European Politico-economics QA Mega-thread - Page 441

The “cultural cognition thesis” is a relatively new approach to science communication (e.g., see Kahan, 2010, 2012, 2015; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011; Kahan et al., 2012). Theoretically, the approach can be seen as a conceptual marriage between the “cultural theory of risk” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) and the psychometric paradigm (Slovic, 2000). Broadly, the theory aims to explain why groups with different “cultural outlooks” tend to disagree about important societal issues. In particular, the cultural cognition thesis argues that public disagreement over key societal risks (e.g., climate change, nuclear power) arises not because people fail to understand the science or lack relevant information, but rather as a result of the fact that “people endorse whichever position reinforces their connection to others with whom they share important ties” (Kahan, 2010, p. 296). This latter notion is central to much of the cultural cognition thesis and is generally referred to as a specific form of motivated reasoning, namely, “identity-protective cognition” (Kahan, 2012). Because espousing beliefs that are not congruent with the dominant sentiment in one’s group could threaten one’s position or status within the group, people may be motivated to “protect” their cultural identities. In fact, the cultural cognition thesis predicts that identity-protective reasoning is a mechanism that people unconsciously employ to assimilate (risk) information. In other words, people are expected to process information in a motivated way, that is, consistent with their cultural worldviews (Kahan, 2012). A key prediction that flows from this theory is that when people are exposed to (new) scientific information, “culturally” biased cognition will merely reinforce existing predispositions and cause groups with opposing values to become even more polarized on the respective issue (Kahan, 2010, 2012).