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Although this thread does not function under the same strict guidelines as the USPMT, it is still a general practice on TL to provide a source with an explanation on why it is relevant and what purpose it adds to the discussion. Failure to do so will result in a mod action. |
Cameron today announced that British military personnel (advisers) will be deployed to Ukraine in about month time and also spoke about non-lethal equipment to be delivered there (i guess that means stuff like body armor/communication devices?) and also spoke about “materially different” sanctions to be deployed if situation dosn't improve. Not sure about what he means about different sanctions, but well, im happy to at least see some actions taking place instead of just stating that politics are "deeply concerned". It's also important to note that he considers possibilty of similar hybrid war scenario development in Moldavia and Baltic States.
More details http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/feb/24/britain-to-send-military-advisers-to-ukraine-cameron
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On February 25 2015 02:22 Sent. wrote:
It's understandable that some people think Euro (currency) is bad but when someone says that European Union is a "failed experiment" I just can't take him seriously. Explain to me why economic freedoms (especially freedom of movement) are bad for Europe. Tell me what's wrong with the European Court of Justice or judicial cooperation in EU. Tell me we should dissolve the Union and negotiate treaties separately, from weaker position.
You call it a weaker position, I would prefer to look at it as a position in which each state can negotiate with its own best interests at heart. It's only a weaker position if you seek to impose your will on what would otherwise be an asymmetrical negotiation. In addition, you may be party to other negotiations that are not in your best interests.
It doesn't take a foreign policy genius to realize that EU will be dominated by the strong entities within it. While you may view it as allowing you to negotiate from a stronger position, that only lasts as long as you are safely lined up behind the big bird(s). Ask Greece if it is really negotiating from a stronger position now. And I say that with no implication whatsoever on whether the current situation is just/unjust, deserved/undeserved.
It should be no surprise that it was always the leading power(s) of Europe that lead the pan-European charge.
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United States22883 Posts
On February 25 2015 01:36 WhiteDog wrote:Show nested quote +But praising Germany's superior industries/companies/products is missing the forest for the trees. In simple terms, Germany has been ignoring basic principles of comparative advantage, and is just beating everyone in every category because it has an absolute advantage in almost everything compared to its neighbors. And even when Germany's end product don't have a quality advantage, they have a price advantage because it's cheaper than it should be. Wages need to go up so the cost of German products go up so Germany isn't able to produce everything and crush its neighbors with higher quality/artificially cheaper products. That's why its trade surplus is killing the eurozone. That's a fun way to put it. Germany has a competitive advantage in specific fields, mainly industry. It's quite easy to make it seem like Germany is the absolute best in everything, and to be fair it's quite wrong. Take the agriculture and food industry, France was the 1st productor in Europe some years ago. Germany then was angry at the common agricultural policy. What has happened ? Germany has developped an industrial and intensive food production, in the porcine industry for exemple - a terrible model from an ethical and environmental point of view btw, which shows the hypocrisy when northern countries cry against the "foie gras" - and paid its worker from three to five time less than French workers in the same industry. How is that a competitive advantage ? It's just using the euro and the schenghen treaty as a tool for economic warfare. Now the problem is not Germany, it is the legal frame that permit such behavior that is in question (every countries in europe are doing this from a lesser extent, it's not only germany, but in this game the some countries - Poland, Germany, France to a lesser extent - are better than others).
This is essentially the same thing I'm talking about. France is one of the few EU countries Germany doesn't have an absolute advantage over in most industries, but that's besides the point. The point is that you shouldn't produce for an absolute advantage, you should produce for a comparative advantage. German companies have been ignoring that because the government has helped suppress wages, making them profitable when they shouldn't be.
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On February 25 2015 02:22 Sent. wrote:
It's understandable that some people think Euro (currency) is bad but when someone says that European Union is a "failed experiment" I just can't take him seriously. Explain to me why economic freedoms (especially freedom of movement) are bad for Europe. Tell me what's wrong with the European Court of Justice or judicial cooperation in EU. Tell me we should dissolve the Union and negotiate treaties separately, from weaker position.
Agreed. To all the EU a failed experiment is crazy talk, it has its ups and downs for different members, but it's a cold day in hell when cooperation and helping each other out is ever a bad thing.
Its unrealistic to think that the EU would make things perfect for everyone.
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On February 24 2015 22:46 Taguchi wrote:Show nested quote +On February 24 2015 12:14 cLutZ wrote:On February 24 2015 11:44 JonnyBNoHo wrote:On February 24 2015 11:05 cLutZ wrote:
Then what is important? Because you said Greece is in "debtor's jail", but havent said why that is the case. Or indicated why someone would lend to Greece without imposing conditions. I mean, Greece doesn't have to accept any of Germany's demands, they can just run a balanced budget starting tomorrow, however they want to, and they don't have to accept any of Germany's conditions. Analogies are never perfect but Greece was unable to repay its debts and so an outside force (Troika) imposed conditions to force a repayment (bailout / austerity program). If Greece refuses they may lose central bank (ECB) support and / or be removed from the Eurozone. So if they don't repay, there's a threat beyond losing access to credit. Moreover, debtor's prison would be a bit wonky in a modern economy. Sending someone to a workhouse would probably reduce their ability to repay, much like how Greece at 25% unemployment is less able to repay than Greece at 14% unemployment. I'll also question the ability of Greece to run a surplus (not just primary). It would be really easy for Greece to run a surplus. Its just politically unpopular. Run a surplus? As in, total surplus, debt service included? Let's just go with Nyxisto's 2.6% GDP for servicing debt figure. Government spending last year was 58% of GDP (it was 46% before 2010, thank the fantastic program for that, if only troika remembered to correctly calculate the macroeconomic multiplier!) which means that we'd have to run primary surplus of 4.5% GDP to break even. (edit: I think this number includes t-bonds which may or may not throw the rest of the numbers off, depending on how the 2.6% gdp for debt servicing is calculated. Actual number for interest payments expected in 2014 budget forecast is 6.15bn, in any case) If, by some wizardry and contrary to recent experience in Greece, or any other country ever for that matter that tries to get bigger surpluses not during a boom, we didn't spiral into a new recession and even assume a humongus growth rate of 5% every year (lol), we'd be able to get to a 108% GDP ratio in... 10 years. I think Norway managed such a surplus for such a length of time, mostly because of oil profits alongside good management. If you think the Aegean is about to start gushing oil tell people about it! Nevermind loan repayments, 2022 start of repayment is only for EFSF, this is the actual maturity profile for Greek debt (2015 probably includes t-bills and such seems way too high otherwise) + Show Spoiler +So... yeah. Easy.
See, when you make that number smaller you can easily pay the 2.6% debt service.
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On February 25 2015 04:11 cLutZ wrote:Show nested quote +On February 24 2015 22:46 Taguchi wrote:On February 24 2015 12:14 cLutZ wrote:On February 24 2015 11:44 JonnyBNoHo wrote:On February 24 2015 11:05 cLutZ wrote:
Then what is important? Because you said Greece is in "debtor's jail", but havent said why that is the case. Or indicated why someone would lend to Greece without imposing conditions. I mean, Greece doesn't have to accept any of Germany's demands, they can just run a balanced budget starting tomorrow, however they want to, and they don't have to accept any of Germany's conditions. Analogies are never perfect but Greece was unable to repay its debts and so an outside force (Troika) imposed conditions to force a repayment (bailout / austerity program). If Greece refuses they may lose central bank (ECB) support and / or be removed from the Eurozone. So if they don't repay, there's a threat beyond losing access to credit. Moreover, debtor's prison would be a bit wonky in a modern economy. Sending someone to a workhouse would probably reduce their ability to repay, much like how Greece at 25% unemployment is less able to repay than Greece at 14% unemployment. I'll also question the ability of Greece to run a surplus (not just primary). It would be really easy for Greece to run a surplus. Its just politically unpopular. Run a surplus? As in, total surplus, debt service included? Let's just go with Nyxisto's 2.6% GDP for servicing debt figure. Government spending last year was 58% of GDP (it was 46% before 2010, thank the fantastic program for that, if only troika remembered to correctly calculate the macroeconomic multiplier!) which means that we'd have to run primary surplus of 4.5% GDP to break even. (edit: I think this number includes t-bonds which may or may not throw the rest of the numbers off, depending on how the 2.6% gdp for debt servicing is calculated. Actual number for interest payments expected in 2014 budget forecast is 6.15bn, in any case) If, by some wizardry and contrary to recent experience in Greece, or any other country ever for that matter that tries to get bigger surpluses not during a boom, we didn't spiral into a new recession and even assume a humongus growth rate of 5% every year (lol), we'd be able to get to a 108% GDP ratio in... 10 years. I think Norway managed such a surplus for such a length of time, mostly because of oil profits alongside good management. If you think the Aegean is about to start gushing oil tell people about it! Nevermind loan repayments, 2022 start of repayment is only for EFSF, this is the actual maturity profile for Greek debt (2015 probably includes t-bills and such seems way too high otherwise) + Show Spoiler +So... yeah. Easy. See, when you make that number smaller you can easily pay the 2.6% debt service.
Wow. That number GOT smaller, in absolute terms, by a whole lot. In relative terms, not so much.
See, when governments stops spending, economy goes into recession. Then government can't get money from taxes to pay loans back. I suppose you're not at all familiar with the term 'macroeconomic multiplier'? All Greek to you?
Anyway, my bad for not recognizing the troll. I'll stop feeding you now.
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On February 25 2015 09:30 Taguchi wrote:Show nested quote +On February 25 2015 04:11 cLutZ wrote:On February 24 2015 22:46 Taguchi wrote:On February 24 2015 12:14 cLutZ wrote:On February 24 2015 11:44 JonnyBNoHo wrote:On February 24 2015 11:05 cLutZ wrote:
Then what is important? Because you said Greece is in "debtor's jail", but havent said why that is the case. Or indicated why someone would lend to Greece without imposing conditions. I mean, Greece doesn't have to accept any of Germany's demands, they can just run a balanced budget starting tomorrow, however they want to, and they don't have to accept any of Germany's conditions. Analogies are never perfect but Greece was unable to repay its debts and so an outside force (Troika) imposed conditions to force a repayment (bailout / austerity program). If Greece refuses they may lose central bank (ECB) support and / or be removed from the Eurozone. So if they don't repay, there's a threat beyond losing access to credit. Moreover, debtor's prison would be a bit wonky in a modern economy. Sending someone to a workhouse would probably reduce their ability to repay, much like how Greece at 25% unemployment is less able to repay than Greece at 14% unemployment. I'll also question the ability of Greece to run a surplus (not just primary). It would be really easy for Greece to run a surplus. Its just politically unpopular. Run a surplus? As in, total surplus, debt service included? Let's just go with Nyxisto's 2.6% GDP for servicing debt figure. Government spending last year was 58% of GDP (it was 46% before 2010, thank the fantastic program for that, if only troika remembered to correctly calculate the macroeconomic multiplier!) which means that we'd have to run primary surplus of 4.5% GDP to break even. (edit: I think this number includes t-bonds which may or may not throw the rest of the numbers off, depending on how the 2.6% gdp for debt servicing is calculated. Actual number for interest payments expected in 2014 budget forecast is 6.15bn, in any case) If, by some wizardry and contrary to recent experience in Greece, or any other country ever for that matter that tries to get bigger surpluses not during a boom, we didn't spiral into a new recession and even assume a humongus growth rate of 5% every year (lol), we'd be able to get to a 108% GDP ratio in... 10 years. I think Norway managed such a surplus for such a length of time, mostly because of oil profits alongside good management. If you think the Aegean is about to start gushing oil tell people about it! Nevermind loan repayments, 2022 start of repayment is only for EFSF, this is the actual maturity profile for Greek debt (2015 probably includes t-bills and such seems way too high otherwise) + Show Spoiler +So... yeah. Easy. See, when you make that number smaller you can easily pay the 2.6% debt service. Wow. That number GOT smaller, in absolute terms, by a whole lot. In relative terms, not so much. See, when governments stops spending, economy goes into recession. Then government can't get money from taxes to pay loans back. I suppose you're not at all familiar with the term 'macroeconomic multiplier'? All Greek to you? Anyway, my bad for not recognizing the troll. I'll stop feeding you now.
I'm familiar with Keynes and his successors. What I'm skeptical of is his models applicability if you are running a deficit prior to the start of a recession, or are spending more than 10-30% of GDP as a government prior to the recession, and why it doesn't explain why those two things wouldn't ward off the recession.
In other words, I don't think it applies to modern OECD governments, and I'm really not sure it worked in Keynes time, considering his policies were more or less applied during the Great Depression by Hoover and Roosevelt and it took over a decade to pull out of that.
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On February 25 2015 14:49 cLutZ wrote:Show nested quote +On February 25 2015 09:30 Taguchi wrote:On February 25 2015 04:11 cLutZ wrote:On February 24 2015 22:46 Taguchi wrote:On February 24 2015 12:14 cLutZ wrote:On February 24 2015 11:44 JonnyBNoHo wrote:On February 24 2015 11:05 cLutZ wrote:
Then what is important? Because you said Greece is in "debtor's jail", but havent said why that is the case. Or indicated why someone would lend to Greece without imposing conditions. I mean, Greece doesn't have to accept any of Germany's demands, they can just run a balanced budget starting tomorrow, however they want to, and they don't have to accept any of Germany's conditions. Analogies are never perfect but Greece was unable to repay its debts and so an outside force (Troika) imposed conditions to force a repayment (bailout / austerity program). If Greece refuses they may lose central bank (ECB) support and / or be removed from the Eurozone. So if they don't repay, there's a threat beyond losing access to credit. Moreover, debtor's prison would be a bit wonky in a modern economy. Sending someone to a workhouse would probably reduce their ability to repay, much like how Greece at 25% unemployment is less able to repay than Greece at 14% unemployment. I'll also question the ability of Greece to run a surplus (not just primary). It would be really easy for Greece to run a surplus. Its just politically unpopular. Run a surplus? As in, total surplus, debt service included? Let's just go with Nyxisto's 2.6% GDP for servicing debt figure. Government spending last year was 58% of GDP (it was 46% before 2010, thank the fantastic program for that, if only troika remembered to correctly calculate the macroeconomic multiplier!) which means that we'd have to run primary surplus of 4.5% GDP to break even. (edit: I think this number includes t-bonds which may or may not throw the rest of the numbers off, depending on how the 2.6% gdp for debt servicing is calculated. Actual number for interest payments expected in 2014 budget forecast is 6.15bn, in any case) If, by some wizardry and contrary to recent experience in Greece, or any other country ever for that matter that tries to get bigger surpluses not during a boom, we didn't spiral into a new recession and even assume a humongus growth rate of 5% every year (lol), we'd be able to get to a 108% GDP ratio in... 10 years. I think Norway managed such a surplus for such a length of time, mostly because of oil profits alongside good management. If you think the Aegean is about to start gushing oil tell people about it! Nevermind loan repayments, 2022 start of repayment is only for EFSF, this is the actual maturity profile for Greek debt (2015 probably includes t-bills and such seems way too high otherwise) + Show Spoiler +So... yeah. Easy. See, when you make that number smaller you can easily pay the 2.6% debt service. Wow. That number GOT smaller, in absolute terms, by a whole lot. In relative terms, not so much. See, when governments stops spending, economy goes into recession. Then government can't get money from taxes to pay loans back. I suppose you're not at all familiar with the term 'macroeconomic multiplier'? All Greek to you? Anyway, my bad for not recognizing the troll. I'll stop feeding you now. I'm familiar with Keynes and his successors. What I'm skeptical of is his models applicability if you are running a deficit prior to the start of a recession, or are spending more than 10-30% of GDP as a government prior to the recession, and why it doesn't explain why those two things wouldn't ward off the recession. In other words, I don't think it applies to modern OECD governments, and I'm really not sure it worked in Keynes time, considering his policies were more or less applied during the Great Depression by Hoover and Roosevelt and it took over a decade to pull out of that.
The multiplier is not a fantasy, it's a reality that economists evaluate. But the multiplier has different value, that change in regard to the saving tendancies and the international trade (saving and import are the two economic actions that represent an exit of ressources from the circuit).
To understand if the multiplier has a good chance to be high enough, you need to take into account the inflation rate and the output gap : if the output gap is high (the difference between potential growth and actual growth) then there is a good chance that the keynesian stimulus will have a positive impact on the economy - which is the case in the eurozone right now. But if the outputgap is null, then a keynesian stimulus will most likely create inflation rather than growth : this is why keynes was not for stimulus, he was for counter cyclical policies, which mean stimulus during recession (where the output gap is at its highest) and austerity during growth. The problem is that the europe, because of those stupid rules (60% GDP, 3% deficit) has mostly had procyclical policies (which means austerity during recession and spending during growth...). Here is a proof (in french sadly, in black the US policies, that are always counter cyclical aside of one year - contracyclique in french - and in green the european policies, always procyclical) :
![[image loading]](http://i.imgur.com/PFaPjDY.png)
In europe right now a keynesian stimulus could do wonder, but not in Greece alone, because of the schenghen treaty and the euro (keynes himself said that the stimulus could be supported by a protectionnist policy, substituting imports by home made products). Investing in greece will most likely boost inflation in greece in opposition to other european countries (greek product will then lose competitivity) and also will not necessarily boost greek production (because of imports).
A good way to see that is what happened after the crisis (and why the eurozone is in austerity now) : after the 2007 crisis, all government increased their deficit (most of the time for purely mecanic reasons, as more people in unemployment necessarily create an increase in public spending). What we saw was that countries who were the most open to international trade suffered the most from the crisis (with the biggest recession in germany), but that as countries increased their spending (keynesian stimulus) it was also those same countries that benefitted the most (because they received other countries public investment through their exports). Again, we all see how the task is impossible : to fight a crisis, you increase the inequalities in competitivity rather than reducing them ; the euro is not well equipped to face such exogene crisis. We need a global stimulus on the entire eurozone with mecanism for fiscal redistributions from the countries that benefit the most out of those stimulus to those that benefit the least.
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On February 25 2015 17:52 WhiteDog wrote:Show nested quote +On February 25 2015 14:49 cLutZ wrote:On February 25 2015 09:30 Taguchi wrote:On February 25 2015 04:11 cLutZ wrote:On February 24 2015 22:46 Taguchi wrote:On February 24 2015 12:14 cLutZ wrote:On February 24 2015 11:44 JonnyBNoHo wrote:On February 24 2015 11:05 cLutZ wrote:
Then what is important? Because you said Greece is in "debtor's jail", but havent said why that is the case. Or indicated why someone would lend to Greece without imposing conditions. I mean, Greece doesn't have to accept any of Germany's demands, they can just run a balanced budget starting tomorrow, however they want to, and they don't have to accept any of Germany's conditions. Analogies are never perfect but Greece was unable to repay its debts and so an outside force (Troika) imposed conditions to force a repayment (bailout / austerity program). If Greece refuses they may lose central bank (ECB) support and / or be removed from the Eurozone. So if they don't repay, there's a threat beyond losing access to credit. Moreover, debtor's prison would be a bit wonky in a modern economy. Sending someone to a workhouse would probably reduce their ability to repay, much like how Greece at 25% unemployment is less able to repay than Greece at 14% unemployment. I'll also question the ability of Greece to run a surplus (not just primary). It would be really easy for Greece to run a surplus. Its just politically unpopular. Run a surplus? As in, total surplus, debt service included? Let's just go with Nyxisto's 2.6% GDP for servicing debt figure. Government spending last year was 58% of GDP (it was 46% before 2010, thank the fantastic program for that, if only troika remembered to correctly calculate the macroeconomic multiplier!) which means that we'd have to run primary surplus of 4.5% GDP to break even. (edit: I think this number includes t-bonds which may or may not throw the rest of the numbers off, depending on how the 2.6% gdp for debt servicing is calculated. Actual number for interest payments expected in 2014 budget forecast is 6.15bn, in any case) If, by some wizardry and contrary to recent experience in Greece, or any other country ever for that matter that tries to get bigger surpluses not during a boom, we didn't spiral into a new recession and even assume a humongus growth rate of 5% every year (lol), we'd be able to get to a 108% GDP ratio in... 10 years. I think Norway managed such a surplus for such a length of time, mostly because of oil profits alongside good management. If you think the Aegean is about to start gushing oil tell people about it! Nevermind loan repayments, 2022 start of repayment is only for EFSF, this is the actual maturity profile for Greek debt (2015 probably includes t-bills and such seems way too high otherwise) + Show Spoiler +So... yeah. Easy. See, when you make that number smaller you can easily pay the 2.6% debt service. Wow. That number GOT smaller, in absolute terms, by a whole lot. In relative terms, not so much. See, when governments stops spending, economy goes into recession. Then government can't get money from taxes to pay loans back. I suppose you're not at all familiar with the term 'macroeconomic multiplier'? All Greek to you? Anyway, my bad for not recognizing the troll. I'll stop feeding you now. I'm familiar with Keynes and his successors. What I'm skeptical of is his models applicability if you are running a deficit prior to the start of a recession, or are spending more than 10-30% of GDP as a government prior to the recession, and why it doesn't explain why those two things wouldn't ward off the recession. In other words, I don't think it applies to modern OECD governments, and I'm really not sure it worked in Keynes time, considering his policies were more or less applied during the Great Depression by Hoover and Roosevelt and it took over a decade to pull out of that. The multiplier is not a fantasy, it's a reality that economists evaluate. But the multiplier has different value, that change in regard to the saving tendancies and the international trade (saving and import are the two economic actions that represent an exit of ressources from the circuit). To understand if the multiplier has a good chance to be high enough, you need to take into account the inflation rate and the output gap : if the output gap is high (the difference between potential growth and actual growth) then there is a good chance that the keynesian stimulus will have a positive impact on the economy - which is the case in the eurozone right now. But if the outputgap is null, then a keynesian stimulus will most likely create inflation rather than growth : this is why keynes was not for stimulus, he was for counter cyclical policies, which mean stimulus during recession (where the output gap is at its highest) and austerity during growth. In europe right now a keynesian stimulus could do wonder, but not in Greece alone, because of the schenghen treaty and the euro (keynes himself said that the stimulus could be supported by a protectionnist policy, substituting imports by home made products). Investing in greece will most likely boost inflation in greece in opposition to other european countries (greek product will then lose competitivity) and also will not necessarily boost greek production (because of imports). A good way to see that is what happened after the crisis (and why the eurozone is in austerity now) : after the 2007 crisis, all government increased their deficit (most of the time for purely mecanic reasons, as more people in unemployment necessarily create an increase in public spending). What we saw was that countries who were the most open to international trade suffered the most from the crisis (with the biggest recession in germany), but that as countries increased their spending (keynesian stimulus) it was also those same countries that benefitted the most (because they received other countries public investment through their exports). Again, we all see how the task is impossible : to fight a crisis, you increase the inequalities in competitivity rather than reducing them ; the euro is not well equipped to face such exogene crisis. We need a global stimulus on the entire eurozone with mecanism for fiscal redistributions from the countries that benefit the most out of those stimulus to those that benefit the least.
And that distribution is never going to happen. I'm also not sure it should. In the EU in its current form this would just be an excuse for badly performing countries, such as Greece, Portugal etc. to continue to do what got them into trouble in the first place. They would basically be leeching off of the efforts of others (the so-called free rider problem).
Fiscal redistribution on a European level will only work if all member states unanimously give up their sovereignty to the EU parliament. What the Troika did in Italy and Greece is already bordering on the unacceptable (forcing policy or installing technocratic rulers without democratic mandate). The public perception of the EU right now that of a neoliberal, power-hungry and money-hungry apparatus that serves the interests of its many lobbyists (i.e. large corporations, banks, rich people) rather than the interests of the people living in it. A "United States of Europe" is the last thing people want right now.
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On February 25 2015 18:21 maartendq wrote:Show nested quote +On February 25 2015 17:52 WhiteDog wrote:On February 25 2015 14:49 cLutZ wrote:On February 25 2015 09:30 Taguchi wrote:On February 25 2015 04:11 cLutZ wrote:On February 24 2015 22:46 Taguchi wrote:On February 24 2015 12:14 cLutZ wrote:On February 24 2015 11:44 JonnyBNoHo wrote:On February 24 2015 11:05 cLutZ wrote:
Then what is important? Because you said Greece is in "debtor's jail", but havent said why that is the case. Or indicated why someone would lend to Greece without imposing conditions. I mean, Greece doesn't have to accept any of Germany's demands, they can just run a balanced budget starting tomorrow, however they want to, and they don't have to accept any of Germany's conditions. Analogies are never perfect but Greece was unable to repay its debts and so an outside force (Troika) imposed conditions to force a repayment (bailout / austerity program). If Greece refuses they may lose central bank (ECB) support and / or be removed from the Eurozone. So if they don't repay, there's a threat beyond losing access to credit. Moreover, debtor's prison would be a bit wonky in a modern economy. Sending someone to a workhouse would probably reduce their ability to repay, much like how Greece at 25% unemployment is less able to repay than Greece at 14% unemployment. I'll also question the ability of Greece to run a surplus (not just primary). It would be really easy for Greece to run a surplus. Its just politically unpopular. Run a surplus? As in, total surplus, debt service included? Let's just go with Nyxisto's 2.6% GDP for servicing debt figure. Government spending last year was 58% of GDP (it was 46% before 2010, thank the fantastic program for that, if only troika remembered to correctly calculate the macroeconomic multiplier!) which means that we'd have to run primary surplus of 4.5% GDP to break even. (edit: I think this number includes t-bonds which may or may not throw the rest of the numbers off, depending on how the 2.6% gdp for debt servicing is calculated. Actual number for interest payments expected in 2014 budget forecast is 6.15bn, in any case) If, by some wizardry and contrary to recent experience in Greece, or any other country ever for that matter that tries to get bigger surpluses not during a boom, we didn't spiral into a new recession and even assume a humongus growth rate of 5% every year (lol), we'd be able to get to a 108% GDP ratio in... 10 years. I think Norway managed such a surplus for such a length of time, mostly because of oil profits alongside good management. If you think the Aegean is about to start gushing oil tell people about it! Nevermind loan repayments, 2022 start of repayment is only for EFSF, this is the actual maturity profile for Greek debt (2015 probably includes t-bills and such seems way too high otherwise) + Show Spoiler +So... yeah. Easy. See, when you make that number smaller you can easily pay the 2.6% debt service. Wow. That number GOT smaller, in absolute terms, by a whole lot. In relative terms, not so much. See, when governments stops spending, economy goes into recession. Then government can't get money from taxes to pay loans back. I suppose you're not at all familiar with the term 'macroeconomic multiplier'? All Greek to you? Anyway, my bad for not recognizing the troll. I'll stop feeding you now. I'm familiar with Keynes and his successors. What I'm skeptical of is his models applicability if you are running a deficit prior to the start of a recession, or are spending more than 10-30% of GDP as a government prior to the recession, and why it doesn't explain why those two things wouldn't ward off the recession. In other words, I don't think it applies to modern OECD governments, and I'm really not sure it worked in Keynes time, considering his policies were more or less applied during the Great Depression by Hoover and Roosevelt and it took over a decade to pull out of that. The multiplier is not a fantasy, it's a reality that economists evaluate. But the multiplier has different value, that change in regard to the saving tendancies and the international trade (saving and import are the two economic actions that represent an exit of ressources from the circuit). To understand if the multiplier has a good chance to be high enough, you need to take into account the inflation rate and the output gap : if the output gap is high (the difference between potential growth and actual growth) then there is a good chance that the keynesian stimulus will have a positive impact on the economy - which is the case in the eurozone right now. But if the outputgap is null, then a keynesian stimulus will most likely create inflation rather than growth : this is why keynes was not for stimulus, he was for counter cyclical policies, which mean stimulus during recession (where the output gap is at its highest) and austerity during growth. In europe right now a keynesian stimulus could do wonder, but not in Greece alone, because of the schenghen treaty and the euro (keynes himself said that the stimulus could be supported by a protectionnist policy, substituting imports by home made products). Investing in greece will most likely boost inflation in greece in opposition to other european countries (greek product will then lose competitivity) and also will not necessarily boost greek production (because of imports). A good way to see that is what happened after the crisis (and why the eurozone is in austerity now) : after the 2007 crisis, all government increased their deficit (most of the time for purely mecanic reasons, as more people in unemployment necessarily create an increase in public spending). What we saw was that countries who were the most open to international trade suffered the most from the crisis (with the biggest recession in germany), but that as countries increased their spending (keynesian stimulus) it was also those same countries that benefitted the most (because they received other countries public investment through their exports). Again, we all see how the task is impossible : to fight a crisis, you increase the inequalities in competitivity rather than reducing them ; the euro is not well equipped to face such exogene crisis. We need a global stimulus on the entire eurozone with mecanism for fiscal redistributions from the countries that benefit the most out of those stimulus to those that benefit the least. And that distribution is never going to happen. I'm also not sure it should. In the EU in its current form this would just be an excuse for badly performing countries, such as Greece, Portugal etc. to continue to do what got them into trouble in the first place. They would basically be leeching off of the efforts of others (the so-called free rider problem). Fiscal redistribution on a European level will only work if all member states unanimously give up their sovereignty to the EU parliament. What the Troika did in Italy and Greece is already bordering on the unacceptable (forcing policy or installing technocratic rulers without democratic mandate). The public perception of the EU right now that of a neoliberal, power-hungry and money-hungry apparatus that serves the interests of its many lobbyists (i.e. large corporations, banks, rich people) rather than the interests of the people living in it. A "United States of Europe" is the last thing people want right now.
Yes and that's why I'm against the euro.
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On February 25 2015 18:24 WhiteDog wrote:Show nested quote +On February 25 2015 18:21 maartendq wrote:On February 25 2015 17:52 WhiteDog wrote:On February 25 2015 14:49 cLutZ wrote:On February 25 2015 09:30 Taguchi wrote:On February 25 2015 04:11 cLutZ wrote:On February 24 2015 22:46 Taguchi wrote:On February 24 2015 12:14 cLutZ wrote:On February 24 2015 11:44 JonnyBNoHo wrote:On February 24 2015 11:05 cLutZ wrote:
Then what is important? Because you said Greece is in "debtor's jail", but havent said why that is the case. Or indicated why someone would lend to Greece without imposing conditions. I mean, Greece doesn't have to accept any of Germany's demands, they can just run a balanced budget starting tomorrow, however they want to, and they don't have to accept any of Germany's conditions. Analogies are never perfect but Greece was unable to repay its debts and so an outside force (Troika) imposed conditions to force a repayment (bailout / austerity program). If Greece refuses they may lose central bank (ECB) support and / or be removed from the Eurozone. So if they don't repay, there's a threat beyond losing access to credit. Moreover, debtor's prison would be a bit wonky in a modern economy. Sending someone to a workhouse would probably reduce their ability to repay, much like how Greece at 25% unemployment is less able to repay than Greece at 14% unemployment. I'll also question the ability of Greece to run a surplus (not just primary). It would be really easy for Greece to run a surplus. Its just politically unpopular. Run a surplus? As in, total surplus, debt service included? Let's just go with Nyxisto's 2.6% GDP for servicing debt figure. Government spending last year was 58% of GDP (it was 46% before 2010, thank the fantastic program for that, if only troika remembered to correctly calculate the macroeconomic multiplier!) which means that we'd have to run primary surplus of 4.5% GDP to break even. (edit: I think this number includes t-bonds which may or may not throw the rest of the numbers off, depending on how the 2.6% gdp for debt servicing is calculated. Actual number for interest payments expected in 2014 budget forecast is 6.15bn, in any case) If, by some wizardry and contrary to recent experience in Greece, or any other country ever for that matter that tries to get bigger surpluses not during a boom, we didn't spiral into a new recession and even assume a humongus growth rate of 5% every year (lol), we'd be able to get to a 108% GDP ratio in... 10 years. I think Norway managed such a surplus for such a length of time, mostly because of oil profits alongside good management. If you think the Aegean is about to start gushing oil tell people about it! Nevermind loan repayments, 2022 start of repayment is only for EFSF, this is the actual maturity profile for Greek debt (2015 probably includes t-bills and such seems way too high otherwise) + Show Spoiler +So... yeah. Easy. See, when you make that number smaller you can easily pay the 2.6% debt service. Wow. That number GOT smaller, in absolute terms, by a whole lot. In relative terms, not so much. See, when governments stops spending, economy goes into recession. Then government can't get money from taxes to pay loans back. I suppose you're not at all familiar with the term 'macroeconomic multiplier'? All Greek to you? Anyway, my bad for not recognizing the troll. I'll stop feeding you now. I'm familiar with Keynes and his successors. What I'm skeptical of is his models applicability if you are running a deficit prior to the start of a recession, or are spending more than 10-30% of GDP as a government prior to the recession, and why it doesn't explain why those two things wouldn't ward off the recession. In other words, I don't think it applies to modern OECD governments, and I'm really not sure it worked in Keynes time, considering his policies were more or less applied during the Great Depression by Hoover and Roosevelt and it took over a decade to pull out of that. The multiplier is not a fantasy, it's a reality that economists evaluate. But the multiplier has different value, that change in regard to the saving tendancies and the international trade (saving and import are the two economic actions that represent an exit of ressources from the circuit). To understand if the multiplier has a good chance to be high enough, you need to take into account the inflation rate and the output gap : if the output gap is high (the difference between potential growth and actual growth) then there is a good chance that the keynesian stimulus will have a positive impact on the economy - which is the case in the eurozone right now. But if the outputgap is null, then a keynesian stimulus will most likely create inflation rather than growth : this is why keynes was not for stimulus, he was for counter cyclical policies, which mean stimulus during recession (where the output gap is at its highest) and austerity during growth. In europe right now a keynesian stimulus could do wonder, but not in Greece alone, because of the schenghen treaty and the euro (keynes himself said that the stimulus could be supported by a protectionnist policy, substituting imports by home made products). Investing in greece will most likely boost inflation in greece in opposition to other european countries (greek product will then lose competitivity) and also will not necessarily boost greek production (because of imports). A good way to see that is what happened after the crisis (and why the eurozone is in austerity now) : after the 2007 crisis, all government increased their deficit (most of the time for purely mecanic reasons, as more people in unemployment necessarily create an increase in public spending). What we saw was that countries who were the most open to international trade suffered the most from the crisis (with the biggest recession in germany), but that as countries increased their spending (keynesian stimulus) it was also those same countries that benefitted the most (because they received other countries public investment through their exports). Again, we all see how the task is impossible : to fight a crisis, you increase the inequalities in competitivity rather than reducing them ; the euro is not well equipped to face such exogene crisis. We need a global stimulus on the entire eurozone with mecanism for fiscal redistributions from the countries that benefit the most out of those stimulus to those that benefit the least. And that distribution is never going to happen. I'm also not sure it should. In the EU in its current form this would just be an excuse for badly performing countries, such as Greece, Portugal etc. to continue to do what got them into trouble in the first place. They would basically be leeching off of the efforts of others (the so-called free rider problem). Fiscal redistribution on a European level will only work if all member states unanimously give up their sovereignty to the EU parliament. What the Troika did in Italy and Greece is already bordering on the unacceptable (forcing policy or installing technocratic rulers without democratic mandate). The public perception of the EU right now that of a neoliberal, power-hungry and money-hungry apparatus that serves the interests of its many lobbyists (i.e. large corporations, banks, rich people) rather than the interests of the people living in it. A "United States of Europe" is the last thing people want right now. Yes and that's why I'm against the euro.
Greece's problem actually goes beyond currency. Even if they had refrained from joining the Eurozone, they would still have had a bloated, clientelistic, inefficient and unaffordable government apparatus and a private sector that can neither compete with the former or the rest of Europe. They could of course print more money, but that would only temporarily treat the symptom, while actually agravating the disease in the long term.
Clientelism is all fun and games until you run out of tax money to fund both the increasingly insane promises made by politicians wishing to use that system to attract (and keep) voters, and the salaries, pensions, benefits etc of the people employed by or "enjoying" that system.
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The currency is not the origin of the problem but the reason why they can't get out of it.
The greeks are not responsible for the entirety of the greek tho. In your mind, I'm sure greeks are like kiddos drinking soda under the sun spending german's money and going around buttnaked in their BMWs... Do you know that the debt quadrupled under the dictature of the colonels (1967 - 1974), that another part has been contracted in order to help european financial institutions (mainly german and french institutions), that another part is the result of the corruption (like when firms such as Siemens - in 2008 - tried to sell their defectuous products) ?
I really think it is insulting to make it seem like the greeks profited from all this, especially considering 40 % of them had no heating this winter, that 30 % of them are under the poverty line, that 25 % of them are unemployed.
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On February 25 2015 21:41 WhiteDog wrote:
The currency is not the origin of the problem but the reason why they can't get out of it.
The greeks are not responsible for the entirety of the greek tho. In your mind, I'm sure greeks are like kiddos drinking soda under the sun spending german's money and going around buttnaked in their BMWs... Do you know that the debt quadrupled under the dictature of the colonels (1967 - 1974), that another part has been contracted in order to help european financial institutions (mainly german and french institutions), that another part is the result of the corruption (like when firms such as Siemens - in 2008 - tried to sell their defectuous products) ?
I really think it is insulting to make it seem like the greeks profited from all this, especially considering 40 % of them had no heating this winter, that 30 % of them are under the poverty line, that 25 % of them are unemployed.
No, in my mind the Greeks are people who have continually and democratically elected clientelistic governments since 1974, and in my mind people in a democracy bear responsibility for the representatives they send to parliament.
You cannot want to have the power to vote your own leaders into office, enjoy all the benefits during the good times but deny any and all responsibility for their actions once things go south.
I hope that Syriza is serious about their efforts to reform the country. They can be a force for the better for all of Europe if their project is succesful, and if they are given a chance to proceed with their plans. I think Schäuble should have given them a little bit more leeway, although his position is understandable. It will be a huge uphill struggle nonetheless.
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According to you, we should have executed the entirety of the german population for the deeds of Hitler, or the entirety of the belge population for the colonialism, or the entirety of france for all the fuck we did... not many peope free and innocent in your world.
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United States22883 Posts
On February 25 2015 18:21 maartendq wrote:Show nested quote +On February 25 2015 17:52 WhiteDog wrote:On February 25 2015 14:49 cLutZ wrote:On February 25 2015 09:30 Taguchi wrote:On February 25 2015 04:11 cLutZ wrote:On February 24 2015 22:46 Taguchi wrote:On February 24 2015 12:14 cLutZ wrote:On February 24 2015 11:44 JonnyBNoHo wrote:On February 24 2015 11:05 cLutZ wrote:
Then what is important? Because you said Greece is in "debtor's jail", but havent said why that is the case. Or indicated why someone would lend to Greece without imposing conditions. I mean, Greece doesn't have to accept any of Germany's demands, they can just run a balanced budget starting tomorrow, however they want to, and they don't have to accept any of Germany's conditions. Analogies are never perfect but Greece was unable to repay its debts and so an outside force (Troika) imposed conditions to force a repayment (bailout / austerity program). If Greece refuses they may lose central bank (ECB) support and / or be removed from the Eurozone. So if they don't repay, there's a threat beyond losing access to credit. Moreover, debtor's prison would be a bit wonky in a modern economy. Sending someone to a workhouse would probably reduce their ability to repay, much like how Greece at 25% unemployment is less able to repay than Greece at 14% unemployment. I'll also question the ability of Greece to run a surplus (not just primary). It would be really easy for Greece to run a surplus. Its just politically unpopular. Run a surplus? As in, total surplus, debt service included? Let's just go with Nyxisto's 2.6% GDP for servicing debt figure. Government spending last year was 58% of GDP (it was 46% before 2010, thank the fantastic program for that, if only troika remembered to correctly calculate the macroeconomic multiplier!) which means that we'd have to run primary surplus of 4.5% GDP to break even. (edit: I think this number includes t-bonds which may or may not throw the rest of the numbers off, depending on how the 2.6% gdp for debt servicing is calculated. Actual number for interest payments expected in 2014 budget forecast is 6.15bn, in any case) If, by some wizardry and contrary to recent experience in Greece, or any other country ever for that matter that tries to get bigger surpluses not during a boom, we didn't spiral into a new recession and even assume a humongus growth rate of 5% every year (lol), we'd be able to get to a 108% GDP ratio in... 10 years. I think Norway managed such a surplus for such a length of time, mostly because of oil profits alongside good management. If you think the Aegean is about to start gushing oil tell people about it! Nevermind loan repayments, 2022 start of repayment is only for EFSF, this is the actual maturity profile for Greek debt (2015 probably includes t-bills and such seems way too high otherwise) + Show Spoiler +So... yeah. Easy. See, when you make that number smaller you can easily pay the 2.6% debt service. Wow. That number GOT smaller, in absolute terms, by a whole lot. In relative terms, not so much. See, when governments stops spending, economy goes into recession. Then government can't get money from taxes to pay loans back. I suppose you're not at all familiar with the term 'macroeconomic multiplier'? All Greek to you? Anyway, my bad for not recognizing the troll. I'll stop feeding you now. I'm familiar with Keynes and his successors. What I'm skeptical of is his models applicability if you are running a deficit prior to the start of a recession, or are spending more than 10-30% of GDP as a government prior to the recession, and why it doesn't explain why those two things wouldn't ward off the recession. In other words, I don't think it applies to modern OECD governments, and I'm really not sure it worked in Keynes time, considering his policies were more or less applied during the Great Depression by Hoover and Roosevelt and it took over a decade to pull out of that. The multiplier is not a fantasy, it's a reality that economists evaluate. But the multiplier has different value, that change in regard to the saving tendancies and the international trade (saving and import are the two economic actions that represent an exit of ressources from the circuit). To understand if the multiplier has a good chance to be high enough, you need to take into account the inflation rate and the output gap : if the output gap is high (the difference between potential growth and actual growth) then there is a good chance that the keynesian stimulus will have a positive impact on the economy - which is the case in the eurozone right now. But if the outputgap is null, then a keynesian stimulus will most likely create inflation rather than growth : this is why keynes was not for stimulus, he was for counter cyclical policies, which mean stimulus during recession (where the output gap is at its highest) and austerity during growth. In europe right now a keynesian stimulus could do wonder, but not in Greece alone, because of the schenghen treaty and the euro (keynes himself said that the stimulus could be supported by a protectionnist policy, substituting imports by home made products). Investing in greece will most likely boost inflation in greece in opposition to other european countries (greek product will then lose competitivity) and also will not necessarily boost greek production (because of imports). A good way to see that is what happened after the crisis (and why the eurozone is in austerity now) : after the 2007 crisis, all government increased their deficit (most of the time for purely mecanic reasons, as more people in unemployment necessarily create an increase in public spending). What we saw was that countries who were the most open to international trade suffered the most from the crisis (with the biggest recession in germany), but that as countries increased their spending (keynesian stimulus) it was also those same countries that benefitted the most (because they received other countries public investment through their exports). Again, we all see how the task is impossible : to fight a crisis, you increase the inequalities in competitivity rather than reducing them ; the euro is not well equipped to face such exogene crisis. We need a global stimulus on the entire eurozone with mecanism for fiscal redistributions from the countries that benefit the most out of those stimulus to those that benefit the least. And that distribution is never going to happen. I'm also not sure it should. In the EU in its current form this would just be an excuse for badly performing countries, such as Greece, Portugal etc. to continue to do what got them into trouble in the first place. They would basically be leeching off of the efforts of others (the so-called free rider problem). Fiscal redistribution on a European level will only work if all member states unanimously give up their sovereignty to the EU parliament. What the Troika did in Italy and Greece is already bordering on the unacceptable (forcing policy or installing technocratic rulers without democratic mandate). The public perception of the EU right now that of a neoliberal, power-hungry and money-hungry apparatus that serves the interests of its many lobbyists (i.e. large corporations, banks, rich people) rather than the interests of the people living in it. A "United States of Europe" is the last thing people want right now.
You're missing the fact that Germany is leading the rest of the EU, whether there's as much mismanagement as Greece or not, into the same trap. The European Commission and US Treasury pointed it out two years ago and Germany got incredulous, pointing to its successful balance sheet. Germany sends shockwaves through the rest of the EU and Greece is the first to collapse because it has a shaky foundation, but eventually the rest will too.
Debt relief for Greece is hardly the end of the world. It's not fair but it's just, the same as it was last century when the US did it for most of Europe. But it doesn't solve the actual issue. The actual issue is in Berlin. The EU has zero chance of longterm survival if Germany won't increase real wage rates and up fiscal spending. Ya'll are all screwed, Northern Europe too, if they don't.
The EU was supposed to signal the end of neo-realism (not really, but crazy idealists thought it would, including many on TL), yet Germany's policies might be the ultimate act of neo-realism and self-conservation.
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On February 26 2015 00:19 maartendq wrote:Show nested quote +On February 25 2015 21:41 WhiteDog wrote:
The currency is not the origin of the problem but the reason why they can't get out of it.
The greeks are not responsible for the entirety of the greek tho. In your mind, I'm sure greeks are like kiddos drinking soda under the sun spending german's money and going around buttnaked in their BMWs... Do you know that the debt quadrupled under the dictature of the colonels (1967 - 1974), that another part has been contracted in order to help european financial institutions (mainly german and french institutions), that another part is the result of the corruption (like when firms such as Siemens - in 2008 - tried to sell their defectuous products) ?
I really think it is insulting to make it seem like the greeks profited from all this, especially considering 40 % of them had no heating this winter, that 30 % of them are under the poverty line, that 25 % of them are unemployed. No, in my mind the Greeks are people who have continually and democratically elected clientelistic governments since 1974, and in my mind people in a democracy bear responsibility for the representatives they send to parliament. You cannot want to have the power to vote your own leaders into office, enjoy all the benefits during the good times but deny any and all responsibility for their actions once things go south. I hope that Syriza is serious about their efforts to reform the country. They can be a force for the better for all of Europe if their project is succesful, and if they are given a chance to proceed with their plans. I think Schäuble should have given them a little bit more leeway, although his position is understandable. It will be a huge uphill struggle nonetheless.
I think f Tsipras and Varoufakis wouldn't have acted like an elephant in a porcelain closet and antagonized the whole of Europe to please their voters before they even started negotiating they would've gotten better terms.
Dijsselbloem actually said as much on Dutch TV.
Instead now we're stuck with a sub optimal solution for Europe and Greece.
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Cayman Islands24199 Posts
^that is not really true. a conciliatory greek government would not be able to get germans to relax anything and this stuff about blaming greeks for taking the hard line is just rationalization and blame shifting. they need to recognize the reality that they need to write off some fo the debt.
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The debt is not the problem. Again, Greek debt service is at 2.6% of their GDP, and the loans are already stretched until god knows when. It's practically already written off without using the words "written off". The problem is political disparity about which course the Greek government is supposed to take when it comes to how they want to organize the government, labour market and their fiscal policies.
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On February 26 2015 01:50 oneofthem wrote:
^that is not really true. a conciliatory greek government would not be able to get germans to relax anything and this stuff about blaming greeks for taking the hard line is just rationalization and blame shifting. they need to recognize the reality that they need to write off some fo the debt.
I'm not saying they shouldn't be taking a hard line. Obviously they should in a negotiation. There is a difference though between tough negotiation and calling an end to the bail out one sidedly, leaking all kinds of stuff to the papers and having a Russian diplomat be the first foreign diplomat to visit.
All it did was entrench opposing countries even further.
edit:
On February 26 2015 01:54 Nyxisto wrote:
The debt is not the problem. Again, Greek debt service is at 2.6% of their GDP, and the loans are already stretched until god knows when. It's practically already written off without using the words "written off". The problem is political disparity about which course the Greek government is supposed to take when it comes to how they want to organize the government, labour market and their fiscal policies.
This article is actually pretty relevant when talking about how big their debt load really is.
Feb 12 (Reuters) - Another round of Greek debt relief could make the country's bonds a safer investment than those of several other euro zone countries, a major U.S bank has told its clients.
Morgan Stanley, a market-maker in Greek bonds, said in an online video that if Athens is given the same leeway from European creditors that it received in the past, its debt-to-GDP ratio of 175 percent would carry the "credit risk" of a country with a ratio of just 88 percent.
Seven countries in the euro zone have debt ratios above this, according to Eurostat: Portugal (128 percent), Ireland (123 percent), Italy (128 percent), Belgium (105 percent), Cyprus (102 percent), Spain and France (both 92 percent).
"The credit risk of the 320 billion euros of debt in Greece, may in fact be lower than in some other euro zone countries," said Paolo Batori, the bank's global head of emerging market fixed income strategy told Reuters.
With around 90 percent of Greece's debt owed to public bodies including its euro zone partners, the bloc's EFSF bailout fund and the International Monetary Fund, the make-up of Greece's debt is unique in the single currency club.
Batori argues that a major part of its debt - a 107 billion euro bailout loan from the EFSF - should not even be counted as debt because it bears no interest for the next eight years and is not due to be paid back for 30 years.
The Greek government is lobbying for further debt relief, with new finance minister Yanis Varoufakis said to be targeting 53 billion euros of bilateral loans from other European countries.
Batori said that if these loans were restructured to look like the EFSF loans, then they could also be discounted, making Greece's debts look very manageable.
"When you look at the specific characteristics of the components of the debt, some parts contribute to Greek credit risk less than what the market is thinking, or what a traditional approach implies," said Batori.
Sustainability - the country's ability to pay interest and repay the debt at maturity - is key to assessing the risk attached to investing in these bonds, he added.
Morgan Stanley, one of Greece's 22 primary dealer banks, is not alone in calling for a rethink of Greece's debts.
Japonica Partners, a U.S. investment firm, maintains that under different accounting standards, Greece's net debt is just 18 percent of GDP. (editing by David Stamp)
source
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2.6 % is the projection of the debt service in 2015, it was 4.5 % in 2014. Now you make it seem like 2.6 % is nothing, and it is in a normal environment, but not with a deflation at - 0.2 %, not with budgetary cut, and not with fiscal fraud at a massive level.
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EPT![[image loading]](http://www.pdma.gr/images/maturityprofile2_eng_24_02_2015.jpg)
