There is an email by a former Flightsimulator-Trainer who claims that south-korean work-spirit harms their piloting skills. He mentions that met pilots who knew the manuals of the specific aircrafts word-for-word but can not use their theoretical knowledge in the cockpit. He says SKorean pilots also suffer from the lack off private aviation (they can not train on smaller aircrafts, since there is just military and commercial). He thinks Koreans pilots are very, very smart and hard working, but they only repeat everything over and over again theoretically, not thinking about it (wich kind of reminds me of every korean starcraft player and their hammered in mechanics ). Also he speaks of a ban of SK-Aircrafts on US and EU airports because of the bad pilot-training in the 80´s and 90´s. SK-Airlines had to hire foreign trainers to improve their pilot skills. He claims that if korean pilots fail at mandatory simulator tests, they are not fired, they are send to different Trainers/instructors instead until sombody lets them pass.
On Jul 9th 2013 the NTSB reported in their third press conference based on pilot interviews, that they were requested to maintain 180 KIAS until 5nm out, then extended the flaps to landing configuration of 30 degrees (160 KIAS max speed), they were high descending through 4000 feet, set vertical speed mode at -1500fpm, at 500 feet AGL the PAPIs were showing three red one white and the pilot began to pull back on the yoke to reduce rate of descent assuming the autothrottles would maintain the speed set to 137 knots. A lateral deviation developed taking the attention of the crew. Descending through 200 feet all PAPIs were red and the speed had decayed into the red/black marked range, the training captain realised the autothrottles were not maintaining the target speed, at that point the pilot flying had already started to move the levers forward. There were three pilots in the cockpit, the captain under supervision was pilot flying occupying the left hand seat, the training captain was pilot monitoring occupying the right hand seat, the relief first officer was occupying the observer seat, the relief captain was in the cabin at the time of the landing. The captain under supervision, 9700 hours total flying experience with 5000 hours in command, type ratings for B737, B747 and A320 having been ground instructor and sim instructor as well captain on A320s from 2005 to 2013, had flown 10 legs for a total of 35 hours on the Boeing 777-200 so far and was about half way through his supervision. The training captain, about 3000 hours on B777 and about 10k hours in command, was on his first flight as training captain, he was pilot in command, the two pilots had never flown together before. The relief first officer had 4600 hours of total experience, about 900 hours on B772 and about 5-6 landings into SFO as pilot monitoring on B772. The autothrottle switches were found in the armed position post accident, it is not yet clear in what mode the autothrottles were and whether autothrottles were engaged or not. Two flight attendants in the aft cabin were ejected from the aircraft during the accident sequence and were later found up and aside of the runway with injuries. At least one of the escape slides inflated inside the cabin. There was a post accident fire at the inboard section of the #2 engine, a fuel tank had ruptured leaking fuel onto the hot engine. The thrust reversers were found stowed, the speedbrakes were retracted. Both engine fire handles were pulled and agents discharged, the APU fire handle was pulled and agent discharged as well. Traces at the sea wall reveal that the main landing gear struck the sea wall first, then the tail of the aircraft.
On Jul 10th 2013 the NTSB reported in their fourth press conference, that the captain under supervision and training captain had flown the takeoff from Seoul, had taken about 5 hours of rest enroute and took their seats again about 90 minutes prior to landing. During the last 2.5 minutes of flight there were multiple autopilot and multiple autothrust modes. The various modes needs to be assessed to see whether they were result of single pilot actions or result of interconnected system responses. The aircraft received landing clearance about 1.5nm before touchdown. Six of twelve flight attendants are still in hospital care and were not interviewed so far. The flight attendants at doors 1R and 2R were pinned by evacuation slides deploying into the cabin. 3 of four flight attendants at the rear doors were ejected from the aircraft together with their seats. None of the passenger seats were ejected from the aircraft. The six uninjured flight attendants were interviewed and reported that after the aircraft came to a stop, one of the flight attendants at 1L went to the cockpit and checked with flight crew whether an evacuation should be initiated, the flight crew instructed to not initiate the evacuation. The flight attendants at 2L saw fire outside the aircraft near seat row 10, consistent with the position of the right hand engine's position adjacent to the fuselage, and initiated the evacuation. 90 seconds after the aircraft came to a stop door 2L closely followed by 1L opened and the evacuation began. 120 seconds after the aircraft came to a stop the first emergency responders arrived on scene, about 150 seconds after the aircraft came to a stop the first fire agent was applied to the right hand side by emergency services. Emergency services entered the aircraft with a hose and attempted to fight the fire from the inside of the aircraft as well as assisted in the passenger evacuation. While trying to liberate the pinned flight attendants emergency services observed fire coming in from the window/fuselage. The NTSB is probably going to release runway 28L to the airport within the next 24 hours. In an interview with Korean Authorities the pilot flying reported that a flash of light occurred at 500 feet which temporarily blinded him, the NTSB confirmed that this was mentioned in their interview as a temporary event, too.
So it was indeed the right-hand side engine (#2) that triggered the fire in the cabin as it had liberated and rolled up to the fuselage near 2R and row 10 and oil was leaking onto its hot surface from a ruptured tank.
As can be seen on the following pictures (marked on the first, visible on the second), there was a United Boeing 747 (flight UA885) waiting on the taxiway next to runway 28L facing the seawall where the Asiana Boeing 777 impacted on landing:
The first officer of said United Boeing 747 (flight UA885) now gave a witness account in an e-mail as follows:
On July 6, 2013 at approximately 1827Z I was the 747-400 relief F/O on flt 885, ID326/06 SFO-KIX. I was a witness to the Asiana Flt 214 accident. We had taxied to hold short of runway 28L at SFO on taxiway F, and were waiting to rectify a HAZMAT cargo issue as well as our final weights before we could run our before takeoff checklist and depart. As we waited on taxiway F heading East, just prior to the perpendicular holding area, all three pilots took notice of the Asiana 777 on short final. I noticed the aircraft looked low on glidepath and had a very high deck angle compared to what seemed “normal”. I then noticed at the apparent descent rate and closure to the runway environment the aircraft looked as though it was going to impact the approach lights mounted on piers in the SF Bay. The aircraft made a fairly drastic looking pull up in the last few feet and it appeared and sounded as if they had applied maximum thrust. However the descent path they were on continued and the thrust applied didn't appear to come soon enough to prevent impact. The tail cone and empennage of the 777 impacted the bulkhead seawall and departed the airplane and the main landing gear sheared off instantly. This created a long debris field along the arrival end of 28L, mostly along the right side of 28L. We saw the fuselage, largely intact, slide down the runway and out of view of our cockpit. We heard much confusion and quick instructions from SFO Tower and a few moments later heard an aircraft go around over the runway 28 complex. We realized within a few moments that we were apparently unharmed so I got on the PA and instructed everyone to remain seated and that we were safe.
We all acknowledged if we had been located between Runways 28R and 28L on taxiway F we would have likely suffered damage to the right side aft section of our aircraft from the 777.
Approximately two minutes later I was looking out the left side cockpit windows and noticed movement on the right side of Runway 28L. Two survivors were stumbling but moving abeam the Runway “28L” marking on the North side of the runway. I saw one survivor stand up, walk a few feet, then appear to squat down. The other appeared to be a woman and was walking, then fell off to her side and remained on the ground until rescue personnel arrived. The Captain was on the radio and I told him to tell tower what I had seen, but I ended up taking the microphone instead of relaying through him. I told SFO tower that there appeared to be survivors on the right side of the runway and they needed to send assistance immediately. It seemed to take a very long time for vehicles and assistance to arrive for these victims. The survivors I saw were approximately 1000-1500' away from the fuselage and had apparently been ejected from the fuselage.
We made numerous PAs to the passengers telling them any information we had, which we acknowledged was going to change rapidly, and I left the cockpit to check on the flight attendants and the overall mood of the passengers, as I was the third pilot and not in a control seat. A couple of our flight attendants were shaken up but ALL were doing an outstanding and extremely professional job of handling the passenger's needs and providing calm comfort to them. One of the flight attendants contacted unaccompanied minors' parents to ensure them their children were safe and would be taken care of by our crew. Their demeanor and professionalism during this horrific event was noteworthy. I went to each cabin and spoke to the passengers asking if everyone was OK and if they needed any assistance, and gave them information personally, to include telling them what I saw from the cockpit. I also provided encouragement that we would be OK, we'd tell them everything we learn and to please relax and be patient and expect this is going to be a long wait. The passenger mood was concerned but generally calm. A few individuals were emotional as nearly every passenger on the left side of the aircraft saw the fuselage and debris field going over 100 knots past our aircraft only 300' away. By this point everyone had looked out the windows and could see the smoke plume from the 777. A number of passengers also noticed what I had seen with the survivors out near the end of 28L expressing concern that the rescue effort appeared slow for those individuals that had been separated from the airplane wreckage.
We ultimately had a tug come out and tow us back to the gate, doing a 3 point turn in the hold short area of 28L. We were towed to gate 101 where the passengers deplaned.
On July 13 2013 08:56 Ubiquitousdichotomy wrote: Dats So Wong...Is this news anchor channeling Ron Burgangy? What intelligent person would think their is 4 pilots for 1 plane?
Not sure if you're joking, but the aircraft had a relief crew due to the length of the flight. There were four pilots in the cockpit at landing.
Anyways, a former pilot created these insightful simulated videos depicting what the final approach of Asiana 214 looked like and what it should have been without crashing (mind the Youtube comments of the author re:speed and re:engine #1):
A third child has died from the Asiana Airlines crash at San Francisco International Airport, hospital officials announced Friday afternoon. San Francisco General Hospital officials said that the victim, a girl, died of her injuries Friday morning. Her parents asked that the hospital not reveal her identity or the nature of her injuries, said hospital spokeswoman Rachel Kagen.
She had been one of three patients in critical condition at the hospital. They suffered spinal cord injuries, traumatic brain injuries, abdominal injuries and internal bleeding. Two adults remain in critical condition. The conditions of four others, including a girl, range from serious to fair to good.
Earlier Friday, police confirmed that one of two Chinese teens killed was run over by a firetruck that responded to the emergency. It's not yet clear whether the victim, 16-year-old Ye Meng Yuan, was already dead from injuries in the crash when she was struck by the truck, police said. "We are confirming that at least one time, a firetruck went over a victim," said San Francisco Police Officer Albie Esparza, a police spokesman.
Esparza said two large airport firetrucks initially responded to the crash and began spraying the fuselage with flame-retardant foam. The area around the plane became covered in foam, and when firetrucks moved to continue fighting the fire, the victim, covered in foam, was run over, Esparza said. "When at least one firetruck repositioned itself, to continue fighting the fire, at that time the victim was discovered in the tire track."
The KTVU on-air mistake is unfortunate, but nothing more. They followed proper procedure in reporting here, having verified the list with the NTSB. The fault is with the NTSB for allowing one of their interns to be in a position to troll them. As for blaming the news station for lacking common sense, not everyone is as familiar with Korean names in general as the average TL poster. For my part, when I watched the clip, the only mistake I could think of was that the names looked more Chinese than Korean. Took me some additional thought to realise what the "names" actually were. Yeah, the names are complete BS, and obviously so for a lot of people, but not for everyone.
The NTSB claimed they didn't create the names, just "confirmed" them. Obviously some troll somewhere is going to get fired (or someone will take the fall for them, in addition to that intern who is surely already fired). I doubt anybody is getting sued.