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On July 29 2013 21:08 gneGne wrote:Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 18:51 Rassy wrote:
"Would you say democracy is a façade?"
In general yes, there are situations in wich democracy is not a facade but thoose are verry small scale. I don't quite understand what you mean that the limitations of for example Obama's power are pragmatic. I would say every limitation is never pragmatic, since it is limiting. Or do you mean that Obama's power is not absolute enough to do his job well? So you do agree that democracy exists, but only on a small scale. And I can follow you with that, but don't you think it is an ideal worth to keep striving for, at the least on a national level? Don't you think the limitations to the power of our politicians have purpose?
You ask so manny questions lol, how about answering one?
Wich time scale should we look at when we want to minimise suffering and maximise pleasure?
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On July 29 2013 21:30 Rassy wrote:Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 21:08 gneGne wrote:On July 29 2013 18:51 Rassy wrote:
"Would you say democracy is a façade?"
In general yes, there are situations in wich democracy is not a facade but thoose are verry small scale. I don't quite understand what you mean that the limitations of for example Obama's power are pragmatic. I would say every limitation is never pragmatic, since it is limiting. Or do you mean that Obama's power is not absolute enough to do his job well? So you do agree that democracy exists, but only on a small scale. And I can follow you with that, but don't you think it is an ideal worth to keep striving for, at the least on a national level? Don't you think the limitations to the power of our politicians have purpose? You ask so manny questions lol, how about answering one? Wich time scale should we look at when we want to minimise suffering and maximise pleasure?
Well, that is a good remark. I tend to find trying to ask the right questions intruiging and a prerequisite for finding the right answer. So its really important to me, Im sorry if it annoys you ^^.
So as to answering your question, I think that equating morality with maximizing pleasure even on whatever time scale is in principle untenable. That is why instead I think morality is about freedom and asking the question if and how it is possible to legitimize the state, thus to find a state which is compatible with freedom.
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On July 29 2013 18:27 Poffel wrote:
@WhiteDog: Catching up from yesterday, I strongly reject the assumption that moral realism is reactionary ("a defense of the status quo and the people who defined morals") by nature. From the realist point of view, it simply doesn't matter whether you're part of the dominant or the subordinate because the same ethical truths apply to every human being - for example, everybody should respect human dignity, no matter if they work at McDonalds or Goldman Sachs. From your angle, this obviously doesn't make much sense; yet, even if I imagine myself in a Bourdieuian social space (or even a Weberian sphere of value), i.e. as a social agent who's (ethical) dispositions correspond to his social position, I still don't see the necessity for moral realism to concur with that of the dominant - unless I find myself in a dominant social position. In other words, why should moral realism necessarily be the "taste" of dominant morals when moral realists come from completely different life styles?
If I understands well, we are talking about two different things. You consider that if a "moral realism" existed, it would not be the morality of the dominant because it would be true for every being no matter what their life style or social origin. I agree with that and I sympathise with the idea that defining a "true" moral system ceteris paribus would be a great thing if it was possible. I also feel attracted by this theorical idea.
But in practice it is not possible (as we've stated before, there is no way for you to judge of the "truthness" every thing being equals of any moral system) and in the end there is no other type of argument to justify your own moral than an argument of authority : it is better because human dignity is universal, because I judge it this way, because I "feel" it this way, because god told me, because the USA judge it this way, because Lenine wrote it this way, etc.
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On July 29 2013 20:41 gneGne wrote:Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 16:58 xM(Z wrote:On July 29 2013 09:09 gneGne wrote:On July 29 2013 07:07 xM(Z wrote:On July 29 2013 02:14 gneGne wrote:On July 29 2013 02:06 xM(Z wrote:
i'm missing something then.
what is wrong with the phrasing - "slavery is moral because it doesn't violate human dignity" (i see it as true, under the 'slavery is moral' ethics).
for you, the expression human dignity falls under realism, for me it doesn't. (we just have different definitions for human/humanity and/or dignity). Well, if I may answer too, slavery is contradictory to human dignity, because it treats a person only as a means to a certain end. That is the difference between work and slavery, where work is with consent and slavery without. i see them both as varying degrees of slavery and i would argue that consent is imposed on you by certain social needs/requirements you'd have to adhere to. since consent is not given freely, you are still a slave. Consent is no real consent if its not self-imposed and this is what human dignity presupposes. In other words this human dignity doesn't mean much more than that I respect the other person as another person (equal). I don't see how this understanding of human dignity can work enslaving, quite the contrary actually. And ofcourse we would have to analyse how or whether this actual self-imposed consent is possible at all within certain social regimes (aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny), but that perhaps is a somewhat different question or atleast for a later stage on how to realise human dignity. , you will never be able to distinguish between self-imposed and outside-imposed factors while living in a world based on an outside-imposed moral realism. the only dignity/equality you will be able to see is the equality among slaves. or, OR!, you will always be a slave and the sam harrises of the world will teach you how to like it, how to be happy about it. I would reject the impossibility of distinguishing between self-imposed and outside-imposed factors even for the slave! Because in so far the slave realises him/herself as being enslaved, there already is presupposed a certain freedom which however is yet merely internal. The conscious slave knows he is serving certain laws/commands which are not his own. This also the claim that is in your argument, because you also implicitly still made the distinction between being imposed from the self and the outside to explain the domination of the outside-imposed factors. However, I do agree that the internal freedom of the slave exists only as but a potentiality.
i stressed the S&M agenda of moral realism vs expressivism because i see moral realism as the slave agent and expressivism as the dominant agent based (but not only) on their definitions: imposed limits/graduality vs no limits/absolutes.
i am a dualist. i can not see motion, change, progress, evolution that can be driven by a single thing/concept/entity (moral realism in this case).
i mostly agree with WhiteDog in
On July 29 2013 18:27 Poffel wrote:
@WhiteDog: Catching up from yesterday, I strongly reject the assumption that moral realism is reactionary ("a defense of the status quo and the people who defined morals") by nature.
and about
On July 29 2013 18:27 Poffel wrote:
From the realist point of view, it simply doesn't matter whether you're part of the dominant or the subordinate because the same ethical truths apply to every human being - for example, everybody should respect human dignity, no matter if they work at McDonalds or Goldman Sachs.
it's just wishful thinking or more of a plea, urging people to respect human dignity. it is in no way an imperative. who would force me to do that?, ethical truths by themselves?, i don't think so.
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On July 29 2013 22:41 xM(Z wrote:Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 20:41 gneGne wrote:On July 29 2013 16:58 xM(Z wrote:On July 29 2013 09:09 gneGne wrote:On July 29 2013 07:07 xM(Z wrote:On July 29 2013 02:14 gneGne wrote:On July 29 2013 02:06 xM(Z wrote:
i'm missing something then.
what is wrong with the phrasing - "slavery is moral because it doesn't violate human dignity" (i see it as true, under the 'slavery is moral' ethics).
for you, the expression human dignity falls under realism, for me it doesn't. (we just have different definitions for human/humanity and/or dignity). Well, if I may answer too, slavery is contradictory to human dignity, because it treats a person only as a means to a certain end. That is the difference between work and slavery, where work is with consent and slavery without. i see them both as varying degrees of slavery and i would argue that consent is imposed on you by certain social needs/requirements you'd have to adhere to. since consent is not given freely, you are still a slave. Consent is no real consent if its not self-imposed and this is what human dignity presupposes. In other words this human dignity doesn't mean much more than that I respect the other person as another person (equal). I don't see how this understanding of human dignity can work enslaving, quite the contrary actually. And ofcourse we would have to analyse how or whether this actual self-imposed consent is possible at all within certain social regimes (aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny), but that perhaps is a somewhat different question or atleast for a later stage on how to realise human dignity. , you will never be able to distinguish between self-imposed and outside-imposed factors while living in a world based on an outside-imposed moral realism. the only dignity/equality you will be able to see is the equality among slaves. or, OR!, you will always be a slave and the sam harrises of the world will teach you how to like it, how to be happy about it. I would reject the impossibility of distinguishing between self-imposed and outside-imposed factors even for the slave! Because in so far the slave realises him/herself as being enslaved, there already is presupposed a certain freedom which however is yet merely internal. The conscious slave knows he is serving certain laws/commands which are not his own. This also the claim that is in your argument, because you also implicitly still made the distinction between being imposed from the self and the outside to explain the domination of the outside-imposed factors. However, I do agree that the internal freedom of the slave exists only as but a potentiality. i stressed the S&M agenda of moral realism vs expressivism because i see moral realism as the slave agent and expressivism as the dominant agent based (but not only) on their definitions: imposed limits/graduality vs no limits/absolutes. i am a dualist. i can not see motion, change, progress, evolution that can be driven by a single thing/concept/entity (moral realism in this case). i mostly agree with WhiteDog in Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 18:27 Poffel wrote:
@WhiteDog: Catching up from yesterday, I strongly reject the assumption that moral realism is reactionary ("a defense of the status quo and the people who defined morals") by nature. and about Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 18:27 Poffel wrote:
From the realist point of view, it simply doesn't matter whether you're part of the dominant or the subordinate because the same ethical truths apply to every human being - for example, everybody should respect human dignity, no matter if they work at McDonalds or Goldman Sachs. it's just wishful thinking or more of a plea, urging people to respect human dignity. it is in no way an imperative. who would force me to do that?, ethical truths by themselves?, i don't think so.
I think I sort of see where you are coming from. I think you do value freedom as well (as you brought up the S&M relation), but you think of freedom as opposed to moral realism which you see as limiting freedom, am I correct? While I see human dignity and absolute freedom as implicating each other and are what constitutes morality, therefore it is the moral imperative (as maxim/construct of reason) which presses me on and makes me knowledgeable of my freedom. I'm not sure if this makes things any clearer for you. Sort of like a mix of imposed limits/absolutes in your scheme of things.
I must add however that all this is still as a prerequisite for the freedom of man on the individual level. So then it is the task to create a society based on this model, for which I think democracy is a good start as the imposed laws brought about by all of society as self-imposed laws.
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On July 29 2013 22:05 WhiteDog wrote:Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 18:27 Poffel wrote:
@WhiteDog: Catching up from yesterday, I strongly reject the assumption that moral realism is reactionary ("a defense of the status quo and the people who defined morals") by nature. From the realist point of view, it simply doesn't matter whether you're part of the dominant or the subordinate because the same ethical truths apply to every human being - for example, everybody should respect human dignity, no matter if they work at McDonalds or Goldman Sachs. From your angle, this obviously doesn't make much sense; yet, even if I imagine myself in a Bourdieuian social space (or even a Weberian sphere of value), i.e. as a social agent who's (ethical) dispositions correspond to his social position, I still don't see the necessity for moral realism to concur with that of the dominant - unless I find myself in a dominant social position. In other words, why should moral realism necessarily be the "taste" of dominant morals when moral realists come from completely different life styles? If I understands well, we are talking about two different things. You consider that if a "moral realism" existed, it would not be the morality of the dominant because it would be true for every being no matter what their life style or social origin. I agree with that and I sympathise with the idea that defining a "true" moral system ceteris paribus would be a great thing if it was possible. I also feel attracted by this theorical idea. But in practice it is not possible (as we've stated before, there is no way for you to judge of the "truthness" every thing being equals of any moral system) and in the end there is no other type of argument to justify your own moral than an argument of authority : it is better because human dignity is universal, because I judge it this way, because I "feel" it this way, because god told me, because the USA judge it this way, because Lenine wrote it this way, etc.
In the types of discussion you two are having I find it most useful to distinguish between moral semantics, moral ontology and moral obligations in order to better understand where the difference in opinion actually lies.
What do you guys think the sentence "torturing babies for fun is morally wrong" actually means? It seems to me that Whitedog thinks that all it means (or could possibly mean) is that "in society X at point in time Y the prevailing moral code forbids torturing babies for fun". Poffel (and me) think that the sentence usually means (or possibly could mean) something stronger. In my case: "Given some contingent facts about human beings and some necessary truths about rational agent interaction allowing torturing babies for fun as a general rule will not lead to a flourishing society."
Assuming that this difference in assessing semantic content is accurate, we will naturally point to different facts in order to ground our understanding. I will point to human physiology or game theory for instance, whereas Whitedog might point to laws or social codes of conduct and we will come to vastly different conclusions with regard to the universality or truth-aptness of moral statements.
That's why I would completely disagree with the notion that different practiced moral codes cannot be critiqued from the outside or even shown to be morally wrong themselves. The huge problem I have in these discussions is that it is so difficult to come to a common understanding of what it is that one is actually talking about.
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On July 29 2013 23:16 gneGne wrote:Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 22:41 xM(Z wrote:On July 29 2013 20:41 gneGne wrote:On July 29 2013 16:58 xM(Z wrote:On July 29 2013 09:09 gneGne wrote:On July 29 2013 07:07 xM(Z wrote:On July 29 2013 02:14 gneGne wrote:On July 29 2013 02:06 xM(Z wrote:
i'm missing something then.
what is wrong with the phrasing - "slavery is moral because it doesn't violate human dignity" (i see it as true, under the 'slavery is moral' ethics).
for you, the expression human dignity falls under realism, for me it doesn't. (we just have different definitions for human/humanity and/or dignity). Well, if I may answer too, slavery is contradictory to human dignity, because it treats a person only as a means to a certain end. That is the difference between work and slavery, where work is with consent and slavery without. i see them both as varying degrees of slavery and i would argue that consent is imposed on you by certain social needs/requirements you'd have to adhere to. since consent is not given freely, you are still a slave. Consent is no real consent if its not self-imposed and this is what human dignity presupposes. In other words this human dignity doesn't mean much more than that I respect the other person as another person (equal). I don't see how this understanding of human dignity can work enslaving, quite the contrary actually. And ofcourse we would have to analyse how or whether this actual self-imposed consent is possible at all within certain social regimes (aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny), but that perhaps is a somewhat different question or atleast for a later stage on how to realise human dignity. , you will never be able to distinguish between self-imposed and outside-imposed factors while living in a world based on an outside-imposed moral realism. the only dignity/equality you will be able to see is the equality among slaves. or, OR!, you will always be a slave and the sam harrises of the world will teach you how to like it, how to be happy about it. I would reject the impossibility of distinguishing between self-imposed and outside-imposed factors even for the slave! Because in so far the slave realises him/herself as being enslaved, there already is presupposed a certain freedom which however is yet merely internal. The conscious slave knows he is serving certain laws/commands which are not his own. This also the claim that is in your argument, because you also implicitly still made the distinction between being imposed from the self and the outside to explain the domination of the outside-imposed factors. However, I do agree that the internal freedom of the slave exists only as but a potentiality. i stressed the S&M agenda of moral realism vs expressivism because i see moral realism as the slave agent and expressivism as the dominant agent based (but not only) on their definitions: imposed limits/graduality vs no limits/absolutes. i am a dualist. i can not see motion, change, progress, evolution that can be driven by a single thing/concept/entity (moral realism in this case). i mostly agree with WhiteDog in On July 29 2013 18:27 Poffel wrote:
@WhiteDog: Catching up from yesterday, I strongly reject the assumption that moral realism is reactionary ("a defense of the status quo and the people who defined morals") by nature. and about On July 29 2013 18:27 Poffel wrote:
From the realist point of view, it simply doesn't matter whether you're part of the dominant or the subordinate because the same ethical truths apply to every human being - for example, everybody should respect human dignity, no matter if they work at McDonalds or Goldman Sachs. it's just wishful thinking or more of a plea, urging people to respect human dignity. it is in no way an imperative. who would force me to do that?, ethical truths by themselves?, i don't think so. I think I sort of see where you are coming from. I think you do value freedom as well (as you brought up the S&M relation), but you think of freedom as opposed to moral realism which you see as limiting freedom, am I correct? While I see human dignity and absolute freedom as implicating each other and are what constitutes morality, therefore it is the moral imperative (as maxim/construct of reason) which presses me on and makes me knowledgeable of my freedom. I'm not sure if this makes things any clearer for you. Sort of like a mix of imposed limits/absolutes in your scheme of things. I must add however that all this is still as a prerequisite for the freedom of man on the individual level. So then it is the task to create a society based on this model, for which I think democracy is a good start as the imposed laws brought about by all of society as self-imposed laws.
i value change and the wasting of energy that comes with it. the creation of (a new) form if you like (a new form of moral realism, a new form of dignity, a new form of freedom and so on).
that being said, i don't think freedom, absolute freedom could ever exist if we remain bound to any type/kind of physicalism/physical laws (even bound to selves for that matter) .
but, being a nutjob i can absolutise everything. absolute freedom = death (the moment of). the death of you, the death of form, the death of the universe. now, if you believe in a cyclic model of our universe, birth followed by death and death followed by rebirth you might catch a glimpse of what 'absolute' of anything could mean: the moment of crossover, that split second before all hell breaks loose.
analogy: when you flip a coin, every time it changes sides you stare at its edge for a brief moment. it's like that: of both sides but in neither of them ... and then it's all over.
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On July 29 2013 23:32 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 22:05 WhiteDog wrote:On July 29 2013 18:27 Poffel wrote:
@WhiteDog: Catching up from yesterday, I strongly reject the assumption that moral realism is reactionary ("a defense of the status quo and the people who defined morals") by nature. From the realist point of view, it simply doesn't matter whether you're part of the dominant or the subordinate because the same ethical truths apply to every human being - for example, everybody should respect human dignity, no matter if they work at McDonalds or Goldman Sachs. From your angle, this obviously doesn't make much sense; yet, even if I imagine myself in a Bourdieuian social space (or even a Weberian sphere of value), i.e. as a social agent who's (ethical) dispositions correspond to his social position, I still don't see the necessity for moral realism to concur with that of the dominant - unless I find myself in a dominant social position. In other words, why should moral realism necessarily be the "taste" of dominant morals when moral realists come from completely different life styles? If I understands well, we are talking about two different things. You consider that if a "moral realism" existed, it would not be the morality of the dominant because it would be true for every being no matter what their life style or social origin. I agree with that and I sympathise with the idea that defining a "true" moral system ceteris paribus would be a great thing if it was possible. I also feel attracted by this theorical idea. But in practice it is not possible (as we've stated before, there is no way for you to judge of the "truthness" every thing being equals of any moral system) and in the end there is no other type of argument to justify your own moral than an argument of authority : it is better because human dignity is universal, because I judge it this way, because I "feel" it this way, because god told me, because the USA judge it this way, because Lenine wrote it this way, etc. In the types of discussion you two are having I find it most useful to distinguish between moral semantics, moral ontology and moral obligations in order to better understand where the difference in opinion actually lies. What do you guys think the sentence "torturing babies for fun is morally wrong" actually means? It seems to me that Whitedog thinks that all it means (or could possibly mean) is that "in society X at point in time Y the prevailing moral code forbids torturing babies for fun". Poffel (and me) think that the sentence usually means (or possibly could mean) something stronger. In my case: "Given some contingent facts about human beings and some necessary truths about rational agent interaction allowing torturing babies for fun as a general rule will not lead to a flourishing society." Assuming that this difference in assessing semantic content is accurate, we will naturally point to different facts in order to ground our understanding. I will point to human physiology or game theory for instance, whereas Whitedog might point to laws or social codes of conduct and we will come to vastly different conclusions with regard to the universality or truth-aptness of moral statements. That's why I would completely disagree with the notion that different practiced moral codes cannot be critiqued from the outside or even shown to be morally wrong themselves. The huge problem I have in these discussions is that it is so difficult to come to a common understanding of what it is that one is actually talking about.
I'm not sure you can jump from "torturing babies for fun is morally wrong" to "Given some contingent facts about human beings and some necessary truths about rational agent interaction allowing torturing babies for fun as a general rule will not lead to a flourishing society.". The first sentence makes an ethical assertion while the second one makes a point about how society ought to be, so it sounds odd to say the first meaning to say the second.
On game theory, I know you can use it to show how in certain situations rational actors cooperate despite their (short-term) best interests, but it doesn't seem logical to derive morals from this. Game theory can attempt to show the presence of an unwritten normative code that punishes people through future non-cooperation, but to me this is much more akin to customary law than morals. How do you actually work rational agents and game theory into this whole discussion?
I'm no philosopher, so correct me if I say something silly. I do know a bit of game theory from my econ course.
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On July 29 2013 23:32 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 22:05 WhiteDog wrote:On July 29 2013 18:27 Poffel wrote:
@WhiteDog: Catching up from yesterday, I strongly reject the assumption that moral realism is reactionary ("a defense of the status quo and the people who defined morals") by nature. From the realist point of view, it simply doesn't matter whether you're part of the dominant or the subordinate because the same ethical truths apply to every human being - for example, everybody should respect human dignity, no matter if they work at McDonalds or Goldman Sachs. From your angle, this obviously doesn't make much sense; yet, even if I imagine myself in a Bourdieuian social space (or even a Weberian sphere of value), i.e. as a social agent who's (ethical) dispositions correspond to his social position, I still don't see the necessity for moral realism to concur with that of the dominant - unless I find myself in a dominant social position. In other words, why should moral realism necessarily be the "taste" of dominant morals when moral realists come from completely different life styles? If I understands well, we are talking about two different things. You consider that if a "moral realism" existed, it would not be the morality of the dominant because it would be true for every being no matter what their life style or social origin. I agree with that and I sympathise with the idea that defining a "true" moral system ceteris paribus would be a great thing if it was possible. I also feel attracted by this theorical idea. But in practice it is not possible (as we've stated before, there is no way for you to judge of the "truthness" every thing being equals of any moral system) and in the end there is no other type of argument to justify your own moral than an argument of authority : it is better because human dignity is universal, because I judge it this way, because I "feel" it this way, because god told me, because the USA judge it this way, because Lenine wrote it this way, etc. In the types of discussion you two are having I find it most useful to distinguish between moral semantics, moral ontology and moral obligations in order to better understand where the difference in opinion actually lies. What do you guys think the sentence "torturing babies for fun is morally wrong" actually means? It seems to me that Whitedog thinks that all it means (or could possibly mean) is that "in society X at point in time Y the prevailing moral code forbids torturing babies for fun". Poffel (and me) think that the sentence usually means (or possibly could mean) something stronger. In my case: "Given some contingent facts about human beings and some necessary truths about rational agent interaction allowing torturing babies for fun as a general rule will not lead to a flourishing society." Assuming that this difference in assessing semantic content is accurate, we will naturally point to different facts in order to ground our understanding. I will point to human physiology or game theory for instance, whereas Whitedog might point to laws or social codes of conduct and we will come to vastly different conclusions with regard to the universality or truth-aptness of moral statements. That's why I would completely disagree with the notion that different practiced moral codes cannot be critiqued from the outside or even shown to be morally wrong themselves. The huge problem I have in these discussions is that it is so difficult to come to a common understanding of what it is that one is actually talking about.
Moral codes can be critiqued just like any political statement or political institutions. For exemple, if you compare democracy and dictature, you will find logical arguments for each one of those, but in the end the only way for you to get out of this mess is to define what is a man and what is the criteria of "efficience" for a political system.
In the end, it is something that you cannot falsify that will make you decide between democracy and dictature, a political choice - or a "moral" choice - for what you consider to be the best political system in regard to how you define "man".
The problem is that you are all searching for a definition of "man" that is not supposed to be up to controversy - so you need something to define this man. See your sentence "Given some contingent facts about human beings and some necessary truths about rational agent interaction allowing torturing babies for fun as a general rule will not lead to a flourishing society" : you considers that there are contingent "facts" about human beings (the use of contingent is obviously really problematic because you admit that you can't define man always and everywhere), you are making the assumption that men are evolving in a "rational" society and you use the idea of "flourishing society" without defining it. Why ? Because this is something that you cannot and will never be able to prove irrefutably.
In this desire to "prove" that there is an inherent nature of man that will back up the idea that a moral that can be considered as true always and everywhere exist, you are somehow forced to resort to a tierce party - the "something" (hence the word "meta) - that will back up the claim that you make on man : god, the human "nature" or "dignity", the "rationality" of men, our deep "biological" nature within our genes, etc.
Since all those things are not and will never be considered as valid axiom for some of us on this topic, because they obviously create controversy, your logic cannot be considered as true always and everywhere, unless you are able to falsify the existence of one of those things in our world - you are actually trying to prove that god exist.
It is really interesting because deep down most of you knows that simple fact that "true" moral can only exist if "Man" (a certain idea of what we are) also exist - for exemple radscorpion9 in the last page consider that for "true" morality (what it should be) to exist, we might need to alter our brains (read : to change men into "Men") :
But as for what morality should be (as in the ideal moral system), assuming we find a way to alter our brains (perhaps through social conditioning or genetic engineering), I think that is entirely up for debate.
You are also mistaking my stance. I does not at all consider that "torturing babies for fun is morally wrong" actually means that in "society X at point in time Y the prevailing moral code forbids torturing babies for fun". I consider two things : that the society made me to think that torturing babies is morally wrong (and I will never be able to get out of that), and that "torturing babies for fun is morally wrong" is a political choice, a choice made on no grounds except my own limited point of view, biography, reasoning, feeling, etc. on what we are..
I would fight for a society that don't torture its babies for fun (well I'm not sure, I'm a pussy in real life) but I have no logical ground on which I can definitely says that "torturing babies for fun is wrong" is more true than "torturing babies for fun is right".
For exemple : "Considering what the old testament said about men, it is not right to consider men and women equally" try to prove this wrong without criticising the idea of men and women presented by the old testament.
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On July 30 2013 01:07 xM(Z wrote:Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 23:16 gneGne wrote:On July 29 2013 22:41 xM(Z wrote:On July 29 2013 20:41 gneGne wrote:On July 29 2013 16:58 xM(Z wrote:On July 29 2013 09:09 gneGne wrote:On July 29 2013 07:07 xM(Z wrote:On July 29 2013 02:14 gneGne wrote:On July 29 2013 02:06 xM(Z wrote:
i'm missing something then.
what is wrong with the phrasing - "slavery is moral because it doesn't violate human dignity" (i see it as true, under the 'slavery is moral' ethics).
for you, the expression human dignity falls under realism, for me it doesn't. (we just have different definitions for human/humanity and/or dignity). Well, if I may answer too, slavery is contradictory to human dignity, because it treats a person only as a means to a certain end. That is the difference between work and slavery, where work is with consent and slavery without. i see them both as varying degrees of slavery and i would argue that consent is imposed on you by certain social needs/requirements you'd have to adhere to. since consent is not given freely, you are still a slave. Consent is no real consent if its not self-imposed and this is what human dignity presupposes. In other words this human dignity doesn't mean much more than that I respect the other person as another person (equal). I don't see how this understanding of human dignity can work enslaving, quite the contrary actually. And ofcourse we would have to analyse how or whether this actual self-imposed consent is possible at all within certain social regimes (aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny), but that perhaps is a somewhat different question or atleast for a later stage on how to realise human dignity. , you will never be able to distinguish between self-imposed and outside-imposed factors while living in a world based on an outside-imposed moral realism. the only dignity/equality you will be able to see is the equality among slaves. or, OR!, you will always be a slave and the sam harrises of the world will teach you how to like it, how to be happy about it. I would reject the impossibility of distinguishing between self-imposed and outside-imposed factors even for the slave! Because in so far the slave realises him/herself as being enslaved, there already is presupposed a certain freedom which however is yet merely internal. The conscious slave knows he is serving certain laws/commands which are not his own. This also the claim that is in your argument, because you also implicitly still made the distinction between being imposed from the self and the outside to explain the domination of the outside-imposed factors. However, I do agree that the internal freedom of the slave exists only as but a potentiality. i stressed the S&M agenda of moral realism vs expressivism because i see moral realism as the slave agent and expressivism as the dominant agent based (but not only) on their definitions: imposed limits/graduality vs no limits/absolutes. i am a dualist. i can not see motion, change, progress, evolution that can be driven by a single thing/concept/entity (moral realism in this case). i mostly agree with WhiteDog in On July 29 2013 18:27 Poffel wrote:
@WhiteDog: Catching up from yesterday, I strongly reject the assumption that moral realism is reactionary ("a defense of the status quo and the people who defined morals") by nature. and about On July 29 2013 18:27 Poffel wrote:
From the realist point of view, it simply doesn't matter whether you're part of the dominant or the subordinate because the same ethical truths apply to every human being - for example, everybody should respect human dignity, no matter if they work at McDonalds or Goldman Sachs. it's just wishful thinking or more of a plea, urging people to respect human dignity. it is in no way an imperative. who would force me to do that?, ethical truths by themselves?, i don't think so. I think I sort of see where you are coming from. I think you do value freedom as well (as you brought up the S&M relation), but you think of freedom as opposed to moral realism which you see as limiting freedom, am I correct? While I see human dignity and absolute freedom as implicating each other and are what constitutes morality, therefore it is the moral imperative (as maxim/construct of reason) which presses me on and makes me knowledgeable of my freedom. I'm not sure if this makes things any clearer for you. Sort of like a mix of imposed limits/absolutes in your scheme of things. I must add however that all this is still as a prerequisite for the freedom of man on the individual level. So then it is the task to create a society based on this model, for which I think democracy is a good start as the imposed laws brought about by all of society as self-imposed laws. i value change and the wasting of energy that comes with it. the creation of (a new) form if you like (a new form of moral realism, a new form of dignity, a new form of freedom and so on). that being said, i don't think freedom, absolute freedom could ever exist if we remain bound to any type/kind of physicalism/physical laws (even bound to selves for that matter) . but, being a nutjob i can absolutise everything. absolute freedom = death (the moment of). the death of you, the death of form, the death of the universe. now, if you believe in a cyclic model of our universe, birth followed by death and death followed by rebirth you might catch a glimpse of what 'absolute' of anything could mean: the moment of crossover, that split second before all hell breaks loose. analogy: when you flip a coin, every time it changes sides you stare at its edge for a brief moment. it's like that: of both sides but in neither of them ... and then it's all over.
Well, sure if we are just bound and only bound by the laws of nature then we are all slaves and freedom is impossible, and then strictly speaking so is creation (unless you might assume some God of nature as creator).
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The most passionate anti-realist arguments in this thread have all been epistemic. Claims such as the following have popped up repeatedly:
(1) Our ethical beliefs are too determined by our historical/cultural context and what we hear from peers and authorities for there to be non-relative ethical truths.
(2) All ethical arguments require you to assume some principles or axioms which cannot themselves be established to be true, so there are no non-relative ethical truths.
(3) You cannot find any completely non-controversial ethical claims. The disagreement over ethics means there are no non-relative ethical truths.
The most important step to take when evaluating this style of argument is to check whether or not each principle is plausible in full generality, not just when you selectively apply it to ethics.
To my eye, every single truth in every single area fails all of these epistemic tests that are supposedly damning for ethics.
There is widespread disagreement over scientific claims. Even in the united states vast swaths of people do not believe in the theory of evolution. Yes there is agreement within the scientific community, but how (in a non-question begging way) is this different than agreements within ethical communities?
Further, it is clear that the source of this disagreement is in large part that our beliefs in just about every matter are influenced as much by where we come from and who we associate with as by anything else. If you grew up in a radically different context you wouldn't believe in evolution either.
Finally, scientific truths aren't given to us. They don't simply jump out from the world and compel our acceptance regardless of our acceptance of any other truths or principles about what procedures are reliable. We are in science, just as much as in ethics, trapped on Neurath's boat.
We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using the old beams and driftwood the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but only by gradual reconstruction. -Quine
The general problem for these anti-realist arguments, then, is that it's hard to see how you can accept them while not taking them to undermine all truths, and in particular those of science. Realists will, quite understandably, not be moved if you cannot produce non-question begging reasons why.
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You seem like a moral realist, so maybe you can answer my question wich noone has managed to do till now.
When trying to minimise pain and maximise pleasure,or freedom or annything else you use to judge right from wrong , at wich time scale should we look?
I realise this is a verry difficult question to answer for moral realist and people have somehow managed to avoid and ignore this question (probably because moral realism can not answer this question). But i would still like to get an answer,as it is an important question for considering moral realism as a serious option. (you can read more about this question on the previous page where i detailed it a bit more to make it more clear)
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On July 30 2013 03:14 frogrubdown wrote:The most passionate anti-realist arguments in this thread have all been epistemic. Claims such as the following have popped up repeatedly: Show nested quote +(1) Our ethical beliefs are too determined by our historical/cultural context and what we hear from peers and authorities for there to be non-relative ethical truths.
(2) All ethical arguments require you to assume some principles or axioms which cannot themselves be established to be true, so there are no non-relative ethical truths.
(3) You cannot find any completely non-controversial ethical claims. The disagreement over ethics means there are no non-relative ethical truths. The most important step to take when evaluating this style of argument is to check whether or not each principle is plausible in full generality, not just when you selectively apply it to ethics. To my eye, every single truth in every single area fails all of these epistemic tests that are supposedly damning for ethics. There is widespread disagreement over scientific claims. Even in the united states vast swaths of people do not believe in the theory of evolution. Yes there is agreement within the scientific community, but how (in a non-question begging way) is this different than agreements within ethical communities? Further, it is clear that the source of this disagreement is in large part that our beliefs in just about every matter are influenced as much by where we come from and who we associate with as by anything else. If you grew up in a radically different context you wouldn't believe in evolution either. Finally, scientific truths aren't given to us. They don't simply jump out from the world and compel our acceptance regardless of our acceptance of any other truths or principles about what procedures are reliable. We are in science, just as much as in ethics, trapped on Neurath's boat. Show nested quote +We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using the old beams and driftwood the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but only by gradual reconstruction. -Quine The general problem for these anti-realist arguments, then, is that it's hard to see how you can accept them while not taking them to undermine all truths, and in particular those of science. Realists will, quite understandably, not be moved if you cannot produce non-question begging reasons why.
Sciences are refutable. I have discussed this before by quoting Passeron. You are making a grave mistake in thinking that assertions on men have the same properties as biological laws or physics.
None of the logical conditions of the "falsification" of a theory or a general proposition is fulfilled strictly speaking in the case of the logical structure of sociological theories (or "historical synthesis") as soon as one takes seriously the constraints of historical observation. Since no historical statement can completely dispose co-occurences, that the statement consider as related in the explanation or interpretation, from its space-time coordinates (context more or less expanded by typology), the universality of general propositions in sociology or history is about "digital universality" and never about the universality in the strict sense. In other words, the general sociological propositions can always be generated by the logical "conjunction" of singular statements that it resume.
I can test that the theory of evolution is "right" or "wrong" all things equals because there are valid techniques to test that (and it will always work when I repeat the same process - it is therefore anhistoric) : through that refutation or falsification I can therefore make a distinction between the theory (and its "truthness") and the social context through which the theory have been made. You cannot do that for men's morality or men overall - they are always historical and social beings.
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Why don't you guys begin by answering a question like what is the purpose of life? I think when you answer that ethics will become more clear. If you have to theorize the existence of ethics it is because you are lost. You're experience of reality is not a criteria for truth and likewise using it as such instrument will only lead you into threads like these.
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On July 30 2013 03:23 WhiteDog wrote:Show nested quote +On July 30 2013 03:14 frogrubdown wrote:The most passionate anti-realist arguments in this thread have all been epistemic. Claims such as the following have popped up repeatedly: (1) Our ethical beliefs are too determined by our historical/cultural context and what we hear from peers and authorities for there to be non-relative ethical truths.
(2) All ethical arguments require you to assume some principles or axioms which cannot themselves be established to be true, so there are no non-relative ethical truths.
(3) You cannot find any completely non-controversial ethical claims. The disagreement over ethics means there are no non-relative ethical truths. The most important step to take when evaluating this style of argument is to check whether or not each principle is plausible in full generality, not just when you selectively apply it to ethics. To my eye, every single truth in every single area fails all of these epistemic tests that are supposedly damning for ethics. There is widespread disagreement over scientific claims. Even in the united states vast swaths of people do not believe in the theory of evolution. Yes there is agreement within the scientific community, but how (in a non-question begging way) is this different than agreements within ethical communities? Further, it is clear that the source of this disagreement is in large part that our beliefs in just about every matter are influenced as much by where we come from and who we associate with as by anything else. If you grew up in a radically different context you wouldn't believe in evolution either. Finally, scientific truths aren't given to us. They don't simply jump out from the world and compel our acceptance regardless of our acceptance of any other truths or principles about what procedures are reliable. We are in science, just as much as in ethics, trapped on Neurath's boat. We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using the old beams and driftwood the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but only by gradual reconstruction. -Quine The general problem for these anti-realist arguments, then, is that it's hard to see how you can accept them while not taking them to undermine all truths, and in particular those of science. Realists will, quite understandably, not be moved if you cannot produce non-question begging reasons why. Sciences are refutable. I have discussed this before by quoting Passeron. You are making a grave mistake in thinking that philosophical knowledge has the same properties as biological laws or physics. Show nested quote +None of the logical conditions of the "falsification" of a theory or a general proposition is fulfilled strictly speaking in the case of the logical structure of sociological theories (or "historical synthesis") as soon as one takes seriously the constraints of historical observation. Since no historical statement can completely dispose co-occurences, that the statement consider as related in the explanation or interpretation, from its space-time coordinates (context more or less expanded by typology), the universality of general propositions in sociology or history is about "digital universality" and never about the universality in the strict sense. In other words, the general sociological propositions can always be generated by the logical "conjunction" of singular statements that it resume. I can test that the theory of evolution is "right" or "wrong" all things equals because there are valid techniques to test that (and it will always work when I repeat the same process - it is therefore anhistoric) : through that refutation or falsification I can therefore make a distinction between the theory (and its "truthness") and the social context through which the theory have been made. You cannot do that for men's morality or men overall - they are always historical beings.
Refutation doesn't occur is Popperian single steps. It's a matter of being moved in degrees by solid evidence and reasoning. So refutability is a measure of whether or not you can offer solid reasons against a given theory. And you can do this in ethics too. You can refute the supposed moral law that lying is always wrong by considering the counterexample wherein you are questioned by Nazis about the Jews you're hiding in your attic. Sure, some would disagree that this counterexample suffices, such as Kant, but many "creation scientists" disagree with the exemplary refutations of their views.
The fact remains that to refute things in science you need to accept a number of principles and if you want your refutation to convince anyone else you'll have to hope they agree with you on them. And on this particular point, the differences between science and ethics aren't so clear.
Of course, things aren't identical epistemically between science and ethics. Repeatable experiments are a great thing. But science isn't the only epistemically virtuous activity. History has no repeatable experiments and yet there are numerous historical truths and we can come to know quite a few of them.
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On July 30 2013 03:23 Rassy wrote:
You seem like a moral realist, so maybe you can answer my question wich noone has managed to do till now.
When trying to minimise pain and maximise pleasure,or freedom or annything else you use to judge right from wrong , at wich time scale should we look?
I realise this is a verry difficult question to answer for moral realist and people have somehow managed to avoid and ignore this question (probably because moral realism can not answer this question). But i would still like to get an answer,as it is an important question for considering moral realism as a serious option. (you can read more about this question on the previous page where i detailed it a bit more to make it more clear)
I lean towards realism, but I probably wouldn't describe myself as accepting it. I'm not a utilitarian though, and realists don't have to be.
I think that the most consistent answer to your question, from a utilitarian perspective, is that all pleasures count equally, and this is what I take most utilitarians to have concluded. There will remain an epistemic difference between nearby pleasures and far away ones, since it will be much easier to tell what effects your actions will have on distant populations. But this won't be a difference in the importance of the pleasures, just in the reliability of bringing them about.
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Despite having browsed the numerous sources provided by the OP, I still do not fully grasp why I cannot call myself a moral relativist anymore. What exactly happenend to the term?
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On July 30 2013 03:44 grassHAT wrote:
Why don't you guys begin by answering a question like what is the purpose of life? I think when you answer that ethics will become more clear. If you have to theorize the existence of ethics it is because you are lost. You're experience of reality is not a criteria for truth and likewise using it as such instrument will only lead you into threads like these.
there is no inherent purpose to life. You can answer to that question whatever you like, and then be happy. It comes down to compromise between people's morals/ethics in the end so that we can have the practical benefits of a flourishing society.
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On July 30 2013 03:48 frogrubdown wrote:Show nested quote +On July 30 2013 03:23 WhiteDog wrote:On July 30 2013 03:14 frogrubdown wrote:The most passionate anti-realist arguments in this thread have all been epistemic. Claims such as the following have popped up repeatedly: (1) Our ethical beliefs are too determined by our historical/cultural context and what we hear from peers and authorities for there to be non-relative ethical truths.
(2) All ethical arguments require you to assume some principles or axioms which cannot themselves be established to be true, so there are no non-relative ethical truths.
(3) You cannot find any completely non-controversial ethical claims. The disagreement over ethics means there are no non-relative ethical truths. The most important step to take when evaluating this style of argument is to check whether or not each principle is plausible in full generality, not just when you selectively apply it to ethics. To my eye, every single truth in every single area fails all of these epistemic tests that are supposedly damning for ethics. There is widespread disagreement over scientific claims. Even in the united states vast swaths of people do not believe in the theory of evolution. Yes there is agreement within the scientific community, but how (in a non-question begging way) is this different than agreements within ethical communities? Further, it is clear that the source of this disagreement is in large part that our beliefs in just about every matter are influenced as much by where we come from and who we associate with as by anything else. If you grew up in a radically different context you wouldn't believe in evolution either. Finally, scientific truths aren't given to us. They don't simply jump out from the world and compel our acceptance regardless of our acceptance of any other truths or principles about what procedures are reliable. We are in science, just as much as in ethics, trapped on Neurath's boat. We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using the old beams and driftwood the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but only by gradual reconstruction. -Quine The general problem for these anti-realist arguments, then, is that it's hard to see how you can accept them while not taking them to undermine all truths, and in particular those of science. Realists will, quite understandably, not be moved if you cannot produce non-question begging reasons why. Sciences are refutable. I have discussed this before by quoting Passeron. You are making a grave mistake in thinking that philosophical knowledge has the same properties as biological laws or physics. None of the logical conditions of the "falsification" of a theory or a general proposition is fulfilled strictly speaking in the case of the logical structure of sociological theories (or "historical synthesis") as soon as one takes seriously the constraints of historical observation. Since no historical statement can completely dispose co-occurences, that the statement consider as related in the explanation or interpretation, from its space-time coordinates (context more or less expanded by typology), the universality of general propositions in sociology or history is about "digital universality" and never about the universality in the strict sense. In other words, the general sociological propositions can always be generated by the logical "conjunction" of singular statements that it resume. I can test that the theory of evolution is "right" or "wrong" all things equals because there are valid techniques to test that (and it will always work when I repeat the same process - it is therefore anhistoric) : through that refutation or falsification I can therefore make a distinction between the theory (and its "truthness") and the social context through which the theory have been made. You cannot do that for men's morality or men overall - they are always historical beings. Refutation doesn't occur is Popperian single steps. It's a matter of being moved in degrees by solid evidence and reasoning. So refutability is a measure of whether or not you can offer solid reasons against a given theory. And you can do this in ethics too. You can refute the moral law that lying is always wrong by considering the counterexample wherein you are questioned by Nazis about the Jews you're hiding in your attic. Sure, some would disagree that this counterexample suffices, such as Kant, but many "creation scientists" disagree with the exemplary refutations of their views.
You can do that for all moral statements. You are using an historical fact to suggest something anhistoric.
The fact remains that to refute things in science you need to accept a number of principles and if you want your refutation to convince anyone else you'll have to hope they agree with you on them. And on this particular point, the differences between science and ethics aren't so clear.
Yes, but those necessary axiom are - as the greek etymology suggest - self evident. That a true moral exist is not self evident.
Of course, things aren't identical epistemically between science and ethics. Repeatable experiments are a great thing. But science isn't the only epistemically virtuous activity. History has no repeatable experiments and yet there are numerous historical truths and we can come to know quite a few of them.
There are many historical truth... and they are all historic. There is no way to define a "law" on our society through the study of history - this was actually the basis of Popper's critic. It's the same for every sciences that study things related to man behavior (at least today since we didn't discovered god yet) - there are no "laws" in economy, sociology, etc. or the word "law" doesn't refer to the same "law" as in physics or biology (since they are not anhistoric and a-social).
There isa reason why neuroscience are the new favorite son of social sciences : people believe that they will be able to find irrefutable truth on men behaviors by searching in our brains.
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On July 30 2013 03:49 Spekulatius wrote:
Despite having browsed the numerous sources provided by the OP, I still do not fully grasp why I cannot call myself a moral relativist anymore. What exactly happenend to the term?
Did you read the "long story" spoiler? If you think that moral predicates have a hidden indexical element in them tied to the moral code of a person's society, then you should continue to be happy calling yourself a relativist and select "other" in the poll. But you should keep in mind that this is a linguistic claim and the types of evidence standardly marshaled for such claims seems to count against this. That said, there are a number of complications here that would require more explanation of formal semantics than I feel would be productive right now.
Alternatively, you may basically think along the lines of an error theorist that moral predicates behave as though there were a non-relative morality based on categorical imperatives even though there are in fact no categorical imperatives for them to answer to. This would make such claims systematically false. If you felt that the best response to this is a linguistic reform wherein we interpret our claims with hidden indexicals, then you could call yourself a different type of relativist. But for the purposes of the poll you would be an error theorist.
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On July 30 2013 03:58 WhiteDog wrote:Show nested quote +On July 30 2013 03:48 frogrubdown wrote:On July 30 2013 03:23 WhiteDog wrote:On July 30 2013 03:14 frogrubdown wrote:The most passionate anti-realist arguments in this thread have all been epistemic. Claims such as the following have popped up repeatedly: (1) Our ethical beliefs are too determined by our historical/cultural context and what we hear from peers and authorities for there to be non-relative ethical truths.
(2) All ethical arguments require you to assume some principles or axioms which cannot themselves be established to be true, so there are no non-relative ethical truths.
(3) You cannot find any completely non-controversial ethical claims. The disagreement over ethics means there are no non-relative ethical truths. The most important step to take when evaluating this style of argument is to check whether or not each principle is plausible in full generality, not just when you selectively apply it to ethics. To my eye, every single truth in every single area fails all of these epistemic tests that are supposedly damning for ethics. There is widespread disagreement over scientific claims. Even in the united states vast swaths of people do not believe in the theory of evolution. Yes there is agreement within the scientific community, but how (in a non-question begging way) is this different than agreements within ethical communities? Further, it is clear that the source of this disagreement is in large part that our beliefs in just about every matter are influenced as much by where we come from and who we associate with as by anything else. If you grew up in a radically different context you wouldn't believe in evolution either. Finally, scientific truths aren't given to us. They don't simply jump out from the world and compel our acceptance regardless of our acceptance of any other truths or principles about what procedures are reliable. We are in science, just as much as in ethics, trapped on Neurath's boat. We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using the old beams and driftwood the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but only by gradual reconstruction. -Quine The general problem for these anti-realist arguments, then, is that it's hard to see how you can accept them while not taking them to undermine all truths, and in particular those of science. Realists will, quite understandably, not be moved if you cannot produce non-question begging reasons why. Sciences are refutable. I have discussed this before by quoting Passeron. You are making a grave mistake in thinking that philosophical knowledge has the same properties as biological laws or physics. None of the logical conditions of the "falsification" of a theory or a general proposition is fulfilled strictly speaking in the case of the logical structure of sociological theories (or "historical synthesis") as soon as one takes seriously the constraints of historical observation. Since no historical statement can completely dispose co-occurences, that the statement consider as related in the explanation or interpretation, from its space-time coordinates (context more or less expanded by typology), the universality of general propositions in sociology or history is about "digital universality" and never about the universality in the strict sense. In other words, the general sociological propositions can always be generated by the logical "conjunction" of singular statements that it resume. I can test that the theory of evolution is "right" or "wrong" all things equals because there are valid techniques to test that (and it will always work when I repeat the same process - it is therefore anhistoric) : through that refutation or falsification I can therefore make a distinction between the theory (and its "truthness") and the social context through which the theory have been made. You cannot do that for men's morality or men overall - they are always historical beings. Refutation doesn't occur is Popperian single steps. It's a matter of being moved in degrees by solid evidence and reasoning. So refutability is a measure of whether or not you can offer solid reasons against a given theory. And you can do this in ethics too. You can refute the moral law that lying is always wrong by considering the counterexample wherein you are questioned by Nazis about the Jews you're hiding in your attic. Sure, some would disagree that this counterexample suffices, such as Kant, but many "creation scientists" disagree with the exemplary refutations of their views. You can do that for all moral statements. You are using an historical fact to suggest something anhistoric. Show nested quote +The fact remains that to refute things in science you need to accept a number of principles and if you want your refutation to convince anyone else you'll have to hope they agree with you on them. And on this particular point, the differences between science and ethics aren't so clear. Yes, but those necessary axiom are - as the greek etymology suggest - self evident. That a true moral exist is not self evident. Show nested quote +Of course, things aren't identical epistemically between science and ethics. Repeatable experiments are a great thing. But science isn't the only epistemically virtuous activity. History has no repeatable experiments and yet there are numerous historical truths and we can come to know quite a few of them. There are many historical truth... and they are all historic. There is no way to define a "law" on our society through the study of history - this was actually the basis of Popper's critic. It's the same for every sciences that study things related to men - there are no "laws" in economy, sociology, etc. or the word "law" doesn't refer to the same "law" as in physics or biology (since they are not anhistoric and a-social).
To assume without argument that that is simply an historical fact is just question-begging. Why is it?
And if the axioms whereby we refute scientific theories were so self-evident, how come there's so much disagreement about them. An alien reading your claim about the axioms of science would be astounded to come to earth and discover creation scientists. They'd be even more astounded if they took a poll and discovered that only a minority of people accept the overwhelming evidence for evolution. What does "self-evident" even mean if the majority of a population fails to find the self-evident things true, let alone obvious?
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EPT
