NOTE: When providing a source, please provide a very brief summary on what it's about and what purpose it adds to the discussion. The supporting statement should clearly explain why the subject is relevant and needs to be discussed. Please follow this rule especially for tweets.
Your supporting statement should always come BEFORE you provide the source.
Here you go. Should wrap up any questions you have about active warfare stopping since the beginning of 2015.
Weird how an agreement between Russia and Ukraine would stop a Ukrainian civil war.
Almost as if it was Russia doint all that "independent seperatists" things all along.
I'm not quite sure what you are getting at with your comment. The Minsk agreements were negotiated between the two Donbas Republics and the post Maidan elected Kiev government in 2015. France and Germany signed as guarantors for the Kiev government and Russia acted as a guarantor for the Donbass Republics.
Poroshenko, Merkel and Hollande though would all later admit that they had no intention of fulfilling the Minsk agreements when they signed them. Stating that they wanted to buy time in order to get more weapons from the West and build up the UKR army.
I am sure you can produce quotes for those claims.
While I don't doubt Poroshenko didn't want to eat the shit sandwich France and Germany served him, Merkel really hoped this would appease the Russian hunger for Lebensraum. As she has stated continuously to this day. Don't know what Hollande was thinking.
Obviously a direct confession that they used the Minsk agreements as a mechanism to give them space to arm Ukraine to the teeth would make them guilty of a Crime Against Peace, something that entails an international tribunal. Implicit confirmations were to be expected. For instance Poroshenko:
At around 8min into the video along with this Financial Times interview
The Minsk agreements bought Ukraine time, including to build its army, by freezing the conflict with Russia. But the accords were never properly implemented, and in the hindsight brought by this year’s invasion are seen by Ukrainians to have been at best a stop-gap that failed to address its root causes or contain further Russian aggression. Does he, I ask, now regret signing them? No, he says, paraphrasing the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu: “The main achievement is to avoid war, not to win war.” ------------- He lists his achievements: the first was building up Ukraine’s armed forces — though in many Ukrainians’ telling, the push was in large part a bottom-up initiative, starting with volunteer fighters at the Maidan, then in the Donbas.
With co-operation from Nato countries — which has intensified since the invasion — Ukraine has indeed developed a military that has so far proved more flexible in its structure and effective on the battlefield than Putin’s Soviet-issue top-down army.
“It is like my child, and I am very proud,” he says. “Now the whole world can see, and the Ukrainian armed forces surprised the world.”
Second, Poroshenko says, his presidency “institutionalised the Ukrainian state” and promoted the Ukrainian language (not without controversy), switching off the Russian TV signal that was “poisoning Ukrainian society”. Third, he says, his presidency saw the creation of an independent autocephalous Ukrainian church; fourth, “significant progress” on European integration; and fifth, co-operation with Nato.
---------
In 2019 he ran a nationalist re-election campaign under the slogan “Army! Language! Faith!” that flopped. Zelensky trounced Poroshenko, campaigning on a ticket of unity and throwing out the old order, and taking 73 per cent of the vote compared with 24 per cent for Poroshenko. I ask him why he thinks he lost.
“After five years of war, people wanted to have somebody who promised peace within two weeks, promised that we had ended the time of poor people, and that now it would be the time for rich people,” Poroshenko says. “They really liked to believe in tales.”
During Zelensky’s presidency, Poroshenko was charged with treason and financing terrorism for allegedly having been involved in the sale of coal to state companies by separatists in the Donbas — the very men his administration was fighting. A Kyiv court deemed the charges serious enough to freeze his assets in January as part of the investigation.
From 2015 Kiev had fulfilled zero of the signed obligations it had according to the Minsk agreements with Poroshenko even being investigated for treason by the UKR government for signing the peace deal.
President Petro Poroshenko has warned Ukrainian politicians that the collapse of the Minsk agreements aimed at ending a war with Russia-backed separatists could set off a "full-scale conflict" with Russia.
Poroshenko was speaking at a conference of local leaders in Kyiv on January 23.
"Those political forces that want to torpedo the Minsk agreements at any cost...and to block the constitutional process, must clearly understand the consequences of their actions," he said.
"They will lead to the resumption of the 'hot phase' of the conflict, including a full-scale -- and not local, as it has been so far -- conflict with Russia," he added.
His words appeared to be aimed at foes of "decentralization" legislation that Ukraine is required to pass under the peace deal signed in February 2015 by Ukraine, Russia, and separatists who hold parts of the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
The Minsk deal is crucial for Kyiv because it calls for the restoration of Ukrainian control over the state border between the separatist-held territories and Russia, which has backed the separatists in a conflict that has killed more than 9,000 people since April 2014.
Since zeo once again intentionally failed to mention this: In late September 2014 the Russian proxies discarded the first Minsk agreement to launch an offensive on the Donetsk Airport, rendering it pretty much null and void.
That conference on the 23th of January 2015 was 2 days after the battle had concluded. It is of note, however, that the Russian proxies and later on the Russian Army itself continued their advance on Debaltseve, with Putin himself trying to delay it so that they could finish their conquest of the town first. When that didn't work out, the Russian proxies simply ignored the February 15 ceasefire deadline to continue their heavy assault.
This topic has been heavily discussed in the old Maidan thread and reported on in the media, with the aftermath of Russian adherence to the ceasefire clearly visible in the corpses of butchered Ukrainians.
Here you go. Should wrap up any questions you have about active warfare stopping since the beginning of 2015.
Weird how an agreement between Russia and Ukraine would stop a Ukrainian civil war.
Almost as if it was Russia doint all that "independent seperatists" things all along.
I'm not quite sure what you are getting at with your comment. The Minsk agreements were negotiated between the two Donbas Republics and the post Maidan elected Kiev government in 2015. France and Germany signed as guarantors for the Kiev government and Russia acted as a guarantor for the Donbass Republics.
Poroshenko, Merkel and Hollande though would all later admit that they had no intention of fulfilling the Minsk agreements when they signed them. Stating that they wanted to buy time in order to get more weapons from the West and build up the UKR army.
I am sure you can produce quotes for those claims.
While I don't doubt Poroshenko didn't want to eat the shit sandwich France and Germany served him, Merkel really hoped this would appease the Russian hunger for Lebensraum. As she has stated continuously to this day. Don't know what Hollande was thinking.
Obviously a direct confession that they used the Minsk agreements as a mechanism to give them space to arm Ukraine to the teeth would make them guilty of a Crime Against Peace, something that entails an international tribunal. Implicit confirmations were to be expected. For instance Poroshenko:
At around 8min into the video along with this Financial Times interview
The Minsk agreements bought Ukraine time, including to build its army, by freezing the conflict with Russia. But the accords were never properly implemented, and in the hindsight brought by this year’s invasion are seen by Ukrainians to have been at best a stop-gap that failed to address its root causes or contain further Russian aggression. Does he, I ask, now regret signing them? No, he says, paraphrasing the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu: “The main achievement is to avoid war, not to win war.” ------------- He lists his achievements: the first was building up Ukraine’s armed forces — though in many Ukrainians’ telling, the push was in large part a bottom-up initiative, starting with volunteer fighters at the Maidan, then in the Donbas.
With co-operation from Nato countries — which has intensified since the invasion — Ukraine has indeed developed a military that has so far proved more flexible in its structure and effective on the battlefield than Putin’s Soviet-issue top-down army.
“It is like my child, and I am very proud,” he says. “Now the whole world can see, and the Ukrainian armed forces surprised the world.”
Second, Poroshenko says, his presidency “institutionalised the Ukrainian state” and promoted the Ukrainian language (not without controversy), switching off the Russian TV signal that was “poisoning Ukrainian society”. Third, he says, his presidency saw the creation of an independent autocephalous Ukrainian church; fourth, “significant progress” on European integration; and fifth, co-operation with Nato.
---------
In 2019 he ran a nationalist re-election campaign under the slogan “Army! Language! Faith!” that flopped. Zelensky trounced Poroshenko, campaigning on a ticket of unity and throwing out the old order, and taking 73 per cent of the vote compared with 24 per cent for Poroshenko. I ask him why he thinks he lost.
“After five years of war, people wanted to have somebody who promised peace within two weeks, promised that we had ended the time of poor people, and that now it would be the time for rich people,” Poroshenko says. “They really liked to believe in tales.”
During Zelensky’s presidency, Poroshenko was charged with treason and financing terrorism for allegedly having been involved in the sale of coal to state companies by separatists in the Donbas — the very men his administration was fighting. A Kyiv court deemed the charges serious enough to freeze his assets in January as part of the investigation.
From 2015 Kiev had fulfilled zero of the signed obligations it had according to the Minsk agreements with Poroshenko even being investigated for treason by the UKR government for signing the peace deal.
President Petro Poroshenko has warned Ukrainian politicians that the collapse of the Minsk agreements aimed at ending a war with Russia-backed separatists could set off a "full-scale conflict" with Russia.
Poroshenko was speaking at a conference of local leaders in Kyiv on January 23.
"Those political forces that want to torpedo the Minsk agreements at any cost...and to block the constitutional process, must clearly understand the consequences of their actions," he said.
"They will lead to the resumption of the 'hot phase' of the conflict, including a full-scale -- and not local, as it has been so far -- conflict with Russia," he added.
His words appeared to be aimed at foes of "decentralization" legislation that Ukraine is required to pass under the peace deal signed in February 2015 by Ukraine, Russia, and separatists who hold parts of the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
The Minsk deal is crucial for Kyiv because it calls for the restoration of Ukrainian control over the state border between the separatist-held territories and Russia, which has backed the separatists in a conflict that has killed more than 9,000 people since April 2014.
Since zeo once again intentionally failed to mention this: In late September 2014 the Russian proxies discarded the first Minsk agreement to launch an offensive on the Donetsk Airport, rendering it pretty much null and void.
That conference on the 23th of January 2015 was 2 days after the battle had concluded. It is of note, however, that the Russian proxies and later on the Russian Army itself continued their advance on Debaltseve, with Putin himself trying to delay it so that they could finish their conquest of the town first. When that didn't work out, the Russian proxies simply ignored the February 15 ceasefire deadline to continue their heavy assault.
This topic has been heavily discussed in the old Maidan thread and reported on in the media, with the aftermath of Russian adherence to the ceasefire clearly visible in the corpses of butchered Ukrainians.
Except... it wasn't discussed in the old Maidan thread... at all... because the old Maidan thread was closed on June 16th 2014. From July of that year the MH17 thread lasted until August 17th 2014. After which sporadic Ukraine talk moved to the European Politico-economics QA Mega-thread where the only mention of Debaltseve is this post and was promptly not commentated on by anyone further. Actually thats the only mention of the town on this forum until Jan 19th 2023 when it was mentioned in a quote from an article related to active hostilities.
Again, I mentioned this before but I really hope you read through the link I sent you regarding cult like behaviors, if you actually believe these things you are writing about you are retroactively convincing yourself that they happened and they are real. Search for Minsk yourself, or Debaltseve in TL threads, none of it was talked about here while it was going on. How don't you know about this?
Supposed photos of the damaged Russian missile corvette that was hit over the weekend.
edit: So confirmation essentially. Only question as to what is behind the strategy is behind this. Force Russia to send troops over there as to replace Wagner units.
I enjoy the idea that fortifying yourself against a neighbour that is currently in the process of invading you is a crime against peace. Sure, there were Russian little green men in the Donbas and sure, Russia had invaded and annexed Crimea. But it was when Ukraine took no offensive actions in return that the peace was broken.
So confirmation essentially. Only question as to what is behind the strategy is behind this. Force Russia to send troops over there as to replace Wagner units.
The strategic goal has always been to hurt Russia enough that it's not worth it to continue the war. This is just another theatre where you can do this.
It's also a much better use of resources. Special forces are not very useful in this kind of positional warfare that Ukraine has but raiding enemy compounds is exactly what they are good at. If Ukraine is receiving NATO intelligence on Wagner in Africa they also have a clear advantage. They can know exactly where the enemy is, how many, which types of weapons etc. but Wagner have no idea when, where or how they could be hit. Also you can hang a predator over Sudan and Russia has no way of countering it, or even knowing it's there. While Wagner will have basically zero support in the air.
Now this is likely a one off but theoretically if Ukraine could seriously contest Russian interests in Africa that would be huge. Suddenly a local war would have geopolitical implications on another continent.
I think there is a lot of egg on the face of the Biden administration right now by being such cowards early on and essentially feeling committed to that cowardice. The US takes way too much pride in "being the adult in the room" by bending to Russia, Iran and basically every adversary we currently have.
I understand the general idea that until you actually need to use the stick, you may as well do what you can to maintain global stability and prevent anything from getting out of hand and whatnot. But I think the US has gotten so used to backing down every single time that they have lost track of what is and what is not worth pushing back on.
I suppose I am speaking too soon at this point. Until Ukraine is actually folding, rather than deeply struggling, nothing "permanently bad" has actually happened. But I feel like soft allies of the US have reason to be a little uncomfortable watching Ukraine suffer to this extent.
Ukraine is being kept above water, but is this perhaps a little too much suffering relative to what the US could provide? At what point are we just letting Russia do whatever they want because we've let them frame themselves as irrational actors?
Yes, nuclear war totally sucks and we ought to prevent it as much as we can. But when you compare everything to nuclear war, isn't everything short of American land being conquered an acceptable loss? Maybe I am misreading the situation and I'm just some shitty arm chair dude on the internet, but I am assuming the US's intention was not for Ukraine to be suffering quite this much. What went wrong? Or do folks think this is all according to plan?
On November 07 2023 06:25 Mohdoo wrote: I think there is a lot of egg on the face of the Biden administration right now by being such cowards early on and essentially feeling committed to that cowardice. The US takes way too much pride in "being the adult in the room" by bending to Russia, Iran and basically every adversary we currently have.
I understand the general idea that until you actually need to use the stick, you may as well do what you can to maintain global stability and prevent anything from getting out of hand and whatnot. But I think the US has gotten so used to backing down every single time that they have lost track of what is and what is not worth pushing back on.
I suppose I am speaking too soon at this point. Until Ukraine is actually folding, rather than deeply struggling, nothing "permanently bad" has actually happened. But I feel like soft allies of the US have reason to be a little uncomfortable watching Ukraine suffer to this extent.
Ukraine is being kept above water, but is this perhaps a little too much suffering relative to what the US could provide? At what point are we just letting Russia do whatever they want because we've let them frame themselves as irrational actors?
Yes, nuclear war totally sucks and we ought to prevent it as much as we can. But when you compare everything to nuclear war, isn't everything short of American land being conquered an acceptable loss? Maybe I am misreading the situation and I'm just some shitty arm chair dude on the internet, but I am assuming the US's intention was not for Ukraine to be suffering quite this much. What went wrong? Or do folks think this is all according to plan?
If I was to put on my tinfoil hat, I'd say "follow the money."
Yeah, the financial component can be entertained for sure. But I think this is a situation where ultimately the pentagon is the one calling most of the shots within the confines of what the administration considers acceptable.
I suppose if we strictly approach this from the US's interests, you could argue the only real priorities are:
1) Keep Ukraine alive 2) Russia suffers as many losses as possible
But I think the one thing that doesn't get captured by this is how much obvious Ukrainian suffering is taking place. I think it shows the US to be somewhat uncaring, skimpy, and perhaps even unreliable. I think we have enough data/evidence at this point to determine the US is miles ahead of where Russia is right now, but what use is that if being a soft-ally still basically destroys your country? Of course Ukraine is better off right now than they would be without the US's help, but I just feel like being under the US's protection, even if informally, should do a bit more than we are seeing.
I know some folks around here are a lot more informed on military stuff than I am, so maybe one of you can help me see where I am misunderstanding.
On November 07 2023 06:25 Mohdoo wrote: Maybe I am misreading the situation and I'm just some shitty arm chair dude on the internet, but I am assuming the US's intention was not for Ukraine to be suffering quite this much. What went wrong? Or do folks think this is all according to plan?
What went wrong is that Ukraine resisted too well when they were expected to fold within a month or so. They have done it on terrible assumption that western powers (and regular Russians) wouldn't stand for a full scale war in Europe. Meanwhile there was never a consensus in the west to fund a hot war against Russia, US position is not exceptional here.
The only way Ukraine could've received enough equipment/training early enough to make a difference would've been if tanks and IFVs were committed in June 2022 or so. If they had heavy armour, there is a chance they could've pushed through the limited minefields that Russia was able to set up and get somewhere in the winter of 2022, or sustain the Kharkiv counteroffensive for an additional amount of time. Keep in mind though, at this time, Russia still enjoyed a significant level of fire superiority in terms of artillery.
If Ukraine had F-16 pilots in training from June. 2022, they would just be getting combat sorties in the middle of this year, arguably too late to stop the minefields that are stopping the ground offensive from being planted. We also had very little idea a year ago just how extensive and difficult the minefields would be. GMLRS made a large difference in the amount of shells Russia is able to fire by targeting ammunition depots. These were provided just a few months after the invasion. I guess ATACMS would've made a difference if it were provided earlier by pushing back key supply points even further from the front lines.
We don't have a good picture other than we know that 155mm ammunition stockpiles are as low as western nations are willing to drop them. GMLRS rockets are being provided off the assembly line at this point. Once access to technology/capability is granted, all of the tech is shipped to Ukraine.
For my diletant eye, this one looks more than mere "damaged". It looks pretty much as "eliminated". I do not believe ship in that bad state can be even towed.
On November 07 2023 07:26 Lmui wrote: The only way Ukraine could've received enough equipment/training early enough to make a difference would've been if tanks and IFVs were committed in June 2022 or so. If they had heavy armour, there is a chance they could've pushed through the limited minefields that Russia was able to set up and get somewhere in the winter of 2022, or sustain the Kharkiv counteroffensive for an additional amount of time. Keep in mind though, at this time, Russia still enjoyed a significant level of fire superiority in terms of artillery.
If Ukraine had F-16 pilots in training from June. 2022, they would just be getting combat sorties in the middle of this year, arguably too late to stop the minefields that are stopping the ground offensive from being planted. We also had very little idea a year ago just how extensive and difficult the minefields would be. GMLRS made a large difference in the amount of shells Russia is able to fire by targeting ammunition depots. These were provided just a few months after the invasion. I guess ATACMS would've made a difference if it were provided earlier by pushing back key supply points even further from the front lines.
We don't have a good picture other than we know that 155mm ammunition stockpiles are as low as western nations are willing to drop them. GMLRS rockets are being provided off the assembly line at this point. Once access to technology/capability is granted, all of the tech is shipped to Ukraine.
Maybe I am miss-remembering, but I feel like the first year of the war involved a ton of "we don't want to provide that because it might escalate the situation" responses from the Biden administration. ATACMS were requested from the beginning and it seems like they were only provided once it felt necessary. And so I suppose I am questioning the entire framing of "necessary" balanced against "but what if Russia nukes us because of it".
Right now my arm chair perspective is that Russia is a reasonable actor, and as a reasonable actor, they are cashing in the free gains they can make because they have determined the US is too scared to intervene to the extent that is necessary.
The entire situation has framed the US as willing to let any country barely scrape by, sustain incredible losses, and barely be kept afloat. It might make other nations reconsider relying on the US.
On November 07 2023 07:26 Lmui wrote: The only way Ukraine could've received enough equipment/training early enough to make a difference would've been if tanks and IFVs were committed in June 2022 or so. If they had heavy armour, there is a chance they could've pushed through the limited minefields that Russia was able to set up and get somewhere in the winter of 2022, or sustain the Kharkiv counteroffensive for an additional amount of time. Keep in mind though, at this time, Russia still enjoyed a significant level of fire superiority in terms of artillery.
If Ukraine had F-16 pilots in training from June. 2022, they would just be getting combat sorties in the middle of this year, arguably too late to stop the minefields that are stopping the ground offensive from being planted. We also had very little idea a year ago just how extensive and difficult the minefields would be. GMLRS made a large difference in the amount of shells Russia is able to fire by targeting ammunition depots. These were provided just a few months after the invasion. I guess ATACMS would've made a difference if it were provided earlier by pushing back key supply points even further from the front lines.
We don't have a good picture other than we know that 155mm ammunition stockpiles are as low as western nations are willing to drop them. GMLRS rockets are being provided off the assembly line at this point. Once access to technology/capability is granted, all of the tech is shipped to Ukraine.
Maybe I am miss-remembering, but I feel like the first year of the war involved a ton of "we don't want to provide that because it might escalate the situation" responses from the Biden administration. ATACMS were requested from the beginning and it seems like they were only provided once it felt necessary. And so I suppose I am questioning the entire framing of "necessary" balanced against "but what if Russia nukes us because of it".
Right now my arm chair perspective is that Russia is a reasonable actor, and as a reasonable actor, they are cashing in the free gains they can make because they have determined the US is too scared to intervene to the extent that is necessary.
The entire situation has framed the US as willing to let any country barely scrape by, sustain incredible losses, and barely be kept afloat. It might make other nations reconsider relying on the US.
Yep ATACMS would've been nice to have a year ago with the initial release of, or within a month or two of getting GMLRS. Would it have prevented Russia from mining 1/3 of Ukraine? Probably not. I'd think that it would at best have reduced the minefield density to some degree, but the amount of landmines produced by the USSR is staggering. You also have to consider internal politics in the US.
There's also not many options for ground launched cruise/ballistic missiles. Most countries choose to air launch them (ex. Scalp/storm shadow)
There's probably also other reasons not made public why stuff is/isn't delivered. Can speculate, but I don't think we'll know the true story for another decade or more.
I think the main thing to question the US on is why there are not 2000 M1 Abrams in Ukraine right now. The rest has been a slow pushing of Russian red lines, with storage being brought to what they consider the minimum after the line is passed. The red line pushing has been slower than the build up of Russian defensive lines inside Ukraine which in hindsight is a massive mistake.
The main complaint towards EU is long term military contracts. They are not willing to sign 5 year contracts for buying 3 million 155mm artillery pieces per year. Thus nobody is building up capacity for it in the scale required.
I also think both US and EU can be targeted for not ramping up drone production. Those have not been covered by the red line, are pretty cheap and hard for Ukraine to produce enough of while under missile attack.
On November 09 2023 05:01 Yurie wrote: I think the main thing to question the US on is why there are not 2000 M1 Abrams in Ukraine right now. The rest has been a slow pushing of Russian red lines, with storage being brought to what they consider the minimum after the line is passed. The red line pushing has been slower than the build up of Russian defensive lines inside Ukraine which in hindsight is a massive mistake.
The main complaint towards EU is long term military contracts. They are not willing to sign 5 year contracts for buying 3 million 155mm artillery pieces per year. Thus nobody is building up capacity for it in the scale required.
I also think both US and EU can be targeted for not ramping up drone production. Those have not been covered by the red line, are pretty cheap and hard for Ukraine to produce enough of while under missile attack.
I think the issue with tanks on both sides that they makes for very expensive targets. Some amount are required but there can be too many
On November 09 2023 05:01 Yurie wrote: I think the main thing to question the US on is why there are not 2000 M1 Abrams in Ukraine right now. The rest has been a slow pushing of Russian red lines, with storage being brought to what they consider the minimum after the line is passed. The red line pushing has been slower than the build up of Russian defensive lines inside Ukraine which in hindsight is a massive mistake.
The main complaint towards EU is long term military contracts. They are not willing to sign 5 year contracts for buying 3 million 155mm artillery pieces per year. Thus nobody is building up capacity for it in the scale required.
I also think both US and EU can be targeted for not ramping up drone production. Those have not been covered by the red line, are pretty cheap and hard for Ukraine to produce enough of while under missile attack.
I think the issue with tanks on both sides that they makes for very expensive targets. Some amount are required but there can be too many
An armoured vehicle (like an MRAP) costs between 300k-1mn. An Abrams tank cots between 10mn and 24mn.
So you can send somewhere between 10 to 80 armoured vehicles for every tank which is arguably a lot more useful at this stage. Ukraine needs:
1. Artillery ammo and long range missiles. 2. Artillery ammo and long range missiles. 3. Artillery ammo and long range missiles. 4. Drones (all kinds) 5. Armoured vehicles (to save lives during attrition warfare). 6. Other stuff.
But yeah. If EU + US just bit the bullet and signed both contracts for a fuckton of artillery shells and set aside money for aid packages for the next 5 years (into law so they are guaranteed) the war would probably be over. If you don't care about red lines you could also just give Ukraine a real airforce.
Russia is all in on war economy and posturing up that they are ready for a long war. But if it's 100 % certain that they would have to deal with it for 5 years I'm pretty sure they would reconsider.
Yeah, i also don't think this counts as "winning". The best result Ukraine can achieve is a stalemate where no one has ships in the black sea. Which is still impressive, of course. But to me, "winning" at sea means that you have your ships at sea and the other side doesn't.
I think what this does show is that at medium range, a modern-ish but not too modern fleet is pretty vulnerable to shore-based attacks. Which, i am pretty sure, is another aspect of this war that is being closely watched by militaries around the world.
No way the US, France, or even Turkey will allow this to go through as there are too many what ifs etc. Also this would, PR wise, weaken NATO in a number of ways. Hell even Germany would get angry about this.
Also what would happen if a Russian shell, say, kills a Danish or Spanish advisor in Ukraine and as a result Spain, or Denmark triggers article 5? Ukraine does not have to do anything it etc. No allied country will want to risk that.
The Danes have lost their minds tbh.
A former Nato secretary general has put forward a proposal for Ukraine to join the military alliance but stripped of the territories occupied by Russia.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen has long worked alongside Andriy Yermak, an adviser to the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, particularly ahead of the last Nato summit in Vilnius this year that ended with no invitation for Ukraine to join.
The two men are again broadly discussing Ukraine’s place in a new European security architecture, including practical questions around the extent of Ukraine’s Nato membership.
Rasmussen, who was Nato’s secretary general between 2009 and 2014, insisted that a plan for partial Ukraine membership would not symbolise a freezing of the conflict, but would instead mark a determination to warn Russia that it cannot prevent Ukraine joining the western defensive alliance.
Nato is due to hold its 75th anniversary summit in Washington next summer, and the issue of Ukraine’s future membership is bound to be a major topic.
Ukraine’s leadership was left bitterly disappointed when, under US and German pressure, Nato at its summit this year issued a statement saying Ukraine would be offered an invitation when conditions allowed, effectively rejecting Ukraine’s request to be given a specific date.
Instead, Ukraine’s relationship with Nato was elevated on the margins by setting up a Ukraine-Nato council and through an agreement that Nato members bilaterally would offer security guarantees to Ukraine.
Rasmussen said the cause of Ukraine’s Nato membership cannot be deferred again next year. He said: “The time has come to take the next step and extend an invitation for Ukraine to join Nato. We need a new European security architecture in which Ukraine is in the heart of Nato.”
Those advocating for Ukraine’s Nato membership have been hamstrung by the near-impossibility of a country at war being offered membership, since under Nato’s article 5 clause of collective self-defence, all Nato member states are required to come to the active defence of the country in conflict. Nato membership for all of Ukraine now would in effect be a notice to Russia by Nato that it was about to go to war with Moscow.
Discussions are under way to enlist military specialists ahead of the next Nato summit to work through the details of their idea, including how in the context of shifting frontlines a credible demarcation line could be drawn, showing Ukrainian territory deemed inside Nato and territory occupied by Russia.
Rasmussen said an imprecise precedent existed since west Germany joined the alliance in 1955, and article 5 covered its territory but not that of east Germany.
EPT
