|
On March 29 2012 04:04 sam!zdat wrote:
Sorry, doing what? I don't follow.
I was responding directly to your post.
You are assuming the time you live in is exceptional or a major turning point in human history.
As I mentioned earlier, almost every generation of humans seem to do this. I know you're going to argue why this time is special, in a lot of ways because you have to (if you study 20th century intellectual history, you have to think that time is especially important).
It's an argument I really don't feel like having right now. All I'll say is that I once believed the same thing, but realized a couple things:
1. It is a recurring theme in history. I try to not repeat the dumb, illogical things people do in the past, and this is one of them. Everyone thinks their time is special, and when I found myself thinking the same thing, I naturally took a step back and started to question it.
2. Even with the "technology" we have, the "information age" and age of travel, I couldn't come with solid reasons why this time was more important than any other major break-throughs in history. Of course there are sort of "lull" periods where it seems like not a lot happens for about 100 years, but you can only make those sorts of judgments looking back. People living those 100 years could probably come up with lots of reasons why (to them) their time was an especially important time in human history (if they were educated enough to compare).
Edit: I know this won't stop you from making your case, because it is the internet. But seriously, I'm not going to debate it right now, maybe in a few days when I don't have more to do, but probably not.
|
It's simple, there is no such thing as "contemporary history".
To analyze a certain period, we need to define it, look for reasons and consequences. How can this be done of the present? Only by speculation.
|
Ok, fair enough. But please don't think that I am "assuming..." as I am not. I have put a great deal of thought into the question. Since you don't want to argue, I won't. But I will say that I have considered (1) and (2) and I don't think they present unsolvable difficulties.
It is bad discourse to say that someone who disagrees with you is simply "assuming" the opposite of your argument, especially if you don't feel like arguing your position. Why don't we treat one another with respect?
Kukaracha, I'm not sure why this can't be done of the present? Why can't we look for reasons and consequences in what is currently happening?
|
Because the consequences have not happened. Again, it is only hypothetical, and there are as many visions of the future as there are people on the earth.
People in the 18th century thought they would make flying machines within a hundred morel years, people thought WWI would last a few months...
I would also add that many reasons are only seen decades after everything is long done...
|
The consequences of our observations in astronomy have not yet happened (and will never happen that we can observe), yet we can predict them with a great degree of confidence. Astronomy is a very interesting problem because we are only able to observe one instant in time of a system whose dynamics span eons. The study of evolutionary systems encounters a similar obstacle. Neither of these problems are intractible (is it spelled intractable? idk sorry should look that up; important word.) What is different about the study of history (there are unquestionably things that are different, but what are they?)
You give two examples of things people got wrong. Was there never anything that people got right? Was there never anything that people got wrong for specific reasons which we can understand? (edit: we should ask ourselves: what kind of things do people get wrong? what kinds of things might they be able to get right? I.e. what questions should we be asking?)
In reading Walter Benjamin, to give just one example, I found a remarkable prescience in his observations about early 20th century and 19th century culture which give insight into our own contemporary moment. Cannot we do the same? "Every epoch dreams the one to follow."
A good theory of history would incorporate and explain all of the many visions of the future. I think you will find as you examine these various visions that there are not so many as you might think. Through careful study we can begin to categorize and understand them in their relationships to one another, and then to situate our own understanding within this framework in order to gain further understanding. This is the progression of the dialectic.
Comprehension is the precondition of praxis. We cannot serve our own interests if we do not study such matters. If we give up on the whole issue as intractible we abdicate all our power to change our world for the better. I think that such negative epistemological claims are furthermore incoherent, although that is perhaps a longer discussion. they are, to be certain, currently in vogue.
|
You speak of scientific examples - astronomy, which draws laws from past events and applies them to the future - while we're discussing human history.
The difference is that history is not a science.
Taking the example of Benjamin, he did foresee some aspects of our culture we inherited from the industrial revolution, the new forms of urbanization and the importance of images through cinematography and photography. However, I have never seen him speak of the current forms of globalization or about cybercultures, virtual realms, video games, even though they were born just thirty years after his death. Those elements are now a great part of our culture and are still growing exponentially. Also, when he wrote about the 19th century, he was talking about the past...
And history does incorporate past visions of the future, simply because they belong to the past.
Unless you provide me with this small amount of imaginable outcomes, I will still believe that there are many, many of them. Simply because "the future" encompasses everything we know.
My main point is that history is the analysis of a certain contextualized era, which cannot be applied to the present, since half of the context (the future) is missing. If you're simply predicting different outcomes, then those are simply an hypothesis, which are almost always at least partially false, as history has shown us, from WW2 soldiers using Gamelin holes to defend themselves from stuckas to the real-estate crisis of Spain.
Of course, from time to time, someone get some predictions right. However, if we remember him, it's because of the Texas sharpshooter fallacy. It's impressive.
|
On March 29 2012 08:37 Kukaracha wrote:
You speak of scientific examples - astronomy, which draws laws from past events and applies them to the future - while we're discussing human history.
The difference is that history is not a science.
Ok, but the response is question begging. What is it exactly about history that makes it different from science? What is science, so that I know what history isn't?
My point in the analogy of astronomy has to do with trajectory. Why can we not, through careful study of the past, observe a trajectory in history and thereby make substantial qualitative predictions about the future? These predictions will have to take the form of contingency trees but that is still a prediction. Astronomy is a much easier science than is history.
I think that history IS a science; it's just a special kind of very messy science. But here perhaps we are equivocating over terms.
Taking the example of Benjamin, he did foresee some aspects of our culture we inherited from the industrial revolution, the new forms of urbanization and the importance of images through cinematography and photography. However, I have never seen him speak of the current forms of globalization or about cybercultures, virtual realms, video games, even though they were born just thirty years after his death. Those elements are now a great part of our culture and are still growing exponentially. Also, when he wrote about the 19th century, he was talking about the past...
And history does incorporate past visions of the future, simply because they belong to the past.
I think that there is much in Benjamin that provides illumination on cyberculture etc., if you know how to read for it.
In any event:
"A way can be a guide, but not a fixed path;
names can be given, but not permanent labels."
What we are looking for is not a particular history but a strategy (dao) of looking at history. We are looking not for a vision, but for a way of seeing. Strategy is a method for dealing objectively with computational intractability; the study of history is fundamentally strategic.
Unless you provide me with this small amount of imaginable outcomes, I will still believe that there are many, many of them. Simply because "the future" encompasses everything we know.
There are any infinite (or at least very large) number of possible outcomes, but they arrange themselves in certain patterns. These patterns are attractors.
At any rate, I misunderstood you. I thought we were talking about weltanschauungen. There are not an infinite number of world-views.
My main point is that history is the analysis of a certain contextualized era, which cannot be applied to the present, since half of the context (the future) is missing.
Why do you exclusively privilege diachrony over synchrony?
If you're simply predicting different outcomes, then those are simply an hypothesis, which are almost always at least partially false
So what, then, was partially true? The dialectic is fundamentally concerned with the interrelationships of partial truths.
, as history has shown us,
How does this fit into your theory? How does history show us? What kinds of things does it show us?
from WW2 soldiers using Gamelin holes to defend themselves from stuckas to the real-estate crisis of Spain.
Of course, from time to time, someone get some predictions right. However, if we remember him, it's because of the Texas sharpshooter fallacy. It's impressive.
You are correct that there cannot be a complete diachronic analysis of the present. However, as above, we can attempt to discern a trajectory by means of dialectical seeing.
It is impossible to predict events, but history is more than a succession of events. What remains true independent of contingency? Is that even possible? What is the structure and ontology of contingency?
Through what means do you believe that we should make decisions on how to act re the future? Or is all action impossible? That is certainly a position that people have taken.
(thanks, btw, for participating in this conversation with me. I'm glad somebody feels like arguing  )
|
I'll start with this statement : history is not a science, history is a humanity. While some will argue that it is a science, I believe that it broadens the definition by a great deal. Most of historic studies don't follow any part of what we call the scientific method. Michelet didn't write his History of France that long ago, and even if we avoid such extremes, how objective can we be when we create a subjective explanatory system based on subjective testimonies? Open a study on Robert II of France, look at the sources, and you'll find that we mostly gather our information on dithyrambic records written by a handful of monks.
Even though you say that you can find "illuminations" in Benjamin's works when you know how to "read" for it, until I've seen said excerpts I will believe that this is the same as to "find" hints about your own future in Nostradamus' writings when you are looking for them. Same with supposed patterns you speak of, I ask to see.
Now, why do I privilege diachrony over synchrony (just a note, in French, those terms are only used in linguistic studies)? Simply because synchrony lacks context which is the essence of history. You speak of strategy (contrary to a scientific hypothetical approach I believe), a part of the historical analysis of our past indeed, especially among Michelet's followers, which can only be reached with context, to avoid giving a particular meaning to contigent points.
And, as I said, the study of past civlizations and past writers has shown us that they often make such claims about their own times being a turning point, and that they are often wrong in their predictions. To take the example of l'an Mil again, how were they supposed to foresee that the new class division in oratores, bellatores and laboratores would last until 1789? Did they measure the importance of the "God's peace" treaties? No, they didn't. And what allows us to understand why it lasted and why they did not realize the extent of their actions is the study of both their past, their present, and their future.
Finally, as you said it yourself, contigency is an obstacle to our understanding. And yet we keep on trying to tell our future, but we mostly fail. Very few people actually work on long-term projects, even Kissinger's "illuminated" realpolitik failed to last more than half a century I believe that we can "predict" the next hour with some sort of success, but a decent number of mistakes arise when we try to guess our day. We are unable to see more than our routine when speaking of weeks or months, and there we start to become clueless.
In reality, our "comprehensive predictions" simply rely on the hypothesis that tomorrow will be the same day as today. This is the same at a macroscopic level : we rely on the next hudred years seeing no major change, keeping a capitalistic, consumerist and liberal model. We are not looking for patterns, we are simply extending the present and calling it "the future".
|
On March 29 2012 22:13 Kukaracha wrote:
I'll start with this statement : history is not a science, history is a humanity. While some will argue that it is a science, I believe that it broadens the definition by a great deal. Most of historic studies don't follow any part of what we call the scientific method.
Yes, in the way you mean it's certainly not a science. What I was saying about "science" is more of a metaphysical claim and is tangential to the present discussion. My feeling is that all fields of human inquiry have the same fundamental object (the dao), are therefore but different ways of looking at the same thing, and therefore different kinds of "science." Of course, those fields of inquiry whose objects (unfoldings of the dao) are of a certain complex type do not avail themselves to the "scientific method" (due to computational intractability or "messiness") and are therefore not science in the traditional or Popperian sense. Some of these things we can study with the aid of simulation (weather, evolution), some are so complex that they can only be accessed through the mediation of language (history is one of these). As I say, this is a digression.
Even though you say that you can find "illuminations" in Benjamin's works when you know how to "read" for it, until I've seen said excerpts I will believe that this is the same as to "find" hints about your own future in Nostradamus' writings when you are looking for them. Same with supposed patterns you speak of, I ask to see.
I don't think this is the same at all. It's not about making predictions, it's about having insight into the spirit of the age. I'm not going to be able to convince you of this in this forum if you haven't had a similar experience, so ok. It's not really in the spirit of Benjamin to quote him and then go "SEE!! LOOK!!" Benjamin only reveals himself when you've lived with him for a while.
Do you not find that there is any structure in the progression of history? What is the nature of this structure as you see it?
Now, why do I privilege diachrony over synchrony (just a note, in French, those terms are only used in linguistic studies)?
No reason not to apply them in cultural studies as well. We often do. Really you can apply them to the study of any system which has extension over time. (note that the distinction between the two is more heuristic than ontological; it may be that they are inextricable).
Simply because synchrony lacks context which is the essence of history. You speak of strategy (contrary to a scientific hypothetical approach I believe), a part of the historical analysis of our past indeed, especially among Michelet's followers, which can only be reached with context, to avoid giving a particular meaning to contigent points.
Synchronically, you can analyze the cultural logic of a given epoch without having to trace the origins of that logic through the past (although this is also a useful exercise). The essence of strategy is to learn to imply context which is missing. This is a deeply problematic but not totally aporetic endeavor. (perhaps this last is the point of disagreement).
Not familiar with Michelet. You are a Micheletian? What would be a foundational text that you would recommend?
It seems worth noting there that structure arises out of aggregate contingency. This is "strategic" (but more in Foucault's sense than in the way I use the term). It would therefore be a mistake to assign structure to any single contingent point (context IS important) but it equally a mistake to ignore the structure that arises from all of this contingency. That emergent structure is the object of the philosophy of history.
And, as I said, the study of past civlizations and past writers has shown us that they often make such claims about their own times being a turning point, and that they are often wrong in their predictions.
Doesn't prove anything. Sometimes there really are wolves. You should be able to see how this argument is simply fallacious. All this presents to us is an imperative to consider our claims very carefully.
And what allows us to understand why it lasted and why they did not realize the extent of their actions is the study of both their past, their present, and their future.
Yes, but can the insight we arrive at through this study not present us with strategic understanding that aids us in our present endeavors? I ask you again: on what basis should we make decisions about how to act re the future?
This is the point of the scientific method. By observing a number of examples of past (circumstance), present (stimulus), and future (result), one can attempt to understand (through a process of theorization and falsification) the way that the future is produced by the stimulus of the present in the context of the past. This allows you to plan ahead.
Finally, as you said it yourself, contigency is an obstacle to our understanding. And yet we keep on trying to tell our future, but we mostly fail. Very few people actually work on long-term projects, even Kissinger's "illuminated" realpolitik failed to last more than half a century I believe that we can "predict" the next hour with some sort of success, but a decent number of mistakes arise when we try to guess our day. We are unable to see more than our routine when speaking of weeks or months, and there we start to become clueless.
You are still in the mindset of predicting events. This is of course impossible. (and is the fallacy of Asimovian "psychohistory")
The constitutive inability of postmodernism to engage itself with long-term projects is probably my primary polemical target. some good work on the topic: Jameson Archaeologies of the Future, Harvey Spaces of Hope.
In reality, our "comprehensive predictions" simply rely on the hypothesis that tomorrow will be the same day as today. This is the same at a macroscopic level : we rely on the next hudred years seeing no major change, keeping a capitalistic, consumerist and liberal model. We are not looking for patterns, we are simply extending the present and calling it "the future".
I'm not really sure who you think you're arguing against here. I could not agree more with this point. My predictions about the future involve the collapse of global finance capital and neoliberal hegemony within the next 20-50 years (either that or a police state - this is the kind of contingency tree I'm speaking of).
The "comprehensive predictions" of which you speak are precisely the kinds of predictions which can't be made. We agree about this. It's the "major changes" into which we can gain some (necessarily fuzzy) insight. This the same as the way that you cannot predict the weather on some given day in any meaningful way, but I can make substantial predictions about climate - e.g. I know that if I go to Seattle it's probably gonna fucking rain. But sometimes I get pleasantly surprised. None of this is inconsistent with what I'm saying.
This objection certainly applies to most mainstream economists, who assume many of these things you mention as well as the capacity of the earth for infinite compound growth (among numerous other problems with mainstream economics, such as the assumption that growth=good).
|
We seem to agree, but to be sure, I'll clarify my point : we can't tell the future. However, we can use science to create an hypothesis based on measurable values. Outside of this scope, our predictions become more and more erratic and vague as we reach further away from present times, because the only real claims we can make are simply the continuation of our present context : to say that in twenty years, capitalism will still be the ruling economical model seems safe. To claim it will go on for fifty years becomes more of a bet, and thinking it will last another century is more of a hope.
This means that we can argue about the future, but we can't make such statements as "we certainly are at a turning point in history".
About Michelet, you could read any of his works to understand his position. He considers history as a "resurrection", giving a very personal and vivid vision (as a republican) of France's past, glorifying the revolution and raising a few national heroes in a lyrical manner (Joan of Arc or François the Ist). I used this example to illustrate the strong subjectivity that constitutes the base of most - if not all - historical studies.
The constitutive inability of postmodernism to engage itself with long-term projects is probably my primary polemical target. some good work on the topic: Jameson Archaeologies of the Future, Harvey Spaces of Hope.
Could you clarify this bit?
|
ENOUGH OF THIS NINCOMPOOPERY!
|
Nincompoopery? We're having a pretty interesting discussion I think. This is what your english class should be like.
You seem to be worried about people "arguing" in your blogs, but there's a big difference between "arguing" and "argumentation."
Kukaracha, I'll post a couple of closing responses to that last post soon.
|
History isn't science, not even close. I thought you might have some formal training on the subject when you mentioned you had read some Benjamin, but then you said history could be a science, and destroyed any credibility you might have, as far as I'm concerned.
|
There's really no need to take that tone. Why do you feel the need to be so belligerent?
You may not have seen my later elaboration on this point:
On March 30 2012 01:48 sam!zdat wrote:
Yes, in the way you mean it's certainly not a science. What I was saying about "science" is more of a metaphysical claim and is tangential to the present discussion. My feeling is that all fields of human inquiry have the same fundamental object (the dao), are therefore but different ways of looking at the same thing, and therefore different kinds of "science." Of course, those fields of inquiry whose objects (unfoldings of the dao) are of a certain complex type do not avail themselves to the "scientific method" (due to computational intractability or "messiness") and are therefore not science in the traditional or Popperian sense. Some of these things we can study with the aid of simulation (weather, evolution), some are so complex that they can only be accessed through the mediation of language (history is one of these). As I say, this is a digression.
I am, of course, in awe of your formal training. If only I could have been so lucky as to receive such a thing.
edit: Azera, for comparison, what Hardly Never is doing is "arguing."
|
I'm not arguing, or trying to be belligerent. You put forth an idea (history can be used as a form of "science" to predict the future) that has no basis in reality or academic practice. If I misunderstood your idea, then I'm sorry, but that seems to be what you are arguing.
|
No basis in academic practice? Isn't that the aim of critical theory?
The demystification of the present is the precondition of praxis, which is necessarily future-oriented and would be impossible if the future were wholly unknowable. Postmodernism (and poststructuralism) does argue this (this, Kukaracha, is the reason it cannot engage in long-term planning) but there are other views. I would recommend Fredric Jameson for another way of looking at things. A good place to start might be "Postmodernism: Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism"
Benjamin would CERTAINLY not endorse the total-aporia view of the future. The whole point of the Arcades Project was to read his contemporary moment as immanent in the 19th century. Once this task had been accomplished, the critic would be able to apply this same strategy of dialectical seeing to awaken from the dream of his own present.
edit: I should add that my particular area of interest is science fiction. The point of science fiction is to try to see into the future. The theorists and critics working in this field are well aware of the great difficulties (including the ones that have been raised in this thread) involved in this project.
|
I'm still not 100% clear on what you are saying. It still seems like you believe you can use the past to predict the future (but again, you are sort of skirting the subject, so I'm not 100% that is what you are saying).
Let me give you my point of view on what you (seem) to be arguing. As a historian in training, you read Benjamin (it sounds like you read his Illuminations) not to emulate his way of deconstructing society. Nor do you read Faucault to emulate his. You read them to understand some of the previous methods of historical practice, so you can better understand them when you see them in literature, and build upon them in your own work. If a modern historian adopted Benjamin's (and even Faucault's, at this point) methodology wholesale at this point, no one would take him/her seriously. That would be the academic equivalent of using a scientific text from the early 20th century as a modern and current form of scholarship. It doesn't work. Can you cite Benjamin? Of course. Can you use some of his ideas in your methodology? Possibly, depending what you are working on. However, no one would seriously pretend that form of thought is current.
In closing, I'll quote one of my professors from my undergrad years, when this topic came up in class (this was a history of mexico class, but that isn't that relevant). I'm paraphrasing a bit, but you'll get the idea. The question was about using what we were learning to predict the future of mexican government (this was back in like 2004):
"I don't buy this idea of learning history or you're 'doomed to repeat it.' I don't think the time we live in is close enough to any other time in history to be able to make accurate predictions about the future. It doesn't work. Why do I study history? Well you can sit around and pick your nose for the rest of your life, or you can study something you enjoy."
Again, that is paraphrasing a bit, but the message is the same. I've heard similar sentiments from a lot of professional historians, but that one stuck with me as rather succinct, for whatever reason.
|
So the point of that quotation is that the study of history is only a diversion from nose-picking? How depressing. Why do you do it?
I don't buy it.
The academy gets told enough from outside that what it does is without practical utility - very depressing to hear that coming from within as well.
I am not a historian. My field is literature. (it is perhaps a very unfortunate thing about the current state of the academy that we introduce such artificial divisions into the humanities and that the various departments do not talk to each other very much - academics in my own field often display a shocking ignorance of contemporary thought in philosophy, for example). So keep in mind that I don't know much about current methodologies in contemporary history departments. I do think if historians consider the Benjamins and Foucaults to be only exempla of outdated methodologies then that is a very sad and misguided thing indeed. Perhaps they are not doing "history" in the way that historians think of it (in the same way that Freud didn't do psychology in the way that psychologists see it) but that doesn't mean that their project is illegitimate (and we still have a great deal to learn from Freud as well).
I do not think the critical method is dead. The rise of poststructuralism as the (ironically) hegemonic theoretical discourse in the west has pushed it to the margins, but there is still good work being done in this field and I think that there will soon be a renewed interest in this tradition, as we need it very much in our contemporary moment. It's true that this form of thought is not current but I'm not so sure that that is a good thing. It ain't easy bein' heterodox.
"doomed to repeat it" is obviously stupid and a very vulgar form of the thesis that I am supporting here.
I have read some of the Illuminations but the text I am mostly familiar with is the Arcades Project (das Passagenwerk - love the german title). I have the four volume selected works on my shelf and I hope to work my way through it soon. The discovery of Benjamin was one of three watershed moments in my own intellectual development (the other two being classes I took on the philosophy of biology and classical chinese philosophical traditions), so I look forward to becoming more comprehensively familiar with his work.
I'm sorry if I seem to be skirting the subject but I am trying to make myself clear as well as I can. The thesis that I am trying to argue is a bit subtle and, as I have experienced to my chagrin, prone to misunderstanding. It also challenges certain theoretical positions which are widely held in the academic community. The reason that I enjoy discussions such as this is so that I can discover where I am most easily misunderstood so that I can seek to find better ways to communicate (and also to rectify mistakes in my own thought). Thanks for bearing with me, and I'm glad that you have posted a real reply as it is always nice to have more than two voices in a discourse.
I would be very interested to hear your thoughts on contemporary historical method and what current thought in this field finds lacking in these previous methods of inquiry.
|
On April 01 2012 05:23 sam!zdat wrote:
So the point of that quotation is that the study of history is only a diversion from nose-picking? How depressing. Why do you do it?
I don't buy it.
The academy gets told enough from outside that what it does is without practical utility - very depressing to hear that coming from within as well.
I am not a historian. My field is literature. (it is perhaps a very unfortunate thing about the current state of the academy that we introduce such artificial divisions into the humanities and that the various departments do not talk to each other very much - academics in my own field often display a shocking ignorance of contemporary thought in philosophy, for example). So keep in mind that I don't know much about current methodologies in contemporary history departments. I do think if historians consider the Benjamins and Foucaults to be only exempla of outdated methodologies then that is a very sad and misguided thing indeed. Perhaps they are not doing "history" in the way that historians think of it (in the same way that Freud didn't do psychology in the way that psychologists see it) but that doesn't mean that their project is illegitimate (and we still have a great deal to learn from Freud as well).
I do not think the critical method is dead. The rise of poststructuralism as the (ironically) hegemonic theoretical discourse in the west has pushed it to the margins, but there is still good work being done in this field and I think that there will soon be a renewed interest in this tradition, as we need it very much in our contemporary moment. It's true that this form of thought is not current but I'm not so sure that that is a good thing. It ain't easy bein' heterodox.
"doomed to repeat it" is obviously stupid and a very vulgar form of the thesis that I am supporting here.
I have read some of the Illuminations but the text I am mostly familiar with is the Arcades Project (das Passagenwerk - love the german title). I have the four volume selected works on my shelf and I hope to work my way through it soon. The discovery of Benjamin was one of three watershed moments in my own intellectual development (the other two being classes I took on the philosophy of biology and classical chinese philosophical traditions), so I look forward to becoming more comprehensively familiar with his work.
I'm sorry if I seem to be skirting the subject but I am trying to make myself clear as well as I can. The thesis that I am trying to argue is a bit subtle and, as I have experienced to my chagrin, prone to misunderstanding. It also challenges certain theoretical positions which are widely held in the academic community. The reason that I enjoy discussions such as this is so that I can discover where I am most easily misunderstood so that I can seek to find better ways to communicate (and also to rectify mistakes in my own thought). Thanks for bearing with me, and I'm glad that you have posted a real reply as it is always nice to have more than two voices in a discourse.
I would be very interested to hear your thoughts on contemporary historical method and what current thought in this field finds lacking in these previous methods of inquiry.
In terms of why I study history, or what benefit it provides to society, I'll direct you to my blog post regarding the subject. The short answer is, I'd compare the "practical" uses of history as similar to the "practical" uses of astronomy. Not because history is like a science, but by understanding it, we better understand the world (or universe) we live in, but the vast majority of people don't give rat's ass about what is discovered anyhow, unless they want to use that information to push some political agenda. While you could argue that astronomy has very long term practical applications, say if we have to go live on Mars or something, most of what it does now is to study astronomy for the sake of astronomy. For instance, I just watched a TED talk on a probe that finally reached a moon of Saturn. Why are they studying the moon? Well, basically just to study it. We can't live there. While there might be life there some kind (probably not) it sure wouldn't be something we could interact with. They just want to learn more about the way the universe works, and that is fine. I love astronomy, and wish it got more attention in today's society.
History is very similar. If you want to get all sci-fi (and I know you do) about it, I guess you could argue that if we ever invent time travelling, we'd like to know what to expect when we get there. But that is far fetched. I study ancient Romans because I like ancient Romans. Period. While we do discovery new "facts" every now and again, it has little to no relevance to modern life except in the most academic of senses. No one studies history to predict the future. And if they did, as my blog post suggests, no one would listen.
As far is current academic trends in history, by far the prevailing (but not only) one is cultural history. What is cultural history? Short answer, fuck if I know. I read this book cover to cover and I still couldn't tell you exactly what cultural history is. I could tell you components, I could tell you what it isn't if I saw it, but just the like world culture, it is hard to nail down. I think that is why it is popular now, because you can do a cultural history of just about anything, and you can shoehorn what you are doing into "cultural history" without too much of a problem.
As far as past trends, there are a bunch. The generation before mine is still sort of stuck on Foucault, which is largely a precursor to cultural history(with a strong emphasis on power relationships within culture). However, even most of them are starting to agree that it shouldn't be the dominant paradigm. In the 1970s, economic history was really popular. This created a lot of seminal works that are boring as shit to read, in general. They basically (and this is an overstatement) take a lot of the "human" elements out of history, and focus on things like food and other natural resources, and how these shape human behavior. This, of course, leads to using economic methods for understanding history. In a way it is almost anti-cultural history, but that is a bit harsh. Before that, military history was popular. This was an idea that the most important things in history were wars, results of wars, and people's ability to coerce others through force. You go further back and you start seeing people using Marxist methods.
All of these things are still floating around, to some degree or another. Hell, rumor was that a professor at my dept. was still a Marxist (no clue if its true). As you hinted at, these trends to be cyclical, just like anything else. Fortunately, "cultural" history can usually find a place for them, one way or another. If I had to label myself (and I'd rather not), I'd label myself a "cultural" historian, that tends to drift towards political history.
|
Interesting, thanks. I remember your blog and enjoyed it. In it you say that people don't learn from history. Do you think that this is a necessary or contingent truth? In other words, can we as a culture make a concerted effort (given whatever preconditions or resources or paradigm shifts or w/e) to change this and start to learn from history? I think that would be nice, and a project toward which we should work.
I am a Marxist, by the way - although it might be more precise (and more euphemistic) to say that I am a Jamesonian. In the second to last paragraph, you speak of the various schools of historical inquiry as reducing history so some particular class of phenomena (wars, culture, economics, etc). The contemporary trend in Marxism is to attempt to synthesize these various reductionisms and provide a comprehensive and non-reductionistic picture of the way that all of these things mutually influence each other to create history (I would recommend David Harvey's recent book The Enigma of Capital for an argument like this). It's important to note that many people incorrectly see historical materialism as a reductionistic paradigm - this is not the case and results from a very common misreading of Marx even among his followers (which is partly his fault as "reductionism" was not a thing to be avoided when he was writing).
I loaned my copy of Enigma of Capital to a friend but I'll quote from a review which quotes him on the thesis mentioned above:
After examining the potential barriers to capital flow, Harvey offers a list of seven “activity spheres” that affect the evolution of capitalism. These spheres are: “technologies and organizational forms; social relations; institutional and administrative arrangements; production and labour processes; relations to nature; the reproduction of daily life and of the species; and ‘mental conceptions of the world.’” As with his previous list, he argues, “No one of the spheres dominates even as none of them are independent of the others.” He adds, “The danger for social theory as well as for popular understanding is to see one of the spheres as determinant.” The spheres are “inextricably interwoven with each other,” and the dialectical interaction of all [of] them explains the evolution of capitalism.
There is still work to be done on the nature of the relationships between these spheres, as it is a very tricky problem. I'll note that most flavors of postmodernism are a reduction to the "mental conceptions of the world" sphere. This is the reason for what you observe with the trend toward "cultural history" because, for a postmodernist, there is nothing BUT culture. This is what is meant by a phrase you may have run across: "the linguistic turn." Foucault is part of this tradition but he is by far the most reasonable of the bunch, and my understanding is that he later rejects much of this - I have only read some small selections from him to date and am certainly no Foucault scholar although I have admired aspects of his work.
I laughed to consider the idea of time travel being the practical application of historical inquiry. God I hate time travel stories.
I will say that in my own studies of Roman culture (mostly literature, not history - I know Latin and have read Vergil, Catullus, Horace, Ovid, Martial, and Apuleius) I have found some remarkable and enlightening parallels (NOT identities) between that culture and our own. In other ways it is totally alien, which is also illuminating.
I guess my question would be: what kinds of things about "how the universe works" does one learn from the study of history?
From a Daoist perspective, "how the universe works" is just the dao. Therefore one would study astronomy (or anything else) not "for the sake of astronomy" but for the sake of bringing human-mind (asymptotically) closer to dao-mind. Since the dao is everything, and is the source of everything, anything at all that you could learn would be an important part of this process. This is why it is not a waste of time, but indeed the highest human activity, to do things like astronomy or theoretical physics or philosophy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
EPT
