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Yes, this is a thread on TL that involves religion, but I hate to think that our policy should be to blindly close every such thread. Sam Harris is a writer whose books are both insightful and have sparked many good discussions in the past and as long as the thread doesn't derail I'd like to leave it open. This should be the basic premise for every such thread, no matter how high the odds of it derailing. In that light, these posts that just predict the downfall of this thread (whether it be pre-determined or not) are 1) Not contributing to the discussion 2) Backseat moderating 3) Annoying 4) Actually contributing towards derailing it. I'll keep 2 daying people for this. |
On March 13 2012 16:07 Swede wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 15:47 frogrubdown wrote:On March 13 2012 15:36 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 14:55 frogrubdown wrote:On March 13 2012 13:18 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 08:20 frogrubdown wrote:On March 13 2012 07:42 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 00:34 frogrubdown wrote:This thread has predominantly featured three debates: does libertarian free will exist; does 'free will' express a libertarian or a compatibilist concept; does morality/moral responsibility require libertarian free will? I'll address each in turn. (1) Does Libertarian Free Will Exist?I won't define 'libertarian free will', but suffice it to say that it requires one's actions to be independent of the fundamental physical laws of the universe (I'm using it to speak of the highest grade variety discussed here). Some in this thread have accused this idea of being incoherent, but that's a confused outlook. It is physically impossible for this type of free will to exist, but that doesn't mean that it's impossible for it to exist. There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws). If libertarian free will exists, then it would simply turn out that physical possibility is a narrower type of possibility than was thought. This doesn't make sense. We've never seen anything which existed and was 'physically impossible' (or at least nothing which wasn't later discovered to be perfectly possible under physical laws, a la the bee and its 'impossible' flight). Our ability to conceive of something is not evidence that that thing can exist. In fact, our conception of a world with different physical laws is incomplete anyway. Surely in order to truly 'conceive' of something you must understand the necessary mechanisms which allow it to be. But just 'conceiving of something' is not evidence of anything. It's like writing the conclusion without all of the necessary reasoning to reach that conclusion. People have actually used this as an argument against me in different situations. It basically simplifies to this: 'I can imagine you being wrong (but not how you would be wrong), therefore I will disagree/withhold judgment'. As far as I know, that isn't a formal fallacy... But I certainly wouldn't hesitate to call it fallacious given the uselessness of an argument like that. A cursory study of modality will reveal that there is an absurdly wide array of types of possibility. Ignoring outliers such as deontic and epistemic possibility, we can construct an ordering based in part on which sciences supervene on which other sciences. Science possibilities are just metaphysical possibilities with the added restriction that the laws of the relevant science have to hold. There are biologically possible things that are not psychologically possible, chemically possible things that aren't biologically possible, and physically possible things that are not chemically possible. Moving further up, there are metaphysically possible things that are not physically possible. If you don't think a world in which a single particle accelerates away from another is possible in any sense (that is all there is in that world), then you likely do not possess the every day concept of possibility. Even higher up than that is logical possibility, which makes the fewest restrictions. It is logically, though not metaphysically, possible for an object to be both red all over and green all over. The only logical impossibilities are explicit logical contradictions. This is all pretty basic stuff. I don't think you understood what I meant. I'm not saying that, for example, a world with different physical laws is impossible, I'm saying that simply 'conceiving' of it is not a reflection of it's actual possibility (which is what you seemed to suggest in the post I originally replied to with "There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws)"). Maybe that wasn't the intended implication of what you originally said, but I thought it was worth saying either way since it's a line of reasoning I see a lot. By "actual possibility" do you mean it being true of the actual world? Because I thought I was pretty clear about not believing that libertarian free will exists in the actual world. The conceivability thing was meant to indicate that the concept was at least coherent, not that it was instantiated. No. I mean actual possibility in any way, the actual world or not. My point was that any coherence that a concept might have is related directly to the 'how' of that concept. Without giving some sort of 'how' it's impossible to assign any given concept a probability (which is exactly what saying 'it's possible' is doing). So my question to you would be how do you know that Free Will is possible at all, in any other way? Because if you don't know then it's a guess at best, and a guess which can be tagged onto any other concept you can name with just as much justification (hence why I called it fallacious). Like I said, I may have misinterpreted your original point, in which case I'm sorry for using you as an example. Either way, I've made the point I wanted to now (I think). I think that conceivability represents a defeasible method of attaining knowledge of what is metaphysically possible. It does sometimes lead one astray, but it's often the best that we have. If you can provide a compelling argument against a conceivable things possibility, then that's fine, but I think that its being conceivable at minimum puts the burden of proof on those who would claim it is impossible. Imagine church officials in Galileo's time telling him that the earth moving is not only false but impossible. Would it not be appropriate to appeal to the fact that it is conceivable to rebut that claim? That said, libertarian free will might be metaphysically impossible despite its conceivability, and I'm open to that. But that would still not be enough to establish that the very idea is incoherent. Lots of impossible things are at least coherently imaginable, though in this case I'll admit that we don't have anything close to a clear imagining. Like I said earlier, in my opinion truly conceiving of something includes having some understanding of how that thing might come to be. In short, the 'how'. So while you say you can conceive of libertarian free will being metaphysically possible, I say you can't until you provide a coherent explanation of how libertarian free will might exist. I really can't be bothered laboring the point. To me your definition of conceivability amounts to empty words if it doesn't include some explanation of mechanism. My earlier comparison was good I think: it's like filling in the conclusion without any of the reasoning required to get there. What's the point?
It's still pretty unclear whether this represents an attempt to defeat the concievability evidence in favor of the possibility of libertarian free will or an attempt to say that that's not evidence at all. It sounds like you're arguing for the latter, but for the sake of your argument I hope you are arguing the former. I take it to be obvious that the imagined Galilean rebuttal I alluded to earlier would be justified even if Galileo could not name the mechanism of earth's motion, which he could not.
This is why conceivability must be taken as at least defeasible evidence even in the absence of a known mechanism. It represents a helpful guide to what possibilities can be considered open for the purposes of constructing scientific theories. We obviously cannot already know what the mechanisms are before such a theory is arrived upon.
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thinking that you don't have a free will, is just a way to excuse your lack of responsibility.
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Proof free will exists:
Let's play a game. Here's the rules. You get to pick a number, 1 or 2. You then announce your number. I then get to choose my number. If I match your number, I win the game. Winning the game is good (because it gives me something I want).
You pick one. Do I not have free will to pick whatever number I want?
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On March 13 2012 16:22 BluePanther wrote:
Proof free will exists:
Let's play a game. Here's the rules. You get to pick a number, 1 or 2. You then announce your number. I then get to choose my number. If I match your number, I win the game. Winning the game is good (because it gives me something I want).
You pick one. Do I not have free will to pick whatever number I want? Well it's semantics to a degree but non of the current knowledge about the universe indicates that your pick would be anything other than the outcome of a chain of events, which is probably not how most people would define free will.
On March 13 2012 16:20 Zergmeister wrote:
thinking that you don't have a free will, is just a way to excuse your lack of responsibility. Dare I guess you think free will exists mostly because you want it to exist?
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On March 13 2012 17:07 Akta wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 16:22 BluePanther wrote:
Proof free will exists:
Let's play a game. Here's the rules. You get to pick a number, 1 or 2. You then announce your number. I then get to choose my number. If I match your number, I win the game. Winning the game is good (because it gives me something I want).
You pick one. Do I not have free will to pick whatever number I want? Well it's semantics to a degree but non of the current knowledge about the universe indicates that your pick would be anything other than the outcome of a chain of events, which is probably not how most people would define free will. Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 16:20 Zergmeister wrote:
thinking that you don't have a free will, is just a way to excuse your lack of responsibility. Dare I guess you think free will exists mostly because you want it to exist?
But it doesn't matter what the chain is, i'll always win. Why? Because I can pick whatever number I want. The only way I lose is if I want to lose.
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On March 13 2012 17:30 BluePanther wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 17:07 Akta wrote:On March 13 2012 16:22 BluePanther wrote:
Proof free will exists:
Let's play a game. Here's the rules. You get to pick a number, 1 or 2. You then announce your number. I then get to choose my number. If I match your number, I win the game. Winning the game is good (because it gives me something I want).
You pick one. Do I not have free will to pick whatever number I want? Well it's semantics to a degree but non of the current knowledge about the universe indicates that your pick would be anything other than the outcome of a chain of events, which is probably not how most people would define free will. On March 13 2012 16:20 Zergmeister wrote:
thinking that you don't have a free will, is just a way to excuse your lack of responsibility. Dare I guess you think free will exists mostly because you want it to exist? But it doesn't matter what the chain is, i'll always win. Why? Because I can pick whatever number I want. The only way I lose is if I want to lose. Looks correct but how is it related to free will?
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On March 13 2012 16:17 frogrubdown wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 16:07 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 15:47 frogrubdown wrote:On March 13 2012 15:36 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 14:55 frogrubdown wrote:On March 13 2012 13:18 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 08:20 frogrubdown wrote:On March 13 2012 07:42 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 00:34 frogrubdown wrote:This thread has predominantly featured three debates: does libertarian free will exist; does 'free will' express a libertarian or a compatibilist concept; does morality/moral responsibility require libertarian free will? I'll address each in turn. (1) Does Libertarian Free Will Exist?I won't define 'libertarian free will', but suffice it to say that it requires one's actions to be independent of the fundamental physical laws of the universe (I'm using it to speak of the highest grade variety discussed here). Some in this thread have accused this idea of being incoherent, but that's a confused outlook. It is physically impossible for this type of free will to exist, but that doesn't mean that it's impossible for it to exist. There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws). If libertarian free will exists, then it would simply turn out that physical possibility is a narrower type of possibility than was thought. This doesn't make sense. We've never seen anything which existed and was 'physically impossible' (or at least nothing which wasn't later discovered to be perfectly possible under physical laws, a la the bee and its 'impossible' flight). Our ability to conceive of something is not evidence that that thing can exist. In fact, our conception of a world with different physical laws is incomplete anyway. Surely in order to truly 'conceive' of something you must understand the necessary mechanisms which allow it to be. But just 'conceiving of something' is not evidence of anything. It's like writing the conclusion without all of the necessary reasoning to reach that conclusion. People have actually used this as an argument against me in different situations. It basically simplifies to this: 'I can imagine you being wrong (but not how you would be wrong), therefore I will disagree/withhold judgment'. As far as I know, that isn't a formal fallacy... But I certainly wouldn't hesitate to call it fallacious given the uselessness of an argument like that. A cursory study of modality will reveal that there is an absurdly wide array of types of possibility. Ignoring outliers such as deontic and epistemic possibility, we can construct an ordering based in part on which sciences supervene on which other sciences. Science possibilities are just metaphysical possibilities with the added restriction that the laws of the relevant science have to hold. There are biologically possible things that are not psychologically possible, chemically possible things that aren't biologically possible, and physically possible things that are not chemically possible. Moving further up, there are metaphysically possible things that are not physically possible. If you don't think a world in which a single particle accelerates away from another is possible in any sense (that is all there is in that world), then you likely do not possess the every day concept of possibility. Even higher up than that is logical possibility, which makes the fewest restrictions. It is logically, though not metaphysically, possible for an object to be both red all over and green all over. The only logical impossibilities are explicit logical contradictions. This is all pretty basic stuff. I don't think you understood what I meant. I'm not saying that, for example, a world with different physical laws is impossible, I'm saying that simply 'conceiving' of it is not a reflection of it's actual possibility (which is what you seemed to suggest in the post I originally replied to with "There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws)"). Maybe that wasn't the intended implication of what you originally said, but I thought it was worth saying either way since it's a line of reasoning I see a lot. By "actual possibility" do you mean it being true of the actual world? Because I thought I was pretty clear about not believing that libertarian free will exists in the actual world. The conceivability thing was meant to indicate that the concept was at least coherent, not that it was instantiated. No. I mean actual possibility in any way, the actual world or not. My point was that any coherence that a concept might have is related directly to the 'how' of that concept. Without giving some sort of 'how' it's impossible to assign any given concept a probability (which is exactly what saying 'it's possible' is doing). So my question to you would be how do you know that Free Will is possible at all, in any other way? Because if you don't know then it's a guess at best, and a guess which can be tagged onto any other concept you can name with just as much justification (hence why I called it fallacious). Like I said, I may have misinterpreted your original point, in which case I'm sorry for using you as an example. Either way, I've made the point I wanted to now (I think). I think that conceivability represents a defeasible method of attaining knowledge of what is metaphysically possible. It does sometimes lead one astray, but it's often the best that we have. If you can provide a compelling argument against a conceivable things possibility, then that's fine, but I think that its being conceivable at minimum puts the burden of proof on those who would claim it is impossible. Imagine church officials in Galileo's time telling him that the earth moving is not only false but impossible. Would it not be appropriate to appeal to the fact that it is conceivable to rebut that claim? That said, libertarian free will might be metaphysically impossible despite its conceivability, and I'm open to that. But that would still not be enough to establish that the very idea is incoherent. Lots of impossible things are at least coherently imaginable, though in this case I'll admit that we don't have anything close to a clear imagining. Like I said earlier, in my opinion truly conceiving of something includes having some understanding of how that thing might come to be. In short, the 'how'. So while you say you can conceive of libertarian free will being metaphysically possible, I say you can't until you provide a coherent explanation of how libertarian free will might exist. I really can't be bothered laboring the point. To me your definition of conceivability amounts to empty words if it doesn't include some explanation of mechanism. My earlier comparison was good I think: it's like filling in the conclusion without any of the reasoning required to get there. What's the point? It's still pretty unclear whether this represents an attempt to defeat the concievability evidence in favor of the possibility of libertarian free will or an attempt to say that that's not evidence at all. It sounds like you're arguing for the latter, but for the sake of your argument I hope you are arguing the former. I take it to be obvious that the imagined Galilean rebuttal I alluded to earlier would be justified even if Galileo could not name the mechanism of earth's motion, which he could not. This is why conceivability must be taken as at least defeasible evidence even in the absence of a known mechanism. It represents a helpful guide to what possibilities can be considered open for the purposes of constructing scientific theories. We obviously cannot already know what the mechanisms are before such a theory is arrived upon.
My argument is that conceivability is only evidence of possibility provided that mechanism is included in the definition of conceivability. Without mechanism included it is a useless measurement since in that case anything can be conceived of, including things which we already know to be incoherent/impossible.
I should clarify and say that knowing the exact mechanism is not necessary. It only has to be an idea which is consistent with current knowledge (excepting any knowledge it might be challenging) and makes no logical fallacies. A scientific hypothesis is a perfect example of this. Some are right and some are wrong, but they all make sense at first (all the good ones anyway), although later on hindsight will make the incorrect ones look silly.
To use your Galileo example: Galileo would be justified in thinking that the Earth was in motion provided that he had some evidence that this was the case. If his justification was as simple as 'I can imagine the Earth in motion' then his belief that the Earth is in motion would be irrational, regardless of the fact that he 'conceived' of it (by your definition of conceive.. or what I interpret it to be anyway) and regardless of its actual correctness. Likewise, a belief that libertarian free will is metaphysically possible is irrational unless you have good evidence to believe that to be the case.
I mean, you still haven't said how you think libertarian free will might be metaphysically possible. I doubt you can even imagine a world in which libertarian free will exists. Thus far, your 'conception' of libertarian free will being metaphysically possible has gone as far as saying that libertarian free will could be metaphysically possible. Don't you see how inane 'conceiving' of something becomes if that is all that is required?
I hope you get what I'm saying now, although I still think my original reply to you was my best explanation, it being the most within the context I intended.
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You pick one. Do I not have free will to pick whatever number I want?
No, not according to the arguments people have been pressing here, since your choise will in the end be either caused or arbitrary.
It even seems as if free will is theoretically impossible in the model people use here,
If you examine it closely, free will is nearly the same concept as god,
It comes from something not found in current physics (wich is either arbitrary or caused) while it does effect the current physical world.
Where it comes from is not described , though when you look at it closely then you will notice that the concept of free will almost implies the existance of a god or a higher power to be the source of this will, since nothing in the physical world as we know it today can be the source.
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On March 13 2012 17:48 Swede wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 16:17 frogrubdown wrote:On March 13 2012 16:07 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 15:47 frogrubdown wrote:On March 13 2012 15:36 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 14:55 frogrubdown wrote:On March 13 2012 13:18 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 08:20 frogrubdown wrote:On March 13 2012 07:42 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 00:34 frogrubdown wrote:This thread has predominantly featured three debates: does libertarian free will exist; does 'free will' express a libertarian or a compatibilist concept; does morality/moral responsibility require libertarian free will? I'll address each in turn. (1) Does Libertarian Free Will Exist?I won't define 'libertarian free will', but suffice it to say that it requires one's actions to be independent of the fundamental physical laws of the universe (I'm using it to speak of the highest grade variety discussed here). Some in this thread have accused this idea of being incoherent, but that's a confused outlook. It is physically impossible for this type of free will to exist, but that doesn't mean that it's impossible for it to exist. There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws). If libertarian free will exists, then it would simply turn out that physical possibility is a narrower type of possibility than was thought. This doesn't make sense. We've never seen anything which existed and was 'physically impossible' (or at least nothing which wasn't later discovered to be perfectly possible under physical laws, a la the bee and its 'impossible' flight). Our ability to conceive of something is not evidence that that thing can exist. In fact, our conception of a world with different physical laws is incomplete anyway. Surely in order to truly 'conceive' of something you must understand the necessary mechanisms which allow it to be. But just 'conceiving of something' is not evidence of anything. It's like writing the conclusion without all of the necessary reasoning to reach that conclusion. People have actually used this as an argument against me in different situations. It basically simplifies to this: 'I can imagine you being wrong (but not how you would be wrong), therefore I will disagree/withhold judgment'. As far as I know, that isn't a formal fallacy... But I certainly wouldn't hesitate to call it fallacious given the uselessness of an argument like that. A cursory study of modality will reveal that there is an absurdly wide array of types of possibility. Ignoring outliers such as deontic and epistemic possibility, we can construct an ordering based in part on which sciences supervene on which other sciences. Science possibilities are just metaphysical possibilities with the added restriction that the laws of the relevant science have to hold. There are biologically possible things that are not psychologically possible, chemically possible things that aren't biologically possible, and physically possible things that are not chemically possible. Moving further up, there are metaphysically possible things that are not physically possible. If you don't think a world in which a single particle accelerates away from another is possible in any sense (that is all there is in that world), then you likely do not possess the every day concept of possibility. Even higher up than that is logical possibility, which makes the fewest restrictions. It is logically, though not metaphysically, possible for an object to be both red all over and green all over. The only logical impossibilities are explicit logical contradictions. This is all pretty basic stuff. I don't think you understood what I meant. I'm not saying that, for example, a world with different physical laws is impossible, I'm saying that simply 'conceiving' of it is not a reflection of it's actual possibility (which is what you seemed to suggest in the post I originally replied to with "There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws)"). Maybe that wasn't the intended implication of what you originally said, but I thought it was worth saying either way since it's a line of reasoning I see a lot. By "actual possibility" do you mean it being true of the actual world? Because I thought I was pretty clear about not believing that libertarian free will exists in the actual world. The conceivability thing was meant to indicate that the concept was at least coherent, not that it was instantiated. No. I mean actual possibility in any way, the actual world or not. My point was that any coherence that a concept might have is related directly to the 'how' of that concept. Without giving some sort of 'how' it's impossible to assign any given concept a probability (which is exactly what saying 'it's possible' is doing). So my question to you would be how do you know that Free Will is possible at all, in any other way? Because if you don't know then it's a guess at best, and a guess which can be tagged onto any other concept you can name with just as much justification (hence why I called it fallacious). Like I said, I may have misinterpreted your original point, in which case I'm sorry for using you as an example. Either way, I've made the point I wanted to now (I think). I think that conceivability represents a defeasible method of attaining knowledge of what is metaphysically possible. It does sometimes lead one astray, but it's often the best that we have. If you can provide a compelling argument against a conceivable things possibility, then that's fine, but I think that its being conceivable at minimum puts the burden of proof on those who would claim it is impossible. Imagine church officials in Galileo's time telling him that the earth moving is not only false but impossible. Would it not be appropriate to appeal to the fact that it is conceivable to rebut that claim? That said, libertarian free will might be metaphysically impossible despite its conceivability, and I'm open to that. But that would still not be enough to establish that the very idea is incoherent. Lots of impossible things are at least coherently imaginable, though in this case I'll admit that we don't have anything close to a clear imagining. Like I said earlier, in my opinion truly conceiving of something includes having some understanding of how that thing might come to be. In short, the 'how'. So while you say you can conceive of libertarian free will being metaphysically possible, I say you can't until you provide a coherent explanation of how libertarian free will might exist. I really can't be bothered laboring the point. To me your definition of conceivability amounts to empty words if it doesn't include some explanation of mechanism. My earlier comparison was good I think: it's like filling in the conclusion without any of the reasoning required to get there. What's the point? It's still pretty unclear whether this represents an attempt to defeat the concievability evidence in favor of the possibility of libertarian free will or an attempt to say that that's not evidence at all. It sounds like you're arguing for the latter, but for the sake of your argument I hope you are arguing the former. I take it to be obvious that the imagined Galilean rebuttal I alluded to earlier would be justified even if Galileo could not name the mechanism of earth's motion, which he could not. This is why conceivability must be taken as at least defeasible evidence even in the absence of a known mechanism. It represents a helpful guide to what possibilities can be considered open for the purposes of constructing scientific theories. We obviously cannot already know what the mechanisms are before such a theory is arrived upon. My argument is that conceivability is only evidence of possibility provided that mechanism is included in the definition of conceivability. Without mechanism included it is a useless measurement since in that case anything can be conceived of, including things which we already know to be incoherent/impossible. I should clarify and say that knowing the exact mechanism is not necessary. It only has to be an idea which is consistent with current knowledge (excepting any knowledge it might be challenging) and makes no logical fallacies. A scientific hypothesis is a perfect example of this. Some are right and some are wrong, but they all make sense at first (all the good ones anyway), although later on hindsight will make the incorrect ones look silly. To use your Galileo example: Galileo would be justified in thinking that the Earth was in motion provided that he had some evidence that this was the case. If his justification was as simple as 'I can imagine the Earth in motion' then his belief that the Earth is in motion would be irrational, regardless of the fact that he 'conceived' of it (by your definition of conceive.. or what I interpret it to be anyway) and regardless of its actual correctness. Likewise, a belief that libertarian free will is metaphysically possible is irrational unless you have good evidence to believe that to be the case. I mean, you still haven't said how you think libertarian free will might be metaphysically possible. I doubt you can even imagine a world in which libertarian free will exists. Thus far, your 'conception' of libertarian free will being metaphysically possible has gone as far as saying that libertarian free will could be metaphysically possible. Don't you see how inane 'conceiving' of something becomes if that is all that is required? I hope you get what I'm saying now, although I still think my original reply to you was my best explanation, it being the most within the context I intended.
To be clear, I think that Galileo conceiving that is evidence for its possibility, not evidence for it being the case. There were those in his time who thought not only that it was false but that it was impossible.
I think that our disagreement concerning the importance of mechanism might boil down to a far more fundamental disagreement between us. Metaphysically, I lean towards the view that there are no mechanisms at the fundamental level. That is, I think that all modal notions are ultimately grounded in non-modal features of reality. Here's the flavor of this view.
(A) A World without Hooks (No Primitive Mechanisms)
I do not think that laws of nature are anything over and above the history of the universe, where the latter records the positions and intrinsic qualitative properties of every object in the universe over its entire existence. Rather, I hold a best systems account according to which the laws of nature are those true generalizations about the history of the universe that have the best combination of simplicity and strength.
Simplicity can be taken intuitively; strength is a measure of the information that can be derived by a given set of true generalizations (we're treating them sort of like axioms). Adding in the proposition that for all x, if x is Barrack Obama at noon on April 1st 2012 then x is eating a ham sandwich (supposing this statement true) would add only a tiny bit of strength while detracting greatly from simplicity. It would not be included in the laws.
Using the laws of nature derived here, one can account for many other modal notions such as those involving causation and counterfactuals. There is probably some left over modality, involving for instance metaphysically but not physically possible worlds, and I'd have to deal with this separately. I'm less settled on what to do here, but lean towards something roughly in accord with what Ted Sider does in his latest book (it's sort of like a rigidified conventionalism if you're familiar with this kind of thing).
(B) Why I Think That and Why it Matters to Our Debate
Why is any of this relevant? Because I don't think very much of the notion of a mechanism, and I am at least as unable to understand physical mechanisms as you are unable to understand the mechanisms of libertarian free will. I look at the world and see a sequence events. I do not see any causal hooks between those events and over and above those events. This isn't to say that I don't see causes, just that I reduce them to non-causal things.
This presumably all sounds very Humean, and in a sense it is. But my reasons for holding it are very different from Hume's. Hume was motivated by his empiricism and his copy principle according to which every idea is composed out of copies of previous sensory impressions. Since he could not locate causal hooks in any of those impressions, he was a skeptic about those hooks existing and about our being able to have any well-formed understanding of what robust causality (as opposed to mere constant conjunction) would be like.
I am not an empiricist. My reason for avoiding primitive modality is essentially the same as my reason for being an atheist. Theories according to which, say, laws are something over and above the history of the universe are proposed to explain why certain generalities are true, but all they end up doing is pushing the demand for explanation one step back. They are an unexplained explainer that leave one with no greater understanding of the phenomenon than one had before. It's similar to my rejection of the cosmological argument for God. If God does not require a cause, then neither does the universe, so positing God has not added any new understanding. I thus reject both God and primitive modality for simplicity or Ockham's razor type concerns.
But I cannot reject as incoherent the idea that the world has fundamental modality that I cannot understand any more than I can reject the idea that one of those fundamental mechanisms is a libertarian free will mechanism. There are reasons for doubting both, and I do doubt both, but the theories are at least coherent.
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@eatthepath
I don't think I can add very much to my first response concerning the main body of your post. I lean towards physicalism and did not quite understand your argument for monism. Of course, physcalism is a type of monism, but I gathered that you were talking about something more along the lines of what's called "Russellian Monism."
As for why people believe in a robust version of free will, I definitely agree that epistemic openness is a large part of it. I would add that the Libet findings indicate another reason for belief in free will. That is, our consciousness seems more relevant to the production of our actions than it actually is because we become aware of how we are about to act slightly before we perceive ourselves acting that way. They've actually done studies in which they've abused this mechanism to trick people into thinking they exercised their will in cases in which they clearly did not.
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Ok, this is something I've spent a lot of time thinking about. So I'll drop my two cents in here.
Does free will exist? No. We make millions thousands of choices every day, but these choices are already pre-determined. We make decisions based on two things, genetics and past experiences. You can not control your genetics and you can not control you past decisions, therefore you can not control your decisions. When you make a choice your brain is recounting experiences that have happened in the past that relate to your current decision. Using the outcomes you've experienced in the past, and your general feeling towards each choice (again determined by outcomes and results from the past) you "make" your decision. You are not out of the blue making some kind of "arbitrary choice", the choice has already been made based on million and millions of stimuli you've experienced before that point. And each of those stimuli was predetermined as well, because if you trace it back the people in those positions before you, like your parents, would have encountered the same "choice" evaluations as you have before, which in turn were affected by previous stimuli beforehand.
In my mind a choice comes down to this:
Presented with option ----> remember similiar/applicable situations from the past ----> determine if they benefit you or not
------> choose most beneficial, or least harmful option
Everything you do comes down to selfish desire.
Some might try and argue, "well what about a mother who sacrifices herself for her child, how is that selfish?"
A) Because the mother doesn't want to endure in the pain, regret, and agony of having lost her child.
B) Motherly instinct, it is how our species has survived.
So if everything comes down to making the choices that are best for ourselves, it simply becomes a matter of deciding which option is best for ourselves after evaluating past experiences. There is no choice. One option i simply better than the other.
What about situations where there is no clear benefit? ie choose a number, 1 or 2?
Your brain then picks one based on seemingly random or meaningless experience from the past.
-Maybe the last number you saw was 2 so you choose that
-Maybe your favorite number is 2 so you pick it
-Maybe your favorite number is 2 but you have recently been unhappy with yourself, so you choose 1
-Maybe you are disinterested in the question and pick 1 because it was the first number you read
-Maybe you pick 2 because it was the last number you read
There is a reason for every choice, and those reasons are what take away those choice and free-will altogether. Since the reasons already exist behind each choice, we are making no choices on our own.
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On March 10 2012 11:24 Hypertension wrote:
The problem with quantum fluctuation = free will is the random nature of it.
If quantum fluctuations are where free will lives, this means we should be able to impact quantum fluctuations somehow with our willpower. This makes them predictable,and no longer random.
If they are truly random, then we can't put our will upon them. In that case free will dissapears and we are again slave to random quantum fluctuations in comibination with the endless march of cause and effect.
I don't think religion has to impact on this argument. An omnipotent, omniscient god poses many more problems for free will than a purely physical universe ever could.
I always check these types of threads to have a laugh with arguments like this. This type of high rethoric really reminds me of defenders of communism/creationism, they think they are right only because their words are so complex that only they understand. You are not a unique snowflake.
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United States7483 Posts
What is a decision? With regards to physics, it's nothing more than some form of physical or chemical reaction taking place among the particles that compose your brain. So, why does this matter?
Well, the heisenberg uncertainty principle would suggest that the way those reactions occur means that we do indeed have at least some degree of free will, because the way these reactions occur are not predetermined.
Regardless, there's no evidence that we don't have free will, and there's tons of evidence that we do have free will, so any sort of argument that our supposed free will decisions are forced by some kind of outside force is baseless and arguing from a position on the same level as arguing for the existence of Santa Clause, the Easter Bunny, and the Flying Spaghetti Monster.
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On March 23 2012 12:24 Nevermind86 wrote:Show nested quote +On March 10 2012 11:24 Hypertension wrote:
The problem with quantum fluctuation = free will is the random nature of it.
If quantum fluctuations are where free will lives, this means we should be able to impact quantum fluctuations somehow with our willpower. This makes them predictable,and no longer random.
If they are truly random, then we can't put our will upon them. In that case free will dissapears and we are again slave to random quantum fluctuations in comibination with the endless march of cause and effect.
I don't think religion has to impact on this argument. An omnipotent, omniscient god poses many more problems for free will than a purely physical universe ever could. I always check these types of threads to have a laugh with arguments like this. This type of high rethoric really reminds me of defenders of communism/creationism, they think they are right only because their words are so complex that only they understand. You are not a unique snowflake.
dude you need to chill. it was just yesterday that you posted the same type of nonsense in the "freewill and modern science" thread where you ridiculed my post and tried to make me look like an idiot without actually addressing anything related to the topic. i thought his post was perfectly clear and understandable...
i assume he's talking about the argument that the possibility of random events in the quantum world means that not everything is predetermined, and if nothing is predetermined then that might leave room for freewill to exist. however, as he pointed out, if something is random then by definition we dont have any control over it otherwise it wouldnt be random.
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So to those that are better versed in these concepts than myself what explains things like behavioral patterns or hobbies. For instance why do I "choose", or perhaps better phrased as "end-up" running twice a day every day at consistent times, deciding to do different workouts based on a training plan I have built for myself based on knowledge I have acquired? This certainly doesn't sound like it squares with a random process and if it isn't random what would be the mechanism for behavioral patterns?
Also, what would explain why if you gave people a gun and told them to shoot themselves they would consistently and almost universally fail to do so, but if you offered the,1 billion no strings attached they would universally accept it. If it's not come level of conscious choice or will, what then accounts for these consistent choices?
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I study a new field of space-time geometry that describes the universe in 3 dimensions of spatial dilation. (THERE WILL NOT BE A TEST!)
However in order to define those perceptions you need to define an observer Tau(0) which is effectively the one and only YOU. The fact that intrinsically I can predict anything is shadowed by the fact that there is one unique variable that defines the laws of physics. I always thought philosophically that my ignorance is the definition of free will and my knowledge is physics.
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This certainly doesn't sound like it squares with a random process and if it isn't random what would be the mechanism for behavioral patterns?
It could at start still be random, and after that some mechanism emphasises repetition to a certain degree of your decission if you are satisfied with the results of your random decission.
Survival of the fittest combined with learning from our ancestors (repetition) could weed out "bad" behavioural paterns.
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On March 23 2012 12:29 Whitewing wrote:
What is a decision? With regards to physics, it's nothing more than some form of physical or chemical reaction taking place among the particles that compose your brain. So, why does this matter?
Well, the heisenberg uncertainty principle would suggest that the way those reactions occur means that we do indeed have at least some degree of free will, because the way these reactions occur are not predetermined.
Regardless, there's no evidence that we don't have free will, and there's tons of evidence that we do have free will, so any sort of argument that our supposed free will decisions are forced by some kind of outside force is baseless and arguing from a position on the same level as arguing for the existence of Santa Clause, the Easter Bunny, and the Flying Spaghetti Monster.
It seems you have it the wrong way around: arguing that we have "free will" is to argue that physics is "forced by some kind of outside force".
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Actually I'm rather confused about the way consciousness works. Let's say you are going to meet me at 5:00 under the old oak tree. Now there must be some physical and chemical things going on in my brain that not only understands that information, but stores it so that at 445 I can run out the door. It must be distinctly different physical thing from, say, meeting you at 4:30.
But the shear space of information is enormous. If I imagine a cat, it's different than a dog. The space of information, including abstract ideas is even larger than the trillions of combinations of reactions that must occur in the brain. It's mind boggling, which I suppose is ironic. I don't understand how that's supposed to work out.
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EPT
