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On May 10 2022 01:28 {CC}StealthBlue wrote: Apparently what trigsgered the reaction was the Ambassador saying the Hospital bombings, and Bucha were all staged by Ukraine.
I'm torned apart. This is pretty uncivilised and should never happen. On the other hand... son of a bitch deserved that.
In terms of violence, throwing some paint isn't uncivilized, especially when considering Russia's actions. He took it like a champ though
A very detailed article about the fight on the Eastern front.
In their way stands Dima — and tens of thousands like him. Now 32, he was 24 when the war began in 2014 and he volunteered to serve in Dnipro 1. He fought for two years before leaving to work as an IT product manager. But when the war started earlier this year, he re-joined.
“We are fighting over [the town of] Rubizhne at the moment,” he tells me. “It’s one of the hottest spots right now. We’re desperately trying to hold it. But it’s close to Sievierodonetsk and [Russian-occupied] Luhansk so it’s tough. The Russians are throwing everything at us there. Missiles, artillery, tanks, men, drones: the works. A guy I know who was in Afghanistan twice said it was like a playground compared to eastern Ukraine.”
Yet the Ukranians remain confident, having already pushed the Russians back from Kyiv. More than this, they are angry. Mass graves discovered in towns such as Bucha mean no one I meet is interested in territorial compromise. “Even if they drop a nuclear bomb on Kyiv they will not win,” Dima tells me. He snorts at Russia’s plans to take southern Ukraine and link Russia up with Transnistria. “Sometimes you play poker with a bad hand, but Russia is playing without any cards at all. Their tactics are insane. Take Chernobaivka: it has a small military airport. Seventeen times they’ve tried to take it. Seventeen times we’ve smashed them. Still they come. Our soldiers ask: ‘Are they dumb?’ No, just incapable of independent thought. They just follow orders — no matter how crazy.”
Ukraine’s problem is resources: the army doesn’t have enough ammunition and artillery, but this is also something of a blessing: it forces them to be creative. “The Russians use Soviet military tactics that were out of date 30 years ago,” he says. “But we study the Afghanistan war and Israeli tactics. Russia just tries to press with mass.”
Beyond Ukraine, Dima is especially positive about two things, or rather, two people. “Elon Musk’s Starlink is what changed the war in Ukraine’s favour,” he tells me. “Russia went out of its way to blow up all our comms. Now they can’t. Starlink works under Katyusha fire, under artillery fire. It even works in Mariupol.”
“I know you British have a complicated relationship with your Prime Minister, but here Boris Johnson has become something of a national hero,” he continues. “The NLAWs you have given us are the best. Easy to use — lock, load and move. Without them we wouldn’t be taking out so many Russian tanks. We knew from the beginning that Britain was a very ancient and important nation. Now we know it’s a country that stands by its word.”
I ask if he minds if I take photos of him. “Take as many photos as you want,” he replies. “I spit on these bastards.” He’s into his stride now. “Look at General Zhukov, the ‘Great Marshal’ who was just a butcher. The Russians are fighting like Zhukov. They send wave after wave but our guys figured out they fight just like Soviets. The tank commander is always in the first tank, so we shoot it. Once you shoot the first and last tanks, they’re immobilised.”
He leans forward and gives me his final thoughts. “Look, we are standing with our blood for Western values. The more you focus on us the more we will break the back of the TV, the press, the foggy mind — all of it: the collective Putin inside Russians.”
Summary of recent events (sources in the spoiler):
RU positions near Kharkiv have collapsed. There appears to be a full retreat, and it's unclear if RU has any reserves to use to try to retake ground here. This is important for two reasons: - UA has reached artillery range on some rail supply routes towards the Izyum axis, likely causing delays and disruptions. - RU might need to spend precious remaining BTGs to reinforce this area instead of attacking near Severodonetsk or Izyum (some BTGs have already been moved from Izyum further north). UA is in the process of liquidating some RU gains in the rest of the Donbas area. We seem to have reached the point at which RU runs out of offensive potential, so RU needs to make a choice about how to proceed with the war.
The Rainer Saks update: 11. mai kokkuvõte eelneva päeva kohta. Ukraina jätkab edenemist Harkivi juures, vene üksused ei suutnud mitte üheski punktis edasi liikuda. - Harkivi juures on vene organiseeritud vastupanu viimase kahe päevaga lagunenud. Ukraina väed puhastavad viimaseid alasid vastu venemaa riigipiiri. Venemaa poolt väga halvasti juhitud vastupanu Ukraina pealetungile, sisuliselt põgenemine viimastel päevadel. Näis, mis tehnikat nad maha jätsid. Siit lahkunud üksused ei olnud väga suured, aga on sisuliselt võitlusvõimetud. Kui vene üksused lähima nädala jooksul ei suuda siin üritada oma positsioone kasvõi osaliselt taastada, on see kindel indikaator vene reservide puudumisest vähemalt sellel suunal. - Izjumi juures ei ole vene üksused suutnud pealetungile asuda, kuigi siin paikenb kõige suurem nende grupeering. Lahingute alguses hinnatai selle suuruseks 22 pataljoni taktikalist gruppi. Vahepeal on kantud väga suuri kaotusi aga saadud ka täiendust, samas antud o ära üksuseid Harkovi ja Severodonetsi suunale. Siiski on siin veel arvestatav jõud peale tungimiseks. Võimalik, et siin paiknenud juhtimispunktide hävitamine ja ukrainlaste hilisemad tulelöögid ei ole lasknud pealetungile grupeeruda. Näis, kuidas edasi, kindlasti sooviks venelased veel pealetungida - Donbassi põhjaosas, Severodonetsi linna ümbruses on vene üksused mitmes suunas endiselt kõige aktiivsemad. Eilse päeva jooksul suutsid Ukraina väed vene üksuste üleeile saavutatud edu likvideerida. Vene poole kaotused on jätkuvalt suured. Lähipäevad näitavad, kas suudetakse uuesti pealetungiks grupeeruda. Mujal Donbassis piirduti suurtükitule ja luurelahingutega. Mariupolis samuti välditakse jalaväega pealetungimist, ilmsesti vägede nappuse ja kaotuste pärast. Keskendutakse õhurünnakutele ja suurtükitulele. - Lõunarindel üritavad vene üksused hoida ukrainlasi suurtükitulega eemal. Üha rohkem tuleb teateid suuremate kaitserajatiste ehitamise kohta vene üksuste poolt - pealetungi potentsiaal on vähemalt praegu ammendunud. Mujal üritab venemaa jätta muljet soovist laiendada sõjategevuse ala, mis tegelikult on lihtsalt pettemanööver. - Transnistrijas hoitakse vägeseid lahingvalmiduses. Samuti üritavad vene raketiväed hävitada Ukraina ühendusi Odessast lõunaase Rumeenia suunal (tegelikult häirib neid Ukraina eksport läbi Rumeenia ja Bulgaaria). Odessat rünnatakse kõige rohkem rakettidega ning kokkuvõttes soovitakse jätte muljet võimalikust dessandist seal piirkonnas. Selliseks ürituseks venemaal praegu jõudu ei ole. Samuti ei ole jõudu Transnistrijast Odessa suunas tungida, kuna Ukrainal paineb selle piirkonnas rohkem vägesid, kui kogu Transnistrijas oleks võimalik välja panna. Siiski teatas Ukraina, et valmistab veel ette täiendavad 2000 vabatahtlikku territoriaalkaitseväelast, lisaks seal juba varem moodustatud territoriaalkaitse üksustele ning regulaarväe üksustele. - Valgevene on juba mai algusest korraldanud oma sõjaväele lahingvalmiduse kontrolle ja õppuseid. On oma üksuseid lohistatud edasi - tagasi Poola ja Leedu suunal. Nüüd teatati oma vägede suunamisest Ukraina piirilie Lvovi suunal. Kõik see on tegelikult vastuseks NATO õppusele Poolas. (need õppused on väga hea heidutus venemaa tegevusele). Ilmselt Venemaa survel liigutakse nüüd Ukraina piirile jättes mulje valmidusest tungida Ukrainasse et lõigata ära Ukraina ühendused Poolaga. Valgevene üksustele ei oleks see jõukohane manööver, lisaks ei saaks venemaa üksused neid mitte kuidagi enam toetada, sest võitlusvõimelisi vene üksuseid enam Valgevenes ei ole. On mõned lahinglennukid ja paar Iskanderi laskesealdedist, mis aga on pigem möeldud Lukašenka kaitseks võimaliku Ukrana rünnaku eest. Valgevene juhile tähendaks Ukraina vastu sõtta astumine selgelt enesetapu missiooni. Kuid venemaa surve on ilmselt olemas ning ega garantiid ka anda ei saa, et sellist rünnakut ei toimu. Aga valgevene sõtta astumine oma vägedeleda on väga väikese tõenäosusega. - Ukraina vägede sidumiseks rünnatakse suurtükiväega venemaa territrooiumilt ka Sumõ oblasti alasid. Venemaa üksused on suures osas tänaseks kaotanud oma ründepotentsiaali. Ainus piirkond, kus see on praegu veel säilinud on Izjumi ja Severodonetsi piirkonnas Donbassis. Lisaks on nad kindlasti võimelised pikapeale vallutma Mariupoli. Ukraina veel ei ole võimeline laial rindel peale tungima, kuigi momentum selleks on tekkimas, osades piirkondades juba tekkinud. Venemaa juhktonna jaoks on saabunud otsustamise koht- kuidas seda sõda edasi pidada. Olen ka varem kahte varianti maininud, homme kirjutab sellest pikemalt.
US authorized 40bn (up from 33bn) to support UA and allies.
Under the Ukraine aid plan, the nearly $40 billion total goes beyond Biden’s request for $33 billion, a sum that was already expected to be transformative for both the Ukrainian military and NATO allies. The almost $40 billion total amounts to more than 5 percent of the United States’ entire national security budget of $782 billion, and lawmakers opted to include even more funding for military and humanitarian programs than Biden had originally requested.
Attracting overwhelming support, the measure cleared the House in a 368-57 vote, just hours after bill text was released. Across the Capitol, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer has promised the Senate “will move swiftly” to pass the package for Biden’s signature.
Despite the boost to Biden’s proposal, some Republicans argue more cash might still be needed to adequately help Ukraine beat back the Russian invasion.
“Defeating Putin is priceless,” said Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), the Senate’s top Republican on the spending panel that funds the State Department and foreign aid programs.
“Do I think this will be the last round? No, I think we’ll be doing this again,” Graham said. “Who knows where we’re going to be two months from now, three months from now. As long as they’re willing to fight, we need to help.”
Some House Republicans groused in their Tuesday leadership meeting about the short period of time between the bill’s release and the evening vote, according to three sources in the room.
“This is a historic vote, and it could determine the course of this war, and to vote no is a vote for Putin,” said House Foreign Affairs ranking member Mike McCaul (R-Texas).
The president’s original request included billions to arm Ukraine and finance higher troop levels in Europe, as well as restock military inventories of weapons that were sent into the fight against Russia. The White House estimated its request would bolster Ukraine through the next five months of the unfolding conflict, though some lawmakers have questioned that assessment.
“From what I understand, it’s not enough,” said Sen. Jim Inhofe of Oklahoma, the top Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, during a brief interview Tuesday.
The bill would authorize up to $11 billion worth of transfers of weapons and equipment to Ukraine drawn directly from U.S. military stockpiles.
The Biden administration has used the process, known as drawdown authority, to get equipment and weapons to Ukraine quickly — most notably to arm them with Javelin anti-tank and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, drones and ammunition. The White House has warned that the current $3.5 billion in drawdown authority has nearly been exhausted.
The package also includes nearly $20 billion for the Pentagon. That includes $8.7 billion to replenish weapons inventories sent to the front lines, $3.3 billion more than the administration requested. And $6 billion would go to the Pentagon’s main account to arm Ukraine’s military, along with $3.9 billion for increased troop deployments and other military operations in Europe to bolster NATO.
Amid the last-minute jostling over final text of the emergency aid package, a bipartisan group of senators pushed for the bill to allow the United States to seize and sell the assets of Russian oligarchs as a way to pay for humanitarian efforts in Ukraine. The legislation includes $67 million in funding for the Justice Department to help pay for the costs of seizing and selling such assets, such as oligarchs’ yachts. Source. Text.
Edit:
Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance for Ukraine
The United States has committed more than $4.5 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden Administration, including approximately $3.8 billion since the beginning of Russia’s unprovoked invasion on February 24.
On May 6, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown of security assistance valued at up to an additional $150 million tailored to meet critical Ukrainian needs for today’s fight as Russian forces launch a renewed offensive in eastern Ukraine. This authorization is the ninth drawdown of equipment from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021.
United States security assistance committed to Ukraine includes:
- Over 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems; - Over 5,500 Javelin anti-armor systems; - Over 14,000 other anti-armor systems; - Over 700 Switchblade Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems; - 90 155mm Howitzers and over 200,000 155mm artillery rounds; - 72 Tactical Vehicles to tow 155mm Howitzers; - 16 Mi-17 helicopters; - Hundreds of Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles; - 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers; - Over 7,000 small arms; - Over 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition; - 75,000 sets of body armor and helmets; - 121 Phoenix Ghost Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems; - Laser-guided rocket systems; - Puma Unmanned Aerial Systems; - Unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels; - 17 counter-artillery radars; - Four counter-mortar radars; - Two air surveillance radars; - M18A1 Claymore anti-personnel munitions; - C-4 explosives and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing; - Tactical secure communications systems; - Night vision devices, thermal imagery systems, optics, and laser rangefinders; - Commercial satellite imagery services; - Explosive ordnance disposal protective gear; - Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment; - Medical supplies to include first aid kits; - Electronic jamming equipment; - Field equipment and spare parts. Source
"Karl" the Estonian intelligence officer provides another anonymous update. Key points:
- UA success near Kharkiv is probably permanent and increases the chance of attacks towards Izyum and !Russia near Belgorod. - RU attack was stopped near Popasna. - Lukashenka is not about to join the war, he's signaling to the West that he wants to make a deal.
I think it’s a given that Lukashenka, as well as everyone else, is not super interested in getting in on Putin’s Folly. Nothing happening there looks like it’d be fun to join in.
Well that and Lukashenko support is hanging on by a thread via the military. Who have made it quite clear they have no intention of wanting to go fight and die in Ukraine.
Any deal with Lukashenka would be a mistake. He has nothing to offer, no ability to follow through on his threats and he destroyed his credibility with numerous transgressions before and during the war.
On May 10 2022 07:18 KwarK wrote: My understanding was that they weren’t doing proper combined arms anyway. If a Russian infantry company are coming under artillery fire then the Air Force doesn’t really see how that’s their problem. If you wanted something bombed you should have put in the appropriate forms several weeks ago and if you couldn’t be bothered to do that then that’s on you.
Your understanding isn't exactly correct. While our army isn't as efficient at coordination between land and air as the US military and doesn't have the same amount of precision guided munitions, close air support is a thing and it is employed en masse. Plus most of the helicopter squadrons, while being in the structure of the Air Force, who are responsible for their training and maintenance, are still answering to the Land Forces command about their combat deployment. Here are some examples under spoiler: + Show Spoiler +
Combined arms isn't just about air support. It's cooperation between infantry, tanks, artillery etc. Russian performance in combined arms warfare has been aweful. It's why so many tanks are being picked off for example. They're without proper infantry support.
On May 12 2022 03:18 RvB wrote: Combined arms isn't just about air support. It's cooperation between infantry, tanks, artillery etc. Russian performance in combined arms warfare has been aweful. It's why so many tanks are being picked off for example. They're without proper infantry support.
Let me underline the quotes I was primarily responding to:
If a Russian infantry company are coming under artillery fire then the Air Force doesn’t really see how that’s their problem. If you wanted something bombed you should have put in the appropriate forms several weeks ago and if you couldn’t be bothered to do that then that’s on you.
I understand that the post could be ironical a bit, but you do not fly on tanks, small truck columns or squad of troops sitting in a trench by planning it weeks in advance, or without coordination with ground forces.
As for lackluster combined arms performance - I won't be denying our organizational shortcomings, especially in the Chernigov/Sumy/Kharkov area, though a lot of those losses were due to the false strategic assumptions that Ukraine won't resist much, hence the long marching columns and little area control. Neither I would deny the problems with communication and recoinassance assets, especially UAVs. But while I understand the desire of many people to the west of the Dniepr to see Russians and their military as incompetent morons, I should notice that you generally look at only one side of the picture (because other is "Russian propaganda" and can not be trusted a priori). Of course, looking only at Ukrainian successes and loss figures for both sides, it could be easily believed that Russkies are dumb as hell. But then I have a few questions: 1) According to Oryx website, Ukraine have lost 157 tanks, while capturing 238. Considering the fact that Ukraine had 1000+ tanks by the start of the war, it means now they have even more (okay, lets consider couple hundred as damaged). So it's 1000 battle ready tanks. Why there is so little combat video footage from them? Ukraine is better than Russia in information warfare. They post ton of recordings with ATGM, MANPADs, artillery and mortar hit control from UAVs, infantry combat to show how good they are at killing Russians. But why so few videos with killing Russians from tanks or other armored vehicles (last that I remember was couple of BTR-4 videos from "Azov" in Mariupol, while they still were fighting in the streets)? Same question goes for the UA Air force. 2) If everything is allright, and losses from both sides are like reported by Ukrainian HQ, why send the territorial defence force without proper armament from Zakarpatia region (the western-most Ukrainian region) to the frontlines?
It would be completely irrational to keep people who can be useful in combat west of Lviv. What are they supposed to do in Zakarpatia, watch out for a Hungarian backstab?
I've seen videos of the American pieces (with the signature muzzle break tow hook) being used in the field and transported. I'm not familiar with the other nations pieces but I haven't seen the German self propelled pieces. I have seen some advanced French manpads bolted down to civilian trucks. I haven't seen a star streak in action and that thing makes javalins look like rpgs. Pushes 3 tungsten darts at mach 4 out of a crew served weapon platform. Sure they're suppose to take out ground attack jets but what can honestly eat tungsten darts at mach 4?
Sending militia forces to do no combat duties is a legitimate strategy. Repairing damaged roads and paths, patrolling rear areas as well as handling pow guard duty while escorting supplies and captured equipment to rear areas.
You want your best forces doing combat and your worst forces to not do combat.
Just a reminder that "militia" and "territorial defense forces" might not always mean inexperienced. Many of UA's vets from the last 8 years of war re-joined after retirement as TDFs. They're both experienced and trained to use much of the more advanced equipment, so they can lead certain operations, including the clearing of the Kharkiv area that's currently being concluded. Azov is also widely considered the most well trained and equipped among UA units, and they're basically a private militia. Wars are weird.
On May 12 2022 03:18 RvB wrote: Combined arms isn't just about air support. It's cooperation between infantry, tanks, artillery etc. Russian performance in combined arms warfare has been aweful. It's why so many tanks are being picked off for example. They're without proper infantry support.
Let me underline the quotes I was primarily responding to:
If a Russian infantry company are coming under artillery fire then the Air Force doesn’t really see how that’s their problem. If you wanted something bombed you should have put in the appropriate forms several weeks ago and if you couldn’t be bothered to do that then that’s on you.
I understand that the post could be ironical a bit, but you do not fly on tanks, small truck columns or squad of troops sitting in a trench by planning it weeks in advance, or without coordination with ground forces.
As for lackluster combined arms performance - I won't be denying our organizational shortcomings, especially in the Chernigov/Sumy/Kharkov area, though a lot of those losses were due to the false strategic assumptions that Ukraine won't resist much, hence the long marching columns and little area control. Neither I would deny the problems with communication and recoinassance assets, especially UAVs. But while I understand the desire of many people to the west of the Dniepr to see Russians and their military as incompetent morons, I should notice that you generally look at only one side of the picture (because other is "Russian propaganda" and can not be trusted a priori). Of course, looking only at Ukrainian successes and loss figures for both sides, it could be easily believed that Russkies are dumb as hell. But then I have a few questions: 1) According to Oryx website, Ukraine have lost 157 tanks, while capturing 238. Considering the fact that Ukraine had 1000+ tanks by the start of the war, it means now they have even more (okay, lets consider couple hundred as damaged). So it's 1000 battle ready tanks. Why there is so little combat video footage from them? Ukraine is better than Russia in information warfare. They post ton of recordings with ATGM, MANPADs, artillery and mortar hit control from UAVs, infantry combat to show how good they are at killing Russians. But why so few videos with killing Russians from tanks or other armored vehicles (last that I remember was couple of BTR-4 videos from "Azov" in Mariupol, while they still were fighting in the streets)? Same question goes for the UA Air force. 2) If everything is allright, and losses from both sides are like reported by Ukrainian HQ, why send the territorial defence force without proper armament from Zakarpatia region (the western-most Ukrainian region) to the frontlines?
We have a bloodshed on both sides and the only thing you care is that reputation of capability of your army has been tarnished?
On May 12 2022 05:05 JimmiC wrote: Has their been any reports to whether UA are using all the new artillery they have recently received and its effectiveness?
Yes, it's doing pretty well. Also, Ukrainians have modernized the artillery strikes.
They're collecting data from various sources - air recon, drones, satellite, radar and putting it into a single system called GIS Art that works as an "Artillery Uber". They can call an artillery strike and get it in 30s instead of 20min (for comparison, US needs about an hour to call a strike, due to all the checks to exclude potential errors etc. Ukraininans don't really care about double-checking during wartime). Ukrainian artillery is then firing single artillery pieces which are organized more like a dispersed swarm rather than full batteries. This means that the strikes are coming on a single target from multiple directions, making it harder to track down the origin and easier to redeploy after firing the salvo to avoid counter-strikes. The software also coordinates firing times so that salvos arrive at the target at the same time. Russians identified this threat and started the war with a hacking attack on satellite data transmission systems which the Ukrainians were using but Ukrainians used Starlink as backup, which might be even better for them (better connection speeds, harder to track).