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On September 04 2024 16:07 zeo wrote: Interesting wave of resignations and removals within the Kiev government these days.
Submitted resignations: - Deputy Prime Minister Vereshchuk - Minister of Strategic Industry Kamyshin - Minister of Justice Maliuska - Minister of Ecology Strelec - Head of the State Property Fund Koval
Fired: - Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba ('resigned') - Deputy Head of Zelensky's Office Rostyslav Shurma
Removed from office: - Chief of Staff of the Unmanned Systems Forces Command Roman Gladkyi
There are a few more coming aparently and a few of these positions could be purged altogether. Generally a few of them were looking to buy out of the money laundering schemes but it could be a sign of Zelensky being forced to share power. Will be interesting to follow.
Also an ongoing purge within the army looking for 'ties to Russia'
Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, offered to resign on Wednesday amid plans by President Volodymyr Zelensky to restructure his cabinet in the biggest shake-up since Russia invaded more than two years ago.
At least six other senior leaders in Mr. Zelensky’s government have offered to resign, said Ruslan Stefanchuk, the speaker of Ukraine’s Parliament. More cabinet members were expected to offer their resignations on Wednesday, and a new list of ministers was to be presented on Thursday.
“Our state institutions must be set up in such a way that Ukraine will achieve all the results we need — for all of us,” Mr. Zelensky said in an address to the nation on Tuesday night. “To do this, we need to strengthen some areas in the government — and personnel decisions have been prepared.”
The restructuring appears to be the most far-reaching shake-up of Mr. Zelensky’s administration since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, and it comes at a particularly precarious moment in the war, with Kyiv rushing reinforcements to its eastern front in an attempt to stabilize its defensive lines.
Mr. Stefanchuk said other government leaders who had submitted their resignations included Oleksandr Kamyshin, the minister of strategic industries; Denys Maliuska, the justice minister; Ruslan Strilets, the minister of environmental protection and natural resources; Vitaliy Koval, the head of the state property fund; Iryna Vereshchuk, the minister for the reintegration of temporarily occupied territories; and Olha Stefanishyna, the deputy prime minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration.
On September 04 2024 16:07 zeo wrote: Interesting wave of resignations and removals within the Kiev government these days.
Submitted resignations: - Deputy Prime Minister Vereshchuk - Minister of Strategic Industry Kamyshin - Minister of Justice Maliuska - Minister of Ecology Strelec - Head of the State Property Fund Koval
I’ve read it’s just a cabinet reshuffle. Most of these people will be part of the new governement.
Can be cabinet reshuffle, can also be the case of some corruption coming to light during war times. Ukraine still has a pretty big problem with that, similar to Russia.
Or a culling of members of his own party deemed disloyal. Interesting that a few of the votes to dismiss certain ministers critical of the government failed
ON WEDNESDAY UKRAINE’S parliament convened to approve an unexpected wave of resignations. It was the start of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s first major wartime shake-up, a merry-go-round of promotions and dispatches to irrelevance. The president had wanted a quick show to bamboozle his way to the headlines. The result, which saw even members of his own party mocking the proceedings, and three of the seven votes failing, hinted at increasing dysfunction within the government.
Those lined up for dismissal included heavyweights. Two deputy prime ministers, Iryna Vereschuk and Olga Stefanishyna. The justice minister, Denys Maliuska. The charismatic, ponytailed head of the ministry of strategic industries, Oleksandr Kamyshin. Environment minister, Ruslan Strilets, and the head of the State Property Fund, Vitalii Koval. Perhaps the best known of those departing is Dmytro Kuleba (pictured), the long-time foreign minister. Explaining his reshuffle, Mr Zelensky said the country needed a “new structure.” He will not have missed the massive drop in government popularity registered by polls in recent months. With elections cancelled during the war, this was one of the only levers he could pull.
Tensions between the president and his foreign minister have been growing since the start of full-scale invasion in 2022. Before then, the two men’s careers dovetailed. Mr Zelensky pulled the nerdy diplomat from relative obscurity in 2019, first making him deputy prime minister, then foreign minister. A sharp communicator with rounded glasses—more Harry Potter than John Lennon—and Vivienne Westwood ties, Mr Kuleba became respected among foreign diplomats in Kyiv and in the West. But in the end his sophisticated diplomacy did not always align with the raw and emotional rhetoric of his boss.
To the president’s office, the complaint was that Mr Kuleba avoided getting his hands dirty. “They think he just liked to collect victories,” says one MP from the president’s bloc. “He doesn’t see things through.”
Insiders suggest Mr Kuleba’s fate was sealed in April when Andriy Sybiha, rumoured to be his replacement, was moved from the president’s office to become a deputy minister. Several sources close to the president suggested that pressure from America’s State Department prevented the switch from happening then. With election season underway in America, the focus is now elsewhere, one source notes.
American pressure does however appear to be behind another change in Mr Zelensky’s top team, with Rostyslav Shurma, an influential but controversial presidential adviser, stepping away from his backroom role. Oleksandr Kamyshin, the outgoing minister of strategic industries, is expected to take over part of Mr Shurma’s portfolio. In normal times, the move from minister to presidential adviser could be seen as a demotion. Insiders say that in a time of the increased power of the presidential office, the opposite is true. Two sources suggest that Herman Smetanin, the 32-year-old head of Ukraine’s state defence company is likely to replace Mr Kamyshin at the ministry.
Given the centralisation that has already happened during wartime, the ministerial changes are unlikely to have a serious impact—either on the government or the front lines in eastern Ukraine, which are looking increasingly precarious. Several sources, however, describe the changes as a further consolidation of power around Volodymyr Zelensky’s influential chief of staff Andriy Yermak. “They had loyal people around them,” says Yaroslav Zhelezhnyk, an opposition MP. “But they now have even more loyal ones.”
On September 06 2024 15:09 zeo wrote: Why is your first reaction to anything you dont want to hear whataboutism?
Nobody here (except maybe GH) seems particularly gung-ho about Ukraine's constitutional democracy while embroiled in a total war, nor do I think anybody is very invested in Zelenskyi. Thus your posts about how Zelenskyi's government is undemocratic/bad fall flat. Nobody responds with content/opinions to your posts because you seem to be the only one who is unwilling to accept that when your country is invaded, the war effort comes first, and everything else after.
The whataboutism is a reasonable deflection, because you are only ever critical of Zelenskyi's government, while Putin's government is worse in every way and doesn't have the benefit of being an unwilling participant in a war for survival. So we are questioning your sincerity when you proclaim Zelenskyi's government is problematic
On September 06 2024 00:28 zeo wrote: Or a culling of members of his own party deemed disloyal. Interesting that a few of the votes to dismiss certain ministers critical of the government failed
ON WEDNESDAY UKRAINE’S parliament convened to approve an unexpected wave of resignations. It was the start of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s first major wartime shake-up, a merry-go-round of promotions and dispatches to irrelevance. The president had wanted a quick show to bamboozle his way to the headlines. The result, which saw even members of his own party mocking the proceedings, and three of the seven votes failing, hinted at increasing dysfunction within the government.
Those lined up for dismissal included heavyweights. Two deputy prime ministers, Iryna Vereschuk and Olga Stefanishyna. The justice minister, Denys Maliuska. The charismatic, ponytailed head of the ministry of strategic industries, Oleksandr Kamyshin. Environment minister, Ruslan Strilets, and the head of the State Property Fund, Vitalii Koval. Perhaps the best known of those departing is Dmytro Kuleba (pictured), the long-time foreign minister. Explaining his reshuffle, Mr Zelensky said the country needed a “new structure.” He will not have missed the massive drop in government popularity registered by polls in recent months. With elections cancelled during the war, this was one of the only levers he could pull.
Tensions between the president and his foreign minister have been growing since the start of full-scale invasion in 2022. Before then, the two men’s careers dovetailed. Mr Zelensky pulled the nerdy diplomat from relative obscurity in 2019, first making him deputy prime minister, then foreign minister. A sharp communicator with rounded glasses—more Harry Potter than John Lennon—and Vivienne Westwood ties, Mr Kuleba became respected among foreign diplomats in Kyiv and in the West. But in the end his sophisticated diplomacy did not always align with the raw and emotional rhetoric of his boss.
To the president’s office, the complaint was that Mr Kuleba avoided getting his hands dirty. “They think he just liked to collect victories,” says one MP from the president’s bloc. “He doesn’t see things through.”
Insiders suggest Mr Kuleba’s fate was sealed in April when Andriy Sybiha, rumoured to be his replacement, was moved from the president’s office to become a deputy minister. Several sources close to the president suggested that pressure from America’s State Department prevented the switch from happening then. With election season underway in America, the focus is now elsewhere, one source notes.
American pressure does however appear to be behind another change in Mr Zelensky’s top team, with Rostyslav Shurma, an influential but controversial presidential adviser, stepping away from his backroom role. Oleksandr Kamyshin, the outgoing minister of strategic industries, is expected to take over part of Mr Shurma’s portfolio. In normal times, the move from minister to presidential adviser could be seen as a demotion. Insiders say that in a time of the increased power of the presidential office, the opposite is true. Two sources suggest that Herman Smetanin, the 32-year-old head of Ukraine’s state defence company is likely to replace Mr Kamyshin at the ministry.
Given the centralisation that has already happened during wartime, the ministerial changes are unlikely to have a serious impact—either on the government or the front lines in eastern Ukraine, which are looking increasingly precarious. Several sources, however, describe the changes as a further consolidation of power around Volodymyr Zelensky’s influential chief of staff Andriy Yermak. “They had loyal people around them,” says Yaroslav Zhelezhnyk, an opposition MP. “But they now have even more loyal ones.”
All of this surely would be raising eyebrows across the globe in peacetime. In a total war/ fight for survival nobody cares. When this is over and UA won and have their land back and martial law ends, the democratic stance in UA surely will be revisited with the help of Western governments. I have no doubts about that
On September 06 2024 00:37 Simberto wrote: Why do you care so much about this?
And why don't you react in the same way when Russia is just an obviously blatant autocracy barely cosplaying as a democracy?
Feel free to ignore Zeo, Not to defend him but we are free to bring political argument about Russia, and he uses his freedom to ignore everything we say quite extensively.
Someone should nuke foreignaffairs.com too: The offensive does not redress the current materiel imbalance in the war. For now, Russia retains an advantage in manpower, equipment, and ammunition. This advantage has not proved decisive, or led to operationally significant breakthroughs, but Russian forces have steadily gained 750 square miles of territory since October 2023, and they have kept advancing in the weeks since Ukraine pushed into Kursk. Recently, the pace of that advance has accelerated, and Ukraine’s position looks increasingly precarious along parts of the front. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ukraines-gamble September 2, 2024
Kursk is not materially connected to the Donetsk axis. Donetsk is all mines, artillery, trenches, glide bombs, and drone strikes. Putting highly mobile mechanized infantry there wouldn’t do shit. We know that because Ukraine tried that a year ago. Also there just aren’t the numbers. The units in the initial Kursk incursion were in the low thousands, that would be ground to nothing quickly in Donetsk.
Someone in Ukrainian command said “well if we can’t use them in defence what can we do with them?” and you get a Kursk offensive. It’s not a trade off.
Last I heard Russia had moved 15-30 000 people against the Kursk offensive. Which means they are not on other fronts. The main offensive in Donetsk is rumored to have lost a tiny bit of equipment but the main thing is that those 15-30k did not join the offensive, perhaps 5k of them would have.
It seems likely that Ukraine will lose another city in Donetsk in the next 7 months. Ok, then another one in 6 months? At that pace the war is still running in 10 years. At which point the west hopes the increasing cost of the war for Russia makes it too hard to continue and it has already ended.
There is a big competition between military and military factories for people inside of Russia. Constantly driving the costs up as the population decreases. Military production is not slated to increase much overall unless finances does, currently planned increased spending will likely only keep up with increased salary pressure.
It also seems that despite all of the material and production advantages Russia is actually running short on stuff. They're now pulling men from Burkina Faso to get some bodies in the front. The price of military contracts is now 4x higher than initially etc.
For all intents and purposes it looks like they're running out of men. It doesn't mean that the situation for Ukraine is much better but overall it seems that the war has definitely taken a heavy toll on Russian military.
On September 10 2024 09:19 Manit0u wrote: It also seems that despite all of the material and production advantages Russia is actually running short on stuff. They're now pulling men from Burkina Faso to get some bodies in the front. The price of military contracts is now 4x higher than initially etc. For all intents and purposes it looks like they're running out of men. It doesn't mean that the situation for Ukraine is much better but overall it seems that the war has definitely taken a heavy toll on Russian military.
You mean that "that the war has definitely not taken a heavy toll on Ukrainian military"? Ukraine is not "running short on stuff"? You mean 100.000 men from Burkina Faso? 10.000 men? Have you read anything about inflation in Ukraine recently? and the salaries of its soldiers? etc...
I think that if you dismount the infantry from their APC you can use them to defend and those vehicles to provide fire support.
On September 10 2024 09:19 Manit0u wrote: It also seems that despite all of the material and production advantages Russia is actually running short on stuff. They're now pulling men from Burkina Faso to get some bodies in the front. The price of military contracts is now 4x higher than initially etc. For all intents and purposes it looks like they're running out of men. It doesn't mean that the situation for Ukraine is much better but overall it seems that the war has definitely taken a heavy toll on Russian military.
You mean that "that the war has definitely not taken a heavy toll on Ukrainian military"? Ukraine is not "running short on stuff"? You mean 100.000 men from Burkina Faso? 10.000 men? Have you read anything about inflation in Ukraine recently? and the salaries of its soldiers? etc...
I think that if you dismount the infantry from their APC you can use them to defend and those vehicles to provide fire support.
Ukraine’s pool of hardware is the boneyards in the United States which are largely untapped. If the US holds firm in its commitment to a Ukrainian victory then we can consider them to not be running short on hardware. The election, and subsequent US policy, is the issue. At present the US has donated more vehicles to the Taliban than Ukraine and keeps giving the Ukraine vouchers to spend on US manufacturers (essentially domestic stimulus) instead of just shipping 10,000 IFVs.
Ukraine's arsenal is bigger than when the war started. No, they are not "running short on stuff", because that would require the entirety of NATO to stop supporting them. Even if Trump won the next election, it would require the rest of NATO to stop their support as well, which there is no indication of happening.
On September 10 2024 09:19 Manit0u wrote: It also seems that despite all of the material and production advantages Russia is actually running short on stuff. They're now pulling men from Burkina Faso to get some bodies in the front. The price of military contracts is now 4x higher than initially etc. For all intents and purposes it looks like they're running out of men. It doesn't mean that the situation for Ukraine is much better but overall it seems that the war has definitely taken a heavy toll on Russian military.
You mean that "that the war has definitely not taken a heavy toll on Ukrainian military"? Ukraine is not "running short on stuff"? You mean 100.000 men from Burkina Faso? 10.000 men? Have you read anything about inflation in Ukraine recently? and the salaries of its soldiers? etc...
I think that if you dismount the infantry from their APC you can use them to defend and those vehicles to provide fire support.
There are currently 3 likely major ways the war can end in the next 2 years.
3. Ukraine gives up, most people here doesn't hope for that. They have the equipment, money and people to hold if they want to. It is depressingly costly and they have to draft people to keep the military supplied with enough people.
2. Russia thinks it is too expensive and actually wants a negotiated peace treaty.
1. Putin dies and his replacement thinks 2. is viable since it isn't their sunk cost and goal. Instead wanting a few mansions for his family in London and Paris over a war in Ukraine.
Past that horizon I am not sure how likely a total Ukrainian collapse even if they want to defend is. I also don't know how likely it is that the economical and logistical pressures on Russia makes it incapable of fielding enough hardware to continue the war. Basically ending in a stalemate without a peace treaty, see Korea.
So to summarize why we discuss Russian losses and costs. It is because it is only way that the war ends without Ukraine giving up in the near future. Most of Europe would prefer a scenario where Ukraine still exists as a friend after the war. We would even like it if Russian leadership and way of ruling changed enough so that they can be our friend again.
EPT![[image loading]](https://i.imgur.com/4BbJ1nl.png)
