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No, the point is that moral realism or anny other way to deduct morals do not and can not follow the scientific method at all. But i guess thats why its called "meta" ethics
Lots of things don't follow the scientific method. Mathematics, for instance, doesn't follow the scientific method; it follows logical argument and considers experimental verification largely superfluous.
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On July 29 2013 02:46 Rassy wrote:
Lets look at it from a practical point of vieuw. Then it is clear that the human without anny moral limitations for their actions, has an advantage over humans who have some moral limitations for their actions. Having morals and considering them to be "true" is a sort of phylosophic slavery.
Would you really feel free in a society without any limitations whatsoever?
It would only lead to the domination of the strongest.
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On July 29 2013 02:53 Shiori wrote:Show nested quote +No, the point is that moral realism or anny other way to deduct morals do not and can not follow the scientific method at all. But i guess thats why its called "meta" ethics Lots of things don't follow the scientific method. Mathematics, for instance, doesn't follow the scientific method; it follows logical argument and considers experimental verification largely superfluous. As another TLer (harlock78 two pages ago) stated "Mathematical object live in their own space". Moral on the other hand, has been defined (I should say is defined) and exist in our space, our society, and our time.
On July 29 2013 02:39 Shiori wrote:Show nested quote +As I stated by quoting Passeron, there are no ground on which you can really define that a moral statement is true always and everywhere because you cannot separate it from its context - "meta-ethic" is not falsifiable "science". Yes, but this is true of every belief. Hell, it even applies to the laws of logic. Most moral realists start from the notion that one or two axioms are basically self-evident, and then move on from there. Your issue with moral realism seems to be rather like objecting to the scientific method on the grounds that Hume totally deconstructed our ability to prove causality rationally. It's just one of those things we kinda take for granted as being true, because it seems like it has to be for anything to ever get done. Seems kinda tautologic : I need to accept (or "believe") as an axiom that "something" exist beyond my own subjectivity that define and can tell objectively what is moral or not, to then see through logic that "moral statements" exists and are "true" outside of my own subjectivity.
Having morals and considering them to be "true" is a sort of phylosophic slavery. I completly agree with that.
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On July 29 2013 03:03 gneGne wrote:Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 02:46 Rassy wrote:
Lets look at it from a practical point of vieuw. Then it is clear that the human without anny moral limitations for their actions, has an advantage over humans who have some moral limitations for their actions. Having morals and considering them to be "true" is a sort of phylosophic slavery. Would you really feel free in a society without any limitations whatsoever? It would only lead to the domination of the strongest.
Yes thats how society works, just look at america. Off course there are limitations to what one can do, but they are all pragmatic. If obama would do action A wich will result in a revolution in the usa, then he wont do that. Not because it is morally wrong, but because it is not pragmatic and wont lead to the result he wants to.
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On July 29 2013 03:09 Rassy wrote:Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 03:03 gneGne wrote:On July 29 2013 02:46 Rassy wrote:
Lets look at it from a practical point of vieuw. Then it is clear that the human without anny moral limitations for their actions, has an advantage over humans who have some moral limitations for their actions. Having morals and considering them to be "true" is a sort of phylosophic slavery. Would you really feel free in a society without any limitations whatsoever? It would only lead to the domination of the strongest. Yes thats how society works, just look at america. Off course there are limitations to what one can do, but they are all pragmatic. If obama would do action A wich will result in a revolution in the usa, then he wont do that. Not because it is morally wrong, but because it is not pragmatic and wont lead to the result he wants to.
Would you say democracy is a façade?
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On July 29 2013 03:05 WhiteDog wrote:Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 02:53 Shiori wrote:No, the point is that moral realism or anny other way to deduct morals do not and can not follow the scientific method at all. But i guess thats why its called "meta" ethics Lots of things don't follow the scientific method. Mathematics, for instance, doesn't follow the scientific method; it follows logical argument and considers experimental verification largely superfluous. As another TLer (harlock78 two pages ago) stated "Mathematical object live in their own space". Moral on the other hand, has been defined (I should say is defined) and exist in our space, our society, and our time. What does that mean? Where does mathematics exist? Are not moral systems abstractions of the same construction as mathematical theorems, just with different objects?
On July 29 2013 02:39 Shiori wrote:Show nested quote +As I stated by quoting Passeron, there are no ground on which you can really define that a moral statement is true always and everywhere because you cannot separate it from its context - "meta-ethic" is not falsifiable "science". Yes, but this is true of every belief. Hell, it even applies to the laws of logic. Most moral realists start from the notion that one or two axioms are basically self-evident, and then move on from there. Your issue with moral realism seems to be rather like objecting to the scientific method on the grounds that Hume totally deconstructed our ability to prove causality rationally. It's just one of those things we kinda take for granted as being true, because it seems like it has to be for anything to ever get done.
Seems kinda tautologic : I need to accept (or "believe") as an axiom that "something" exist beyond my own subjectivity that define and can tell objectively what is moral or not, to then see through logic that "moral statements" exists and are "true" outside of my own subjectivity. That's because it is a tautology. And that's not a problem, at the most basic level, because all reasoning is ultimately circular or axiomatic. It doesn't matter what you choose. It could be the scientific method, or mathematics, or the New Criticism, or anything else; every single one depends on some axiom or derivation of axioms.
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On July 29 2013 02:39 FallDownMarigold wrote:Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 02:06 xM(Z wrote: i'm missing something then. what is wrong with the phrasing - "slavery is moral because it doesn't violate human dignity" (i see it as true, under the 'slavery is moral' ethics). for you, the expression human dignity falls under realism, for me it doesn't. (we just have different definitions for human/humanity and/or dignity). In your "for me" world, how do you reconcile slavery being moral with the fact that it violates the moral autonomy of the slaves? (my reply is aimed not only at you but at everyone replaying to my earlier posts) i figured it would be pretty obvious that my statement "we just have different definitions for human/humanity and/or dignity" would open a can of worms full of racism, eugenics, xenophobia, misogyny and whatever else you have there on your list of 'bad behaviors/ethics/morals'. i'm not condoning said behaviors but i will never agree with your list of objective goodnesses that define your moral realism. i don't understand the well-being concept. well-being for whom?, why? ... i'm an expressivist/absolutist primarily but i would totally man up, arm up and go defend one of your objective truths out of pure (immediate) pragmatism. also (as a side note), based on what i've read, i don't think my empathy is working as it should (if a standard for it would exist).
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On July 29 2013 02:14 gneGne wrote:Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 02:06 xM(Z wrote: i'm missing something then. what is wrong with the phrasing - "slavery is moral because it doesn't violate human dignity" (i see it as true, under the 'slavery is moral' ethics). for you, the expression human dignity falls under realism, for me it doesn't. (we just have different definitions for human/humanity and/or dignity). Well, if I may answer too, slavery is contradictory to human dignity, because it treats a person only as a means to a certain end. That is the difference between work and slavery, where work is with consent and slavery without. i see them both as varying degrees of slavery and i would argue that consent is imposed on you by certain social needs/requirements you'd have to adhere to. since consent is not given freely, you are still a slave.
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On July 28 2013 04:03 farvacola wrote:Show nested quote +On July 28 2013 03:52 radscorpion9 wrote:So I guess Sam Harris would be an example of a naturalistic moral realist? I seem to identify with both of their positions. But my god this stuff is complex - I was just reading your links and suddenly I felt like I was reading my math paper on analytic functions  Before you get too comfortable in identifying with Sam Harris' work in ethics, have a look at this link.. At the bottom are more links to a variety of critiques of Harris. Suffice it to say, I don't find his ideas very appealing.
Wish I had responded to this earlier, but its nice to see the discussion that evolved out of this.
Thank you for the links, its nice to re-read the is-ought problem in clear terms, although I guess I'm already familiar with those arguments. But I would basically echo MCC's comments in that I can't imagine any other saner, more rational option for a moral philosophy than one in which the aim is to decrease suffering as much as possible, and if it can't be done for everyone, then to at least do it for the greatest number (utilitarianism). So if you assume that as your very reasonable starting point, then science can fill in the gaps.
Really what he's saying is quite obvious, because we do it all the time. Whether its deciding on the ideal economic system that serves the majority in the best way, the ideal prison system that will reduce recidivism by the highest degree, to how we should treat each other in relationships...all of these questions are answerable by science assuming that you agree with the initial philosophical claim that we should strive to be "happy" or "fulfilled". Perhaps those words are a bit nebulous, but practically speaking its rigorous enough that we can make enormous strides. Clearly these are not obvious questions either as your article suggests; for example economics can be very complex, and the consequences of choosing a particular system impacts millions.
But anyway, I do think that in the future science really will have something to say about morality. If we are just biological beings, than our moral feelings are really nothing more than a signal in our brains that are provoked by certain stimulus. If we can use neuroscience to analyze this, then we can clearly define what morality is in scientific terms. This will allow us to make at least a few claims concerning metaethics - for instance we can clearly show that expressivism in its simplest form "emotivism" is either true or false based on what we find in our brain. If our moral reactions do not stem directly from the emotional centers of our brain, then it is plainly false without needing to engage in any thought experiments.
So while we do not have a rigorous proof for it yet, I think its overwhelmingly likely, based on empirical evidence, that naturalistic moral realism is correct. After all what else could it be? Where else does our sense of "morality" come from except our brains? It must be based on biology and the laws of physics. So I think that science will help us explain what the "moral impulse" is in the far-flung future.
But as for what morality should be (as in the ideal moral system), assuming we find a way to alter our brains (perhaps through social conditioning or genetic engineering), I think that is entirely up for debate. But I find it seriously hard to believe that it will end up being anything other than maximizing happiness, which of course can be defined more specifically for certain people. Why "ought" we maximize happiness? Because it feels good, THAT'S WHY. lol
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On July 29 2013 08:12 radscorpion9 wrote:Show nested quote +On July 28 2013 04:03 farvacola wrote:On July 28 2013 03:52 radscorpion9 wrote:So I guess Sam Harris would be an example of a naturalistic moral realist? I seem to identify with both of their positions. But my god this stuff is complex - I was just reading your links and suddenly I felt like I was reading my math paper on analytic functions  Before you get too comfortable in identifying with Sam Harris' work in ethics, have a look at this link.. At the bottom are more links to a variety of critiques of Harris. Suffice it to say, I don't find his ideas very appealing. Wish I had responded to this earlier, but its nice to see the discussion that evolved out of this. Thank you for the links, its nice to re-read the is-ought problem in clear terms, although I guess I'm already familiar with those arguments. But I would basically echo MCC's comments in that I can't imagine any other saner, more rational option for a moral philosophy than one in which the aim is to decrease suffering as much as possible, and if it can't be done for everyone, then to at least do it for the greatest number (utilitarianism). So if you assume that as your very reasonable starting point, then science can fill in the gaps. Really what he's saying is quite obvious, because we do it all the time. Whether its deciding on the ideal economic system that serves the majority in the best way, the ideal prison system that will reduce recidivism by the highest degree, to how we should treat each other in relationships...all of these questions are answerable by science assuming that you agree with the initial philosophical claim that we should strive to be "happy" or "fulfilled". Perhaps those words are a bit nebulous, but practically speaking its rigorous enough that we can make enormous strides. Clearly these are not obvious questions either as your article suggests; for example economics can be very complex, and the consequences of choosing a particular system impacts millions. But anyway, I do think that in the future science really will have something to say about morality. If we are just biological beings, than our moral feelings are really nothing more than a signal in our brains that are provoked by certain stimulus. If we can use neuroscience to analyze this, then we can clearly define what morality is in scientific terms. This will allow us to make at least a few claims concerning metaethics - for instance we can clearly show that expressivism in its simplest form "emotivism" is either true or false based on what we find in our brain. If our moral reactions do not stem directly from the emotional centers of our brain, then it is plainly false without needing to engage in any thought experiments. So while we do not have a rigorous proof for it yet, I think its overwhelmingly likely, based on empirical evidence, that naturalistic moral realism is correct. After all what else could it be? Where else does our sense of "morality" come from except our brains? It must be based on biology and the laws of physics. So I think that science will help us explain what the "moral impulse" is in the far-flung future. But as for what morality should be (as in the ideal moral system), assuming we find a way to alter our brains (perhaps through social conditioning or genetic engineering), I think that is entirely up for debate. But I find it seriously hard to believe that it will end up being anything other than maximizing happiness, which of course can be defined more specifically for certain people. Why "ought" we maximize happiness? Because it feels good, THAT'S WHY. lol
My happiness is stabbing babies in the eyes
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On July 29 2013 07:07 xM(Z wrote:Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 02:14 gneGne wrote:On July 29 2013 02:06 xM(Z wrote: i'm missing something then. what is wrong with the phrasing - "slavery is moral because it doesn't violate human dignity" (i see it as true, under the 'slavery is moral' ethics). for you, the expression human dignity falls under realism, for me it doesn't. (we just have different definitions for human/humanity and/or dignity). Well, if I may answer too, slavery is contradictory to human dignity, because it treats a person only as a means to a certain end. That is the difference between work and slavery, where work is with consent and slavery without. i see them both as varying degrees of slavery and i would argue that consent is imposed on you by certain social needs/requirements you'd have to adhere to. since consent is not given freely, you are still a slave.
Consent is no real consent if its not self-imposed and this is what human dignity presupposes. In other words this human dignity doesn't mean much more than that I respect the other person as another person (equal). I don't see how this understanding of human dignity can work enslaving, quite the contrary actually.
And ofcourse we would have to analyse how or whether this actual self-imposed consent is possible at all within certain social regimes (aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny), but that perhaps is a somewhat different question or atleast for a later stage on how to realise human dignity.
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On July 29 2013 04:08 Shiori wrote:Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 03:05 WhiteDog wrote:On July 29 2013 02:53 Shiori wrote:No, the point is that moral realism or anny other way to deduct morals do not and can not follow the scientific method at all. But i guess thats why its called "meta" ethics Lots of things don't follow the scientific method. Mathematics, for instance, doesn't follow the scientific method; it follows logical argument and considers experimental verification largely superfluous. As another TLer (harlock78 two pages ago) stated "Mathematical object live in their own space". Moral on the other hand, has been defined (I should say is defined) and exist in our space, our society, and our time. What does that mean? Where does mathematics exist? Are not moral systems abstractions of the same construction as mathematical theorems, just with different objects? Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 02:39 Shiori wrote:As I stated by quoting Passeron, there are no ground on which you can really define that a moral statement is true always and everywhere because you cannot separate it from its context - "meta-ethic" is not falsifiable "science". Yes, but this is true of every belief. Hell, it even applies to the laws of logic. Most moral realists start from the notion that one or two axioms are basically self-evident, and then move on from there. Your issue with moral realism seems to be rather like objecting to the scientific method on the grounds that Hume totally deconstructed our ability to prove causality rationally. It's just one of those things we kinda take for granted as being true, because it seems like it has to be for anything to ever get done. Show nested quote +Seems kinda tautologic : I need to accept (or "believe") as an axiom that "something" exist beyond my own subjectivity that define and can tell objectively what is moral or not, to then see through logic that "moral statements" exists and are "true" outside of my own subjectivity. That's because it is a tautology. And that's not a problem, at the most basic level, because all reasoning is ultimately circular or axiomatic. It doesn't matter what you choose. It could be the scientific method, or mathematics, or the New Criticism, or anything else; every single one depends on some axiom or derivation of axioms. I'm not going to write a resume of everything that has been said since the beginning.
I am not arguing that there are no moral systems in a logical way, I'm arguing that nothing exist to know which of those moral systems is "more true" than the other. It's exactly like in mathematic if you will : there are multiple "equally true" system of logic. Now moral has not been defined as an abstraction (thus it does not exist in its own space as Mathematics) since the beginning of this thread so I don't know why you are trying to make me talk from a pure logical point of view.
(1) Ethical discourse is cognitive (or, fact-stating; or, truth-evaluable). That is, ethical assertions make claims about the world and are capable of being either true or false.[1] Considering that, everything you've said about axiom and all reasonning being tautological doesn't make sense. Axiom in greek mean a premise that can be considered as true without creating controversy. Saying that god exist is not an "axiom" as it does create controversy.
If you start by saying "I consider that I can draw a straight line between two points" and prove me, from this axiom, that god exist, yes it is a tautology if you follow everystep of the logical reasonning, but you still proved by logic that god exist in a world where I can draw a straight line between two points. Now to prove that god exist in our day and age, you just have to falsify empirically that you can draw a straight line between two points in our day and age (and that your system of logic apply to our world but that is another matter entirely). On the other side, if you state that "god exist", and then from this statement, come to conclusion that "god exist", you just ran in circle without proving anything, and you can't after that come to me and say : I don't know why you disagree with me on the fact that god exist, because god exist is my axiom. You still have to find god and prove that "it is" to state that god exist in our day and age.
Yes god exist in a world where god exist. Now good luck proving me that this world is our world.
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On July 29 2013 08:12 radscorpion9 wrote:Show nested quote +On July 28 2013 04:03 farvacola wrote:On July 28 2013 03:52 radscorpion9 wrote:So I guess Sam Harris would be an example of a naturalistic moral realist? I seem to identify with both of their positions. But my god this stuff is complex - I was just reading your links and suddenly I felt like I was reading my math paper on analytic functions  Before you get too comfortable in identifying with Sam Harris' work in ethics, have a look at this link.. At the bottom are more links to a variety of critiques of Harris. Suffice it to say, I don't find his ideas very appealing. Wish I had responded to this earlier, but its nice to see the discussion that evolved out of this. Thank you for the links, its nice to re-read the is-ought problem in clear terms, although I guess I'm already familiar with those arguments. But I would basically echo MCC's comments in that I can't imagine any other saner, more rational option for a moral philosophy than one in which the aim is to decrease suffering as much as possible, and if it can't be done for everyone, then to at least do it for the greatest number (utilitarianism). So if you assume that as your very reasonable starting point, then science can fill in the gaps. Really what he's saying is quite obvious, because we do it all the time. Whether its deciding on the ideal economic system that serves the majority in the best way, the ideal prison system that will reduce recidivism by the highest degree, to how we should treat each other in relationships...all of these questions are answerable by science assuming that you agree with the initial philosophical claim that we should strive to be "happy" or "fulfilled". Perhaps those words are a bit nebulous, but practically speaking its rigorous enough that we can make enormous strides. Clearly these are not obvious questions either as your article suggests; for example economics can be very complex, and the consequences of choosing a particular system impacts millions. But anyway, I do think that in the future science really will have something to say about morality. If we are just biological beings, than our moral feelings are really nothing more than a signal in our brains that are provoked by certain stimulus. If we can use neuroscience to analyze this, then we can clearly define what morality is in scientific terms. This will allow us to make at least a few claims concerning metaethics - for instance we can clearly show that expressivism in its simplest form "emotivism" is either true or false based on what we find in our brain. If our moral reactions do not stem directly from the emotional centers of our brain, then it is plainly false without needing to engage in any thought experiments. So while we do not have a rigorous proof for it yet, I think its overwhelmingly likely, based on empirical evidence, that naturalistic moral realism is correct. After all what else could it be? Where else does our sense of "morality" come from except our brains? It must be based on biology and the laws of physics. So I think that science will help us explain what the "moral impulse" is in the far-flung future. But as for what morality should be (as in the ideal moral system), assuming we find a way to alter our brains (perhaps through social conditioning or genetic engineering), I think that is entirely up for debate. But I find it seriously hard to believe that it will end up being anything other than maximizing happiness, which of course can be defined more specifically for certain people. Why "ought" we maximize happiness? Because it feels good, THAT'S WHY. lol
Decreasing suffering is an appalling idea: get everyone on heroin all the time and there is no more suffering.
I should phrase that better, as it is a general critique of utilitarianism, that "utility" is incredibly hard to define. And I believe that's exactly one of the critiques against Sam Harris' stab at philosophy.
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On July 29 2013 08:12 radscorpion9 wrote:Show nested quote +On July 28 2013 04:03 farvacola wrote:On July 28 2013 03:52 radscorpion9 wrote:So I guess Sam Harris would be an example of a naturalistic moral realist? I seem to identify with both of their positions. But my god this stuff is complex - I was just reading your links and suddenly I felt like I was reading my math paper on analytic functions  Before you get too comfortable in identifying with Sam Harris' work in ethics, have a look at this link.. At the bottom are more links to a variety of critiques of Harris. Suffice it to say, I don't find his ideas very appealing. Wish I had responded to this earlier, but its nice to see the discussion that evolved out of this. Thank you for the links, its nice to re-read the is-ought problem in clear terms, although I guess I'm already familiar with those arguments. But I would basically echo MCC's comments in that I can't imagine any other saner, more rational option for a moral philosophy than one in which the aim is to decrease suffering as much as possible, and if it can't be done for everyone, then to at least do it for the greatest number (utilitarianism). So if you assume that as your very reasonable starting point, then science can fill in the gaps. Really what he's saying is quite obvious, because we do it all the time. Whether its deciding on the ideal economic system that serves the majority in the best way, the ideal prison system that will reduce recidivism by the highest degree, to how we should treat each other in relationships...all of these questions are answerable by science assuming that you agree with the initial philosophical claim that we should strive to be "happy" or "fulfilled". Perhaps those words are a bit nebulous, but practically speaking its rigorous enough that we can make enormous strides. Clearly these are not obvious questions either as your article suggests; for example economics can be very complex, and the consequences of choosing a particular system impacts millions. But anyway, I do think that in the future science really will have something to say about morality. If we are just biological beings, than our moral feelings are really nothing more than a signal in our brains that are provoked by certain stimulus. If we can use neuroscience to analyze this, then we can clearly define what morality is in scientific terms. This will allow us to make at least a few claims concerning metaethics - for instance we can clearly show that expressivism in its simplest form "emotivism" is either true or false based on what we find in our brain. If our moral reactions do not stem directly from the emotional centers of our brain, then it is plainly false without needing to engage in any thought experiments. So while we do not have a rigorous proof for it yet, I think its overwhelmingly likely, based on empirical evidence, that naturalistic moral realism is correct. After all what else could it be? Where else does our sense of "morality" come from except our brains? It must be based on biology and the laws of physics. So I think that science will help us explain what the "moral impulse" is in the far-flung future. But as for what morality should be (as in the ideal moral system), assuming we find a way to alter our brains (perhaps through social conditioning or genetic engineering), I think that is entirely up for debate. But I find it seriously hard to believe that it will end up being anything other than maximizing happiness, which of course can be defined more specifically for certain people. Why "ought" we maximize happiness? Because it feels good, THAT'S WHY. lol We are not only biological being, we are also social being. This idea that neuroscience can and will be able to unveil the hidden truth about what we are and what we want in life is dangerous from my point of view - it's like waiting for a new god within our genes. There are many problems behind utilitarism, mainly because it is impossible to define or quantify utility (since at least Pareto). It is a flawed system of thought that still exist because it gives a moral justification behind material inequalities. There are ton of discussions behind it in economy especially, because they are always searching for a criteria through which they will be able to quantify economic efficiences.
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all this is 100 years old yes ?
and its not philosophy anymore -_-;
meta éthique lol its like a 1900 movie
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On July 29 2013 09:09 gneGne wrote:Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 07:07 xM(Z wrote:On July 29 2013 02:14 gneGne wrote:On July 29 2013 02:06 xM(Z wrote: i'm missing something then. what is wrong with the phrasing - "slavery is moral because it doesn't violate human dignity" (i see it as true, under the 'slavery is moral' ethics). for you, the expression human dignity falls under realism, for me it doesn't. (we just have different definitions for human/humanity and/or dignity). Well, if I may answer too, slavery is contradictory to human dignity, because it treats a person only as a means to a certain end. That is the difference between work and slavery, where work is with consent and slavery without. i see them both as varying degrees of slavery and i would argue that consent is imposed on you by certain social needs/requirements you'd have to adhere to. since consent is not given freely, you are still a slave. Consent is no real consent if its not self-imposed and this is what human dignity presupposes. In other words this human dignity doesn't mean much more than that I respect the other person as another person (equal). I don't see how this understanding of human dignity can work enslaving, quite the contrary actually. And ofcourse we would have to analyse how or whether this actual self-imposed consent is possible at all within certain social regimes (aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny), but that perhaps is a somewhat different question or atleast for a later stage on how to realise human dignity. you will never be able to distinguish between self-imposed and outside-imposed factors while living in a world based on an outside-imposed moral realism. the only dignity/equality you will be able to see is the equality among slaves.
or, OR!, you will always be a slave and the sam harrises of the world will teach you how to like it, how to be happy about it.
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@WhiteDog: Catching up from yesterday, I strongly reject the assumption that moral realism is reactionary ("a defense of the status quo and the people who defined morals") by nature. From the realist point of view, it simply doesn't matter whether you're part of the dominant or the subordinate because the same ethical truths apply to every human being - for example, everybody should respect human dignity, no matter if they work at McDonalds or Goldman Sachs. From your angle, this obviously doesn't make much sense; yet, even if I imagine myself in a Bourdieuian social space (or even a Weberian sphere of value), i.e. as a social agent who's (ethical) dispositions correspond to his social position, I still don't see the necessity for moral realism to concur with that of the dominant - unless I find myself in a dominant social position. In other words, why should moral realism necessarily be the "taste" of dominant morals when moral realists come from completely different life styles?
@xM(Z: I concur with gneGne: Slavery violates human dignity because it treats humans only as a means to an end. That said, slavery is not the only instance of such a violation of human dignity, and the same argument certainly can be (and is) put forward against exploitative labor conditions. However, even though everybody has to respond to structural conditions beyond their personal control, these conditions are not necessarily (and certainly not to the same degree) violating the integrity of the individual just because they are socially concerted. For instance, you seem to think (for reasons I can't imagine) that moral realism itself is "outside-imposed". Frankly, even though I find that notion to be rather abstruse, if that would be the case, it would be a good example of the above reasoning... if I find myself 'coerced' into having dignity, that's an "outside-imposition" I'm willing to accept.
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On July 29 2013 08:12 radscorpion9 wrote:Show nested quote +On July 28 2013 04:03 farvacola wrote:On July 28 2013 03:52 radscorpion9 wrote:So I guess Sam Harris would be an example of a naturalistic moral realist? I seem to identify with both of their positions. But my god this stuff is complex - I was just reading your links and suddenly I felt like I was reading my math paper on analytic functions  Before you get too comfortable in identifying with Sam Harris' work in ethics, have a look at this link.. At the bottom are more links to a variety of critiques of Harris. Suffice it to say, I don't find his ideas very appealing. Wish I had responded to this earlier, but its nice to see the discussion that evolved out of this. Thank you for the links, its nice to re-read the is-ought problem in clear terms, although I guess I'm already familiar with those arguments. But I would basically echo MCC's comments in that I can't imagine any other saner, more rational option for a moral philosophy than one in which the aim is to decrease suffering as much as possible, and if it can't be done for everyone, then to at least do it for the greatest number (utilitarianism). So if you assume that as your very reasonable starting point, then science can fill in the gaps. Really what he's saying is quite obvious, because we do it all the time. Whether its deciding on the ideal economic system that serves the majority in the best way, the ideal prison system that will reduce recidivism by the highest degree, to how we should treat each other in relationships...all of these questions are answerable by science assuming that you agree with the initial philosophical claim that we should strive to be "happy" or "fulfilled". Perhaps those words are a bit nebulous, but practically speaking its rigorous enough that we can make enormous strides. Clearly these are not obvious questions either as your article suggests; for example economics can be very complex, and the consequences of choosing a particular system impacts millions. But anyway, I do think that in the future science really will have something to say about morality. If we are just biological beings, than our moral feelings are really nothing more than a signal in our brains that are provoked by certain stimulus. If we can use neuroscience to analyze this, then we can clearly define what morality is in scientific terms. This will allow us to make at least a few claims concerning metaethics - for instance we can clearly show that expressivism in its simplest form "emotivism" is either true or false based on what we find in our brain. If our moral reactions do not stem directly from the emotional centers of our brain, then it is plainly false without needing to engage in any thought experiments. So while we do not have a rigorous proof for it yet, I think its overwhelmingly likely, based on empirical evidence, that naturalistic moral realism is correct. After all what else could it be? Where else does our sense of "morality" come from except our brains? It must be based on biology and the laws of physics. So I think that science will help us explain what the "moral impulse" is in the far-flung future. But as for what morality should be (as in the ideal moral system), assuming we find a way to alter our brains (perhaps through social conditioning or genetic engineering), I think that is entirely up for debate. But I find it seriously hard to believe that it will end up being anything other than maximizing happiness, which of course can be defined more specifically for certain people. Why "ought" we maximize happiness? Because it feels good, THAT'S WHY. lol
Think morals come from the neo cortex as animals have no sense of morals at all, it has to come from the section of the brain that we have and wich animals dont have. The origin might still be a feeling btw, i will keep that option open. Then morals could be a way in wich we try to rationalise our feelings.(wich imo is futile)
Maximising happiness i find a verry bad starting point btw, and it should also be specified. Happiness in what timescale? People often do something wich makes them happy in the short run but unhappy in the long run, like drug abuse. And people also often do things wich dont make them happy in the short run but wich will make them happy in the long run, like studying and working hard to achieve a better life and more happiness in the future. Same goes on a much wider scale,like (social) revolutions wich often cause alot of pain in the short term, but wich will create more happiness for the whole society in the long run.
Determining wich timescale we should look at is for me a breaking point in the whole discussion of morals, although i dont deny that it is possible for manny situations to judge wich one is more desireable then the other, i personally find it impossible to determine wich timescale is the most important. By taking the longest timescale possible i came to the conclusion that good moralty is doing that wich increases the entropy the least, though this has nearly no practical use. How does annyone of you who believe in scientific morals decide on wich timescale is the most important?
"Would you say democracy is a façade?" In general yes, there are situations in wich democracy is not a facade but thoose are verry small scale.
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On July 29 2013 16:58 xM(Z wrote:Show nested quote +On July 29 2013 09:09 gneGne wrote:On July 29 2013 07:07 xM(Z wrote:On July 29 2013 02:14 gneGne wrote:On July 29 2013 02:06 xM(Z wrote: i'm missing something then. what is wrong with the phrasing - "slavery is moral because it doesn't violate human dignity" (i see it as true, under the 'slavery is moral' ethics). for you, the expression human dignity falls under realism, for me it doesn't. (we just have different definitions for human/humanity and/or dignity). Well, if I may answer too, slavery is contradictory to human dignity, because it treats a person only as a means to a certain end. That is the difference between work and slavery, where work is with consent and slavery without. i see them both as varying degrees of slavery and i would argue that consent is imposed on you by certain social needs/requirements you'd have to adhere to. since consent is not given freely, you are still a slave. Consent is no real consent if its not self-imposed and this is what human dignity presupposes. In other words this human dignity doesn't mean much more than that I respect the other person as another person (equal). I don't see how this understanding of human dignity can work enslaving, quite the contrary actually. And ofcourse we would have to analyse how or whether this actual self-imposed consent is possible at all within certain social regimes (aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny), but that perhaps is a somewhat different question or atleast for a later stage on how to realise human dignity. you will never be able to distinguish between self-imposed and outside-imposed factors while living in a world based on an outside-imposed moral realism. the only dignity/equality you will be able to see is the equality among slaves. or, OR!, you will always be a slave and the sam harrises of the world will teach you how to like it, how to be happy about it.
I would reject the impossibility of distinguishing between self-imposed and outside-imposed factors even for the slave! Because in so far the slave realises him/herself as being enslaved, there already is presupposed a certain freedom which however is yet merely internal. The conscious slave knows he is serving certain laws/commands which are not his own. This also the claim that is in your argument, because you also implicitly still made the distinction between being imposed from the self and the outside to explain the domination of the outside-imposed factors. However, I do agree that the internal freedom of the slave exists only as but a potentiality.
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On July 29 2013 18:51 Rassy wrote:
"Would you say democracy is a façade?" In general yes, there are situations in wich democracy is not a facade but thoose are verry small scale.
I don't quite understand what you mean that the limitations of for example Obama's power are pragmatic. I would say every limitation is never pragmatic, since it is limiting. Or do you mean that Obama's power is not absolute enough to do his job well?
So you do agree that democracy exists, but only on a small scale. And I can follow you with that, but don't you think it is an ideal worth to keep striving for, at the least on a national level? Don't you think the limitations to the power of our politicians have purpose?
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