Russo-Ukrainian War Thread - Page 635

On December 14 2023 23:26 Manit0u wrote:


I wouldn't really say it's low. Tanks weren't in huge demand really and I would assume that most orders were in the form of "we need 20 tanks in 5 years" and such (checking some info I was able to find on it and most countries were ordering like 40-100 tanks, most of them older used models). No need for big production capabilities, 3/month sounds about right considering that the latest Leo costs around EUR 30 mil and it would primarily be used to replace older models in your own army which then could be sold outside. Also, a lot of those seem to be assembled on site (like in the Greece example where they ordered I think 140 Leos of which 100 were assembled in Greece or something like that).

Wikipedia states that during the Cold War they were able to produce 16 tanks per month and have retained the capability to ramp back up to this number if materials and supply chains were available.

Edit:

It seems that Russia is capable of producing about 300-500 tanks/month. Not sure if this is accurate since we don't really know if they have the materials and components required to produce them.



Source: https://en.defence-ua.com/industries/analyzing_russian_report_of_2100_tanks_produced_in_2023_and_wheres_the_catch_in_these_data-8511.html

On December 15 2023 18:09 Ardias wrote:

Tanks worldwide are quite in large demand, espescially in 3rd world countries. However Cold War built stocks of tanks so large, that all former major producers (US, Germany, Russia, Ukraine, China) exploited them for decades by modernization without much need of procuring new hulls.
For more precise numbers TradeRegisters in a spun of 2012-2021 gives the following (it's only export contracts+license-produced. bear in mind, and some numbers include contracts, that started to be executed before 2012, so the numbers could be inflated a bit, though I tried to adjust and round them up accordingly):
1000 M1 Abrams of different versions
50 T-84 Oplot
70 Leclerc
1100 T-90 (incl. 500 license-produced in India)
850 Leopard 2
50 Leopard 1
1250 different older T-series with various degrees of modernization
300 MBT-2000 (license-produced in Pakistan)
150 VT-4/VT-5

Source - https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php
(search by required criteria, I've put "Armored vehicles", "2012-2021", suppliers/recipients - "All")

Out of those new hulls were - T-90/T-84/MBT-2000/VT-4/VT-5.
Others were old hulls modernized with new kits. Hence the low capability to procure new hulls. M1s that US produces in Lima, Ohio (the only currently active tank production plant) are also repaired and modernized old hulls, since there are plenty in stock.

As for Russian production capacity - evaluating pre-war capabilities, we should divide the new hulls and modernized ones, in same time period of 2012-2021:
New - Russia in 2010-s was trying to fix the issues with Armata and prepare it for mass production, hence it wasn't procuring any new tanks of other types since home fleet of T-series was quite large already. So there are only aforementioned export 600 T-90S in this period (with main buyers being India, Algeria, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Vietnam). It's 60 tanks a year, or 5 a month.
Modernized - intermediate pre-Armata solution was T-72B3, bringing old T-72B to somewhat modern capacity. Production started in 2011, so it fully falls in this time period. Military Balance 2021 lists 1750 T-72B3 in service, plus also 200 T-80BVM (same kind of modernization, but for T-80, started in 2017). So 1950 tanks in 10 years - 195 a year, 16,25 a month.
There are also some 400 older T-series sent on export after repairs and little modernization. It would be 40 a year, or 3,3 a month.
So overall 24,25 tanks a month in peacetime.

For the current numbers - of course there aren't any clear figures. I know for a fact that a lot of money is being poured in to enlarge facilities, by equipment and hire a new personnel. For example 103rd Tank repair plant, which was previously running low-scale capital repairs of older T-series stock for African countries, recieved order on repair and modernization of 800 tanks in 3 years.
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5607913
It's 267 tanks a year (or 22,2 a month) for this plant alone, so almost as much as entire Russian peacetime production for this plant alone. UVZ has much bigger production base, so it's most likely given orders a lot larger than that. There is also Omsktransmash, which was previously working on T-80 modification.

So 500 a month most likely a big stretch, but anything around 200-300 is quite possible.

On December 15 2023 18:59 zeo wrote:

I remember reading a few months back the Russians were aiming for 400-500 new tanks for the whole of 2023 as a kind of max estimate. How many were brand new from scratch who knows.

200 a month is 2400 a year. That just seems like a crazy number.

On December 19 2023 06:03 Ardias wrote:
Because it was likely not related to Russia at all, being an internal Ukrainian thing of all this Zelensky vs Zaluzniy struggle.

On December 19 2023 07:48 Excludos wrote:


Really skirting the Occam's Razor there

"Could the espionage be from the guys they are actively at war with?"
"No! It must be an internal power struggle!"

On December 19 2023 10:45 KwarK wrote:
Is the stance now that there are no Russia sympathetic Ukrainians living in Ukraine? Has someone told Putin?

On December 19 2023 10:45 KwarK wrote:
Is the stance now that there are no Russia sympathetic Ukrainians living in Ukraine? Has someone told Putin?

A difficult Ukrainian counter-offensive, with lesser results than anticipated, has fueled deeply dark discussions about a deadlocked and bloody long-term war with Russia. Meanwhile, analysts and politicians have started to snipe at Ukraine’s military and political leaders, blaming them for the war effort’s failure and even speculating about defeat.

Further feeding this atmosphere of pessimism is evidence of tension between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the country’s military command, as well as delays in military aid from the United States. And these pressures now need to be addressed.

------------

The massive loss of fighters amid meagre gains and a slow-moving positional war eroded public trust in the president and his team for the first time since the war began.

A subsequent mid-November poll gave Zelenskyy a trust rating of only net 32 percent plus — meaning two-thirds of Ukrainians trusted the president, while a third now did not. This was a steep decline from polls earlier in the year, and far below the trust ratings of the armed forces and their commander, General Valery Zaluzhny.

A later poll conducted for the President’s Office and leaked to the Ukrainska Pravda news site showed Zelenskyy was neck and neck with Zaluzhny in a hypothetical race for president. Moreover, Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People party — which currently holds over two-thirds of the seats in parliament — would see its presence shrink dramatically if elections were held today.

And as Zelenskyy’s support weakens, Ukraine now faces a number of challenges and difficult decisions. These include a deadlock on the front, a rapidly depleting supply of munitions, some erosion of support from Europe, and an impasse in the U.S. Congress over a bill to provide for the military needs of both Ukraine and Israel. His star power notwithstanding, Zelenskyy faces new difficulties in maintaining high levels of military and financial support for Ukraine both in North America and in Europe.

Additionally, the ranks of Ukraine’s armed forces — initially populated by experienced military professionals with combat experience and highly motivated volunteers — have suffered mass casualties during these brutal two years of war. Аs a result, military recruiters — now called “people snatchers” — are scouring cities and villages in search of males aged 18 to 60 for military service. Sometimes, these recruiters are not merely using coercive tactics against draft dodgers but detaining and pressuring those not called or exempt from service into signing on. And such tactics are contributing to justifiable public anger toward the authorities

In addition to such unpopular tactics, Zelenskyy will soon likely need to dramatically widen the national military mobilization and shift social spending toward military expenditures, if only to hedge against any decline in, or interruption of, financing from key allies. Both moves will be highly unpopular.

--------------

Furthermore, as importantly, as domestic support erodes, Zelenskyy’s term in office is due to formally expire in May 2024, while the parliament’s four-year term expired in October. New elections are well-nigh impossible with millions of voters outside the country, a million engaged at the front and millions more internally displaced or under Russian occupation. Elections amid bloody combat and constant missiles and drone attacks on urban centers are unlikely, and would require both legislative and constitutional changes.

This issue of expiring mandates would be moot were the ratings of Zelenskyy and his party unassailable, but polls show a creeping disenchantment with both.

In this context, the time is ripe for Ukraine’s president to consider establishing a broad-based government of national unity. Opening the government to opposition and civil society leaders in this way would instantly provide legitimacy to the leadership team, reduce opposition criticism and widen the circle of voices that have the president’s ear.

There are compelling precedents for such a step too. For example, as World War II began, Conservative Prime Minister Winston Churchill understood Britain faced an existential threat that required sustaining national unity and created a broad-based coalition government. Churchill installed his main rival — Labour leader Clement Attlee — as deputy prime minister, and added Labour’s Ernest Bevin, a former trade union leader, to the national unity cabinet.

Similarly, this practice was followed most recently by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who offered opposition party leaders a place in a unity government after Hamas’s brutal October 7 attacks. The proposal was accepted by centrist Benny Gantz.

Since the beginning of his presidency, Zelenskyy has relied on an exceedingly narrow circle of trusted advisors. But while he meets with his top military command, intelligence officials, visiting Western leaders and the media, he has largely shut himself off from civic leaders, political critics and rivals — including some with important foreign policy, national security and economic experience.

Their inclusion in leadership posts would offer Zelenskyy additional input on policy options, allow for discussions of alternative tactics and contribute to new approaches when it comes to external relations. With national unity showing signs of fraying, a government that includes the opposition would truly give it a boost.

The only questions are whether Zelenskyy is flexible enough to overcome his contempt for most opposition leaders, and change his style of governing from highly centralized decision-making to more broad-based consensus-building.