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On April 18 2026 00:57 Jankisa wrote: Israel is not only criticized about it's conduct during war. They are and have been criticized for decades for aggressive settlement expansion, the two tier justice system in West Bank and Israel in general, terrible conditions they are keeping Palestinian prisoners in, sniping of kids and journalists outside of war etc.
They have also been cracking down on protests (semi justified as they are in a state of war and missiles were flying at them at the time), they have been criticized for shutting down investigation in their soldiers raping (with a knife) a Palestinian prisoner, for enacting a death penalty only for Palestinians and so, so much more.
The point wasn’t to deny that Israel has been criticized for a wide range of issues. And while some of the claims you mentioned are well-supported, others are disputed or overstated, that’s not what I was addressing.
My focus is on the comparison itself. Saying “they’re no better than Iran” implies a level of equivalence that I don’t think is accurate or justified. You can strongly criticize Israel’s policies without concluding that it is essentially the same kind of state as Iran.
To be precise, I reject the following premises: 1. That no one in this thread has argued that Israel deliberately tries to kill as many Palestinians as possible. 2. That the available data and described events justify the conclusion that Israel does not care at all about civilians. 3. That Israel and Iran can be meaningfully described as “no different” in the way suggested.
This doesn’t mean rejecting all criticism or dismissing the possibility of serious wrongdoing. It just means that criticism should remain proportionate and not collapse into oversimplified equivalence.
Be the one that goes with the evidence, like the Israeli government does not do enough to restrain the extremist settlers in both policing and prosecuting, or the IDF fires too freely on perceived threats and doesn't investigate and prosecute strongly the worst cases of it, or the judiciary system is too lenient.
On April 18 2026 00:57 Jankisa wrote: Israel is not only criticized about it's conduct during war. They are and have been criticized for decades for aggressive settlement expansion, the two tier justice system in West Bank and Israel in general, terrible conditions they are keeping Palestinian prisoners in, sniping of kids and journalists outside of war etc.
They have also been cracking down on protests (semi justified as they are in a state of war and missiles were flying at them at the time), they have been criticized for shutting down investigation in their soldiers raping (with a knife) a Palestinian prisoner, for enacting a death penalty only for Palestinians and so, so much more.
The point wasn’t to deny that Israel has been criticized for a wide range of issues. And while some of the claims you mentioned are well-supported, others are disputed or overstated, that’s not what I was addressing.
My focus is on the comparison itself. Saying “they’re no better than Iran” implies a level of equivalence that I don’t think is accurate or justified. You can strongly criticize Israel’s policies without concluding that it is essentially the same kind of state as Iran.
To be precise, I reject the following premises: 1. That no one in this thread has argued that Israel deliberately tries to kill as many Palestinians as possible. 2. That the available data and described events justify the conclusion that Israel does not care at all about civilians. 3. That Israel and Iran can be meaningfully described as “no different” in the way suggested.
This doesn’t mean rejecting all criticism or dismissing the possibility of serious wrongdoing. It just means that criticism should remain proportionate and not collapse into oversimplified equivalence.
1. Correct, people in this thread have suggested that. 2. Israel used to care about civilians but in recent years I at least get the feeling that they now care about civilians only in how it affects their image. If no one knows it doesn't matter, if it gets out it still hardly matters. Potential suffering amongst "enemy" civilians seem to be a non factor in the new military planning. Individual cases of abuse or obvious mistakes are either swept under the rug or given a slap on the wrist. And senior Israeli politicians actively encourage that type of behaviour. Also se point 3. 3. Iran and Israel are different as apples and oranges are but they are both still fruit. I'd argue that in when it comes to stoking conflict in the middle east they are on the same level. When it comes to ignoring the plight of other countries and civilians they are also on the same level. Iran funds Hezbollah and the Houthis and helped Assad in the civil war. But Israel has Gaza and has no problem "mowing the lawn" in Lebanon. They actively tried to rekindle the civil war in Syria. They obviously prefer weak and broken states next door and show absolutely no regard to the tremendous cost this incours on those countries. And again, senior Israeli politicians said as much. If Turkey hadn't put the foot down (and Erdogan being buddies with Trump) Syria would be fucked right now. So when it comes to being good neighbours and preventing conflict I feel both countries are about equally horrible. In many other aspects Israel is better than Iran. But those areas are usually not related to the government and Iranian citizens are not their goverment any more than Israeli citizens are.
I am not sure, how you arrive at the feeling that they only care about their image. The military has comparable numbers to similar conflicts. Israel has implemented extensive warning systems compared to many conflicts, after being hit by the biggest trauma the country ever suffered. Casualty numbers are in line with usual observations, as casualties in Gaza were extremely high at the beginning (late 2023), then generally declined over time into 2024 - 2025, but never dropped to zero and have shown intermittent spikes rather than a smooth trend. That is completely normal for conflict zones.
I also don't see how you can make the claim that Israel is "actively trying to rekindle the civil war in Syria". Israel openly admits to targeting or carrying out airstrikes against Iranian military infrastructure or weapons shipments to Hezbollah. This is part of Israel’s strategy to prevent Iran from establishing a military foothold near its borders. I see no broad intervention in Syria’s internal political or factional conflict though. You even had operation "Good neighbour", as many Syrians were treated in Israeli hospitals during the Syrian war from 2010 (which of course, also added to their interest of creating a buffer zone). And what exactly do you see Erdogan's influence in? My understanding is, that he was mostly involved in Northern Syria, pushing back the Kurds and creating a buffer zone. How do you think that Turkey was countering Israeli influence in any clear strategic sense? Israel’s observable policy priorities - such as maintaining peace treaties, expanding normalization agreements, and deterring hostile actors - suggest a preference for stable neighboring states that accept its existence. While some analysts have argued that weakened adversaries can reduce conventional threats, there’s no clear evidence that Israel pursues instability in neighboring countries as a general policy. In Gaza and the West Bank, where this accussation pops up the most, Israel’s security and administrative policies have operated in a context where Gaza and the West Bank are treated as separate governance and security environments. Combined with Palestinian political fragmentation, this has reinforced the division between the two territories, but - as far as I know - there is no clear evidence of a single overarching strategy to permanently divide them.
On April 15 2026 02:16 dyhb wrote: [quote]Even an evil tyrant might accidentally improve the conditions and lives around him by prosecuting wars against their authoritarian oppressors for purely selfish reasons. Netanyahu is less than that for wanting a non-terrorist regime to the north of his country with ample weapons and will to kill Israeli civilians in its north. He isn't doing it out of the goodness of his heart for the Lebanese people, nor is it anything but stupid to discount the results based on the intentions.
I think the anti-Israel blame, in some areas well-founded, has erased in the minds of the arguers just how terrible groups like Hezbollah and Hamas and the IRGC and the ayatollahs are for the innocents surrounding them. Israel gets more press simply because the western world has more influence on their actions. Any deal between Israel and Lebanon that creates peace and rids the Lebanese of Hezbollah control of their politics and southern territory is an unqualified victory for the Lebanese people. Anybody with a brain should be desiring that without whitewashing Israel's interests.
What's your strategy to make sure that all of the Lebanese people who lose relatives and friends in this campaign to get rid of Hezbollah don't start feeling hatred toward Israel, hatred that will then be fueled by continued mistreatment of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and will motivate them to form another terrible group that is bad for the innocents surrounding them and that you will have to kill a bunch of Lebanese people to get rid of in 30 years?
I think they'll do a much better job than you at judging Hezbollah's oppression and intentions regarding the Lebanese people. As much as you would dismiss and ignore Hezbollah's actions after the US-Israel war on Iran, they saw the rocket and missile fire from Hezbollah into Israel first-hand. I just have to reject your premise here that it requires a strategy and their local observations are outweighed by propaganda coming from 100 miles away.
On April 15 2026 03:02 Billyboy wrote:
On April 15 2026 02:16 dyhb wrote: [quote]Even an evil tyrant might accidentally improve the conditions and lives around him by prosecuting wars against their authoritarian oppressors for purely selfish reasons. Netanyahu is less than that for wanting a non-terrorist regime to the north of his country with ample weapons and will to kill Israeli civilians in its north. He isn't doing it out of the goodness of his heart for the Lebanese people, nor is it anything but stupid to discount the results based on the intentions.
I think the anti-Israel blame, in some areas well-founded, has erased in the minds of the arguers just how terrible groups like Hezbollah and Hamas and the IRGC and the ayatollahs are for the innocents surrounding them. Israel gets more press simply because the western world has more influence on their actions. Any deal between Israel and Lebanon that creates peace and rids the Lebanese of Hezbollah control of their politics and southern territory is an unqualified victory for the Lebanese people. Anybody with a brain should be desiring that without whitewashing Israel's interests.
I agree with most of what you said and I don’t think you would be able to find a post from me that suggests Netanyahu’s interests are anything other than self.
What frustrates me is there are people in this thread that post as if groups like Hezbollah or Hamas are freedom fighters, which simply is not accurate. There are plenty of things to criticize Israel about that are real and proven.
Iran being only in Iran should be a goal that everyone shares. If you don’t share it, you are either uninformed, filled with hatred or both.
I think they really truly believe that Iranian proxies are legitimately concerned with the well-being of non-combatants. It's some kind of remix of the old pan-Arab nationalism movement or something.
I don’t think thread denizens view Hezbollah, Hamas as honourable freedom fighters at all.
The quibble is mostly if Israel should kill mostly civilians to eradicate those organisations in lieu of other potential avenues.
Israel at this stage is just as hardline as an Iran, increasingly virulently nationalistic emboldened by the US and just bombs folks as they want.
Polling, increasingly reflects this as well. The idea that a Netanyahu was doing certain things to deflect from unpopularity, and it didn’t reflect general Israeli sentiment and there was sizeable opposition used to have some legs, increasingly it appears it doesn’t.
They are not nearly as hard line. For example, in Israel no protesters have been killed. In Iran 10s of thousands have.
How many civilians have been killed in Palestine?
Hard to say since Israel claims most were Hamas and Hamas claims all were civilians. Around 70k total. But there is a real chance less civilians died in Gaza during their war then Iran killed in a couple weeks of protesters. And well the number is way to high, it is an absolute bollocks assertion that Israel was trying to kill as many as they could. If that was the case the number would be 7 figures.
Right so we’ve got a ballpark 70k number to begin with and an Israel that has been progressively more hostile to international observers operating to even verify such things. This incidentally doesn’t include civilian casualties in say the Lebanon, or Iran
We’ve got illegal settlements ever expanding too.
The assertion has never been that Israel is trying to kill as many as it could possibly can, just that it doesn’t really give a shit about killing civiiians.
By the same logic I mean Russia isn’t behaving abominably, because if they really wanted to kill as many as they could they could just nuke Ukraine.
At what point do people abandon this fanciful idea that Israel is some outlier of democratic values in the region, when they’re bombing the fucking beejaysus out of everyone?
They’re no better than Iran really, same shit different flavour. An appalling state that could do considerably better but chooses not to.
The assertion - at least by some in this thread - definitely has been that Israel is trying to kill as many as it can get away with. And these, among others, are the kind of claims I argued against. I still don't see myself as a staunch defender of Israel - rather a more nuanced view on this conflict-, but arguing against such idiotic statements was the thing that branded me one. MagicPowers clearly made that claim many times and others assisted his line of argumentation, tried to attack the evidence I posted or didn't bother speaking out against these claims.
But even the assertion that Israel doesn't give a shit about killing civilians can be tested... We have the numbers from the IDF, but also the ones from independent sources. These put the civilian casualty rate in Gaza at around 50 to 75 %. Compare that to Mosul (60 - 80%) or the Syrian Civil War, which is believed to be majority civilian casualties. This clearly puts Gaza in the range of other urban / asymmetric wars or slightly below it. But even if it was worse slightly... Gaza is more populated in general, more populated with women and children and Hamas is among the most, if not the faction which is most embedded in civilian infrastructure, even firing rockets from refugee camps. In Lebanon the estimate is 40 - 70% civilian casualties and the numbers depend on whether urban strikes are included or the intensity of the phase are already lower. And as you mentioned Iran, we have a perfectly fine comparison, how Israel's civilian tolls are, when there is no urban warfare, as the reported deaths - depending on the source - sit at 10 - 30 %. So there is a clear degression and one that can be explained by the nature of the battle. So I would really like to know, how you arrive at the idea, that Israel doesn't give a shit about civilians, as I think these numbers and the context clearly hint at a different conclusion. And not only looking at casualty figures, but overall conduct: Israel has provided fuel, water and electricity to a hostile region and also has similar rates of civilian casualties to comparable conflicts. Gazan civilians were warned via speakers, SMS, TV, radio ahead of time and patients from Gaza have been treated in Israeli hospitals. At different times in history, tens of thousands of Palestinians have worked in Israel, taking home much higher income. Israel has different kind of ethnicities in every branch of society, allowing for freedom of religion and has given up their most holy site to the Muslims, which don't want to share the Temple Mount / Al Aqsa. And despite all its flaws, it still is a democratic state with rules and regulations, whereas Iran killed of tens of thousands protestors. These observations obviously don't negate valid criticism of military actions but it shows that there are long-standing systems of cooperation, dependence and even support to Palestinian civilians.
So to say that Israel is no better than Iran - in my opinion - is preposterous. Although I respect your opinion most of the time, even if it differs from mine, this statement is absolute madness. Israel operates in ongoing asymmetric conflicts, dense urban warfare environments, while Iran has mostly been attacking Israel through proxies or launching rockets at everything -often not even military sites -, which is supported by missiles hitting residential building, a synagogue or apartment blocks. In some phases almost all fatalities on the Israeli side were civilians and the recent war sits at 65 - 75% civilian casualties in non urban warfare but missile strikes. Compare that to the 10 - 30% on the other side. Further, Iran is primarily criticized for systematic internal repression, while Israel is criticized for conduct in war. Collapsing those into a single moral judgement ignores that they operate in fundamentally different domains. Your statement completely erases what these states are actually being criticized for and it treats outcome as intentional. Perhaps there is something I overlooked, so please share your thoughts on this one...
Ok to clarify, no Israel isn’t as bad as Iran IMO. Venting frustration doesn’t aid specificity. For me their conduct has increasingly taken them past a threshold and into a similar domain, namely of consistently egregious conduct that can simply be outright condemned wholesale rather than dissected with the scalpel of nuance.
There are mitigating factors, although less so than prior, and accompanied with significant increases in the bad so to speak.
Alas bit too busy to do a more lengthy reply, will pop back in at some point.
Essentially the crux of my point is simply that ‘it’s complicated’ or other barriers tend to pop up on this particular topic, where they don’t necessarily elsewhere, or employ rationales they wouldn’t elsewhere.
I don’t think this precludes discussing complexities either, or mitigating factors or what have you.
Thanks, for coming back! If you find the time, I'd be interested to hear what threshold you are talking about. Legal? Moral? Proportion? Intent? Also, which conduct you speak of... Over what time period? Compared to what baseline?
I'd also be interested which barriers you see that are not necessarily present elsewhere.
Imo, a “wholesale condemnation vs dissection” framing would be overly binary (not sure, if that is what you suggested). It would set up a contrast between two modes of judgement: either one evaluates actions in a detailed, case-by-case way (“dissection with a scalpel of nuance”), or one moves to a broad, systemic condemnation that treats conduct as a whole category. The issue with this framing is that it treats these two approaches as mutually exclusive, when in practice serious analysis usually combines both. You can recognise recurring patterns or systemic concerns while still examining individual events in detail to understand intent, context, and variation over time. Because of that, the argument risks oversimplifying the range of analytical tools available by implying that once a “threshold” is crossed, detailed scrutiny becomes unnecessary or secondary, rather than still essential for understanding what is actually happening.
I also don't see how you can make the claim that Israel is "actively trying to rekindle the civil war in Syria". Israel openly admits to targeting or carrying out airstrikes against Iranian military infrastructure or weapons shipments to Hezbollah. This is part of Israel’s strategy to prevent Iran from establishing a military foothold near its borders. I see no broad intervention in Syria’s internal political or factional conflict though. You even had operation "Good neighbour", as many Syrians were treated in Israeli hospitals during the Syrian war from 2010 (which of course, also added to their interest of creating a buffer zone). And what exactly do you see Erdogan's influence in? My understanding is, that he was mostly involved in Northern Syria, pushing back the Kurds and creating a buffer zone. How do you think that Turkey was countering Israeli influence in any clear strategic sense? Israel’s observable policy priorities - such as maintaining peace treaties, expanding normalization agreements, and deterring hostile actors - suggest a preference for stable neighboring states that accept its existence. While some analysts have argued that weakened adversaries can reduce conventional threats, there’s no clear evidence that Israel pursues instability in neighboring countries as a general policy. In Gaza and the West Bank, where this accussation pops up the most, Israel’s security and administrative policies have operated in a context where Gaza and the West Bank are treated as separate governance and security environments. Combined with Palestinian political fragmentation, this has reinforced the division between the two territories, but - as far as I know - there is no clear evidence of a single overarching strategy to permanently divide them.
Lmao.
So Israel has hit Syria with over 600 airstrikes since the fall of Assad. That's two a day. The first thing they did after Assad fell was to hit every piece of military equipment they could so the new government wouldn't get stronger. They have also invaded souther Syria without provocation.
Their foreign minister (Gideon Sa'ar) has openly stated that they wanted a federalized Syria. With the situation on the ground that would have meant a new civil war and we know from Iraq it means instability and infighting. A vast majority of Syrian did not want this. They openly support one separatist faction, even protecting them with airstrikes. They say it's to protect Druze in Syria but <50% of Druze live in Suweyda and there has been no mistreatment of Druze in general. Al-Hirji is also the leader of a criminal gang and in order to stay in power he has imprisoned and killed a lot of Druze from other factions. Ask Jordan why Israel allows them to keep doing cross border airstrikes in the region (hint, it involves drug smuggling).
The minister of national security has repeatedly called for the assassination of Jolani and stated that there can not be negotiated with the new Syrian government, labeling them as an enemy. While they have done nothing.
While Israel explicitly support al-Hiri and his faction they reached out to Alawites and the Kurds early on. Even with demands of a "safe corridor" between Suwedya and the SDF.
This is where Erdogan stepped in. The threat of Turkish military installations with advanced AA down towards Damascus was a red line for Israel but it showed how serious Turkey was about the Kurds. Israel had to back down 100% from supporting the kurds and Erdogan got Trump to cut ties.
Assad remnants in the coast blew their wad way to early and the rest of the world needed HTS to stop everything from going from a massacre to full on genocide. Much later the new government folded the Kurds like a lawn chair, thus ending the Israeli dream of a weak, federalized Syria plagued by infighting. Al-Hirji is way to weak to pose a threat and economically the region is insignificant. It's a shame for the Druze living there because there is no way they are getting out of poverty. Still just last week Syria was counted as an enemy by Israel even when they have done nothing towards Israel which itself has both invaded, bombed and tried to wreck their internal politics to destabilize the country.
So get your head out of the sand. Israel says exactly what they want with Syria, and is aggressively trying for it. Their nightmare scenario is a peaceful viable Syria with geopolitical importance. The new communications line being built between SA and Turkey is precursor step to a long envisioned pipeline project. Everything points to Turkey and the gulf states taking "joint custody" of Syria. If it's a success Israel will have to deal with illegally occupying a globally important, peaceful country which they can't just destroy with their military.
On April 18 2026 00:57 Jankisa wrote: Israel is not only criticized about it's conduct during war. They are and have been criticized for decades for aggressive settlement expansion, the two tier justice system in West Bank and Israel in general, terrible conditions they are keeping Palestinian prisoners in, sniping of kids and journalists outside of war etc.
They have also been cracking down on protests (semi justified as they are in a state of war and missiles were flying at them at the time), they have been criticized for shutting down investigation in their soldiers raping (with a knife) a Palestinian prisoner, for enacting a death penalty only for Palestinians and so, so much more.
The point wasn’t to deny that Israel has been criticized for a wide range of issues. And while some of the claims you mentioned are well-supported, others are disputed or overstated, that’s not what I was addressing.
My focus is on the comparison itself. Saying “they’re no better than Iran” implies a level of equivalence that I don’t think is accurate or justified. You can strongly criticize Israel’s policies without concluding that it is essentially the same kind of state as Iran.
To be precise, I reject the following premises: 1. That no one in this thread has argued that Israel deliberately tries to kill as many Palestinians as possible. 2. That the available data and described events justify the conclusion that Israel does not care at all about civilians. 3. That Israel and Iran can be meaningfully described as “no different” in the way suggested.
This doesn’t mean rejecting all criticism or dismissing the possibility of serious wrongdoing. It just means that criticism should remain proportionate and not collapse into oversimplified equivalence.
Be the one that goes with the evidence, like the Israeli government does not do enough to restrain the extremist settlers in both policing and prosecuting, or the IDF fires too freely on perceived threats and doesn't investigate and prosecute strongly the worst cases of it, or the judiciary system is too lenient.
On April 18 2026 00:57 Jankisa wrote: Israel is not only criticized about it's conduct during war. They are and have been criticized for decades for aggressive settlement expansion, the two tier justice system in West Bank and Israel in general, terrible conditions they are keeping Palestinian prisoners in, sniping of kids and journalists outside of war etc.
They have also been cracking down on protests (semi justified as they are in a state of war and missiles were flying at them at the time), they have been criticized for shutting down investigation in their soldiers raping (with a knife) a Palestinian prisoner, for enacting a death penalty only for Palestinians and so, so much more.
The point wasn’t to deny that Israel has been criticized for a wide range of issues. And while some of the claims you mentioned are well-supported, others are disputed or overstated, that’s not what I was addressing.
My focus is on the comparison itself. Saying “they’re no better than Iran” implies a level of equivalence that I don’t think is accurate or justified. You can strongly criticize Israel’s policies without concluding that it is essentially the same kind of state as Iran.
To be precise, I reject the following premises: 1. That no one in this thread has argued that Israel deliberately tries to kill as many Palestinians as possible. 2. That the available data and described events justify the conclusion that Israel does not care at all about civilians. 3. That Israel and Iran can be meaningfully described as “no different” in the way suggested.
This doesn’t mean rejecting all criticism or dismissing the possibility of serious wrongdoing. It just means that criticism should remain proportionate and not collapse into oversimplified equivalence.
1. Correct, people in this thread have suggested that. 2. Israel used to care about civilians but in recent years I at least get the feeling that they now care about civilians only in how it affects their image. If no one knows it doesn't matter, if it gets out it still hardly matters. Potential suffering amongst "enemy" civilians seem to be a non factor in the new military planning. Individual cases of abuse or obvious mistakes are either swept under the rug or given a slap on the wrist. And senior Israeli politicians actively encourage that type of behaviour. Also se point 3. 3. Iran and Israel are different as apples and oranges are but they are both still fruit. I'd argue that in when it comes to stoking conflict in the middle east they are on the same level. When it comes to ignoring the plight of other countries and civilians they are also on the same level. Iran funds Hezbollah and the Houthis and helped Assad in the civil war. But Israel has Gaza and has no problem "mowing the lawn" in Lebanon. They actively tried to rekindle the civil war in Syria. They obviously prefer weak and broken states next door and show absolutely no regard to the tremendous cost this incours on those countries. And again, senior Israeli politicians said as much. If Turkey hadn't put the foot down (and Erdogan being buddies with Trump) Syria would be fucked right now. So when it comes to being good neighbours and preventing conflict I feel both countries are about equally horrible. In many other aspects Israel is better than Iran. But those areas are usually not related to the government and Iranian citizens are not their goverment any more than Israeli citizens are.
I am not sure, how you arrive at the feeling that they only care about their image. The military has comparable numbers to similar conflicts. Israel has implemented extensive warning systems compared to many conflicts, after being hit by the biggest trauma the country ever suffered. Casualty numbers are in line with usual observations, as casualties in Gaza were extremely high at the beginning (late 2023), then generally declined over time into 2024 - 2025, but never dropped to zero and have shown intermittent spikes rather than a smooth trend. That is completely normal for conflict zones.
I also don't see how you can make the claim that Israel is "actively trying to rekindle the civil war in Syria". Israel openly admits to targeting or carrying out airstrikes against Iranian military infrastructure or weapons shipments to Hezbollah. This is part of Israel’s strategy to prevent Iran from establishing a military foothold near its borders. I see no broad intervention in Syria’s internal political or factional conflict though. You even had operation "Good neighbour", as many Syrians were treated in Israeli hospitals during the Syrian war from 2010 (which of course, also added to their interest of creating a buffer zone). And what exactly do you see Erdogan's influence in? My understanding is, that he was mostly involved in Northern Syria, pushing back the Kurds and creating a buffer zone. How do you think that Turkey was countering Israeli influence in any clear strategic sense? Israel’s observable policy priorities - such as maintaining peace treaties, expanding normalization agreements, and deterring hostile actors - suggest a preference for stable neighboring states that accept its existence. While some analysts have argued that weakened adversaries can reduce conventional threats, there’s no clear evidence that Israel pursues instability in neighboring countries as a general policy. In Gaza and the West Bank, where this accussation pops up the most, Israel’s security and administrative policies have operated in a context where Gaza and the West Bank are treated as separate governance and security environments. Combined with Palestinian political fragmentation, this has reinforced the division between the two territories, but - as far as I know - there is no clear evidence of a single overarching strategy to permanently divide them.
What's your strategy to make sure that all of the Lebanese people who lose relatives and friends in this campaign to get rid of Hezbollah don't start feeling hatred toward Israel, hatred that will then be fueled by continued mistreatment of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and will motivate them to form another terrible group that is bad for the innocents surrounding them and that you will have to kill a bunch of Lebanese people to get rid of in 30 years?
I think they'll do a much better job than you at judging Hezbollah's oppression and intentions regarding the Lebanese people. As much as you would dismiss and ignore Hezbollah's actions after the US-Israel war on Iran, they saw the rocket and missile fire from Hezbollah into Israel first-hand. I just have to reject your premise here that it requires a strategy and their local observations are outweighed by propaganda coming from 100 miles away.
On April 15 2026 03:02 Billyboy wrote: [quote]
I agree with most of what you said and I don’t think you would be able to find a post from me that suggests Netanyahu’s interests are anything other than self.
What frustrates me is there are people in this thread that post as if groups like Hezbollah or Hamas are freedom fighters, which simply is not accurate. There are plenty of things to criticize Israel about that are real and proven.
Iran being only in Iran should be a goal that everyone shares. If you don’t share it, you are either uninformed, filled with hatred or both.
I think they really truly believe that Iranian proxies are legitimately concerned with the well-being of non-combatants. It's some kind of remix of the old pan-Arab nationalism movement or something.
I don’t think thread denizens view Hezbollah, Hamas as honourable freedom fighters at all.
The quibble is mostly if Israel should kill mostly civilians to eradicate those organisations in lieu of other potential avenues.
Israel at this stage is just as hardline as an Iran, increasingly virulently nationalistic emboldened by the US and just bombs folks as they want.
Polling, increasingly reflects this as well. The idea that a Netanyahu was doing certain things to deflect from unpopularity, and it didn’t reflect general Israeli sentiment and there was sizeable opposition used to have some legs, increasingly it appears it doesn’t.
They are not nearly as hard line. For example, in Israel no protesters have been killed. In Iran 10s of thousands have.
How many civilians have been killed in Palestine?
Hard to say since Israel claims most were Hamas and Hamas claims all were civilians. Around 70k total. But there is a real chance less civilians died in Gaza during their war then Iran killed in a couple weeks of protesters. And well the number is way to high, it is an absolute bollocks assertion that Israel was trying to kill as many as they could. If that was the case the number would be 7 figures.
Right so we’ve got a ballpark 70k number to begin with and an Israel that has been progressively more hostile to international observers operating to even verify such things. This incidentally doesn’t include civilian casualties in say the Lebanon, or Iran
We’ve got illegal settlements ever expanding too.
The assertion has never been that Israel is trying to kill as many as it could possibly can, just that it doesn’t really give a shit about killing civiiians.
By the same logic I mean Russia isn’t behaving abominably, because if they really wanted to kill as many as they could they could just nuke Ukraine.
At what point do people abandon this fanciful idea that Israel is some outlier of democratic values in the region, when they’re bombing the fucking beejaysus out of everyone?
They’re no better than Iran really, same shit different flavour. An appalling state that could do considerably better but chooses not to.
The assertion - at least by some in this thread - definitely has been that Israel is trying to kill as many as it can get away with. And these, among others, are the kind of claims I argued against. I still don't see myself as a staunch defender of Israel - rather a more nuanced view on this conflict-, but arguing against such idiotic statements was the thing that branded me one. MagicPowers clearly made that claim many times and others assisted his line of argumentation, tried to attack the evidence I posted or didn't bother speaking out against these claims.
But even the assertion that Israel doesn't give a shit about killing civilians can be tested... We have the numbers from the IDF, but also the ones from independent sources. These put the civilian casualty rate in Gaza at around 50 to 75 %. Compare that to Mosul (60 - 80%) or the Syrian Civil War, which is believed to be majority civilian casualties. This clearly puts Gaza in the range of other urban / asymmetric wars or slightly below it. But even if it was worse slightly... Gaza is more populated in general, more populated with women and children and Hamas is among the most, if not the faction which is most embedded in civilian infrastructure, even firing rockets from refugee camps. In Lebanon the estimate is 40 - 70% civilian casualties and the numbers depend on whether urban strikes are included or the intensity of the phase are already lower. And as you mentioned Iran, we have a perfectly fine comparison, how Israel's civilian tolls are, when there is no urban warfare, as the reported deaths - depending on the source - sit at 10 - 30 %. So there is a clear degression and one that can be explained by the nature of the battle. So I would really like to know, how you arrive at the idea, that Israel doesn't give a shit about civilians, as I think these numbers and the context clearly hint at a different conclusion. And not only looking at casualty figures, but overall conduct: Israel has provided fuel, water and electricity to a hostile region and also has similar rates of civilian casualties to comparable conflicts. Gazan civilians were warned via speakers, SMS, TV, radio ahead of time and patients from Gaza have been treated in Israeli hospitals. At different times in history, tens of thousands of Palestinians have worked in Israel, taking home much higher income. Israel has different kind of ethnicities in every branch of society, allowing for freedom of religion and has given up their most holy site to the Muslims, which don't want to share the Temple Mount / Al Aqsa. And despite all its flaws, it still is a democratic state with rules and regulations, whereas Iran killed of tens of thousands protestors. These observations obviously don't negate valid criticism of military actions but it shows that there are long-standing systems of cooperation, dependence and even support to Palestinian civilians.
So to say that Israel is no better than Iran - in my opinion - is preposterous. Although I respect your opinion most of the time, even if it differs from mine, this statement is absolute madness. Israel operates in ongoing asymmetric conflicts, dense urban warfare environments, while Iran has mostly been attacking Israel through proxies or launching rockets at everything -often not even military sites -, which is supported by missiles hitting residential building, a synagogue or apartment blocks. In some phases almost all fatalities on the Israeli side were civilians and the recent war sits at 65 - 75% civilian casualties in non urban warfare but missile strikes. Compare that to the 10 - 30% on the other side. Further, Iran is primarily criticized for systematic internal repression, while Israel is criticized for conduct in war. Collapsing those into a single moral judgement ignores that they operate in fundamentally different domains. Your statement completely erases what these states are actually being criticized for and it treats outcome as intentional. Perhaps there is something I overlooked, so please share your thoughts on this one...
Ok to clarify, no Israel isn’t as bad as Iran IMO. Venting frustration doesn’t aid specificity. For me their conduct has increasingly taken them past a threshold and into a similar domain, namely of consistently egregious conduct that can simply be outright condemned wholesale rather than dissected with the scalpel of nuance.
There are mitigating factors, although less so than prior, and accompanied with significant increases in the bad so to speak.
Alas bit too busy to do a more lengthy reply, will pop back in at some point.
Essentially the crux of my point is simply that ‘it’s complicated’ or other barriers tend to pop up on this particular topic, where they don’t necessarily elsewhere, or employ rationales they wouldn’t elsewhere.
I don’t think this precludes discussing complexities either, or mitigating factors or what have you.
Thanks, for coming back! If you find the time, I'd be interested to hear what threshold you are talking about. Legal? Moral? Proportion? Intent? Also, which conduct you speak of... Over what time period? Compared to what baseline?
I'd also be interested which barriers you see that are not necessarily present elsewhere.
Imo, a “wholesale condemnation vs dissection” framing would be overly binary (not sure, if that is what you suggested). It would set up a contrast between two modes of judgement: either one evaluates actions in a detailed, case-by-case way (“dissection with a scalpel of nuance”), or one moves to a broad, systemic condemnation that treats conduct as a whole category. The issue with this framing is that it treats these two approaches as mutually exclusive, when in practice serious analysis usually combines both. You can recognise recurring patterns or systemic concerns while still examining individual events in detail to understand intent, context, and variation over time. Because of that, the argument risks oversimplifying the range of analytical tools available by implying that once a “threshold” is crossed, detailed scrutiny becomes unnecessary or secondary, rather than still essential for understanding what is actually happening.
Bias, presumably. Some of which I’m sympathetic to, some of which I’m not. Jewish people having a degree of reflexive defensive to such a state in a world where anti-Semitism is on the rise (even outside of that boosted by the current conflict), isn’t something I’m particularly condemnatory of. We’ve all got biases and some are very difficult to shift even if one actively tries. Other biases such as ‘I don’t like Muslims very much’ I am less sympathetic to, which I’ve encountered plenty, albeit to firmly stress I don’t think are factors in TL threads.
All of the above really.
It’s really a combination of multiple areas and an intensification in the post October 7th period, although one can perhaps point to a general direction of travel that precedes that.
As I’ve said prior, no state in the world would just suck up an October 7th event, or various groups and states that believe you don’t have a right to exist and act upon it. That’s an unrealistic expectation, and one I’d reject coming from anyone who isn’t a hardcore pacifist as it’s demanding things of Israel that wouldn’t be demanded elsewhere. To go back to biases, I think one can observe them here too, just in the opposite direction.
If we take the sheer volume of increased casualties, the continued expansion of settlements, the increasingly poisonous rhetoric of leaders, shifts in attitudes amongst the populace, and an increased hostility to third party observation or oversight etc.
It’s difficult to put an exact marker on it, even personally given it’s so multi-factored, and of course personal views will vary. So what the ‘threshold’ is is quite hard to specifically nail down, and where it shifts from not ideal but grey into just outright unacceptable.
I don’t think those two aforementioned approaches are mutually exclusive, indeed for me it’s the exact opposite. I’d consider the questions of Israel’s conduct being acceptable, and how do you resolve such a conflict as two that can exist independently, although of course interlinked.
To put it crudely I consider there to be a difference between ‘that’s bad, but…’ and ‘thats bad. But let’s examine the wider context.’
I mean to pick one example, complicated conflict but how have an estimated 2600 people been killed at aid sites? Aid sites that foreign observers have increasingly restricted access to.
As I’ve said prior I also don’t really buy into the idea of comparable conflicts because I don’t know of many that exist. There’s such a power asymmetry, which isn’t unique to conflict. Palestinians exist in effective pseudo-states which are simultaneously not really fully-fledged states, nor are they actually part of Israel, so it doesn’t neatly fit into most categories very neatly. It’s not an inter-state war, nor a civil war, nor a state crushing internal dissent. Which makes it tricky to benchmark versus those kind of things for better or for worse.
I also don't see how you can make the claim that Israel is "actively trying to rekindle the civil war in Syria". Israel openly admits to targeting or carrying out airstrikes against Iranian military infrastructure or weapons shipments to Hezbollah. This is part of Israel’s strategy to prevent Iran from establishing a military foothold near its borders. I see no broad intervention in Syria’s internal political or factional conflict though. You even had operation "Good neighbour", as many Syrians were treated in Israeli hospitals during the Syrian war from 2010 (which of course, also added to their interest of creating a buffer zone). And what exactly do you see Erdogan's influence in? My understanding is, that he was mostly involved in Northern Syria, pushing back the Kurds and creating a buffer zone. How do you think that Turkey was countering Israeli influence in any clear strategic sense? Israel’s observable policy priorities - such as maintaining peace treaties, expanding normalization agreements, and deterring hostile actors - suggest a preference for stable neighboring states that accept its existence. While some analysts have argued that weakened adversaries can reduce conventional threats, there’s no clear evidence that Israel pursues instability in neighboring countries as a general policy. In Gaza and the West Bank, where this accussation pops up the most, Israel’s security and administrative policies have operated in a context where Gaza and the West Bank are treated as separate governance and security environments. Combined with Palestinian political fragmentation, this has reinforced the division between the two territories, but - as far as I know - there is no clear evidence of a single overarching strategy to permanently divide them.
Lmao.
So Israel has hit Syria with over 600 airstrikes since the fall of Assad. That's two a day. The first thing they did after Assad fell was to hit every piece of military equipment they could so the new government wouldn't get stronger. They have also invaded souther Syria without provocation.
Their foreign minister (Gideon Sa'ar) has openly stated that they wanted a federalized Syria. With the situation on the ground that would have meant a new civil war and we know from Iraq it means instability and infighting. A vast majority of Syrian did not want this. They openly support one separatist faction, even protecting them with airstrikes. They say it's to protect Druze in Syria but <50% of Druze live in Suweyda and there has been no mistreatment of Druze in general. Al-Hirji is also the leader of a criminal gang and in order to stay in power he has imprisoned and killed a lot of Druze from other factions. Ask Jordan why Israel allows them to keep doing cross border airstrikes in the region (hint, it involves drug smuggling).
The minister of national security has repeatedly called for the assassination of Jolani and stated that there can not be negotiated with the new Syrian government, labeling them as an enemy. While they have done nothing.
While Israel explicitly support al-Hiri and his faction they reached out to Alawites and the Kurds early on. Even with demands of a "safe corridor" between Suwedya and the SDF.
This is where Erdogan stepped in. The threat of Turkish military installations with advanced AA down towards Damascus was a red line for Israel but it showed how serious Turkey was about the Kurds. Israel had to back down 100% from supporting the kurds and Erdogan got Trump to cut ties.
Assad remnants in the coast blew their wad way to early and the rest of the world needed HTS to stop everything from going from a massacre to full on genocide. Much later the new government folded the Kurds like a lawn chair, thus ending the Israeli dream of a weak, federalized Syria plagued by infighting. Al-Hirji is way to weak to pose a threat and economically the region is insignificant. It's a shame for the Druze living there because there is no way they are getting out of poverty. Still just last week Syria was counted as an enemy by Israel even when they have done nothing towards Israel which itself has both invaded, bombed and tried to wreck their internal politics to destabilize the country.
So get your head out of the sand. Israel says exactly what they want with Syria, and is aggressively trying for it. Their nightmare scenario is a peaceful viable Syria with geopolitical importance. The new communications line being built between SA and Turkey is precursor step to a long envisioned pipeline project. Everything points to Turkey and the gulf states taking "joint custody" of Syria. If it's a success Israel will have to deal with illegally occupying a globally important, peaceful country which they can't just destroy with their military.
Well, there goes a neutral tone with the lmao-start and the last paragraph. I try not to be too dismissive in return, but I've gotta say that your analysis - at least to me - seems to mix facts with emotional conclusions absent evidence, flavored with a lot of speculation. There are leaps that could be true, but most certainly don't have to be; other parts are simply overexaggerated interpretations.
Sa'ar's words can be reasonably interpreted as security framing rather than strategic destabilization intent, which is absolutely legitimate in a power vacuum environment. There are concerns about preventing weapons proliferation or stopping hostile actors exploiting the vacuum. So yes, in line with everything they said and did about southern and eastern Syria in the past, these actions make absolute sense. Buffer zones are the explanation and most of the Israeli strikes in Syria are predominantly concentrated in southern Syria near the Golan border (Daraa and Quneitra), with a secondary but significant cluster around Damascus targeting military infrastructure and alleged Iranian-linked assets. Btw, do you have a source for this 600 airstrike claim? I'd like to check what was actually counted (airstrike vs artillery vs drones).
In regards to Erdogan's "stepping in": What do you think which AA was deployed? SHORADs? NASAMS? Or S-300s/S-400s? And where exactly? The installations I know of, are in place to protect southern Turkey via a northern Syrian buffer zone.. the same thing Israel is doing in the south. This is an area where Israel has operated the least in anyways. None of those systems are credibly reported as deployed in Syria by Turkey; Turkish systems remain inside Turkey and for even the S-400s to have meaningful effect in their max range you'd need radar sites, command infrastructure and secure logistics, all of which Turkey does not have in Syria.
You further make it seem like Israel has had an operational alliance or direct military support relationship with Kurdish forces in Syria, which is not supported by evidence. Some Israeli political commentary has been sympathetic to Kurdish autonomy and occasional strategic analysis suggested Kurds are a “useful counterweight” to Iran in theory. But nothing more. There are no confirmed “support programs”, no operational command relationship, no formal military alliance, no joint command structures, no sustained weapons supply program and no documented battlefield coordination. So yeah, while there is no documented “withdrawal from supporting Kurds” it is mostly because there was no support system to withdraw from in the first place. Israeli policy in Syria was and is mainly focused on: Iranian military presence, missile transfers and border security in the Golan area. And while Turkish pressure was one factor among many (US desire to reduce military footprint in Syria, domestic US political debates, competing priorities like ISIS containment vs regional alliances) you are making it seem that no other explanation is possible. US presence in Syria has been reduced gradually and inconsistently, not suddenly “cut”, because after partnering with the SDF and the territorial defeat of ISIS US support became more limited and conditional.
And in regards to that last paragraph: Israel has repeatedly signaled that stability in neighboring states is preferable, provided it does not include hostile military entrenchment. The Egypt-Israel peace treaty is a strong counterexample to “Israel prefers instability”.
On April 18 2026 00:57 Jankisa wrote: Israel is not only criticized about it's conduct during war. They are and have been criticized for decades for aggressive settlement expansion, the two tier justice system in West Bank and Israel in general, terrible conditions they are keeping Palestinian prisoners in, sniping of kids and journalists outside of war etc.
They have also been cracking down on protests (semi justified as they are in a state of war and missiles were flying at them at the time), they have been criticized for shutting down investigation in their soldiers raping (with a knife) a Palestinian prisoner, for enacting a death penalty only for Palestinians and so, so much more.
The point wasn’t to deny that Israel has been criticized for a wide range of issues. And while some of the claims you mentioned are well-supported, others are disputed or overstated, that’s not what I was addressing.
My focus is on the comparison itself. Saying “they’re no better than Iran” implies a level of equivalence that I don’t think is accurate or justified. You can strongly criticize Israel’s policies without concluding that it is essentially the same kind of state as Iran.
To be precise, I reject the following premises: 1. That no one in this thread has argued that Israel deliberately tries to kill as many Palestinians as possible. 2. That the available data and described events justify the conclusion that Israel does not care at all about civilians. 3. That Israel and Iran can be meaningfully described as “no different” in the way suggested.
This doesn’t mean rejecting all criticism or dismissing the possibility of serious wrongdoing. It just means that criticism should remain proportionate and not collapse into oversimplified equivalence.
Be the one that goes with the evidence, like the Israeli government does not do enough to restrain the extremist settlers in both policing and prosecuting, or the IDF fires too freely on perceived threats and doesn't investigate and prosecute strongly the worst cases of it, or the judiciary system is too lenient.
Agreed.
On April 18 2026 05:11 CuddlyCuteKitten wrote:
On April 18 2026 01:16 PremoBeats wrote:
On April 18 2026 00:57 Jankisa wrote: Israel is not only criticized about it's conduct during war. They are and have been criticized for decades for aggressive settlement expansion, the two tier justice system in West Bank and Israel in general, terrible conditions they are keeping Palestinian prisoners in, sniping of kids and journalists outside of war etc.
They have also been cracking down on protests (semi justified as they are in a state of war and missiles were flying at them at the time), they have been criticized for shutting down investigation in their soldiers raping (with a knife) a Palestinian prisoner, for enacting a death penalty only for Palestinians and so, so much more.
The point wasn’t to deny that Israel has been criticized for a wide range of issues. And while some of the claims you mentioned are well-supported, others are disputed or overstated, that’s not what I was addressing.
My focus is on the comparison itself. Saying “they’re no better than Iran” implies a level of equivalence that I don’t think is accurate or justified. You can strongly criticize Israel’s policies without concluding that it is essentially the same kind of state as Iran.
To be precise, I reject the following premises: 1. That no one in this thread has argued that Israel deliberately tries to kill as many Palestinians as possible. 2. That the available data and described events justify the conclusion that Israel does not care at all about civilians. 3. That Israel and Iran can be meaningfully described as “no different” in the way suggested.
This doesn’t mean rejecting all criticism or dismissing the possibility of serious wrongdoing. It just means that criticism should remain proportionate and not collapse into oversimplified equivalence.
1. Correct, people in this thread have suggested that. 2. Israel used to care about civilians but in recent years I at least get the feeling that they now care about civilians only in how it affects their image. If no one knows it doesn't matter, if it gets out it still hardly matters. Potential suffering amongst "enemy" civilians seem to be a non factor in the new military planning. Individual cases of abuse or obvious mistakes are either swept under the rug or given a slap on the wrist. And senior Israeli politicians actively encourage that type of behaviour. Also se point 3. 3. Iran and Israel are different as apples and oranges are but they are both still fruit. I'd argue that in when it comes to stoking conflict in the middle east they are on the same level. When it comes to ignoring the plight of other countries and civilians they are also on the same level. Iran funds Hezbollah and the Houthis and helped Assad in the civil war. But Israel has Gaza and has no problem "mowing the lawn" in Lebanon. They actively tried to rekindle the civil war in Syria. They obviously prefer weak and broken states next door and show absolutely no regard to the tremendous cost this incours on those countries. And again, senior Israeli politicians said as much. If Turkey hadn't put the foot down (and Erdogan being buddies with Trump) Syria would be fucked right now. So when it comes to being good neighbours and preventing conflict I feel both countries are about equally horrible. In many other aspects Israel is better than Iran. But those areas are usually not related to the government and Iranian citizens are not their goverment any more than Israeli citizens are.
I am not sure, how you arrive at the feeling that they only care about their image. The military has comparable numbers to similar conflicts. Israel has implemented extensive warning systems compared to many conflicts, after being hit by the biggest trauma the country ever suffered. Casualty numbers are in line with usual observations, as casualties in Gaza were extremely high at the beginning (late 2023), then generally declined over time into 2024 - 2025, but never dropped to zero and have shown intermittent spikes rather than a smooth trend. That is completely normal for conflict zones.
I also don't see how you can make the claim that Israel is "actively trying to rekindle the civil war in Syria". Israel openly admits to targeting or carrying out airstrikes against Iranian military infrastructure or weapons shipments to Hezbollah. This is part of Israel’s strategy to prevent Iran from establishing a military foothold near its borders. I see no broad intervention in Syria’s internal political or factional conflict though. You even had operation "Good neighbour", as many Syrians were treated in Israeli hospitals during the Syrian war from 2010 (which of course, also added to their interest of creating a buffer zone). And what exactly do you see Erdogan's influence in? My understanding is, that he was mostly involved in Northern Syria, pushing back the Kurds and creating a buffer zone. How do you think that Turkey was countering Israeli influence in any clear strategic sense? Israel’s observable policy priorities - such as maintaining peace treaties, expanding normalization agreements, and deterring hostile actors - suggest a preference for stable neighboring states that accept its existence. While some analysts have argued that weakened adversaries can reduce conventional threats, there’s no clear evidence that Israel pursues instability in neighboring countries as a general policy. In Gaza and the West Bank, where this accussation pops up the most, Israel’s security and administrative policies have operated in a context where Gaza and the West Bank are treated as separate governance and security environments. Combined with Palestinian political fragmentation, this has reinforced the division between the two territories, but - as far as I know - there is no clear evidence of a single overarching strategy to permanently divide them.
On April 18 2026 07:55 WombaT wrote:
On April 17 2026 15:00 PremoBeats wrote:
On April 15 2026 10:18 WombaT wrote:
On April 15 2026 06:48 Billyboy wrote:
On April 15 2026 06:39 WombaT wrote:
On April 15 2026 05:53 Billyboy wrote:
On April 15 2026 05:43 WombaT wrote:
On April 15 2026 04:12 dyhb wrote: [quote]I think they'll do a much better job than you at judging Hezbollah's oppression and intentions regarding the Lebanese people. As much as you would dismiss and ignore Hezbollah's actions after the US-Israel war on Iran, they saw the rocket and missile fire from Hezbollah into Israel first-hand. I just have to reject your premise here that it requires a strategy and their local observations are outweighed by propaganda coming from 100 miles away.
[quote]I think they really truly believe that Iranian proxies are legitimately concerned with the well-being of non-combatants. It's some kind of remix of the old pan-Arab nationalism movement or something.
I don’t think thread denizens view Hezbollah, Hamas as honourable freedom fighters at all.
The quibble is mostly if Israel should kill mostly civilians to eradicate those organisations in lieu of other potential avenues.
Israel at this stage is just as hardline as an Iran, increasingly virulently nationalistic emboldened by the US and just bombs folks as they want.
Polling, increasingly reflects this as well. The idea that a Netanyahu was doing certain things to deflect from unpopularity, and it didn’t reflect general Israeli sentiment and there was sizeable opposition used to have some legs, increasingly it appears it doesn’t.
They are not nearly as hard line. For example, in Israel no protesters have been killed. In Iran 10s of thousands have.
How many civilians have been killed in Palestine?
Hard to say since Israel claims most were Hamas and Hamas claims all were civilians. Around 70k total. But there is a real chance less civilians died in Gaza during their war then Iran killed in a couple weeks of protesters. And well the number is way to high, it is an absolute bollocks assertion that Israel was trying to kill as many as they could. If that was the case the number would be 7 figures.
Right so we’ve got a ballpark 70k number to begin with and an Israel that has been progressively more hostile to international observers operating to even verify such things. This incidentally doesn’t include civilian casualties in say the Lebanon, or Iran
We’ve got illegal settlements ever expanding too.
The assertion has never been that Israel is trying to kill as many as it could possibly can, just that it doesn’t really give a shit about killing civiiians.
By the same logic I mean Russia isn’t behaving abominably, because if they really wanted to kill as many as they could they could just nuke Ukraine.
At what point do people abandon this fanciful idea that Israel is some outlier of democratic values in the region, when they’re bombing the fucking beejaysus out of everyone?
They’re no better than Iran really, same shit different flavour. An appalling state that could do considerably better but chooses not to.
The assertion - at least by some in this thread - definitely has been that Israel is trying to kill as many as it can get away with. And these, among others, are the kind of claims I argued against. I still don't see myself as a staunch defender of Israel - rather a more nuanced view on this conflict-, but arguing against such idiotic statements was the thing that branded me one. MagicPowers clearly made that claim many times and others assisted his line of argumentation, tried to attack the evidence I posted or didn't bother speaking out against these claims.
But even the assertion that Israel doesn't give a shit about killing civilians can be tested... We have the numbers from the IDF, but also the ones from independent sources. These put the civilian casualty rate in Gaza at around 50 to 75 %. Compare that to Mosul (60 - 80%) or the Syrian Civil War, which is believed to be majority civilian casualties. This clearly puts Gaza in the range of other urban / asymmetric wars or slightly below it. But even if it was worse slightly... Gaza is more populated in general, more populated with women and children and Hamas is among the most, if not the faction which is most embedded in civilian infrastructure, even firing rockets from refugee camps. In Lebanon the estimate is 40 - 70% civilian casualties and the numbers depend on whether urban strikes are included or the intensity of the phase are already lower. And as you mentioned Iran, we have a perfectly fine comparison, how Israel's civilian tolls are, when there is no urban warfare, as the reported deaths - depending on the source - sit at 10 - 30 %. So there is a clear degression and one that can be explained by the nature of the battle. So I would really like to know, how you arrive at the idea, that Israel doesn't give a shit about civilians, as I think these numbers and the context clearly hint at a different conclusion. And not only looking at casualty figures, but overall conduct: Israel has provided fuel, water and electricity to a hostile region and also has similar rates of civilian casualties to comparable conflicts. Gazan civilians were warned via speakers, SMS, TV, radio ahead of time and patients from Gaza have been treated in Israeli hospitals. At different times in history, tens of thousands of Palestinians have worked in Israel, taking home much higher income. Israel has different kind of ethnicities in every branch of society, allowing for freedom of religion and has given up their most holy site to the Muslims, which don't want to share the Temple Mount / Al Aqsa. And despite all its flaws, it still is a democratic state with rules and regulations, whereas Iran killed of tens of thousands protestors. These observations obviously don't negate valid criticism of military actions but it shows that there are long-standing systems of cooperation, dependence and even support to Palestinian civilians.
So to say that Israel is no better than Iran - in my opinion - is preposterous. Although I respect your opinion most of the time, even if it differs from mine, this statement is absolute madness. Israel operates in ongoing asymmetric conflicts, dense urban warfare environments, while Iran has mostly been attacking Israel through proxies or launching rockets at everything -often not even military sites -, which is supported by missiles hitting residential building, a synagogue or apartment blocks. In some phases almost all fatalities on the Israeli side were civilians and the recent war sits at 65 - 75% civilian casualties in non urban warfare but missile strikes. Compare that to the 10 - 30% on the other side. Further, Iran is primarily criticized for systematic internal repression, while Israel is criticized for conduct in war. Collapsing those into a single moral judgement ignores that they operate in fundamentally different domains. Your statement completely erases what these states are actually being criticized for and it treats outcome as intentional. Perhaps there is something I overlooked, so please share your thoughts on this one...
Ok to clarify, no Israel isn’t as bad as Iran IMO. Venting frustration doesn’t aid specificity. For me their conduct has increasingly taken them past a threshold and into a similar domain, namely of consistently egregious conduct that can simply be outright condemned wholesale rather than dissected with the scalpel of nuance.
There are mitigating factors, although less so than prior, and accompanied with significant increases in the bad so to speak.
Alas bit too busy to do a more lengthy reply, will pop back in at some point.
Essentially the crux of my point is simply that ‘it’s complicated’ or other barriers tend to pop up on this particular topic, where they don’t necessarily elsewhere, or employ rationales they wouldn’t elsewhere.
I don’t think this precludes discussing complexities either, or mitigating factors or what have you.
Thanks, for coming back! If you find the time, I'd be interested to hear what threshold you are talking about. Legal? Moral? Proportion? Intent? Also, which conduct you speak of... Over what time period? Compared to what baseline?
I'd also be interested which barriers you see that are not necessarily present elsewhere.
Imo, a “wholesale condemnation vs dissection” framing would be overly binary (not sure, if that is what you suggested). It would set up a contrast between two modes of judgement: either one evaluates actions in a detailed, case-by-case way (“dissection with a scalpel of nuance”), or one moves to a broad, systemic condemnation that treats conduct as a whole category. The issue with this framing is that it treats these two approaches as mutually exclusive, when in practice serious analysis usually combines both. You can recognise recurring patterns or systemic concerns while still examining individual events in detail to understand intent, context, and variation over time. Because of that, the argument risks oversimplifying the range of analytical tools available by implying that once a “threshold” is crossed, detailed scrutiny becomes unnecessary or secondary, rather than still essential for understanding what is actually happening.
Bias, presumably. Some of which I’m sympathetic to, some of which I’m not. Jewish people having a degree of reflexive defensive to such a state in a world where anti-Semitism is on the rise (even outside of that boosted by the current conflict), isn’t something I’m particularly condemnatory of. We’ve all got biases and some are very difficult to shift even if one actively tries. Other biases such as ‘I don’t like Muslims very much’ I am less sympathetic to, which I’ve encountered plenty, albeit to firmly stress I don’t think are factors in TL threads.
All of the above really.
It’s really a combination of multiple areas and an intensification in the post October 7th period, although one can perhaps point to a general direction of travel that precedes that.
As I’ve said prior, no state in the world would just suck up an October 7th event, or various groups and states that believe you don’t have a right to exist and act upon it. That’s an unrealistic expectation, and one I’d reject coming from anyone who isn’t a hardcore pacifist as it’s demanding things of Israel that wouldn’t be demanded elsewhere. To go back to biases, I think one can observe them here too, just in the opposite direction.
If we take the sheer volume of increased casualties, the continued expansion of settlements, the increasingly poisonous rhetoric of leaders, shifts in attitudes amongst the populace, and an increased hostility to third party observation or oversight etc.
It’s difficult to put an exact marker on it, even personally given it’s so multi-factored, and of course personal views will vary. So what the ‘threshold’ is is quite hard to specifically nail down, and where it shifts from not ideal but grey into just outright unacceptable.
I don’t think those two aforementioned approaches are mutually exclusive, indeed for me it’s the exact opposite. I’d consider the questions of Israel’s conduct being acceptable, and how do you resolve such a conflict as two that can exist independently, although of course interlinked.
To put it crudely I consider there to be a difference between ‘that’s bad, but…’ and ‘thats bad. But let’s examine the wider context.’
I mean to pick one example, complicated conflict but how have an estimated 2600 people been killed at aid sites? Aid sites that foreign observers have increasingly restricted access to.
As I’ve said prior I also don’t really buy into the idea of comparable conflicts because I don’t know of many that exist. There’s such a power asymmetry, which isn’t unique to conflict. Palestinians exist in effective pseudo-states which are simultaneously not really fully-fledged states, nor are they actually part of Israel, so it doesn’t neatly fit into most categories very neatly. It’s not an inter-state war, nor a civil war, nor a state crushing internal dissent. Which makes it tricky to benchmark versus those kind of things for better or for worse.
Alright.. thanks for the clarification; now I've got a clearer picture. And yeah. I can't give you a singular or probably even satisfying answer in regards to the question about aid sites. Violence and mass-casualty incidents near humanitarian aid distribution points have occurred in multiple modern conflict zones (including Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and South Sudan), typically as a result of insecurity, crowding, and ongoing hostilities rather than aid sites being isolated or fully protected environments. Add to that bad decision making in selecting personnel, extremely high population density, confined geography, centralized border-controlled aid entry points as well as an active high-intensity urban warfare environment and high-risk conditions for such incidents are established. This description shouldn't be seen as an excuse though.. simply an explanation. And as I said multiple times already: these incidents should be examined and trialed and the perpetrators or persons in charge should be held accountable as best as possible.
And while I understand that no clear cut comparison is realistic, I think numbers in regards to relative civilian casualty rates can be analyzed given the context of other conflicts, even if the nature of the factions is unclear or there is asymmetry in their fire power. Urban warfare tends to produce similar civilian risk patterns across conflicts... and power asymmetry is playing a more limited role there. If we acknowledge that ISIS fighters were often clearly identified combatants or that Mosul civilians could often escape in phases, whereas Gaza has much more geographically constrained exit routes, as well as other factors like the behavior of Hamas, it wouldn't be unreasonable to say that Gaza has several battlefield conditions that are among the most structurally severe for civilian risk in modern urban warfare. Yet, the relative casualty numbers are lower than in these conflicts. This of course still doesn't allow for a clear cut comparison, but it hints at the idea that the IDF isn't going around, not giving a fuck about civilian damage.
Well, there goes a neutral tone with the lmao-start and the last paragraph. I try not to be too dismissive in return, but I've gotta say that your analysis - at least to me - seems to mix facts with emotional conclusions absent evidence, flavored with a lot of speculation. There are leaps that could be true, but most certainly don't have to be; other parts are simply overexaggerated interpretations.
Sa'ar's words can be reasonably interpreted as security framing rather than strategic destabilization intent, which is absolutely legitimate in a power vacuum environment. There are concerns about preventing weapons proliferation or stopping hostile actors exploiting the vacuum. So yes, in line with everything they said and did about southern and eastern Syria in the past, these actions make absolute sense. Buffer zones are the explanation and most of the Israeli strikes in Syria are predominantly concentrated in southern Syria near the Golan border (Daraa and Quneitra), with a secondary but significant cluster around Damascus targeting military infrastructure and alleged Iranian-linked assets. Btw, do you have a source for this 600 airstrike claim? I'd like to check what was actually counted (airstrike vs artillery vs drones).
In regards to Erdogan's "stepping in": What do you think which AA was deployed? SHORADs? NASAMS? Or S-300s/S-400s? And where exactly? The installations I know of, are in place to protect southern Turkey via a northern Syrian buffer zone.. the same thing Israel is doing in the south. This is an area where Israel has operated the least in anyways. None of those systems are credibly reported as deployed in Syria by Turkey; Turkish systems remain inside Turkey and for even the S-400s to have meaningful effect in their max range you'd need radar sites, command infrastructure and secure logistics, all of which Turkey does not have in Syria.
You further make it seem like Israel has had an operational alliance or direct military support relationship with Kurdish forces in Syria, which is not supported by evidence. Some Israeli political commentary has been sympathetic to Kurdish autonomy and occasional strategic analysis suggested Kurds are a “useful counterweight” to Iran in theory. But nothing more. There are no confirmed “support programs”, no operational command relationship, no formal military alliance, no joint command structures, no sustained weapons supply program and no documented battlefield coordination. So yeah, while there is no documented “withdrawal from supporting Kurds” it is mostly because there was no support system to withdraw from in the first place. Israeli policy in Syria was and is mainly focused on: Iranian military presence, missile transfers and border security in the Golan area. And while Turkish pressure was one factor among many (US desire to reduce military footprint in Syria, domestic US political debates, competing priorities like ISIS containment vs regional alliances) you are making it seem that no other explanation is possible. US presence in Syria has been reduced gradually and inconsistently, not suddenly “cut”, because after partnering with the SDF and the territorial defeat of ISIS US support became more limited and conditional.
And in regards to that last paragraph: Israel has repeatedly signaled that stability in neighboring states is preferable, provided it does not include hostile military entrenchment. The Egypt-Israel peace treaty is a strong counterexample to “Israel prefers instability”.
Maybe because when you post you always act like there should be tons of evidence that we look at without interpreting it or drawing conclusions. According to you we should not assume that Israel means anything based on what they are doing unless they have explicitly said so. But when even when Israeli ministers explicitly says what they think and want you interpret that differently. Not only these quotes, just in general.
I have followed this conflict for a long time so to me a lot of things are very clear cut. You obviously are not as informed.
"insisting that Israel and various sects in Syria should work together in the face of threats from Islamists.". Also stating that "They [kurds] are our natural ally," Saar said, urging to reach out and strengthen ties for political and security considerations."
This on the backdrop of the 480 airstrikes to take out as much military infrastructure as possible from the new government.
11 April
But 2 weeks later something has happened. Turkey has declared their intent to establish forward bases for their air force (which is also their AA) in Syria. And mentions there needs to be an understanding with Israel so they don't accidently shoot down each others aircraft. Israel declares forward bases to be a red line for them.
Israel stops talking about Kurds and solely focuses on Druze after this.
10 March A framework agreement is reached for the integration with the Kurds into Syria.
If you look at the whole picture it's very clear. Israel was moving to support minorities to institute their version of a federalized Syria. Turkey saw it coming and given their history with the Kurds they stepped in. I think we can be fairly sure it was "you start supporting the Kurds we will attack them ourselves, and we will place AA in Syria to protect our planes while we do it". An autonomous official Kurdish region is probably the biggest no-go for Turkey that exist.
So, yes. There was no never any real Israeli support for the Kurds because Turkey stepped in. But there were clearly plans for it (and the Druze, and the coast probably).
Well, there goes a neutral tone with the lmao-start and the last paragraph. I try not to be too dismissive in return, but I've gotta say that your analysis - at least to me - seems to mix facts with emotional conclusions absent evidence, flavored with a lot of speculation. There are leaps that could be true, but most certainly don't have to be; other parts are simply overexaggerated interpretations.
Sa'ar's words can be reasonably interpreted as security framing rather than strategic destabilization intent, which is absolutely legitimate in a power vacuum environment. There are concerns about preventing weapons proliferation or stopping hostile actors exploiting the vacuum. So yes, in line with everything they said and did about southern and eastern Syria in the past, these actions make absolute sense. Buffer zones are the explanation and most of the Israeli strikes in Syria are predominantly concentrated in southern Syria near the Golan border (Daraa and Quneitra), with a secondary but significant cluster around Damascus targeting military infrastructure and alleged Iranian-linked assets. Btw, do you have a source for this 600 airstrike claim? I'd like to check what was actually counted (airstrike vs artillery vs drones).
In regards to Erdogan's "stepping in": What do you think which AA was deployed? SHORADs? NASAMS? Or S-300s/S-400s? And where exactly? The installations I know of, are in place to protect southern Turkey via a northern Syrian buffer zone.. the same thing Israel is doing in the south. This is an area where Israel has operated the least in anyways. None of those systems are credibly reported as deployed in Syria by Turkey; Turkish systems remain inside Turkey and for even the S-400s to have meaningful effect in their max range you'd need radar sites, command infrastructure and secure logistics, all of which Turkey does not have in Syria.
You further make it seem like Israel has had an operational alliance or direct military support relationship with Kurdish forces in Syria, which is not supported by evidence. Some Israeli political commentary has been sympathetic to Kurdish autonomy and occasional strategic analysis suggested Kurds are a “useful counterweight” to Iran in theory. But nothing more. There are no confirmed “support programs”, no operational command relationship, no formal military alliance, no joint command structures, no sustained weapons supply program and no documented battlefield coordination. So yeah, while there is no documented “withdrawal from supporting Kurds” it is mostly because there was no support system to withdraw from in the first place. Israeli policy in Syria was and is mainly focused on: Iranian military presence, missile transfers and border security in the Golan area. And while Turkish pressure was one factor among many (US desire to reduce military footprint in Syria, domestic US political debates, competing priorities like ISIS containment vs regional alliances) you are making it seem that no other explanation is possible. US presence in Syria has been reduced gradually and inconsistently, not suddenly “cut”, because after partnering with the SDF and the territorial defeat of ISIS US support became more limited and conditional.
And in regards to that last paragraph: Israel has repeatedly signaled that stability in neighboring states is preferable, provided it does not include hostile military entrenchment. The Egypt-Israel peace treaty is a strong counterexample to “Israel prefers instability”.
Maybe because when you post you always act like there should be tons of evidence that we look at without interpreting it or drawing conclusions. According to you we should not assume that Israel means anything based on what they are doing unless they have explicitly said so. But when even when Israeli ministers explicitly says what they think and want you interpret that differently. Not only these quotes, just in general.
I have followed this conflict for a long time so to me a lot of things are very clear cut. You obviously are not as informed.
"insisting that Israel and various sects in Syria should work together in the face of threats from Islamists.". Also stating that "They [kurds] are our natural ally," Saar said, urging to reach out and strengthen ties for political and security considerations."
This on the backdrop of the 480 airstrikes to take out as much military infrastructure as possible from the new government.
11 April
But 2 weeks later something has happened. Turkey has declared their intent to establish forward bases for their air force (which is also their AA) in Syria. And mentions there needs to be an understanding with Israel so they don't accidently shoot down each others aircraft. Israel declares forward bases to be a red line for them.
Israel stops talking about Kurds and solely focuses on Druze after this.
10 March A framework agreement is reached for the integration with the Kurds into Syria.
If you look at the whole picture it's very clear. Israel was moving to support minorities to institute their version of a federalized Syria. Turkey saw it coming and given their history with the Kurds they stepped in. I think we can be fairly sure it was "you start supporting the Kurds we will attack them ourselves, and we will place AA in Syria to protect our planes while we do it". An autonomous official Kurdish region is probably the biggest no-go for Turkey that exist.
So, yes. There was no never any real Israeli support for the Kurds because Turkey stepped in. But there were clearly plans for it (and the Druze, and the coast probably).
I can accept that we have differing takes. I only attribute intent when there is explicit evidence or when the available evidence forms a very strong, low-ambiguity pattern that reasonably constrains alternative explanations. Otherwise, I treat intent as uncertain and keep multiple hypotheses open. You seem to interpret consistent patterns of statements plus actions as strategy more loosely. Neither is wrong in principle but while you are operating at a higher level of inference I am doing so at a stricter evidentiary threshold. I have been following this conflict for a very long time as well and don't focus solely on everything negative Israel does. I further go for more nuanced media reportings like Ground News, instead of Al Jazeera or New Arab. They can be factually right, but their framings and interpretations seem similar to the notions that you use to get your points across and - at least as I'm concerned - are way too reaching.
To sum it up.. I think what you are doing is pattern recognition -> story constructing -> certainty, while I am going for pattern recognition -> generate alternatives -> withhold certainty. And to suggest that I am "not as informed"... yeah... I mean. That's like.. your opinion, man.
What I can easily concede and never doubted: - Israel has expressed occasional interest in minority groups in Syria (including Kurds and Druze) as strategic counterweights in rhetoric - Turkey strongly opposes Kurdish autonomy near its borders - Israel’s Syria policy is primarily Iran-focused and border-security-focused - There is no confirmed Israeli-Kurdish military alliance or operational coordination
What is up to interpretation: - Israel had concrete plans for Kurdish state-building in Syria - Turkey directly forced a reversal of Israeli Kurdish policy - Israeli strikes were part of a coordinated federalization strategy
Your earlier words were, that Israel is "actively trying to rekindle the civil war in Syria". If we take Sa'ar's word - that you used to make your point - at face value, in the most extreme form that we can extract, he wants to establish a separated, safe state... not to rekindle civil war. That claim simply cannot be extrapolated. And why would he? As I pointed out with the Egypt counterexample: Historically, Israel has no issues to form treaties, when opposing states are no longer threatening... they even traded territory/security for long-term stability. Israel has historically demonstrated willingness to normalize relations and accept stable neighboring states when core, credible security threats are removed (even when not, looking at Gaza 2005). However, whether this applies to Syria depends on the credibility, durability, and enforceability of such conditions in a post-conflict environment.
Among others, all these questions would need answering to create the story that you have established and even then it wouldn't be clear cut: - 480 strikes directly (!) after the regime collapsed in December, in line with most of what Israel did in the past when trying to establish security in southern Syria (which your own source even shows). What does that have to do with statements made in February? Or with Kurds who operate in northern Syria? - As all of the named factions have been persecuted by them at one point or another, why should statements about working together against Islamist extremists be controversial? - Further, do these statements by Sa'ar in any way shape or form imply a rekindling of civil war with no other alternatives, that - arguably seem much more plausible? - If there were supposed plans by Israel to support minorities in northern Syria: what were they exactly? Training, arming local forces? Via what route? Direct coordinations in operations? Again, across the whole distance of Syria in between Israel and the Kurds? Have we seen any Israeli base in Kurdish regions? Any training equipment or weapon pipelines or plans of them? Any air cover in northern Syria? Any diplomatic campaign except that one statement? That entire line of your story is purely speculative. - Could it be that the Israelis stopped talking about the Kurds because of the planed arrangement that was published in March you mentioned yourself (which was before the Turkish-Israeli-meeting in Azerbaijan in April)? The timeline would match there too, so how can you rule out that scenario? Especially when... - the bombings in southern Syria continued even though you assign Erdogan and Turkey some kind of effect. So what exactly was that effect besides Israel supposedly not talking anymore about the Kurds, which could have a multitude of other explanations like the reaching of an agreement? - Further, the claim that Israel actually stopped talking about Kurds is factually wrong. Sa'ar made comments about Kurds in July to other foreign ministers, mostly from Europe. He also voiced his fear of Syria continuing to oppresse minorities after the incidents in Aleppo, which was in January 2026. So he didn't stop talking about it at all.. only when the agreement was close to being finished. He resumed criticizing the new regime, when the murderous repressions continued or when talking to international colleagues.
"If you look at the whole picture it's very clear." Yup, to you it may be, that much I understand. Some of your story is factually wrong, most of it can have different explanations and be solely correlational instead of causal. But you treat it like that. Clear. Which is fine for you, but please don't expect others to take the same leaps.
Well, there goes a neutral tone with the lmao-start and the last paragraph. I try not to be too dismissive in return, but I've gotta say that your analysis - at least to me - seems to mix facts with emotional conclusions absent evidence, flavored with a lot of speculation. There are leaps that could be true, but most certainly don't have to be; other parts are simply overexaggerated interpretations.
Sa'ar's words can be reasonably interpreted as security framing rather than strategic destabilization intent, which is absolutely legitimate in a power vacuum environment. There are concerns about preventing weapons proliferation or stopping hostile actors exploiting the vacuum. So yes, in line with everything they said and did about southern and eastern Syria in the past, these actions make absolute sense. Buffer zones are the explanation and most of the Israeli strikes in Syria are predominantly concentrated in southern Syria near the Golan border (Daraa and Quneitra), with a secondary but significant cluster around Damascus targeting military infrastructure and alleged Iranian-linked assets. Btw, do you have a source for this 600 airstrike claim? I'd like to check what was actually counted (airstrike vs artillery vs drones).
In regards to Erdogan's "stepping in": What do you think which AA was deployed? SHORADs? NASAMS? Or S-300s/S-400s? And where exactly? The installations I know of, are in place to protect southern Turkey via a northern Syrian buffer zone.. the same thing Israel is doing in the south. This is an area where Israel has operated the least in anyways. None of those systems are credibly reported as deployed in Syria by Turkey; Turkish systems remain inside Turkey and for even the S-400s to have meaningful effect in their max range you'd need radar sites, command infrastructure and secure logistics, all of which Turkey does not have in Syria.
You further make it seem like Israel has had an operational alliance or direct military support relationship with Kurdish forces in Syria, which is not supported by evidence. Some Israeli political commentary has been sympathetic to Kurdish autonomy and occasional strategic analysis suggested Kurds are a “useful counterweight” to Iran in theory. But nothing more. There are no confirmed “support programs”, no operational command relationship, no formal military alliance, no joint command structures, no sustained weapons supply program and no documented battlefield coordination. So yeah, while there is no documented “withdrawal from supporting Kurds” it is mostly because there was no support system to withdraw from in the first place. Israeli policy in Syria was and is mainly focused on: Iranian military presence, missile transfers and border security in the Golan area. And while Turkish pressure was one factor among many (US desire to reduce military footprint in Syria, domestic US political debates, competing priorities like ISIS containment vs regional alliances) you are making it seem that no other explanation is possible. US presence in Syria has been reduced gradually and inconsistently, not suddenly “cut”, because after partnering with the SDF and the territorial defeat of ISIS US support became more limited and conditional.
And in regards to that last paragraph: Israel has repeatedly signaled that stability in neighboring states is preferable, provided it does not include hostile military entrenchment. The Egypt-Israel peace treaty is a strong counterexample to “Israel prefers instability”.
Maybe because when you post you always act like there should be tons of evidence that we look at without interpreting it or drawing conclusions. According to you we should not assume that Israel means anything based on what they are doing unless they have explicitly said so. But when even when Israeli ministers explicitly says what they think and want you interpret that differently. Not only these quotes, just in general.
I have followed this conflict for a long time so to me a lot of things are very clear cut. You obviously are not as informed.
"insisting that Israel and various sects in Syria should work together in the face of threats from Islamists.". Also stating that "They [kurds] are our natural ally," Saar said, urging to reach out and strengthen ties for political and security considerations."
This on the backdrop of the 480 airstrikes to take out as much military infrastructure as possible from the new government.
11 April
But 2 weeks later something has happened. Turkey has declared their intent to establish forward bases for their air force (which is also their AA) in Syria. And mentions there needs to be an understanding with Israel so they don't accidently shoot down each others aircraft. Israel declares forward bases to be a red line for them.
Israel stops talking about Kurds and solely focuses on Druze after this.
10 March A framework agreement is reached for the integration with the Kurds into Syria.
If you look at the whole picture it's very clear. Israel was moving to support minorities to institute their version of a federalized Syria. Turkey saw it coming and given their history with the Kurds they stepped in. I think we can be fairly sure it was "you start supporting the Kurds we will attack them ourselves, and we will place AA in Syria to protect our planes while we do it". An autonomous official Kurdish region is probably the biggest no-go for Turkey that exist.
So, yes. There was no never any real Israeli support for the Kurds because Turkey stepped in. But there were clearly plans for it (and the Druze, and the coast probably).
I can accept that we have differing takes. I only attribute intent when there is explicit evidence or when the available evidence forms a very strong, low-ambiguity pattern that reasonably constrains alternative explanations. Otherwise, I treat intent as uncertain and keep multiple hypotheses open. You seem to interpret consistent patterns of statements plus actions as strategy more loosely. Neither is wrong in principle but while you are operating at a higher level of inference I am doing so at a stricter evidentiary threshold. I have been following this conflict for a very long time as well and don't focus solely on everything negative Israel does. I further go for more nuanced media reportings like Ground News, instead of Al Jazeera or New Arab. They can be factually right, but their framings and interpretations seem similar to the notions that you use to get your points across and - at least as I'm concerned - are way too reaching.
To sum it up.. I think what you are doing is pattern recognition -> story constructing -> certainty, while I am going for pattern recognition -> generate alternatives -> withhold certainty. And to suggest that I am "not as informed"... yeah... I mean. That's like.. your opinion, man.
What I can easily concede and never doubted: - Israel has expressed occasional interest in minority groups in Syria (including Kurds and Druze) as strategic counterweights in rhetoric - Turkey strongly opposes Kurdish autonomy near its borders - Israel’s Syria policy is primarily Iran-focused and border-security-focused - There is no confirmed Israeli-Kurdish military alliance or operational coordination
What is up to interpretation: - Israel had concrete plans for Kurdish state-building in Syria - Turkey directly forced a reversal of Israeli Kurdish policy - Israeli strikes were part of a coordinated federalization strategy
Your earlier words were, that Israel is "actively trying to rekindle the civil war in Syria". If we take Sa'ar's word - that you used to make your point - at face value, in the most extreme form that we can extract, he wants to establish a separated, safe state... not to rekindle civil war. That claim simply cannot be extrapolated. And why would he? As I pointed out with the Egypt counterexample: Historically, Israel has no issues to form treaties, when opposing states are no longer threatening... they even traded territory/security for long-term stability. Israel has historically demonstrated willingness to normalize relations and accept stable neighboring states when core, credible security threats are removed (even when not, looking at Gaza 2005). However, whether this applies to Syria depends on the credibility, durability, and enforceability of such conditions in a post-conflict environment.
Among others, all these questions would need answering to create the story that you have established and even then it wouldn't be clear cut: - 480 strikes directly (!) after the regime collapsed in December, in line with most of what Israel did in the past when trying to establish security in southern Syria (which your own source even shows). What does that have to do with statements made in February? Or with Kurds who operate in northern Syria? - As all of the named factions have been persecuted by them at one point or another, why should statements about working together against Islamist extremists be controversial? - Further, do these statements by Sa'ar in any way shape or form imply a rekindling of civil war with no other alternatives, that - arguably seem much more plausible? - If there were supposed plans by Israel to support minorities in northern Syria: what were they exactly? Training, arming local forces? Via what route? Direct coordinations in operations? Again, across the whole distance of Syria in between Israel and the Kurds? Have we seen any Israeli base in Kurdish regions? Any training equipment or weapon pipelines or plans of them? Any air cover in northern Syria? Any diplomatic campaign except that one statement? That entire line of your story is purely speculative. - Could it be that the Israelis stopped talking about the Kurds because of the planed arrangement that was published in March you mentioned yourself (which was before the Turkish-Israeli-meeting in Azerbaijan in April)? The timeline would match there too, so how can you rule out that scenario? Especially when... - the bombings in southern Syria continued even though you assign Erdogan and Turkey some kind of effect. So what exactly was that effect besides Israel supposedly not talking anymore about the Kurds, which could have a multitude of other explanations like the reaching of an agreement? - Further, the claim that Israel actually stopped talking about Kurds is factually wrong. Sa'ar made comments about Kurds in July to other foreign ministers, mostly from Europe. Sa'ar's fear of Syria oppressing minorities was voiced by him after the incidents in Aleppo, which was in January 2026. So he didn't stop talking about it at all.. only when the agreement was close to being finished. He resumed criticizing the new regime, when the murderous repressions continued or when talking to international colleagues.
"If you look at the whole picture it's very clear." Yup, to you it may be, that much I understand. Some of your story is factually wrong, most of it can have different explanations and be solely correlational instead of causal. But you treat it like that. Clear. Which is fine for you, but please don't expect others to take the same leaps.
Syria had a civil war for 14 years with dozens, maybe hundreds, of factions. Many fighting each other. They finally overthrew Assad and got a new government which was in itself a loose coalition of factions around HTS as a core. What do you, honestly, think would happen if the new government collapses? There would obviously be more fighting. I mean there was more fighting even with the current government and everyone agrees that it has been extremely contained from what it could have been.
Initially the only thing holding the entire thing together was that HTS beat Assad. Israel then goes in and - Bombs the shit out of all military equipment they can find to keep it out of the hands of the new government (because "just in case", obviously not because they don't want them to consolidate their power). - Have their foreign minister state they want a federalized Syria. - Invade southern Syria. - Offers direct protection to a minority faction so they can refuse to integrate and then let them be provocative (almost getting them wiped out by the tribes in the process). - Have their minister of national security talk about assassinating the new president of Syria (cutting the head of the snake).
Are these the actions of a country that want to stabilize their neighbor? Or are these the actions of a country that wants to destabilize the new government in order to achieve their stated policy/vision? Which one feels more likely? And what would be the effect of such destabilisation in early 2025? (Very likely civil war, again).
Did they continue to bomb in southern Syria? Yes. Does that mean there was no effect from Turkey? The effect was that Israel did not get involved with the faction that held 1/3 of Syria and all the oil fields and there was a deal with USA involved to not do anything for a year with the kurds. Which was upheld. Al-Shara held his cool, managed to calm his followers down, got the Alwaite coast under control with no new massacres, waited out the 1 year truce with the kurds, dealt with that. The country held together, despite Israel.
Well, there goes a neutral tone with the lmao-start and the last paragraph. I try not to be too dismissive in return, but I've gotta say that your analysis - at least to me - seems to mix facts with emotional conclusions absent evidence, flavored with a lot of speculation. There are leaps that could be true, but most certainly don't have to be; other parts are simply overexaggerated interpretations.
Sa'ar's words can be reasonably interpreted as security framing rather than strategic destabilization intent, which is absolutely legitimate in a power vacuum environment. There are concerns about preventing weapons proliferation or stopping hostile actors exploiting the vacuum. So yes, in line with everything they said and did about southern and eastern Syria in the past, these actions make absolute sense. Buffer zones are the explanation and most of the Israeli strikes in Syria are predominantly concentrated in southern Syria near the Golan border (Daraa and Quneitra), with a secondary but significant cluster around Damascus targeting military infrastructure and alleged Iranian-linked assets. Btw, do you have a source for this 600 airstrike claim? I'd like to check what was actually counted (airstrike vs artillery vs drones).
In regards to Erdogan's "stepping in": What do you think which AA was deployed? SHORADs? NASAMS? Or S-300s/S-400s? And where exactly? The installations I know of, are in place to protect southern Turkey via a northern Syrian buffer zone.. the same thing Israel is doing in the south. This is an area where Israel has operated the least in anyways. None of those systems are credibly reported as deployed in Syria by Turkey; Turkish systems remain inside Turkey and for even the S-400s to have meaningful effect in their max range you'd need radar sites, command infrastructure and secure logistics, all of which Turkey does not have in Syria.
You further make it seem like Israel has had an operational alliance or direct military support relationship with Kurdish forces in Syria, which is not supported by evidence. Some Israeli political commentary has been sympathetic to Kurdish autonomy and occasional strategic analysis suggested Kurds are a “useful counterweight” to Iran in theory. But nothing more. There are no confirmed “support programs”, no operational command relationship, no formal military alliance, no joint command structures, no sustained weapons supply program and no documented battlefield coordination. So yeah, while there is no documented “withdrawal from supporting Kurds” it is mostly because there was no support system to withdraw from in the first place. Israeli policy in Syria was and is mainly focused on: Iranian military presence, missile transfers and border security in the Golan area. And while Turkish pressure was one factor among many (US desire to reduce military footprint in Syria, domestic US political debates, competing priorities like ISIS containment vs regional alliances) you are making it seem that no other explanation is possible. US presence in Syria has been reduced gradually and inconsistently, not suddenly “cut”, because after partnering with the SDF and the territorial defeat of ISIS US support became more limited and conditional.
And in regards to that last paragraph: Israel has repeatedly signaled that stability in neighboring states is preferable, provided it does not include hostile military entrenchment. The Egypt-Israel peace treaty is a strong counterexample to “Israel prefers instability”.
Maybe because when you post you always act like there should be tons of evidence that we look at without interpreting it or drawing conclusions. According to you we should not assume that Israel means anything based on what they are doing unless they have explicitly said so. But when even when Israeli ministers explicitly says what they think and want you interpret that differently. Not only these quotes, just in general.
I have followed this conflict for a long time so to me a lot of things are very clear cut. You obviously are not as informed.
"insisting that Israel and various sects in Syria should work together in the face of threats from Islamists.". Also stating that "They [kurds] are our natural ally," Saar said, urging to reach out and strengthen ties for political and security considerations."
This on the backdrop of the 480 airstrikes to take out as much military infrastructure as possible from the new government.
11 April
But 2 weeks later something has happened. Turkey has declared their intent to establish forward bases for their air force (which is also their AA) in Syria. And mentions there needs to be an understanding with Israel so they don't accidently shoot down each others aircraft. Israel declares forward bases to be a red line for them.
Israel stops talking about Kurds and solely focuses on Druze after this.
10 March A framework agreement is reached for the integration with the Kurds into Syria.
If you look at the whole picture it's very clear. Israel was moving to support minorities to institute their version of a federalized Syria. Turkey saw it coming and given their history with the Kurds they stepped in. I think we can be fairly sure it was "you start supporting the Kurds we will attack them ourselves, and we will place AA in Syria to protect our planes while we do it". An autonomous official Kurdish region is probably the biggest no-go for Turkey that exist.
So, yes. There was no never any real Israeli support for the Kurds because Turkey stepped in. But there were clearly plans for it (and the Druze, and the coast probably).
The events become a lot more understandable when you realize the purpose of Israel's existence. To do this you need to take a step back and take a wider view of Israel's behaviours and the international community's reaction to them over the decades.
Paul Newman nailed it in 1983.
104 countries at the UN vote to condemn Israel shooting down a civilian passenger plan. The USA abstains. "if they're not really a big enough enemy how are we going to get appropriations for more arms". Once you have all those weapons you then feel more inclined to use them. "hey guys we already spent the money...".
The purpose of Israel's existence is to maximize world wide military spending. Once you understand this is what is going on ... many of the seemingly contradictory events make more sense.
In 1983, the Soviet Union shoots down a passenger plane and it is the end of the world. in 1979, Israel does the same thing and the USA looks the other way. Why? The Soviet Union must be viewed as the big bad enemy and Israel must be viewed as the USA's #1 ally. Why? To motivate the manufacture and selling of billions of $$$ of weapons in as many areas of the world as possible.
I know billyboy gives me alot of shit for 'low effort posts' but tbh when I see these huge walls of text It seems like people going to an absolutely huge amount of effort to obfuscate something extremely simple.
I also don't see how you can make the claim that Israel is "actively trying to rekindle the civil war in Syria". Israel openly admits to targeting or carrying out airstrikes against Iranian military infrastructure or weapons shipments to Hezbollah. This is part of Israel’s strategy to prevent Iran from establishing a military foothold near its borders. I see no broad intervention in Syria’s internal political or factional conflict though. You even had operation "Good neighbour", as many Syrians were treated in Israeli hospitals during the Syrian war from 2010 (which of course, also added to their interest of creating a buffer zone). And what exactly do you see Erdogan's influence in? My understanding is, that he was mostly involved in Northern Syria, pushing back the Kurds and creating a buffer zone. How do you think that Turkey was countering Israeli influence in any clear strategic sense? Israel’s observable policy priorities - such as maintaining peace treaties, expanding normalization agreements, and deterring hostile actors - suggest a preference for stable neighboring states that accept its existence. While some analysts have argued that weakened adversaries can reduce conventional threats, there’s no clear evidence that Israel pursues instability in neighboring countries as a general policy. In Gaza and the West Bank, where this accussation pops up the most, Israel’s security and administrative policies have operated in a context where Gaza and the West Bank are treated as separate governance and security environments. Combined with Palestinian political fragmentation, this has reinforced the division between the two territories, but - as far as I know - there is no clear evidence of a single overarching strategy to permanently divide them.
Lmao.
So Israel has hit Syria with over 600 airstrikes since the fall of Assad. That's two a day. The first thing they did after Assad fell was to hit every piece of military equipment they could so the new government wouldn't get stronger. They have also invaded souther Syria without provocation.
Their foreign minister (Gideon Sa'ar) has openly stated that they wanted a federalized Syria. With the situation on the ground that would have meant a new civil war and we know from Iraq it means instability and infighting. A vast majority of Syrian did not want this. They openly support one separatist faction, even protecting them with airstrikes. They say it's to protect Druze in Syria but <50% of Druze live in Suweyda and there has been no mistreatment of Druze in general. Al-Hirji is also the leader of a criminal gang and in order to stay in power he has imprisoned and killed a lot of Druze from other factions. Ask Jordan why Israel allows them to keep doing cross border airstrikes in the region (hint, it involves drug smuggling).
The minister of national security has repeatedly called for the assassination of Jolani and stated that there can not be negotiated with the new Syrian government, labeling them as an enemy. While they have done nothing.
While Israel explicitly support al-Hiri and his faction they reached out to Alawites and the Kurds early on. Even with demands of a "safe corridor" between Suwedya and the SDF.
This is where Erdogan stepped in. The threat of Turkish military installations with advanced AA down towards Damascus was a red line for Israel but it showed how serious Turkey was about the Kurds. Israel had to back down 100% from supporting the kurds and Erdogan got Trump to cut ties.
Assad remnants in the coast blew their wad way to early and the rest of the world needed HTS to stop everything from going from a massacre to full on genocide. Much later the new government folded the Kurds like a lawn chair, thus ending the Israeli dream of a weak, federalized Syria plagued by infighting. Al-Hirji is way to weak to pose a threat and economically the region is insignificant. It's a shame for the Druze living there because there is no way they are getting out of poverty. Still just last week Syria was counted as an enemy by Israel even when they have done nothing towards Israel which itself has both invaded, bombed and tried to wreck their internal politics to destabilize the country.
So get your head out of the sand. Israel says exactly what they want with Syria, and is aggressively trying for it. Their nightmare scenario is a peaceful viable Syria with geopolitical importance. The new communications line being built between SA and Turkey is precursor step to a long envisioned pipeline project. Everything points to Turkey and the gulf states taking "joint custody" of Syria. If it's a success Israel will have to deal with illegally occupying a globally important, peaceful country which they can't just destroy with their military.
Well, there goes a neutral tone with the lmao-start and the last paragraph. I try not to be too dismissive in return, but I've gotta say that your analysis - at least to me - seems to mix facts with emotional conclusions absent evidence, flavored with a lot of speculation. There are leaps that could be true, but most certainly don't have to be; other parts are simply overexaggerated interpretations.
Sa'ar's words can be reasonably interpreted as security framing rather than strategic destabilization intent, which is absolutely legitimate in a power vacuum environment. There are concerns about preventing weapons proliferation or stopping hostile actors exploiting the vacuum. So yes, in line with everything they said and did about southern and eastern Syria in the past, these actions make absolute sense. Buffer zones are the explanation and most of the Israeli strikes in Syria are predominantly concentrated in southern Syria near the Golan border (Daraa and Quneitra), with a secondary but significant cluster around Damascus targeting military infrastructure and alleged Iranian-linked assets. Btw, do you have a source for this 600 airstrike claim? I'd like to check what was actually counted (airstrike vs artillery vs drones).
In regards to Erdogan's "stepping in": What do you think which AA was deployed? SHORADs? NASAMS? Or S-300s/S-400s? And where exactly? The installations I know of, are in place to protect southern Turkey via a northern Syrian buffer zone.. the same thing Israel is doing in the south. This is an area where Israel has operated the least in anyways. None of those systems are credibly reported as deployed in Syria by Turkey; Turkish systems remain inside Turkey and for even the S-400s to have meaningful effect in their max range you'd need radar sites, command infrastructure and secure logistics, all of which Turkey does not have in Syria.
You further make it seem like Israel has had an operational alliance or direct military support relationship with Kurdish forces in Syria, which is not supported by evidence. Some Israeli political commentary has been sympathetic to Kurdish autonomy and occasional strategic analysis suggested Kurds are a “useful counterweight” to Iran in theory. But nothing more. There are no confirmed “support programs”, no operational command relationship, no formal military alliance, no joint command structures, no sustained weapons supply program and no documented battlefield coordination. So yeah, while there is no documented “withdrawal from supporting Kurds” it is mostly because there was no support system to withdraw from in the first place. Israeli policy in Syria was and is mainly focused on: Iranian military presence, missile transfers and border security in the Golan area. And while Turkish pressure was one factor among many (US desire to reduce military footprint in Syria, domestic US political debates, competing priorities like ISIS containment vs regional alliances) you are making it seem that no other explanation is possible. US presence in Syria has been reduced gradually and inconsistently, not suddenly “cut”, because after partnering with the SDF and the territorial defeat of ISIS US support became more limited and conditional.
And in regards to that last paragraph: Israel has repeatedly signaled that stability in neighboring states is preferable, provided it does not include hostile military entrenchment. The Egypt-Israel peace treaty is a strong counterexample to “Israel prefers instability”.
On April 18 2026 00:57 Jankisa wrote: Israel is not only criticized about it's conduct during war. They are and have been criticized for decades for aggressive settlement expansion, the two tier justice system in West Bank and Israel in general, terrible conditions they are keeping Palestinian prisoners in, sniping of kids and journalists outside of war etc.
They have also been cracking down on protests (semi justified as they are in a state of war and missiles were flying at them at the time), they have been criticized for shutting down investigation in their soldiers raping (with a knife) a Palestinian prisoner, for enacting a death penalty only for Palestinians and so, so much more.
The point wasn’t to deny that Israel has been criticized for a wide range of issues. And while some of the claims you mentioned are well-supported, others are disputed or overstated, that’s not what I was addressing.
My focus is on the comparison itself. Saying “they’re no better than Iran” implies a level of equivalence that I don’t think is accurate or justified. You can strongly criticize Israel’s policies without concluding that it is essentially the same kind of state as Iran.
To be precise, I reject the following premises: 1. That no one in this thread has argued that Israel deliberately tries to kill as many Palestinians as possible. 2. That the available data and described events justify the conclusion that Israel does not care at all about civilians. 3. That Israel and Iran can be meaningfully described as “no different” in the way suggested.
This doesn’t mean rejecting all criticism or dismissing the possibility of serious wrongdoing. It just means that criticism should remain proportionate and not collapse into oversimplified equivalence.
Be the one that goes with the evidence, like the Israeli government does not do enough to restrain the extremist settlers in both policing and prosecuting, or the IDF fires too freely on perceived threats and doesn't investigate and prosecute strongly the worst cases of it, or the judiciary system is too lenient.
Agreed.
On April 18 2026 05:11 CuddlyCuteKitten wrote:
On April 18 2026 01:16 PremoBeats wrote:
On April 18 2026 00:57 Jankisa wrote: Israel is not only criticized about it's conduct during war. They are and have been criticized for decades for aggressive settlement expansion, the two tier justice system in West Bank and Israel in general, terrible conditions they are keeping Palestinian prisoners in, sniping of kids and journalists outside of war etc.
They have also been cracking down on protests (semi justified as they are in a state of war and missiles were flying at them at the time), they have been criticized for shutting down investigation in their soldiers raping (with a knife) a Palestinian prisoner, for enacting a death penalty only for Palestinians and so, so much more.
The point wasn’t to deny that Israel has been criticized for a wide range of issues. And while some of the claims you mentioned are well-supported, others are disputed or overstated, that’s not what I was addressing.
My focus is on the comparison itself. Saying “they’re no better than Iran” implies a level of equivalence that I don’t think is accurate or justified. You can strongly criticize Israel’s policies without concluding that it is essentially the same kind of state as Iran.
To be precise, I reject the following premises: 1. That no one in this thread has argued that Israel deliberately tries to kill as many Palestinians as possible. 2. That the available data and described events justify the conclusion that Israel does not care at all about civilians. 3. That Israel and Iran can be meaningfully described as “no different” in the way suggested.
This doesn’t mean rejecting all criticism or dismissing the possibility of serious wrongdoing. It just means that criticism should remain proportionate and not collapse into oversimplified equivalence.
1. Correct, people in this thread have suggested that. 2. Israel used to care about civilians but in recent years I at least get the feeling that they now care about civilians only in how it affects their image. If no one knows it doesn't matter, if it gets out it still hardly matters. Potential suffering amongst "enemy" civilians seem to be a non factor in the new military planning. Individual cases of abuse or obvious mistakes are either swept under the rug or given a slap on the wrist. And senior Israeli politicians actively encourage that type of behaviour. Also se point 3. 3. Iran and Israel are different as apples and oranges are but they are both still fruit. I'd argue that in when it comes to stoking conflict in the middle east they are on the same level. When it comes to ignoring the plight of other countries and civilians they are also on the same level. Iran funds Hezbollah and the Houthis and helped Assad in the civil war. But Israel has Gaza and has no problem "mowing the lawn" in Lebanon. They actively tried to rekindle the civil war in Syria. They obviously prefer weak and broken states next door and show absolutely no regard to the tremendous cost this incours on those countries. And again, senior Israeli politicians said as much. If Turkey hadn't put the foot down (and Erdogan being buddies with Trump) Syria would be fucked right now. So when it comes to being good neighbours and preventing conflict I feel both countries are about equally horrible. In many other aspects Israel is better than Iran. But those areas are usually not related to the government and Iranian citizens are not their goverment any more than Israeli citizens are.
I am not sure, how you arrive at the feeling that they only care about their image. The military has comparable numbers to similar conflicts. Israel has implemented extensive warning systems compared to many conflicts, after being hit by the biggest trauma the country ever suffered. Casualty numbers are in line with usual observations, as casualties in Gaza were extremely high at the beginning (late 2023), then generally declined over time into 2024 - 2025, but never dropped to zero and have shown intermittent spikes rather than a smooth trend. That is completely normal for conflict zones.
I also don't see how you can make the claim that Israel is "actively trying to rekindle the civil war in Syria". Israel openly admits to targeting or carrying out airstrikes against Iranian military infrastructure or weapons shipments to Hezbollah. This is part of Israel’s strategy to prevent Iran from establishing a military foothold near its borders. I see no broad intervention in Syria’s internal political or factional conflict though. You even had operation "Good neighbour", as many Syrians were treated in Israeli hospitals during the Syrian war from 2010 (which of course, also added to their interest of creating a buffer zone). And what exactly do you see Erdogan's influence in? My understanding is, that he was mostly involved in Northern Syria, pushing back the Kurds and creating a buffer zone. How do you think that Turkey was countering Israeli influence in any clear strategic sense? Israel’s observable policy priorities - such as maintaining peace treaties, expanding normalization agreements, and deterring hostile actors - suggest a preference for stable neighboring states that accept its existence. While some analysts have argued that weakened adversaries can reduce conventional threats, there’s no clear evidence that Israel pursues instability in neighboring countries as a general policy. In Gaza and the West Bank, where this accussation pops up the most, Israel’s security and administrative policies have operated in a context where Gaza and the West Bank are treated as separate governance and security environments. Combined with Palestinian political fragmentation, this has reinforced the division between the two territories, but - as far as I know - there is no clear evidence of a single overarching strategy to permanently divide them.
On April 18 2026 07:55 WombaT wrote:
On April 17 2026 15:00 PremoBeats wrote:
On April 15 2026 10:18 WombaT wrote:
On April 15 2026 06:48 Billyboy wrote:
On April 15 2026 06:39 WombaT wrote:
On April 15 2026 05:53 Billyboy wrote:
On April 15 2026 05:43 WombaT wrote: [quote] I don’t think thread denizens view Hezbollah, Hamas as honourable freedom fighters at all.
The quibble is mostly if Israel should kill mostly civilians to eradicate those organisations in lieu of other potential avenues.
Israel at this stage is just as hardline as an Iran, increasingly virulently nationalistic emboldened by the US and just bombs folks as they want.
Polling, increasingly reflects this as well. The idea that a Netanyahu was doing certain things to deflect from unpopularity, and it didn’t reflect general Israeli sentiment and there was sizeable opposition used to have some legs, increasingly it appears it doesn’t.
They are not nearly as hard line. For example, in Israel no protesters have been killed. In Iran 10s of thousands have.
How many civilians have been killed in Palestine?
Hard to say since Israel claims most were Hamas and Hamas claims all were civilians. Around 70k total. But there is a real chance less civilians died in Gaza during their war then Iran killed in a couple weeks of protesters. And well the number is way to high, it is an absolute bollocks assertion that Israel was trying to kill as many as they could. If that was the case the number would be 7 figures.
Right so we’ve got a ballpark 70k number to begin with and an Israel that has been progressively more hostile to international observers operating to even verify such things. This incidentally doesn’t include civilian casualties in say the Lebanon, or Iran
We’ve got illegal settlements ever expanding too.
The assertion has never been that Israel is trying to kill as many as it could possibly can, just that it doesn’t really give a shit about killing civiiians.
By the same logic I mean Russia isn’t behaving abominably, because if they really wanted to kill as many as they could they could just nuke Ukraine.
At what point do people abandon this fanciful idea that Israel is some outlier of democratic values in the region, when they’re bombing the fucking beejaysus out of everyone?
They’re no better than Iran really, same shit different flavour. An appalling state that could do considerably better but chooses not to.
The assertion - at least by some in this thread - definitely has been that Israel is trying to kill as many as it can get away with. And these, among others, are the kind of claims I argued against. I still don't see myself as a staunch defender of Israel - rather a more nuanced view on this conflict-, but arguing against such idiotic statements was the thing that branded me one. MagicPowers clearly made that claim many times and others assisted his line of argumentation, tried to attack the evidence I posted or didn't bother speaking out against these claims.
But even the assertion that Israel doesn't give a shit about killing civilians can be tested... We have the numbers from the IDF, but also the ones from independent sources. These put the civilian casualty rate in Gaza at around 50 to 75 %. Compare that to Mosul (60 - 80%) or the Syrian Civil War, which is believed to be majority civilian casualties. This clearly puts Gaza in the range of other urban / asymmetric wars or slightly below it. But even if it was worse slightly... Gaza is more populated in general, more populated with women and children and Hamas is among the most, if not the faction which is most embedded in civilian infrastructure, even firing rockets from refugee camps. In Lebanon the estimate is 40 - 70% civilian casualties and the numbers depend on whether urban strikes are included or the intensity of the phase are already lower. And as you mentioned Iran, we have a perfectly fine comparison, how Israel's civilian tolls are, when there is no urban warfare, as the reported deaths - depending on the source - sit at 10 - 30 %. So there is a clear degression and one that can be explained by the nature of the battle. So I would really like to know, how you arrive at the idea, that Israel doesn't give a shit about civilians, as I think these numbers and the context clearly hint at a different conclusion. And not only looking at casualty figures, but overall conduct: Israel has provided fuel, water and electricity to a hostile region and also has similar rates of civilian casualties to comparable conflicts. Gazan civilians were warned via speakers, SMS, TV, radio ahead of time and patients from Gaza have been treated in Israeli hospitals. At different times in history, tens of thousands of Palestinians have worked in Israel, taking home much higher income. Israel has different kind of ethnicities in every branch of society, allowing for freedom of religion and has given up their most holy site to the Muslims, which don't want to share the Temple Mount / Al Aqsa. And despite all its flaws, it still is a democratic state with rules and regulations, whereas Iran killed of tens of thousands protestors. These observations obviously don't negate valid criticism of military actions but it shows that there are long-standing systems of cooperation, dependence and even support to Palestinian civilians.
So to say that Israel is no better than Iran - in my opinion - is preposterous. Although I respect your opinion most of the time, even if it differs from mine, this statement is absolute madness. Israel operates in ongoing asymmetric conflicts, dense urban warfare environments, while Iran has mostly been attacking Israel through proxies or launching rockets at everything -often not even military sites -, which is supported by missiles hitting residential building, a synagogue or apartment blocks. In some phases almost all fatalities on the Israeli side were civilians and the recent war sits at 65 - 75% civilian casualties in non urban warfare but missile strikes. Compare that to the 10 - 30% on the other side. Further, Iran is primarily criticized for systematic internal repression, while Israel is criticized for conduct in war. Collapsing those into a single moral judgement ignores that they operate in fundamentally different domains. Your statement completely erases what these states are actually being criticized for and it treats outcome as intentional. Perhaps there is something I overlooked, so please share your thoughts on this one...
Ok to clarify, no Israel isn’t as bad as Iran IMO. Venting frustration doesn’t aid specificity. For me their conduct has increasingly taken them past a threshold and into a similar domain, namely of consistently egregious conduct that can simply be outright condemned wholesale rather than dissected with the scalpel of nuance.
There are mitigating factors, although less so than prior, and accompanied with significant increases in the bad so to speak.
Alas bit too busy to do a more lengthy reply, will pop back in at some point.
Essentially the crux of my point is simply that ‘it’s complicated’ or other barriers tend to pop up on this particular topic, where they don’t necessarily elsewhere, or employ rationales they wouldn’t elsewhere.
I don’t think this precludes discussing complexities either, or mitigating factors or what have you.
Thanks, for coming back! If you find the time, I'd be interested to hear what threshold you are talking about. Legal? Moral? Proportion? Intent? Also, which conduct you speak of... Over what time period? Compared to what baseline?
I'd also be interested which barriers you see that are not necessarily present elsewhere.
Imo, a “wholesale condemnation vs dissection” framing would be overly binary (not sure, if that is what you suggested). It would set up a contrast between two modes of judgement: either one evaluates actions in a detailed, case-by-case way (“dissection with a scalpel of nuance”), or one moves to a broad, systemic condemnation that treats conduct as a whole category. The issue with this framing is that it treats these two approaches as mutually exclusive, when in practice serious analysis usually combines both. You can recognise recurring patterns or systemic concerns while still examining individual events in detail to understand intent, context, and variation over time. Because of that, the argument risks oversimplifying the range of analytical tools available by implying that once a “threshold” is crossed, detailed scrutiny becomes unnecessary or secondary, rather than still essential for understanding what is actually happening.
Bias, presumably. Some of which I’m sympathetic to, some of which I’m not. Jewish people having a degree of reflexive defensive to such a state in a world where anti-Semitism is on the rise (even outside of that boosted by the current conflict), isn’t something I’m particularly condemnatory of. We’ve all got biases and some are very difficult to shift even if one actively tries. Other biases such as ‘I don’t like Muslims very much’ I am less sympathetic to, which I’ve encountered plenty, albeit to firmly stress I don’t think are factors in TL threads.
All of the above really.
It’s really a combination of multiple areas and an intensification in the post October 7th period, although one can perhaps point to a general direction of travel that precedes that.
As I’ve said prior, no state in the world would just suck up an October 7th event, or various groups and states that believe you don’t have a right to exist and act upon it. That’s an unrealistic expectation, and one I’d reject coming from anyone who isn’t a hardcore pacifist as it’s demanding things of Israel that wouldn’t be demanded elsewhere. To go back to biases, I think one can observe them here too, just in the opposite direction.
If we take the sheer volume of increased casualties, the continued expansion of settlements, the increasingly poisonous rhetoric of leaders, shifts in attitudes amongst the populace, and an increased hostility to third party observation or oversight etc.
It’s difficult to put an exact marker on it, even personally given it’s so multi-factored, and of course personal views will vary. So what the ‘threshold’ is is quite hard to specifically nail down, and where it shifts from not ideal but grey into just outright unacceptable.
I don’t think those two aforementioned approaches are mutually exclusive, indeed for me it’s the exact opposite. I’d consider the questions of Israel’s conduct being acceptable, and how do you resolve such a conflict as two that can exist independently, although of course interlinked.
To put it crudely I consider there to be a difference between ‘that’s bad, but…’ and ‘thats bad. But let’s examine the wider context.’
I mean to pick one example, complicated conflict but how have an estimated 2600 people been killed at aid sites? Aid sites that foreign observers have increasingly restricted access to.
As I’ve said prior I also don’t really buy into the idea of comparable conflicts because I don’t know of many that exist. There’s such a power asymmetry, which isn’t unique to conflict. Palestinians exist in effective pseudo-states which are simultaneously not really fully-fledged states, nor are they actually part of Israel, so it doesn’t neatly fit into most categories very neatly. It’s not an inter-state war, nor a civil war, nor a state crushing internal dissent. Which makes it tricky to benchmark versus those kind of things for better or for worse.
Alright.. thanks for the clarification; now I've got a clearer picture. And yeah. I can't give you a singular or probably even satisfying answer in regards to the question about aid sites. Violence and mass-casualty incidents near humanitarian aid distribution points have occurred in multiple modern conflict zones (including Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and South Sudan), typically as a result of insecurity, crowding, and ongoing hostilities rather than aid sites being isolated or fully protected environments. Add to that bad decision making in selecting personnel, extremely high population density, confined geography, centralized border-controlled aid entry points as well as an active high-intensity urban warfare environment and high-risk conditions for such incidents are established. This description shouldn't be seen as an excuse though.. simply an explanation. And as I said multiple times already: these incidents should be examined and trialed and the perpetrators or persons in charge should be held accountable as best as possible.
And while I understand that no clear cut comparison is realistic, I think numbers in regards to relative civilian casualty rates can be analyzed given the context of other conflicts, even if the nature of the factions is unclear or there is asymmetry in their fire power. Urban warfare tends to produce similar civilian risk patterns across conflicts... and power asymmetry is playing a more limited role there. If we acknowledge that ISIS fighters were often clearly identified combatants or that Mosul civilians could often escape in phases, whereas Gaza has much more geographically constrained exit routes, as well as other factors like the behavior of Hamas, it wouldn't be unreasonable to say that Gaza has several battlefield conditions that are among the most structurally severe for civilian risk in modern urban warfare. Yet, the relative casualty numbers are lower than in these conflicts. This of course still doesn't allow for a clear cut comparison, but it hints at the idea that the IDF isn't going around, not giving a fuck about civilian damage.
But they won’t be trialled or held accountable will they?
The very factors that make pursuing a policy of wiping out a terrorist organisation in a rather small, often population dense urban area, as a strong and stable state, are simultaneously factors that should make securing aid sites easier in areas in theory
I think its perfectly fair to try to find a baseline from comparable phenomena
If we’re looking aid distribution specifically I’m not sure we can look at examples with as many differences as commonality to find said baseline.
In addition we can also look at Israel’s own past record in this domain, which has been considerably better historically even if one may find other policies objectionable. We can baseline something partly against its past self
Occam and his razor aren’t faultless tools, they are useful though.
There’s been a marked increase in hostility to third party institutions or observers operating in the area too. The BBC doc I watched on aid sites had to rely on an IDF whistleblower for footage from aid sites as they were barred from entering and observing themselves.
There’s shades of ‘aurora borealis, localised entirely within your kitchen?’ ‘May I see it?’ ‘No.’ to some of this
On April 20 2026 00:44 Jockmcplop wrote: I know billyboy gives me alot of shit for 'low effort posts' but tbh when I see these huge walls of text It seems like people going to an absolutely huge amount of effort to obfuscate something extremely simple.
Best I can do is 9 paragraphs on that bombing children is morally complicated I’m afraid.
I don’t consider them especially convincing arguments because they often end up becoming contradictory.
On April 20 2026 00:44 Jockmcplop wrote: I know billyboy gives me alot of shit for 'low effort posts' but tbh when I see these huge walls of text It seems like people going to an absolutely huge amount of effort to obfuscate something extremely simple.
ITs the low content plus the made up hateful shit I call you out on. Such as
[/QUOTE] I wonder what it is about Israel that makes them absolutely refuse to stop killing people for any reason at all.[/QUOTE]
killing as many people as possible
And you always "defend" yourself by attacking me with straw mans you make up about me celebrating war crimes, which of course you can't ever find. My take is because if you turn me into a monster you can pretend the lies you spread are not out of hate (wtf you think its love?).
I guess the bonus of things is you have found something you and Nettles agree on!
Another funny thing is watching Wombat jump in with exactly what I've stated over and over again, as if it is a counter to me and not you.
The assertion has never been that Israel is trying to kill as many as it could possibly can, just that it doesn’t really give a shit about killing civiiians.
At least you give me confidence in my position when you can't argue against and have to make up random shit to paint me negatively.
On April 20 2026 09:03 Godwrath wrote: You are on oBlade's level of "i Will just argue semantics now so hopefully i will be right at some point about something else".
Nope, I'm very clear and direct. It only gets complicated when people full of hate like you make up positions for me and then argue them. You left fringe fucks should be asking yourselves why you happen to agree with the fringe righties on this one.
That's easy. The statements I highlighted are examples, and there is a huge amounts of them. Then there is how they personally attack and strawman anyone who pushes against their false narratives. Anyone who doesn't agree completely, no matter the BS, is the enemy.
Billy have you tried maybe interpreting other people's post a bit more generously?
For example you say:
I wonder what it is about Israel that makes them absolutely refuse to stop killing people for any reason at all.
is a statement full of hate and inaccurate.
It wasn't intended that way at all. It was a response to the fact that Israel was saying they will negotiate with Lebanon but they won't stop bombing them while they do it. It was part exaggeration and part reaction, and there is NO hate involved.
Similarly when I talk about Israel killing as many people as possible I am not being literal, and anyone with half a brain knows that, but you are so argumentative you decide to take it literally anyway just so you can call me hateful.
Its typical tactics of the liberal center. Do anything you can to paint everyone else as terrible people.
There's no need for it. Just act a bit less like a cunt and you'll probably find less people getting into personal arguments with you (this is top tier advice, I should charge for it). Your ban history makes it absolutely clear that you get involved in more of this shit than anyone else.
Next time you read a post and think to yourself 'This person is anti-semitic!', try seeing if maybe you could interpret their post some other way.
To be clear, I do hate. I hate Israel's policies. I hate it when they execute children and hail the executioners as heroes. But I don't hate all Israelis or all Jews or anything like that because I am a leftist and have a conscience.
And no, I'm not carrying on this argument forever with you because I know in my heart of hearts that you will respond with pure aggression and then expect me to carry it on forever. Give it your best shot, I'm about done here for now.
I wonder what it is about Israel that makes them absolutely refuse to stop killing people for any reason at all.
is a statement full of hate and inaccurate.
It wasn't intended that way at all. It was a response to the fact that Israel was saying they will negotiate with Lebanon but they won't stop bombing them while they do it. It was part exaggeration and part reaction, and there is NO hate involved.
Similarly when I talk about Israel killing as many people as possible I am not being literal, and anyone with half a brain knows that, but you are so argumentative you decide to take it literally anyway just so you can call me hateful.
Its typical tactics of the liberal center. Do anything you can to paint everyone else as terrible people.
There's no need for it. Just act a bit less like a cunt and you'll probably find less people getting into personal arguments with you (this is top tier advice, I should charge for it). Your ban history makes it absolutely clear that you get involved in more of this shit than anyone else.
Next time you read a post and think to yourself 'This person is anti-semitic!', try seeing if maybe you could interpret their post some other way.
To be clear, I do hate. I hate Israel's policies. I hate it when they execute children and hail the executioners as heroes. But I don't hate all Israelis or all Jews or anything like that because I am a leftist and have a conscience.
And no, I'm not carrying on this argument forever with you because I know in my heart of hearts that you will respond with pure aggression and then expect me to carry it on forever. Give it your best shot, I'm about done here for now.
ROLF! That is rich, do you remotely do that? No, you pile on and even just straight make up peoples positions and then insult them for things they do not say.
I have given the benefit of the doubt over and over again. That time has passed. I will continue to just respond to the actual words written, though, even though it is not what you deserve.
You are extremely biased, you are just completely unaware of it. I mean all people are, but some actually try to not be. Being a leftist does not give you a conscience or make you a good person any more than being Christian, Muslim, conservative or whatever does. Being a good person requires much more than that.
I do love how you finish as if you are the victim. Who has said anything mean to you personally? The closest thing is me saying your posts, that are factually wrong and super negative, are drive by hate. Compare that with the type of shit you say and the shit you just straight up make up. Get off you're high horse, you are not the victim.
Edit: Also hilarious, is I was the one who stopped, and you kept talking about me for posts after and then again days after. You have ZERO self realization!
Well, there goes a neutral tone with the lmao-start and the last paragraph. I try not to be too dismissive in return, but I've gotta say that your analysis - at least to me - seems to mix facts with emotional conclusions absent evidence, flavored with a lot of speculation. There are leaps that could be true, but most certainly don't have to be; other parts are simply overexaggerated interpretations.
Sa'ar's words can be reasonably interpreted as security framing rather than strategic destabilization intent, which is absolutely legitimate in a power vacuum environment. There are concerns about preventing weapons proliferation or stopping hostile actors exploiting the vacuum. So yes, in line with everything they said and did about southern and eastern Syria in the past, these actions make absolute sense. Buffer zones are the explanation and most of the Israeli strikes in Syria are predominantly concentrated in southern Syria near the Golan border (Daraa and Quneitra), with a secondary but significant cluster around Damascus targeting military infrastructure and alleged Iranian-linked assets. Btw, do you have a source for this 600 airstrike claim? I'd like to check what was actually counted (airstrike vs artillery vs drones).
In regards to Erdogan's "stepping in": What do you think which AA was deployed? SHORADs? NASAMS? Or S-300s/S-400s? And where exactly? The installations I know of, are in place to protect southern Turkey via a northern Syrian buffer zone.. the same thing Israel is doing in the south. This is an area where Israel has operated the least in anyways. None of those systems are credibly reported as deployed in Syria by Turkey; Turkish systems remain inside Turkey and for even the S-400s to have meaningful effect in their max range you'd need radar sites, command infrastructure and secure logistics, all of which Turkey does not have in Syria.
You further make it seem like Israel has had an operational alliance or direct military support relationship with Kurdish forces in Syria, which is not supported by evidence. Some Israeli political commentary has been sympathetic to Kurdish autonomy and occasional strategic analysis suggested Kurds are a “useful counterweight” to Iran in theory. But nothing more. There are no confirmed “support programs”, no operational command relationship, no formal military alliance, no joint command structures, no sustained weapons supply program and no documented battlefield coordination. So yeah, while there is no documented “withdrawal from supporting Kurds” it is mostly because there was no support system to withdraw from in the first place. Israeli policy in Syria was and is mainly focused on: Iranian military presence, missile transfers and border security in the Golan area. And while Turkish pressure was one factor among many (US desire to reduce military footprint in Syria, domestic US political debates, competing priorities like ISIS containment vs regional alliances) you are making it seem that no other explanation is possible. US presence in Syria has been reduced gradually and inconsistently, not suddenly “cut”, because after partnering with the SDF and the territorial defeat of ISIS US support became more limited and conditional.
And in regards to that last paragraph: Israel has repeatedly signaled that stability in neighboring states is preferable, provided it does not include hostile military entrenchment. The Egypt-Israel peace treaty is a strong counterexample to “Israel prefers instability”.
Maybe because when you post you always act like there should be tons of evidence that we look at without interpreting it or drawing conclusions. According to you we should not assume that Israel means anything based on what they are doing unless they have explicitly said so. But when even when Israeli ministers explicitly says what they think and want you interpret that differently. Not only these quotes, just in general.
I have followed this conflict for a long time so to me a lot of things are very clear cut. You obviously are not as informed.
"insisting that Israel and various sects in Syria should work together in the face of threats from Islamists.". Also stating that "They [kurds] are our natural ally," Saar said, urging to reach out and strengthen ties for political and security considerations."
This on the backdrop of the 480 airstrikes to take out as much military infrastructure as possible from the new government.
11 April
But 2 weeks later something has happened. Turkey has declared their intent to establish forward bases for their air force (which is also their AA) in Syria. And mentions there needs to be an understanding with Israel so they don't accidently shoot down each others aircraft. Israel declares forward bases to be a red line for them.
Israel stops talking about Kurds and solely focuses on Druze after this.
10 March A framework agreement is reached for the integration with the Kurds into Syria.
If you look at the whole picture it's very clear. Israel was moving to support minorities to institute their version of a federalized Syria. Turkey saw it coming and given their history with the Kurds they stepped in. I think we can be fairly sure it was "you start supporting the Kurds we will attack them ourselves, and we will place AA in Syria to protect our planes while we do it". An autonomous official Kurdish region is probably the biggest no-go for Turkey that exist.
So, yes. There was no never any real Israeli support for the Kurds because Turkey stepped in. But there were clearly plans for it (and the Druze, and the coast probably).
I can accept that we have differing takes. I only attribute intent when there is explicit evidence or when the available evidence forms a very strong, low-ambiguity pattern that reasonably constrains alternative explanations. Otherwise, I treat intent as uncertain and keep multiple hypotheses open. You seem to interpret consistent patterns of statements plus actions as strategy more loosely. Neither is wrong in principle but while you are operating at a higher level of inference I am doing so at a stricter evidentiary threshold. I have been following this conflict for a very long time as well and don't focus solely on everything negative Israel does. I further go for more nuanced media reportings like Ground News, instead of Al Jazeera or New Arab. They can be factually right, but their framings and interpretations seem similar to the notions that you use to get your points across and - at least as I'm concerned - are way too reaching.
To sum it up.. I think what you are doing is pattern recognition -> story constructing -> certainty, while I am going for pattern recognition -> generate alternatives -> withhold certainty. And to suggest that I am "not as informed"... yeah... I mean. That's like.. your opinion, man.
What I can easily concede and never doubted: - Israel has expressed occasional interest in minority groups in Syria (including Kurds and Druze) as strategic counterweights in rhetoric - Turkey strongly opposes Kurdish autonomy near its borders - Israel’s Syria policy is primarily Iran-focused and border-security-focused - There is no confirmed Israeli-Kurdish military alliance or operational coordination
What is up to interpretation: - Israel had concrete plans for Kurdish state-building in Syria - Turkey directly forced a reversal of Israeli Kurdish policy - Israeli strikes were part of a coordinated federalization strategy
Your earlier words were, that Israel is "actively trying to rekindle the civil war in Syria". If we take Sa'ar's word - that you used to make your point - at face value, in the most extreme form that we can extract, he wants to establish a separated, safe state... not to rekindle civil war. That claim simply cannot be extrapolated. And why would he? As I pointed out with the Egypt counterexample: Historically, Israel has no issues to form treaties, when opposing states are no longer threatening... they even traded territory/security for long-term stability. Israel has historically demonstrated willingness to normalize relations and accept stable neighboring states when core, credible security threats are removed (even when not, looking at Gaza 2005). However, whether this applies to Syria depends on the credibility, durability, and enforceability of such conditions in a post-conflict environment.
Among others, all these questions would need answering to create the story that you have established and even then it wouldn't be clear cut: - 480 strikes directly (!) after the regime collapsed in December, in line with most of what Israel did in the past when trying to establish security in southern Syria (which your own source even shows). What does that have to do with statements made in February? Or with Kurds who operate in northern Syria? - As all of the named factions have been persecuted by them at one point or another, why should statements about working together against Islamist extremists be controversial? - Further, do these statements by Sa'ar in any way shape or form imply a rekindling of civil war with no other alternatives, that - arguably seem much more plausible? - If there were supposed plans by Israel to support minorities in northern Syria: what were they exactly? Training, arming local forces? Via what route? Direct coordinations in operations? Again, across the whole distance of Syria in between Israel and the Kurds? Have we seen any Israeli base in Kurdish regions? Any training equipment or weapon pipelines or plans of them? Any air cover in northern Syria? Any diplomatic campaign except that one statement? That entire line of your story is purely speculative. - Could it be that the Israelis stopped talking about the Kurds because of the planed arrangement that was published in March you mentioned yourself (which was before the Turkish-Israeli-meeting in Azerbaijan in April)? The timeline would match there too, so how can you rule out that scenario? Especially when... - the bombings in southern Syria continued even though you assign Erdogan and Turkey some kind of effect. So what exactly was that effect besides Israel supposedly not talking anymore about the Kurds, which could have a multitude of other explanations like the reaching of an agreement? - Further, the claim that Israel actually stopped talking about Kurds is factually wrong. Sa'ar made comments about Kurds in July to other foreign ministers, mostly from Europe. Sa'ar's fear of Syria oppressing minorities was voiced by him after the incidents in Aleppo, which was in January 2026. So he didn't stop talking about it at all.. only when the agreement was close to being finished. He resumed criticizing the new regime, when the murderous repressions continued or when talking to international colleagues.
"If you look at the whole picture it's very clear." Yup, to you it may be, that much I understand. Some of your story is factually wrong, most of it can have different explanations and be solely correlational instead of causal. But you treat it like that. Clear. Which is fine for you, but please don't expect others to take the same leaps.
Syria had a civil war for 14 years with dozens, maybe hundreds, of factions. Many fighting each other. They finally overthrew Assad and got a new government which was in itself a loose coalition of factions around HTS as a core. What do you, honestly, think would happen if the new government collapses? There would obviously be more fighting. I mean there was more fighting even with the current government and everyone agrees that it has been extremely contained from what it could have been.
Initially the only thing holding the entire thing together was that HTS beat Assad. Israel then goes in and - Bombs the shit out of all military equipment they can find to keep it out of the hands of the new government (because "just in case", obviously not because they don't want them to consolidate their power). - Have their foreign minister state they want a federalized Syria. - Invade southern Syria. - Offers direct protection to a minority faction so they can refuse to integrate and then let them be provocative (almost getting them wiped out by the tribes in the process). - Have their minister of national security talk about assassinating the new president of Syria (cutting the head of the snake).
Are these the actions of a country that want to stabilize their neighbor? Or are these the actions of a country that wants to destabilize the new government in order to achieve their stated policy/vision? Which one feels more likely? And what would be the effect of such destabilisation in early 2025? (Very likely civil war, again).
Did they continue to bomb in southern Syria? Yes. Does that mean there was no effect from Turkey? The effect was that Israel did not get involved with the faction that held 1/3 of Syria and all the oil fields and there was a deal with USA involved to not do anything for a year with the kurds. Which was upheld. Al-Shara held his cool, managed to calm his followers down, got the Alwaite coast under control with no new massacres, waited out the 1 year truce with the kurds, dealt with that. The country held together, despite Israel.
The way you frame them, no, these actions are not the actions of a country that wants to stabilize their neighbor. But ironically enough, that is exactly what Sa'ar mentioned in the speech you quoted. By acknowledging that Syria has an incredible amount of factions and diverse communities, a separated Syria is a more stable and safe Syria... you know win-win. While of course, Syria will also have less possible influence to do harm to Israel. But that's the thing... you assume the worst intent and singular master plan for these takes, yet most of them are complex and have several layers. You formulate an "obvious" result, based on leaps. To not give Israel any credit in regards to their security concerns seems wild to me, but hey, I guess we won't find common ground here. I still think the exaggerations and motifs you attribute to Iseael to arrive at the conclusion that it is actively rekindling a civil war are far from being clear. We agreed on contention #1 (hard to disagree when a user on the same page repeats the contested phrasing). For #2 and #3, well... I still don't see Israel not caring about civilians or it being similar to Iran. I listed what Israel has done to an enemy faction, relative data sets and general conduct. Israel isn't repressing their own population, by killing tens of thousands. Nearly all of Israel's moves in other countries can be explained by security concerns and attacks against enemy factions who escalated first. It is hard to "prevent conflict" in neighboring countries when they throw missile, after missile, after missile. Even the claim that Israel isn't a good neighbor or did nothing to prevent conflict can be contested. Jordan: Long-standing security coordination, intelligence sharing (especially on jihadist threats), water and energy cooperation agreements. They are interested in a stable regime. Egypt: Deep security coordination in Sinai against ISIS affiliates, gas exports and economic ties, maintenance of the peace framework... same thing. Interested in a stable regime. Whenever the other country isn't actively trying to bomb the shit out of Israel, Israel doesn't seem to be interested in bombing the shit out of them, even though these countries have been previously at war with it too. Now how is that for inference? Do you seriously believe, that Israel would keep bombing southern Syria if there is long lasting peace on the table and the Jihadists are eradicated?
On April 20 2026 00:44 Jockmcplop wrote: I know billyboy gives me alot of shit for 'low effort posts' but tbh when I see these huge walls of text It seems like people going to an absolutely huge amount of effort to obfuscate something extremely simple.
On April 20 2026 09:47 Jockmcplop wrote: Billy have you tried maybe interpreting other people's post a bit more generously?
Pretty ironic to see these posts on the same page. Yeah, all we do is obfuscate something simple. Israel is evil, does only bad things, is committing a genocide and simply - in all relevant aspects - is the bad guy; nothing complex about the region's history, religious aspects, military operations or geopolitical factors in this thread or topic. Why don't we close the thread as the very simply stuff that we have been trying to obfuscate has been exposed. Nothing more to discuss, right? Gee whiz. If history and life would always be as easy a JJR's explanation for all this.
I also don't see how you can make the claim that Israel is "actively trying to rekindle the civil war in Syria". Israel openly admits to targeting or carrying out airstrikes against Iranian military infrastructure or weapons shipments to Hezbollah. This is part of Israel’s strategy to prevent Iran from establishing a military foothold near its borders. I see no broad intervention in Syria’s internal political or factional conflict though. You even had operation "Good neighbour", as many Syrians were treated in Israeli hospitals during the Syrian war from 2010 (which of course, also added to their interest of creating a buffer zone). And what exactly do you see Erdogan's influence in? My understanding is, that he was mostly involved in Northern Syria, pushing back the Kurds and creating a buffer zone. How do you think that Turkey was countering Israeli influence in any clear strategic sense? Israel’s observable policy priorities - such as maintaining peace treaties, expanding normalization agreements, and deterring hostile actors - suggest a preference for stable neighboring states that accept its existence. While some analysts have argued that weakened adversaries can reduce conventional threats, there’s no clear evidence that Israel pursues instability in neighboring countries as a general policy. In Gaza and the West Bank, where this accussation pops up the most, Israel’s security and administrative policies have operated in a context where Gaza and the West Bank are treated as separate governance and security environments. Combined with Palestinian political fragmentation, this has reinforced the division between the two territories, but - as far as I know - there is no clear evidence of a single overarching strategy to permanently divide them.
Lmao.
So Israel has hit Syria with over 600 airstrikes since the fall of Assad. That's two a day. The first thing they did after Assad fell was to hit every piece of military equipment they could so the new government wouldn't get stronger. They have also invaded souther Syria without provocation.
Their foreign minister (Gideon Sa'ar) has openly stated that they wanted a federalized Syria. With the situation on the ground that would have meant a new civil war and we know from Iraq it means instability and infighting. A vast majority of Syrian did not want this. They openly support one separatist faction, even protecting them with airstrikes. They say it's to protect Druze in Syria but <50% of Druze live in Suweyda and there has been no mistreatment of Druze in general. Al-Hirji is also the leader of a criminal gang and in order to stay in power he has imprisoned and killed a lot of Druze from other factions. Ask Jordan why Israel allows them to keep doing cross border airstrikes in the region (hint, it involves drug smuggling).
The minister of national security has repeatedly called for the assassination of Jolani and stated that there can not be negotiated with the new Syrian government, labeling them as an enemy. While they have done nothing.
While Israel explicitly support al-Hiri and his faction they reached out to Alawites and the Kurds early on. Even with demands of a "safe corridor" between Suwedya and the SDF.
This is where Erdogan stepped in. The threat of Turkish military installations with advanced AA down towards Damascus was a red line for Israel but it showed how serious Turkey was about the Kurds. Israel had to back down 100% from supporting the kurds and Erdogan got Trump to cut ties.
Assad remnants in the coast blew their wad way to early and the rest of the world needed HTS to stop everything from going from a massacre to full on genocide. Much later the new government folded the Kurds like a lawn chair, thus ending the Israeli dream of a weak, federalized Syria plagued by infighting. Al-Hirji is way to weak to pose a threat and economically the region is insignificant. It's a shame for the Druze living there because there is no way they are getting out of poverty. Still just last week Syria was counted as an enemy by Israel even when they have done nothing towards Israel which itself has both invaded, bombed and tried to wreck their internal politics to destabilize the country.
So get your head out of the sand. Israel says exactly what they want with Syria, and is aggressively trying for it. Their nightmare scenario is a peaceful viable Syria with geopolitical importance. The new communications line being built between SA and Turkey is precursor step to a long envisioned pipeline project. Everything points to Turkey and the gulf states taking "joint custody" of Syria. If it's a success Israel will have to deal with illegally occupying a globally important, peaceful country which they can't just destroy with their military.
Well, there goes a neutral tone with the lmao-start and the last paragraph. I try not to be too dismissive in return, but I've gotta say that your analysis - at least to me - seems to mix facts with emotional conclusions absent evidence, flavored with a lot of speculation. There are leaps that could be true, but most certainly don't have to be; other parts are simply overexaggerated interpretations.
Sa'ar's words can be reasonably interpreted as security framing rather than strategic destabilization intent, which is absolutely legitimate in a power vacuum environment. There are concerns about preventing weapons proliferation or stopping hostile actors exploiting the vacuum. So yes, in line with everything they said and did about southern and eastern Syria in the past, these actions make absolute sense. Buffer zones are the explanation and most of the Israeli strikes in Syria are predominantly concentrated in southern Syria near the Golan border (Daraa and Quneitra), with a secondary but significant cluster around Damascus targeting military infrastructure and alleged Iranian-linked assets. Btw, do you have a source for this 600 airstrike claim? I'd like to check what was actually counted (airstrike vs artillery vs drones).
In regards to Erdogan's "stepping in": What do you think which AA was deployed? SHORADs? NASAMS? Or S-300s/S-400s? And where exactly? The installations I know of, are in place to protect southern Turkey via a northern Syrian buffer zone.. the same thing Israel is doing in the south. This is an area where Israel has operated the least in anyways. None of those systems are credibly reported as deployed in Syria by Turkey; Turkish systems remain inside Turkey and for even the S-400s to have meaningful effect in their max range you'd need radar sites, command infrastructure and secure logistics, all of which Turkey does not have in Syria.
You further make it seem like Israel has had an operational alliance or direct military support relationship with Kurdish forces in Syria, which is not supported by evidence. Some Israeli political commentary has been sympathetic to Kurdish autonomy and occasional strategic analysis suggested Kurds are a “useful counterweight” to Iran in theory. But nothing more. There are no confirmed “support programs”, no operational command relationship, no formal military alliance, no joint command structures, no sustained weapons supply program and no documented battlefield coordination. So yeah, while there is no documented “withdrawal from supporting Kurds” it is mostly because there was no support system to withdraw from in the first place. Israeli policy in Syria was and is mainly focused on: Iranian military presence, missile transfers and border security in the Golan area. And while Turkish pressure was one factor among many (US desire to reduce military footprint in Syria, domestic US political debates, competing priorities like ISIS containment vs regional alliances) you are making it seem that no other explanation is possible. US presence in Syria has been reduced gradually and inconsistently, not suddenly “cut”, because after partnering with the SDF and the territorial defeat of ISIS US support became more limited and conditional.
And in regards to that last paragraph: Israel has repeatedly signaled that stability in neighboring states is preferable, provided it does not include hostile military entrenchment. The Egypt-Israel peace treaty is a strong counterexample to “Israel prefers instability”.
On April 18 2026 21:05 WombaT wrote:
On April 18 2026 14:51 PremoBeats wrote:
On April 18 2026 02:35 dyhb wrote:
On April 18 2026 01:16 PremoBeats wrote:
On April 18 2026 00:57 Jankisa wrote: Israel is not only criticized about it's conduct during war. They are and have been criticized for decades for aggressive settlement expansion, the two tier justice system in West Bank and Israel in general, terrible conditions they are keeping Palestinian prisoners in, sniping of kids and journalists outside of war etc.
They have also been cracking down on protests (semi justified as they are in a state of war and missiles were flying at them at the time), they have been criticized for shutting down investigation in their soldiers raping (with a knife) a Palestinian prisoner, for enacting a death penalty only for Palestinians and so, so much more.
The point wasn’t to deny that Israel has been criticized for a wide range of issues. And while some of the claims you mentioned are well-supported, others are disputed or overstated, that’s not what I was addressing.
My focus is on the comparison itself. Saying “they’re no better than Iran” implies a level of equivalence that I don’t think is accurate or justified. You can strongly criticize Israel’s policies without concluding that it is essentially the same kind of state as Iran.
To be precise, I reject the following premises: 1. That no one in this thread has argued that Israel deliberately tries to kill as many Palestinians as possible. 2. That the available data and described events justify the conclusion that Israel does not care at all about civilians. 3. That Israel and Iran can be meaningfully described as “no different” in the way suggested.
This doesn’t mean rejecting all criticism or dismissing the possibility of serious wrongdoing. It just means that criticism should remain proportionate and not collapse into oversimplified equivalence.
Be the one that goes with the evidence, like the Israeli government does not do enough to restrain the extremist settlers in both policing and prosecuting, or the IDF fires too freely on perceived threats and doesn't investigate and prosecute strongly the worst cases of it, or the judiciary system is too lenient.
Agreed.
On April 18 2026 05:11 CuddlyCuteKitten wrote:
On April 18 2026 01:16 PremoBeats wrote:
On April 18 2026 00:57 Jankisa wrote: Israel is not only criticized about it's conduct during war. They are and have been criticized for decades for aggressive settlement expansion, the two tier justice system in West Bank and Israel in general, terrible conditions they are keeping Palestinian prisoners in, sniping of kids and journalists outside of war etc.
They have also been cracking down on protests (semi justified as they are in a state of war and missiles were flying at them at the time), they have been criticized for shutting down investigation in their soldiers raping (with a knife) a Palestinian prisoner, for enacting a death penalty only for Palestinians and so, so much more.
The point wasn’t to deny that Israel has been criticized for a wide range of issues. And while some of the claims you mentioned are well-supported, others are disputed or overstated, that’s not what I was addressing.
My focus is on the comparison itself. Saying “they’re no better than Iran” implies a level of equivalence that I don’t think is accurate or justified. You can strongly criticize Israel’s policies without concluding that it is essentially the same kind of state as Iran.
To be precise, I reject the following premises: 1. That no one in this thread has argued that Israel deliberately tries to kill as many Palestinians as possible. 2. That the available data and described events justify the conclusion that Israel does not care at all about civilians. 3. That Israel and Iran can be meaningfully described as “no different” in the way suggested.
This doesn’t mean rejecting all criticism or dismissing the possibility of serious wrongdoing. It just means that criticism should remain proportionate and not collapse into oversimplified equivalence.
1. Correct, people in this thread have suggested that. 2. Israel used to care about civilians but in recent years I at least get the feeling that they now care about civilians only in how it affects their image. If no one knows it doesn't matter, if it gets out it still hardly matters. Potential suffering amongst "enemy" civilians seem to be a non factor in the new military planning. Individual cases of abuse or obvious mistakes are either swept under the rug or given a slap on the wrist. And senior Israeli politicians actively encourage that type of behaviour. Also se point 3. 3. Iran and Israel are different as apples and oranges are but they are both still fruit. I'd argue that in when it comes to stoking conflict in the middle east they are on the same level. When it comes to ignoring the plight of other countries and civilians they are also on the same level. Iran funds Hezbollah and the Houthis and helped Assad in the civil war. But Israel has Gaza and has no problem "mowing the lawn" in Lebanon. They actively tried to rekindle the civil war in Syria. They obviously prefer weak and broken states next door and show absolutely no regard to the tremendous cost this incours on those countries. And again, senior Israeli politicians said as much. If Turkey hadn't put the foot down (and Erdogan being buddies with Trump) Syria would be fucked right now. So when it comes to being good neighbours and preventing conflict I feel both countries are about equally horrible. In many other aspects Israel is better than Iran. But those areas are usually not related to the government and Iranian citizens are not their goverment any more than Israeli citizens are.
I am not sure, how you arrive at the feeling that they only care about their image. The military has comparable numbers to similar conflicts. Israel has implemented extensive warning systems compared to many conflicts, after being hit by the biggest trauma the country ever suffered. Casualty numbers are in line with usual observations, as casualties in Gaza were extremely high at the beginning (late 2023), then generally declined over time into 2024 - 2025, but never dropped to zero and have shown intermittent spikes rather than a smooth trend. That is completely normal for conflict zones.
I also don't see how you can make the claim that Israel is "actively trying to rekindle the civil war in Syria". Israel openly admits to targeting or carrying out airstrikes against Iranian military infrastructure or weapons shipments to Hezbollah. This is part of Israel’s strategy to prevent Iran from establishing a military foothold near its borders. I see no broad intervention in Syria’s internal political or factional conflict though. You even had operation "Good neighbour", as many Syrians were treated in Israeli hospitals during the Syrian war from 2010 (which of course, also added to their interest of creating a buffer zone). And what exactly do you see Erdogan's influence in? My understanding is, that he was mostly involved in Northern Syria, pushing back the Kurds and creating a buffer zone. How do you think that Turkey was countering Israeli influence in any clear strategic sense? Israel’s observable policy priorities - such as maintaining peace treaties, expanding normalization agreements, and deterring hostile actors - suggest a preference for stable neighboring states that accept its existence. While some analysts have argued that weakened adversaries can reduce conventional threats, there’s no clear evidence that Israel pursues instability in neighboring countries as a general policy. In Gaza and the West Bank, where this accussation pops up the most, Israel’s security and administrative policies have operated in a context where Gaza and the West Bank are treated as separate governance and security environments. Combined with Palestinian political fragmentation, this has reinforced the division between the two territories, but - as far as I know - there is no clear evidence of a single overarching strategy to permanently divide them.
On April 18 2026 07:55 WombaT wrote:
On April 17 2026 15:00 PremoBeats wrote:
On April 15 2026 10:18 WombaT wrote:
On April 15 2026 06:48 Billyboy wrote:
On April 15 2026 06:39 WombaT wrote:
On April 15 2026 05:53 Billyboy wrote: [quote] They are not nearly as hard line. For example, in Israel no protesters have been killed. In Iran 10s of thousands have.
How many civilians have been killed in Palestine?
Hard to say since Israel claims most were Hamas and Hamas claims all were civilians. Around 70k total. But there is a real chance less civilians died in Gaza during their war then Iran killed in a couple weeks of protesters. And well the number is way to high, it is an absolute bollocks assertion that Israel was trying to kill as many as they could. If that was the case the number would be 7 figures.
Right so we’ve got a ballpark 70k number to begin with and an Israel that has been progressively more hostile to international observers operating to even verify such things. This incidentally doesn’t include civilian casualties in say the Lebanon, or Iran
We’ve got illegal settlements ever expanding too.
The assertion has never been that Israel is trying to kill as many as it could possibly can, just that it doesn’t really give a shit about killing civiiians.
By the same logic I mean Russia isn’t behaving abominably, because if they really wanted to kill as many as they could they could just nuke Ukraine.
At what point do people abandon this fanciful idea that Israel is some outlier of democratic values in the region, when they’re bombing the fucking beejaysus out of everyone?
They’re no better than Iran really, same shit different flavour. An appalling state that could do considerably better but chooses not to.
The assertion - at least by some in this thread - definitely has been that Israel is trying to kill as many as it can get away with. And these, among others, are the kind of claims I argued against. I still don't see myself as a staunch defender of Israel - rather a more nuanced view on this conflict-, but arguing against such idiotic statements was the thing that branded me one. MagicPowers clearly made that claim many times and others assisted his line of argumentation, tried to attack the evidence I posted or didn't bother speaking out against these claims.
But even the assertion that Israel doesn't give a shit about killing civilians can be tested... We have the numbers from the IDF, but also the ones from independent sources. These put the civilian casualty rate in Gaza at around 50 to 75 %. Compare that to Mosul (60 - 80%) or the Syrian Civil War, which is believed to be majority civilian casualties. This clearly puts Gaza in the range of other urban / asymmetric wars or slightly below it. But even if it was worse slightly... Gaza is more populated in general, more populated with women and children and Hamas is among the most, if not the faction which is most embedded in civilian infrastructure, even firing rockets from refugee camps. In Lebanon the estimate is 40 - 70% civilian casualties and the numbers depend on whether urban strikes are included or the intensity of the phase are already lower. And as you mentioned Iran, we have a perfectly fine comparison, how Israel's civilian tolls are, when there is no urban warfare, as the reported deaths - depending on the source - sit at 10 - 30 %. So there is a clear degression and one that can be explained by the nature of the battle. So I would really like to know, how you arrive at the idea, that Israel doesn't give a shit about civilians, as I think these numbers and the context clearly hint at a different conclusion. And not only looking at casualty figures, but overall conduct: Israel has provided fuel, water and electricity to a hostile region and also has similar rates of civilian casualties to comparable conflicts. Gazan civilians were warned via speakers, SMS, TV, radio ahead of time and patients from Gaza have been treated in Israeli hospitals. At different times in history, tens of thousands of Palestinians have worked in Israel, taking home much higher income. Israel has different kind of ethnicities in every branch of society, allowing for freedom of religion and has given up their most holy site to the Muslims, which don't want to share the Temple Mount / Al Aqsa. And despite all its flaws, it still is a democratic state with rules and regulations, whereas Iran killed of tens of thousands protestors. These observations obviously don't negate valid criticism of military actions but it shows that there are long-standing systems of cooperation, dependence and even support to Palestinian civilians.
So to say that Israel is no better than Iran - in my opinion - is preposterous. Although I respect your opinion most of the time, even if it differs from mine, this statement is absolute madness. Israel operates in ongoing asymmetric conflicts, dense urban warfare environments, while Iran has mostly been attacking Israel through proxies or launching rockets at everything -often not even military sites -, which is supported by missiles hitting residential building, a synagogue or apartment blocks. In some phases almost all fatalities on the Israeli side were civilians and the recent war sits at 65 - 75% civilian casualties in non urban warfare but missile strikes. Compare that to the 10 - 30% on the other side. Further, Iran is primarily criticized for systematic internal repression, while Israel is criticized for conduct in war. Collapsing those into a single moral judgement ignores that they operate in fundamentally different domains. Your statement completely erases what these states are actually being criticized for and it treats outcome as intentional. Perhaps there is something I overlooked, so please share your thoughts on this one...
Ok to clarify, no Israel isn’t as bad as Iran IMO. Venting frustration doesn’t aid specificity. For me their conduct has increasingly taken them past a threshold and into a similar domain, namely of consistently egregious conduct that can simply be outright condemned wholesale rather than dissected with the scalpel of nuance.
There are mitigating factors, although less so than prior, and accompanied with significant increases in the bad so to speak.
Alas bit too busy to do a more lengthy reply, will pop back in at some point.
Essentially the crux of my point is simply that ‘it’s complicated’ or other barriers tend to pop up on this particular topic, where they don’t necessarily elsewhere, or employ rationales they wouldn’t elsewhere.
I don’t think this precludes discussing complexities either, or mitigating factors or what have you.
Thanks, for coming back! If you find the time, I'd be interested to hear what threshold you are talking about. Legal? Moral? Proportion? Intent? Also, which conduct you speak of... Over what time period? Compared to what baseline?
I'd also be interested which barriers you see that are not necessarily present elsewhere.
Imo, a “wholesale condemnation vs dissection” framing would be overly binary (not sure, if that is what you suggested). It would set up a contrast between two modes of judgement: either one evaluates actions in a detailed, case-by-case way (“dissection with a scalpel of nuance”), or one moves to a broad, systemic condemnation that treats conduct as a whole category. The issue with this framing is that it treats these two approaches as mutually exclusive, when in practice serious analysis usually combines both. You can recognise recurring patterns or systemic concerns while still examining individual events in detail to understand intent, context, and variation over time. Because of that, the argument risks oversimplifying the range of analytical tools available by implying that once a “threshold” is crossed, detailed scrutiny becomes unnecessary or secondary, rather than still essential for understanding what is actually happening.
Bias, presumably. Some of which I’m sympathetic to, some of which I’m not. Jewish people having a degree of reflexive defensive to such a state in a world where anti-Semitism is on the rise (even outside of that boosted by the current conflict), isn’t something I’m particularly condemnatory of. We’ve all got biases and some are very difficult to shift even if one actively tries. Other biases such as ‘I don’t like Muslims very much’ I am less sympathetic to, which I’ve encountered plenty, albeit to firmly stress I don’t think are factors in TL threads.
All of the above really.
It’s really a combination of multiple areas and an intensification in the post October 7th period, although one can perhaps point to a general direction of travel that precedes that.
As I’ve said prior, no state in the world would just suck up an October 7th event, or various groups and states that believe you don’t have a right to exist and act upon it. That’s an unrealistic expectation, and one I’d reject coming from anyone who isn’t a hardcore pacifist as it’s demanding things of Israel that wouldn’t be demanded elsewhere. To go back to biases, I think one can observe them here too, just in the opposite direction.
If we take the sheer volume of increased casualties, the continued expansion of settlements, the increasingly poisonous rhetoric of leaders, shifts in attitudes amongst the populace, and an increased hostility to third party observation or oversight etc.
It’s difficult to put an exact marker on it, even personally given it’s so multi-factored, and of course personal views will vary. So what the ‘threshold’ is is quite hard to specifically nail down, and where it shifts from not ideal but grey into just outright unacceptable.
I don’t think those two aforementioned approaches are mutually exclusive, indeed for me it’s the exact opposite. I’d consider the questions of Israel’s conduct being acceptable, and how do you resolve such a conflict as two that can exist independently, although of course interlinked.
To put it crudely I consider there to be a difference between ‘that’s bad, but…’ and ‘thats bad. But let’s examine the wider context.’
I mean to pick one example, complicated conflict but how have an estimated 2600 people been killed at aid sites? Aid sites that foreign observers have increasingly restricted access to.
As I’ve said prior I also don’t really buy into the idea of comparable conflicts because I don’t know of many that exist. There’s such a power asymmetry, which isn’t unique to conflict. Palestinians exist in effective pseudo-states which are simultaneously not really fully-fledged states, nor are they actually part of Israel, so it doesn’t neatly fit into most categories very neatly. It’s not an inter-state war, nor a civil war, nor a state crushing internal dissent. Which makes it tricky to benchmark versus those kind of things for better or for worse.
Alright.. thanks for the clarification; now I've got a clearer picture. And yeah. I can't give you a singular or probably even satisfying answer in regards to the question about aid sites. Violence and mass-casualty incidents near humanitarian aid distribution points have occurred in multiple modern conflict zones (including Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and South Sudan), typically as a result of insecurity, crowding, and ongoing hostilities rather than aid sites being isolated or fully protected environments. Add to that bad decision making in selecting personnel, extremely high population density, confined geography, centralized border-controlled aid entry points as well as an active high-intensity urban warfare environment and high-risk conditions for such incidents are established. This description shouldn't be seen as an excuse though.. simply an explanation. And as I said multiple times already: these incidents should be examined and trialed and the perpetrators or persons in charge should be held accountable as best as possible.
And while I understand that no clear cut comparison is realistic, I think numbers in regards to relative civilian casualty rates can be analyzed given the context of other conflicts, even if the nature of the factions is unclear or there is asymmetry in their fire power. Urban warfare tends to produce similar civilian risk patterns across conflicts... and power asymmetry is playing a more limited role there. If we acknowledge that ISIS fighters were often clearly identified combatants or that Mosul civilians could often escape in phases, whereas Gaza has much more geographically constrained exit routes, as well as other factors like the behavior of Hamas, it wouldn't be unreasonable to say that Gaza has several battlefield conditions that are among the most structurally severe for civilian risk in modern urban warfare. Yet, the relative casualty numbers are lower than in these conflicts. This of course still doesn't allow for a clear cut comparison, but it hints at the idea that the IDF isn't going around, not giving a fuck about civilian damage.
But they won’t be trialled or held accountable will they?
The very factors that make pursuing a policy of wiping out a terrorist organisation in a rather small, often population dense urban area, as a strong and stable state, are simultaneously factors that should make securing aid sites easier in areas in theory
I think its perfectly fair to try to find a baseline from comparable phenomena
If we’re looking aid distribution specifically I’m not sure we can look at examples with as many differences as commonality to find said baseline.
In addition we can also look at Israel’s own past record in this domain, which has been considerably better historically even if one may find other policies objectionable. We can baseline something partly against its past self
Occam and his razor aren’t faultless tools, they are useful though.
There’s been a marked increase in hostility to third party institutions or observers operating in the area too. The BBC doc I watched on aid sites had to rely on an IDF whistleblower for footage from aid sites as they were barred from entering and observing themselves.
There’s shades of ‘aurora borealis, localised entirely within your kitchen?’ ‘May I see it?’ ‘No.’ to some of this
Probably not. War crimes often won't be. Yes, there of course are also aspects that in theory make this enterprise of securing aid sites easier. And a lot of complexity (some of it only in Israel's realm of responsibility) led to this. You won't see me try to defend it. It shouldn't happen. But it still doesn't follow that it is preventable or Israel is doing it with intent, like other actions (for example trying to starve out Hamas and hitting the population at the same time, which contributed to this disaster and in my opinion is a war crime).
On April 20 2026 00:44 Jockmcplop wrote: I know billyboy gives me alot of shit for 'low effort posts' but tbh when I see these huge walls of text It seems like people going to an absolutely huge amount of effort to obfuscate something extremely simple.
Best I can do is 9 paragraphs on that bombing children is morally complicated I’m afraid.
EPT
