[Guide] Intelligent Investing - Page 4
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InDaHouse
Sweden956 Posts
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SerpentFlame
415 Posts
floor exercise wrote: I have not read 95% of what you wrote but just glanced through most of it Brilliant way to start a criticism. On June 07 2009 11:09 kewlsunman wrote: I'm not sure if you actually read the guide because I don't start with financial analysis. I believe I spend the first three parts discussing some basic financial concepts, and I specifically touch on the exact subjects that you list: the time value of money, compounding, portfolio management, the differences between debt and equity, and the various investment vehicles. I've also included a glossary to explicitly address anything that I think the novice investor might need to know which might not have been clear in the read-through. Besides dollar cost averaging, which is an investment strategy for old people who are trying to build up their retirement account (and like I mentioned above, I just don't think my audience here is retirees), I believe I talk about everything you mentioned--except for the trading stuff, which you're right, I don't talk about. Because this isn't a guide on trading; this is a guide on investing, and there's a very important difference between the two. | ||
Etherone
United States1898 Posts
I am also OUTRAGED that these people would make such unsubstantiated claims. I would usually not read a guide after 2 posters have discredited it, luckily i also happened to notice their user names and have seen less than encouraging posting from both of them ( that and the fact that they posted absolutely no source, and that one of them started with "I'll agree the flashy one is a moron and I have not read 95% of what you wrote but just glanced through most of it" ) | ||
kewlsunman
United States131 Posts
Thanks for support everyone. | ||
SirKibbleX
United States479 Posts
I guess I just have such a strong attachment to Blizzard that I want to believe it is a good investment. I understand this is a very biased place from which to start, but all the same, I think it says a lot about the power of branding when it comes to Blizzard (and several other Vivendi properties). I suppose I argue from a much to qualitative perspective and not enough of a quantitative one. My argument centers around three points: the financial value of WoW, the very large hype surrounding Starcraft II (SC's popularity has become a rather viral meme, almost every person I know between 12 and 35 has at least heard of it, and many know of its success in SK), and the fact that the acquisition of Activision was a very large one-time cost that seems like it will pay off in the long-term. I first want to say that I don't hang out exclusively with hardcore gamers, but mostly with people in my age range, as one would expect, so there may also be some bias in my processes. WoW is like a phenomenon. First, the fact that WoW is still the dominant MMORPG in the industry, with some people citing replacement costs of over one BILLION (with a B) dollars or more, makes it a special property. In the gaming industry especially, there is a lot of power in branding and gaining customer loyalty. That people gladly pay a respectable sum of money monthly to play a game, still surprise me but MMOs, I suppose, are subject to a powerful snowball effect. The more people play, the more exciting the game gets. WoW is a quality game that is frequently updated and well respected. All other Blizzard games are also receiving this special treatment, D2 is getting 1.13, and SC is still occasionally patched. People KNOW Blizzard stands behind its products, which gives them a reputational advantage that may be worth untold millions. Second, Starcraft II is just around the corner. This may be one of the most anticipated releases I've heard of in a while. A lot of people have played Starcraft, or heard of its popularity, and I think SC2 is going to sell more units than a lot of people expect. Not everyone is a hardcore PC gamer or RTS player, but I think there will be a lot of casuals who will buy SC just to be a part of the initial wave of players 'breaking the game in'. Diablo III may similarly take an unexpected volume of sales, especially with the pre-1.13 buzz bringing people back onto D2. And finally, I think the costs of acquiring Activision were warranted. Vivendi is likely going to leverage Activision's publishing arm to gain additional market share and save on costs for pushing their newest titles. The process of restructuring and Vivendi's own self-analyses will likely cure Activisions woes within a year or so, and powerful franchises like Call of Duty and Guitar Hero should ensure positive growth. I'm just saying, I think we have a special level of understanding of the gaming market and industry above and beyond that of just the numerical data stock analysts would use. I also understand that you're trying to demonstrate how to evaluate companies with which we may not be as familiar. I love the guide, the only thing I would like to see is a step-by-step guide for how to actually go about investing, what sites/services are suggested, and maybe a single, good example of what to look for when investing. And how you would go about acquiring stock in that company. Sorry if I come across as stupid, I'm curious to learn more. Thanks for the guide, hope you get the key! | ||
omninmo
2349 Posts
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poppa
United States329 Posts
Well structured, simple, and well written for those who are willing to start their path of investing. | ||
Gumbo
Canada807 Posts
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Meretricious
Canada161 Posts
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Polus
United States25 Posts
While no investing guide should ever be taken as gospel, this piece offers a great overview for those looking to understand the basics from someone who works in the field. | ||
kewlsunman
United States131 Posts
On June 08 2009 01:07 SirKibbleX wrote: I'm honestly looking for a well constructed rebuttal to my own mental argument in words I can understand after reading the guide. I guess I just have such a strong attachment to Blizzard that I want to believe it is a good investment. I understand this is a very biased place from which to start, but all the same, I think it says a lot about the power of branding when it comes to Blizzard (and several other Vivendi properties). I suppose I argue from a much to qualitative perspective and not enough of a quantitative one. My argument centers around three points: the financial value of WoW, the very large hype surrounding Starcraft II (SC's popularity has become a rather viral meme, almost every person I know between 12 and 35 has at least heard of it, and many know of its success in SK), and the fact that the acquisition of Activision was a very large one-time cost that seems like it will pay off in the long-term. I first want to say that I don't hang out exclusively with hardcore gamers, but mostly with people in my age range, as one would expect, so there may also be some bias in my processes. WoW is like a phenomenon. First, the fact that WoW is still the dominant MMORPG in the industry, with some people citing replacement costs of over one BILLION (with a B) dollars or more, makes it a special property. In the gaming industry especially, there is a lot of power in branding and gaining customer loyalty. That people gladly pay a respectable sum of money monthly to play a game, still surprise me but MMOs, I suppose, are subject to a powerful snowball effect. The more people play, the more exciting the game gets. WoW is a quality game that is frequently updated and well respected. All other Blizzard games are also receiving this special treatment, D2 is getting 1.13, and SC is still occasionally patched. People KNOW Blizzard stands behind its products, which gives them a reputational advantage that may be worth untold millions. Second, Starcraft II is just around the corner. This may be one of the most anticipated releases I've heard of in a while. A lot of people have played Starcraft, or heard of its popularity, and I think SC2 is going to sell more units than a lot of people expect. Not everyone is a hardcore PC gamer or RTS player, but I think there will be a lot of casuals who will buy SC just to be a part of the initial wave of players 'breaking the game in'. Diablo III may similarly take an unexpected volume of sales, especially with the pre-1.13 buzz bringing people back onto D2. And finally, I think the costs of acquiring Activision were warranted. Vivendi is likely going to leverage Activision's publishing arm to gain additional market share and save on costs for pushing their newest titles. The process of restructuring and Vivendi's own self-analyses will likely cure Activisions woes within a year or so, and powerful franchises like Call of Duty and Guitar Hero should ensure positive growth. I'm just saying, I think we have a special level of understanding of the gaming market and industry above and beyond that of just the numerical data stock analysts would use. I also understand that you're trying to demonstrate how to evaluate companies with which we may not be as familiar. I love the guide, the only thing I would like to see is a step-by-step guide for how to actually go about investing, what sites/services are suggested, and maybe a single, good example of what to look for when investing. And how you would go about acquiring stock in that company. Sorry if I come across as stupid, I'm curious to learn more. Thanks for the guide, hope you get the key! It's great that you're really thinking about this! Hopefully I can address all your points, though perhaps not in the order that you asked them: 1) SC2, Diablo 3, other new releases - I have a lot of hope for these titles, not just as an investor, but also as a gamer. However, there's a real problem with a business model that revolves around producing new "hit" games--the business becomes a "trend-chaser". That means that the business model is constantly focused on producing the newest, bestest, flashiest products. That's great and all for the consumer, but it's terrible for the business. Think about a company like Coca-Cola--their core product hasn't really changed in decades. They've come out with new stuff, certainly, but not nearly as fast as a game company like ATVI would have to. Moreover, most gamers will only buy one copy of the game, and that's it. There's no recurring revenue here--you hope to sell as many copies as possible, and then you're done. The company is going to see a surge in revenues, and then who knows? They have to rely on constantly putting cash back into their business, back into development, back into operating costs--just to try to get a new hit game out there. Coca-Cola doesn't have to do that. In this respect, the investor in this sort of trend-chasing business model is making a bet that the team at ATVI can consistently produce games that its customers will want. You're betting on the management and the employees at ATVI. I, personally, think there are easier places to put your money where you don't have to make that sort of bet. Just to draw the comparison again, if I were to bet in Coca-Cola, I don't need to bet on great management--Coca-Cola sells itself, and I don't need to sit up late at night wondering if they can come out with a new product--they are doing just fine with what they have, and they'll continue to do fine without the need for constantly being an innovator. In short, you can like the product, but you don't have to like the company or the business model. You can continue to support the company by being a customer, you don't have to become an owner (investing) to show that. 2) World of Warcraft - You're definitely right about WoW being a great franchise. It's a great business as well. MMORPGs are very sexy to investors, because they make a lot of money, without requiring a lot of costs to maintain. Look at the numbers: at ATVI, MMORPGs brought in 38% of net revenues in 2008, they only cost 7%; compare that with other traditional games, which accounted for 46% of revenues, but cost 38%. In other words, once you get the initial infrastructure costs of the servers, the development, etc. etc. out of the way, MMORPGs are profit-machines. Traditional computer games require material costs (like making the guitars for Guitar Hero, shipping and handling costs, printing manuals, printing CDs, etc.). This is why ATVI explicitly states that they're trying to expand their MMORPG business, because they know that's where the profit is. Eventually, many in the gaming industry are going to want to shift to a more recurring-revenue type model. If you have reason to believe that ATVI is going to do it faster and better than their competitors, that might be a legitimate reason to consider investing. 3) Step by step guide to investing - I thought this came about as close as I could get it to simulating what a professional investor would do. If you're talking about where, specifically, to buy stocks, I'd recommend a discount online broker like Scottrade. As far as what else to look for in terms of analyzing a company, I'd suggest taking a look at some of the links and books that are in the Additional Resources part of the guide. Hope this covers everything. As a final note: I should reemphasize that the intelligent investor wants to be reasonably certain he can make a profit. If you don't fulfill that criterion, you're speculating, and that's not what this guide aims to cover. Investing is about developing reasonable projections about the future which quantitatively indicate a return on investment. In your post and mine, we've discussed certain qualitative factors, but the key is to see whether the qualitative factors will have an impact on the numbers. In short, I simply do not feel that I can make a confident enough conjecture about ATVI's future (because it depends so much on their development team coming up with new things, each one of which requires separate analysis, separate consideration) to invest in it. | ||
Deadlift
United States358 Posts
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bellweather
United States404 Posts
On June 06 2009 16:32 kewlsunman wrote: DISCLAIMER I've been involved in the investment industry for more than a few years now. I worked at an international investment bank for a while, doing the standard--investment analysis, deal sourcing and structuring for hedgies and other IB boys--and then moved on to the buy-side. Just out of curiosity what division/department were you in during your stint at the IB and what kind of buy-side work are you doing now; mutual fund, hedge fund? | ||
kewlsunman
United States131 Posts
On June 08 2009 04:17 InsideTheBox wrote: Just out of curiosity what division/department were you in during your stint at the IB and what kind of buy-side work are you doing now; mutual fund, hedge fund? I moved in between research and banking and did a tiny bit with capital markets. | ||
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Bahamas2 Posts
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Milton Friedman
98 Posts
On June 07 2009 11:09 kewlsunman wrote: Well, if you're interested, I don't think CAPM or APT make any sense at all. The idea that volatility substitutes as a proxy for risk is oftentimes right, but on very important occasions turn out to be false. Those very important occasions being situations like the collapse of LTCM, the collapse of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, etc. I know, the entire academic establishment still disagrees. Don't worry, I've taken those classes too. They've convinced most of Wall Street but I wouldn't be surprised if even the investment banks started to shy away from volatility-based risk models in a year or two--they simply don't hold up when it's most crucial that they do. I do mention other asset classes, by the way. Maybe not as much as you would have preferred but I think the most important points were made: no other asset class beats equities in the long run. Retirement planners suggest a variety of asset classes for older investors because lower volatility is important for them--they have to live off their investments. But for younger investors who are more interested in capital appreciation, there's almost no reason not to invest in equities. (Also, intangible assets are one of the last of one's worries when it comes to intrinsic value. Most companies don't have a large amount of intangible assets relative to the rest of their book, you can oftentimes write-down the entire figure and not have a significant effect on your investment assessment.) CAPM is the most fundamental theory on asset pricing there is. It makes perfect theoretical sense, but I will assume you mean it doesn't hold up empirically, which is true and inevitable from the assumptions required. APT on the other hand holds up much better empirically and is the natural extension from CAPM. Both theories make complete sense. It's an empirical fact that volatility is correlated and that when asset prices fall they tend to fall together, even between assets that are seemingly unrelated. Volatility models capture these effects, as well as more extreme movements in price that is also observed in the data. I'm honestly not sure how much volatitility models had to do with the collapse of LTCM, Bear Stearns and Lehman. I didn't think it played any role, and the factors for their demise lie elsewhere. I don't disagree that equity outperforms in the long run. But I can't imagine any (potential) investor on TL is going to go 100% in equity. Of course, maybe this is what you're telling people to do: "The third contribution that Buffett made was a complete reversal of Graham’s theory of diversification. Buffett essentially said, if I’m willing to put $1 into this investment opportunity, then I should be willing to put $100, and if I’d be willing to lose $100, I should be willing to lose $1,000, etc. etc. He did not fear losing money because he had done the analysis to make sure that he wasn’t at risk. “Wide diversification is only required when investors do not understand what they’re doing.”" Portfolio diversification is necessary because it hedges risk. Buffett says he's not at risk thanks to his analysis but any stock will always be subject to a stochastic component. Yes, you may make a profit in the long run, but not necessarily so in the short run. The implication of what you're telling people to do is invest all they have in one thing - that is, they are equally risk averse to losing $100 compared to $10,000. However, I think you'll find few people for which that is really the case. Since stocks are subject to volatility if you invest all your money in it and it turns out badly for you, you'll be living off nothing. If you invest a small percentage in one stock, the risk to you is less. This is standard intuition: investors tend to have DARA and CRRA preferences. Buffett's quote implies CARA, which is empirically implausible. A typical (and famous) hedge might be to take roughly an opposite and equal position in options on your stocks. I'm not saying most of what you've written is incorrect, but since time (and thus length) is scarce I just feel there could've been less on who is an intelligent investor and the introduction and more on actual finance. | ||
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Bahamas2 Posts
Also, 100% equity > all , especially for young people like us. and even more especially because of today's prices. | ||
Xeln4g4
Italy1201 Posts
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ambit!ous1
United States3662 Posts
On June 06 2009 17:30 lilsusie wrote: Wow - this is really really good guide, thanks for your efforts and can't wait to read the rest of it! | ||
kewlsunman
United States131 Posts
On June 08 2009 14:23 Milton Friedman wrote: CAPM is the most fundamental theory on asset pricing there is. It makes perfect theoretical sense, but I will assume you mean it doesn't hold up empirically, which is true and inevitable from the assumptions required. APT on the other hand holds up much better empirically and is the natural extension from CAPM. Both theories make complete sense. It's an empirical fact that volatility is correlated and that when asset prices fall they tend to fall together, even between assets that are seemingly unrelated. Volatility models capture these effects, as well as more extreme movements in price that is also observed in the data. I'm honestly not sure how much volatitility models had to do with the collapse of LTCM, Bear Stearns and Lehman. I didn't think it played any role, and the factors for their demise lie elsewhere. I don't disagree that equity outperforms in the long run. But I can't imagine any (potential) investor on TL is going to go 100% in equity. Of course, maybe this is what you're telling people to do: "The third contribution that Buffett made was a complete reversal of Graham’s theory of diversification. Buffett essentially said, if I’m willing to put $1 into this investment opportunity, then I should be willing to put $100, and if I’d be willing to lose $100, I should be willing to lose $1,000, etc. etc. He did not fear losing money because he had done the analysis to make sure that he wasn’t at risk. “Wide diversification is only required when investors do not understand what they’re doing.”" Portfolio diversification is necessary because it hedges risk. Buffett says he's not at risk thanks to his analysis but any stock will always be subject to a stochastic component. Yes, you may make a profit in the long run, but not necessarily so in the short run. The implication of what you're telling people to do is invest all they have in one thing - that is, they are equally risk averse to losing $100 compared to $10,000. However, I think you'll find few people for which that is really the case. Since stocks are subject to volatility if you invest all your money in it and it turns out badly for you, you'll be living off nothing. If you invest a small percentage in one stock, the risk to you is less. This is standard intuition: investors tend to have DARA and CRRA preferences. Buffett's quote implies CARA, which is empirically implausible. A typical (and famous) hedge might be to take roughly an opposite and equal position in options on your stocks. I'm not saying most of what you've written is incorrect, but since time (and thus length) is scarce I just feel there could've been less on who is an intelligent investor and the introduction and more on actual finance. This is a great post which I'd like to respond to in length. LTCM as empirical proof for why CAPM is theoretically flawed For those who do not know, LTCM is short for Long-term Capital Management, one of the most famous hedge funds in financial history. They were run by the very well-regarded John Meriwether and his "arb boys", who came out of Salomon Brothers as the preeminent bond traders of the 1990s. These guys used complex mathematical models to find asset mispricings. One of their favorite investment strategies was to bet that the interest rates on two separate securities were going to converge. So, for instance, if corporate AAA-bonds traded at 5% interest and certain US Treasuries were trading at 3%, the arb boys might make a bet that the spread (the difference) between those bonds would eventually shrink from 2% to 1% to maybe even 0.5%. The returns from these bets were tiny, however, like, $1 invested would return 1/100 of 15 cents tiny. So they would employ a significant amount of leverage just to make a decent return; at the time of their collapse it was something ridiculous like, for every $1 invested, they had $30 in debt--that was how sure they were of their bets. The mathematical models that they used were essentially complex forms of the CAPM, short for capital-asset pricing model. The CAPM used a variable named "beta" to denote riskiness. What beta actually modeled was volatility--the variance between a security and the market. That is, if historically, security-A moves up 10% when the market remains stable, it would be considered more volatile, and also more risky, than security-B, which historically only moves up 5% when the market remains stable. Using beta, portfolio managers can construct a portfolio and give it a nice, neat "riskiness" score based on the correlation between the assets that comprise the portfolio. A "risky" portfolio is one which moves a lot in relation to the market because all of its assets are correlated and move in the same direction (all go up, or all go down); a "risk-free" portfolio is one which doesn't move a lot in relation to the market because its assets are balanced and supposedly non-correlated (some go up when others go down, but the overall average should be up, of course). LTCM had a diverse range of investments across asset classes and across international markets. Every academic that saw their portfolio would tell you that it was as close to diversified, hedged, and "risk-free" as possible. However, in 1998, the Russians defaulted on their currency (it would be like if the US said dollars aren't worth anything anymore). The widespread global panic this political event triggered caused ALL assets in ALL asset classes in ALL markets to go in the SAME direction--down. None of LTCM's volatility-based models predicted this, no model that is based on past statistical data could have predicted this, and thus, all of LTCM's historically non-correlated assets suddenly became correlated--they all lost money at the same time. Due to the ridiculous leverage (debt) LTCM employed, they were forced to liquidate a lot of their positions at very low prices. Needless to say, LTCM lost a ton of money and shortly after had to close its doors. So in response to your statement that, "[CAPM] makes perfect theoretical sense, but I will assume you mean it doesn't hold up empirically, which is true and inevitable from the assumptions required", I'd argue that CAPM doesn't make any theoretical sense, and LTCM and Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Citigroup, and all the other guys that depended on volatility-based pricing models are the empirical proof. Why beta is volatility, NOT risk; and what risk really means Risk is the potential for capital loss. Volatility is a measure of "unpredictable" change. A volatile security may go from $5 to $20 to $1 to $30. Say I buy at $5. If I had no control over when I had to sell the security (say, if I used a large amount of debt), so that I might end up having to sell at $1, then yes, this security is also risky. But that also doesn't reflect reality. I can control when I want to sell the security (because I don't encourage the use of debt for investing), and if I'm certain that the security is worth $20 to $30, then I won't sell at $1, I'll sell at $20 or $30--there's no risk there. In fact, I'll BUY MORE at $1, and as long as I'm confident in my intrinsic value estimate, I do not bear any risk. To Milton Friedman specifically, when you say: Portfolio diversification is necessary because it hedges risk. Buffett says he's not at risk thanks to his analysis but any stock will always be subject to a stochastic component. Yes, you may make a profit in the long run, but not necessarily so in the short run. The implication of what you're telling people to do is invest all they have in one thing - that is, they are equally risk averse to losing $100 compared to $10,000. However, I think you'll find few people for which that is really the case. Since stocks are subject to volatility if you invest all your money in it and it turns out badly for you, you'll be living off nothing. If you invest a small percentage in one stock, the risk to you is less. This is standard intuition: investors tend to have DARA and CRRA preferences. Buffett's quote implies CARA, which is empirically implausible. A typical (and famous) hedge might be to take roughly an opposite and equal position in options on your stocks. ...you are approaching risk from the standard academic's chair, sequestered behind books, a ton of hypotheticals, and the university pension which most professors don't use to back up their own theories. Their arguments make sense, if one were to agree to their definition of the terms. But I don't, and neither does the real world. I'm not suggesting people are "equally risk averse to losing $100 compared to $10,000"--I'm saying that if they do their homework, they can minimize the potential for losing any money at all! If I gave you a bet with a 90% chance of doubling your money; a 5% chance of losing half; and a 5% chance of not gaining or losing anything; the correct response is to put ANY AND ALL your money into this bet, over and over and over again. That's what risk is, and what risk management should be from the investor's standpoint--a series of expected return calculations based on the potential for permanent capital loss/gain, not on relative correlation and the magnitude of price movements. Portfolio diversification, as you say, is necessary. But not in the way that the academics frame it. Again, if you make up your own definitions for the terms (aka, stating that risk = volatility), then yes, the logical conclusions that you draw from those terms will make sense. But when the definitions you make up do not equal the definitions that hold true in the real world, then, it doesn't matter how large or how grand your intellectual edifice grows, it will always be based on false assumptions. At his most concentrated, Buffett still held about 5 or 6 stocks at any one time, if he was an expert on every one of them (and he made sure that he was), and each of them gave him an expected return game tree like the example I gave above, then he has diversified enough. Most analysts can't claim to be as talented as Buffett, so they might diversify upwards of 10, 20, or even 30; but beyond 30 is just ludicrous. You might as well just diversify to capture the entire market and buy an index fund--which is what I explicitly suggest for most investors. any stock will always be subject to a stochastic component. Yes, you may make a profit in the long run, but not necessarily so in the short run. --you have control over when you sell, so you can hold out for the long run and ignore the short run. Since stocks are subject to volatility if you invest all your money in it and it turns out badly for you, you'll be living off nothing. If you invest a small percentage in one stock, the risk to you is less. --you control risk by analyzing and understanding the stock. If it's not a good stock, don't invest. If it's a good stock, then the expected return (probability of success x outcome of success - probability of failure x outcome of failure) isn't going to be affected by whether you put in $100 or $10,000. If you still aren't convinced by my arguments, which come from a value-oriented investor point of view, then I strongly suggest you read Nassim Taleb's Fooled by Randomness. He reaches the same conclusions as the value-oriented crowd, but he approaches the discussion from the academic point of view which you also seem to be attracted to. Short of that, read this article: Recipe for Disaster: The Formula That Killed Wall Street which explains the volatility-based model that caused the speculative bubble (and eventual collapse) of sub-prime mortgages. | ||
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