually means when the market figures out that a fixed-exchange rate is overvalued and the government is running low on foreign currency reserves, prompting domestic speculators to buy foreign currency to force the government to devalue the exchange rate. Moot point if you've got capital controls, though. so how realistic would you think it will be to have a credible fiat currency after a default? Specifically, I mean how long will it take?  I'm not sure I understand what you mean. The only thing you really need to have a credible fiat currency is a government mandate. Or do you think people would go back to a barter economy or something? When would risk premiums go down to 'normal' levels. I'm not sure about Greek people, but foreign investors will generally require higher compensation right? Right now their debt is being backed by a central bank that at least tries to seem credible. Risk premiums would be high as fuck for a long time, no question about that, but that's talking about government debt. Just because there's a serious risk of future default on government bonds doesn't mean the locals will stop using the currency. The greek people will still have to use something to buy stuff with and receive wages through (in this hypothetical scenario, it's not as if they have an alternative). What I'd like to find some insight to is how long the adjustment path will take after the shock of default, I can believe Greeks would find it hard to use an alternative currency, although it has happened before in other countries. I'm a bit worried about the hypothetical situation we are talking about, mainly because I don't think devaluations address the root cause of skewed terms of trade. They would need some form of investment in capital etc.
Setting up a new currency is easy, here in South America we're experts at doing it . While you can have situations like in Argentina where for a long time (and still now) dollars are accepted informally in many places, most establishments will have to comply with the new currency either through force of law or force of necessity. Financial institutions are key because once they stop lending euros internally (through regulations and through lack of euros), the rest of the economy has to follow suit.
I read this whole situation like one of a country with a fixed (and overvalued) exchange rate. Two solutions are possible: let the economy's non-tradable sector (most importantly: the labor market) deflate until the exchange rate is no longer overvalued or let the exchange rate float. Except you can't let the exchange rate float if you're in a monetary union. Raising labor productivity is also theoretically a third possible solution, but it's easier said than done. It would require political reforms (which themselves aren't as obvious as people think) and a massive influx of investments. Neither will realistically happen with unemployment at 25%. Hoping that courageous political reforms would spurn this massive influx of investments would be, at most, wishful thinking.
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On July 09 2013 21:19 Sbrubbles wrote:Show nested quote +On July 09 2013 17:35 Flyingdutchman wrote:On July 09 2013 10:02 Sbrubbles wrote:On July 09 2013 09:52 Flyingdutchman wrote:On July 09 2013 09:41 Sbrubbles wrote:On July 09 2013 07:22 Flyingdutchman wrote:On July 09 2013 07:02 Sbrubbles wrote:On July 09 2013 05:52 Crushinator wrote:On July 09 2013 04:17 Sbrubbles wrote:On July 09 2013 03:11 Rassy wrote: I can ask you one thing. Where inflation goes, wages will want to follow. How can this be any good for the competitiveness of Greece?
I imagine the trick will be to not allow wages to follow. People are easier to accept inflation eating away their purchase power then they are willing to accept lower wages, the end result is the same off course.
What Greece is looking for in this case is not inflation, but currency devaluation, which does create competitiveness by brute-forcing national costs down relative to international costs. Initially, there would probably be a spike in cost of living and a shock to real wages, which would only be socially acceptable because unemployment is so high. This is a quicker and less costly process than lowering wages through years of low GDP output and high unemployment, even though, as you pointed out, the end result is the same. Inflation will come, of course, because eventually workers will eventually react, because the greek economy will have to reoganize and because the greek government is not only irresponsible, but even if it wasn't it would have to cope with difficulty borrowing, probably leading it to print money. But this inflation isn't 1-for-1 with the currency devaluation. This current situation is analogous to a country having an overvalued fixed exchange rate: letting the currency float will bring inflation, but the change in relative prices between foreign and domestic outpaces it. On July 09 2013 03:11 Rassy wrote: My guess is that in this situation the debt would remain in euros, and that greece would be forced to buy euros for its drachmes at the forex markets to pay of its debt. I dont think annyone who has lend monney to greece (amongst others manny central banks) would accept a conversion rate for drachme/euro as the one wich was used at the introduction of the euro. In what ways would Greece be "forced" to do anything in this situation? If they decide to leave the euro (which I really think would already include a partial default), shit will already be flying, so what's to stop them from doing whatever they feel is best? I understand they might choose do a controlled default and accept conditions on their default so that they maintain some access to foreign funds, but that can hardly be called "forced". Of course, my whole argument is theoretically speaking. I doubt any greek government would actually default and leave the euro. I have a firm belief in EU's capacity to muddle through this crisis for a couple more years. If greece defaults on debt, all of its banks will become insolvent, resulting in pretty much immediate bankruptcy. YOu need your banks to introduce a new currency, and the central bank must credibly be able to defend against speculative attacks, or they will be inviting them. Greeks must also be enticed to exchange their euros for the new currency, which no sane Greek will do without a credible banking system. Some of this might be nonsense, so if any proper economist wants to correct me thats fine. Strict capital controls would have to be enacted to keep euros from leaving the country (like was done in Cyprus), at least in imediate term. Greeks would be forced to exchange their euros for the new currency by force of necessity. The bank system would probably have to be reworked, but I'm not really sure how that would go down (wouldn't be pretty, though). Speculative attack on a currency usually means when the market figures out that a fixed-exchange rate is overvalued and the government is running low on foreign currency reserves, prompting domestic speculators to buy foreign currency to force the government to devalue the exchange rate. Moot point if you've got capital controls, though. so how realistic would you think it will be to have a credible fiat currency after a default? Specifically, I mean how long will it take?  I'm not sure I understand what you mean. The only thing you really need to have a credible fiat currency is a government mandate. Or do you think people would go back to a barter economy or something? When would risk premiums go down to 'normal' levels. I'm not sure about Greek people, but foreign investors will generally require higher compensation right? Right now their debt is being backed by a central bank that at least tries to seem credible. Risk premiums would be high as fuck for a long time, no question about that, but that's talking about government debt. Just because there's a serious risk of future default on government bonds doesn't mean the locals will stop using the currency. The greek people will still have to use something to buy stuff with and receive wages through (in this hypothetical scenario, it's not as if they have an alternative). What I'd like to find some insight to is how long the adjustment path will take after the shock of default, I can believe Greeks would find it hard to use an alternative currency, although it has happened before in other countries. I'm a bit worried about the hypothetical situation we are talking about, mainly because I don't think devaluations address the root cause of skewed terms of trade. They would need some form of investment in capital etc. Setting up a new currency is easy, here in South America we're experts at doing it  . While you can have situations like in Argentina where for a long time (and still now) dollars are accepted informally in many places, most establishments will have to comply with the new currency either through force of law or force of necessity. Financial institutions are key because once they stop lending euros internally (through regulations and through lack of euros), the rest of the economy has to follow suit. I read this whole situation like one of a country with a fixed (and overvalued) exchange rate. Two solutions are possible: let the economy's non-tradable sector (most importantly: the labor market) deflate until the exchange rate is no longer overvalued or let the exchange rate float. Except you can't let the exchange rate float if you're in a monetary union. Raising labor productivity is also theoretically a third possible solution, but it's easier said than done. It would require political reforms (which themselves aren't as obvious as people think) and a massive influx of investments. Neither will realistically happen with unemployment at 25%. Hoping that courageous political reforms would spurn this massive influx of investments would be, at most, wishful thinking.
You certainly have had lots of practice, and have also shown that it can go wrong as well 
Raising labour productivity is indeed harder than letting exchange rate float, certainly in the short run. But that is basically my point, a structural improvement is harder than a temporary one but that does not say anything on which would ultimately have better results. It will depend on your time frame of preference (I'd rather look at a 100 year period than a 4 year period) At least that is the way I see it. Political reforms are historically only possible in time of dire need because of uncertainty on who will carry the initial burden of reform. If you only have losers then the chances of generating sufficient political support for reform is easier than when you have a group of winners that will probably leave the status quo unchanged. If you are interested I can link some research papers that formed my opinion on this matter of reform timing. That aside, I agree it remains wishful thinking whether reforms change the institutional framework for the better, or in the case of cultural influences are actually feasibly changeable. But if I look at IMF reports to see what specific institutional improvements have been proposed and what they are working I'd say it will certainly help. Subsequently, you can also see that the willingness and effectiveness to reform in the areas where there are winners reflect what I have said about winners and losers above, like tax evasion or downscaling the public sector.
So the TL;DR would be: reforms can lead to structural improvements, in some cases they are even inevitable. But reforms are more likely after a crisis, the only question that remains is after how many crises a country will finally have the political will to follow through on what is eventually needed.
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On July 09 2013 23:45 Flyingdutchman wrote:Show nested quote +On July 09 2013 21:19 Sbrubbles wrote:On July 09 2013 17:35 Flyingdutchman wrote:On July 09 2013 10:02 Sbrubbles wrote:On July 09 2013 09:52 Flyingdutchman wrote:On July 09 2013 09:41 Sbrubbles wrote:On July 09 2013 07:22 Flyingdutchman wrote:On July 09 2013 07:02 Sbrubbles wrote:On July 09 2013 05:52 Crushinator wrote:On July 09 2013 04:17 Sbrubbles wrote: [quote]
What Greece is looking for in this case is not inflation, but currency devaluation, which does create competitiveness by brute-forcing national costs down relative to international costs. Initially, there would probably be a spike in cost of living and a shock to real wages, which would only be socially acceptable because unemployment is so high. This is a quicker and less costly process than lowering wages through years of low GDP output and high unemployment, even though, as you pointed out, the end result is the same.
Inflation will come, of course, because eventually workers will eventually react, because the greek economy will have to reoganize and because the greek government is not only irresponsible, but even if it wasn't it would have to cope with difficulty borrowing, probably leading it to print money. But this inflation isn't 1-for-1 with the currency devaluation. This current situation is analogous to a country having an overvalued fixed exchange rate: letting the currency float will bring inflation, but the change in relative prices between foreign and domestic outpaces it.
[quote]
In what ways would Greece be "forced" to do anything in this situation? If they decide to leave the euro (which I really think would already include a partial default), shit will already be flying, so what's to stop them from doing whatever they feel is best? I understand they might choose do a controlled default and accept conditions on their default so that they maintain some access to foreign funds, but that can hardly be called "forced".
Of course, my whole argument is theoretically speaking. I doubt any greek government would actually default and leave the euro. I have a firm belief in EU's capacity to muddle through this crisis for a couple more years. If greece defaults on debt, all of its banks will become insolvent, resulting in pretty much immediate bankruptcy. YOu need your banks to introduce a new currency, and the central bank must credibly be able to defend against speculative attacks, or they will be inviting them. Greeks must also be enticed to exchange their euros for the new currency, which no sane Greek will do without a credible banking system. Some of this might be nonsense, so if any proper economist wants to correct me thats fine. Strict capital controls would have to be enacted to keep euros from leaving the country (like was done in Cyprus), at least in imediate term. Greeks would be forced to exchange their euros for the new currency by force of necessity. The bank system would probably have to be reworked, but I'm not really sure how that would go down (wouldn't be pretty, though). Speculative attack on a currency usually means when the market figures out that a fixed-exchange rate is overvalued and the government is running low on foreign currency reserves, prompting domestic speculators to buy foreign currency to force the government to devalue the exchange rate. Moot point if you've got capital controls, though. so how realistic would you think it will be to have a credible fiat currency after a default? Specifically, I mean how long will it take?  I'm not sure I understand what you mean. The only thing you really need to have a credible fiat currency is a government mandate. Or do you think people would go back to a barter economy or something? When would risk premiums go down to 'normal' levels. I'm not sure about Greek people, but foreign investors will generally require higher compensation right? Right now their debt is being backed by a central bank that at least tries to seem credible. Risk premiums would be high as fuck for a long time, no question about that, but that's talking about government debt. Just because there's a serious risk of future default on government bonds doesn't mean the locals will stop using the currency. The greek people will still have to use something to buy stuff with and receive wages through (in this hypothetical scenario, it's not as if they have an alternative). What I'd like to find some insight to is how long the adjustment path will take after the shock of default, I can believe Greeks would find it hard to use an alternative currency, although it has happened before in other countries. I'm a bit worried about the hypothetical situation we are talking about, mainly because I don't think devaluations address the root cause of skewed terms of trade. They would need some form of investment in capital etc. Setting up a new currency is easy, here in South America we're experts at doing it  . While you can have situations like in Argentina where for a long time (and still now) dollars are accepted informally in many places, most establishments will have to comply with the new currency either through force of law or force of necessity. Financial institutions are key because once they stop lending euros internally (through regulations and through lack of euros), the rest of the economy has to follow suit. I read this whole situation like one of a country with a fixed (and overvalued) exchange rate. Two solutions are possible: let the economy's non-tradable sector (most importantly: the labor market) deflate until the exchange rate is no longer overvalued or let the exchange rate float. Except you can't let the exchange rate float if you're in a monetary union. Raising labor productivity is also theoretically a third possible solution, but it's easier said than done. It would require political reforms (which themselves aren't as obvious as people think) and a massive influx of investments. Neither will realistically happen with unemployment at 25%. Hoping that courageous political reforms would spurn this massive influx of investments would be, at most, wishful thinking. So the TL;DR would be: reforms can lead to structural improvements, in some cases they are even inevitable. But reforms are more likely after a crisis, the only question that remains is after how many crises a country will finally have the political will to follow through on what is eventually needed.
Well considering that wages need to go down by 30% in the most troubled countries, and Greece is one of them, i would consider that impossible if you look at the current situation there. Unbelievable high unemployment, child death rates up by 40%, drug use and HIV infections going trough the roof etc. This crisis handling management is literally killing people. Long term thinking is fine but it doesn't matter if you're dead in the short run. In my opinion Greece is simply in a dead-end, structural reforms on the scale they're needed can't happen, lending new money won't also work because debt and interest rates are too high.
I think it's very likely that Greece will need a big new haircut, but i don't think it will happen before our elections here.
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Flyingdutchman please link those papers I'm always interested those things.
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On July 09 2013 23:45 Flyingdutchman wrote:Show nested quote +On July 09 2013 21:19 Sbrubbles wrote:On July 09 2013 17:35 Flyingdutchman wrote:On July 09 2013 10:02 Sbrubbles wrote:On July 09 2013 09:52 Flyingdutchman wrote:On July 09 2013 09:41 Sbrubbles wrote:On July 09 2013 07:22 Flyingdutchman wrote:On July 09 2013 07:02 Sbrubbles wrote:On July 09 2013 05:52 Crushinator wrote:On July 09 2013 04:17 Sbrubbles wrote: [quote]
What Greece is looking for in this case is not inflation, but currency devaluation, which does create competitiveness by brute-forcing national costs down relative to international costs. Initially, there would probably be a spike in cost of living and a shock to real wages, which would only be socially acceptable because unemployment is so high. This is a quicker and less costly process than lowering wages through years of low GDP output and high unemployment, even though, as you pointed out, the end result is the same.
Inflation will come, of course, because eventually workers will eventually react, because the greek economy will have to reoganize and because the greek government is not only irresponsible, but even if it wasn't it would have to cope with difficulty borrowing, probably leading it to print money. But this inflation isn't 1-for-1 with the currency devaluation. This current situation is analogous to a country having an overvalued fixed exchange rate: letting the currency float will bring inflation, but the change in relative prices between foreign and domestic outpaces it.
[quote]
In what ways would Greece be "forced" to do anything in this situation? If they decide to leave the euro (which I really think would already include a partial default), shit will already be flying, so what's to stop them from doing whatever they feel is best? I understand they might choose do a controlled default and accept conditions on their default so that they maintain some access to foreign funds, but that can hardly be called "forced".
Of course, my whole argument is theoretically speaking. I doubt any greek government would actually default and leave the euro. I have a firm belief in EU's capacity to muddle through this crisis for a couple more years. If greece defaults on debt, all of its banks will become insolvent, resulting in pretty much immediate bankruptcy. YOu need your banks to introduce a new currency, and the central bank must credibly be able to defend against speculative attacks, or they will be inviting them. Greeks must also be enticed to exchange their euros for the new currency, which no sane Greek will do without a credible banking system. Some of this might be nonsense, so if any proper economist wants to correct me thats fine. Strict capital controls would have to be enacted to keep euros from leaving the country (like was done in Cyprus), at least in imediate term. Greeks would be forced to exchange their euros for the new currency by force of necessity. The bank system would probably have to be reworked, but I'm not really sure how that would go down (wouldn't be pretty, though). Speculative attack on a currency usually means when the market figures out that a fixed-exchange rate is overvalued and the government is running low on foreign currency reserves, prompting domestic speculators to buy foreign currency to force the government to devalue the exchange rate. Moot point if you've got capital controls, though. so how realistic would you think it will be to have a credible fiat currency after a default? Specifically, I mean how long will it take?  I'm not sure I understand what you mean. The only thing you really need to have a credible fiat currency is a government mandate. Or do you think people would go back to a barter economy or something? When would risk premiums go down to 'normal' levels. I'm not sure about Greek people, but foreign investors will generally require higher compensation right? Right now their debt is being backed by a central bank that at least tries to seem credible. Risk premiums would be high as fuck for a long time, no question about that, but that's talking about government debt. Just because there's a serious risk of future default on government bonds doesn't mean the locals will stop using the currency. The greek people will still have to use something to buy stuff with and receive wages through (in this hypothetical scenario, it's not as if they have an alternative). What I'd like to find some insight to is how long the adjustment path will take after the shock of default, I can believe Greeks would find it hard to use an alternative currency, although it has happened before in other countries. I'm a bit worried about the hypothetical situation we are talking about, mainly because I don't think devaluations address the root cause of skewed terms of trade. They would need some form of investment in capital etc. Setting up a new currency is easy, here in South America we're experts at doing it  . While you can have situations like in Argentina where for a long time (and still now) dollars are accepted informally in many places, most establishments will have to comply with the new currency either through force of law or force of necessity. Financial institutions are key because once they stop lending euros internally (through regulations and through lack of euros), the rest of the economy has to follow suit. I read this whole situation like one of a country with a fixed (and overvalued) exchange rate. Two solutions are possible: let the economy's non-tradable sector (most importantly: the labor market) deflate until the exchange rate is no longer overvalued or let the exchange rate float. Except you can't let the exchange rate float if you're in a monetary union. Raising labor productivity is also theoretically a third possible solution, but it's easier said than done. It would require political reforms (which themselves aren't as obvious as people think) and a massive influx of investments. Neither will realistically happen with unemployment at 25%. Hoping that courageous political reforms would spurn this massive influx of investments would be, at most, wishful thinking. You certainly have had lots of practice, and have also shown that it can go wrong as well  Raising labour productivity is indeed harder than letting exchange rate float, certainly in the short run. But that is basically my point, a structural improvement is harder than a temporary one but that does not say anything on which would ultimately have better results. It will depend on your time frame of preference (I'd rather look at a 100 year period than a 4 year period) At least that is the way I see it. Political reforms are historically only possible in time of dire need because of uncertainty on who will carry the initial burden of reform. If you only have losers then the chances of generating sufficient political support for reform is easier than when you have a group of winners that will probably leave the status quo unchanged. If you are interested I can link some research papers that formed my opinion on this matter of reform timing. That aside, I agree it remains wishful thinking whether reforms change the institutional framework for the better, or in the case of cultural influences are actually feasibly changeable. But if I look at IMF reports to see what specific institutional improvements have been proposed and what they are working I'd say it will certainly help. Subsequently, you can also see that the willingness and effectiveness to reform in the areas where there are winners reflect what I have said about winners and losers above, like tax evasion or downscaling the public sector. So the TL;DR would be: reforms can lead to structural improvements, in some cases they are even inevitable. But reforms are more likely after a crisis, the only question that remains is after how many crises a country will finally have the political will to follow through on what is eventually needed. You think Greece low productivity is a problem ? It wouldn't be a problem if they were not in the euro. You think their debt is a problem ? It wouldn't be if they were not in the euro. Also you point out those "structural reform" without defining them exactly. What structural change needs to be done in Greece ? Smell a lot like the washington consensus to me: everybody think they know what Greece needs, and everybody will end up fucking Greece hard for their own ignorance. All in all, the only thing you are preaching for a competitive disinflation without even considering how criminal this action is if you consider the actual living condition of the average Greek, and disregarding the fact that there are other solutions (that would not profit to Germany true) that would have the same result but with less arm.
Finally, you always say "after a crisis", but the Greece crisis is far from over.
You also misunderstand why a monetary union work in the US and not in europe. It's not because some weird conditions are not there (the EU actually respond to almost all the conditions of an optimal currency area), it's because there are no way for capital to flow from richest regions to poorest. It is as simple as that.
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On July 09 2013 20:03 WhiteDog wrote:Show nested quote +On July 09 2013 19:48 Flyingdutchman wrote:On July 09 2013 18:06 WhiteDog wrote:
Because those structural reform are a mirage : there are no amount of "good reform" that could help the Greek being more competitive than the Germany in a 10 year time. Do you want to make Greece suffer ad vitam eternam ? At some point you got to take the right step and face the fact that the euro is flawed. I will take another exemple : in France, our labor productivity is way better than Germany's, yet our competitivity is not at their level. Why is that ? The question of productivity, competitivity and growth is so complex, if anybody had the answer to help a country get some of those with "intelligent reform", we would know it, considering what we did in under developped countries from 1950 to 1990. The idea of sustainable growth is very good, but I could give you a class on sustainable growth model and you would see how unrealistic those models are. I'd say the Greeks should worry about staying ahead of Zimbabwe. But all joking aside, they don't need to be more productive than Germany on a whole. The way I see it is that the current formal and informal institutional framework is not conductive for sustained growth in the long run. The reason why I feel this is the time for reform is because reform is ultimately only really possible after a crisis, you cannot purely look at this in economical perspective without applying the political constraints to decision making. This does not only apply to Greece but the other countries in EU and the EU political framework as well. The EU monetary union certainly has flaws and they should be adressed, but that does not mean there isn't anything wrong in the long term strategy that the member countries are displaying. Wouldn't it be better if you go back and look at the replay of a game you lost to see where you could have done better instead of going on a forum and crying imba? And when you talk about sustainable growth models, are you talking in the sense of endogenous growth models or sustainable as in natural resources? I was talking about endogenous growth, maybe I should have called it sustained instead of sustainable growth. Quite frankly I am quite surprised at how easy you dismiss things that do enable you to be 'right' yet you embrace things like the rational expectations hypothesis which can just as easily be dismissed when you look at empirical evidence. You must not forget that economic research is done to better understand the sources of growth. They produce stylized facts or indicate some empirical issues that can be built upon to better understand all the complexities you mention. Things like the rational expectation hypothesis are assumptions made to try and explain behaviour in a model. Can you honestly say that you have worked with the mathematical models, as in doing them yourself? If not, it is understandable that you do not realize how much changing the assumptions will affect how well the model fits with what we can observe. It is therefore not very conductive to cherrypick certain assumptions (like the rational expectations hypothesis), when they happen to fit your world view in a theoretical sense and disregard them completely when they don't. That implies you are just trying to be right instead of building your understanding of the real world, which is ultimately the goal of economic academics. I'm not embracing the idea of rational expectancy, it's a weak theory to explain actual economical matter, but in the long run it's the best way we have to explain the impact of inflation on economical behaviors : in the long run, people just behave like inflation was not there to begin with. As I said before, it's something that is widely accepted by economists (that you can't trade off between inflation and unemployment in the long run), from the monetarist to the keynesians (Phelps). Inflation would have huge impact on short term behavior tho. You are mixing things up, there is no tradeoff between output and inflation in the long run. However there is a tradeoff between temporary short run employment boosts and pursuing a low inflation target, which is what the actual decision for policy makers comes down to. And what I've been saying all this time. Expansionary monetary policy is a tool used by policy makers to boost employment above their natural level. Money growth, in the long run, remains the key determinant of inflation, regardless of the specific assumption you make on expectations.
Admittedly, policy decisions are left to the discretion of the policymakers in the various countries, and what is optimal varies from region to region and even from sector to sector. The political process will always have an influence unless we switch to a dictatorship. I accept that fact. As of now, Greece is in a monetary union and therefore only really has control over fiscal and institutional policy. The have some constraints on fiscal policy right now, so realistically institutional improvements are all they have left to relieve those constraints on their fiscal policy. If Greece would step out of the Eurozone I will focus my theorizing to the new situation.
Talking on endegenous growth models would lead us to a long talk. All I see through those models for the problem we are facing are broad ideas : you should invest in R&D (something that can't be done without the state, so the EU is pushing state to invest more and more in it and help private investment in the research, so more state ?), education is important (again, education has external effect and because of that should be supported by the state), human capital is important (health is important, something that need the state again) public infrastructure help the productivity of private firms (again, we need the state). The more recent models put in light the importance of goods diversity in the economy - so again, it's not something that you can just help with private investment, it's something that comes off after 1) research and innovation (that needs the state) 2) long term strategies by the firms. At no point those models suggest that the solution is budget rigor ? And what can those models do for the Greece of today ? And if I look at empirical evidences, what I see is that inequalities between countries are pretty persistent, and that the competitivity of today's Germany has more to do with German's history than with the strategy your country had for the last 10 years.
Your are stating an assumption as a fact. If you really think R&D, education, health, human capital, and public infrastructure can't be done without the state you have an extremely unrealistic world view. The question is whether the market can determine optimal levels on its own. Things like military/defence are clearly not optimal when left to the market. R&D and education will have a mixed bag of results both in terms of market and government efficiency in determining the optimal level. Healthcare can be done optimally. But in the Netherlands for example, the reforms in combination with the guaranteed demand has mostly led to rent seeking instead of production and quality improvements (on the whole). Infrastructure is quite clearly something the government should handle, at least for roads. They require huge investments that will accumulate benefits over very long periods of time and thus benefit different generations. In any case, it would be a false assumption that governments will always have a better result than market forces for the things you mentioned. Whatever levels of public services the electorate decides to demand from their government is up to the voters, but there is a natural constraint, namely that it should be affordable.
Inflation would lower the debt, maybe lower unemployment in some countries like France, and it will maybe force some firm to push higher the wages in some countries such as Germany, but it will not help the competitivity problem and the structural problem that exist because of how the euro was built...
You seem to forget that there are two sides to competivety, on one side you have productivity and on the other hand you have the costs, like wages for example. In one of the spoilers in the above quotebox you asked why higher labour productivity in France somehow did not translate to better competitiveness vis-a-vis Germany. What matters for this specific component is how labour productivity relates to to the wages. And I'm not sure if you are talking about 'green' development or permanent development when you say sustainable development? I was talking in the temporal sense
On July 10 2013 00:32 WhiteDog wrote:You think Greece low productivity is a problem ? It wouldn't be a problem if they were not in the euro. You think their debt is a problem ? It wouldn't be if they were not in the euro. Also you point out those "structural reform" without defining them exactly. What structural change needs to be done in Greece ? Smell a lot like the washington consensus to me: everybody think they know what Greece needs, and everybody will end up fucking Greece hard for their own ignorance. All in all, the only thing you are preaching for a competitive disinflation without even considering how criminal this action is if you consider the actual living condition of the average Greek, and disregarding the fact that there are other solutions (that would not profit to Germany true) that would have the same result but with less arm. Finally, you always say "after a crisis", but the Greece crisis is far from over. You also misunderstand why a monetary union work in the US and not in europe. It's not because some weird conditions are not there (the EU actually respond to almost all the conditions of an optimal currency area), it's because there are no way for capital to flow from richest regions to poorest. It is as simple as that.
You are right, obviously during a crisis, or after the start of a crisis. Considering my explanation to why this is the case, I'd say that was quite clear for someone who has some understanding of the English language. You can argue semantics but that does not take away from what I said. And if you even bothered to read the imf report I posted earlier you can clearly see what structural changes I am talking about. Why would I have to spell it out to someone who is only arguing for arguing s' sake. You obviously are overestimating what you know about economics, and that applies to me as well. But I suspect you have some fundamental problems in comprehending English, which makes it harder to actually not get elementary things completely upside down I guess. Reserving future income without increasing the natural rate of growth is what is criminal. What is not criminal is expecting that a country that runs prolonged fiscal deficits without improving fundamentals has to endure a recession while they return to their natural long run growth path. That is just common sense. And personally I feel that the critique that Milton Friedman posited about why the Euro area would not work to be more applicable: http://www.greekcrisis.net/2012/08/the-euro-monetary-unity-to-political.html Besides, Capital flows from richest to poorest easier than anything else, it is just what happens with it that was one of the problems.
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On July 10 2013 00:09 RvB wrote: Flyingdutchman please link those papers I'm always interested those things. Here is a working paper version from 2003 that I could easily find online by Abiad&Mody. If you have access to better sources you could check the title at least. the version I have is from 2005. It is an analysis of financial reform. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp0370.pdf
Here is a paper by Acemoglu et.al. on the colonial origins of comparative growth. http://economics.mit.edu/files/4123
I don't have much time right now, feel free to PM for more on any specific subject.
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On July 10 2013 01:34 Flyingdutchman wrote:Show nested quote +On July 09 2013 20:03 WhiteDog wrote:On July 09 2013 19:48 Flyingdutchman wrote:On July 09 2013 18:06 WhiteDog wrote:
Because those structural reform are a mirage : there are no amount of "good reform" that could help the Greek being more competitive than the Germany in a 10 year time. Do you want to make Greece suffer ad vitam eternam ? At some point you got to take the right step and face the fact that the euro is flawed. I will take another exemple : in France, our labor productivity is way better than Germany's, yet our competitivity is not at their level. Why is that ? The question of productivity, competitivity and growth is so complex, if anybody had the answer to help a country get some of those with "intelligent reform", we would know it, considering what we did in under developped countries from 1950 to 1990. The idea of sustainable growth is very good, but I could give you a class on sustainable growth model and you would see how unrealistic those models are. I'd say the Greeks should worry about staying ahead of Zimbabwe. But all joking aside, they don't need to be more productive than Germany on a whole. The way I see it is that the current formal and informal institutional framework is not conductive for sustained growth in the long run. The reason why I feel this is the time for reform is because reform is ultimately only really possible after a crisis, you cannot purely look at this in economical perspective without applying the political constraints to decision making. This does not only apply to Greece but the other countries in EU and the EU political framework as well. The EU monetary union certainly has flaws and they should be adressed, but that does not mean there isn't anything wrong in the long term strategy that the member countries are displaying. Wouldn't it be better if you go back and look at the replay of a game you lost to see where you could have done better instead of going on a forum and crying imba? And when you talk about sustainable growth models, are you talking in the sense of endogenous growth models or sustainable as in natural resources? I was talking about endogenous growth, maybe I should have called it sustained instead of sustainable growth. Quite frankly I am quite surprised at how easy you dismiss things that do enable you to be 'right' yet you embrace things like the rational expectations hypothesis which can just as easily be dismissed when you look at empirical evidence. You must not forget that economic research is done to better understand the sources of growth. They produce stylized facts or indicate some empirical issues that can be built upon to better understand all the complexities you mention. Things like the rational expectation hypothesis are assumptions made to try and explain behaviour in a model. Can you honestly say that you have worked with the mathematical models, as in doing them yourself? If not, it is understandable that you do not realize how much changing the assumptions will affect how well the model fits with what we can observe. It is therefore not very conductive to cherrypick certain assumptions (like the rational expectations hypothesis), when they happen to fit your world view in a theoretical sense and disregard them completely when they don't. That implies you are just trying to be right instead of building your understanding of the real world, which is ultimately the goal of economic academics. I'm not embracing the idea of rational expectancy, it's a weak theory to explain actual economical matter, but in the long run it's the best way we have to explain the impact of inflation on economical behaviors : in the long run, people just behave like inflation was not there to begin with. As I said before, it's something that is widely accepted by economists (that you can't trade off between inflation and unemployment in the long run), from the monetarist to the keynesians (Phelps). Inflation would have huge impact on short term behavior tho. You are mixing things up, there is no tradeoff between output and inflation in the long run. However there is a tradeoff between temporary short run employment boosts and pursuing a low inflation target, which is what the actual decision for policy makers comes down to. And what I've been saying all this time. Expansionary monetary policy is a tool used by policy makers to boost employment above their natural level. Money growth, in the long run, remains the key determinant of inflation, regardless of the specific assumption you make on expectations. Admittedly, policy decisions are left to the discretion of the policymakers in the various countries, and what is optimal varies from region to region and even from sector to sector. The political process will always have an influence unless we switch to a dictatorship. I accept that fact. As of now, Greece is in a monetary union and therefore only really has control over fiscal and institutional policy. The have some constraints on fiscal policy right now, so realistically institutional improvements are all they have left to relieve those constraints on their fiscal policy. If Greece would step out of the Eurozone I will focus my theorizing to the new situation. No I'm not mixing things up, you were wrong in the beginning, I thought we were already past that. I'm just explaining why rational expectation are a good thing to use in this specific matter, and useless to understand things like risk management, etc.
Show nested quote + Talking on endegenous growth models would lead us to a long talk. All I see through those models for the problem we are facing are broad ideas : you should invest in R&D (something that can't be done without the state, so the EU is pushing state to invest more and more in it and help private investment in the research, so more state ?), education is important (again, education has external effect and because of that should be supported by the state), human capital is important (health is important, something that need the state again) public infrastructure help the productivity of private firms (again, we need the state). The more recent models put in light the importance of goods diversity in the economy - so again, it's not something that you can just help with private investment, it's something that comes off after 1) research and innovation (that needs the state) 2) long term strategies by the firms. At no point those models suggest that the solution is budget rigor ? And what can those models do for the Greece of today ? And if I look at empirical evidences, what I see is that inequalities between countries are pretty persistent, and that the competitivity of today's Germany has more to do with German's history than with the strategy your country had for the last 10 years.
Your are stating an assumption as a fact. If you really think R&D, education, health, human capital, and public infrastructure can't be done without the state you have an extremely unrealistic world view. The question is whether the market can determine optimal levels on its own. Things like military/defence are clearly not optimal when left to the market. R&D and education will have a mixed bag of results both in terms of market and government efficiency in determining the optimal level. Healthcare can be done optimally. But in the Netherlands for example, the reforms in combination with the guaranteed demand has mostly led to rent seeking instead of production and quality improvements (on the whole). Infrastructure is quite clearly something the government should handle, at least for roads. They require huge investments that will accumulate benefits over very long periods of time and thus benefit different generations. In any case, it would be a false assumption that governments will always have a better result than market forces for the things you mentioned. Whatever levels of public services the electorate decides to demand from their government is up to the voters, but there is a natural constraint, namely that it should be affordable. You have an extremely unrealistic world view if you can't see that public infrastructure, human capital, education, health and R&D cannot be done efficiently without the state. Just look around you, in which country is there a good private education that get no money from the state ? On the public infrastructure, just read C. Pigou, back in 1920 he already acknowledge the fact that they are a "market failure" and thus that they need the state. On R&D, look at the europe, and their policy in the last 10 years : yeah, state incitation for private investment in... R&D...
Show nested quote +Inflation would lower the debt, maybe lower unemployment in some countries like France, and it will maybe force some firm to push higher the wages in some countries such as Germany, but it will not help the competitivity problem and the structural problem that exist because of how the euro was built... You seem to forget that there are two sides to competivety, on one side you have productivity and on the other hand you have the costs, like wages for example. In one of the spoilers in the above quotebox you asked why higher labour productivity in France somehow did not translate to better competitiveness vis-a-vis Germany. What matters for this specific component is how labour productivity relates to to the wages. And I'm not sure if you are talking about 'green' development or permanent development when you say sustainable development? I was talking in the temporal sense. It's not a question of wage, at all, it's way bigger. It's a question of average working time, and competitivety is not only on price. The brand is part of competitivity. The fact that German cars are well known for their quality just add to their competitivity.
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On July 10 2013 05:45 WhiteDog wrote: No I'm not mixing things up, you were wrong in the beginning, I thought we were already past that. I'm just explaining why rational expectation are a good thing to use in this specific matter, and useless to understand things like risk management, etc.
Well you are free to believe want you want to believe, I'm telling you that you are misinterpreting things here. If you don't believe me fine, would you believe Mankiw? He writes economic textbooks you know This is the conclusion he came to in his paper 'THE INEXORABLE AND MYSTERIOUS TRADEOFF BETWEEN INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT' + Show Spoiler +Let me conclude by summarizing my view of the health of the inflation-unemployment tradeoff. There is goods news and bad news.The good news is that the inflation-unemployment tradeoff has a secure place in economics. (In the second edition of my principles text, it is still one of the ten principles.) Almost all economists today agree that monetary policy influences unemployment, at least temporarily, and determines inflation, at least in the long run. This is all you need to believe to accept the inflation-unemployment tradeoff as a basic tenet of economics. Moreover, the theoretical basis for this tradeoff is well understood. We now have good theories to explain why prices are sticky, and much evidence that actual prices in fact remain stuck for long periods of time. Price stickiness can easily explain why society faces a short-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. The bad news is that the dynamic relationship between inflation and unemployment remains a mystery. The so-called "new Keynesian Phillips curve" is appealing from a theoretical standpoint, but it is ultimately a failure. It is not at all consistent with the standard stylized facts about the dynamic effects of monetary policy, according to which monetary shocks have a delayed and gradual effect on inflation. We can explain these facts with traditional backward-looking models of inflation-unemployment dynamics, but these models lack any foundation in the microeconomic theories of price adjustment. Other than that I do not know what to say except opening basic macro textbooks.
You have an extremely unrealistic world view if you can't see that public infrastructure, human capital, education, health and R&D cannot be done efficiently without the state. Just look around you, in which country is there a good private education that get no money from the state ? On the public infrastructure, just read C. Pigou, back in 1920 he already acknowledge the fact that they are a "market failure" and thus that they need the state. On R&D, look at the Europe, and their policy in the last 10 years : yeah, state incitation for private investment in... R&D...
Where did I say that public infrastructure was not best left to governments? Again, you either have difficulty reading, comprehending english, or are just very selective in what you actually read. The role of the state in R&D is to finance possible 'blue skies research' where possible real world application is not immediately apparent. R&D with direct applications are better handled by the private sector. And there are loads of privately funded Universities, did you ever bother to look into this? Human capital? Aside from schooling, the majority of human capital is formed by actually working and on the job training. How is that something only a government could do efficiently? A friend of mine worked as a junior policy maker at one of the ministries here in the Netherlands. He switched to become an analyst at PWC, took a paycut in the process. Why? Because companies like PWC actually invest a lot in building the skills of their workers.
I do not need to read Pigou (again). Next time don't come with blanket statement arguments like market failures without looking at the specific characteristics of the sector, of which I actually provided a few examples of. Just reread my statement about roads for example. Yet you somehow either didn't recognize the examples as market failures (proving your ignorance on the subject) or you only chose to read the general gist of my first sentence.
It's not a question of wage, at all, it's way bigger. It's a question of average working time, and competitivety is not only on price. The brand is part of competitivity. The fact that German cars are well known for their quality just add to their competitivity.
Yes German cars are very good, in a city like Larisa there are even more Porsche Cayenne's than there are people reporting an income over 50.000 Euro. Imagine that
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On July 10 2013 07:12 Flyingdutchman wrote:Show nested quote +On July 10 2013 05:45 WhiteDog wrote: No I'm not mixing things up, you were wrong in the beginning, I thought we were already past that. I'm just explaining why rational expectation are a good thing to use in this specific matter, and useless to understand things like risk management, etc.
Well you are free to believe want you want to believe, I'm telling you that you are misinterpreting things here. If you don't believe me fine, would you believe Mankiw? He writes economic textbooks you know  This is the conclusion he came to in his paper ' THE INEXORABLE AND MYSTERIOUS TRADEOFF BETWEEN INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT' + Show Spoiler +Let me conclude by summarizing my view of the health of the inflation-unemployment tradeoff. There is goods news and bad news.The good news is that the inflation-unemployment tradeoff has a secure place in economics. (In the second edition of my principles text, it is still one of the ten principles.) Almost all economists today agree that monetary policy influences unemployment, at least temporarily, and determines inflation, at least in the long run. This is all you need to believe to accept the inflation-unemployment tradeoff as a basic tenet of economics. Moreover, the theoretical basis for this tradeoff is well understood. We now have good theories to explain why prices are sticky, and much evidence that actual prices in fact remain stuck for long periods of time. Price stickiness can easily explain why society faces a short-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. The bad news is that the dynamic relationship between inflation and unemployment remains a mystery. The so-called "new Keynesian Phillips curve" is appealing from a theoretical standpoint, but it is ultimately a failure. It is not at all consistent with the standard stylized facts about the dynamic effects of monetary policy, according to which monetary shocks have a delayed and gradual effect on inflation. We can explain these facts with traditional backward-looking models of inflation-unemployment dynamics, but these models lack any foundation in the microeconomic theories of price adjustment. Other than that I do not know what to say except opening basic macro textbooks. Damn are you serious ? You are arguing for EVERYTHING I was saying like two pages ago. "Price stickiness" = nominal rigidities (yeah I talked about that), Phillips Curve, etc. Everything I said you is in your quote, while you were at the time saying the exact opposite. Central Banks suppose that there are no "long" run trade off (now we can discuss on the "long", but I'm sure your Mankiw would never argue that price are sticky for more than one year), but you can trade off in the short term because of nominal rigidities. Everything you are quoting comes from Phelps' and keynesians works that I quoted a few time. Could you stop trying to measure your dick to me when you clearly cannot because you don't understand half of what I say ? Do you even understand what he means by price being "sticky" ?
Do you even understand that the keynesian argument for nominal rigidities goes against the defense of the independance of the central bank (that you were arguing for at the beginning ?), because it imply that you can trade off between employment and inflation ? And thus monetary policy should be cyclical ? And even with nominal rigidities, keynesians only argue for a low inflation (2 to 4%) because they still acknowledge the fact that in the long run, the trade off doesn't work if the inflation is higher than that (hence the 2% inflation cible made by the BCE).
I'm trying to be neutral in all this, and only point out how economist think those things, I'm not, personally, at all for the independance of the central bank, and I think that the idea that you can't trade off in the long term is useless because in the long run, we are all I dead, to quote Keynes.
I'm glad you took my recommendation to the letter and actually opened a textbook by the way.
Show nested quote +You have an extremely unrealistic world view if you can't see that public infrastructure, human capital, education, health and R&D cannot be done efficiently without the state. Just look around you, in which country is there a good private education that get no money from the state ? On the public infrastructure, just read C. Pigou, back in 1920 he already acknowledge the fact that they are a "market failure" and thus that they need the state. On R&D, look at the Europe, and their policy in the last 10 years : yeah, state incitation for private investment in... R&D... Where did I say that public infrastructure was not best left to governments? Again, you either have difficulty reading, comprehending english, or are just very selective in what you actually read. The role of the state in R&D is to finance possible 'blue skies research' where possible real world application is not immediately apparent. R&D with direct applications are better handled by the private sector. And there are loads of privately funded Universities, did you ever bother to look into this? Human capital? Aside from schooling, the majority of human capital is formed by actually working and on the job training. You're just nitpicking, it's so boring to talk with you. All in all you agree that, overall, without the state, all those things (public infrastructure, R&D, education, health, etc.) are not efficiently done. Thanks to agree with me.
If you really think R&D, education, health, human capital, and public infrastructure can't be done without the state you have an extremely unrealistic world view. = wrong. Does not work without the state efficiently. Thanks. Would be great if you stopped trying to actually measure your knowledge to me and talk about the subject without referring to an unreal policy that would help Greece competitivity while lowering its debt at the same time.
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On July 10 2013 07:12 Flyingdutchman wrote:What is not criminal is expecting that a country that runs prolonged fiscal deficits without improving fundamentals has to endure a recession while they return to their natural long run growth path. That is just common sense.
While in a theoretical vacuum this may seem logical, it is simply ridiculous to suggest that GDP growth rates of -0.2, -3.1, -4.9, -7.1 and - 6.4 from respectively 2008 to 2012 are acceptable. First of all, it is simply not defensible on a social level. Do I need to bring out the news reports on unemployment, suicide rates, lack of medical supplies, increase of diseases and (more controversially) the rise of extremist political parties?
Secondly and following, from a business cycle standpoint it is inconsequential to flame Greece for following prolonged fiscal deficites and now encourage austerity. You critice (rightly) Greece for maintain prolong fiscal deficits during positive business, which violates the principle of 'leaning against the wind' (as optimal business cycle management). Nevertheless, you suggest that currently austerity is fit while there clearly is recession going on. Which is inconsequential with your critique on prolonged deficits.
Thirdly, your suggestion of returning to the natural long run growth path suggests some pre-set end to the negative spiral Greece currently is in. I suppose I do not need to inform you on the adverse effects of deflation, which Greece currently faces? In addition, if your arguing for the returnal to their natural long run growth path, what is it in terms of GDP growth?
Lastly, if you still were to accept that the theory of natural long run growth applies, then there still remains the issue of overshooting. Both from an empirical and theoretical standpoint, can overshooting be defended. If so, then it is also likely that Greece is currently overreacting in terms of economic shrinkage. Consequently, the austerity policy which you recommend, would be overly harsh.
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On July 10 2013 05:45 WhiteDog wrote: It's not a question of wage, at all, it's way bigger. It's a question of average working time, and competitivety is not only on price. The brand is part of competitivity. The fact that German cars are well known for their quality just add to their competitivity.
That's true, though BMW could, at least in theory, open up a plant in Greece the same way Toyota has opened up plants in the US or how domestic manufacturers in the US have migrated from northern to southern states.
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On July 10 2013 07:27 WhiteDog wrote: Damn are you serious ? You are arguing for EVERYTHING I was saying like two pages ago. "Price stickiness" = nominal rigidities (yeah I talked about that), Phillips Curve, etc. Everything I said you is in your quote, while you were at the time saying the exact opposite. I never argued against or about stickiness, the phillips curve, or any of the other of your things that you brought up. The point of contention was whether it would be a good idea to inflate away debt.At first I just thought it was because you did not see inflation as a cost that we had different opinions. I asked you to drop it because of that because arguing would have point. Then you bring it up again, because of...I don't know. Now I suspect where the error in your reasoning lies. Governments, or the policy makers, can decide to trade off something good, but temporary, for something bad but permanent. The good in this case is increasing employment. The bad is high levels of inflation. This is the tradeoff. In the long run, when prices adjust to the expectations, your real income will be lower or the same, and unemployment will be back to its natural rate. Now consider two cases for Greece. First is that they already were above or on their 'natural' level of employment. The result of expansionary monetary policy in this case would be the picture I just painted. The other case is that Greece was below their natural level of employment. Then Greece would return to their natural level faster. Thing is, the natural level is determined by what I referred to as institutional quality, maybe you have heard about it as social structure. All I've been saying is that it would be better to improve the social structure instead of making changes almost impossible by inflating the economy. That will only lower the growth path and will be a temporary fix at most since the fundamentals are not adequate. Again, after how many crises would you decide to change course. Of course you and I might as well be long dead already by then, but I'd rather be remembered as the generation that improved humanity. Furthermore, when you improve the social infrastructure you can get fast results as well, accelerated growth even.
Whether Greece was under or over their natural growth rate is the essence of the debate on expansionary fiscal policy, especially when you add a monetary policy element to it.
Central suppose that there are no "long" run trade off (now we can discuss on the "long", but I'm sure your Mankiw would never argue that price are sticky for more than one year), but you can trade off in the short term because of nominal rigidities. Everything you are quoting comes from Phelps' and keynesians works that I quoted a few time. Could you stop trying to measure your dick to me when you clearly cannot because you don't understand half of what I say ? Do you even understand what he means by price being "sticky" ? Do you even understand that the keynesian argument for nominal rigidities goes against the defense of the independance of the central bank (that you were arguing for at the beginning ?), because it imply that you can trade off between employment and inflation ? And thus monetary policy should be cyclical ?
That is because you logically contradict yourself sometimes. Coincedentally, I'm not the first one in this thread to call you on that. Namedropping and paraphrasing is not the same as quoting by the way, just so you know.
I'm trying to be neutral in all this, and only point out how economist think those things, I'm not, personally, at all for the independance of the central bank, and I think that the idea that you can't trade off in the long term is useless because in the long run, we are all I dead, to quote Keynes.
I'm glad you took my recommendation to the letter and actually opened a textbook by the way.
Well, try harder because you are not really neutral. Not in a generational sense, international sense, or even Greek sense. I am not going to spell it out for you, it should be clear from the discussion we have been having. And I hope you take your own recommendation sometime.
You're just nitpicking, it's so boring to talk with you. All in all you agree that, overall, without the state, all those things (public infrastructure, R&D, education, health, etc.) are not efficiently done. Thanks to agree with me.
Lets not forget that the state itself can be quite inefficient. I hope they seize the moment here in the Netherlands to do something about how they manage large infrastructural projects like Betuwelijn and Fyra.
= wrong. Does not work without the state efficiently. Thanks. Would be great if you stopped trying to actually measure your knowledge to me and talk about the subject without referring to an unreal policy that would help Greece competitivity while lowering its debt at the same time.
Whatever, have fun in your little bubble where everything is black and white and you are always right.
On July 10 2013 08:54 Trollk wrote:
While in a theoretical vacuum this may seem logical, it is simply ridiculous to suggest that GDP growth rates of -0.2, -3.1, -4.9, -7.1 and - 6.4 from respectively 2008 to 2012 are acceptable. First of all, it is simply not defensible on a social level. Do I need to bring out the news reports on unemployment, suicide rates, lack of medical supplies, increase of diseases and (more controversially) the rise of extremist political parties?
Secondly and following, from a business cycle standpoint it is inconsequential to flame Greece for following prolonged fiscal deficites and now encourage austerity. You critice (rightly) Greece for maintain prolong fiscal deficits during positive business, which violates the principle of 'leaning against the wind' (as optimal business cycle management). Nevertheless, you suggest that currently austerity is fit while there clearly is recession going on. Which is inconsequential with your critique on prolonged deficits.
Thirdly, your suggestion of returning to the natural long run growth path suggests some pre-set end to the negative spiral Greece currently is in. I suppose I do not need to inform you on the adverse effects of deflation, which Greece currently faces? In addition, if your arguing for the returnal to their natural long run growth path, what is it in terms of GDP growth?
Lastly, if you still were to accept that the theory of natural long run growth applies, then there still remains the issue of overshooting. Both from an empirical and theoretical standpoint, can overshooting be defended. If so, then it is also likely that Greece is currently overreacting in terms of economic shrinkage. Consequently, the austerity policy which you recommend, would be overly harsh.
1. Why not? If you can accept high growth rates running fiscal deficits you can accept negative growth rates when you run out of sources of money. I can understand that it is socially unwanted but what can you expect. What road they will take to recovery is not up to me, I'm just giving my opinion on what would be good in a sustainable sense.
2. I'm not arguing with the business cycle standpoint, you are right that expansionary fiscal policy would work in reducing unemployment. I see austerity as a tool to enable reforms that would possibly not materialize if expansionary fiscal policy is used.
3. Are you talking about deflation in the fiscal sense? Concerning GDP growth:Well that depends on where they are in relation to that path. If they can sufficiently raise the growth rate equations by optimizing their social structure they will grow faster compared to being close to their natural path and level.
4. Right now they have some guarantees from a seemingly credible central bank, which would help to alleviate that situation. I probably have too much emphasis on the long run, but I thought this thread needed it so I stepped in
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That is because you logically contradict yourself sometimes. Coincedentally, I'm not the first one in this thread to call you on that. Namedropping and paraphrasing is not the same as quoting by the way, just so you know. I name dropped a nobel price in economy who is widely known for his work on the Phillips Curve. If you don't know or don't understand something, just type it in wikipedia. "Phillips Curve" or "Edmund Phelps" will do the trick.
Most economists no longer use the Phillips curve in its original form because it was shown to be too simplistic. This can be seen in a cursory analysis of US inflation and unemployment data from 1953-92. There is no single curve that will fit the data, but there are three rough aggregations—1955–71, 1974–84, and 1985-92—each of which shows a general, downwards slope, but at three very different levels with the shifts occurring abruptly. The data for 1953-54 and 1972-73 do not group easily, and a more formal analysis posits up to five groups/curves over the period. But still today, modified forms of the Phillips Curve that take inflationary expectations into account remain influential. The theory goes under several names, with some variation in its details, but all modern versions distinguish between short-run and long-run effects on unemployment. The "short-run Phillips curve" is also called the "expectations-augmented Phillips curve", since it shifts up when inflationary expectations rise, Edmund Phelps and Milton Friedman argued. In the long run, this implies that monetary policy cannot affect unemployment, which adjusts back to its "natural rate", also called the "NAIRU" or "long-run Phillips curve". However, this long-run "neutrality" of monetary policy does allow for short run fluctuations and the ability of the monetary authority to temporarily decrease unemployment by increasing permanent inflation, and vice versa. Blanchard (2000, chapter 8) gives a textbook presentation of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve. An equation like the expectations-augmented Phillips curve also appears in many recent New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. In these macroeconomic models with sticky prices, there is a positive relation between the rate of inflation and the level of demand, and therefore a negative relation between the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment. This relationship is often called the "New Keynesian Phillips curve." Like the expectations-augmented Phillips curve, the New Keynesian Phillips curve implies that increased inflation can lower unemployment temporarily, but cannot lower it permanently. Two influential papers that incorporate a New Keynesian Phillips curve are Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) and Blanchard and Galí (2007). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phillips_curve
Lets not forget that the state itself can be quite inefficient. I hope they seize the moment here in the Netherlands to do something about how they manage large infrastructural projects like Betuwelijn and Fyra. The state can be inefficient... who cares for the question at hand ? The market can't, by itself, push for investment in public infrastructure - that's why they are public. That the state is inefficient is another matter. Please, stop spouting nonsense. I'm not saying that the state should completly control the economy like some kind of communist state, of course the market is more efficient for most of the actual goods. I'm pointing out that most of the endegenous factor enlighted by the endegenous growth theory need the state to be developped.
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On July 10 2013 11:39 WhiteDog wrote:Most economists no longer use the Phillips curve in its original form because it was shown to be too simplistic. This can be seen in a cursory analysis of US inflation and unemployment data from 1953-92. There is no single curve that will fit the data, but there are three rough aggregations—1955–71, 1974–84, and 1985-92—each of which shows a general, downwards slope, but at three very different levels with the shifts occurring abruptly. The data for 1953-54 and 1972-73 do not group easily, and a more formal analysis posits up to five groups/curves over the period. But still today, modified forms of the Phillips Curve that take inflationary expectations into account remain influential. The theory goes under several names, with some variation in its details, but all modern versions distinguish between short-run and long-run effects on unemployment. The "short-run Phillips curve" is also called the "expectations-augmented Phillips curve", since it shifts up when inflationary expectations rise, Edmund Phelps and Milton Friedman argued. In the long run, this implies that monetary policy cannot affect unemployment, which adjusts back to its "natural rate", also called the "NAIRU" or "long-run Phillips curve". However, this long-run "neutrality" of monetary policy does allow for short run fluctuations and the ability of the monetary authority to temporarily decrease unemployment by increasing permanent inflation, and vice versa. Blanchard (2000, chapter 8) gives a textbook presentation of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve. An equation like the expectations-augmented Phillips curve also appears in many recent New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. In these macroeconomic models with sticky prices, there is a positive relation between the rate of inflation and the level of demand, and therefore a negative relation between the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment. This relationship is often called the "New Keynesian Phillips curve." Like the expectations-augmented Phillips curve, the New Keynesian Phillips curve implies that increased inflation can lower unemployment temporarily, but cannot lower it permanently. Two influential papers that incorporate a New Keynesian Phillips curve are Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) and Blanchard and Galí (2007). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phillips_curve At least I can read...
The state can be inefficient... who cares for the question at hand ? The market can't, by itself, push for investment in public infrastructure - that's why they are public. That the state is inefficient is another matter. Please, stop spouting nonsense. I'm not saying that the state should completly control the economy like some kind of communist state, of course the market is more efficient for most of the actual goods. I'm pointing out that most of the endegenous factor enlighted by the endegenous growth theory need the state to be developped.
I'd say states are developed wouldn't you say? We just need to improve them, that is what I've been saying all the time.
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On July 10 2013 08:54 Trollk wrote:Show nested quote +On July 10 2013 07:12 Flyingdutchman wrote:What is not criminal is expecting that a country that runs prolonged fiscal deficits without improving fundamentals has to endure a recession while they return to their natural long run growth path. That is just common sense. While in a theoretical vacuum this may seem logical, it is simply ridiculous to suggest that GDP growth rates of -0.2, -3.1, -4.9, -7.1 and - 6.4 from respectively 2008 to 2012 are acceptable. First of all, it is simply not defensible on a social level. Do I need to bring out the news reports on unemployment, suicide rates, lack of medical supplies, increase of diseases and (more controversially) the rise of extremist political parties? Secondly and following, from a business cycle standpoint it is inconsequential to flame Greece for following prolonged fiscal deficites and now encourage austerity. You critice (rightly) Greece for maintain prolong fiscal deficits during positive business, which violates the principle of 'leaning against the wind' (as optimal business cycle management). Nevertheless, you suggest that currently austerity is fit while there clearly is recession going on. Which is inconsequential with your critique on prolonged deficits. Thirdly, your suggestion of returning to the natural long run growth path suggests some pre-set end to the negative spiral Greece currently is in. I suppose I do not need to inform you on the adverse effects of deflation, which Greece currently faces? In addition, if your arguing for the returnal to their natural long run growth path, what is it in terms of GDP growth? Lastly, if you still were to accept that the theory of natural long run growth applies, then there still remains the issue of overshooting. Both from an empirical and theoretical standpoint, can overshooting be defended. If so, then it is also likely that Greece is currently overreacting in terms of economic shrinkage. Consequently, the austerity policy which you recommend, would be overly harsh.
In addition, if your arguing for the returnal to their natural long run growth path, what is it in terms of GDP growth?
For greece atm i asume the long term natural growth path is equall to its long term population growth. If greece was a net. exporting country it could also benefit from the population growth outside of greece Growth can make jumps when new scientific discoverys are made wich allow for higher productivity and a higher extraction rate of natural resources but thoose jumps are verry unpredictable.
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On July 10 2013 19:26 Rassy wrote:Show nested quote +On July 10 2013 08:54 Trollk wrote:On July 10 2013 07:12 Flyingdutchman wrote:What is not criminal is expecting that a country that runs prolonged fiscal deficits without improving fundamentals has to endure a recession while they return to their natural long run growth path. That is just common sense. While in a theoretical vacuum this may seem logical, it is simply ridiculous to suggest that GDP growth rates of -0.2, -3.1, -4.9, -7.1 and - 6.4 from respectively 2008 to 2012 are acceptable. First of all, it is simply not defensible on a social level. Do I need to bring out the news reports on unemployment, suicide rates, lack of medical supplies, increase of diseases and (more controversially) the rise of extremist political parties? Secondly and following, from a business cycle standpoint it is inconsequential to flame Greece for following prolonged fiscal deficites and now encourage austerity. You critice (rightly) Greece for maintain prolong fiscal deficits during positive business, which violates the principle of 'leaning against the wind' (as optimal business cycle management). Nevertheless, you suggest that currently austerity is fit while there clearly is recession going on. Which is inconsequential with your critique on prolonged deficits. Thirdly, your suggestion of returning to the natural long run growth path suggests some pre-set end to the negative spiral Greece currently is in. I suppose I do not need to inform you on the adverse effects of deflation, which Greece currently faces? In addition, if your arguing for the returnal to their natural long run growth path, what is it in terms of GDP growth? Lastly, if you still were to accept that the theory of natural long run growth applies, then there still remains the issue of overshooting. Both from an empirical and theoretical standpoint, can overshooting be defended. If so, then it is also likely that Greece is currently overreacting in terms of economic shrinkage. Consequently, the austerity policy which you recommend, would be overly harsh. In addition, if your arguing for the returnal to their natural long run growth path, what is it in terms of GDP growth? For greece atm i asume the long term natural growth path is equall to its long term population growth. If greece was a net. exporting country it could also benefit from the population growth outside of greece Growth can make jumps when new scientific discoverys are made wich allow for higher productivity and a higher extraction rate of natural resources but thoose jumps are verry unpredictable. Those jumps are daily on a micro level. Not all firms will fully utilize new technology and methodology to increase business efficiency at the same time. For this reason, real GDP growth is normally much greater than population growth, unless an economy is suffering from some economic shock.
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On July 10 2013 15:34 Flyingdutchman wrote:Show nested quote +On July 10 2013 11:39 WhiteDog wrote:Most economists no longer use the Phillips curve in its original form because it was shown to be too simplistic. This can be seen in a cursory analysis of US inflation and unemployment data from 1953-92. There is no single curve that will fit the data, but there are three rough aggregations—1955–71, 1974–84, and 1985-92—each of which shows a general, downwards slope, but at three very different levels with the shifts occurring abruptly. The data for 1953-54 and 1972-73 do not group easily, and a more formal analysis posits up to five groups/curves over the period. But still today, modified forms of the Phillips Curve that take inflationary expectations into account remain influential. The theory goes under several names, with some variation in its details, but all modern versions distinguish between short-run and long-run effects on unemployment. The "short-run Phillips curve" is also called the "expectations-augmented Phillips curve", since it shifts up when inflationary expectations rise, Edmund Phelps and Milton Friedman argued. In the long run, this implies that monetary policy cannot affect unemployment, which adjusts back to its "natural rate", also called the "NAIRU" or "long-run Phillips curve". However, this long-run "neutrality" of monetary policy does allow for short run fluctuations and the ability of the monetary authority to temporarily decrease unemployment by increasing permanent inflation, and vice versa. Blanchard (2000, chapter 8) gives a textbook presentation of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve. An equation like the expectations-augmented Phillips curve also appears in many recent New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. In these macroeconomic models with sticky prices, there is a positive relation between the rate of inflation and the level of demand, and therefore a negative relation between the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment. This relationship is often called the "New Keynesian Phillips curve." Like the expectations-augmented Phillips curve, the New Keynesian Phillips curve implies that increased inflation can lower unemployment temporarily, but cannot lower it permanently. Two influential papers that incorporate a New Keynesian Phillips curve are Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) and Blanchard and Galí (2007). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phillips_curve At least I can read... You understand that's what I was saying since like two pages ago right ? Short run = trade off, long run = no impact on real economy.
Show nested quote +The state can be inefficient... who cares for the question at hand ? The market can't, by itself, push for investment in public infrastructure - that's why they are public. That the state is inefficient is another matter. Please, stop spouting nonsense. I'm not saying that the state should completly control the economy like some kind of communist state, of course the market is more efficient for most of the actual goods. I'm pointing out that most of the endegenous factor enlighted by the endegenous growth theory need the state to be developped. I'd say states are developed wouldn't you say? We just need to improve them, that is what I've been saying all the time. Yeah like our life on this planet, or the mystical thing we call the market, they are developed. And we all know the best way to improve or develop something is to reduce its importance.
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On July 10 2013 19:26 Rassy wrote:Show nested quote +On July 10 2013 08:54 Trollk wrote:On July 10 2013 07:12 Flyingdutchman wrote:What is not criminal is expecting that a country that runs prolonged fiscal deficits without improving fundamentals has to endure a recession while they return to their natural long run growth path. That is just common sense. While in a theoretical vacuum this may seem logical, it is simply ridiculous to suggest that GDP growth rates of -0.2, -3.1, -4.9, -7.1 and - 6.4 from respectively 2008 to 2012 are acceptable. First of all, it is simply not defensible on a social level. Do I need to bring out the news reports on unemployment, suicide rates, lack of medical supplies, increase of diseases and (more controversially) the rise of extremist political parties? Secondly and following, from a business cycle standpoint it is inconsequential to flame Greece for following prolonged fiscal deficites and now encourage austerity. You critice (rightly) Greece for maintain prolong fiscal deficits during positive business, which violates the principle of 'leaning against the wind' (as optimal business cycle management). Nevertheless, you suggest that currently austerity is fit while there clearly is recession going on. Which is inconsequential with your critique on prolonged deficits. Thirdly, your suggestion of returning to the natural long run growth path suggests some pre-set end to the negative spiral Greece currently is in. I suppose I do not need to inform you on the adverse effects of deflation, which Greece currently faces? In addition, if your arguing for the returnal to their natural long run growth path, what is it in terms of GDP growth? Lastly, if you still were to accept that the theory of natural long run growth applies, then there still remains the issue of overshooting. Both from an empirical and theoretical standpoint, can overshooting be defended. If so, then it is also likely that Greece is currently overreacting in terms of economic shrinkage. Consequently, the austerity policy which you recommend, would be overly harsh. In addition, if your arguing for the returnal to their natural long run growth path, what is it in terms of GDP growth? For greece atm i asume the long term natural growth path is equall to its long term population growth. If greece was a net. exporting country it could also benefit from the population growth outside of greece Growth can make jumps when new scientific discoverys are made wich allow for higher productivity and a higher extraction rate of natural resources but thoose jumps are verry unpredictable.
Capital accumulation is probably the single most important factor in a country's growth performance compared to other nations. Which is why it is important for Greece to get its shit together in terms of the financial system.
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