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On January 13 2010 13:27 L wrote:Show nested quote +On January 13 2010 13:17 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:13 Slow Motion wrote:
There is no actual value or logic in retaliation against the enemy if your country has already been destroyed by nukes. However, for the purpose of MAD, it is imperative that the adversary believes that there will be retaliation.
It's kinda paradoxical, but it comes down to the fact that, for example, the US has to understand that USSR will retaliate even when it's already been destroyed and there is no point in retaliation. Without this understanding there can be no MAD.
Personally, as a leader of the US I will give the adversary no doubt that I would retaliate even if my country were completely destroyed. But when the moment actually came that every American is nuked to death, I would not retaliate. There is no reason at that point to destroy every human life in the world. Good  Now we are ready for the billion dollar (or life) question Are you convinced that America has 7000 nuclear warheads aimed at Russia? Are you convinced that Russia has 7000 nuclear warheads aimed at America?
Yes. Which is why the system works.
Suppose one of the states decided that it was the threat of nuclear anhilation, and not actual nuclear anhilation that they most desired. Suppose they decided that should they die it would be better for the enemy to live then all to die.
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On January 13 2010 13:26 starfries wrote:Show nested quote +On January 13 2010 13:18 sassy wrote:
LOL i just thought of a weird scenario
imagine actual world, one country starts launching nukes targeted at different cities elsewhere
then the target gets a phone call stating that it is a mistake/computer bug/some kind of error( all of this while more nukes being launched)
what would the response be? Strike back or just wait? I remember a story like that, some terrorist in the US launches a nuke at Moscow and there's going to be full-out nuclear war, but the US calls Russia and says stop. Russia agrees, but in return, the US has to let them nuke one of their cities (New York I believe), without telling the civilians since that's what happened to Moscow...
HAH
was that some sci fi novel? or a movie? Sounds awesome
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America has enough sheer firepower to destroy the world more than once over and so does Russia... It's really not a question. As for whether it's specifically 7000 nukes, who knows and more importantly, why does it matter?
On a personal note, I would wipe out all of mankind along with me in that scenario just because I'm a selfish bastard...
This seems less like game theory and more like philosophy... But then again, I suppose the two come together in that there's inevitably philosophy involved in defining certain aspects of the game such as the definition of winning..
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On January 13 2010 13:37 HeartOfTofu wrote:
America has enough sheer firepower to destroy the world more than once over and so does Russia... It's really not a question. As for whether it's specifically 7000 nukes, who knows and more importantly, why does it matter?
The question is which is more important (and desired) the threat of 7000 nukes or actually having 7000 nukes?
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On January 13 2010 13:38 Archerofaiur wrote:Show nested quote +On January 13 2010 13:37 HeartOfTofu wrote:
America has enough sheer firepower to destroy the world more than once over and so does Russia... It's really not a question. As for whether it's specifically 7000 nukes, who knows and more importantly, why does it matter?
The question is which is more important (and desired) the threat of 7000 nukes or actually having 7000 nukes?
The threat is more important of course. But in the real world countries are able to obtain enough info on one another that the threat must in effect be roughly equivalent to actuality.
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On January 13 2010 13:41 Slow Motion wrote:Show nested quote +On January 13 2010 13:38 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:37 HeartOfTofu wrote:
America has enough sheer firepower to destroy the world more than once over and so does Russia... It's really not a question. As for whether it's specifically 7000 nukes, who knows and more importantly, why does it matter?
The question is which is more important (and desired) the threat of 7000 nukes or actually having 7000 nukes? The threat is more important of course. But in the real world countries are able to obtain enough info on one another that the threat must in effect be roughly equivalent to actuality.
Yes! Great point. Which means either you have the real deal or you have almost the real deal and hid say a tiny but crucial part.
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On January 13 2010 13:42 Archerofaiur wrote:Show nested quote +On January 13 2010 13:41 Slow Motion wrote:On January 13 2010 13:38 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:37 HeartOfTofu wrote:
America has enough sheer firepower to destroy the world more than once over and so does Russia... It's really not a question. As for whether it's specifically 7000 nukes, who knows and more importantly, why does it matter?
The question is which is more important (and desired) the threat of 7000 nukes or actually having 7000 nukes? The threat is more important of course. But in the real world countries are able to obtain enough info on one another that the threat must in effect be roughly equivalent to actuality. Yes! Great point. Which means?
Which means for the logic of MAD to work, a country can only assure its safety by actually having enough of a stockpile of nukes for second strike, or at least being very closely allied to a country with such capabilities.
However, I think the logic of MAD is less important in the 21st century (at least until world war 3 is fought over energy resources).
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On January 13 2010 13:35 sassy wrote:Show nested quote +On January 13 2010 13:26 starfries wrote:On January 13 2010 13:18 sassy wrote:
LOL i just thought of a weird scenario
imagine actual world, one country starts launching nukes targeted at different cities elsewhere
then the target gets a phone call stating that it is a mistake/computer bug/some kind of error( all of this while more nukes being launched)
what would the response be? Strike back or just wait? I remember a story like that, some terrorist in the US launches a nuke at Moscow and there's going to be full-out nuclear war, but the US calls Russia and says stop. Russia agrees, but in return, the US has to let them nuke one of their cities (New York I believe), without telling the civilians since that's what happened to Moscow... HAH was that some sci fi novel? or a movie? Sounds awesome
i wish i could remember... sadly google and wikipedia brings up nothing relevant. but I did find out that the peace symbol (the chicken foot in a circle) was originally the symbol for nuclear disarmament... gotta love wikipedia.
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On January 13 2010 13:29 Archerofaiur wrote:Show nested quote +On January 13 2010 13:27 L wrote:On January 13 2010 13:17 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:13 Slow Motion wrote:
There is no actual value or logic in retaliation against the enemy if your country has already been destroyed by nukes. However, for the purpose of MAD, it is imperative that the adversary believes that there will be retaliation.
It's kinda paradoxical, but it comes down to the fact that, for example, the US has to understand that USSR will retaliate even when it's already been destroyed and there is no point in retaliation. Without this understanding there can be no MAD.
Personally, as a leader of the US I will give the adversary no doubt that I would retaliate even if my country were completely destroyed. But when the moment actually came that every American is nuked to death, I would not retaliate. There is no reason at that point to destroy every human life in the world. Good Now we are ready for the billion dollar (or life) question Are you convinced that America has 7000 nuclear warheads aimed at Russia? Are you convinced that Russia has 7000 nuclear warheads aimed at America? Yes. Which is why the system works.
Why do you believe that?
More importantly, is the amount of uncertainty in that Yes greater than the uncertainty needed for you to launch a nuclear attack?
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On January 13 2010 13:45 starfries wrote:Show nested quote +On January 13 2010 13:35 sassy wrote:On January 13 2010 13:26 starfries wrote:On January 13 2010 13:18 sassy wrote:
LOL i just thought of a weird scenario
imagine actual world, one country starts launching nukes targeted at different cities elsewhere
then the target gets a phone call stating that it is a mistake/computer bug/some kind of error( all of this while more nukes being launched)
what would the response be? Strike back or just wait? I remember a story like that, some terrorist in the US launches a nuke at Moscow and there's going to be full-out nuclear war, but the US calls Russia and says stop. Russia agrees, but in return, the US has to let them nuke one of their cities (New York I believe), without telling the civilians since that's what happened to Moscow... HAH was that some sci fi novel? or a movie? Sounds awesome i wish i could remember... sadly google and wikipedia brings up nothing relevant. but I did find out that the peace symbol (the chicken foot in a circle) was originally the symbol for nuclear disarmament... gotta love wikipedia.
I remember this one about Taiwanese terrorists, and nuclear brinkmanship between the US and China.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chain_of_Command_(film)
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On January 13 2010 13:46 L wrote:Show nested quote +On January 13 2010 13:29 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:27 L wrote:On January 13 2010 13:17 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:13 Slow Motion wrote:
There is no actual value or logic in retaliation against the enemy if your country has already been destroyed by nukes. However, for the purpose of MAD, it is imperative that the adversary believes that there will be retaliation.
It's kinda paradoxical, but it comes down to the fact that, for example, the US has to understand that USSR will retaliate even when it's already been destroyed and there is no point in retaliation. Without this understanding there can be no MAD.
Personally, as a leader of the US I will give the adversary no doubt that I would retaliate even if my country were completely destroyed. But when the moment actually came that every American is nuked to death, I would not retaliate. There is no reason at that point to destroy every human life in the world. Good Now we are ready for the billion dollar (or life) question Are you convinced that America has 7000 nuclear warheads aimed at Russia? Are you convinced that Russia has 7000 nuclear warheads aimed at America? Yes. Which is why the system works. Why do you believe that? More importantly, is the amount of uncertainty in that Yes greater than the uncertainty needed for you to launch a nuclear attack?
Well theres two ways the uncertainty effects me
1) How I react to BEFORE the event (including what I try to convince the other guy).
and
2) How I prepare the system to react AFTER the event (what kind of world I leave behind).
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On January 13 2010 13:44 Slow Motion wrote:Show nested quote +On January 13 2010 13:42 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:41 Slow Motion wrote:On January 13 2010 13:38 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:37 HeartOfTofu wrote:
America has enough sheer firepower to destroy the world more than once over and so does Russia... It's really not a question. As for whether it's specifically 7000 nukes, who knows and more importantly, why does it matter?
The question is which is more important (and desired) the threat of 7000 nukes or actually having 7000 nukes? The threat is more important of course. But in the real world countries are able to obtain enough info on one another that the threat must in effect be roughly equivalent to actuality. Yes! Great point. Which means? Which means for the logic of MAD to work, a country can only assure its safety by actually having enough of a stockpile of nukes for second strike, or at least being very closely allied to a country with such capabilities. However, I think the logic of MAD is less important in the 21st century (at least until world war 3 is fought over energy resources).
Second strike isn't necessary if your enemy doesn't have real first-strike capability. Unless you are defining your terms differently.
And MAD is extremely important in the 21st century. Nuclear weapons are still the final arbiters in warfare. Joke countries like Iraq/Afghanistan get limited war treatment. There will be no 'energy wars' between nuclear-armed countries that don't involve a massive nuclear exchange; limited warfare between nuclear-armed states has always been impossible.
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On January 13 2010 13:48 Archerofaiur wrote:Show nested quote +On January 13 2010 13:46 L wrote:On January 13 2010 13:29 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:27 L wrote:On January 13 2010 13:17 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:13 Slow Motion wrote:
There is no actual value or logic in retaliation against the enemy if your country has already been destroyed by nukes. However, for the purpose of MAD, it is imperative that the adversary believes that there will be retaliation.
It's kinda paradoxical, but it comes down to the fact that, for example, the US has to understand that USSR will retaliate even when it's already been destroyed and there is no point in retaliation. Without this understanding there can be no MAD.
Personally, as a leader of the US I will give the adversary no doubt that I would retaliate even if my country were completely destroyed. But when the moment actually came that every American is nuked to death, I would not retaliate. There is no reason at that point to destroy every human life in the world. Good Now we are ready for the billion dollar (or life) question Are you convinced that America has 7000 nuclear warheads aimed at Russia? Are you convinced that Russia has 7000 nuclear warheads aimed at America? Yes. Which is why the system works. Why do you believe that? More importantly, is the amount of uncertainty in that Yes greater than the uncertainty needed for you to launch a nuclear attack? Well theres two ways the uncertainty effects me 1) How I react to BEFORE the event (including what I try to convince the other guy). and 2) How I prepare the system to react AFTER the event (what kind of world I leave behind).
Its more than that; The system isn't binary. Your reaction prior to the event isn't simply coloured by your opponent, its coloured by other currently involved parties.
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On January 13 2010 13:51 L wrote:Show nested quote +On January 13 2010 13:48 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:46 L wrote:On January 13 2010 13:29 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:27 L wrote:On January 13 2010 13:17 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:13 Slow Motion wrote:
There is no actual value or logic in retaliation against the enemy if your country has already been destroyed by nukes. However, for the purpose of MAD, it is imperative that the adversary believes that there will be retaliation.
It's kinda paradoxical, but it comes down to the fact that, for example, the US has to understand that USSR will retaliate even when it's already been destroyed and there is no point in retaliation. Without this understanding there can be no MAD.
Personally, as a leader of the US I will give the adversary no doubt that I would retaliate even if my country were completely destroyed. But when the moment actually came that every American is nuked to death, I would not retaliate. There is no reason at that point to destroy every human life in the world. Good Now we are ready for the billion dollar (or life) question Are you convinced that America has 7000 nuclear warheads aimed at Russia? Are you convinced that Russia has 7000 nuclear warheads aimed at America? Yes. Which is why the system works. Why do you believe that? More importantly, is the amount of uncertainty in that Yes greater than the uncertainty needed for you to launch a nuclear attack? Well theres two ways the uncertainty effects me 1) How I react to BEFORE the event (including what I try to convince the other guy). and 2) How I prepare the system to react AFTER the event (what kind of world I leave behind). Its more than that; The system isn't binary. Your reaction prior to the event isn't simply coloured by your opponent, its coloured by other currently involved parties.
I think he's assuming a binary system for his scenarios, aka Cold War era.
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On January 13 2010 13:51 L wrote:Show nested quote +On January 13 2010 13:48 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:46 L wrote:On January 13 2010 13:29 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:27 L wrote:On January 13 2010 13:17 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:13 Slow Motion wrote:
There is no actual value or logic in retaliation against the enemy if your country has already been destroyed by nukes. However, for the purpose of MAD, it is imperative that the adversary believes that there will be retaliation.
It's kinda paradoxical, but it comes down to the fact that, for example, the US has to understand that USSR will retaliate even when it's already been destroyed and there is no point in retaliation. Without this understanding there can be no MAD.
Personally, as a leader of the US I will give the adversary no doubt that I would retaliate even if my country were completely destroyed. But when the moment actually came that every American is nuked to death, I would not retaliate. There is no reason at that point to destroy every human life in the world. Good Now we are ready for the billion dollar (or life) question Are you convinced that America has 7000 nuclear warheads aimed at Russia? Are you convinced that Russia has 7000 nuclear warheads aimed at America? Yes. Which is why the system works. Why do you believe that? More importantly, is the amount of uncertainty in that Yes greater than the uncertainty needed for you to launch a nuclear attack? Well theres two ways the uncertainty effects me 1) How I react to BEFORE the event (including what I try to convince the other guy). and 2) How I prepare the system to react AFTER the event (what kind of world I leave behind). Its more than that; The system isn't binary. Your reaction prior to the event isn't simply coloured by your opponent, its coloured by other currently involved parties.
Like I said thats where it gets tricky. Other parties can interfere with what im going to call the "Christ Option" (btw not a religous thing, just think it fits with the theme).
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What we talking bout btw? Read entire thread and can't understand a thing.
edit: Someone trying to argue than in the case of a nuclear attack the United States shouldn't return fire, because then humanity overall loses? And that all that is necessary is the threat that you will retaliate rather than the actual action?
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On January 13 2010 11:20 Archerofaiur wrote:
What is the difference between a 7000 nuclear warhead stockpile and a 1 nuclear warhead stockpile with a 6999 bluff?
Game Theory Puzzle
Consider that two states have 7000 nuclear "missles" aimed at each other. One state really has 7000 and the other only has 1 real missle. Both state have secondary strike capabilities and cannot intercept the missles (MIRV). Alliances with other countries are such that all countries bond to a state act as the state does. Together the whole of humanity is bond to one state or the other. What difference does this system have from the scenario where both states have 7000 real missles.
*Ignore the ecological effects of a possible Nuclear Winter
The question asks for the difference between "7k nuke for both sides", and "7k nuke vs 1 nuke +buff".
It didn't ask what and how leaders of which ever side will react, and think. The question does not care about ppl's opinion on the annihilation of the human race if these 2 scenario plays out. OP's question did not state what kind of differences he's looking for in the answer. One can argue that the difference between the 2 scenario literally is difference between the total destructive power of 14k nuke and 7001 nuke.
Unless OP will kindly change his question, the difference in destructive power is the most logical answer. and there is no puzzle. Could OP have worded this thing wrong. OP, maybe you need to define what kind of difference you are referring to,
Could you mean the difference of how ppl would react when one nation fires their shits?
Could you mean the difference of how shits will end up which also depend on how the leader of these 2 nation will react?
Maybe you mean the differences between the available war strategies before the first nuke attacks?
you ask for the difference, but what kind of differences are you looking for?
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On January 13 2010 13:53 Archerofaiur wrote:Show nested quote +On January 13 2010 13:51 L wrote:On January 13 2010 13:48 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:46 L wrote:On January 13 2010 13:29 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:27 L wrote:On January 13 2010 13:17 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:13 Slow Motion wrote:
There is no actual value or logic in retaliation against the enemy if your country has already been destroyed by nukes. However, for the purpose of MAD, it is imperative that the adversary believes that there will be retaliation.
It's kinda paradoxical, but it comes down to the fact that, for example, the US has to understand that USSR will retaliate even when it's already been destroyed and there is no point in retaliation. Without this understanding there can be no MAD.
Personally, as a leader of the US I will give the adversary no doubt that I would retaliate even if my country were completely destroyed. But when the moment actually came that every American is nuked to death, I would not retaliate. There is no reason at that point to destroy every human life in the world. Good Now we are ready for the billion dollar (or life) question Are you convinced that America has 7000 nuclear warheads aimed at Russia? Are you convinced that Russia has 7000 nuclear warheads aimed at America? Yes. Which is why the system works. Why do you believe that? More importantly, is the amount of uncertainty in that Yes greater than the uncertainty needed for you to launch a nuclear attack? Well theres two ways the uncertainty effects me 1) How I react to BEFORE the event (including what I try to convince the other guy). and 2) How I prepare the system to react AFTER the event (what kind of world I leave behind). Its more than that; The system isn't binary. Your reaction prior to the event isn't simply coloured by your opponent, its coloured by other currently involved parties. Like I said thats where it gets tricky. Other parties can interfere with what im going to call the "Christ Option". But what I'm saying is that it isn't actually tricky; It isn't the actual ability to be able to fulfill MAD, but rather the presentation that you can above a certain level of doubt, that matters.
So the real issue isn't the amount of warheads being faked or the reactions afterwards; its the amount of information both sides have and how trustworthy it is.
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United States4796 Posts
That's what the cold war is, really. Until anyone starts firing, it's all the same. But when the country who threatens to fire doesn't fire...then the other country knows the first one is bluffing and wins.
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On January 13 2010 13:57 L wrote:Show nested quote +On January 13 2010 13:53 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:51 L wrote:On January 13 2010 13:48 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:46 L wrote:On January 13 2010 13:29 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:27 L wrote:On January 13 2010 13:17 Archerofaiur wrote:On January 13 2010 13:13 Slow Motion wrote:
There is no actual value or logic in retaliation against the enemy if your country has already been destroyed by nukes. However, for the purpose of MAD, it is imperative that the adversary believes that there will be retaliation.
It's kinda paradoxical, but it comes down to the fact that, for example, the US has to understand that USSR will retaliate even when it's already been destroyed and there is no point in retaliation. Without this understanding there can be no MAD.
Personally, as a leader of the US I will give the adversary no doubt that I would retaliate even if my country were completely destroyed. But when the moment actually came that every American is nuked to death, I would not retaliate. There is no reason at that point to destroy every human life in the world. Good Now we are ready for the billion dollar (or life) question Are you convinced that America has 7000 nuclear warheads aimed at Russia? Are you convinced that Russia has 7000 nuclear warheads aimed at America? Yes. Which is why the system works. Why do you believe that? More importantly, is the amount of uncertainty in that Yes greater than the uncertainty needed for you to launch a nuclear attack? Well theres two ways the uncertainty effects me 1) How I react to BEFORE the event (including what I try to convince the other guy). and 2) How I prepare the system to react AFTER the event (what kind of world I leave behind). Its more than that; The system isn't binary. Your reaction prior to the event isn't simply coloured by your opponent, its coloured by other currently involved parties. Like I said thats where it gets tricky. Other parties can interfere with what im going to call the "Christ Option". But what I'm saying is that it isn't actually tricky; It isn't the actual ability to be able to fulfill MAD, but rather the presentation that you can above a certain level of doubt, that matters. So the real issue isn't the amount of warheads being faked or the reactions afterwards; its the amount of information both sides have and how trustworthy it is.
Except if you know you have 7000 actual warheads, you only have to worry about your opponent firing. If you have only 1 actual warhead you have to be constantly afraid that, should that info be leaked out, you will likely be destroyed.
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